The Axiom 2 by Abingdon Publications

FEATURE ARTICLE

THE

AXIOM ABINGDON SCHOOL'S PHILOSOPHY MAGAZINE

WINTER

ISSUE 2

• ENDLESSNESS • JTB AND ITS PROBLEMS • FLYING THE FLAG • THE NONISSUE OF MORAL TESTIMONY • IS THIS STICK STRAIGHT? • PHILOSOPHICAL ALIGNMENT CHART • THOMAS REID SO FANCY • PHILOSOPHERS ON POLITICS • EXISTENTIAL COMICS

Understanding Infinity

What are the challenges surrounding 'Justified True Belief'?

Understanding nationalism and patriotism

Is moral testimony defendable?

Who is too much of an 'empire-icist'?

Letter From the Editor

New Year doesn’t seem the time to be for deep contemplation. Not, at least, for any kind of analytic philosophy; people seem to get rather put off if you try talking about how definite descriptions obtain while tucking into champagne and a cheese board. This issue, therefore, stretching from infinity to very short sticks, from politics to metaphysics, should give those who find it hard to keep themselves from talking about that nerdy sort of thing in civilised conversation an opportunity to let loose without bothering anyone else. That isn’t to say that a New Year doesn’t lend itself to philosophy at all - to me it’s always seemed quite an existential affair - it tends to get us thinking about things a bit more human, like ‘why do I have to keep this damn resolution’ and ‘at what do mondays feel normal again?’ or ‘why can’t I exercise my radical free will and avoid putting on all this weight after Christmas?’. Camu or Sartre might have loved it merely as an opportunity to be stoic about it all. Whatever the time of year however, we should be sure never to put away contemplation. Although it might not seem it, with the damp walks to school on a monday morning, and a feeling of impending mock based doom, the new term is just that; a time to experience the geography prep or the graphing calculator afresh from last year, and get down and do some proper work and some proper, clear thinking. A new term comes after a long rest, and there is no better time for philosophy than when you have been resting. So take a rest at some point, pick up a battered copy of ‘Language Truth and Logic’ or ‘The Stranger’, depending on your philosophical taste, and take a claritive pause. Perhaps, even, some of you might find something in this issue to settle down by the fire on a cold day with. Resoundingly however, from everyone here at The Axiom, we wish you all the best for this New Year of school! Tomas Brown

Contents

ENDLESSNESS 5 JTB AND IT'S PROBLEMS

FLYING THE FLAG

THE NONISSUE OF MORAL TESTIMONY

IS THIS STICK STRAIGHT?

PHILOSOPHICAL ALIGNMENT CHART

THOMAS REID SO FANCY

PHILOSOPHERS ON POLITICS

EXISTENTIAL COMICS

CONTRIBUTORS 38

The Axiom

ENDLESSNESS Words by James Beazley

Endlessness

Inﬁnity. It’s an idea that’s been with us forever. Ever since we started counting, we’ve grown a custom to the fact that some things just don’t end: most notably, π. π is an infinite, non-repeating decimal. This means that within π lies every number that exists. If you were to convert those numbers into letters, within π lies every word ever created. The words of Shelley, Byron, and Keats are included; the names of everyone you’ve ever, or will ever, love are included; every thought you’ve ever had is included. In fact all information exists within π. Everything that has ever been, is, and ever will be, is included in the simple ratio of a circumference to a diameter. But does this phenomenon we call infinity exist only within mathematics, or does it exist in reality as well?

Endlessness

ne viewpoint which would answer this question with ease is Platonic realism. This view accepts the independent status of mathematical entities in the real world. This perspective sees maths as existing independently of the activity of the human mind: i.e. maths is a science of discovery not creation. The conclusion therefore being that because infinity exists within mathematics, it exists within reality as well. Infinity is merely something to be discovered. However, the nominalists, conceptualists and formalists among you will disagree. Nominalism believes that abstract entities, such as numbers or sets, do not really exist. They believe only individuals exist. Conceptualists see the language of mathematics much like any other: they believe it is devised by the human mind and has no independent status in the real world. In the same way the word ‘newspaper’ is not really a newspaper (merely a word describing it), maths is not real but merely a way we can communicate what we experience. Formalists see maths as ‘symbols without content’. Maths may have a consistency; it may be free from contradiction and holds considerable utility in the real world; but, this system that man has formulated has no real significance. Hence, it’s fair to say that we can’t take Plato as the only option and we must investigate further. If we try and apply infinity to the real world, we come across certain paradoxes and absurdities. To demonstrate this, let’s take the most famous thought experiment concerning infinity: the Hilbert Hotel. David Hilbert, in the late 19th century, considered a hotel with an infinite number of rooms and an infinite number of guests. So let’s say Crescent House has an infinite number of rooms with an infinite number of borders therein. Hilbert asked what would happen if a new border comes along? One answer to this is that Mr. Kendry makes each boy move along one room - where boy A in Room 1 would go to Room 2, boy B in Room 2 would go to Room 3, boy n in room N would go to Room N+1 etc. This would hence leave Room 1 free for the new border. This seems like a reasonable solution but what then would happen if a bus filled with an infinite number of new borders turned up? The answer Hilbert gave was that Mr. Kendry makes each boy move to the room number double their current one. Where boy A in Room 1 moves to Room 2, boy B in Room 2 moves to Room 4, boy n in Room N goes to Room 2N etc. This leaves all the odd numbered rooms, an infinite number of rooms, free for the bus load of new borders. This paradox has fascinated mathematicians, physicists, philosophers and even theologians. The flaw in trying to work out this paradox with maths is that one can not use infinity, ∞, in mathematically equations as one can use numbers. To say ∞+1=∞, or 2∞=∞ has no meaning at all and hence is not a solution to this problem. The next paradox we’re going to look at involves an infinite number of divisions. It is known as Zeno’s paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise. However, there is a simpler way of describing this problem without the need for Greek heroes or herbivorous land reptiles. Say you’re high-fiving someone; let’s say they keep their hand still while you move yours to theirs and that you’re 2 metres away. By moving your hand towards theirs, what you’re doing is perpetually halving the distance between the hands. From 2 metres, the distance halves to 1 metre; from 1 metre it halves to 0.5m; and from 0.5m it halves to 0.25m etc. Now, the keen eyed among you may see where this is going. For your hand to have covered 2m it must be at the end 2m-2m away from your mate’s hand. As 2- 2=0, your hand must be 0m away by the end. However as 0x2=0, nothing can be halved to equal 0. Surely then this process is infinite, goes on forever, and you’ll never high five? The action of the high five is an addition: 2 + 1 + 1/2 +

Endlessness

1/4 + 1/8 + .... The sum of the series tends to 2 as the amount of elements tends to infinity. The conclusion therefore is that to high-five, to move 2 metres, your hand is performing an infinite process. But an infinite process can’t have a final step and yet you know for a fact you can, and have, completed this final step i.e. the high five. So this is the paradox. One solution to this paradox can found using quantum physics. In mathematics you can, theoretically, keep dividing forever. However, in the real world, you can’t. Once you divided 2 metres enough you’ll eventually get down to 10-35m - this distance is known as Planck length. This is where you’d start having problems, and these problems arise from the uncertainty principle. Heisenberg's principle states that is impossible to know where something is within 10-35m. Therefore, if something is 10-35m from X it is, to all intents and purposes, at X. So, one does not need to keep dividing from 2 to 0, but rather from 2 to 10-35. The latter is not an infinite system and hence, can be completed. This mention of Planck length brings me onto an altogether larger concept of infinity: the Universe as a whole. We’ve seen that when we try and apply infinity to Crescent House or high-fives we arrive at paradoxes or distinctions between maths and reality. But what when we consider all of space? Firstly, let’s prove that the Universe can’t have an edge. This is due to the following logic:

If it exists, it must exist within the Universe. • Therefore, there can be nothing existing outside of the Universe. • Therefore, there can not be an outside to the Universe. • Therefore, there is no edge separating the Universe from ‘outside the Universe’ as the latter does not. This leaves us with two options. The first is that the Universe continues forever. The second is that the Universe comes back on itself so that there are no edges: In the same way the spherical Earth has no edges, the Universe could too be edgeless. However, only one of these options concludes in an infinite Universe - the former. The latter can not be considered an infinite Universe as it repeats itself. We will never know which of the options is true, however: we will never know if the Universe continues forever because we can’t see further than 13.8 billion light years away (due to the CMBR wall of quark-gluon plasma). We will never know if the Universe repeats itself forever as we can’t travel faster than the rate the Universe is expanding. So this is where I leave you. There are currently no verifiable situations in reality where infinity is displayed. However, this does not mean infinity doesn’t exist within reality - after all, science is an art of falsification, not verification: the Universe may indeed go on forever. Which would mean not only would the words of Shelley, Byron, and Keats be included: not only the names of everyone you’ve ever, or will ever love, be included: not only every thought you’ve ever had be included, but everything that could possibly exist does so, and does now. Maybe everything that has ever been, is, and ever will be exists somewhere - we just need to discover it.

The Axiom

JTB AND ITS PROBLEMS Words by Tom Davy

JTB and its Problems

he pursuit of creating a definite and infallible set of criterion for attaining knowledge has become a long-term goal in epistemic fields. In the course of this article I wish not to address the broader context of these theories, but to target in particular the contention between Plato’s concept of “justified true beliefs” and Edmund Gettier’s retort within his “Gettier cases”, which are presented in his paper Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Plato and Socrates present knowledge in the traditional ‘tripartite’ analysis:

S knows that P iff i) P is true; ii) S believes that P; iii) S is justified in b elieving that P. This analysis of knowledge is known as the JTB theory and is developed within Plato’s Theaetetus. Critical to this theory is the use of three defined criterion: the criterion of ‘justified’, of ‘true’, and of ‘belief’. Although the ‘truth’ criterion remains relatively uncontroversial (with the exception of Hazlett’s heavily debunked theory of non-factive knowledge) the remaining criterion of ‘belief’ and ‘justified’ have met a great deal of philosophical contention, which will be briefly outlined. On the former, the necessity of belief in

Truth

Knowledge

Belief

JTB and its Problems

attaining knowledge may be rejected through linguistic avenues. For instance, the common phrase “I don’t believe it!” upon observing unusual phenomenon may result in both a state of knowing and a state of disbelief, thus denying the prerequisite of all three criterion as is suggested in the JTB analysis. An example of this is a subject, Q, witnessing a calamity (such as their car being stolen) and expressing a state of disbelief in spite of truly knowing that their car has been stolen – this state of knowledge may be justified by Q’s immediate response, which would not have been stimulated in the absence of knowledge. This is typically rejected, however, as it raises two issues. Initially, one may intuitively identify the response of “I don’t believe it!” as a form of sarcasm or as an expression of discontent – secondly, if this viewpoint is rejected then the subject, Q, must actually be in denial. If Q is truly in denial, then he does not ‘know’ as an individual that his car has been stolen, and the consequent of ‘knowledge’ never truly arises in the first place. The latter condition of ‘justification’ that meets similar controversy will be addressed in our investigation of the Gettier cases. The primary concept behind Edmund Gettier’s paper is the deconstruction of ‘justification’ as a genuine or adequate condition for attaining knowledge. He claims that, as per the traditional JTB analysis, “it is possible for a person to be justified in believing a proposition that is in fact false”. This conclusion is arrived at largely through his famous ‘first case’ involving two characters, Smith and Jones. Suppose that two men apply for a job, and that these two men are 1: Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. called Smith and Jones. Smith wields strong evidence for the conjunctive proposition: 2: The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. It may thus be entailed from ‘1’ that: Assuming that Smith observes the entailment from 1 to 2 and accepts 2 as ‘knowledge’ given that 1 is true, then Smith is justified in believing that 2 is true. Yet, in spite of a fulfilment of all of the criterion within Plato’s tripartite analysis, the following may occur:

i) ii) iii) iv)

P is true; S believes that P; If it were the case that (not-P), S would not believe that P; If it were the case that P, S would believe that P. Beyond Smith’s knowledge, he, instead of Jones, will get the job. Further that Smith also – by sheer coincidence - has ten coins in his pocket. Bizarrely, proposition 2 remains true in spite of its entailment from proposition 1, which we have now ascertained is false. 2 is true, Smith believes that 2 is true, and Smith is justified in believing that 2 is true – yet, Smith fails to know 2. Consequently, it is evident that the three simple conditions presented in Plato’s tripartite are not adequate for attaining ‘knowledge’ and have the potential to mislead. Regrettably, Gettier leaves no solution to follow his paper – the issue of JTB’s insufficiency is left to other epistemologists. Before we attempt to

JTB and its Problems

resolve Gettier’s problem in a satisfactory way, it is worth briefly outlining the cases general structure that is applicable to all of his later cases. The cases contain two vital features, the first being coincidence, and the second being fallibility. In Gettier case 1 these two features are expressed in Smith’s possession of ten coins and his fallible justification, respectively. In spite of Gettier’s criticism not being wholly applicable to every epistemic situation, its selective failing in any context demonstrates that the JTB analysis is incomplete. We must arrive at a Gettier-proof set of criterion for knowledge, and to do so I consider a breakdown of ‘justification’ necessary. When observing the two features of a Gettier case – coincidence and fallibility – it becomes clear that the former is more an expression of context with the latter acting as an outlier of fault. In case 1, Smith’s justification for his belief is fallible. He wields “strong evidence” to suggests that Jones is the man who will be hired, and a subsequent coincidence on the entailment leads to his eventual failure of knowledge. Following, even in situations of convincing justification – here, evidence, it can never fully realize the totality required to eliminate fallibility. Strong evidence is not necessarily true, such a level of certainty seems prerequisite to actual justification. Nozick (1981) attempts to close the issue here by integrating a fourth condition. This approach is often abbreviated to the JTB+G solution in its addition of a ‘Gettier’ criterion: This is otherwise known as the “truth-tracking theory” which was co-developed with Fred Dretske (1971). Simplistically, the solution removes the chance for Smith to be mistaken in his original judgement (and thus, justification) and limits him exclusively to believe P in the event that P is true. This fundamentally differs in the original structure, which aligns factual truth with an entailing belief. Perhaps the greatest issue here, and an issue that is commonly held in JTB + G theories, is that the problem isn’t pragmatically solved. By forcing Smith to believe only ‘P’ and not ‘¬P’ he must be infallibly aware of when ¬P arises. Rather than solving the issue, Dretske and Nozick seem to conceal it within an unexplained ability to ‘track’ the truth, which may only exist in hypothetical contexts. Thus we are presented with a consistent issue across any JTB-based theory, or any set of criterion that attempts to capture knowledge in a logical manner. Shifts between hypothetical structures and the empirical contexts from which ‘knowledge’ is typically acquired fall short. Just as Dretske’s solution is victim to transitive failures in sense datum (from a lacking capacity to immediately verify), any formulation of ‘JTB’ seems to conflate the empirical status of ‘belief’ from ‘truth’, and precisely how ‘truth’ interacts with a conception of knowledge – this very misconstruction is what allows Gettier to raise his original counter-arguments in the first place. In order to categorize guidelines for seeking knowledge it appears that we must fully enter the plane of reason to which Kant aspires, otherwise we may only make inferences as to its precise nature.

The Axiom

FLYING THE FLAG Words by Giannis Giortzis

Flying the Flag

As we move towards the end of the fifth fiscal year since the start of the global economic crisis, we see that the issue of nationalism and patriotism has been repeatedly brought to the headlines, with sensationalised events and views being constantly blown out of proportion to distort reality and serve personal interests. But, behind the rhetoric, is there a difference between nationalism and patriotism, and to what extent can either (or both) be morally justified?

Flying the Flag

n the one hand, many in the past have attempted to highlight the differences between the two, albeit with conflicting results. Lord Acton, in the 19th century, claimed that Nationality is a “connection with [one’s] race which is merely natural or physical”, while patriotism is “the awareness of the moral or political responsibility towards a community”. Writing almost a century later, Elie Kedurie defined Nationalism as being a philosophical and political doctrine about nations being “the basic units of humanity”, while patriotism was the simple expression of sentiment or devotion towards that unit. Meanwhile, George Orwell added that, while Nationalism was aggressive in nature, the adherent wanting to gain as much power and glory for his country as possible, patriotism was a more reactionary concept based on defence against foreign elements, but with no wish to actually impose one’s own identity or beliefs on others. On the other hand, should we distinguish between country (increasingly defined as territory split on political or sociocultural boundaries) and nation (a set of peoples united by common descent, history, culture or language), we could simply render the previous arguments irrelevant, and argue that the difference between Nationalism and Patriotism is only the subject of such pride and affection or care, rather than trying to evaluate the precise characteristics of each. In any case, since Nationalism is often defined as an extreme form of patriotism, or as a set of patriotic principles and efforts, and the two terms are used interchangeably by most authors, we could say that focusing on the difference is beside the point in this debate: an interesting moral (or even etymological) question perhaps, but with little effect on reality. So, viewing Nationalism or Patriotism through a philosophical prism, how justified are they as concepts? It is reasonable to say that both have been becoming increasingly irrelevant since the 19th and early 20th centuries, with only recent events restoring them as an object of scrutiny. One of Patriotism’s greatest opponents is Russian novelist and thinker Leo Tolstoy, who not only highlighted the obvious flaw that, even if we somehow did manage to objectively compare all nations, only one nation in this world would be the superior one, but also reminded us of the question of morality of the act of treating other humans, possibly of a similar origin to us, as somehow inferior or less important, something which we could expand upon by touching upon the concept of a meritocracy theoretically present in modern society. George Kaleb, the American political theorist, raised further issues with patriotism specifically, by referring to the nature of the entities one is fighting to protect. According to his theories, a country, per se, is an artificial human construct, which is built from a set of complex, almost intangible links with one’s history and fellow citizens. “It is constructed”, he argues, “out of transmitted memories true and false; a history usually mostly falsely sanitized or falsely heroised; a sense of kinship of a largely invented purity”. Therefore, one is defending (and possibly sacrificing their bodily integrity or life for) what is in essence an abstraction, a mere “figment of the imagination”. Quite simply, events, origins and ties are distorted in order to just glorify that one nation is superior to all the rest—after all, if patriots judged their special affection for a country solely based on objective criteria, they would change their loyalty once they found a nation with a worthier history than theirs. Simon Keller, on the contrary, supports that this is not necessarily the case, as the loyalty is the patriot’s “in the first instance”—the patriot is prepared to support that her nation is virtuous than any other regardless of reality, simply because it is his country or culture he is admiring. Even more importantly, she reminds us that one cannot remain a patriot in this sense if he/she admits

Flying the Flag

this bias, and is usually in denial about the real reason behind his/her beliefs, meaning that this process of thinking is bad faith, and is therefore unjustified. However, some of these concepts are refutable. The preconception that one’s country is superior to all the others is not necessarily a prerequisite of a “fully-fledged” patriotic belief, especially when nationalists, in particular, recognise other nations as their allies and refer to historical ties based on co-operation and mutual ties rather than just common origin. Recognising one’s merits does not automatically bring with it a disregard for others’ virtues, and, as such, believing that all nationalists act in this manner is a sweeping generalisation, to say the least. Additionally, as Benedict Anderson, accredited with the coinage of the term “imaginary community”, notes, any community larger than a miniscule, primordial one based on face-to-face contact is imaginary, and therefore, such communities are not the contrary to “real communities”, but rather to communities where the members enjoy relatively intimate personal relations. As a result, it could be said that, indeed, recognising that there is a national entity which supersedes your local environment is not necessarily a mere product of humanity’s tendency to form clans or group, but rather a belief that should be judged individually on a case-by-case basis. It is also imperative, once again, to avoid the trap of oversimplifying too much, and accept the fact that a great number of countries in the world are homogenous, and, as such, may have closer cultural ties and racial links than some of the West’s multicultural, multi-faith societies. The patriots may have therefore held their own in terms of the debate on morals, even though many of the objections to the critics’ are merely excuses that are exceptions to their assertions, rather than substantial objections to the core argument. However, should we have examined the real-life impacts of Nationalism or Patriotism, comparing the benefits of the formation of communities to xenophobia, inter-societal aggression, and prolonged tension between nations, the outcome of this discussion would have undoubtedly been very different.

The Axiom

THE NONISSUE OF MORAL TESTIMONY Words by Tom Davy

£ The Nonissue of Moral Testimony

In recent literature moral testimony has been presented as a problem. A general consensus has arisen that although ordinary testimony concerning nonmoral issues may be reliable, moral testimony may not. This distinction is based, largely, on the importance of self-taught moral principles – that we must, through our own efforts, discern what is morally ‘true’ and what is morally ‘false’. This paper will attempt to oppose these views and demonstrate that moral testimony is defendable.

The Nonissue of Moral Testimony

Moral Testimony:

Third party evidence or suggestions toward what is morally right and morally wrong.

estimony attests to the truth of a situation. It is a witness-based form of evidence that has remained fundamental to Law since its very conception. Although nonmoral testimony may be held in high regard, shifting testimony into moral fields has recently caused some academic opposition. It is suffice to claim that the source of these doubts originates from the concept of “moral knowledge” – how can we receive testimony over that which may not be objectively true? Though this may plainly appear to be the primary difference between nonmoral and moral testimony, it does not hold up to the modern conception of how we value moral epistemology. Moral epistemology, it can be argued, is not an issue of “knowledge”, but one of understanding. Imagine the following:

Two roommates, James and Ivan, are buying a flat. Ivan is wealthy by virtue of his family’s status, and by contrast, James has a low income. Though common courtesy dictates a split of 50:50 on the flat payment, James ponders as to whether or not it would be appropriate for Ivan to pay a higher ratio, given his comparative wealth. Unsure as to what is morally right in the situation, James seeks wisdom from his brother. The natural difficulty with this case is there is no apparent affirmation within an outcome. Knowledge is defined by Plato as a “justified true belief”, and it appears that we cannot fulfil these criteria in the context of moral testimony, or moral situations in general. It follows, then, that something preceding knowledge must take its place – understanding. Though it may be apparent that in this case the ‘brother’ is the provider of moral testimony, or moral advice, even this remains contestable. If the brother suggests a course of action, one cannot necessarily discern between his proposed preference of morality and a potential ulterior motive – for instance, which action appears to be the appropriate one, a matter of social priorities. For the sake of convenience, we will simply assume that he is interested exclusively in the morality of James’ action – or that there is an underlying interest in morality. The distinction established between necessitated ‘knowledge’ in contention with necessitated ‘understanding’ is somewhat problematic. If James wanted to know more about atom theory and his brother was an expert atomist, it would not be unusual for him to request testimony from him on issues of atomism – on the contrary, such a pursuit of understanding would be admirable. It seems foolish, then, to frown upon a subject that seeks moral testimony in the absence of sufficient understanding. In the preceding modified example, James’ brother is in an epistemically preferable situation to make a judgement on James’ problem - or so we assume. The notion that this cannot analogously convert into issues of moral testimony is faulty, even considering the absence of an attainable ‘truth’. Even in the omission of knowledge, it is overwhelming evident that moral testimony can provide some form of understanding. So if we concede that ‘understanding’ is an attenuation or antecedent of

The Nonissue of Moral Testimony

knowledge then it is fair to conclude that in both nonmoral and moral testimony understanding may be attained. Thus the line of argument which dissociates moral from nonmoral testimony through the disaggregation of knowledge and understanding fails to subvert the value of testimony in the first place; that it provides epistemic insight from an alternative source. Whether or not this alternative source is in a superior epistemic position is up for debate, though in the event that he or she is, the aforementioned divide fails to successfully disallow moral testimony, this argument only holds weight if the provider of moral testimony is in some way less morally appropriate or knowledgeable than the recipient of testimony - yet, even this may be contested through an understanding that by asking for moral testimony, you are already admitting that you are (likely) in an inferior epistemic position than the third party. Though we have rejected the primary criticism of moral testimony, the falsificationist route still remains. This approach may be applied to the preceding argument that concerns the lacking prerequisite of ‘truth’. In the event that we receive moral testimony from an alternative agent, they cannot provide us a notion of truth - morality is relativistic. If we accept this, then we are left with only understanding, further, that this understanding is dependent on both the provider of testimony and the effectiveness with which this testimony is received. The presence of inconsistencies in both recipient and donor of testimony results in the clear possibility for moral testimony failing to provide both moral understanding and truth, thus resulting in a moral delusion. This argument is subject to similar criticisms as a common theological argument: “Moral and natural evil may be explained away by God acting in mysterious ways”. The hypocrisy is apparent - if you explain natural and moral evil through lacking understanding, you must symmetrically apply this to evidence for design; all of the beauty in the world must also derive from “mysterious ways” and must be placed on motivationally equal ground to evil. Though somewhat tangential, the same issue applies to the preceding argument. If you claim that moral testimony may be invalidated via singular cases of lacking understanding, then you must similarly argue that lacking understanding in itself is an invalidating factor. Yet, this factor is not exclusive to moral testimony. In fact, moral testimony is only requested in the absence of understanding, regardless of its relation to an alternative source. Thus, whether moral testimony is requested or not, moral delusions may arise - all that moral testimony needs to do is improve the odds of a subject arriving at a morally sound judgement. To summarize, the fundamental criticism of moral truths that is integral to all rejections of moral testimony fails to invalidate the value of understanding, and further, that this understanding cannot be independently assigned to self-created moral knowledge. By reaching the unavoidable suggestion of moral understanding, opponents to moral testimony have to imply some level of value to nonmoral testimony, which analogously translates into moral fields. This is the crux of this defense of moral testimony, and leaves only the question of whether moral testimony does genuinely provide a higher success rate of strong moral judgements.

The Axiom

IS THIS STICK STRAIGHT? Words by Tomas Brown

Is this Stick Straight?

When in error we experience two contrary accounts of an object. At one moment, I am presented with a visual account of a stick as bent when under refraction 足at another, I am presented with a similar account of it as straight when it is in air. I make an error when I take one of these accounts足 first or second a 足 s true according to some value judgement on the basis of coherence or reliability. Perceptual error in part must be considered an epistemological process, or else we are merely being presented with contrary accounts; we decide our mistakes, forming belief from our initial perceptions, and making some value judgement to justify one belief over another.

Is this Stick Straight?

hen talking about ‘mistakes’ the cases I deal with are not limited to those where our senses are less reliable due to impediment or bodily functionfor example, the phi phenomenon, where we naturally ‘fill in’ the visual blanks in groups. This I believe leads to a restrictive account of error, which excludes the possibility for error made in sound senses. My primary example shall be this stick under refractionappearing bent when placed under water, but straight when taken out. My focus is not on the ‘hindering’ factor of water here but the wider aspect of being presented with two contrary experiences. Hsieh suggests for us that by necessity theories of error are representationalist, and rely on a very specific understanding of perception. Modern theories, such as those of ‘utilitarianism’ can’t be general theories, as they rely on a disparity between noumenon and phenomenon. Under utilitarianism, our brain ‘fills in’ the gaps in our experience eg, in the case of a leopard’s spots moving with it’s outline instead of being individually tracked to save processing power. This creates a disparity between the objects of our experience and perception. One objection to this is that this view is plainly incompatible with direct theories of perception such as realism and idealism, given that it assumes that such a disparity has to exist for error to occur. I also contend that representationalist theories of error present two narrow a definition; it is perfectly possible to make a mistake while in sound senses. To appropriate an example from Millar, we might make a recognitional error in sound senses if asked to pick out a real magpie from a field of identical false birds for example. This demonstrates a third problem with representationalist error; to be aware of error would necessitate knowing truths about the world outside of our perceptual knowledge (which of the birds, for instance, was truly a magpie and which were not, though they are identical). As Berkeley suggests, esse est percipi -to exist is to be perceived - to us, it would be impossible to draw conclusions from anything other than the ‘unreliable’ perceptions we are alleging don’t correspond to reality. * * * Historically there are three archetypal theories of perception with which to make the general account compatible. Realism is characterised as any subject seeing all aspects of an object of perception directly. Thomas Reid defended realism on the basis of sensus communis the idea that reason itself demands a ‘constitution’ of axiomatic beliefs. ‘The belief [in external things] consistently and directly follow sensations’it seems common sense that the objects of our perception exist, and are causally interacting with our sense organs, and as such we see things directly with no mental signs or intimidatory. I would, in the stick case, be directly aware that the stick is bent, or the stick is straight, without mentally processing that the stick is bent or the stick is straight. Representationalism is a development of a realistic viewpoint, whereby the causal account of perception is retained, however external objects are represented to the subject through sensory mediationthey become mental entities. Descartes, due to his substance dualism would be an example of a representationalist. There are two substances, mind and body; and we have perception of both ‘clear and distinct’ first order perceptions such as extension, and uncertain second order perceptions such as colour and heat, which are coincidental. Descartes maintains this argument for an external represented reality via

Is this Stick Straight?

the principle of sufficient cause for our perception, and the fact that while our sense organs may stay constant, the external world changes. In the stick case, I would be aware only of what my sense organs represented to me of the stick, rather than the stick itself. I am summarizing and actively apprehending whether the stick is straight or bent inside or outside of water. Idealism is often portrayed as a reaction to the noumenon phenomenon divide that was created by representationalism, and advocates that all that is ever present to our perception is ideas, or some kind of mental substance. Berkeley and Locke are idealists. Berkeley’s principle of esse est percipi asserts that only what is open to perception is real; to stipulate an external world, as Descartes does, is to postulate something unverifiable, as we can’t go beyond experience. Such a school of thought influences Russell and Ayer’s Phenomenalism , and is what makes representationalist theories of error untenable as general theories. Within the stick example, I see the stick and if perceived as bent, the stick is bent, and if perceived as straight, it is straight. As a result of these investigations, we must make caveats our new account of error. First, we must say that perceptions are presented with no mental signs or intermediary they are taken as they are presented. This is not as problematic as it might seem; although, within the magpie case, we form propositional belief about crows, and we choose between propositional beliefs when deciding we have made a mistake, this does not devote us to a theory of active apprehension or schema, such as that of Kant’s synthesis. All that is required is the ability to form belief off of given perception. Second, our theory must not be dualistic, and focus entirely on phenomenal experience without specifying if such experience is of ideas or objects. Having phenomenal experience is the only commonality between these three schools of perception. John Cottingham also vouches that this progression provides a reason for the importance of a general account of perceptual error. He portrays progression from direct realism to idealism as a natural philosophical process; realism cannot account for perceptual illusions, as we must access the objects of experience directly; representationalism cannot give us strong guarantee of an external world, as we can only access our perceptions; and idealism is the natural conclusion. However, idealism comes with several undesirable aspects; adopters are hypocritical, often continuing to live their own lives; we are unable to guarantee the unobservable such as molecules (indeed the instrumentalist Mach did not do so into his old age); it leads to immaterialism and debatable metaphysics on the existence of an external world; we have no sufficient cause for our perceptions; and we can't guarantee a persisting world without an omniscient guarantor. This could lead some, such as Hsieh, to say that a general theory is attractive, as it can make direct realism tenable as a position; giving it a mechanism whereby to cope with perceptual errors which otherwise require representationalism. * * * A major objection to our theory may be that mistakes should exist interdependent of our awareness of them. Millar takes such a position when he argues we have not performed true recognition unless successful; he argues that that ‘you exercise an ability only if you do the thing that the ability is an ability to do’ recognition, in his terms, is a ‘success term’. He postulates in cases such as mistaking a stranger across the street for a friend, we are not performing

Is this Stick Straight?

recognition at all; we are either making a ‘messy rationalisation’ from an insecure foundation, or we are suspending conclusive judgement about the person altogether. I object to this view. There can be no basis for extrinsic definitions of perceptual events; ‘success terms’ in the context of perception hold no water, as if all we have present to us is the objects of perception, a successful recognition will be identical to an unsuccessful one. It is impossible to truly realise perceptual success through our equally suspect perception. For this reason we can’t have perceptive theories based on extrinsic success, and the objection fails. Due to the same objections however, we may criticise an aspect of our own model; how supportable is a theory of perception which includes ‘validity judgement’? For the same reason that success terms are unsupportable, so are effective validity judgements; how can we form judgements about perception from perception which is equally suspect? Some might conclude a sort of positive idealism from this that all perceptions, even those contradictory, are equally valid and real in other words, Berkeley’s esse est percipi to exist is to be perceived. This is misguided for two reasons. Our model, as I suggested, is phenomenological not metaphysical, and so should not be employed to conclude the broad strokes of Berkeleyit only provides an account of perceptual error, rather than recommending any structure to substance and the world. Further, we make validity judgements regularly, and while they may not be metaphysically conclusive, their invalidity does not preclude the model from functioning. I often make validity judgements on the basis of descriptive knowledge; I judge that the stick is not actually bent when submerged in water, as I have knowledge of the process of refraction. Therefore, this criticism too fails. However, it does recommend that we are not so sure footed in our dismissal of contradictory experience; our descriptive validity judgements too are not metaphysically conclusive, and the objection does preclude metaphysical stipulation. * * * The resultant theory of perceptual error serves two historical purposes. On one hand, we see an opportunity to reinvigorate realism (and thereby avoid being forced into a position of idealism) by providing it with capacity to handle perceptual mistakes. On the other, we have now presented the possibility of developing a wider range of perceptual theories, having alleviated them of the need to incorporate perceptual error in the ‘representationalist’ manner. Now to apply our conclusions to the case of the refracted stick, and to provide a final answer to the question of ‘is this stick straight?’. We must say that conclusively and objectively, it should be treated as either; both experiences, of the stick under refraction and out of refraction, do not recommend themselves as more valid than the other; subjectively however, we may form a descriptive judgement to confirm the stick is indeed straight.

The Axiom

PHILOSOPHICAL ALIGNMENT CHART Words by Tom Davy and Tomas Brown

Philosophical Alignment Chart

GOOD

9 1 8 6 4

LAWFUL

CHAOTIC

2 EVIL

Philosophical Alignment Chart

Carnap

(Chaotic Good) Can you really verify where he goes on the graph?

4 Sartre

(True Neutral) He just exists, lol.

Ramsey

(???) No-one knows where he goes on this graph.

10 Nietzsche

(Chaotic Evil) He exercises his ‘will’ to eat the poor, becoming the ultimate metaphorical lion.

Popper

(Chaotic Evil) Chaotic Evil He goes everywhere, you can validate any hypothesis you want!

Wittgenstein

(Chaotic Evil) Be careful kids or you’s get a poker in the eye!

8 Moore

(Lawful Good) If you tessellated him to the other side of the graph he would be in an identical position, technically.

Xeno and Xeno

(Neutral Lawful) Neutral Lawful - He tried to get all the way to the end of the line, but never quite made it

3 Kant

(Lawful Good) We were lookin

Russell

(Lawful Evil) You can’t place him in any set.

Augustine

(???) Is the greatest possible philosopher. Obviously.

12 Hume

(Chaotic Neutral) Uncomfortable with the affirmative boundaries of the graph, Hume begrudgingly accepts his position.

The Axiom

THOMAS REID SO FANCY Words by Tomas Brown

Thomas Reid So Fancy

First thing's first, I'm a realist, Drop this and see the whole world you feel it, And I'm still in the Phila Bizness I got the whole thing down, see my sensus communis You should know Hume was wrong about this Drop it all and pick it up just like this; All rhyme, no meaning, fo yo kids Got my towel, somethin' worth metaphysics with a twist Takin' all my reason, never chase that Rooftop like we bringin' the Wise Club back Bring the books in, where the base at? Freewill spillin', you should taste that I'm so fancy You already know I'm in the fast lane From Aberdeen to Glasgow I'm so fancy Can't you read this gold? Remember my name Idealism 'bout to blow

The Axiom

PHILOSOPHERS ON POLITICS Words by Richard Ainslie

Philosophers on Politics

Berkeley refused to address real-world issues, Nietzsche had too many perspectives, Aquinas was too concerned with illogical tele debates, Paley was too focused on his ‘grand design’, Locke had outdated British empire-icist beliefs, Hegel denied the existence of climate-change, Russell was banned from politics for his revolt on idealism, Descartes was disliked by the left wing because he thought the sovereign was good, Martin Luther introduced too many reforms, Heidegger had trouble Being und Time Hume had problems inducing reform Stuart Mill drove up utility bills and it turned out that Kant couldn’t.

The Axiom

EXISTENTIAL COMICS

Existential Comics

THE

AXIOM ISSUE No.2

Contributors

Tomas Brown James Beazley Tom Davy Giannis Giortzis Richard Ainslie Blake Jones Comic by Existential Comics Design by Blake Jones & Asten Yeo Front Cover: “Infinity Lemniscate” courtesy of flickr user Transaction Fraud is licenced under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

2015 No.2 THE AXIOM