European and Regional Studies Vol. 19, 2021

Acta Universitatis Sapientiae The scientific journal of Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania (Cluj-Napoca, Romania) publishes original papers and surveys in several areas of sciences written in English.

Information about each series can be found at http://www.acta.sapientia.ro.

Main Editorial Board Márton TONK Editor-in-Chief Adalbert BALOG Executive Editor Zoltán KÁSA Member Angella SORBÁN Managing Editor Laura NISTOR Member Csaba FARKAS Member Ágnes PETHŐ Member

Acta Universitatis Sapientiae European and Regional Studies Executive Editor Miklós BAKK (Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania, Romania) bakk.miklos@kv.sapientia.ro Editorial Board Gabriel ANDREESCU (University of Bucharest, Romania) József BENEDEK, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania) Barna BODÓ (Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania, Cluj-Napoca, Romania) Vasile DOCEA (West University, Timisoara, Romania) Ferenc HÖRCHER (University of Public Service, Research Institute for Politics and Government, Budapest, Hungary) László MARÁCZ (University of Amsterdam, Netherland) Christoph PAN (Volksgruppen Institut, Bozen, Italy) Erzsébet SZALAYNÉ SÁNDOR (University of Pécs, Hungary) Tibor TORÓ (Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania, Cluj-Napoca, Romania) Balázs VIZI, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre of Excellence, Centre for Social Sciences)

Sapientia University

ISSN 2066-639X http://www.acta.sapientia.roScientia Publishing House

Acta Universitatis Sapientiae

European and Regional Studies Volume 19, 2021

Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania Scientia Publishing House

Contents

East-Central European Issues János SÁRINGER Diplomatic Steps of the Antall Government towards the Euro-Atlantic Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 János Kristóf MURÁDIN The Problem of Transylvania in the Emigration Correspondence of Count Béla Teleki from the End of the Second World War to the Abolition of the Communist Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Barna BODÓ Neighbourhood Policy vs. Remembrance Policy: Romania and Hungary . . . . . 40 Endre DOMONKOS Economic Stabilization after the Treaty of Trianon: Challenges and Possibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Milada NAGY Cyber Security Strategies of the Visegrád Group States and Romania . . . . . . . 72 Attila JÓZSA, László ZUBÁNICS Changes in the Townscape of Lampertszásza (Berehove/Beregszász) in the 13th– 15th Centuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Book Review Nóra BARNUCZ Courage, Success, Faith…? But Now What Is Courage in Politics? . . . . . . . . . . 98

East-Central European Issues

Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 19 (2021) 1–13

DOI: 10.2478/auseur-2021-0001

Diplomatic Steps of the Antall Government towards the Euro-Atlantic Integration1 János SÁRINGER

PhD, Head of Department, Associate Professor of Budapest Business School, Head of the Central European Regional Research Group e-mail: Saringer.Janos@uni-bge.hu Abstract. My dissertation is based on more than ten years of archival research. One of the goals of Antall’s foreign policy was the Euro-Atlantic integration. In December 1991, Hungary signed an association agreement with the European Community. By 1992, opinions on the future were divided between and within the Member States of the European Communities.

There was a debate among the twelve about the concept of ‘deepening’ or ‘widening’, and the term ‘multi-speed Europe’ appeared. At this time, a number of questions arose about the full membership of the Trio in NATO, of which ‘how’ and ‘when’ came first. It has also been suggested whether it would be more appropriate to intensify economic and political cooperation rather than military ones. Perhaps the NACC should be thoroughly expanded first and then move on to expanding the range of full member states?

Keywords: Antall’s foreign policy, integration, European agreement, NACC, NATO

My dissertation is based on more than ten years of archival research, which I have published in two volumes so far;2 the third volume is about to be published, and the fourth volume is under preparation. The top-secret documents of the period, created in the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, can now be searched in the National Archives of the Hungarian National Archives.3 As a result of the first free and democratic elections in Hungary, József Antall formed a government in May 1990. One of the goals of Antall’s foreign policy was the Euro-Atlantic integration. At the end of October 1991, at the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, József Antall put it this way: ‘The European integration is 1

2 3

This paper was presented at the conference Past, Present and Future of Central Europe, organized by Budapest Business School and Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania in Cluj-Napoca on 20 November 2020 (online conference).

Sáringer 2015, 2018.

See also Kecskés 2018; Gazdag 1997; Jeszenszky 2002, 2016; Marinovich 2019, Valki 1997, and Wörner 2001.

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inconceivable without a transatlantic cooperation. [...] For us, NATO is the key to the stability of Europe. [...] The region in Central Europe that our three countries represent is also extremely important to NATO from a security perspective.’4 From the point of view of Hungarian diplomacy, many called the year 1990 ‘the year of miracles’, which, if we take it into account, can characterize 1991 as a period of ‘hope’ and ‘desires’. And 1992 was more of a year of ‘reality’.

János Martonyi put it this way: I will talk briefly about two things in a European context, one is geopolitics and the other is the economy. Let’s call the first one ‘flag’ for the sake of simplicity, because it’s a flag, and the second one is called ‘trade’. There is an old debate over which one is more important. For a trader, trade is usually more important; he wants to trade. For politics, it is important that the state, political units, and political entities be able to take their flag, influence, and power to as many places as possible. There is also an old debate about who was the first. Whether the merchant landed with fiery water and other products offered for sale to the natives, or whether the warship appeared first. The two are closely linked.5 In 1991, the European Community introduced the term Europe Agreements, reflecting the particular importance of the expected associations. Negotiations have started with three states: Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. József Antall participated in the meeting of the European Communities held in Brussels on 16–17 December 1991, where the Association Agreement, the so-called Europe Agreement, between the Republic of Hungary and the European Community was signed, confirmed by the Hungarian Parliament resolution of 17 November 1992.

The trade policy chapter of the Agreement came into force on 1 March 1992, while the other parts (from the completion of the partial ratifications – in the case of Hungary) came into force in February 1994. The Association Agreement decided to establish a free trade area and to implement the ‘four freedoms’ (liberalization of goods, services, labour, and capital flows). The European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993 decided on the possibility of enlarging the European Union towards the east, setting out the basic political, economic, and legal criteria that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe wishing to join had to meet. Following the entry into force of the Europe Agreement governing association on 1 February 1994 – based on the authorization contained in Resolution No. 16/1995 (III.31.) HP adopted by consensus of the parliamentary parties –, the Government submitted Hungary’s application to join the European Union on 31 March 1994. The Contracting Parties have established an institutional framework for political cooperation and have targeted full industrial free trade after two to five years of asymmetric tariff 4 5

Antall 2015: 593–594, vol. II. Martonyi 2018: 137. Quotation translated by the author of this paper.

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dismantling. During the negotiations, Hungary and the countries of the region clearly sought to achieve full membership. From December 1991, customs duties on industrial products were abolished in trade between them. The Association Agreement promoted economic, financial, and cultural cooperation and helped to develop Hungary’s economy and market economy. The Association’s institutional system included the Association Council, which consisted of members of the Council of Ministers and the European Commission on behalf of the EU, as well as members and officials of the Hungarian government.

Almost at the same time as the signing of the Association Agreement, the Maastricht European Council took place in December 1991, where instead of recruiting new members, they committed themselves in favour of strengthening internal integration as closely and deeply as possible. At that time, the leaders of the European Communities gave priority to vertical integration rather than horizontal enlargement.

The Twelve signed the Treaty on European Union on 7 February 1992, which set out, inter alia, the objective of political cohesion. It is common ground that the Treaty entered into force on 1 November 1993 and has three pillars: the European Community, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). The first pillar is the European Economic Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, and Euratom, to which the Economic and Monetary Union and the customs union are closely linked.

Fearing the existing economic and political position of the EC member states, they were much more interested in the implementation of free market principles than in the full integration of the Central and Eastern European states. At the same time, the road to full membership remained open, and countries wishing to join were encouraged to implement the Maastricht conditions. But in Maastricht, the economic and financial conditions for full membership – the so-called convergence criteria – were defined, which neither the Visegrád countries nor the Eastern European states could meet at that time.

One of the most important areas of NATO’s transformation has been the Alliance’s partnership. At the end of December 1991, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established, with the aim of NATO cooperating with the former member states of the Warsaw Pact and the new states that emerged after the break-up of the Soviet Union. To the surprise of Hungary and the two Visegrád countries, eleven former Soviet republics of the newly formed Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including Russia, were invited to become founding members of the NACC. Georgia and Azerbaijan, along with Albania, joined the NACC in 1992, and the Central Asian republics soon followed their example.6 NATO decision makers did 6

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established on 20 December 1991.

Launched in 1994, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme has integrated several partners and covered a wide range of defence cooperation, including defence reform.

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not see the North Atlantic Cooperation Council as a first step towards accession but merely as a forum for contact, cooperation, and dialogue between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and NATO. Three months after the coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991, the invitation of eleven members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to the NACC was in line with the logic of NATO’s positive security guarantees. Taking into account the legitimate Soviet security interests, they helped the democratic forces led by Boris Yeltsin in parallel with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of Soviet troops in Europe. NATO decision makers wanted to replace the threat with security guarantees by creating a forum for cooperation and dialogue, the NACC, to reduce the sense of threat in the CIS member states and thus the weight of conservative forces both inside and outside Russia. In the most conservative part of the former Soviet military leadership, with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the ‘we are alone against Europe’ argument remained strong, along with imperial attitudes. Adding that the subsistence situation of officers and civilians withdrawn from Eastern Europe was extremely difficult, they faced severe supply and housing problems.

The Visegrád countries assessed their situation as special, as the EC had already recognized the relative separation of the Visegrád countries by signing the Association Agreement and thus hoped to join NATO relatively faster than the Eastern European states. However, the events in the Baltics and Moscow in early and mid-1991 significantly slowed down the process, precisely by applying positive and negative security guarantees from NATO decision makers to the CIS member states. However, for security policy reasons, Budapest, Warsaw, and Prague wanted to speed up their NATO membership precisely because of the above-mentioned Soviet reorganization attempts.

According to Warsaw, the fastest and most effective way to get into the EC is to prepare and join the Visegrád Group together. Polish politicians have estimated that full membership will be a process of at least ten years, the first phase of which will be the strengthening of the V3s. In Warsaw, the view that the road to NATO was through the WEU became commonplace, and the main task of Polish diplomacy in the medium term was to formalize relations with the WEU – associate membership or observer status.7 The attention of Czech and Slovak politicians at that time was mainly focused on the future of their own country, the issues related to the emergence of the independent Czech Republic and Slovakia on the international stage. They agreed that Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary should strengthen their stability in the region.8 7

8

Summary by Mihály Domszky, Temporary Chargé d’Affaires of the Embassy in Warsaw, on the Polish assessment of the security, economic and political situation in Central Europe. ANAH XIX–J–1–j 1992. 72. b. 25 September 1992.

Summary by Ambassador György Varga from the Embassy in Prague about the assessment of the security situation in the Central European region in Prague. ANAH XIX–J–1–j 1992. 72. b. 22 September 1992.

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At this time, a number of questions arose about the full membership of the Trio in NATO, of which ‘how’ and ‘when’ came first. It has also been suggested whether it would be more appropriate to intensify economic and political cooperation rather than military ones. Perhaps the NACC should be thoroughly expanded first and then move on to expanding the range of full member states?

The neutral Switzerland, Sweden, and Austria maintained close ties with NATO countries during the Cold War. By including the Three, NATO would have ignored these states, in which it would have provoked resentment. Russia and Eastern European countries may have argued that they also need a security guarantee. Turkey would have resented that NATO’s attention would turn to Central Europe instead, when there were also different levels of development within NATO. At that time, enlargement could have led to friction and perhaps even instability both inside and outside NATO. It was also a problem that new full entrants could have immediately requested modern weapons or made other demands that NATO countries could not or did not want to meet.9 At that time, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom formed the EC Troika. The views of London and Amsterdam on enlargement, NATO, and the Conference on European and Security Cooperation (CSCE) are also relevant in this regard. In addition to the many questions and question marks mentioned above about the enlargement of the EC and NATO, the terms ‘dilemma’, ‘debate’, and, at other times, ‘inopportune’ are better read in the available documents.

British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd stressed before the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee that conflicts do not arise between the states of the region and an external power but between the peoples freed from oppression. In his view, therefore, there is no need to intervene in a security integration designed to counter an external threat. The main direction of building the safety net is to further develop the CSCE process. The NACC does not provide a guarantee of security and cannot be a forum for conflict resolution. A question of the representatives of Hungary and Czechoslovakia regarding the possible membership of NATO was resolved by the Minister by stating that no such request had been received from the mentioned countries, so the issue was not on the agenda.10 Boudewijn Johannes van Eenenaam, Head of the Atlantic Cooperation Directorate for Atlantic Cooperation and Security Policy at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told Ambassador István Csejtei in The Hague that we needed to answer the question of what to do in the current situation. At the moment, the answer to this is that we need to address the security needs of the Three primarily within the NACC. Only if this is not possible at all is the issue of full membership possible on the agenda, but we 9 10

Ambassador in The Hague István Csejtei’s note on the question marks of the NATO membership of the Visegrád Three. ANAH XIX–J–1–j 1992. 82. b. 26 February 1992.

Cryptography from London. British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd’s assessment of democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. ANAH XIX–J–1–j 6. b. 15 January 1992.

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will have to think carefully about it. The best explanation would be if we could prove that only full membership is the solution, and no other constellation is possible.11 In addition, there was a debate in the Netherlands as to whether the ‘Visegrád Three’ should be treated differently from a security policy point of view or whether it would be more appropriate to treat the whole region, including the European CIS republics, relatively uniformly. In the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ‘Atlanticist’, which put NATO at the forefront, and in the Ministry of Defence, the ‘European’, which was sympathetic to the Western European Union, was stronger.12 The Advisory Committee on Security Policy of the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence, called the Peace and Security Advisory Committee, prepared a report on the security situation in Central European countries by the end of November 1991, which was discussed by members of the Dutch Parliament on 28 November 1991. The starting point for the Advisory Committee’s analysis was that the Visegrád countries have an advantage over other Central and Eastern European countries in establishing democratic conditions, but their security situation is unstable, and democracy itself could be jeopardized if NATO does not receive clear security guarantees. The Commission’s proposal is that the Visegrád Three should be given some special connection in the context of NATO. According to Dutch Foreign Minister Hans Van den Broek, the Commission’s proposal is sympathetic, but it would be too early to put it into practice. He added that care should also be taken to ensure that the accession of new countries does not loosen NATO’s internal cohesion, so the NACC must be activated before any country is offered special status. However, this did not preclude further relations with Central European countries at a later stage. The Dutch Foreign Minister further objected that it was not expedient to differentiate the Visegrád Three at the beginning of the relationship building. According to him, the Three of them are less afraid of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, and therefore the establishment of security guarantees is no longer so urgent. If a special relationship is established with the Three, the whole nature of NATO will change. Van den Broek’s caution also reflected the debate and dilemma as to whether NATO, the EC, or the CSCE would be the basis of the new European security system.13 NATO’s enlargement was primarily opposed by France, which may have been due to the fact that while the Visegrád countries also joined NATO’s military organization, France, Spain, and Greece would still be formally members of the political organization. The other reason is that France was interested in strengthening 11 12 13

Ambassador in The Hague István Csejtei’s note on the question marks of the NATO membership of the Visegrád Three. ANAH XIX–J–1–j 1992. 82. b. 26 February 1992.

Cryptography from The Hague. Security policy aspirations of the Netherlands. ANAH XIX–J–1–j 1992. 72. b. 30 March 1992.

Ambassador in The Hague István Csejtei’s note on the proposals of the Advisory Board of the Dutch Foreign Minister and Minister of War regarding the Visegrád Three. ANAH XIX–J–1–j 1992. 82. b. 7 January 1992.

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the Western European Union, not NATO.14 In addition, Amsterdam called for closer cooperation between the Visegrád Cooperation and the Benelux Union.

At the Fourth Follow-up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe,15 the Sixteen NATO Member States and Hungary, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Georgia, Poland, Russia, Romania, and Ukraine signed the Open Skies Treaty on 24 March 1992 in Helsinki.16 The treaty allowed the participating countries to carry out observation flights over the territory of any other country in the ‘Vancouver to Vladivostok’ area.

It logically followed from Budapest’s commitment to the Euro-Atlantic integration that it has made it possible to patrol AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft in Hungarian airspace, and it was also important for Budapest to control AWACS aircraft over Hungary. During the South Slavic crisis, Serbian Air Force aircraft made several flights into Hungarian territory. The Hungarian government has repeatedly protested against the violation of Hungary’s airspace, so on 17 September 1991 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned a series of airspace violations of aircraft arriving from the South Slavic territory. During the South Slavic war, several bullets hit Hungarian territory several times due to acts of war. The most serious incident occurred on 27 October 1991, when the Serbian-controlled Yugoslav army dropped two cluster bombs on the town of Barcs at 8:15 p.m. The bombs exploded in a remote part of the city, with no personal injury but damage to several buildings.

In the negotiations in Subotica over the incident, the Yugoslav side denied intent.

The true background to the bombing is still unknown.17 On 27 October 1992, a delegation of NATO experts arrived in Budapest to prepare for the flight of NATO and British AWACS aircraft over Hungary and to discuss technical details. Expert talks were successfully concluded, and it became possible to start flights, which was also necessary due to the fighting on the southern border.

The aircraft were controlled by the Hungarian civil and military air traffic control.

In order to identify military air traffic, the Hungarian side provided to the AWACS aircraft the flight data of aircraft arriving from the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

At the beginning of the mission, Hungary received a liaison officer from NATO and the United Kingdom. The purpose of the patrols was initially to control day-to-day airspace in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the safety of humanitarian flights, but later the activity was extended to nights and larger airspace as well.18 14 15 16

17 18

Cryptography from The Hague. Opinion of Dutch Foreign Minister Van den Broek on NATO enlargement. ANAH XIX–J–1–j 1992. 82. b. 26 February 1992.

The follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki took place from 24 March to 10 June 1992.

The text of the Open Sky Treaty was finalized in Vienna between 13 and 20 January 1992, signed by twenty-five states on 24 March 1992 in Helsinki. The Open Skies allows unarmed observation flights over the territory of States Parties. The first practice observation flight was conducted by Canada over Hungary.

See Sáringer 2018: 167. 24 September 1991.

The three-member NATO expert delegation in Budapest to prepare for the flight of NATO and

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At the Helsinki Summit on 9–10 July 1992, József Antall met in person with several world leaders for the last time. The final document, The Challenges of Change, was published in Helsinki. Heads of State and Government declare the CSCE a regional agreement under Chapter 8 of the UN Charter. The Forum for Security Cooperation, the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Economic Forum, and the Finance Committee were established. The position of the Secretary-General was decided by the Stockholm Council of Ministers (14–15 December 1992). The Heads of State and Government attending the July summit also decided that Budapest would be the next venue for the European Security and Cooperation Council summit.19 This also shows the international prestige and judgment of Hungary, the Hungarian government, and Prime Minister József Antall.

By 1992, views on the future were divided between and within the member states of the European Communities. In the spring of 1992, the view emerged that, in contrast to the already established German Europe (Austria, the Visegrád Three, Baltic States, Ukraine), a French Europe (Romania, Bulgaria, Mediterranean countries) should be created, among which Italy wanted to be a balancing factor.

Among the twelve, there was a debate about the concept of ‘deepening’ or ‘widening’, vertical reinforcement or horizontal enlargement. The term ‘multi-speed Europe’ has emerged, with the full membership of the EFTA countries being set for the middle of the decade and the Visegrád countries projected for the end of the century.

In June 1992, the Lisbon European Council20 set out the path to the European Union and the direction of the common foreign and security policy and set out the challenges of enlargement with reference to the Maastricht Treaty. In October in Birmingham, the presidency of the European Council strengthened economic and monetary cooperation, inter alia. At the end of the year, Edinburgh, Scotland, reviewed, among other things, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in each Member State and the possibilities for new member states to join.21 Due to the outcome of the Danish referendum,22 the Edinburgh Agreement gave Denmark four exceptions to the Maastricht Treaty so that Copenhagen could ratify it,

19

20 21

22

British AWACS aircraft over Hungary. ANAH XIX–J–1–j 1992. 82. b. 28 October 1992; Hungary authorized the patrol of AWACS aircraft in Hungarian airspace for the purpose of day-to-day control of airspace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and for the safety of humanitarian flights. ANAH XIX–J–1–j 1992. 82. b. 29 October 1992.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was established at the CSCE Summit of Heads of State and Government in Budapest on 5–6 December 1994, and the document entitled Towards a True Partnership in a New Era was published in Budapest.

The Lisbon European Council took place on 26 and 27 June 1992.

The European Council’s session in Edinburgh took place between 11 and 12 December 1992, when, in addition to the above-mentioned ones, the application of the principle of subsidiarity, transparency, the promotion of economic recovery in Europe, the internal market, the free movement of persons, the common justice and home affairs, and internal migration were the topics.

In the Danish referendum of 2 June 1992, citizens voted against the ratification of the Treaty on European Union.

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as this was the only way the Treaty could enter into force. Denmark was not obliged to adopt the euro. It did not join the Western European Union, did not participate in the Union’s foreign and security policy or in the Union’s military missions, and was exempted from certain obligations for home affairs harmonization.

The message of the European Council’s exemptions for Denmark to the region and Budapest is that the twelve do not apply the principle of equal treatment to all members of European countries. The Danish referendum and the response to it reflected the uncertainty within the European Communities. All this, together with the concept of a multi-speed Europe, caused disappointment in Hungary and at the same time shattered the hopes of a close accession within two to three years, and the desires were replaced by the recognition of reality.

NATO decision makers have regarded the North Atlantic Cooperation Council as a forum for liaison and cooperation. In Brussels, Liaison Officer György Granasztói extended the invitation of Foreign Minister Géza Jeszenszky and Minister of Defence Lajos Für to NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner in March 1992, but the main topic of discussion was the Russian and Ukrainian military situation.23 In November, the NATO Permanent Council auditioned Ambassador György Granasztói, who described the security situation in Hungary and emphasized that: the country has made an irrevocable commitment to Western, Euro-Atlantic integration. This is reflected in democratic institutions, the parliamentary system and the functioning of the market economy. However, the country alone is not able to implement the goal set, especially in an environment threatened by security risks, and the situation of minorities across the border is very sensitive to the Hungarian public.24 The Atlantic Council of Canada held a seminar in Toronto on 20 November 1992, entitled The Political and Military Dimensions of NATO. The statements of Michael Legge, NATO’s Deputy Secretary General for Defence Planning and Politics, and General Vigleik Eide, Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, were inconsistent, reflecting internal differences ahead of NATO’s Foreign Ministers’ meeting in December.

Michael Legge stressed the need for greater political adaptation to the changing security policy environment. It is the starting point for the organization’s new strategic concept based on political and military approaches, a reassessment of the nature of possible future crises. Following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, there was no danger of a comprehensive conflict; instead, a multifaceted, diverse 23 24

Report by Ambassador György Granasztói on his visit to NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner. ANAH XIX–J–1–j 1992. 82. b. 9 March 1992.

Hearing of Ambassador György Granasztói at the NATO Permanent Council. ANAH XIX–J–1–j 1992. 82. b. 23 November 1992.

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and difficult-to-predict conflict on the periphery of the federal system had to be reckoned with, which could take a political, military, economic, and social form.

He also called the possibility of the proliferation of missile technologies and weapons dangerous. NATO’s primary goal is to preserve transatlantic consultation, provide protection against external aggression, and maintain Europe’s strategic balance. He called the views on NATO’s becoming a political organization a misunderstanding, as NATO has always played an important political role.

However, the political elements that came to the fore as a result of the reduction in the risk of military conflict could not diminish the importance of the organization’s military tasks.

The new types of insecurity and the recognition that NATO’s security is inseparable from the security of Europe as a whole have been reflected in the emphasis on conflict prevention, crisis management, preventive diplomacy, and peacekeeping. NATO’s coordination with European organizations and institutions (EC, CSCE, WEU) has been adapted to new political requirements. However, the increase in the membership of the CSCE and its relatively slow development have made it difficult for it to play a role in crisis management. The development of the security content of the EC and the WEU was also a function of the formation of the European political union. The new political goals would have been met by a new military structure based on more mobilizable, more flexible, smaller troops, which could also have reduced the need to rely on nuclear weapons but has not made it unnecessary. NATO did not have sufficient financial and expert resources to implement the cooperation and support required by the new partner countries.

Emphasizing the importance of multilateral meetings for new partners, he suggested strengthening cooperation with NATO members on specific issues.

He hoped that the Secretariat of the Western European Union would move to Brussels to develop complementary goals, increase transparency and strengthen cooperation. On this basis, the WEU may in the future engage in activities that NATO is unable or unwilling to undertake. However, it was necessary to change the bad practice that the WEU is aware of NATO’s aspirations, while the opposite was often not the case. As a negative example of the relationship between the two organizations, he cited their uncoordinated, often competing actions in peacekeeping activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Vigleik Eide called it essential to maintain the same level of effective and integrated defence capability. In contrast, Legge strongly stated that the primary goal of NATO’s political engagement should not be to adapt quickly to uncertain changes in the international situation but to promote crisis planning and maintain a coordinated defence image in a coordinated manner. He was critical of the role of the UN, the CSCE, and the WEU in carrying out crisis management and peacekeeping missions that reflect a broader approach to security. He called the independence of the European defence pillar within NATO a meaningless concept. In his view,

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the European and transatlantic pillars are inseparable elements of NATO’s defence system. He called maintaining a North American presence an essential component of international security.

According to Jamie Shea, NATO’s Central and Eastern European Affairs Officer, it is inconceivable for NATO to establish a link with the new democracies similar to the EC’s associate membership, as the convergence of some countries would be rejected by other states, further destabilizing the region. In the light of the unpredictable internal processes of the new democracies, their membership would weaken NATO’s cohesion. In this area, he called ‘long engagement before marriage’ essential. Referring to Spain’s accession to NATO in 1992, he stated that in the midst of today’s realities, the framework for accession must be established first, and only then can it be a matter of gaining membership. For the ‘bridal’ relationship, the NACC offers a meaningful framework for cooperation. He suggested that this forum could effectively contribute to neutralizing crisis hotspots. However, increasing financial resources are needed to meet the growing demand for practical forms of cooperation offered by the NACC in Central and Eastern Europe (seminars, conventions, transfer of other expertise).

In his opinion, in the short term, the relationship between the countries of the region and NATO could be positively influenced not only by providing a substantive exchange of views of the NACC but also by increasing its practical functioning. He identified joint action in the areas of arms control, arms control initiatives, nuclear security, and refugees in the new European security system as possible areas for short-term cooperation. In the light of the growing demand for peacekeeping missions, he mentioned the overflights of AWACS aircraft over Hungary as a positive example. Cooperation within the NACC would serve as the ‘servant years’ of NATO membership. With the further development of the CSCE, it is conceivable how the CSCE can become an economic institution and the Council of Europe a human rights one, and in this way NATO can transform into a comprehensive institution in the security sphere.25 At the 46th session of the UN General Assembly, Hungary was elected a nonpermanent member of the Security Council for two years starting from 1 January 1992. The work of the UN Mission in New York is also uninteresting in this respect.

The sixth UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister, took office on 1 January 1992. The term of office of the SecretaryGeneral began at the Security Council Summit on 31 January 1992. On the basis of the summit’s mandate, the Secretary-General drew up a report entitled Agenda for Peace, which set out the directions in which Boutros-Ghali envisioned the further development of the world organization.

25

See the summary report by Canadian Ambassador Kálmán Kulcsár. ANAH XIX–J–1–j 1992. 82. b. 17 December 1992.

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János SÁRINGER

The South Slavic crisis was a key issue on the Security Council’s agenda, but both the European Communities and the CSCE have proved unsuccessful in their peace efforts. Thirteen Security Council resolutions were issued in ten months, ranging from the imposition of an arms embargo on Yugoslavia, the deployment of UNPROFOR, the imposition of general economic and other sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro to the opening of the Sarajevo airport.

In several cases, the Hungarian mission succeeded in ensuring that the proposals reflecting Hungarian interests were included in the wording of the Security Council’s decisions so that the political settlement of the South Slavic crisis be in line with the principles of the CSCE, which are: ensuring the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of national minorities, the unacceptability of attempts to forcibly change borders, an immediate ban on forced evictions, and attempts to change the ethnic composition of the population.

In the wake of the South Slavic crisis, the world community has recognized that neither the United Nations nor Europe has the appropriate tools and institutions to prevent or eradicate such crises.26 In conclusion, as presented above, by 1992, opinions on the future had been divided between the emerging view that a French Europe should be created as opposed to the already established German Europe (and among them Italy as a balancing factor). A debate was launched about the concept of ‘deepening’ or ‘widening’ and about vertical reinforcement or horizontal enlargement. The term ‘multi-speed Europe’ was emerging too. The Danish referendum for the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (rejected by the Danish voters) and the European Council’s response to it reflected the uncertainty within the European Communities. These caused disappointment in Hungary and at the same time shattered the hopes of a close accession within two to three years, and the desires were replaced by the recognition of reality. For this reason, we can say that in terms of Hungary’s EuroAtlantic integration, Hungarian diplomacy had to face the procrastinating reality of Brussels. During the period of the first Orbán government, Hungary became a full member of NATO in 1999 and of the European Union in 2004.

References Archives of the National Archives of Hungary XIX–J–1–j TS Box 5 1992 XIX–J–1–j TS Box 6 1992 XIX–J–1–j TS Box 72 1992 XIX–J–1–j TS Box 82 1992 26

See André Erdős’s report on the activities of the UN Mission in New York from 1991 to 1992.

ANAH XIX–J–1–j 5 b. 2 July 1992.

Diplomatic Steps of the Antall Government towards...

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ANTALL, József. 2015. Modell és valóság. Politikai beszédek, interjúk itthon és külföldön. Bővített díszkiadás az Antall-kormány megalakulásának 25. évfordulójára. Budapest: Antall József Tudásközpont, vol. II. GAZDAG, Ferenc. 1997. Az első negyven év. A NATO 1949–1989 között. In: Dunay, Pál–Tálas, Péter (eds.), Az Észak-atlanti Szerződés Szervezete. Tanulmányok és dokumentumok. Budapest: Stratégiai és Védelmi Kutatóközpont. 21–55.

JESZENSZKY, Géza. 2002. A magyar külpolitika fő irányai a század utolsó évtizedében. In: Sipos, Péter–Zeidler, Miklós–Pritz, Pál (eds.), Magyarország helye a 20. századi Európában. Tanulmányok. Budapest: Magyar Történelmi Társulat. 169–183.

2016. Utunk a NATO-ba. In: Simon János (ed.), 25 éve szabadon Közép-Európában.

Gazdaság, politika, jog. Budapest: CEPoliti. 322–340.

2019. NATO Enlargement: Anchor in a Safe Harbor (Chapter 5). In: Hamilton, Daniel S.–Spohr, Kristina (eds.): Open Door. NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security after the Cold War. Washington: Brookings Institution Press. 117–149.

KECSKÉS D., Gusztáv. 2018. Brüsszelből tekintve. Titkos NATO-jelentések az átalakuló Kelet-Európáról, 1988–1991. Budapest: Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont.

MARINOVICH, Endre. 2019. 1315 nap. Antall József miniszterelnöksége. Budapest: Magyar Napló–VERITAS. MARTONYI, János. 2018. Nyitás és identitás. Geopolitika, világkereskedelem, Európa. Szeged: Iurisperitus.

SÁRINGER, János. 2015. Iratok az Antall-kormány külpolitikájához és diplomáciájához (1990. május–1990. december). Budapest: VERITAS–Magyar Napló, vol I. 2018. Iratok az Antall-kormány külpolitikájához és diplomáciájához 1991. január–1991. december). Budapest: VERITAS–Magyar Napló, vol. II. VALKI, László. 1997. Érvek és ellenérvek. In: Dunay, Pál–Tálas, Péter (eds.), Az Észak-atlanti Szerződés Szervezete. Tanulmányok és dokumentumok. Budapest: ELTE Kiadó.

WÖRNER, Manfred. 1991. NATO Transformed: The Significance of the Rome Summit. NATO Review 39(6). NATO On-line library: https://www.nato.int/ docu/review/1991/9106-1.htm (downloaded on: 5 May 2021).

Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 19 (2021) 14–39

DOI: 10.2478/auseur-2021-0002

The Problem of Transylvania in the Emigration Correspondence of Count Béla Teleki from the End of the Second World War to the Abolition of the Communist Regime1 János Kristóf MURÁDIN

PhD, Associate Professor, Head of Department Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania (Cluj-Napoca, Romania) Department of International Relations and European Studies e-mail: muradinjanos@sapientia.ro Abstract. The aim of this study is to analyse the voluminous emigration correspondence of Count Béla Teleki in order to highlight his main thoughts about the future of Transylvania. Béla Teleki was one of the most important Transylvanian politicians in the middle of the 20th century. His political career reached its peak at the time when Northern Transylvania was regained by Hungary after the Second Vienna Award. At the end of the Second World War, Teleki was persecuted by the Secret Police of the new Hungarian Communist Regime. Starting from 1951, he lived in the United States until his death on 7 February 1990. During the decades of his life in emigration, he carried on a great correspondence with the leading personalities of the Hungarian emigration in the West, several members of the American Senate, and even with President Gerald Ford. In this way, Béla Teleki became one of the central personalities of the Hungarian emigration in the Western World. His opinion, his voice were determining. This study summarizes the most important theme Béla Teleki was preoccupied with, the future of Transylvania, as he imagined it, by making a short analysis of his correspondence consisting of thousands of letters.

Keywords: Transylvania, border, minorities, human rights, emigration, correspondence

1

This paper was presented at the conference Past, Present and Future of Central Europe, organized by Budapest Business School and Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania in Cluj-Napoca on 20 November 2020 (online conference).

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János Kristóf MURÁDIN

Introduction The issue of Transylvania’s belonging to one state or the other has already been at the forefront of Hungarian–Romanian relationships since the conclusion of the Trianon Treaty, but especially after the considerable frontier modifications operated as a result of the Second World War. During the last one hundred years, several scenarios have been elaborated for the future of this ethnically mixed region of the size of a country: it should belong to the Romanian state but receive wide self-determination rights; it should be brought back under Hungarian administration; it should be a region divided by several internal borders between Hungary and Romania; it should form an independent, sovereign state based on a federal structure, relying on the local autonomy of different ethnic groups, etc. So much has been said about this topic that at first glance it might seem that nothing new could be said about it.

However, the voluminous emigration correspondence of Count Béla Teleki reveals several interesting ideas to the researcher, new important elements reflecting the real situation of Transylvania, much of which I had the opportunity to study in Budapest, at the Manuscripts Archives of the National Széchényi Library before the COVID-19 pandemic. Feasible solutions arising from a real knowledge of the political, economic, and demographic situation are outlined in Béla Teleki’s letters concerning Transylvania’s future. During the 43 years of his life in emigration, there was an extensive exchange of correspondence between Béla Teleki, a Transylvanian aristocrat politician, and a number of leading personalities of the age. During the decades spent in Austria and then in the USA, Béla Teleki had gradually become one of the central figures and leaders of Hungarian emigration in the West. His opinion, his voice had gained significant importance regarding topics that most preoccupied both him and his environment. Among these, Transylvania and the future of Hungarians in Transylvania undoubtedly ranked first.

In this study, I attempt to summarize and present Count Béla Teleki’s views on possible pathways for Transylvania’s future and his ensuing plans, as he conceived them, drawing on his vast written legacy consisting of several thousands of letters.

Béla Teleki’s Life and Public Activity up to 1944 Before turning to the analysis of his correspondence, I shall first present Béla Teleki himself. I came across his name approximately ten years ago, when I started to research the history of the dominant Hungarian political formation in Northern Transylvania between 1940 and 1944, i.e. the Transylvanian Party. This exploratory work resulted in an independent monograph on the topic (Murádin 2019). As President of the Transylvanian Party, Béla Teleki was one of the bestknown politicians of his age. His appearance on the Hungarian political scene of

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Transylvania was sudden and unexpected. Then, following a short period of glory (4 years), he disappeared just as suddenly after the regime change in 1944.

Count Béla Teleki of Szék was born in Kolozsvár (Cluj) on 16 May 1899 (Tibori Szabó 1993: 5–6). He was a true aristocrat coming from one of the most prominent families of the Hungarian nobility in Transylvania, the Szék branch of the very numerous Teleki family. He considered himself primarily a farming landlord, with his political self coming only in second place.2 Yet, he was primarily appreciated for his political activity. The State Protection Authority ’s (Államvédelmi Hatóság, or ÁVH) report of 4 May 1956, in which a secret agent of the Hungarian secret police characterizes him as a follows: ‘a very talented, slightly aggressive politician. He is cultivated, speaks several languages, is broadminded’,3 and is very illustrative in this sense.

It can be stated that the personality of Count Béla Teleki was greatly influenced by his family background, which shaped his view of the world and, within it, his attitude towards the Hungarians of Transylvania. He still belonged to the generation of aristocrats and politicians fundamentally driven by public service in its noblest sense. In this respect, his maternal grandfather, Baron Miklós Wesselényi (the younger), the ‘flood sailor’,4 who saved many lives during the Great Flood of Pest in 1838, and his paternal uncle, Prime Minister Count Pál Teleki, who had a tragic fate, could have been his role models.5 Participation in public life and in society were not unfamiliar to his father, Count Artúr Teleki either. As lay Chief Curator of the Reformed Diocese of Transylvania, Vice-President of the National Hungarian Party (Sebestyén 2011: 455), and then president of the territorial organizations of the Transylvanian Party of Maros-Torda (Mureş-Turda) County and Marosvásárhely (Târgu-Mureş ),6 he tried to act for the benefit of Hungarians at the level of both ecclesiastical and political institutions.

2

3

4 5

6

Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára (Historical Archives of the State Security Services, or ÁSZTL). 3.2.3. Mt-578/1. Munka Dosszié Galambos Edit. 49. Galambos Edit jelentése Teleki Béláról (Edit Galambos Work File. 49. Edit Galambos’s Report on Béla Teleki). Budapest, 18 April 1957 [‘Galambos Report on Béla Teleki’]. ÁBTL. 3.2.5. O-8-001/1. Objektum Dosszié. „Farkasok” Magyar Nemzeti Bizottmány. 37. Dunai Lajos feljegyzése Teleki Béláról (Object File. ‘Wolves’ Hungarian National Council. 37. Lajos Dunai’s Note on Béla Teleki), Budapest, 4 May 1956 [‘Dunai Note on Béla Teleki’]. The quotation was translated by the author.

Ibidem.

Országos Széchényi Könyvtár (National Széchényi Library, or OSZK). Kézirattár. Fond 580.

Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 2. doboz. 125. pallium. 1. l. Teleki Béla levele az Életünk című folyóirat szerkesztőjének, Pete Györgynek (Manuscripts Archive, Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 2.

Pallium 125. 1. 1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to György Pete, the Editor of the Periodical Életünk). New York, 10 October 1979.

Count Artúr Teleki was elected with great enthusiasm as President of the Transylvanian Party in Marosvásárhely. Kolozsvári Estilap 24 October 1941: IX.241:3.

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János Kristóf MURÁDIN

Through her mother, Baroness Ilona Wesselényi,7 Béla Teleki was the heir of the famous Wesselényi castle in Zsibó (Jibou). But he did not spend most of his childhood in this huge castle from the Szilágyság region (Sălaj) but partly on his father’s estate in Tancs (Tonciu) and in the other family castle near Marosvásárhely and partly in his birth town, Kolozsvár, in the Teleki Palace.8 His youth was marked

by World War I, which also forced him to suspend his legal studies began at Ferenc József University in 1917, because due to his origins he was expected to volunteer for military service. He served in the war, holding the rank of ensign for more than a year, between 1917 and 1918, as officer of the 7th k.u.k. Hussar Regiment (Botlik 2020: 517). After the collapse caused by World War I, he settled in Zsibó, and meanwhile, between 1920 and 1922, he earned a doctoral degree in agricultural sciences at the University of Debrecen.9 At that time, farming was still his aspiration, and he devoted all his time to it. He created a model farm in Zsibó, achieving considerable success particularly in the field of livestock farming and seed production. He had four children from his marriage with Anna Benz, celebrated in 1930: Miklós (1931), Éva (1933), Ilona (1937), and Pál (1942) (Teleki 1995: 4, 174).

By the 1930s, Béla Teleki had become one of the most prestigious farming specialists in Transylvania, eloquently illustrated by his election, together with Dr Pál Szász, as Vice Chair of the Transylvanian Hungarian Economic Association (Erdélyi Magyar Gazdasági Egyesület, or EMGE) in 1936 (Demeter–Venczel 1940: 20). As a result of the Second Vienna Award of 30 August 1940, similarly to Transylvania, which was divided between Hungary and Romania, the EMGE was also divided into two. Béla Teleki became President of the Northern Transylvanian EMGE functioning under the authority of the Hungarian state (Fülöp–Vincze 1998: 131). With the financial support of the Hungarian state, he started his significant organizational work, initiated the establishment of the farmers’ clubs, started successful farming courses, and held major events related to seeds and animals, all of the above having contributed to the consolidation of his reputation in political circles as well (Tibori Szabó 1993: 24). He became a Member of Parliament selected from Transylvania in October 1940, and one month later, on 12 November 1940, he became one of the vice-presidents of the Northern Transylvanian independent parliamentary group.10 From there, the way was paved to his election as President of the Transylvanian Party formed in December 1940 by members of this independent group. He held this function starting from the constituent assembly of the Party,

7

8 9 10

ÁBTL. 3.2.3. Mt-578/1. Munka Dosszié Galambos Edit. 17. Galambos Edit jelentése a Teleki családról (Edit Galambos Work File. 17. Edit Galambos’s Report on the Teleki Family). Budapest, 13 March 1958. ÁBTL. Galambos Report on Béla Teleki. ÁBTL. Galambos Report on Béla Teleki.

The Transylvanian members of the Parliament formed an independent parliamentary group.

Ellenzék 1940, 61/261 (14 November), 5.

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organized on 28 May 1941, until 24 August 1941, when this political formation ceased to exist (Murádin 2019: 53–241).

Béla Teleki was one of the most active Transylvanian members of the Hungarian Parliament. During his nearly four-year mandate, he held 8 speeches in the Hungarian Parliament although his work was seriously impeded by the temporary cessation of parliamentary sessions from 4 May to 21 October 1943 (Pritz 2011: 127) and then, by 1944, by an increasing loss of political power of the Parliament in the Hungarian political life. As president of the Party, he was the one to announce in the parliament the formation of the Transylvanian Party on 17 June 1941 and to present the programme of the Party.11 Then, on 28 November 1941, after the start of the military campaign against the Soviet Union, he presented the external and internal political position of the Transylvanian Party in this radically changed situation.12 Among Teleki’s most important speeches, it is worthwhile to mention his interpellation of 3 December 1941 addressed to the Minister of Economy and Transport, in which he requested the acceleration of construction works of the Szeretfalva–Déda (Sărăţel– Deda) connecting railway, of key importance for access to Szeklerland,13 as well as his speech given on 15 March 1942, in which he summed up the most important external and internal political guidelines of the Transylvanian Party after the Kállay government had taken office.14 His speech given on 25 November 1942, in which he presented the expectations of Hungarians in Northern Transylvania, drawing attention to the situation of the Hungarian minority in Southern Transylvania and at the same time to the need for a solution to the nationality problem in Northern Transylvania, was also a resounding success.15 Béla Teleki’s parliamentary speech given one year later, on 30 November 1943, in which he already speaks about postwar Hungary, urging comprehensive reforms at the political, administrative, and economic level, also detailing his later highly proclaimed view of the common destiny of peoples living in the Danube Basin, demonstrates his farsightedness and strategic thinking.16 Furthermore, in his other parliamentary speeches, he also addressed the question of relationships with Romania, the need for social reforms, and certainly the question of economic development opportunities so dear to him.

His important political activity did not stop him from performing his duties undertaken as a business leader. He remained committed to his duties as the President of EMGE. He participated in farmer’s days and village house inaugurations, held 11 12 13 14 15 16

Erdély a magyar Képviselőházban (Transylvania in the Hungarian House of Representatives).

Kolozsvár: Az Erdélyi Párt kiadása. Minerva Nyomda Rt. 1942: 5–9.

Idem: 10–22.

Idem: 59–60.

Erdély a magyar Képviselőházban II (Transylvania in the Hungarian House of Representatives II). Kolozsvár: Az Erdélyi Párt kiadása. Lengyel Albert Könyvnyomdája. 1943: 5–11.

Idem: 12–33.

Erdély a magyar Országgyűlésen III (Transylvania at the Hungarian National Assembly III).

Kolozsvár: Az Erdélyi Párt kiadása. Minerva Nyomda Rt. 1944: 7–29.

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presentations at farmer’s clubs, and managed his model farm in Zsibó. Meanwhile, he became better known as a politician and agrarian specialist, gradually turning into an important public figure.

Within a short time, however, the German invasion of Hungary on 19 March 1944 caused a major disruption in his career. After that, Béla Teleki gave up his parliamentary activity because, on the one hand, he did not see the meaning of it in a country that had lost its sovereignty, and, on the other hand, he did not want to assume a political role in this new regime that was servile to the Germans. A few months later, in June 1944, he was offered the position of Minister of Transylvanian Affairs, without portfolio,17 but he refused it (Szász 2012: 102). After a short hesitation, he joined the left wing of the Transylvanian Party organized around Imre Mikó and Sándor Vita, and he tried to establish relationships with leftist intellectuals from Northern Transylvania (Balogh 1992: 110). Following Romania’s changing sides on 23 August 1944, his main goal was for Hungary to withdraw from the war, and thereby he hoped that the re-annexation of Northern Transylvania would persist. After the cessation of the Transylvanian Party, he took part in the Transylvanian Hungarian Council (Erdélyi Magyar Tanács) established on 29 August 1944 by leftist leading personalities, church leaders, writers, trade union leaders, and Hungarian intellectuals from different fields – he presided until 9 October (Szász 2012: 102). As one of Transylvania’s most important opinion leader politicians, he participated at the Budapest Crown Council of 10 September 1944, where he argued for withdrawing from the war (Balogh 1992: 110). He contributed to the elaboration of the memorandum of 12 September addressed to Horthy, in which the regent was requested to give up the military defence of Transylvania. He attained the military evacuation of Kolozsvár without any fight, and thereby he protected the capital of Northern Transylvania from meaningless destruction (Filep 2008: 161).

Béla Teleki’s Persecution and Emigration in 1944–1945 A few days before the Soviet and Romanian troops entered Cluj, on 9 October 1944, Béla Teleki and his three colleagues – István Szász, EMGE director, central cashier of the Transylvanian Party and one of the vice-presidents of the Cluj County party organization; Sándor Vita, Member of the Parliament; his personal assistant, Béla Demeter – had been admitted to the Department of Internal Medicine managed

by Professor Dr Imre Haynal of the Cluj university hospital (Gróf Bethlen 2019: 17

Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár. Országos Levéltár (Hungarian National Archives. State Archives).

P 2256. No. 117. Teleki Béla iratai 1942–1944. 1. csomó. 267. tétel. Dr. Páll György központi főtitkár jelentése Teleki Béla pártelnöknek (Béla Teleki’s Documents 1942–1944. Bundle 1. Item 267. The Report of Secretary-General Dr György Páll to Party Leader Béla Teleki). Kolozsvár, 7 June 1944. 2.

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244). Shortly after the entry of the Soviet and Romanian troops, on 17 October, all four were forcibly taken away based on anonymous denunciations. As the front line moved forward to the West, they were moved along, either on open trucks or on foot. This is how they reached Debrecen and then, two weeks later, Budapest through Tiszalök, Salgótarján, and Dunapentele,18 where they were incarcerated in the Markó Street Prison. There, István Szász and Béla Demeter were set free, but Béla Teleki and Sándor Vita were taken to the Esterházy Castle in Bernolákovo (Cseklész), near Bratislava (Pozsony), in February 1945.19 Meanwhile, with the intermediation of Bishop of the Reformed Diocese János Vásárhelyi, Teleki’s family turned to Edgár Balogh, prominent leftist Transylvanian publicist, to seek their liberation. Balogh wrote a letter to Marshal Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky, military commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front that occupied Cluj, in which he described Béla Teleki’s role in the resistance. This letter was signed by several prominent leftist leaders, but Communist party members refused to sign it (Balogh 1978: 362). It is now impossible to establish whether to the effect of this letter or – as once again later – due to the impossibility to press charges, but Count Béla Teleki was released in Bratislava by the Soviets on 25 April 1945. However, he could hardly enjoy his freedom as he was arrested again, on the same day, by the new Hungarian secret police, the Political Police Department (later renamed State Protection Authority).20 First, he was taken together with Sándor Vita to Budapest, to 60 Andrássy Avenue, the interrogation centre of the political police, then they were transported to the collecting prison on Fő Street, and then to the Markó Street Prison. Here Béla Teleki was found ill, wherefore he was taken to a separate ward within Rókus Hospital. There, his relatives could talk with him under police surveillance, in exchange for certain gifts. Finally, at the end of October 1945, he was handed over again to the Soviets, who placed him into custody in one of the villas on Városligeti Fasor. After two or three weeks, in lack of concrete charges, he was set free by the Soviets together with Sándor Vita (Tibori Szabó 1993: 28–29).

Then, for a short period of time, Béla Teleki stayed at his cousin’s place, Géza Teleki, in Budapest. Meanwhile, in Romania, based on accusations made by nationalist elements, Béla Teleki was sentenced to 20 years in prison in absentia.21 Therefore, he could not return home. Not so much later, this important politician of the Horthy era was also sentenced to life in prison in Hungary. In the following 18 19

20 21

Stalingrad between 1951 and 1961, today Dunaújváros.

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 2. doboz. 154. pallium. Teleki Béla 1965 és 1987 között írott levelei Gosztonyi Péternek (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 2. Pallium 154. Béla Teleki’s Letters Written to Péter Gosztonyi between 1965 and 1987). ÁBTL 3.1.9. V-63925. Vizsgálati dosszié gr. Teleki Béla és tsa. ügyében. 3. Őrizetbevételi utasítás (Investigation File in the Case of Count Béla Teleki and Others. 3. Arrest Order). 25 April 1945. ÁBTL. 2.2.1. I/5.8. Operatív nyilvántartás. Teleki Béla (Operative Records. Béla Teleki).

Budapest, 16 July 1965.

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two years, between 1945 and 1947, he was forced to hide in rural Hungary. First, he lived under extremely difficult circumstances in Rácalmás in Fejér County and then in Bodrogkisfalud in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County until October 1947, when he finally managed to flee to Austria.22 He temporarily settled in Innsbruck, and then in June 1951 he left for the United States of America.23 He found a new home in New York, where he first worked as a real estate agent and then as manager of an independent real estate office for a long time.24

Béla Teleki, Leading Personality of the Western Hungarian Emigration Upon his arrival to Austria, Béla Teleki immediately joined the political life of the 1945 Western European, conservative Hungarian emigration embracing right-wing values. After the death on 3 March 1948 of Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer, renowned leader of the Hungarian emigration and former Minister of Internal Affairs, his role was mainly assumed by Béla Teleki, who became one of the key political actors of the Hungarian emigration from the West.25 The then established conservative Hungarian Union movement strived to bring together Hungarians living in Western Europe around traditional civil and Christian values.26 The voice of his movement, the emigration paper entitled Union started in June 1950,27 was also devoted to this aim.28 Teleki had already participated in the Hungarian National Council (Magyar Nemzeti Bizottmány, or HNC) since its establishment in 1949. The principles of the HNC, which propagated the unity of the Hungarian nation, excluding both rightwing and left-wing extremists and opposing the Communist regime in Hungary 22 23

24

25 26

27

28

ÁBTL. Galambos Report on Béla Teleki.

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 1. doboz. 13. pallium. 1. l. Teleki Béla levele Bánffy Vicának (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 1. Pallium 13. 1. 1.

Béla Teleki’s Letter to Vica Bánffy). New York, 9 May 1986.

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 1. doboz. 69. pallium. 16. l. Teleki Béla levele Bonczos Miklósnak (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 1. Pallium 69.

16. 1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to Miklós Bonczos). New York, 9 February 1971. ÁBTL. Galambos Report on Béla Teleki.

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 1. doboz. 39. pallium. 1. l. Teleki Béla levele Baranyai Lipótnak (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 1. Pallium 39. 1.

1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to Lipót Baranyai). Rum (Austria), 30 April 1949.

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 2. doboz. 127. pallium. 1. l. Teleki Béla levele Falcione Árpádnak (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 2. Pallium 127.

1. 1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to Árpád Falcione). Fribourg (Switzerland), 5 August 1950. ÁBTL. 3.2.3. Mt-655/11. Munka Dosszié Dunai Lajos. A magyar emigráció általános helyzete Ausztriában és Nyugat-Németországban. Dunai Lajos összefoglaló jelentése (Lajos Dunai Work File. The General Situation of the Hungarian Emigration in Austria and West Germany. Lajos Dunai’s Summary Report). 181–182.

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– considering itself as some sort of Hungarian emigration government –, resonated with Béla Teleki’s fundamentally national Christian political views in many respects.

Through his active involvement in the HNC, he developed closer relationships with its leaders, Béla Varga, György Bakách-Bessenyey, Aladár Szegedy-Maszák, and especially Tibor Eckhardt, whom he highly esteemed.29 He worked with the latter for years, also holding the position of Vice-President of the Defence Commission within the HNC beside him.30 From the same year already, beginning with 1949, Béla Teleki also became involved in the activity of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) as well, which was the predecessor of the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). As Head of the IRO headquarters in Switzerland,31 he went to great lengths to ensure that the Hungarian refugees receive migration aid, and he was also instrumental in ensuring that the IRO would advance the travel expenses of those who wanted to settle on the American continent. Thus, he made it possible for many fellow sufferers to emigrate to the USA, and later, in 1951, his own emigration became possible in this way.

Count Béla Teleki, former national President of the Transylvanian Party and politician of the Horthy regime sentenced to life in prison in Hungary and to death in Romania, could not return home, but in spirit he had never been uprooted from Transylvania. Nothing illustrates this better than the establishment of the American Transylvanian Federation32 – whose president and board member he remained until his death in 1990 at the age of 90 – one year upon his arrival to New York, in 1952, when he was in serious financial distress (Várdy 2000: 541). Furthermore, he was editor of the periodical entitled Transsylvania, published in the USA on a quarterly basis for three decades, from 1959 to his death, in which he sought to inform the American public opinion about the current situation in Transylvania and the main issues related to it (Tibori Szabó 1993: 7).

Béla Teleki, who learnt English gradually and only started to realize an income starting from 1953, had the Transylvanian problem and the efforts to bring together the Hungarian emigration from the West at heart.33 Therefore, he co-founded 29

30

31 32

33

In this respect, see Béla Teleki’s eight letters written to Tibor Eckhardt between May 1950 and January 1951. OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 2. doboz. 115. pallium (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 2. Pallium 115). ÁBTL. 3.2.5. O-8-001/1. Objektum Dosszié. „Farkasok” Magyar Nemzeti Bizottmány. A Magyar Nemzeti Bizottmány Elnökétől. Varga Béla körlevele (Object File. ‘Wolves’ Hungarian National Council. From the Chairman of the Hungarian National Council. Béla Varga’s Circular Letter).

New York, 21 July 1948. ÁBTL. Galambos Report on Béla Teleki.

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 1. doboz. 73. pallium. 2. l. Teleki Béla levele Botár Istvánnak (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s legacy. Box 1. Pallium 73. 2. 1.

Béla Teleki’s Letter to István Botár). New York, 16 January 1976.

The interview of the author with Pál Teleki, Béla Teleki’s son. Budapest. 7 October 2019.

Property of the author. [‘Pál Teleki Interview’].

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Társaskör (Club) within the Hungarian House of New York together with Dr István Szentpály, and he continuously assisted the American Hungarian Library and Historical Society (Borbándi 1997: 450–451), of whose board he was also member in 1964.34 Since the fifties, he put all his efforts into bringing together – on a broad national basis – the Hungarian emigration and especially into strengthening the relationships between Hungarian emigrants from Transylvania, just as he had done before within the framework of the HNC in Austria. Therefore, he also assumed the position of President of the Transylvanian Administrative Committee (Erdélyi Intézőbizottság) established in 1965 as the forum linking different immigrant groups,35 and he did not reject old immigration organizations either such as the American Hungarian Federation, of which he became a vice-president in 1968.36 Moreover, the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation (HHRF) – of which he was one of the initiators – may be considered one of the greatest achievements of his enthusiastic organizational efforts. Through its activity of monitoring the legal situation of the Hungarian minority living in communist Romania, then in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union (Subcarpathia), as well as of credibly informing the US Government and the Congress, this human rights organization established in 1967 was of enormous help to Hungarians living in minority in the Carpathian Basin, outside the borders of post-Trianon Hungary.

Today, the HHRF still performs its activity in line with Béla Teleki’s principles, i.e. by silent but consistent everyday work, as well as constant, credible information instead of noisy campaigns, hoping to improve the situation of Hungarian communities living in minority.37 Béla Teleki lived to witness the regime change in 1989, and then in a few months, on 7 February 1990, he died of liver cancer in his New York home, fully aware and conscious.38 His ashes were put to rest in Alba Regia Chapel in Berkeley, West Virginia.39

34 35

36

37 38 39

ÁBTL. 3.2.4. K-182. „B” Dosszié Nagy Klára. 41. Hévizi Klára jelentése Teleki Béláról (“B” Nagy Klára File. 41. Klára Hévizi’s Report on Béla Teleki. Budapest, 4 December 1961). ÁBTL. 3.2.5. O-8-2001/18. Amerikai Magyar Szövetség. 71. Jegyzőkönyv az Erdélyi Intéző Bizottság (EIB) első rendes üléséről (American Hungarian Federation. 71. Minutes of the First Regular Meeting of the Transylvanian Administrative Committee. New York, 24 January 1966 [‘Minutes of the First Regular Meeting of the Transylvanian Administrative Committee’].

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 1. doboz. 69. pallium. 16. l. Teleki Béla levele Bonczos Miklósnak (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 1. Pallium 69.

16. 1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to Miklós Bonczos). New York, 9 February 1971.

The interview of the author with Zsolt Szekeres, President of the HHRF. Budapest, 13 September 2019. Property of the author.

Pál Teleki Interview.

Count Béla Teleki of Szék’s obituary. Property of his descendants.

The Problem of Transylvania in the Emigration Correspondence...

24

Béla Teleki’s Emigration Correspondence Béla Teleki had already started his extensive emigration correspondence during his stay in Austria, at the end of the 1940s. The part concerning Transylvania’s future is the main topic of our study. The several thousand letters written by and addressed to Béla Teleki, copies of which are kept in the Manuscript Archives of the National Széchényi Library, stand for his extensive network of pen friends, and bear a great value as a historical source. At that time, different immigrant groups were essentially keeping contact through correspondence, which most of the time resulted in exchanges of letters built on direct, personal acquaintance. Furthermore, Béla Teleki continuously corresponded with important personalities from Transylvania and Hungary, which is also a very important source for a historian. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, I was unable to fully research this immense correspondence legacy, but from researching its significant part it is now clear that it spans over four decades, covering Béla Teleki’s entire life spent in emigration, from his arrival to Austria to his death in 1990.

The earliest letter pertaining to this legacy was dated 24 April 1949, and it was written by Teleki from Rum, Austria, to an old colleague of his, Dr Dezső Albrecht, former Executive Vice-President of the Transylvanian Party, who was by then already living in Paris. The latest level I studied was written in New York on 3 December 1988, a little more than a year before Béla Teleki’s death, and it was addressed to Pál Péter Domokos, an ethnographer living in Transylvania. All his letters were written in Hungarian, but, as a clear proof of his broad education and knowledge of foreign languages, he also addressed his non-Hungarian pen friends in English, German, and sometimes even in French. Except the early years full of hardships, most of his letters were written on a typewriter and then from 1987 on electronic typewriter. This not only reflects Béla Teleki’s gradually improving financial situation, which was very difficult at the beginning, but it also demonstrates his keeping up with the times, as getting acquainted with the use of electronic typewriters and their regular use is an impressive performance for an old man over 80. And it is a joy for the researcher, as the text of the letters – even of the handwritten ones – are clearly legible.

In line with the extent of this correspondence, the circle of pen friends covers a rather large social spectrum. It is beyond the scope of this short study to list the names of all the persons he was in correspondence with; therefore, taking into consideration only the most important social categories, we shall only highlight some of the very important pen friends. Certainly, there are several politicians among them: Miklós Bonczos, Minister of Internal Affairs, Dezső Sulyok, Tibor Eckhardt, Jenő Padányi Gulyás, Gusztáv Kövér, Sándor Vita, and Dezső Albrecht (the last three former politicians of the Transylvanian Party, Members of the Parliament). He was in correspondence with diplomats (György Bakách-Bessenyey, ambassador), economists (Lipót Baranyai, President of the Hungarian National Bank), and

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military officers (General Lajos Dálnoki Veress, formerly Commander of the IX Corps of Cluj and then Commander of the 2nd Hungarian Army) concerning important political, social, and economic matters. Always very interested in Transylvanian matters, Béla Teleki was in permanent contact with Hungarian intellectuals from Hungary and Transylvania living in emigration, striving to promote the cause of Hungarians in Transylvania. Thus, among his pen friends, we find writers and poets (Tibor Flórián, Gábor Görgei, Domokos Gyallay Pap), linguists (Ádám Szabó T.), ethnographers (Pál Péter Domokos), and especially historians (Péter Gosztonyi, Ildikó Lipcsey, András Ludányi), as well as renowned gastronomists (Pál Kövi).

Consequently, his voluminous correspondence amounts to a rather special legacy in terms of cultural history.

Béla Teleki’s Main Goals in Emigration, in the Light of his Letters After he had been forced to leave Hungary and his return to Transylvania had become impossible, Count Béla Teleki channelled all his energy into the political organization of emigration. By reading his letters, it can be stated that Teleki’s main goal since 1947 up to his emigration to the USA, i.e. during his entire stay in Austria, was to bring together the Hungarian emigration from Western Europe on a broad, national, and Christian basis. He would have liked to manage – under the leadership of the highly respected former President of the Independent Smallholder’s Party (Független Kisgazdapárt), Tibor Eckhardt, with whom he was on extremely good terms – to integrate the entire Hungarian emigration from Western Europe adhering to right-wing values into a unitary organization. As he formulated it, its basis would have been provided by ‘the sound middle line of the national side’.40 In the beginning, he urged the expansion of the HNC,41 and then later he campaigned for a new unity. But all his efforts to this end were unsuccessful. It was impossible to bring together the Hungarian emigration deeply divided by individual conflicts of interest and personal conflicts. Not even the HNC was able to do it.

When his financial situation became critical and he was compelled to emigrate to the USA, Béla Teleki was in fact pursuing the same goal, only this time he was doing it in the interest of Hungarians living in America. He tried to engage in the activity of the American Transylvanian Federation (Amerikai Erdélyi Szövetség) established soon after his arrival for every non-extremist Hungarian immigrant 40

41

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Béla Teleki hagyatéka. 2. doboz. 127. pallium. 3. l. Teleki Béla levele Falcione Árpádnak (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 1. Pallium 127.

3. 1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to Árpád Falcione). New York, 19 June 1954.

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 1. doboz. 59. pallium. 1. l. Teleki Béla levele Bíró Benedeknek (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 1. Pallium 59. 1.

1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to Benedek Bíró). Fribourg (Switzerland), 10 August 1950.

The Problem of Transylvania in the Emigration Correspondence...

26

from Transylvania (Hermann 2011). A little more than a decade later, in 1956, he was already building an entire network by trying to unify three already existing organizations from the USA, grouping Hungarians from Transylvania: the American Hungarian Federation, the Transylvanian Committee (Erdélyi Bizottság) established in Cleveland in 1955, and the Movement for the Protection of Transylvania (Erdély Védelmében Mozgalom), newly established in 1965 under the aegis of the Transylvanian Administrative Committee, of which he became president. His plans reveal unfailing ambitions, which went well beyond his individual environment.

He had a vision of universal solidarity between Hungarians from Transylvania when he initiated the establishment of a global network based on the Transylvanian Administrative Committee. He considered that bringing together Hungarian emigrant groups dispersed all over the ‘free world’ was possible even during the Cold War, in the eventful second half of the 1960s. Through his letters, he was searching for partners to this end in the United States of America, Canada, Brazil, Australia, and Western Europe.42 His aim was to lay down some uniform principles as well as to take a common, global action for Transylvania and Hungarians from Transylvania every time the Hungarian minority community was subjected to discrimination or even persecution by the Romanian state. Béla Teleki was convinced that this was the only way to actually help Hungarians who were left at home, in Transylvania, considering that it would have an even greater impact and it would yield better results if an entire global network were to sustain their well-elaborated memorandums addressed to the United Nations and to Western democratic great powers instead of only one person or group. It was not up to him that this far-reaching plan could not be realized.

Béla Teleki’s deep anti-communism stemming from the period between the two world wars represented one of the cornerstones of his worldview. Thus, he believed that in the new world order created after 1945 neither the Transylvanian issue threatening to change existing power relations nor, beyond that, the situation of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania represented in itself a priority for the Soviet Union, which had a dominant position over Eastern Europe.43 Therefore, in line with the logic of the Cold War, there was no other possibility than convincing the leading politicians of Western great powers of the unsettled character of the Hungarian issue. During his long decades spent in emigration, Teleki has made several attempts in this regard. Certainly, he was most likely to draw the attention of leading political powers in the USA, where, making use of all his personal contacts – as, for example, in 1965 –, he was able to provide a copy of his memorandum 42

43

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 1. doboz. 4. pallium. 1. l. Teleki Béla levele Adorján Ferencnek (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 1. Pallium 4. 1.

1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to Ferenc Adorján). New York, 20 December 1965.

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 2. doboz. 156. pallium. 7. l. Teleki Béla levele Görgey Gábornak (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 2. Pallium 156. 7. 1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to Gábor Görgey). New York, 31 March 1977.

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János Kristóf MURÁDIN

on the repression of Hungarians in Transylvania to every single member of the Congress. Of these, two members of the Senate and eight members of the House of Representatives also delivered speeches in support of the case of Hungarians in Transylvania. Due to tensions created by the Cold War, no further steps could be taken at that time, but, certainly, this also contributed to a somewhat more lenient minority policy applied by the Ceauşescu regime, which was trying to win over the goodwill of the USA in the second half of the 1960s.

However, Béla Teleki was aware that this more moderate minority policy towards Hungarians was only a façade in communist Romania, so he soon went even further and proposed a plan concerning the resettlement of Hungarian immigrants from Transylvania, which in his opinion could be realized in Canada, a country with sufficiently large free land and with an appropriate climate. Seeing that the continuous and increasing emigration of Hungarians was practically unstoppable, Teleki’s aim was in fact to provide them the opportunity to remain a community and keep their national identity in the new world.44 But the Canadian government did not embrace this plan,45 which rendered it one of the very hopeful but never realized emigration utopias.

Of the Western European great powers, Béla Teleki established good relationships with the political leadership of the German Federal Republic and France. He had close relations especially with the top management of the CDU in the German Federal Republic. There he managed to ensure – along the shared Christian democratic line – that decision makers received his memorandums. He was successful in Paris as well. His 1965 memorandum was handed directly to President Charles de Gaulle.46 But all this was of little effect. None of the great powers was in a position to substantially change the direction of Romanian internal policies embedded in the Soviet sphere of interest, and, moreover, the time was not right for it either.

Neither Bonn – which was considering opening up to Eastern Europe, burning with the fever of Ostpolitik – nor Paris – confronted with serious social problems that led to student riots a few years later – considered it timely or politically productive to force the Hungarian issue. Then, when in 1968 Romania had apparently turned against the Soviet Union and refused to participate in the internationalist repression of the Prague Spring, every memorandum criticizing the Ceauşescu regime or urging action against it fell on deaf ears in the West.

44

45 46

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 1. doboz. 4. pallium. 1. l. Teleki Béla levele Adorján Ferencnek (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 1. Pallium 4. 1.

1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to Ferenc Adorján). New York, 20 December 1965. ÁBTL. Minutes of the first regular meeting of the Transylvanian Administrative Committee.

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 2. doboz. 132. pallium. 3. l. Teleki Béla levele Felméry Lajosnak (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 2. Pallium 132. 3. 1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to Lajos Felméry). s.l. [New York], 27 April 1965.

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Béla Teleki’s Plans for Transylvania By the second half of the 1960s, Béla Teleki was convinced that everything he only hoped for earlier had gradually become an absolute necessity: Transylvania should be separated from Romania. Otherwise, the assimilation or expulsion of Hungarians from Transylvania is inevitable, and therefore the liberation of Transylvania from Romanian domination should be promoted in every possible way.47 Teleki’s letters clearly reveal that essentially he identified five possible approaches to Transylvania’s future. The one regarding Transylvania born as an independent state based on a federal structure, which, however, could join the European construction process as member of the Danube Federation,48 comprising both Hungary and Romania (Walachia, Moldova, and Dobruja),49 was the most interesting. In his reasoning inspired by Lajos Kossuth and Oszkár Jászi’s plans concerning a Danube Federation, Transylvania was conceived as an entity that was separate from both Hungary and Romania. But even Teleki admitted the utopic character of this thought when he stated that this solution would be very difficult to implement and only acceptable for Hungarians in Transylvania as a last solution, considering that Transylvania’s majority population would nevertheless be Romanian. His feeling that in lack of enough power he could not initiate a modification of this magnitude was also right.

This plan was only viable if at least one Western great power could be won over for the cause and that state could be convinced to take the initiative.50 But in this regard Béla Teleki was in constant conflict with the extreme right-wing emigration, whose members all interpreted this as treason and considered that it would undoubtedly equal the giving up of the Transylvanian idea.51 Certainly, those who accused Béla Teleki of the latter did not know him well enough, as preserving Transylvania’s Hungarian character was exactly his most important aim.52 47

48

49

50

51

52

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 1. doboz. 60. pallium. 2. l. Teleki Béla levele Bíró Kálmánnak (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 1. Pallium 60. 2. 1.

Béla Teleki’s Letter to Kálmán Bíró). New York, 25 March 1955.

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 1. doboz. 7. pallium. 3. l. Teleki Béla levele Albrecht Dezsőnek (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 1. Pallium 7. 3.

1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to Dezső Albrecht). New York, 20 March 1954.

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 1. doboz. 60. pallium. 1. l. Teleki Béla levele Bíró Kálmánnak (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 1. Pallium 60. 1. 1.

Béla Teleki’s Letter to Kálmán Bíró. New York, 30 October 1954.

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 1. doboz. 7. pallium. 1. l. Teleki Béla levele Albrecht Dezsőnek (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 1. Pallium 7. 1.

1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to Dezső Albrecht). Rum (Austria), 24 April 1949.

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 1. doboz. 7. pallium. 2. l. Teleki Béla levele Albrecht Dezsőnek (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 1. Pallium 7. 2.

1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to Dezső Albrecht). New York, 20 February 1954.

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 1. doboz. 21. pallium. 1. l. Teleki Béla levele Bakos Sándornak (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 1. Pallium 21. 1.

1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to Sándor Bakos). New York, 20 March 1954.

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Nothing illustrates this better than a thought recurring in most of his letters, namely that Transylvania’s re-annexation to Hungary would represent the best solution.

However, with his inborn sense of reality, Béla Teleki always considered this second approach almost completely hopeless. In his opinion, there was perhaps a slight chance – and only under favourable circumstances – for bringing certain regions from the Partium inhabited by Hungarians under Hungarian administration.53 He considered that dividing Transylvania again between Hungary and Romania would not perhaps be an optimal solution, but it would be easier to put into practice.

In his opinion, this solution was acceptable in the long run, accompanied by a limited population exchange, yet he was also aware that it would in fact revive the Nazi-Fascist solution of 1940, and as such it could not be very attractive for any of the winning great powers.

The possibility of a census regarding Transylvania so often voiced among the emigration community recurred in Béla Teleki’s letter as well, but he considered it a clearly negative scenario. In his opinion, this would be definitely detrimental because, due to the existing demographic situation, the votes of the Romanian majority would practically legalize the loss of Transylvania. And he considered this unacceptable from a Hungarian point of view.54 Finally, he considered that the last and at the same time the worst solution was to leave the entire Transylvania under Romanian administration. In his opinion, this would lead to the gradual disappearance of Hungarians from Transylvania.55 So far, different census results have basically confirmed this assumption.

Overviewing Béla Teleki’s plans concerning Transylvania, it may be stated that – setting out from the concept of revisionism and drawing on the four-year-long experience of Transylvania divided by the Second Vienna Award –, in his opinion, border change was the only adequate solution. However, being fully aware of the political situation characteristic of the Cold War period, he modified it by taking into consideration the real power relationships in such a way as to render it attainable, even if the chances were slim. He believed that Hungarians in Transylvania and, at the same time, the ideal of Transylvania could be saved in this way. The following telling lines from one of his letters written in 1965 vividly illustrate both his sense of political reality and strategic thinking: Hungarians in Transylvania could only be saved by separating Transylvania from Romania, but this may not be invoked today given that the Western 53

54

55

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 1. doboz. 60. pallium. 2. l. Teleki Béla levele Bíró Kálmánnak (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 1. Pallium 60. 2. 1.

Béla Teleki’s Letter to Kálmán Bíró). New York, 25 March 1955.

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 1. doboz. 4. pallium. 1. l. Teleki Béla levele Adorján Ferencnek (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 1. Pallium 4. 1.

1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to Ferenc Adorján). New York, 20 December 1965.

Ibidem.

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30

position and political climate is perhaps less favourable than the Eastern one. Today, this could only be invoked by someone who wishes to harm the Hungarians of Transylvania, as no result can be achieved today, but it would encourage Romanians to more ruthless repression, more intense denationalization, or the expulsion of Hungarians. However, if the entire free world keeps the issue of stopping the repression of and granting human rights to Hungarians on the agenda, this would perhaps give them enough time to survive until a more favourable moment comes, when a solution on the merits might be taken into consideration and achieved.56

Fight for Transylvania in Emigration Béla Teleki’s voluminous emigration correspondence reveals that he did not get bogged down in planning, which was so typical of those living in emigration, but he wanted to actually do something in practice for the cause of ‘Hungarian Transylvania’.

He embraced Imre Filep’s (Chief Notary of the Unitarian Church in Hungary) 1965 plan on a Central European Confederation, as his own plan regarding the future of Transylvania presented above could be integrated into it. In Filep’s conception, a confederation would have entailed an extensive Central European cooperation as, besides Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Austria, of the Eastern Bloc it was supposed to include the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Transylvania, also as an independent state. The aim was to defuse the European Cold War confrontation on the one hand and the Central European ethnic conflicts on the other. Basically, this Central European confederation would have been based on neutrality, establishing partnerships with both Western European states and the Soviet Union and therefore ensuring the European balance of power.57 This, however, went against the interests of the great powers, especially with the principle of Moscow’s Eastern European dominance. Imre Filep’s plan was not unequivocally supported by the West; hence, it proved unfeasible.

Nonetheless, it may be stated that if realized, this plan would have led to the rise of a new Central European power centre of which Transylvania would have also been part of and which would have been based on a single monetary, tax, and customs system, as well as a common army and external policy. In an independent Transylvania, integrated in such a community, national minorities could have enjoyed a wide administrative autonomy and the recognition of their mother

56 57

Ibidem.

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 2. doboz. 137. pallium. 6–7. l. Filep Imre levele Teleki Bélának (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 2. Pallium 137. 6-7. 1. Imre Filep’s Letter to Béla Teleki). Splügen (Switzerland), 14 May 1965.

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tongues as regional official languages.58 Béla Teleki considered that this could be advantageous for Romanians as well, and therefore he hoped that the plan would succeed. It was not his fault that it was impracticable.

Besides embracing plans, Teleki tried for years to win over the US administration to the Transylvanian cause by a series of memoranda. He was one of the signatories of the memorandum submitted by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the American Hungarian Federation (AHF) to President Lyndon Johnson, the Congress, and the UN in July 1965, in which the oldest Hungarian organization in the US was requesting intervention to stop the persecution of Hungarians in Transylvania.59 As a result of this memorandum, 51 representatives turned to Secretary of State David Dean Rusk in writing, detailing the persecution of Hungarians in Transylvania by the Romanian communist regime and requesting the intervention of the US Government.60 Not exactly four years later, in March 1969, Béla Teleki is also one of the signatories of the memorandum written by the AHF, the American group of the Freedom Fighters Federation, and the Hungarian Lawyers’ Association to President Richard Nixon, in which they requested ‘the neutralization of the Danube Basin’61 under the pretext of the planned European conference on security,62 but without success, as by the end of the 1960s the Transylvanian cause was overshadowed by Nicolae Ceauşescu’s apparent rapprochement to the West. Washington saw in the Romanian dictator the possibility of dividing the Eastern Bloc. It is no wonder then that the omnipotent conducător ‘leader’ could make two visits to the US. Béla Teleki and the leading personalities of the American emigration tried in both cases to intervene and persuade government circles to drop the idea of receiving Ceauşescu. They were unsuccessful again as neither National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, whom they approached in October 1970,63 nor President Richard Nixon, to whom they

58 59

60

61

62

63

Ibidem. ÁBTL 3.2.5. O-8-2001/18. Amerikai Magyar Szövetség. 8. Beszámoló a hatvan éves Amerikai Magyar Szövetség tevékenységéről (American Hungarian Federation. 8. Report on the Activity of the American Hungarian Federation on its 60th Anniversary). ÁBTL 3.2.5. O-8-2001/18. Amerikai Magyar Szövetség. 11. Az Amerikai Magyar Szövetség vezetőségének körlevele (American Hungarian Federation. 11. Circular Letter of the American Hungarian Federation’s Leadership).

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 2. doboz. 93. pallium. 1. l. Teleki Béla levele Dálnoki Veress Lajosnak (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 2. Pallium 93. 1. 1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to Lajos Dálnoki Veress). New York, 8 December 1970.

Eastern-Western cooperation established later within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe (CSCE), functioning under the form of the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) since 1995. ÁBTL 3.2.5. O-8-2001/201. AMSZ-memorandumok, levelezés, jegyzékek (1968–1972).

32. Az Amerikai Magyar Szövetség vezetőségének meghallgatási kérelme Henry Kissinger nemzetbiztonsági tanácsadóhoz (AHF memorandums, correspondence, lists (1968–1972). 32.

The Hearing Request of the American Hungarian Federation Addressed to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger).

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32

turned in December 1973, listened to their protest. Thus, Ceauşescu’s visit could take place unhindered on both occasions.

The reception of the Romanian communist dictator caused enormous harm to Béla Teleki’s silent war for Transylvania, and at the same time it had a great impact on the entire internal life of the Hungarian emigration in the US as well since it conveyed the feeling that nothing could be achieved in relation to the Transylvanian cause through steady and consistent work or reasonable persuasion alone, without flaunting slogans and spectacular campaigns.

Consequently, radical voices emerged within both the American and the Western European emigration. The Transylvanian World Federation was established in 1974 already under the leadership of István Zolcsák, who lived in Brazil, and two eminent personalities of the Hungarian emigration from the US, Albert Wass and János Nádas.64 This new organization engaged in constant agitation in the interest of Transylvania’s re-annexation to Hungary. However, their widely distributed propaganda materials and often superficially drawn up submissions did not yield significant results.

They caused considerable annoyance to Béla Teleki, who continued to fight for the Transylvanian cause without highlighting his role but through scientifically wellfounded memorandums transmitted, making use of his personal contacts, to the persons deemed most appropriate. He attacked the Transylvanian World Federation in several letters because he believed that its detrimental extremism did much more harm to the Transylvanian cause than good. Among others, Teleki sharply condemned two memorandums transmitted by Wass Albert to President Gerald Ford in 1975, which in his opinion could have given Hungarians an incentive to leave Transylvania by putting the emigration of Hungarians in Transylvania persecuted by the Romanian communist regime on the agenda.65 While Albert Wass and his colleagues were mainly applying the principle of Hungarian-language publication dumping in relation to the Transylvanian cause, Béla Teleki was committed to fact-finding articles written in excellent English and published in the English-language press.66 He was convinced that the competent power factors could only be genuinely and effectively persuaded through the presentation of exact, justifiable, and credible data, building primarily on a human-rights-based argumentation. The volume entitled Witnesses to Cultural Genocide: First-Hand Reports on Rumania’s Minority Policies Today, published by 64

65

66

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 2. doboz. 147. pallium. 1. l. Teleki Béla levele Gábor Áronnak (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 2. Pallium 147. 1. 1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to Áron Gábor). New York, 25 September 1974.

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 1. doboz. 73. pallium. 1. l. Teleki Béla levele Botár Istvánnak (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 1. Pallium 73. 1. 1.

Béla Teleki’s Letter to István Botár). New York, 1 January 1976.

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 1. doboz. 9. pallium. 4. l. Teleki Béla levele Almay Bélának. New York (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 2.

Pallium 147. 1. 1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to Béla Almay). 24 April 1980.

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the American Transylvanian Federation led by Béla Teleki and the Committee for Human Rights in Romania (CHRR) in 1979 in two thousand copies with György Schöpflin’s foreword, is an excellent example.67 On many occasions, Béla Teleki – who knew Albert Wass well but István Zolcsák less – reproached them in his letters that their policy regarding Transylvania was heading in the wrong direction, trying to substantiate his own vision and methods.

Probably not knowing that – even if as a child – István Zolcsák had lived in Transylvania between 1928 and 1938, he fulminated to Lajos Felméri, as can be read in one of his letters written in 1973: Those who have not lived in Transylvania between the two world wars, who are not perfectly familiar with the Romanian way of thinking and methods, who do not know exactly and in every detail how Hungarians live and strive in Transylvania today and how they are still trying to get along, to survive, do not have the right to express their opinion on this matter, and they do not have the right to make the situation of Hungarians in Transylvania even harder.68 Besides justifying the authority of his own emigration actions with his Transylvanian political activity before 1944, Teleki was in fact afraid that, while unsuccessful in the West, this too noisy and less thought-out Zolcsák and Wass propaganda could encourage the Romanian communist leadership to repress Hungarians in Transylvania even more.69 Furthermore, Béla Teleki considered that agitation practised from the comfort of Western well-being was deeply unethical towards those living in minority under the communist regime. This is also reflected in a letter written to the same Lajos Felméri in 1974: ‘If they wish to work, they should work towards the Brazilian government and convince them, but they should not bluster in Hungarian newspapers from the safety of a shelter at the expense of Hungarians in Transylvania. Today, there is nothing that can be done anyway without causing harm. One shall therefore work for the future, secretly and in silence, as the Czechs did once.’70 67

68

69

70

Witnesses to Cultural Genocide: First-Hand Reports on Rumania’s Minority Policies Today.

American Transylvanian Federation. Committee for Human Rights in Rumania. New York, 1979.

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 2. doboz. 132. pallium. 16. l. Teleki Béla levele Felméry Lajosnak (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 2. Pallium 132. 16. 1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to Lajos Felméry). New York, 12 October 1973.

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 1. doboz. 9. pallium. 2. l. Teleki Béla levele Almay Bélának (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 1. Pallium 9. 2. 1.

Béla Teleki’s Letter to Béla Almay). New York, 21 June 1972.

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 2. doboz. 132. pallium. 18. l. Teleki Béla levele Felméry Lajosnak (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 2. Pallium 132. 18. 1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to Lajos Felméry). New York, 3 June 1974.

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Against the Ceauşescu Regime Towards the end of his life, Béla Teleki believed less and less in the possibility of Transylvania’s re-annexation to Hungary. Instead, he was more and more preoccupied with efforts to improve the situation of Hungarians in Romania and to decrease the intensity of their repression. As by the mid-70s the fate of Hungarians in Transylvania had started to worsen, Béla Teleki’s attention became increasingly focused on minority issues. Thus, besides his inherent anti-communism, he became a bitter enemy of the Ceauşescu regime. The persisting Romanian domination of Transylvania, Romania’s communist domination, and the anti-minority practices of the Romanian government all prompted him to take all the necessary steps against the Ceauşescu regime. He was also significantly motivated by his family’s fate, the fate of his loved ones who remained at home, the dispossession of the Count Teleki family from their estates, the displacement of its members, and the ensuing deprivation, which had barely changed since the middle of the 1940s.

Count Béla Teleki, who was then well over 70, was preparing for his last fight with the Ceauşescu regime.

He turned to his well-established tools, when in 1975 his organization, the American Transylvanian Federation, together with the Transylvanian Committee from Cleveland sent a new memorandum directly to President Gerald Ford.71 In this memorandum, he sharply criticized the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, which recognized the Soviet domination over Eastern Europe and stipulated the inviolability of frontiers, considering it a major mistake of the American diplomacy.

He also condemned President Ford for his visit to Romania paid on 2–3 August 1975, finding it utterly reprehensible that he joined the public folk dance in Victory Square, Bucharest, together with Ceauşescu. In his opinion, this represented the validation of the Ceauşescu regime and his anti-minority policy by the US.72 Béla Teleki viscerally rejected the politics of coexistence as well, maintaining his anti-communist position. He had fought against the Most-Favoured Nation clause granted to Romania since 1975, and his consistent efforts were finally rewarded in 1988, shortly before his death. Teleki’s aim was to ensure that the increasingly intense commerce between the US and the communist states was governed by basic principles such as limiting the repression of national minorities and granting human rights, i.e. the beginning of the democratization process. Therefore, he was constantly lobbying with both Republican and Democrat members of the US Congress for respect for human rights through the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation.

71

72

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 2. doboz. 135. pallium. 2. l. Teleki Béla levele Ferenczi Tibornak (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 2. Pallium 135. 2. 1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to Tibor Ferenczi). New York, 5 March 1975.

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 2. doboz. 142. pallium. 1. l. Teleki Béla levele Gerald Ford elnöknek (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 2.

Pallium 142. 1. 1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to President Gerald Ford). New York, 19 November 1975.

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When it became obvious that the spirit of Helsinki would give rise to a series of long transformations, the old Transylvanian count renewed his mobilizing efforts.

On the pretext of the Madrid Follow-up Meeting of the so-called Helsinki process, held in Madrid between 1980 and 1983, he urged the Hungarian emigration to jointly step up against the Ceauşescu regime.73 Although this initiative had failed, he did not feel discouraged, but in 1984 he turned directly to the European Parliament, perceiving its increasing role on the international scene. Through the Federal Union of European Nationalities, he submitted a draft Charter on National Minority Group Rights to the European Parliament.74 In addition, he continued to publish quality written materials. The Background Notes on Romania, a joint publication of the American Transylvanian Federation led by him, the Australian Transylvanian Federation, and the periodical entitled Nemzetőr,75 was published in 1986, and its aim was to sum up and factually present the true characteristics of the Ceauşescu regime, which was going through its darkest period.

It was perhaps due to the loud propaganda of Albert Wass that the Romanian secret services were not so much preoccupied with Béla Teleki. In all likelihood, the fact that he had never put himself forward was also a factor, and therefore he did not become a target of the Romanian communist regime’s henchmen although all the chances were there in the second half of the 1980s. By that time, Béla Teleki had already established close relationships with the Hungarian underground movements in Transylvania, trying to obtain the most up-to-date information about actions against the Hungarian minority in Romania. He also used his acquaintances and friendships to organize collections and humanitarian aid operations for Hungarians in Transylvania. He was continuously sending clothes, food, and medicine76 to Romania, facing shortages of basic necessities by then, and was also seeking to ease the sufferings of his relatives living in Transylvania.

Meanwhile, the loud propaganda of the Transylvanian World Federation continued, which was actually of help to Béla Teleki inasmuch as it shifted the focus away from his efforts. At the same time, however, the old conflict had also started to intensify, and in the September 1977 issue of the Hungarian emigration paper published in Canada and entitled Krónika (Chronicle) Albert Wass was actually 73

74

75

76

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 2. doboz. 157. pallium. 6. l. Teleki Béla levele Gyallay Pap Domokosnak (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 2.

Pallium 157. 6. 1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to Domokos Gyallay Pap). Geneva, 23 October 1979.

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 2. doboz. 505. pallium. 28. l. Teleki Béla levele Vita Sándornak (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 2. Pallium 505. 28. 1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to Sándor Vita). New York, 17 September 1984.

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 2. doboz. 130. pallium. 1. l. Teleki Béla levele Fekete Pálnak (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 2. Pallium 130.

1. 1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to Pál Fekete). New York, 18 February 1987.

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 1. doboz. 30. pallium. 1. l. Teleki Béla levele Balogh Elemérnek (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 1. Pallium 30. 1.

1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to Elemér Balogh). New York, 13 October 1988.

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accusing Béla Teleki of giving up on Transylvania. He blamed him for trying to avoid even the appearance of irredentism by which – horribile dictu – he was looking to seek the favour and goodwill of the Romanian government. According to Wass and his companions, Teleki’s idea of an independent Transylvania was a mere pipe dream. Instead, all efforts should be made to oblige Romania to comply with its international commitments. According to them, the effectiveness of coercion lied in a campaign constantly raising the possibility of invalidating the international agreements guaranteeing the existence of the Romanian state.77 However, Béla Teleki did not believe in this. With his sound judgement, he knew for sure that the power and influence of the Hungarian emigration was far too little for this and that the loud propaganda only incited the communist regime of Romania led by Ceauşescu to stronger resistance and further actions against Hungarians living in Transylvania.78 In the last years of his life, he was vitally concerned about the Hungarian community in Transylvania. In his letter written on 27 January 1986, he confessed to Captain Miklós Korponay, Chief of Staff of the Community of Hungarian Fighters (Magyar Harcosok Bajtársi Közössége), who was also living in emigration, that: ‘The cause of Hungarians in Transylvania is the most important Hungarian issue, which is sentenced to death if the Ceauşescu dictatorship can continue like this. In 50 years, there will be no Hungarians left in Transylvania.’79

Afterword In the last months of his life, Béla Teleki lived to witness the collapse of Eastern European communist regimes. He could see the news reports about the Polish round table discussions and the Pan-European Picnic as well as about the Hungarian regime change. He lived to see the fall of the Berlin wall, could see the photos of the Czechoslovakian Velvet Revolution that circulated the world media, and, last but not least, received the exhilarating news of the bloody collapse of the Romanian communist regime and the victory of the revolution. By the grace of fate, he did not live to see the pogrom against Hungarians in Marosvásárhely, the so-called Black March. He died on 7 February 1990 in the increasing solitude of his emigration to New York, thinking perhaps that his dark prediction from his letter cited above was no longer relevant.

77 78

79

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 2. doboz. 118. pallium. 4. l. (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 2. Pallium 118. 4. 1.). Krónika, September 1977: 3–6.

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 2. doboz. 147. pallium. 2. l. Teleki Béla levele Gábor Áronnak (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 2. Pallium 147. 2. 1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to Áron Gábor). New York, 5 October 1974.

OSZK. Kézirattár. Fond 580. Teleki Béla hagyatéka. 4. doboz. 244. pallium. 2. l. Teleki Béla levele Korponay Miklósnak (Manuscript Archives. Fonds 580. Béla Teleki’s Legacy. Box 4.

Pallium 244. 2. 1. Béla Teleki’s Letter to Miklós Korponay). New York, 27 January 1986.

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References Archive Sources, Manuscripts Historical Archives of the State Security Services – Hungary.

2.2.1. I/5.8. Operatív nyilvántartás. Teleki Béla (Operative records. Béla Teleki).

3.1.9. V-63925. Vizsgálati dosszié gr. Teleki Béla és tsa. ügyében (Investigation File in the Case of Count Béla Teleki and Others).

3.2.3. Mt-578/1. Munka Dosszié Galambos Edit (Edit Galambos Work File).

3.2.3. Mt-655/11. Munka Dosszié Dunai Lajos (Lajos Dunai Work File).

3.2.4. K-182. „B” Dosszié Nagy Klára (Klára ‘B’ Nagy File).

3.2.5. O-8-001/1. Objektum Dosszié. „Farkasok” Magyar Nemzeti Bizottmány (Object File. ‘Wolves’ National Hungarian Council).

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3.2.5. O-8-2001/201. AMSZ-memorandumok, levelezés, jegyzékek (1968–1972) (AHF-Memorandums, Correspondence, Lists, 1968–1972).

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Boxes 1, 2, 4).

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1944. Erdély a magyar Országgyűlésen III (Transylvania in the Hungarian National Assembly III). Kolozsvár: Az Erdélyi Párt kiadása. Minerva Nyomda Rt.

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Reference Books BORBÁNDI, Gyula. 1997. Magyar politikai pályaképek 1938–1948 (Hungarian Political Profiles 1938–1948). Budapest: Európa Könyvkiadó.

BOTLIK, József. 2020. Nemzetünket szolgálták. A visszacsatolt területek felsőházi és képviselőházi tagjai a magyar Országgyűlésben (1938–1944) (They Served Our Nation. Members from Re-Annexed Territories in the Upper House and in the House of Representatives of the Hungarian National Assembly). Budapest: Keskenyúton Délvidéki Tragédiánk 1944–45 Alapítvány.

DEMETER, Béla–VENCZEL, József. 1940. Az Erdélyi Magyar Gazdasági Egyesület munkája a román imperium alatt (The Work of the Transylvanian Hungarian Economic Association under Romanian Rule). Budapest: A „Pátria” Irodalmi Vállalat és Nyomdai Rt. Kiadása.

FÜLÖP, Mihály–VINCZE, Gábor (eds.). 1998. Revízió vagy autonómia. Iratok a magyar–román kapcsolatok történetéből (1945–1947) (Revision or Autonomy.

Documents from the History of Hungarian–Romanian Relationships). [Budapest]: A Teleki László Alapítvány kiadása.

MURÁDIN, János Kristóf. 2019. „Mindent Erdélyért!” Az Erdélyi Párt története 1940 és 1944 között (‘Everything for Tranyslvania!’ The History of the Transylvanian Party between 1940 and 1944). Cluj-Napoca: Scientia Publishing House.

TIBORI SZABÓ, Zoltán. 1993. Teleki Béla erdélyisége. Embernek maradni embertelen időkben (Béla Teleki’s Transylvanianism. Remaining Human in Inhuman Times). Cluj-Napoca: Nis Kiadó.

VÁRDY, Béla. 2000. Magyarok az Újvilágban. Az észak-amerikai magyarság rendhagyó története (Hungarians in the New World. An Unconventional History of North-American Hungarians). Budapest: A Magyar Nyelv és Kultúra Nemzetközi Társasága.

Studies FILEP, Tamás Gusztáv. 2008. A „visszatért” magyarok és nem magyarok beilleszkedése, jogi helyzetük és magatartásuk (The Integration, Legal Standing and Behaviour of ‘Returned’ Hungarians and Non-Hungarians). In: Bárdi, Nándor–Fedinec, Csilla–Szarka, László (eds.), Kisebbségi magyar közösségek a 20. Században (Minority Hungarian Communities in the 20th Century). Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó – MTA Kisebbségkutató Intézet. 154–161.

HERMANN, Gabriella. 2011. Az Amerikai Erdélyi Szövetség története, 1952–1977 (The History of the American Transylvanian Federation, 1952–1977). Magyar Kisebbség 3–4(61–62): 7–111.

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PRITZ, Pál. 2011. Magyar külpolitika – a csatlósság és a revízió között (Hungarian Foreign Policy – Between Vassalage and Revisionism). In: Pritz, Pál: Az objektivitás mítosza? Hazánk és a nagyvilág: 20. századi metszetek (The Myth of Objectivity? Our Country and the World: 20th-Century Cross-Sections). Budapest: Magyar Történelmi Társulat. 123–130.

SZÁSZ, István Tas. 2012. Pillantás az Erdélyi Magyar Gazdasági Egyesület utolsó éveire (A Look at the Last Years of the Transylvanian Hungarian Economic Association). Korunk 11: 100–106.

Chronologies SEBESTYÉN, Mihály (compiled). 2011. Időtár III. Marosvásárhely történeti kronológiája 1919–1944 (Record of Times III. A Historical Chronology of Marosvásárhely 1919–1944). Marosvásárhely: Mentor Kiadó.

Memoires BALOGH, Edgár. 1978. Szolgálatban 1935–1944 (On Duty 1935–1944). Bucharest: Kriterion.

1992. Hatalomváltás Kolozsvárt 1944-ben (Change of Powers in Kolozsvár in 1944). Korunk 10: 108–116.

BETHLEN, Béla. 2019. Visszaemlékezéseim. A cenzurázatlan és teljes változat (My Recollections. The Uncensored and Complete Version). Budapest: Szépmíves.

TELEKI, Éva. 1995. Tölgy és repkény (Oak and Ground Ivy). Cluj-Napoca: Minerva Könyvek 1.

Interviews Interview of the author with Zsolt Szekeres, President of the HHRF. Budapest, 13 September 2019. Property of the author.

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Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 19 (2021) 40–54

DOI: 10.2478/auseur-2021-0003

Neighbourhood Policy vs. Remembrance Policy: Romania and Hungary1 Barna BODÓ

Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania (Cluj-Napoca, Romania) Department of International Relations and European Studies e-mail: bodobarna1@gmail.com Abstract. In East-Central Europe, the past has always been a determining factor as a framework for interpretation: the social construction of the past often serves (served) current political purposes. It is no wonder that in the countries of the region, often different, sometimes contradictory interpretations of the past have emerged. In today’s European situation, however, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are perhaps most keenly faced by the transformation of Europe, with unclear, chaotic ideas dominating political and intellectual markets instead of previous (accepted) values – in the tension between old and new, Europe’s future is at stake. The question is: what role the states of Central and Eastern Europe play/can play, to what extent they will be able to place the neighbourhood policy alongside (perhaps in front of) the policy of remembrance and seek common answers to Europe’s great dilemmas.

Keywords: neighbourhood (policy), Central and Eastern Europe, Hungary, Romania, remembrance policy, memorials

Neighbourhood Relations – Hungary The First World War completely reorganized the borders of the central and eastern parts of Europe. While in the western part of Europe the study of neighbourhood relations is not complicated by changing borders, in Central and Eastern Europe there is a need to talk about eras and the processes that can be linked to them.

The longer-term priorities of a CCE country’s foreign policy may be permanent (for Hungary: competitiveness in the European Union; success in the region; responsible Hungary in the world); the neighbourhood policy changes according to the political configuration of the region. In a 2010 paper, Majoros classifies neighbourhood 1

This paper was presented at the Conference Past, Present and Future of Central Europe, organized by Budapest Business School and Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania in Cluj-Napoca on 20 November 2020 (online conference).

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policy as the second target group and mentions the issue of Hungarian communities across the border as well as the economic relations established with neighbouring countries (Majoros 2010).

I present the development of Hungarian neighbourhood relations based on Majoros’s paper. The defining stages of the development of relations are: the end of the First World War (1918), the period between the two world wars (1920– 1940), the communist period (1948–1990), and the periods before and after joining the EU (2004).

Before the First World War, the territories of the current neighbouring countries formed part of the much larger territory of the Kingdom of Hungary; moreover, for centuries, it was in personal union with the most developed neighbouring state, the Austrian Empire. During this period, the economic-trade relations could develop without borders. In this part of Europe, industrial development was delayed compared to the European West: in Austria, the process started in the 18th and in Hungary in the first half of the 19th century. Significant and close economic-trade partnerships developed during the period of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Within the Monarchy, the development was complementary: Austria was the administrative and infrastructural and the belonging Czech Republic the industrial centre, while Hungary was the supplier of foods, commodities, and raw materials (this is the result of the later development). The peculiarities of the regions complemented each other well, which formed the basis of the development of the Hungarian economy in the nearly half a century following the Austrian– Hungarian compromise. Although a border existed theoretically, it did not separate neighbouring countries.

The Treaty of Trianon, which ended the First World War, was a fundamental change in the history of Hungary, with huge reductions in terms of area (from 282 thousand to 93) and population (from 20.8 million to 7.9 million). The two-thirds of the existing rail network and raw material resources fell outside the new borders.

The production structure of the economy and at the same time the structure of partnerships have changed significantly. The newly independent successor states consciously avoided trade partnerships with the former motherland, and relations between Hungary and its neighbours became strained: the border now separated the previously closely cooperating regions. The situation of the Hungarian (forced) minority stranded outside the borders also deteriorated. The socialist system, which emerged in the late 1940s, established its own framework for integration (COMECON, from 1949), in which a central (Soviet) interest prevailed; the integration was radial: everybody had a special relationship with the centre, and the role of the neighbourhood became secondary. In 1980, the share of Hungary’s foreign trade relations with that of the neighbouring socialist countries (Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the non-COMECON) was 5%. Borders are difficult for the population to cross, i.e. borders divide.

Neighbourhood Policy vs. Remembrance Policy: Romania and Hungary

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After 1990, the performance of the economy and foreign trade will continue to decline, but the strict dividing role of borders will be dissolving: visa obligation with most European states will be abolished, cross-border co-operation will develop, and trade relations will be expanded and restructured. Hungary was in transition from the westernmost state of the East to becoming the easternmost state of the West.

The COMECON was abolished in 1991; however, the political leadership had to understand that a small, open economy like Hungary could only develop properly as an integral part of a larger system, without the capabilities on which it can base an independent economic strategy (e.g. oil or gas exports). At that time and place, there was an opportunity: to join the Euro-Atlantic integration. The signed free trade agreements (EU, EFTA) widened the room for manoeuvre of the Hungarian foreign economy, accelerated the inflow of working capital, and, in political terms, the NATO accession has facilitated the rebuilding of relations. Relations with neighbouring countries improved between 1993 and 2004, with the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) playing a key role. The importance of neighbouring countries in Hungarian foreign trade has increased. In 2003, the weight of neighbours reached 17%, half of which is provided by Austria, the other neighbours (Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania, Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia) making up just over 8%. Austria’s weight has increased relatively little, but in absolute terms very much.

The most important event of 2004 was joining the EU. Austria was already an EU member from 1995. Other neighbours of Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia, joined EU together in 2004, followed by Romania in 2007. The joining negotiations with Croatia had been completed (2013), while the EU had signed an Association Agreement with Serbia and a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Ukraine.

Hungary’s joining the EU yielded an increase in foreign trade. Initially (2004–2005), exchange dynamics were lower with neighbours, while trade relations with some developed EU Member States (France, the Netherlands, Great Britain) and nonEU countries (China, Russia) were built faster. But from 2006 onwards, the weight of neighbouring countries would increase again, exceeding all previous ones. An important structural change in terms of partnership is that Austria’s weight slightly decreases, while the proportion of Romania and Slovakia increases significantly.

Since 2004, the country’s foreign trade balance has been active with neighbouring countries (but still passive with Austria).

Neighbouring Relations – Romania In the case of Romania, the periodization following the Hungarian pattern is difficult in several aspects. Romania was not yet a full-fledged state before 1920; the great unification (the annexation of Transylvania) was brought about by the Peace of Versailles (1920) after the 1918 declaration of the Romanian public will

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in Transylvania. The Romanian foreign and neighbourhood policy before 1918 can be likened to fishing in confusion; in a changing political environment, it sought to establish good relations (Rădulescu-Zoner 1977) with the major powers (Russia, Austria-Hungary, Turkey). Uncertainty in foreign policy is a general characteristic.

Meanwhile, Turkey is gradually losing territory, and Austria-Hungary is gaining power. The Italian–Turkish war, broke out in 1911, aggravated the situation with Bulgaria demanding Dobruja. In 1913, the great powers agreed that Romania would also receive South Dobruja, bringing relations with Bulgaria to a low point.

Although (Austria-) Hungary supports Romania’s independence (1878, Berlin Congress), there are issues that strain the relations: the customs war (Romania’s livestock exports were restricted by Hungary), the Moldavian Csángós without any public law protection (while Romanians in Bukovina and Hungary had rights), and the Apponyi education laws. Romania joined the First World War on the side of Serbia, but later switched to the side of the Central Powers. At the end of the war, Serbia occupied the whole of Banat. The Romanian army could take control of Timişoara in August 1919, and Romania received approx. 65% of the historical region. The Romanian–Russian relations were complicated by the affiliation of the also disputed regions before the First World War: Moldavia and the fact that Russia received three South Moldavian counties at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Romania ended on the winner side of the First World War after multiple changes of position between the warring parties. This does not mean that their every (historically and ethnically unfounded) territorial claim was fulfilled.

The Romanian social élite looks back nostalgically at the period between the two world wars, the era of the Greater Romania. There was also a period of conflicts for Romania, partly because the minority protection treaties drawn up in Paris had first been rejected or not complied with. The nationality policy of the decades after the change of power was characterized by the simultaneous exercise of certain liberal principles of law and official nationalist arbitrariness.

Romania’s foreign policy (and in this context its neighbourhood policy) was framed by the preservation of the Romanian territories (formally: insurance of the national unity and territorial integration) and the fight against revisionism.

Economically, a kind of industrial development had started. Of Romania’s neighbours: it only had better relations only with Yugoslavia (Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes).

From the late 1940s, Bucharest, like other socialist countries, did not pursue an independent foreign policy, listening to Moscow. In 1948, the Soviets took away the Zmiinyi (Snake) Island, the continental shelf which Romania had claimed for itself.

The establishment of the COMECON in 1949 meant the strengthening of the Soviet influence. Following the change in leadership in Moscow (Khrushchev followed Stalin as the head of the party and the country), the Warsaw Pact (1955), i.e. the framework for military cooperation, was established. During his visit to Bucharest,

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Khrushchev was asked about the repatriation of Soviet troops – the answer was a vehement rejection. Romania took part in the political action against the 1956 Hungarian revolution, and Imre Nagy was brought to Bucharest with the promise of inviolability. The party leadership in Bucharest actually served Moscow politics and had exposed Imre Nagy. Bucharest proved a loyal satellite, and in the emerging new international situation, in 1958, Khrushchev repatriated Soviet troops from Romania.

This meant an expansion of foreign policy room for Bucharest but no improvement in neighbourhood relations. From the early 1960s, Romania announced its new foreign policy doctrine, whose keywords were non-intervention in internal affairs, territorial integrity, national sovereignty on the basis of equality, and the territorial issue. In his diary, Khrushchev noted how disturbed he was when Romanian Prime Minister Ion Gh. Maurer remarked at their 1964 meeting that in 1940 the Soviets occupied Bessarabia. Territory – the eternal Romanian motif. Nicolae Ceauşescu, as a party leader, opened up to the West, and then he denied the 1968 military incursion in Prague; moreover, he condemned the intervention led by Moscow. The new Bucharest leader was openly attacking Moscow, changing this way Gh. GheorghiuDej’s small-steps politics. These events did not help the neighbouring relations of Romania, the only exception being Yugoslavia (Lache 2007).

Following the revolutionary events in Timişoara (Romania), Bucharest (Ion Iliescu) preferred Moscow. In 1991, an agreement was signed with the power, which collapsed a few months later, in December. In 1995, the country’s official goal became joining the EU. The basic treaties played a major political role in the Central and Eastern European region, and although the German–German Treaties were signed in 1972, according to Dávid Meiszter (1994), ‘the idea of basic treaties arose in Hungarian foreign policy after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact’; their goal is ‘friendship’, ‘good neighbourliness’, and/or ‘cooperation’;2 nevertheless, they did not do so only in a Hungarian relation. In terms of the basic treaties, their inventors hoped it could be a supplement to the security guarantee. According to Miklós Bakk, one of the fundamental questions is the security of the borders: the basic criteria is the mutual recognition and guarantee of the ensemble of states and their territorial status.

The other dimension, not independent of the issue of territoriality, is the situation of the national minorities, one of the unresolved issues in the region since 1919 2

Signed treaties: agreement about the basis of the neighbourhood and the cooperation between the Hungarian Republic and Ukraine – 6.12.1991; agreement between the Hungarian Republic and the Slovakian Republic about the neighbourhood and the friendly cooperation – 19.3.1995; friendly and cooperation agreement between the Hungarian Republic and Slovenia – 1.12.1992; agreement about understanding, cooperation, and neighbourhood between the Hungarian Republic and Romania – 16.9.1996; friendly, cooperation, and neighbourhood agreement between Romania and Bulgaria – 27.1.1992; cooperation and neighbourhood agreement between Romania and Ukraine – 2.6.1997; friendly and cooperation agreement between the Republic of Moldova and Bulgaria – 7.9.1992.

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(Bakk 1996). These two related problems logically became the central issues of the basic treaties signed in the region (Poland–Germany, Hungary–Ukraine, Poland– Lithuania, Hungary–Slovakia, etc.). With regard to Romania, the Hungarian Horn government accepted the border clause at the beginning of the negotiations, after which it is no wonder that the minority clause became secondary – the treaty was concluded in the absence of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR). For the Romanian public opinion, however, the treaties resulted that the dilemmas of the (state) national identity and the Romanian orientation crisis had become more and more apparent in connection with these dilemmas.

With the accession of Romania to NATO and the EU, diplomatic opportunities have improved according to the official opinion, but the situation has hardly changed with regard to Hungary: Romania still has its own position on the minority issue (the Romanian solution to the minority issue is exemplary); however, the official point of view and the interpretation of the Hungarian minority’s own situation is in sharp contrast to each other. Teodor Meleşcanu as foreign minister (2017) said in an interview that: ‘I cannot say that there are no important plans for Hungary’, and at the same time he made it clear that, although there is a close economic relationship with Hungary, a number of national political dilemmas and other matters burden the relationship’ (Barabás 2017: 5–6).3 However, Romania is consistent in not taking decisive action for Romanian communities outside its borders. The Ukrainian education law of 2018 is antiminority and may abolish minority education in the long run – the Romanian Foreign Affairs Minister responded in a statement but did not take any concrete steps. Romanian NGOs in Northern Bukovina called for concrete support in a statement in the summer of 2020, to which Bucharest remained silent. Earlier, even during Băsescu’s presidency, the Vlachos (Romanians) of Timok Valley (Serbia) asked Bucharest for help to finally have a Romanian-language education, at least a kindergarten, which had never been seen before in history. The promises of the Romanian head of state remained simple promises. Moldavia is a separate issue, not a neighbouring country; however, it is inhabited by a people with whom they share language, culture, history, and traditions. Moldavia is continuously and significantly supported by Romania.

Romania’s foreign policy has no neighbourhood component, no neighbourhood strategy, the question being restricted at the level of cross-border cooperation. It exists only in a regional political dimension. The Romanian foreign policy lacks a clear direction and criteria, slipping between East and West (Fati 2020). Miklós Bakk talks about strategical hesitation, while Valentin Naumescu explains in a 2016 presentation4 that Romania’s international situation is fragile, its foreign policy is 3 4

Translated by the author. https://cdn.cursdeguvernare.ro/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Valentin-Naumescu-copy-1ilovepdf-compressed1.pdf (downloaded on: 14.11.2020).

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mediocre, vulnerable, and characterized by minority complex. It aligns, it is seeking stronger powers, so it cannot represent its own interests. It has no voice of its own, no vision of its own. Naumescu declares: there is a lack of strategy in bilateral (meaning: neighbourhood) relations. The Visegrád Four Group presents a clear Central European (Naumescu: Eurosceptic) position, with Romania being left out.

In his doctoral dissertation, Tamás Szabó raises the following summarizing question: in the long run, what kind of frameworks can we talk about in relation to historical agreement, reconciliation, and rapprochement between the two peoples when the participation of the Hungarians in Transylvania and their legitimate political representation are missing from the processes of elaboration of important documents and treaties regarding the Romanian–Hungarian relations that directly or indirectly affect the Hungarian minority (Szabó 2019)?

Neighbourhood Policy The concept of neighbourhood policy can be understood in many ways. The neighbourhood policy between the two world wars is historical from the Hungarian point of view since the basic problems of the neighbourhood policy were developed in this period. In today’s interpretation, there is a traditional, i.e. direct (geographical) neighbourhood, and a functional, a not direct neighbourhood policy resulting from the EU institutional membership. The distinction between traditional and functional neighbourhood policy is not only theoretical-analytical but also practical. Foreign policy can be effective if it is based on the selectivity relying on geographical and functional weightings (Kiss J. 2007).

The issue of Euro-Atlantic institutional membership became paramount in the profound transformation that followed the regime change, although the disintegration of the Soviet-dominated international subsystem necessarily meant a return not only to Europe but also to traditional bilateral neighbourhood policies.

The change of regime and the emergence of new neighbours highlighted the issues of the identity of states and the (re)definition of the nations and ‘nation-states’ of the region as well as the multi-level processes of transformation (Kiss J. 2007).

The European Union launched the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in May 2004, which has been updated several times. Although the formal aim of the ENP is to promote the economic and political development of the countries neighbouring the European Union and its rapprochement with the Union, it is primarily in the EU’s security and economic interests (Tálas 2011). Since the launch of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in 1992, the Union has focused primarily on building the southern dimension of the neighbourhood policy, reducing the impact of security challenges in the Mediterranean area. This policy does not cover EU candidate countries, potential candidates, EFTA Member States

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(Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland), or European micro-states (Andorra, San Marino, Monaco, and Vatican City State). The countries with a southern or Mediterranean dimension to the ENP basically cover the North African and Middle Eastern coasts of the Mediterranean, while the Eastern Partnership countries launched in May 2008 cover the Eastern European (Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldovia) and the Caucasus regions of the post-Soviet region (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan). Cooperation with Russia is based on a separate strategy. Although the ENP operates as a political toolbar, it allows the Union to adjust its policies to the specific partner’s characteristics and to differentiate the policies according to it.

The Eastern dimension came to the fore after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU, when it was recognized in Brussels that many of the more or less economic and political problems of the Eastern European region would be brought closer to the Union. The Eastern partnership aims to promote democracy and responsible governance, strengthen energy security, encourage sectoral reforms (including environmental protection), foster people-to-people contacts, support economic and social development, and provide additional support to reduce the social-economic inequalities and to fund stability-enhancing projects. The four thematic platforms of the Eastern partnership are: democracy, good governance, and stability; economic integration and convergence with EU policies; energy security; personal relationships.

Senior officials meet at least two times a year, and foreign ministers meet annually.

The work of the platforms is sometimes assisted by sector-specific meetings.

Neighbourhood assistance was initially funded from existing aid funds: TACIS (Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States), MEDA (Mediterranean Development Assistance), and EIDHR (European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights). From the 2007–2013 budget period, the Southern and Eastern ENPs have a multi-pillar system of financial support instruments: the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (bilateral assistance; regional assistance; interregional assistance; cross-border assistance; neighbourhood investment instrument; governance framework; thematic instruments); investment and loan support, other forms of support, e.g. Civil Social Facility.

The neighbourhood policy is not only an instrument but also an objective in the sense of ‘multiple bilateralisms’: to promote regional organization. The defining element of Hungarian foreign policy is the historical dilemma of Hungarian foreign policy, namely the response to the duality of nation and state. Based on the theorem of a unified Hungarian nation (cultural nation) crossing borders, the nationalconservative conception started from a specific foreign policy dualism, namely the duality of the foreign policy of the Hungarian state and the national policy of the Hungarian nation as a whole. Furthermore, it started from the possibility of establishing some special legal relationship between the Hungarian state and its minorities. There is a close interaction between the national policy dealing with the survival of the Hungarian minority communities living in their homeland and their

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relationship with the motherland and the neighbourhood policy. This is contrary to the social-liberal interpretation, which is based on the premise of the political nation and on the national policy explicitly, and its implicit forms are subordinated to the state’s foreign integration policy and the issue of relations with neighbouring states.

Even before the accession to NATO and the EU, in the process of adaptation leading to NATO and the EU, national policy was not merely Hungarian–Hungarian policy and was not limited to traditional interstate relations with neighbouring countries.

Moreover, the issue of minorities is not taking place only in the triangle formed by the motherland–minorities–nationalizing nation but rather with international organizations, and it can be interpreted within a functional rectangle enlarged by the EU. In the case of a neighbourhood policy limited to national policy, both an effective neighbourhood policy and a national policy become impossible. An effective national policy can only be successful in the context of a region-based European Neighbourhood Policy and can only count on support in this sense (Kiss J. 2007).

Remembrance Policy Remembrance policy is a real definition and practice: it exists as a fundamental attribute of the states with a nation-building past, it exists even when its role is passive, that is, it reproduces memory based on existing schemas. Remembrance policy is not a state policy, but through some political concepts and steps – most notably with the official approval of textbooks – it can influence the collective consciousness over a wide historical time horizon. All these have a serious impact on the image of the neighbouring peoples (in this case, the image of the Hungarians formed in the Romanian public memory). Remembrance policy is not defined consensually, the term merely describes the phenomenon that there is a state or, more broadly, a public will to shape collective memory. The term assumes awareness, a lack of spontaneity. In reproducing memory, Pierre Nora refers to detachment from the past when he argues that ‘places of memory’ become places of history; a reconciliation of history and memory is necessary precisely because spontaneous memory ceases (Nora 1999).

According to Slovak historian L’ubomír Lipták, all significant historical events are recorded and displayed by three levels of memory: learned memory, represented by science; the official memory overseen by the power and its institutions; the memory of the individual, which often disputes the former yet intertwines with them (Lipták 2000: 192). Learned memory is teachable (also ‘approved’ by the public authorities), corresponds to the subject of the institutional remembrance policy, and is mostly embodied in textbooks.

State/official remembrance policy places great demands on the historized selfimage of the national community, on the nationalist way of speaking (nationalism:

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everyday discourse on identity and community; it summons the causes and ways of belonging, the imagined past, and the supposed common sense), which flourishes again, and it results in a kind of post-flowering. An important guarantee of the omnipotence of state history policy is school (history) teaching – history as a school subject fully serves the objectives of state memory policy (Gyáni 2016). In more and more countries, the state declares its competence to judge the things of history, in this sense determining what kind of historical images should be circulated in the spheres it directly controls (school, public media, political discourse, and identity politics), i.e. it approaches history with a (political) utility pragmatism.

In Central and Eastern Europe, where state borders differ from national borders in many cases, official remembrance policies do not allow – on a community basis – the social integration of ethnic communities living in (nation-)states, which form even a majority in a given area. One obstacle to reconciliation is precisely the different interpretations of history, especially if the narrative of the majority is central to the justification of statehood or if one of the most important symbols of the state, such as the majority and minority narratives of a national holiday, differs significantly (Manzinger 2019).

With regard to the emotional side of reconciliation, the responsibilities of minority and majority élite are significant in the development and political use of narratives on historical issues. According to Horowitz, care should be taken with reference to the issue of historical opposition as political leaders may distort historical content in order to legitimize the current content (Horowitz 1998, qtd. in Manzinger 2019: 141). Reconciliation also presupposes the acknowledgment of certain facts, exclusion, and bias, as the official view of history almost exclusively uses the narratives of the majority. This relieves him of the moral responsibility of past actions.5 Not only the display of different narratives is necessary but also the free formulation of approaches different from the majority, which in turn should not prevent the repressed group from also facing its own sins.

One dimension of emotional reconciliation is emotional stability. The traditional starting point sharply contrasts emotions with reason. Question: How much more do we understand from political processes, from politics, when we pay attention to emotional aspects? The democratic system is more or less able to strike the right balance, a proportion between political indifference and over-politicization (Kiss 2013). Political restraint is needed among the parties interested in reconciliation(?).

One of the dimensions of emotional reconciliation is emotional stability. The traditional starting point strongly opposes emotions to the mind, emotions to the 5

One example: Axente Sever was involved in the revolution of 1848–49 and was one of Avram Iancu’s companions in the battles of the Apuseni Mountains. He took part in the January 1849 massacre. On 8 January 1849, the town of Aiud was stormed and the city set on fire. This was followed by a 9-day massacre, during which nearly 8,000 innocent Hungarians were executed in the city and the surrounding settlements. Axente Sever is today a Romanian hero, streets and institutions bear his name, and a statue also evokes his memory in Aiud.

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rational. A democratic system can find the appropriate balance, ratio between political disinterest and overpoliticization (Kiss 2013). In reconciliation, there is a need for political restraint between the interested (?) parties.

The average Romanian, but also the Hungarian citizen, lives in a kind of ‘isolation’; s/he does not know the language, culture, and history of the neighbouring peoples, and thus s/he willingly or unwillingly accepts the official position. For the most part, s/he does not even try to orient him-/herself as there are parallel narratives that simultaneously save and reinforce his/her ignorance. First, there would be a need for a distance that would allow for reconciliation. Do not look for a person in charge at the time of fact-finding! An exemplary institution for this is the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which makes it possible to confront South Africa’s painful past: anyone can take action, tell what they have done, and then move on; personal confessions have no consequences. The basic idea here is clear: we cannot change ourselves or our circumstances until we can talk, understand, and accept the current situation. There is a need for objective, cool distance, without which the creation of new, shared concepts will not be possible.

Proponents of inclusive citizenship say that the only way to build democracy is to replace or supplement previous nation-building policies with ones that allow for the collective appearance, representation, and participation in public affairs of culturally diverse, previously excluded groups, indigenous peoples, and national minorities.6

Memorials In a larger dissertation,7 I analysed the current situation of memorials once erected in the Romanian part of the historical Banat: I identified a total of 85 public monuments that fell victim to the changing history after 1918. Of the examined cases, 53 are Hungarian – if I take the dual-related memorials here, then 55 (almost 65%); there are 4 Romanian, 3 German, and no Serbian ones. The difference lies in the memorials associated with the royal house. The vast majority of the monuments (about 80%) were erected after 1880.

6

7

In February 2016, the court of Târgu-Mureş prevented the registration of an association promoting the tourism of Szeklerland in a final judgment, on the grounds that such a geographical unit, i.e.

Szeklerland, did not exist. The justification is false: there are associations with the name of a territorial unit that is not on the map: the Association for Tourism in Bukovina (Asociaţia pentru Turism Bucovina), the Association for the Oaş District (Asociaţia Ţara Oaşului), and various associations in the Făgăraş District (Manzinger 2019).

Barna Bodó: Between Yesterday and Tomorrow – What Happened to the Memorials in Banat after 1918. Minority Protection Special Issue (2020). Institute for the Protection of Minority Rights and the Faculty of Law and Political Sciences of Pázmány Péter Catholic University.

Budapest.

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After the imperial change in 1918, Banat (part of Romanian rule) had to become part of a new country, of Romanian history. The new power demanded a new view of history and, with it, a new, different memory. The Romanian authorities eliminated a significant part of the public representations referring to the previous system. The new power had to legitimize itself, it had to build up its own publicity.

The aim of the new power was to recreate social spaces, to acquire public spaces for itself in order to organize them with its own memorial elements. The initiated process, the attack against existing memorials raises the question: what kind of message was formulated by the disappeared memorials? The answer: none of the memorials could have endangered the new power as none of the 85 memorials that had been removed had (would have) articulated a message against a Romanian community or person.

In protest, Catholic Bishop of Timişoara Augustin Pacha informed the nunciature of Bucharest about the cutting, desecration, and profanation of the sculptures on the façade of the Piarist Grammar School and Piarist Church (Szent István/St. Stephen, Szent László/St. Ladislaus, Szent Imre/St. Emericus, Szent Erzsébet/St. Elizabeth).

The most brutal attack on memorials is not their destruction but the use of certain parts of them to create another (Romanian) memorial. The destruction and ‘re-use’ of memorials is almost unclassifiable from an ethical point of view: destruction, insidious theft takes place when the stolen object is simply incorporated into one’s own creation. There are several such cases: the Révai memorial column (now Eminescu) in Sânnicolau Mare, the Soldier Statue in Bocşa (now a Romanian military monument), and the Hungarian inscription on the Detta Millennium Memorial were scraped in 1923, and the names of the local victims of the war were inscribed on the memorial. After the 1990s changes, the Orthodox stone cross was replaced by the Turul bird. In the early 1920s, a large clock was erected on the pedestal of the sculpture of General Scudier in Timişoara, knocked down in 1918 and then replaced in 1962 by the Soviet Liberation Monument, whose inscription was changed after 1990: today, it is a monument to Romanian heroes.

I must talk at length about the two most egregious cases. The monument to Franciska Maderspach, erected in 1909 in Ruszkabánya/Rusca Montana by her sons at the place of their father’s suicide due to his mother’s public Austrian caning, was damaged in the 1920s, and the bust and inscription were removed. The rest of the monument was moved to the centre of the village, where in 1933 a marble plaque listing the heroes of the First World War was placed on it. The list was later supplemented by the names of those who fell in World War II. What kind of monument of reverence is created by the destruction of the miraculous example of the sons’ grace? In Karánsebes/Caransebeş, after the change of state sovereignty, the statue was removed from the monument of Franz Joseph/Francisc Iosif/Ferenc József, the ruler, against which the local Romanian intelligentsia protested. The rest of the monument has been preserved. In the warehouse of volunteer firefighters in

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Caransebeş, in 1924, the 2.75 m high bronze statue preserved there was discovered.

Military officials wanted to transport it to Bucharest to melt it down, and from this bronze they wanted to erect a statue of Romanian king Ferdinand I, on the same pedestal. The city leadership sabotaged this in various ways, and then in 1930 it was decided that the city would not give up the sculpture, which is of a special artistic value, as the plan of János Fadrusz was executed by the also famous sculptor G. R. Rollinger. In 1931, the statue was still in the local fire station. In 1943, a statue of General Ion Drăgălina was placed on the pedestal of the monument. Two circumstances are important here: local politics opposed Bucharest on the issue of an Austrian monarchy. In the end, however, the central authority enforces its will, the statue is removed, and, finally, the local Romanian élite accepts the monumental humiliation, that is, erecting the statue of Romanian General Drăgălina, which replaces the statue of Franz Joseph.

In several cases, the disappearance of the memorials presupposed the existence of serious logistics, which is why the question is unavoidable: what role did the authorities play at that time? Data from the post-1990 period show that we are facing a new version of Romanian remembrance policy, when the power does not act openly but is forgiving, sometimes outright helping to take action against memorials. An example of this is the case of the table from Hercules Bath/Băile Herculane, which records the meeting of the rulers. In 1896, on the occasion of the opening of the Vaskapu/Porţile de Fier navigation canal, Băile Herculane is the venue of the royal meeting: Emperor Franz Joseph, Romanian King Charles I, and Serbian King Alexander I met here and stayed here for several days. The meeting was immortalized by a huge marble slab mounted on the hillside. The memorial plaque was dismantled and made to disappear by unknown perpetrators in 1993 – those remembering the incident say the heavy plaque was lifted off the high rock face by crane; a ‘simple theft’ is out of question, a high level of technical competence was needed. In 1992, ‘unknown’ perpetrators, using heavy machinery, demolished the monument of János Hunyadi/Iancu de Hunedoara, warlord and governor of Transylvania, at the top of Zeicani Hill, at the height of 669 meters, using heavyduty machines. The monument consisted of a mace set on a high pedestal; the mace disappeared. In 1993, the iron mace was fished out of Lake Ostrov and taken to the museum in Sarmizegetusa, from where the iron mace disappeared permanently in 1994. In April 2003, the pieces of the monument that still existed on the site disappeared, and the pedestal was demolished.

An important and still unanswered question: where should/could the removed monuments not liked by the new power be stored temporarily or permanently?

In Romania no attempt has been made to solve this problem. The storage of some memorials (or parts of memorials) in the museums has not been resolved; several of them have disappeared, and they are not put on display in exhibitions (I know of one exception).

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Although a historical apology would be needed for the disappeared monuments, the events after 1990 show that the dominant Romanian memory construction continues, the time for attacks on memorials is not over; however, no one wants to admit any mistakes, so let us not expect a correction attempt.

To summarize: a) Romania does not have a consciously structured neighbourhood policy, as if it did not want to get involved in regional processes, while the European area is under serious contradictions, and the way out is likely to assign an increased role of the nation-state. b) In Romania, the remembrance policy between the world wars continues even today. There are no signs of relief, and the political practice is not building but destroying the relations established by belonging to a common structure. c) National minority communities could be the engines and the first beneficiaries of networking. Romania is addicted to the previous policy, which has done no good to this issue. They do not admit and accept that today the world (would) dictate(s) another way.

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MEISZTER, Dávid. 1994. Mire jó egy alapszerződés? Népszabadság 28 July.

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Aetas 3: 142–158.

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Nemzet és Biztonság 6: 44–50.

Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 19 (2021) 55–71

DOI: 10.2478/auseur-2021-0004

Economic Stabilization after the Treaty of Trianon: Challenges and Possibilities1 Endre DOMONKOS

Senior Research Fellow Budapest Business School, University of Applied Sciences, Faculty of International Management and Business, Department of International Relations, Budapest, Hungary e-mail: domonkos.endre@uni-bge.hu Abstract. The ‘Great War’ had harmful impacts on Hungary’s national economy. With the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the former self-sufficient economic unit broke into six different entities, which had far-reaching consequences in Central and Eastern Europe. Economic difficulties were further aggravated by rampant inflation. Finally, the loss of the majority of raw materials by the Treaty of Trianon meant that Hungary was cut off from its sources of supply.

The following paper examines the impacts of economic reconstruction in Hungary. The analysis also focuses on the development of industry, agriculture, and trade in the 1920s.

Keywords: economic history, Hungary, Reconstruction Loan, agriculture, industry, trade in the 1920s

1. Introduction At the end of the First World War, the performance of the Hungarian economy – as a result of war efforts – was hardly 40 per cent of the pre-war level. Due to the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Hungary lost its traditional markets. Economic chaos was exacerbated by the requisitions of the Soviet Republic and the Romanian and Serb troops, which occupied a great part of the country.

Additionally, by 1918, Hungary was hit by rampant inflation. The territorial detachments of the Treaty of Trianon resulted serious distortions in the economy, whereas the country was compelled to pay war reparations. All these factors paralysed economic life entirely.

1

This paper was presented at the conference Past, Present and Future of Central Europe, organized by Budapest Business School and Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania in Cluj-Napoca on 20 November 2020 (online conference).

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In parallel with the consolidation of domestic politics, the main aim of the government led by Prime Minister István Bethlen was to carry out economic and financial stabilization. The measures adopted within the framework of the Reconstruction Loan granted by the League of Nations contributed to the balance of budget. According to Law No. V of 1924, the National Bank of Hungary was created. It had the exclusive right to issue banknotes and was independent from the government. The final step of the monetary reform was the introduction of pengő in 1927, which was tied to the pound sterling.

The objective of the paper is to present the economic reconstruction in Hungary after 1920. Taking into account of the modified external conditions from 1920 onwards, it is important to evaluate the impacts of the stabilization measures in the industry and the agriculture. Because of length constraints, I will not highlight the domestic politics of the Bethlen government and the economic measures introduced in other Central and Eastern European countries.

2. Economic Difficulties after the Treaty of Trianon and the Effects of Financial Consolidation After the Treaty of Trianon (4 June 1920), the framework of the Hungarian economy and external conditions changed substantially, which had direct implications both economically and politically. The problems that Hungary had to face after the ‘Great War’ were the following: 1. Before 1918, the Hungarian economy was an organic part of the AustroHungarian Monarchy with well-developed food processing industry, based on a customs union and common monetary and pricing system. In the autumn of 1918, the former large and efficient economic unit was dismembered, and six new entities were created in Central and Eastern Europe. Hungary lost its traditional markets and the main industrial regions. Another major problem was that the length of customs frontiers increased to 6-7,000 km and the number of monetary systems rose from 13 to 27. With the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy, seven new customs areas emerged in the region. Between 1919 and 1924, the Central and Eastern European countries withdrew into isolation, and most of them adopted prohibitive measures in trade (customs tariffs) (Szávai 2009: 114).

2. The Soviet Republic, coupled with political instability, contributed to the economic chaos in Hungary. The nationalization measures of the Hungarian Bolsheviks, which extended to all branches of the economy (agriculture, industry, and trade), further aggravated the economic difficulties in the country. After the collapse of the communist regime, the Romanian and Serbian armies requisitioned not only the agricultural products and livestock but also the rolling stocks and machines. They systematically weakened the economic resources without paying

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any compensation (Gulyás 2012: 12). The first step towards political consolidation was the election of the new legislative body – known as the National Assembly – on 15 January 1920. Finally, the election of Miklós Horthy as Regent of Hungary by the National Assembly on 1 March 1920 marked the end of the period of political instability in Hungary’s modern history.

3. The Treaty of Trianon with its territorial detachments and population losses further exacerbated the severe economic conditions in the Kingdom of Hungary.

Because the majority of raw material resources were annexed to the neighbouring countries (Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes), industrial branches were largely cut off from its sources of supply.

4. Economic exhaustion during the war years led to rampant inflation. In parallel with the deterioration of goods supply, governments resorted to issuing unsecured paper money in order to cover a growing budget deficit. By the end of World War I, money had lost about 60 per cent and by the summer of 1919 more than 85 per cent of its value. From the summer of 1921 to 1924, the volume of banknotes in circulation increased from 17 billion to 2,500 billion crowns. The value of the crown sank to virtually zero (Berend 1985: 267).

As far as inflation was concerned, Aldcroft pointed out its positive impact in stimulating the economic activity and trade. He emphasized that cheap loans and a sharp decline in real wages to less than half of the pre-war level gave a boost to industrial activity and employment. ‘The steel, metal and coal industries were especially favoured, while employment and output in manufacturing as a whole rose by about one-third’ (Aldcroft 1997: 68). In my opinion, the benefit from inflation was relatively short-lived and did not solve the fundamental problems of the Hungarian economy such as the general shortage of capital and the low level of domestic accumulation.

5. Finally, according to the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary was compelled to pay reparations for 30 years in restitution for the war damages that it had caused. From 1921, approximately 880 tons of coal were to be delivered to Yugoslavia and 28,000 heads of livestock each to Italy, Yugoslavia, and Greece (Romsics 1999: 124). In October 1923, decision was taken about the payment of 200 million gold crown by the Kingdom of Hungary. The Reparations Commission introduced reliefs for the repayment conditions, which were fulfilled by coal deliveries to Yugoslavia up to 1926. The unresolved question of war reparations was a serious burden on the economy and hindered its fast recovery (Berend–Ránki 1976: 271).

The victorious Entente Powers were interested in promoting the economic stabilization of the countries of East Central Europe. One of the most important endeavours was to ensure political and economic stability in the region. This implied the avoidance of the spread of a Bolshevik-type regime, which emerged in Soviet Russia. Keynes stressed in 1921 that international loans were essential

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both to former allies and former adversaries to stabilize their economies (Berend– Ránki 1977: 89).

The first attempt to reorganize the economy was carried out in the spring of 1920, when the old banknotes were overprinted – all with the word Magyarország ‘Hungary’ –, and thus the independent Hungarian currency was created. The state used half of the nominal value of all banknotes submitted and debased as a compulsory loan. In order to strengthen the value of the korona, the government decided to stop printing money without the backing of adequate reserves. In parallel with this process, austerity measures were introduced to curb government spending and finance the lowered state expenditures by new taxes. In increasing receipts, the new property tax played a crucial role, which level varied between 5 per cent and 20 per cent for various types of property. Despite the efforts made by Finance Minister Lóránt Hegedüs, the financial reorganization based on domestic resources failed. On 16 September 1921, he resigned, and inflation started to accelerate from the summer of 1922 and reached double figures (Tóth 2005: 501).

The new Finance Minister, Tibor Kállay, strived for the implementation of an ‘organic tax reform’, whose main aim was to increase taxation income. The new system had a progressive element, but it was designed primarily to spread the tax burden over the broad mass of population, which was rejected by the majority of the Hungarian society. At the same time, he tried to reduce the irrationally high numbers of public employees by 11,000 (from 209,000 to 198,000). These measures led to only partial and transitory success, but they did not improve the precarious economic situation. From the second half of 1922, it became more obvious in government circles and economic institutions that restoring the equilibrium of the budget and stabilizing the currency could only be achieved by obtaining a sizeable international loan (Romsics 1999: 131–132). Austria had already taken up a loan of 650 million gold koronas in the autumn of 1922, in which the country was compelled to renounce the Anschluss with Germany (Németh 2011: 133). Other countries in the region followed the same way to reorganize their economies.

After Hungary had been admitted to the League of Nations on 18 September 1922, the government led by István Bethlen submitted a request for a short-term (40–50 million gold koronas) and a long-term loan (350–650 million gold koronas) in April 1923 in order to obtain an arrangement on reparation charges. After lengthy debates, it succeeded in achieving – with the support of Great Britain and the Little Entente and France – that the international loan could not be burdened by reparations (Berend– Ránki 1976: 308). In November 1923, the Head of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations, Sir Arthur Salter paid an official visit to Budapest. He discussed with Hungarian politicians the economic situation of the country. During the negotiations, it became clear that economic and financial consolidation could be achieved with the help of three different instruments: to guarantee the sustained balance of the state budget, to halt accelerating inflation, and, finally, with the creation of an independent

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bank, to enjoy the monopoly of note issue. The delegation agreed on the reconstruction package provided by the League of Nations (Péteri 1985: 121–125).

The reconstruction scheme together with Protocols I and II were signed in March 1924, and the National Assembly enacted them in April of the same year.

In Protocol I, Hungary’s integrity and sovereignty were guaranteed by six countries (Czechoslovakia, France, Great Britain, Italy, Romania, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes). Hungary guaranteed the loyal implementation of the Treaty of Trianon. Protocol II contained the detailed programme of financial stabilization and the tasks of a delegated Commissioner General responsible for the execution of the reconstruction scheme. The Council of the League of Nations entrusted Jeremiah Smith with the supervision of the Hungarian state budget. He vetoed every expenditure that would have jeopardized the implementation of the stabilization programme. If it were necessary, he could levy new taxes (Schlett 2020).

At first, the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia) and France refused the loan that had been requested by Hungary because they insisted on fulfilling strict economic and political conditions. Britain and Italy stood with Hungary, and as a result of their pressure the League agreed to vote half of the credit applied for (Romsics 1999: 132). An important step in the implementation of the scheme was the issue of the Reconstruction Loan in July 1924 of the nominal amount of USD 68.7 million (307,000,000 gold koronas). The greatest part of the loan (96 per cent) was issued publicly in the United Kingdom, the United States, Italy, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Sweden. The conditions were less favourable because the nominal rate of interest was 7.5 per cent, except for the Italian portion, which was 8.05 per cent (Nötel 1986: 196). Therefore, in return for the 250,000,000 gold koronas that were actually taken up, more than 600,000,000 had to be repaid over a twenty-year term (Tóth 2005: 502).

The spring of 1924 marked the first step towards economic consolidation. The reconstruction package was implemented by Law No. V of 1924. This required the creation of the National Bank of Hungary, which was independent from the state.

The newly established institution managed the state debt and handed over the responsibility for issuing currency. The Bank of England contributed to the capital stock of the National Bank of Hungary, which was 4 million pounds (82 million gold koronas). In return, the exchange rate of the national currency was tied to the pound sterling, one gold korona equalling 17,000 paper koronas. The legal framework of the National Bank was also laid down by the reconstruction programme, which was in compliance with the statute of the Bank of England. From 1924 onwards, the former had the exclusive right to issue of banknotes, conducted the monetary policy of the country, and was responsible for the bills of exchange. It was a state treasury being underwritten by private companies (Kaposi 2002: 280–281).

The monetary reform was completed by the introduction of pengő in November 1925, one pengő equalling 12,500 paper koronas, which was tied to the pound

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sterling (Nötel 1986: 196). Its small coin, the fillér, came into circulation only on 1 January 1927.

The number of state employees was lowered in two stages, in 1924 and 1925, by a further 35,000, which brought the total civil service establishment to approximately 150-160,000, or about half of the pre-war level (Tóth 2005: 502). Schlett rightly noted that state bureaucracy was streamlined, and more emphasis was placed on efficiency and profitability. As a result of the saving measures, the Ministry of Food was closed and the benefits in kind of public servant employees at discount prices were abolished. The price review committees and coal government committee ceased to exist. Finally, red tape was eased by the merger of state authorities and institutions, whereas procedures were also simplified (Schlett 2020).

In order to guarantee the sustained balance of the state budget, the rescue plan contained a progressive taxation system, ranging from 1 to 44 per cent (Kádár 2015: 76–81). Due to the measures (the reduction of public expenditures and the increase of receipts) introduced in the middle of the 1920s, in 1925, the budget closed with a surplus of 63 million gold koronas without drawing on the international credit.

As the value of the korona was stabilized, internal equilibrium was restored, and because of the raising demand, tax revenues also increased (Draskóczy et al. 1998: 344). Therefore, more than a third of the international loan was used to maintain the budget in balance. The remainder was applied to various investments. The restructuring of the finances ended officially on 30 June 1926. Hungary regained the control over its public finances because all sequestered revenues were now released and placed at the government’s disposal (Romsics 1999: 133).

As far as the Reconstruction Loan was concerned, it restored the confidence of Western creditors to Hungary. This opened the door to a series of private credits.

In 1931, the total external debt owed by the country was USD 700 million and its annual service of USD 48 million, which accounted for 6 per cent of the national income and as much as 48 per cent of the export receipts. The per capita debt in Hungary was the highest (USD 83) among the Central and Eastern European countries at this time (Nötel 1986: 224).

In Hungary, similarly to Austria, economic consolidation was successful because inflation was halted by the government, and it established the institutional and legal framework of the Hungarian National Bank. The inflationary spiral was stopped in the middle of 1924 as confidence returned and the exchange rate of the korona was stabilized by linking it to the pound sterling (Aldcroft–Morewood 1995: 39).

Tighter budget controls and increasing tax revenues contributed to the balance of the state budget. During the implementation of the stabilization plan, Hungary lost the control over its public finances between 1924 and 1926. The unusually high nominal interest rate (7.5 per cent) of the international loan meant an additional burden for the national economy.

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Table 1. External debt and debt service in 1931 in six Central and Eastern European countries

Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland Romania Yugoslavia Total of six countries

External debt Million USD USD per head of population 138 23 393 27 728 83 860 27 1,016 56 631 45 3,766

40

External debt service Million USD Percentage of Percentage of national income exports 10 3 22 22 1 5 48 6 48 58 3 27 52 8 36 30 5 36 220

3

23

Source: NÖTEL, Rudolf. 1986. International Credit and Finance. In: Kaser, M. C.–Radice, E. A. (eds.), The Economic History of Eastern Europe 1919–1975. Vol. II. Interwar Policy. The War and Reconstruction. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 223.

Although economic and financial consolidation in the mid-1920s was accompanied by bankruptcies both in the state and private sectors and unemployment rose as a result of dismissals in the public administration, labour market had significantly improved in Hungary by 1926 (Szávai 2009: 117). The negative effects of the consolidation process were offset by the restoration of fiscal balances and the growing public and private investments in the national economy.

3. Industrial Development in Hungary in the 1920s The Treaty of Trianon had negative effects on the development of the industry. The uneven distribution of the remaining capacities and the shortage of raw materials were the major problems, which were arisen from the territorial detachments.

Hungary’s industrial capacities were largely cut off from sources of supply, which now lay beyond its frontiers. According to Teichova, as regards basic materials, Hungary lost access to 83 per cent of crude iron, 84 per cent of timber, 65 per cent of coal, and all of the oil, copper, gold, silver, and salt deposits. Therefore, the imports of raw materials became essential to maintain in operation the metallurgy, engineering, and textile factories (Teichova 1985: 226–227).

Other industrial branches, such as the production of means of transport, including rolling stocks and railway carriages, had substantial overcapacities in the tight domestic market. During the interwar period, the shortage of raw materials meant an obstacle for the Hungarian industry. For instance, the flour milling industry was unable to fully utilize its 6.7 mil tons of capacity from domestic supplies of grain on the diminished territory and could not reach more than 3 mil tons at the best of harvests (Teichova 1985: 227). Another major problem occurred with the

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shrinkage of the domestic market, which coupled with the population’s low income level during the interwar period. Due to unfavourable external and internal factors, industrial production in 1920 was only 35-40 per cent of the pre-war level.

There were two important factors which had a profound impact on industrial development in Hungary in the 1920s: 1. Owing to the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the autumn of 1918, Customs Law No. LIII of 1907 was no longer valid, wherefore a completely new customs tariff structure had to be introduced. The new customs tariff system entered into force on 1 January 1925. Its main aim was to protect the development of domestic industry. In Hungary, the 10-20 per cent level formerly prevailing in the Monarchy was replaced by a general tariff of 30 per cent and by one as high as 50 per cent on finished industrial products imported in greater quantities. In the heavy industry, such as the production of means of transport and rolling stocks, the average rate of tariff was 20 per cent. Besides the prohibitions of the early 1920s, the autonomous customs tariff system gave protection in particular to underdeveloped light industries (textiles) that used home-produced materials. At the same time, the import of basic raw materials and agricultural products was not prohibited (Romsics 2017: 117–122).

2. The law that provided state support for industry in Hungary entered into force in 1922. In parallel with the adoption of the new legislation, the majority of the handicraft’s representative organizations and trade corporations were reshuffled.

Turnover taxes were reduced from 3 to 2 per cent for domestic manufacturers. The state allowed tax exemptions and allowances for factories. In 1928, a long-term credit (50 million pengős) was earmarked for the development of industry (Szávai 2009: 118).

Stabilization measures and the new customs tariffs introduced from 1 January 1925 contributed to the modest economic growth in Hungary in the second half of the 1920s. The main endeavour of the government was to support the development of manufacturing industries. Whereas industry and mining accounted for 25 per cent of the national income in 1913, as a result of territorial changes after 1920, this ratio rose to 31 per cent in 1929, when factory production exceeded 12 per cent of the pre-war level (Romsics 2011: 208).

Within the context of general growth, the situation of various branches of industry showed a mixed picture. The textile industry with its spectacular development became the second largest branch of Hungary’s industry, the production of which grew by a factor of ten between 1921 and 1929. Whereas textiles had accounted for only 4.8 per cent of manufacturing output in 1913, this figure was 14.2 per cent in 1929. During the period of 1920–1922, 43 new mills were opened, and 14 acquired major additions of plant and equipment. In the 1920s, textiles absorbed fully one third of all investments in the Hungarian industry, and manpower more than quintupled (from 13,000 to 75,000) (Teichova 1985: 250–252).

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Table 2. Hungarian industrial production by branch in 1913–1938 Percentages of industrial output Iron and metal industry Engineering Electric power Building materials Chemicals Predominantly producers’ goods Textiles Clothing Leather Wood Paper Printing Predominantly consumers’ goods Food processing

19131 15.5 13.8 1.5 4.3 7.8

1929 11.3 10.2 4.2 4.8 7.4

1938 14.2 9.7 4.4 3.7 9.7

42.9

37.9

41.7

4.8 1.5 2.7 2.5 0.6 2.6

14.2 2.2 3.2 3.2 1.2 2.4

15.3 2.4 3.9 2.5 2.1 1.7

14.7

26.4

27.9

42.4

35.7

30.4

Note: on the 1920 territory, calculated in current prices.

Source: Teichova 1985: 241

Similarly to the production of textiles, timber and paper industry showed a dynamic growth. However, only 22 per cent of the capacities remained within the post-Trianon territory of Hungary; thanks to the liberalization measures introduced in the 1920s, wood processing grew significantly. The output of the paper industry increased by two and a half times throughout the whole period, and several new plants were also established (Kaposi 2002: 289).

The relative predominance of the food processing industry fell within the country’s new borders. The main problem was that, due to the Treaty of Trianon, it was not only oversized but also lost the majority of its raw materials and safe markets.

Therefore, its share in the industrial production fell from 42 per cent in 1913 to 36 per cent by 1929, but it still remained the most important source of income for the economy. Tight market conditions and increasing competition from abroad hindered the development of the milling industry. The Hungarian milling products were characterized by inelasticity both in costs and prices in the world market. Energy needs of the milling industry also changed during the interwar period because powersupplied mills assumed an even greater role than before (Kaposi 2002: 289–290).

The capacities of sugar refining remained unused in the post-Trianon territory.

Former plants were merged or closed. Because the level of domestic consumption was low, exports could be maintained by considerable state subventions, whose costs were covered by high internal prices. For instance, the Hungarian sugar was 35-38 per cent cheaper in Austria, which led to the further contraction of the domestic market (Gunst 2006: 79).

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Some other branches of the food processing industry were capable of developing significantly. Milk production and canning industry, especially the production of fruit and tomato preserves, started to play an exceptionally important role. In 1922, the network of cooperatives was built up, which operated as single production units in order to meet milk processing and distribution needs. Canning factories were located in Budapest, in the Great Hungarian Plain and along the Danube–Tisza Interfluve. The output of vegetables and tinned fruit doubled throughout the whole period, while exports of tomato preserves increased by twentyfold (Gunst 2006: 79). Despite the growth of the new branches, such as canning, chocolate and milk processing, milling output fell because high tariffs meant a loss of foreign markets.

Preference given to cane sugar also had negative impacts on the Hungarian sugar beet industry. Finally, the ‘declining market for beer, partly caused by cheap wine, brought about some conversion of Budapest breweries to other activities in the food, chemical and textile sectors’ (Turnock 2005: 213). The structure of the Hungarian light industry more or less adjusted to the country’s new needs.

As far as heavy industry was concerned, a similar reorganization took place after 1920. Due to the lack of reliable markets, the production of agricultural machinery and vehicles were forced to contract. The engineering sector’s share of output fell from 13.8 per cent in 1913 to 9.7 per cent by 1929 (Romsics 1999: 135).

Taking into account the difficulties of the 1920s, the production of tractors at the Hofherr Factory could be interpreted as the renewal of the Hungarian engineering industry. Manufacture of automobiles started to gain ground at the Manfréd Weiss Works and at the Hungarian Wagon and Machine Works in Győr, but as a result of tight market and low internal demand, it could not specialize in mass production.

Several new types of products managed to strike roots, amongst them motorcycles and bicycles. However, other heavy industrial branches were able to retain their competitiveness in the world market. From 1922 onwards, radio sets were produced by the United Incandescent Lamp and Electrical Co. (Egyesült Izzó és Villamossági Gyár), and its output rose significantly. The patent of the galvanometer by Ottó Bláthy in 1923 gained similar success. It was the Ganz Works that focused on the production of diesel-motor-powered locomotives and sea ships. Nevertheless, these successes were not able to offset the overall decline. Kaposi stated that the Hungarian engineering industry could only develop slowly in the 1920s because it lacked the essential elements of modern technologies applied in the industrialized countries of Western Europe (Kaposi 2002: 293–294).

There were a number of endeavours in the chemical industry in order to adjust to the new post-war situation. Hungária Műtrágya, Kénsav és Vegyiipar Rt. [Hungária Artificial Manure, Sulphuric Acid, and Chemicals PLC] and Péti Nitrogén Művek [Pét Nitrogen Works], which were established in the 1920s, played an important role by producing artificial fertilizers. Considerable progress was achieved by the factories of Chinoin and Richter Gedeon with their pharmaceuticals, and new

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capacities were created during the interwar period. The total output of the chemical industry was 50-60 per cent higher than the pre-war level, but it could not carve out a leading position (Berend–Ránki 1976: 451).

It is worth mentioning with regard to the ore mining and metallurgical branch that some new blast furnace capacity was built in Diósgyőr in the 1920s, where the necessary inputs could be assembled. Emphasis was given to steel produced from scrap or from imported pig iron. In 1925, the discovery of huge bauxite deposits in the Veszprém region proved to be of major significance. As Turnock stressed, quarrying at Ajka started in 1932, production from scattered fields was delivered by the Halimba railway, and steps were taken in processing, although it was some time before Hungary would create its own aluminium industry (Turnock 2005: 211).

Of the basic industries, electricity generation flourished spectacularly. The generating capacity that was left within the new frontiers in 1921 amounted to 276 million KW, three times more than before the war. In less than a decade, this tripled again (Romsics 1999: 135). Its share in factory output rose from 1.5 to 4.2 per cent over the whole period in question (Honvári 2005: 46).

Besides the negative impacts of the Treaty of Trianon, another major problem during the interwar period was that the bulk of Hungary’s industrialization was developed in the area of greater Budapest. This was a characteristic of the country’s economy from the late 19th century, and this did not change in the interwar years because 70 per cent of all joint-stock companies, 75 per cent of the total stock capital, nearly half of the labour force, and the majority of productive capacities were located there (Teichova 1985: 259).

4. Agriculture and Foreign Trade Although the share of agriculture in the national income fell from 44 per cent in 1913 to 40 per cent by 1928-29, it preserved its dominance in the national economy.

Several authors emphasized the stagnation of crop production, which was only 1-2 per cent above the pre-war level for the following reasons: the inequalities of landownership despite the land reform introduced in 1920; the persistence of pre-war cultivation methods; a neglect of soil conservation measures (Romsics 1999, Tóth 2005).

Political and social motives, rather than economic policy, played a decisive role in the land reform in Hungary. The Land Reform Bill became an urgent task when the Smallholders Party won the majority in the first post-war election (26 January 1920) in order to consolidate the Horthy regime. As a result of the dominant influence and strength of the aristocracy and the landowner class, the most moderate reform was carried out in Hungary in 1920. The total area that was redistributed was no more than 1.2 million cadastral holds, 6 per cent of the arable land of the

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country. The areas held by the great landed estates decreased only 10 per cent and preserved their predominance during the interwar period. In the 1930s, big estates comprised 48 per cent of all arable land in Hungary. From the expropriated land, 400,000 families received small plots altogether, each averaging only one hectare.

250,000 of the claimants had previously been landless, and after the reform – which gave only tiny scattered parcels of land –, they still remained in a semi-agrarian proletarian state. An additional 100,000 hectares of land was used to strengthen the social basis of the new regime, giving estates to former members of the national army headed by Horthy (the so-called vitézi telek) (Berend 1985: 159–160). At the end of the 1930s, approximately 1,500 large estates amounting to 0.1 per cent of the total number of holdings occupied 23.5 per cent of the total cultivated land, whilst 99.9 per cent of holdings between 1 and 50 hectares owned 53.6 per cent of agricultural land. The land reform of Hungary created the largest rural proletariat in Central and South-Eastern Europe. This was shown by the fact that agricultural labourers’ and peasants’ holdings of less than 1 hectare comprised 52.3 per cent of all active persons in agriculture as against 15.7 per cent in Romania, 15.2 per cent in Yugoslavia, and 9.1 per cent in Bulgaria (Teichova 1989: 900–901).

Table 3. Changes in the distribution of Hungary’s agricultural holdings between 1895 and 1935 Size of farm (acre∗) 0–5 5–20 20–100 100–1,000 over 1,000

Farms Number as % of all farms 53.7 72.5 35.3 21.3 10.0 5.4 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.2

Note: * Hungarian acre [hold] is 5,755 square metres.

Area as % of total area 6.0 10.1 24.2 21.8 23.4 20.0 13.4 18.2 33.0 29.9 Source: Berend–Ránki 1972: 150

As far as the land reform is concerned, the main problem was that peasant families were unable to cultivate their own lands because the majority of them did not have agricultural equipment and machinery. Two-thirds of them had no animals at all.

Besides the unfavourable conditions, the system of compensation was extremely conservative. Whereas peasants had to pay for the land, – generally at 30-40 per cent more than the average market price – the state did not intervene in the purchase (Berend 1985: 160). A significant number of the new landowners were sooner or later bankrupted. Between 1926 and 1938, 67,000 holdings were auctioned, a large part of them being new peasant farms (Pölöskei–Szakács 1962: 634).

The other factor considered a hindrance for agricultural production was the reinforcement of concentration on grain. This happened when the protected grain market of the Monarchy was no longer available to Hungarian agriculture, whilst

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large and growing supplies of grain came onto the international market, primarily by the increase of wheat production in North and South America. The more intensive branches of horticulture and winegrowing hardly expanded. The only positive phenomenon was that the proportion of fallow land fell from 9 to 4 per cent throughout the whole period (Romsics 1999: 136–137).

The input of labour also influenced the productivity of the agriculture. The excess of rural population was a specific problem in Hungary and also in other Central and Eastern European countries between 1920 and 1939. Estimations of Mátyás Matolcsy stated that 24 per cent of the active rural workers were not employable.

The ratio was even higher in the case of day-labourers and peasant owners of dwarf properties, who accounted for 34.2 per cent (Ormos 2004: 303).

Soil conservation, which was one the most crucial means to raise yields, likewise stagnated. The use of artificial fertilizers increased from the pre-war level of 12 kg/ hectare to 15 kg/hectare by the end of the 1920s. At the same time, the most developed western European countries were applying an amount between 100 and 300 kg/ hectare (Tóth 2005: 504). Artificial fertilizers were used mainly by the big estates, while smallholdings hardly applied this farming technology. Agricultural technique was the third important factor which affected the increase of yield. The process of mechanization, which started at the end of the 19th century, further continued in the 1920s. Technological development was coupled with the appearance of tractors in the Hungarian countryside. Berend noted that the first tractors appeared in Hungary in 1912, but by 1925 their number reached 1,189 and by 1928 6,000.

The old steam threshers were also partly replaced by modern combustion engine threshers, numbering 5,700 in 1925 and 9,200 in 1928 (Berend 1985: 166). Despite positive achievements, mechanization did not affect transportation, storage, and hoeing. They were largely carried out using manual or animal power.

Table 4. Crop production in Central Europe in the periods of 1903–1912 and 1934–1938 Country Austria Czechoslovakia Hungary Bulgaria Yugoslavia Romania Poland

Wheat (1) (2) 14 17 15 17 13 14 11 13 9 11 11 10 12 15

Rye (1) 14 15 12 8 8 9 11

Corn (2) 15 16 11 10 8 9 13

(1) 15 5 18 13 13 13 11

Notes: Crop yield figures are given in quintals per hectare.

(1) = yearly average for 1903–1912 (2) = yearly average for 1934–1938

(2) 26 21 20 12 18 10 14

Potatoes (1) (2) 83 137 91 135 80 73 38 61 41 62 75 77 103 138

Sugar beets (1) (2) 242 260 260 290 254 210 129 160 195 190 205 150 243 270

Source: Berend–Ránki 1977: 95.

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The average production of the most important crops was slightly better than the pre-war level. The yields of sugar beet increased by 51 per cent, but the harvest of grain, barley, and potato rose by 38, 25, and 21 per cent respectively, which was higher than the average (between 6 and 10 per cent). The growth of average yields was between 11 and 26 per cent, but only four of the seven main crops surpassed the 1913 level. After 1929, agriculture was characterized by stagnation (Rab 2009: 140).

As far as livestock is concerned, only a moderate progress was achieved compared to the pre-war level. Cattle and sheep stocks lagged behind the pre-war level in 1929 by 15 and 36 per cent respectively, while horse and pig numbers remained constant (Berend 1985: 170). The number of livestock did not increase, but this was compensated by qualitative improvements. Sheep breeding declined, which could be explained by the shrinkage of fertile meadows and the devastations of World War I. Poultry farming was dominant in the interwar years, which made up 1012 per cent of Hungary’s total exports. The ratio of livestock deteriorated slightly compared to the fertile area, but its quality improved over the whole period in question (Rab 2009: 140–141).

Hungary relied heavily on foreign trade in the interwar years. The country’s economic structure depended on the export of agricultural products that required access to new markets. Foreign currency earnings were essential for import substitution, which was based on the protection of domestic manufacturing industries. In the 1920s, our biggest foreign trade partner was Austria, which took up 44 per cent of Hungarian total exports in 1923. The bulk of exports comprised agricultural products, whereas imports mainly consisted of manufactured goods.

From 1926 to 1929, the second most important partner was Czechoslovakia with a share of 18 per cent, followed by Germany, which accounted for 12 per cent of our export and in return delivered metals, machines and equipment, dyestuffs and textiles. Although trade relations developed between Hungary and Italy in the first half of the 1920s, our total exports and imports were not more than 5 and 3 per cent respectively (Kaposi 2002: 294–295).

5. Conclusions At the end of the First World War, the Hungarian economy was hit by rampant inflation, which was a concomitant of economic exhaustion. The dismemberment of the AustroHungarian Monarchy together with the territorial detachments of the Treaty of Trianon meant additional losses. Furthermore, Hungary was compelled to pay war reparations, which was a serious burden on the economy and hindered its fast recovery.

One of the most important endeavours of the government led by István Bethlen was to achieve economic and financial consolidation. Thanks to the loan of the League of Nations, fiscal balance was restored, and inflation was halted. At the same

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time, the National Bank of Hungary was established, which became independent from the government and had the exclusive right to issue banknotes and conduct the monetary policy of the country. The monetary reform was completed by the introduction of the pengő in 1927. The new currency was tied to the pound sterling. Stabilization measures also involved the introduction of a progressive taxation system in order to guarantee the sustained balance of the state budget. The Reconstruction Loan played an important role by creating favourable conditions for growth and investments.

After 1920, the circumstances of industrial development changed significantly in the post-Trianon territory. Owing to the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary’s industrial capacities were largely cut off from sources of supply which laid beyond its frontiers.

Therefore, the bulk of heavy industrial branches (metallurgy and engineering) depended on imports of raw materials, whereas other sectors, such as the production of means of transport, including rolling stocks and railway carriages, had substantial overcapacities in the tight domestic market. The shrinkage of domestic market together with the uneven distribution of industrial capacities further exacerbated the prevailing difficulties in the post-war years.

Agriculture was hit severely by the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the territorial detachments of the Treaty of Trianon. The most fertile soils, including the territories of Bačka, Banat, and Csallóköz, were ceded to the neighbouring countries. Foreign exchange earnings of agricultural export were necessary to meet Hungary’s import needs during the interwar period. Although agricultural output reached the pre-war level in 1923, price changes of farm products were unfavourable for peasant holdings in the 1920s, which reflected the unfavourable gap between agrarian and industrial prices. As the prices of agricultural products declined in the world market, Hungary suffered a significant deterioration in its terms of trade. From 1928, due to the collapse of international market accompanied by the downturn in wholesale prices in the domestic market, agriculture had to face serious difficulties.

References ALDCROFT, Derek Howard. 1997. Inflation, Currency Depreciation and Reconstruction in Europe. In: Aldcroft, Derek Howard (ed.), Studies in the Interwar European Economy. Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 53–88.

ALDCROFT, Derek Howard–MOREWOOD, Steven. 1995. Inflation, Reconstruction, and Stabilization. In: Aldcroft, Derek Howard–Morewood, Steven (eds.), Economic Change in Eastern Europe since 1918. Aldershot, Hants, England: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 22–42.

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BEREND, T. Iván. 1985. Agriculture. In: Kaser, Michael Charles–Radice, Edward Albert (eds.), The Economic History of Eastern Europe 1919–1975. Vol. I. Economic Structure and Performance between the Two Wars. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 148–209.

1987. Válságos évtizedek [Critical Decades]. Budapest: Magvető.

BEREND, T. Iván–RÁNKI, György. 1972. A magyar gazdaság száz éve [One Hundred Years of the Hungarian Economy]. Budapest: Kossuth/Közgazdasági és Jogi Kiadó.

1976. Közép- és Kelet-Európa gazdasági fejlődése a 19–20. században [Economic and Social Development of East Central Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries].

Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó.

1977. East Central Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.

DRASKÓCZY, István–BUZA, János–KAPOSI, Zoltán–KÖVÉR, György–HONVÁRI, János. 1998. Magyarország gazdaságtörténete a honfoglalástól a 20. század közepéig [Hungary’s History from the Conquest to the Middle of the 20th Century].

Revised edition. Budapest: Aula.

GULYÁS, László. 2012. A Horthy-korszak külpolitikája 1. Az első évek: 1919–1924.

[Foreign Policy of the Horthy Era 1. The First Years: 1919–1924]. Máriabesnyő: Attraktor.

GUNST, Péter. 2006. Magyarország gazdaságtörténete 1914–1989 [Economic History of Hungary between 1914 and 1989]. Budapest: Nemzeti Tankönyvkiadó.

HONVÁRI, János. 2005. Magyarország gazdaságtörténete Trianontól a rendszerváltásig [Economic History of Hungary from Trianon to the Change of Regime]. Budapest: Aula.

KÁDÁR, Béla. 2015. Trianontól a győri programig [From Trianon to the Győr Programme]. Rubicon 3: 76–81.

KAPOSI, Zoltán. 2002. Magyarország gazdaságtörténete 1700–2000 [Economic History of Hungary, 1700–2000]. Budapest–Pécs: Dialóg Campus.

NÉMETH, István. 2011. Az első Osztrák Köztársaság (1918–1938): történeti áttekintés [The First Austrian Republic, 1918–1938: Historical Overview]. In: Németh, István–Fiziker, Róbert (eds.): Ausztria a 20. században. Az „életképtelen” államtól a „Boldogok szigetéig” [From the ‘Unviable’ State to the ‘Island of the Happy’]. Budapest: L’Harmattan. 128–147.

NÖTEL, Rudolf. 1986. International Credit and Finance. In: Kaser, Michael Charles– Radice, Edward Albert (eds.), The Economic History of Eastern Europe 1919– 1975. Vol. II. Interwar Policy. The War and Reconstruction. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 170–287.

ORMOS, Mária. 2004. A gazdasági világválság magyar visszhangja [The Repercussions of the Great Depression to Hungary]. Budapest: Polgart.

PÉTERY, György. 1985. Montagu Norman és a magyar „szanálási mű”. Az 1924es magyar pénzügyi stabilizációról [Montagu Norman and the Hungarian

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‘Reconstruction Scheme’. On the Hungarian Financial Stabilization in 1924].

Századok 119(1): 121–125.

PÖLÖSKEI, Ferenc–SZAKÁCS, Kálmán. 1962. Földmunkás és szegényparaszt mozgalmak Magyarországon 1848–1948 II. [Poor Peasants and Country Worker Movements in Hungary]. Budapest: Mezőgazdasági és Erdészeti Dolgozók Szakszervezete.

RAB, Virág. 2009. A mezőgazdaság [The Agriculture]. In: Gulyás, László (ed.): A modern magyar gazdaság története. Széchenyitől a Széchenyi tervig [The Contemporary Economic History of Hungary. From Széchenyi to the Széchenyi Plan]. Szeged: JATE Press. 125–141.

ROMSICS, Ignác. 1999. Hungary in the Twentieth Century. Budapest: Corvina– Osiris.

2011. A 20. század rövid története [Short History of the Twentieth Century].

Rubicon Könyvek. Second, revised edition.

2017. A Horthy-korszak [The Horthy Era]. Budapest: Helikon.

SCHLETT, András. 2020. „Ínségköltségvetés” – Megszorító csomag az 1920-as években [‘Restrictive Budget’. Austerity Measures in the 1920s]. Archívnet 20(4– 5): https://archivnet.hu/insegkoltsegvetes-megszorito-csomag-az-1920-evekben.

Retrieved on: 29 March 2021.

SZÁVAI, Ferenc. 2009. A Horthy-korszak gazdasági élete, 1920–1945 [The Economic Life of the Horthy Era, 1920–1945]. In: Gulyás, László (ed.), A modern magyar gazdaság története. Széchenyitől a Széchenyi tervig [The Contemporary Economic History of Hungary. From Széchenyi to the Széchenyi Plan]. Szeged: JATE Press. 113–122.

TEICHOVA, Alice. 1985. Industry. In: Kaser, Michael Charles–Radice, Edward Albert (eds.), The Economic History of Eastern Europe 1919–1975. Vol. I. Economic Structure and Performance between the Two Wars. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 222–323.

TÓTH, György István. 2005. A Concise History of Hungary: The History of Hungary from the Early Middle Ages to the Present. Budapest: Corvina–Osiris.

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Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 19 (2021) 72–87

DOI: 10.2478/auseur-2021-0005

Cyber Security Strategies of the Visegrád Group States and Romania1 Milada NAGY

PhD, Budapest Business School University of Applied Sciences, Budapest Faculty of International Management and Business Department of International Relations e-mail: nagy.milada@uni-bge.hu Abstract. Among security challenges that have emerged on nation-state level, attacks in cyber space are ‘products’ of the recent past. Their significance has been overvalued especially in 2007 owing to the cyber attack against Estonia. As a consequence, it were not only the European Union (EU) and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to have created their own cyber security strategies but the majority of states have also made preparations for preventing and deterring threats from the cyber space. States of the Visegrád Four (V4) and Romania, though all full members of both the EU and the NATO, have prepared their own cyber security strategies.

The objective of this study is to offer a comparative analysis of cyber security strategies of the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania, contrasting them to the relevant documents of the EU and the NATO, pointing out the identities and differences. A further essential element of the research is the description of the cooperation between V4 members in the implementation of cyber security strategies and of the chances of broader regional cooperation in the given field based on the jointly adopted documents or on other grounds. One important step in this area was the adoption of the Central European Cyber Security Platform in 2013. This common move, joined also by Austria, is directed mainly at technical exercises. However, the functioning of the Platform is not free from difficulties. Therefore, V4 members have undertaken to find common solutions, including education and professional training for the further development of regional cooperation and widening its spectrum.

Keywords: Visegrád Four, Poland, Romania, Hungary, cyber security, strategy

1

This paper was presented at the conference Past, Present and Future of Central Europe, organized by Budapest Business School and Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania in Cluj-Napoca on 20 November 2020 (online conference).

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Introduction It is not exclusively our life that is made easier and more efficient by information and communication technologies but also public administration. The world relies more and more on information technology (IT) methods; therefore, the trends of threats are continuously changing, and nowadays the state-financed, well-organized attacks are typical. Even at the World Economic Forum in 2013, it was stressed that among the global challenges the size of the economic and physical damage caused by terrorism had been exceeded by that related to cyber-attacks (WEF 2013).

The well-known cyber-attacks (in 2007 against Estonia, the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008, the Stuxnet attack against Iranian nuclear facilities in 2010) inspired the states to create their own cyber security strategies and develop the defence of their IT systems to the highest level.

The article analyses the cyber security strategies of the Visegrád Group countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Republic of Poland, and the Slovak Republic) and Romania. Its main aim is to support the oversight of existing strategies by the utilization of its conclusions and the correction of drawbacks and to give help for those countries that are yet to draw up their own documents.

Background Before starting the analysis of the cyber security strategies of the Visegrád Group and Romania, it is important to clarify the changes in the meaning of strategy as a term, furthermore the interpretation of cyberspace and cyber security. The term ‘strategy’ goes back to the Greek word stratēgos and means ‘main military leader’. In the past, it was the planning of military operations and troop movements that was described by the word ‘strategy’. Over time, the meaning underwent some transformation.

In our days, it means ‘the complex application of opportunities’ states have in the international arena as a result of the aforementioned transformation (Csiki 2008).

The concepts of cyberspace and cyber security have been defined by several researchers. The author applies in both cases the definitions of László Kovács, a Hungarian cyber security expert. Cyberspace is: an umbrella term applied to users, instruments, software, processes, information stored or under transmission, services, and systems that are directly or indirectly connected to computer networks (...) Cyber security is a complex of security-determined instruments, policies, conceptions, technologies, perceptions, risk management methods, activities, trainings, the whole of best practices, whose aim is to protect the computer environment

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used by organizations and users and to protect their devices and systems (Kovács 2018: 18).2 It is the constitution or basic law that is at the top of the system of strategic documents encompassing the national values and interests whose defence is a state priority. It follows that this endeavour is bound to appear in the highest-level strategic document, namely in the national security strategy. Besides the formulation of objectives, the environment is usually also defined, wherein the state wishes to achieve its goals. The challenges that exist at the time of drawing up this document as well as their evaluation also form part of the document.

The proposals and guidelines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the specialized telecommunications organization of the United Nations, namely the International Telecommunication Union (ITU),3 and in the European Union those of the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA)4 are decisive. Regarding the ENISA proposals, the most important step is to define the goals. The ENISA assigns several tasks to it: 1. Define the vision and scope that set the high-level objectives to be accomplished in a specific time frame (usually 5–10 years).

2. Define the business sectors and services in scope for this strategy.

3. Prioritise objectives in terms of impact to the society, economy and citizens (see Chapter 4 for examples of potential objectives).

4. Define a roadmap for the implementation of the strategy, which may involve the following steps.

5. Define concrete activities that would meet the objectives of the strategy.

6. Develop a governance framework for the implementation, evaluation and maintenance of the strategy.

7. Develop a master plan for the implementation of the strategy.

8. Develop concrete action plans for each activity.

9. Define the evaluation of the strategy and its main actions (e.g. which key performance indicators (KPIs) will be performed and by whom. (ENISA 2016: 14)

2 3

4

The quotation was translated by the author.

The International Telecommunication Union is an organization with 193 member states – moreover, several companies, universities, international and regional organizations have joined it. Its main goal is the international harmonization of infocommunication technology and telecommunication. The three central topics are radiocommunication, the international standardization and harmonization of telecommunication, and the international development in the infocommunication sector (ITU 2020).

The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security founded in 2004 is one of the cybersecurity organizations of the European Union. The headquarters is in Heraklion (Crete, Greece). The agency plays an active role in the formulation of cybersecurity strategies of the EU Member States by giving advice, supporting governments with experience, and providing consultation opportunities.

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The ENISA proposal highlights the importance of involving the private sector NGOs in the strategy-making process. The reason why civilians are important is that citizens’ awareness is a pivotal issue. Individuals are listed as the most important actors in cyberspace because Europe has an Internet penetration of about 80%.

(Table 1 shows data related to the five countries analysed.)

Table 1. Internet users in the world (2020). The number of Internet users was 4.93 billion worldwide (63.2% of the world population) Internet Users Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia

Total Non-Users Population (2020) (Internetless) (%)

1 Year User Change (%)

Population change (%) between 2019 and 2020

85

10,693,939

9

1

0.7

85 78 72 82

9,769,526 37,958,138 19,328,838 5,4579,873

9 15 18 12

5 4 4 4

-4.0 -3.1 -7.4 0.3

Source: data of DESI 2020, EUROSTAT 2021

Table 2 shows the ranking of the countries analysed by Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI).5 Poland’s 29th and Hungary’s 31st positions in the world should be given a positive evaluation.

Table 2. Ranking of the countries analysed by Global Cybersecurity Index 2020 Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia

GCI European ranking 35 22 18 32 21

GCI global ranking 68 35 30 62 34 Source: GCI 2021

Analysis of the Strategies The basis of the research is formed by the documents6 of the countries analysed, published in English and downloaded from the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) homepage, and by the following aspects: 1. time when the document entered into effect (in the case of several versions, we focus on the latest document), 5 6

The Global Cybersecurity Index considers 25 various viewpoints during the evaluation. These include, among other things, the existence of strategy and the willingness to update it regularly.

The homepage of ENISA metions the new version of the Hungarian government in 2018, but only the version of 2013 can be downloaded.

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2. strategic objectives, 3. clarification of key terms (e.g. cyberspace, cyber security, etc.), 4. perception of cyber threats, 5. cyber security organizations at the national level, 6. listing of critical infrastructure7 and sectors, 7. existence of incident response capabilities, 8. measures (e.g. regular overview of documents), and 9. cooperation between the international and national governmental and nongovernmental actors.

The Republic of Poland The cybersecurity strategy8 of the Republic of Poland adopted in 2017 is a new version of the one from 2013 and is valid for a five-year period. Its subtitle underlines that cybersecurity is an important part of state policy (NCSS-PO 2017). The strategy envisages as its main goal the provision of safe electronic services for the population, the public and private sectors. Four specific objectives are described: (1) to increase ‘capacity for nationally coordinated actions’, (2) to enhance ‘capacity to counteract cyberthreats’, (3) to increase ‘the national potential and competence in the area of security in cyberspace’, and (4) to build ‘a strong international position of the Republic of Poland in the area of cybersecurity’ (NCSS-PO 2017: 7). The objectives mentioned are described in detail in chapters 5–8.

The statutory environment is raised to the ministerial level. The Minister of Digital Affairs is responsible for cooperating with other ministries for undertaking legislative work in order to regulate specialized tools developed for the field of military operations in cyberspace as well as for monitoring and updating the regulation (NCSS-PO 2017: 9).

The lack of sufficient cooperation (between civilian and military actors, public and private sectors) is blamed for the reduced efficiency of the system. This problem has been emphasized by the strategy, wherefore it should be remedied by setting up the National Cybersecurity Centre, the national and sectorial incident response 7

8

Pursuant to the Hungarian law No. CLXVI. of 2012, the critical infrastructure is ‘part of an instrument, facility, or system belonging to certain sectors, which is necessary for the completion of essential social tasks – especially for healthcare, the personal and property security of the population, the providing of economic and social public services –, and services whose stoppage […] would cause significant consequences’ (CLXVI. 2012).

Strategia Cyberbezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na lata 2017–2022. Poszanowanie praw I wolności w cyberprzestrzeni, kompleksowe podejście do bezpieczeństwa, cyberbezpieczeństwo istotnym elementem polityki państwa (National Framework of Cybersecurity policy of the Republic of Poland for 2017–2022. Respecting the rights and freedoms in cyberspace, comprehensive approach to security, and cybersecurity as an important element of the state policy).

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teams (CSIRTs), and the information exchange and analysis centres, furthermore by the extension of CSIRT networks to the national, sectorial, commercial, and corporate levels in the near future. As far as international cooperation is concerned, it is the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Visegrád Group that are mentioned in the first place; additionally, other international actors, among them, governmental and non-governmental organizations.

The strategy highlights the importance of delineating those operators that are responsible for the indispensable services or critical infrastructures. Parallel to this, the security of information and communication technology (ICT) will be developed.

The government has undertaken to create new regulations for the digital service providers and for the ‘digital single market’ in Poland (NCSS-PO 2017: 12).

In the field of secure ICT systems, it is absolutely necessary to have access to information; therefore, Poland is going to establish a system at the national level.

Its main task will be to warn and inform – bearing in mind the security of sensitive information and data. An additional system will protect the population as end users ‘from the effects of identified threats’ (NCSS-PO 2017: 14).

The preparation for the prevention and protection of threats that are growing in number needs state support, chiefly in the field of action coordination and fight against crimes. The efficient, fast, and reliable exchange of information between states, organizations, and service providers is indispensable in threat detection.

In the area of military operations, the Polish Armed Forces should dispose of the full range of capabilities, including threat recognition, thwarting of threats at the source, and the protection of information systems.

The National Cybersecurity Centre will help to increase Poland’s cybersecurity by analysing internal and external information. A further important goal is to develop the technology and the industry and to support research. By the creation of the Cyberpark Enigma Program, high-quality hardware and software can be produced and people can be made knowledgeable – all these are part of cybersecurity. As a result, Polish companies can become competitive in the European Union in the field of ICT services. The Polish government is also planning to expand the cybersecurity competence of research institutions as well as to set up the Scientific Cybersecurity Cluster with a view to raising awareness in the circle of individuals and professionals by way of education activities.

The strategy includes a promise to create a Cybersecurity Action Plan six months after its coming into force. Ideally, the Action Plan will be financed by the national treasury, the National Centre for Research and Development, and the European Union.

The area-specific terms applied in the ten chapters of the strategy are explained in Chapter 11.

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The Czech Republic The cybersecurity strategy of the Czech Republic – the new version of the original from 2011 – came into force in 2015 and was prepared for a five-year period (NCSS-CZ 2015). The nine chapters list the perspectives, the principles, the challenges, and the main goals of the state and also their feasibility in the area of cybersecurity. Regarding the Czech strategy, the main aims are: (1) ‘Efficiency and enhancement of all relevant structures, processes, and of cooperation in ensuring cyber security’, (2) ‘Active international cooperation’, (3) ‘Protection of national CII and IIS’,9 (4) ‘Cooperation with [the] private sector’, (5) ‘Research and development / Consumer trust’, (6) ‘Education, awareness raising and information society development’ (7) ‘Support to the Czech Police capabilities for cybercrime investigation and prosecution’, and (8) ‘Cyber security legislation (development of legislative framework). Participation in creation and implementation of European and international regulations’ (NCSS-CZ 2015: 16–20).

The aims should be reached in line with the principles as, for example, the protection of fundamental human rights and the right to freedom, improving human abilities, the attainment of cybersecurity by obeying the principles of subsidiarity, and cooperation at national and international levels.

The strategy makes references to international organizations concerning international cooperation; in particular, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United Nations Organization are mentioned.

Furthermore, it sets forth the need to assist other organizations (with special regard to the Central European area). As far as military cooperation is concerned, the defence-aimed activity of the NATO is written down. The document names actors of economic and scientific sectors because it wishes to develop research and technology hand in hand with the state. Because of the ever-increasing tendency of attacks, establishing efficient security systems has become necessary. The fulfilment of state tasks could be made more operative by the cooperation with people, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector both at domestic and international levels. The state guarantee of secure networks for the population has a significant effect on people’s trust in the state. The Czech cybersecurity strategy pays special attention to guaranteeing a democratic legal system, human rights, and the fundamental rights to freedom in the cyberspace.

The term ‘challenges’ could refer to a number of things: the Czech Republic as a potential test bed; the loss of public trust; the increased number of ICT tools and Internet users; damage caused by technology failures; increase in the number of malware along the growing number of mobile device users; the Internet of Things;10 9 10

Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) and Important Information Systems (IIS).

Although desktop computers and laptops are protected by antivirus programs, several other devices connected to the Internet and used in the households have not been secured so far.

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the digitalization of public administration; the inappropriate security of small and medium-sized enterprises; the transition from Internet Protocol (IPv4) to Internet Protocol (IPv6); cloud-based data storage; protection of information systems in the health sector and industry; smart networks; increased ICT dependence of state defence forces; more and more sophisticated malware; botnet and DDOS/DOS attacks; cybercrime; challenges related to social networks; the end users’ limited digital knowledge; the lack of cybersecurity experts; deficiencies in education.

The document emphasizes the responsibility of the Czech Republic to preserve the security of the elements of the critical infrastructure and the security of networks used by the industry and the population. The National Security Authority (NSA) and the National Cybersecurity Centre (NCSC) are responsible for the regular control, discussion, and evaluation of the aims mentioned in the strategy. The task to prepare an annual report on the cybersecurity situation of the state is assigned to these two authorities. The strategy raises the task of cybersecurity coordination and defence to the national level. Establishing the CERT/CSIRT groups and the cooperation between them is the state’s responsibility, more specifically, of GovCERT.CZ.11

The Slovak Republic The Slovak Republic – as in the cases of the Czech Republic and the Republic of Poland – prepared its cybersecurity strategy for a five-year period in 2015, which is the new version of the former one from the year 200812 (NCSS-SK 2015). The five chapters specify the principles, the suggested solutions, and the recommendations.

The introductory chapter of the document is followed by the explanation of the terms ‘cyber’ and ‘cybersecurity’. The Appendix at the end of the document contains the glossary with some more definitions.

There is a shortage in the cooperation between the state and the private sector, the academic sectors, and the non-governmental organizations; moreover, the coordination system of their cooperation at the strategic level is also missing. The document highlights the need to take steps against challenges and also the need for the secure handling of modern communication technology (it is not defined whose responsibility it should be). Furthermore, the statutory frameworks necessary for the regulation have not been created. The available information security capabilities in the dynamically changing environment are limited for the sake of an efficient and legal defence of public administration and society.

11 12

GovCERT.CZ is a governmental management unit under the leadership of the National Security Authority (NSA) and the National Cybersecurity Centre (NCSC).

Koncepcia kybernetickej bezpečnosti Slovenskej republiky na roky 2015–2020 (Cybersecurity Concept of the Slovak Republic for 2015–2020).

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The Slovak Republic as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union has played an active role in the cybersecurity activities of these organizations and would like to pursue its cooperative activity in the future.

The main goal described in the strategy document is to have an open, secured, and protected cyberspace in order that the critical infrastructures could operate reliably and safely even in case of an attack. To accomplish this, the Slovak Republic formulates several aims to achieve a state where: (1) ‘the protection of national cyberspace is a system operating conceptually, in a coordinated manner, efficiently, effectively, and on a legal basis’; (2) ‘the security awareness of all components of society is systematically increasing’; (3) ‘the private and academic sectors as well as civil society actively participate in the formulation and implementation of the policy of the Slovak Republic in the area of cyber security’; (4) ‘efficient collaboration is provided for both national and international levels’; (5) ‘the adopted measures are adequate and respect the protection of privacy and basic human rights and freedoms’ (NCSS-SK 2015: 9).

The Slovak Republic wishes to put in place a cybersecurity control system that includes institutional, methodological, and regulatory frameworks. Risk control and information exchange between the public and private sectors is necessary.

Furthermore, it considers the development of internal market actors dealing with cybersecurity products and services indispensable, and also the support of innovations, research, and development. The document highlights the lack of cyberspecific education (from primary schools to universities), and therefore it orders a methodical cybersecurity education for the educational system.

The (proposed) cybersecurity structure is presented as a standalone figure in the Slovak strategy. It makes the coordinated relationship between the government, the Security Council of the Slovak Republic, the Committee for Cyber Security, the National Security Authority (NSA), and National CERT/CSIRT visible in the supreme decision-making. Their working will be regulated by the Cybersecurity Act. It is the National Security Authority that is responsible for cybersecurity, while the CERT/CSIRT units will be subordinated to the NSA. The strategy defines the tasks, competencies, and entitlements of the CERT/CSIRT units and the sectororiented authorities.13 The document specifies the decision-making and control mechanisms, the prevention mechanisms, the reaction mechanisms, and the restoration mechanisms as basic ones in detail. Intelligence activity is mentioned among prevention mechanisms.

13

Pursuant to the strategy, the National Security Authority is responsible for the following: the preparation of cybersecurity-related tasks and strategy, the supervision of their application; risk management; the development of regulatory frameworks and the methodology of operating measures against cyber attacks for the CERT/CSIRT units; the coordination of action plans of relevant state administration bodies; the coordination and monitoring of task fulfilment; the contacts with the NATO, the European Union, and other international actors.

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Hungary The Hungarian cybersecurity strategy drawn up in 2013 gives a taxonomic description of Hungary’s aims, tools, tasks, and environment in four chapters on six pages14 (NCSS-HU 2013). The document is in line with Hungary’s Basic Law, the Hungarian National Security Strategy (Government Regulation No. 1035/2012), the Budapest Convention of the Council of Europe adopted in 2001 (CoE 2001), and the cybersecurity strategy of the European Union and the NATO (EU 2013, NATO 2011).

Among the field-specific terms, it is cyberspace that is given a detailed explanation.

Other terms are not explained in the strategy.

The objectives set include the creation of secure and free cyberspace, the protection of national sovereignty at national and international levels. The document also encompasses the guarantee of security of the economy and society – emphasizing the position of children –, the secure adoption and application of technological innovations, and the international cooperation in line with Hungary’s interests.

Because attacks launched by states and non-state users are on the rise, the electronic information systems and critical infrastructures need a higher-level protection.

Cyberspace is mentioned in the document as one of the main arenas of modern warfare, wherefore the creation of political and professional decision-making is considered necessary. The importance of cooperation between the government and the academic, private, and business sectors regarding security is underlined because these actors have shared responsibility. The Hungarian government cooperates in the global cyberspace with international organizations, with a particular emphasis on the European Union, the NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, the United Nations, and the Council of Europe.

The Prime Minister’s Office is responsible for the coordination. Incident management is conducted by the Government Incident Response Centre and the Sectorial Incident Response Centres in different sectors. Private, business, and academic sectors should all be involved in preparing the regulation.

Hungary pays attention to the distribution of cybersecurity knowledge in primary, secondary, and higher education15 as well as public service employees’ and specialists’ training. The government institutions are to develop a close cooperation with those universities, research institutions that have achieved outstanding and internationally recognized success in the field of cybersecurity.

14

15

Government Resolution No. 1139/2013 (21 March) on the National Cybersecurity Strategy of Hungary (1139/2013. (III. 21.) Korm. határozat Magyarország Nemzeti Kiberbiztonsági Stratégiájáról).

In the meanwhile, Hungary established the cybersecurity major in higher education.

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Romania Romania made public its nine-page long cybersecurity strategy over six chapters in 201316 (NCSS-RO 2013). The Introduction gives a definition of cyberspace, which is characterized by ‘the absence of borders, dynamism, and anonymity’ (NCSS-RO 2013: 1). The Romanian state is supposed to have a coordinative role in reaching cybersecurity at the national level. Its activity has to be in line with the European Union and NATO initiatives, with special regard to the security of national critical infrastructure.

The section of the document setting forth objectives uses the term ‘virtual environment’, in which high-level security has to be reached, in the first place in the case of critical infrastructure. The strategy should support national security and good governance, which is supposed to be for the benefit of the population and the business/corporate sector as well as the whole of Romanian society.

Additional goals mentioned in the document include: a) adapt the regulatory and institutional framework to the cyberspace threats dynamics; b) establish and implement security profiles and minimum requirements for national cyber infrastructures, relevant in terms of the proper functionality of the critical infrastructures; c) ensure the resilience of cyber infrastructure; d) ensure security through understanding, preventing and fighting vulnerabilities, risks and threats to cyber security of Romania; e) take advantage of the opportunities to promote the national interests, values and objective in the cyberspace; f) promote and develop cooperation between the public and private sectors at national and international level in the field of cybersecurity; g) develop a security culture by raising awareness of the population concerning the vulnerabilities, risks and threats originating from cyberspace and the need to ensure protection of their information systems; h) active participation in the initiatives of international organizations which Romania is part of in defining and establishing a set of international confidencebuilding measures concerning use of cyberspace. (NCSS-RO 2013: 2) The secure cyberspace is listed as an objective both in Romania’s National Defence Strategy and the National Strategy for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure. That is the reason why the cybersecurity strategy was created in compliance with the two documents mentioned.

16

Hotărârea nr. 271/2013 pentru aprobarea Strategiei de securitate cibernetică a României şi a Planului de acţiune la nivel naţional privind implementarea Sistemului naţional de securitate cibernetică (the cybersecurity strategy of Romania).

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The strategy defines seventeen cyberspace-related terms (cyberspace, cyber defence, cybersecurity, cyber-attack, cyber threat, cyber incident, cyber espionage, cybercrime, cyber infrastructure, security risk, cyber terrorism, cyber vulnerability, risk management, CERT-type entity, identity management, cyber infrastructure resilience, and operations in computer networks). Cyberspace is defined as a virtual environment that has been created by the cyber infrastructure, including the formation, storage, and transmission of information, and the users’ activity related to these operations.

The document underlines that Romania has to seriously face threats against cyber infrastructure. This is justified by substantial interdependence between the cyber infrastructure and, for example, the banking system, the energy sector, and the national defence sector. The risks concern the population, the business sector, and public service.

The attacks are launched by actors that could be individuals, organized crime groups, terrorists, or extremists, state-related or non-state actors. The strategy distinguishes three possibilities regarding the cyberspace attacks: cybercrime, cyber terrorism, and cyber warfare. All three of them could have state- or non-state origins and could be carried out in several forms: 1. cyber-attacks against the infrastructure supporting public functions or information society services, whose disruption or damage could constitute a danger to the national security; 2. unauthorized access to cyber infrastructures; 3. modification, deletion, or deterioration of computer data or unauthorized illegal restriction of access to such data; 4. cyber espionage; 5. causing patrimonial damage, harassing, and blackmailing individuals and businesses, public and private. (NCSS-RO 2013: 4) The National Cybersecurity System (NCSS) provides the general framework for cooperation between the authorities and institutions (research institutions, universities, professional and non-governmental organizations, etc.) in cybersecurity at the national level. Its main aim is to avert and prevent attacks, vulnerabilities, and risks that could affect the national cyber infrastructure, including consequence management. There are proactive and reactive measures formulated in the NCSS: first of all, sharing of cyber-specific knowledge, information distribution, data recovery, and implementation of cybersecurity strategy. Its efficiency depends on the cooperation between the public and private sectors.

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The Supreme Council of National Defence17 is the coordinating actor at a strategic level regarding the operation of the National Cybersecurity System. The Supreme Council of National Defence approves the state’s cybersecurity strategy and the policies and procedures of the Cybersecurity Operative Council. Using the Ministry of Communication and Information Society, the government of Romania coordinates the work of authorities that are not members of the Cybersecurity Operative Council.

The task of the CERT-RO (Computer Emergency Response Team Romania) is to fulfil the national cybersecurity policy in that incidents are thwarted and prevented by its actions.

The strategy pays close attention to cooperation between business and private sectors and international organizations (e.g. the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, etc.).

Comparative Analysis The content of the documents analysed is similar in several points because all of them are based on the Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union (EU 2013), the NIS directives (NIS 2016), and the ENISA guidelines, and the Cybersecurity Strategy of the NATO was taken into account by the five states as well. Nevertheless, some differences are noticeable among the objectives and measures.

All five documents consider cybersecurity a pivotal factor of state security.

However, they differ in length: the Slovak strategy has 31, the Polish 26, the Czech 23, the Romanian 9, and the Hungarian 6 pages. In the case of the first three documents, attention was also paid to the format because the authors completed them with a title page and a table of contents. The Czech and Slovak documents have spectacular design elements too. The Slovak strategy document uses the term ‘Incident Resolution Unit’ instead of the EU-wide accepted ‘Computer Security Incident Response Team’.

Table 3 contains the publishing date of the analysed strategies, the number of objectives set, and data regarding CERT/CSIRT units.

Hungary pays the least attention to clarify cyber-related terms; only the term cyberspace is explained in its strategy. Slovakia, Poland, and the Czech Republic prepared an extra glossary and a list of abbreviations.

17

Members of the Supreme Council of National Defence are the Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Communication and Information Society, the Romanian Intelligence Service, Special Telecommunication Service, the Foreign Intelligence Service, Protection and Guard Service, the National Registry Office for Classified Information, and the Secretary of the Supreme Council of National Defence.

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Table 3. Summary of particular features of cybersecurity strategies adopted by Romania and the V4 countries NCSS Year of establishment for the Computer Emergency Response Teams – CERTs Number of objectives Number of CSIRT (Computer Security Incident Response Team) Offensive cyber-capability in the NCSS

Czech Hungary Slovakia Poland Republic 2011, 2015 2013, 2018 2008, 2015 2013, 2017 2011 2013 2009 2016

Romania 2013 2013

8 28

5, 9 3

5 7

4 11

8 6

no

no

no

yes

no

Source: the cyber security strategies of the 5 countries, own research

All five documents prioritize the defence of the state and highlight the cooperation with international and national actors; the former group is represented chiefly by the European Union and the NATO. The Polish strategy includes a goal concerning offensive cyber capability, while the others only have goals of a defensive character.

The further goals listed include preparation for the attacks, their countering, setting up specialized organizations (CERT/CSIRT) for incident investigation and management. Beyond the defence of critical infrastructures, the defence of business actors and the population are also equally represented in all strategies. The Czech Republic particularly emphasizes the industry and healthcare. Slovakia makes references to intelligence among preventive measures, whereas the other states do not mention intelligence services in their documents.

There is a significant overlap of the measures referring to the defence of public, critical infrastructures, the business sector, and non-governmental organizations, and it is necessary to have a cooperation between national and international actors.

Summary Nowadays, cybersecurity is one of the main challenges states have to face. This should be reflected in the strategies, too. The analysis shows that this has come true in the case of the countries examined.

The threats from the cyberspace have arisen in enormous extent and have become sophisticated. They have been lifted to the state level and have called for a strategy formation as well as defence measures at national and international levels. Besides their similarities, the cybersecurity strategies of the five Central European countries show some differences in their goals and defence measures. These similarities and differences have been described by this paper with an aim to help experts verify and prepare strategic documents.

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References CLXVI. 2012. The Hungarian Law about the Identification, Attribution, and Defence of Critical Infrastructure No. CLXVI. https://net.jogtar.hu/ jogszabaly?docid=a1200166.tv (Downloaded on: 23.10.2020).

CoE. 2001. Budapest Convention. Convention on Cybercrime. https://www.coe. int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/185 (Downloaded on: 23.10.2020).

CSIKI, Tamás. 2008. A stratégiai dokumentumok rendszere. Nemzet és Biztonság 1(8): 76–81. www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/cikkek/csiki_tamas-a_strategiai_ dokumentumok_rendszere.pdf (Downloaded on: 23.10.2020).

DESI. 2020. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/digital-economy-andsociety-index-desi-2020 (Downloaded on: 18.8.2021).

ENISA. 2016. NCSS Good Practice Guide. Designing and Implementing National Cyber Security Strategies. European Union Agency for Network and Information Security. ISBN: 978-92-9204-179-3 DOI: 10.2824/48036.

EU. 2013. EU Cybersecurity Strategy: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, P7_ TA-PROV(2013)0000 (europa.eu) (Downloaded on: 23. 10. 2020).

EUROSTAT. 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/population-demography/ demography-population-stock-balance/database (Downloaded on: 18.8.2021).

GCI. 2021. Global Security Index (GCI). ITU. https://www.itu.int/epublications/ publication/global-cybersecurity-index-2020/en/ (Downloaded on: 18.8.2021).

ITU. 2020. https://www.itu.int/en/Pages/default.aspx (Downloaded on: 23.10.2020).

KOVÁCS, László. 2018. A kibertér védelme. Budapest: Dialóg Campus. ISBN 978615-5889-64-6. (Downloaded on: 23.10.2020).

MIHAI, Ioan-Cosmin–CIUCHI, Costel–PETRICĂ, Gabriel. 2018. Current Challenges in the Field of Cyber Security. The Impact and Romania’s Contribution to the Field. European Institute of Romania. ISBN 978-606-11-6575-9.

NATO. 2011. NATO Policy on Cyber Defence. https://www.nato.int/nato_ static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_08/20110819_110819-policy-cyberdefence.pdf.

(Downloaded on: 23.10.2020).

NCSS-CZ. 2015. National Cyber Security Strategy of the Czech Republic for the Period from 2015 to 2020. https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/national-cybersecurity-strategies/ncss-map/national-cyber-security-strategies-interactive-map/ strategies/cyber-security-strategy-of-czech-republic-2011-2015 (Downloaded on: 23.10.2020).

NCSS-HU. 2013. Government Decision No. 1139/2013 (21 March) on the National Cyber Security Strategy of Hungary. https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/ national-cyber-security-strategies/ncss-map/national-cyber-security-strategiesinteractive-map/strategies/national-cyber-security-strategy and http://njt.hu/ cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=159530.238845 (Downloaded on: 23.10.2020).

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NCSS-PO. 2017. National Framework of Cyber Security Policy of the Republic of Poland FOR 2017–2022. https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/national-cybersecurity-strategies/ncss-map/national-cyber-security-strategies-interactivemap/strategies/govermental-program-for-protection-of-cyberspace-for-theyears-2011-2016-2013 (Downloaded on: 23.10.2020).

NCSS-RO. 2013. Cyber Security Strategy of Romania. https://www.enisa.europa. eu/topics/national-cyber-security-strategies/ncss-map/national-cyber-securitystrategies-interactive-map/strategies/cyber-security-strategy-in-romania (Downloaded on: 23.10.2020).

NCSS-SK. 2015. Cyber Security Concept of the Slovak Republic for 2015–2020. https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/national-cyber-security-strategies/ncssmap/national-cyber-security-strategies-interactive-map/strategies/cybersecurity-concept-of-the-slovak-republic (Downloaded on: 23.10.2020).

NIS. 2016. OJ EU 2016 L194 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/? uri=OJ:L:2016:194:FULL&from=NL (Downloaded on: 23.10.2020).

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Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 19 (2021) 88–97

DOI: 10.2478/auseur-2021-0006

Changes in the Townscape of Lampertszásza (Berehove/Beregszász) in the 13th–15th Centuries Attila JÓZSA

PhD-student, Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania National University of Public Service, Doctoral School of Public Administration Sciences 1083 Budapest, Ludovika Sq. 2 e-mail: attila@sapientia.ro

László ZUBÁNICS

PhD, Associate Professor Uzhhorod National University Candidate of Historical Sciences (CSc) Ukrainian-Hungarian Institute of Education and Science Department of Hungarian History and European Integration (Head of Department) Vice-Director for International Relations External Member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences e-mail: laslov.zubanych@uzhnu.edu.ua Abstract. Across the River Tisza, there lies a town, Berehove (hereinafter also referred to as Beregszász [Hu]), situated on the north-eastern edge of the Great Hungarian Plain with the wind swaying ears of wheat, on the flatlands surrounded by rustling oak forests, gold-sweating trachyte mountains, and rivers subsiding upon reaching the plain. It is a veritable fairy garden, a small piece of the realm that out foremother, Emese, dreamt of back in the day. Places, just as people, have their own destinies: they emerge, evolve, thrive, and then, if they are destined so, disappear from the stage of history.

The very first mention of Berehove dates back to early 1063, recorded under the name Lamperti, as the estate of Prince Lampert, son of Béla I of Hungary.

Prince Lampert founded the later town. At the time, a small settlement must have been situated here with the prince’s countryseat inhabited by the garrison and the household servants. Residents of the house were mostly the gamekeepers and huntsmen of Bereg Forest County.

To fully uncover the past is not possible – at the very most, some attempts can be made at its reconstruction by drawing on contemporary sources and relying on archaeological research. The mediaeval layout of the settlement is known from the available sources and serves as a basis for the present study in its efforts to reconstruct the settlement image of the historical town centre and to find out why Lampertszásza did not embark on the path of the ‘classic, city wall/fortification’ type of settlement development. The parish church is the only building of the mediaeval townscape that has

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Attila JÓZSA, László ZUBÁNICS survived partially, which, however, provides us with indications about the contemporary buildings of the one-time reginal town and the related ‘block of church buildings’.

Keywords: Lampertszász, Béla IV, Saxon hospites, royal free city, Holy Cross, Dominican monastery, Reformation, Bereg County

The local and settlement history speaks about the past but addresses the present since by making use of research results it aims to contribute to the better understanding of the path leading to its present-day condition as well as of the principles of development. Speaking about our past always implies taking up some sort of position. We can bring ourselves into an organic relationship with our history only if we acquire the historicity of thought besides an adequate level of education – namely that we always take stock of people, events, and contexts while taking account of the place, time, and circumstances. Undoubtedly, a careful examination of history will sometimes shatter the illusions we live by, but it also presents us with true values in exchange. No question, historical tradition will continue to be necessary in the future because we want to learn from it, better ourselves through it, and live with it!

Why are there so many of us interested in local history lately? The fundamental, ultimate cause lies in the geographic division of human life and social movement, that is, in the obvious fact that events and processes take place somewhere. People are most closely connected to a well-defined place: their homeland, their place of residence; they wish to know as much as possible about it, and this strong emotional/spiritual link is also what fuels their desire to understand their native land in the narrow sense. However, there is a further essential motivation: the scientific recognition that the past and the present of a nation or a country are made up to a significant extent of local phenomena and processes.

Just like humans, places have their own destinies: they emerge, evolve, thrive, and then, if they are destined so, disappear from the pages of history. To fully uncover the past is not possible – at the very most, some attempts can be made at its reconstruction by drawing on contemporary sources and relying on archaeological research.

The essential aim of the present paper is to make use of the available literature and attempt to outline the main developments that took place over time in the formation of the townscape of Lampertszásza/Beregszász and describe the impact of the church, and within that of the various religious orders, on the development of the settlement structure. Our research tries to find answers as to what circumstances constituted an obstacle to the settlement on its way to becoming a classic, walled city as well as to what accounts for the fact that Beregszász has lost its former status of royal free city and eventually degraded into a privately owned country town.

The city of Beregszász is currently situated in Ukraine – place-name etymologist Lajos Kiss traces the origin of its name back to Lampertszász (Sebestyén 2020: 50–

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52). The written form of this name can be documented from 1247 to 1643, although the name Beregszász appears in earlier documents as well. The name Bereg was used starting from the year 1248 for the localization and designation of the royal forest county (the name of the forest county also emerges in Regestrum Varadinense), while at later times the territory of the Royal County of Borsova, destroyed during the Tatar invasion, would inherit the name Bereg County.

When writing about the changes of the name Lampertszásza–Beregszász, Lajos Kiss notes the following: It referred to the Saxon settlers of the place on the one hand and to its presumed founder, Prince Lampert, on the other [viz. the place name Lampertszásza], who was the lord of these lands during the reign of Ladislaus I... The prefix of Lampertszásza was later replaced by the name of Bereg Forest County and then Bereg County because this was the main place [most probably residence] of the Count of Bereg at the end of the Kingdom of Hungary, where the county assemblies were held. (quoted in Takács 2015: 6) In working up the legends on the foundation of the settlement, Mihály Tompa links the foundation to the pastoral people living in the marshy pastures, when the herdsmen found great treasures of gold in the hole dug out by lead bulls while fighting each other (Zubánics 2011: 8–9). The gold found here was used at first to build up a church, and then it gradually became an inhabited area. Historical tradition links the ‘foundation’ of the town to the younger brother of kings Géza I and Ladislaus I: Prince Lampert (Lambert). As postulated by Péter Takács, a peculiar feature of this settlement established in the neighbourhood of ‘the holy kings’ hunting forest’ and nearby the trade routes leading to Kievan Rus’ is that Prince Lampert settled here clergymen of various holy orders in addition to the winegrowing, pastoral Saxons – thereby, the settlement was also functioning as some sort of centre for missionary work aimed at eastern territories (Takács 2015: 6). The first settlement was destroyed during the 1241 Tatar invasion, but it would be rebuilt soon after by Béla IV, once again with the involvement of Saxon people.

On 25 December 1247, the king granted town privileges to ‘our Christian guests of Lampertháza’. The most notable passages of the charter are as follows: jurisdiction exercised by their own magistrates (‘except for three: bloodshed, theft, and murder, nothing shall be enforced upon our sechesals’ courthouse, but they shall take the judgment of their village magistrate in all other lawsuits’), freedom of choosing their parish priest (‘and their tithe shall be paid in grain and wine to the priest they have chosen for themselves’), and the right to hold fairs (‘their market shall be held on Saturdays, and not more than one denarius shall be payable for each wagonload of merchandise neither by the buyers nor by the sellers’) (Zubánics 2011: 11). Besides their agricultural and wine-growing activities, the Saxon hospites were mining the

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lode-gold deposits of the mountains surrounding the settlement: ‘deep in the goldbearing mountain of Nagy-hegy, the mine-shafts dug quite laboriously and, as a rule, in pointed Gothic style are considered to be the remnants of the never-resting Saxons’ (Lehoczky 1881/III: 91).

The suppression of the Abas controlling a significant portion of our territory took place in the year 1312 in the Battle of Rozgony, where citizens of Lampertszásza also fought on the king’s side. As a token of gratitude, the king confirmed their charter and granted further rights to the town. In 1320 in Nagyvárad [Oradea] – on the fourth day of the Feast of the Finding of the True Cross –, in response to the complaints of the citizens of Luprechtszász, Charles I ordered the Lord Lieutenant of Bereg that the officers should not interfere unauthorized in their legal disputes and internal affairs and should not harass his guests despite the previously mentioned royal patent issued for their protection, because they are to pay taxes to him alone – the king, who is their liege lord –, and they should not be limited in exercising their privileges (Zubánics 2010: 185–187).

During the Late Middle Ages, Lampertszásza (and the entire royal estate of Munkács [Мукачево/Mukachevo]) became a reginal estate. Charles I (of the House of Anjou) and his queen consort, Elizabeth of Poland, established a reginal residence in the town. Several monasteries were established through his donations such as those of the Dominicans and the Franciscans. It is likely that this is the period when the foundations were laid for the present-day parish church, whose construction was finished in the year 1418, as attested by the date inscribed above the main entrance. (The corbels walled in above one of the portals of today’s parish church probably originate from this building: ‘… and those figures of a human and a dog’s [actually a lion’s] head that are built into the wall above the north door of the church and that are worked into this tale are one of the corbels supporting the vaults of the former, destroyed church’ (Lehoczky 1881/III: 90).

In his charter issued on 2 September 1342 in Visegrád, King Louis I granted the royal free city of Lampertszásza the right of jus gladii: ‘since the royal free city (‘libera civitas nostra’) lies near Russia, on the borderlands, it deserves to be specially favoured, and, granting it full right of jus gladii, he authorized it to pass sentences on nobles and commoners alike and to have its inhabitants held responsible in front of the local authorities alone and not to be subject to the jurisdiction of the county court’ (Zubánics 2011: 14). After the 13th century, jus gladii could be granted to some of the royal free cities (libera civitas) as a privilege. Its main feature was that these cities did not fall under the judicial jurisdiction of the lord lieutenant but were directly subordinate to one of the royal courts. And Lampertszásza did exercise the right of jus gladii since one of King Louis’s 1370 charters makes mention of the town’s executioner named Hankó.

Why did neither Lampertszásza nor other crown cities and country towns of northeastern Hungary become ‘classic, walled’ cities? Péter Takács takes the view that the

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settlements situated on the peripheral regions at the boundary of the highlands and lowlands (all inhabited places of the area fall into this category) could simply not be ‘downsized’ to walled cities due to the geographical and infrastructural factors influencing population trends as well as to issues determining the living conditions of the inhabitants (despite the Saxon population shaping the townscape – even though Lampertszásza had vast expanses of fertile fields/meadows and high-quality arable lands, also enjoying royal privileges as early as the 14th century, similarly to Debrecen). One reason for this may have been that it primarily relied on agriculture, livestock farming, and viticulture for revenue, which required large portals (homesteads)and vast spaces (Takács 2015: 10–11). Naturally, it had a smaller, so to speak classic town centre, which, however, developed first of all in the neighbourhood of church buildings. Besides country towns, settlements with castles were a characteristic feature of the region; yet, with the exception of Ungvár [today: Uzhhorod], the castles and their respective (country) towns lie at considerable distances from each other in most of the cases.

One of the stateliest edifices of Lampertszász (according to a 1507 royal charter issued by King Vladislaus II in Buda: ‘Civitas nostra Beregszász alias Luprechtszasza’), bearing mediaeval features is the Exaltation of the Holy Cross (earlier: All Saints’) parish church. Although burnt down (1657, 1686) and reconstructed several times, some of the sections of its walls and parts of the building still preserve the details of the parish church built in the time of the queen consort, Elizabeth of Poland (Kollár 2013: 174–178). Available data suggest that the priest of the church was subordinate to the Archbishop of Esztergom (instead of the territorially competent Bishop of Eger). Pope Leo X raised Lampertszász to the status of archdeaconry, and its parish priest was entitled to wear the insignia of the prelates. In this period, the annual income of the parish was 500 gold coins. Besides being a royal possession, the substantial amount of income is also indicated by the fact that when the obligation of free and mining towns to organize cavalry exhibitions was regulated by law in the years 1525 and 1545, the priest of Berehove was also mentioned by name.

Around the year 1418, there were eight rectors of the altar (rector altaris; for reasons of simplification, hereinafter also as: rector) and just as many altars (Bishop St Nicholas, St Elizabeth, Virgin Mary, St Dorothy, James the Great, Saints Cosmas and Damian, Archangel Michael, and John the Baptist) – some of them established by royalties –functioning in the church, all of them having their respective properties and real estates. As per Lehoczky’s data, the number of altars increased to 24 (under the management of four rectors) by the age of the Reformation, which is indicative of the citizens’ financial situation, inter alia. Most of the rectors’ arcaded houses stood on Mindenszentek Str. (today: Bethlen Str.) – in his decree issued in 1518, King Louis II ordered the rectors who had their houses elsewhere in the city to sell their properties as soon as possible and buy/build houses on the said street. All evidence suggests that some sort of an internal ‘block of church buildings’ was formed within

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the settlement. The parish house stood at the end of Mindenszentek Str., where ‘the only way for the wine-growers to transport their must to the town was leading through the parish courtyard, there being at first tithed’. Likewise, monasteries were also situated in this area, as follows: – the Dominican monastery named after St Stanislaus (of Szczepanów), Bishop of Krakow and martyr (Religiosi fratres praedicatorurn inclaustro beati Stanislai martyris in oppido Beregszász degentes), built in the town in the early 14th century with the support of Elizabeth of Poland; – the Franciscan monastery named after the Holy Trinity and founded in honour ofthe Blessed Virgin Mary (Religiosi fratres minorum ord. b. Francisci confessioris); – the convent of the Dominican nuns named after St Stanislaus.

At the south-eastern edge of the town stood the monastery of the Order of Saint Paul the First Hermit (Eremitae ordinis sancti Pauli primi eremitae).

‘Very limited credible data have remained on the monastery and convent of the brothers and sisters of the Dominican Order once present in Beregszász since neither the establishment nor the year of foundation nor the name of the saint in whose memory these convents were inaugurated in the name of God were passed on to posterity’ – wrote Jakab Rupp in his 1872 work, Magyarország helyrajzi története [The Topographic History of Hungary] (Rupp 1870–1876: 374). This statement remains valid practically to this day. Rupp presented but one relevant mediaeval charter (presumably assigning a wrong date even to that one) and made references to two earlier, 16th-century data on donating the possessions of the monastery already abandoned by then. Although Tivadar Lehoczky provided further data, he too failed to answer the fundamental questions in a satisfactory manner – all he did was an attempt to identify the founding person and the patron saint of the monastery (Zágorhidi Czigány 2000: 149). What exactly do we know about the Dominican monastery/ies of mediaeval Berehove? Data on the early history of these church propertiescan be found with regard to the nunnery alone, in the 1366 and 1368 documents cited by Lehoczky from the archives of the Leles(z) Convent, these records making reference to the nuns of the Saint Stanislaus Convent in Luprechtszász (religiose domineclaustri Beati Stanizlai martiris de Lupp/re/htzaza) and their estate in Kígyós [Kygios]. The most recent data we have on the religious sisters is from the year 1479, and it refers to their relocation to Szatmárnémeti [Satu Mare – in Romania]. This document contains the provincial’s order providing for the placement of Dominican friars in the convent. Also included in the census of properties compiled by the nuns, Kígyós was listed among their most significant estates. The flourishing of the Dominican monasteries established in our region by the elderly queen consort, Elizabeth (of Poland) can be dated to the 15th century.

The monastery of Lumprechtszász was one of the strongholds of the contemporary intellectual culture and literacy. The first significant library was also established here. In the year 1480, Lőrinc Szász, also a skilful scribe, became the head of the

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monastery, who in 1478 obtained permission from the provincial to accept money in exchange for his work (material possessions were prohibited for members of the mendicant orders, thus for Dominicans as well). In 1489, we find here Friar Ambrus Malontai, ‘the Hungarian orator’, who has received numerous books from his mentor, Gerváz Pesti, Prior of Esztergom (Fehér 1971: 400–407). Documents dated from the end of the 15th century make mention of a certain Friar Imre, who has also been given permission by the provincial to purchase books from the alms he has received. The most significant Dominican orator of the age from Berehove was Tamás Székesfehérvári. By his own admission, he preached 60 sermons altogether in Berehove. The fact that in the year 1493 we come across the name of Bartholomeus de Halábor in the register of the Hungarians’ dormitory (Bursa Hungarorum) at the University of Krakow bears witness to the intellectual radiation of the monastery in Beregszász. He is the person named in a diploma issued in 1512 as ‘son of Gergely Halábori Dobos, Father Bertalan Dobos, royal notary and scrivener’. Bartholomeus is credited with the copy and revision of the Döbrentei Codex, one of our most beautiful linguistic and literary monuments. King Vladislaus II reinforced the monastery in terms of its property rights, according to which: ‘in exchange for offering a mass to God every week on Tuesday while invoking Saint Anne for assistance, the privileges granted by former rulers to the serfs and cottars of this monastic order that reside in Beregszász and Kígyós were reinforced’ (Zubánics 2010: 185–187). As attested by the document, the inhabitants of Újváros and Pap Str. (Mindenszentek) – the residents of nearly 40 plots – worked for the benefit of the monastery. Lehoczky refers to a 1518 document issued by King Louis II, claiming that Dominicans ‘are even running their own wine shop to the detriment of the landlord’. Although we cannot pinpoint an exact date for the destruction of the monastery and the flight of the friars, but it is probably linked to the reformation of the region. It was primarily the 1566 Tatar invasion that caused the end of monasticism, when a substantial part of the town fell into ruin. Their return was prevented by the Reformation that was gaining ground in the meantime as well as by the secularization of church properties, thus including the Dominican monastery. The most recent data related to the Dominicans is from the year 1572, when friars Ferenc Körösbányai and Mátyás Palkonyai were protesting before the General Assembly of Bereg County against seizing the lands of the monastery. They also claimed in their protest that ‘their fellow friars who had been expelled had to take refuge in St John’s Monastery in Szombathely’.

Regrettably, these church buildings were destroyed or served other functions during the Reformation. In 1565, members of the Protestant congregation in Berehove took control of the parish church and threw all the altars out of the building, whitewashed the frescoes, and started using it as their own church.

In the year 1573, the monasteries located in the town were also plundered and closed down, while their buildings were converted into forts by the familiares of

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Péter Petrovics. In this regard, Ferdinand I ordered the citizens of Bereg County in 1553 not to allow such remodelling. Later, one of the monarch’s followers, Antal Dálnoki Székely, acted in a similar way, ‘who would make use of the fortified church here as a shelter for his acts of violence, whom several landowners have spoken out against. Based on Art. 49 of the year 1569, King Maximilian II ordered the decommissioning of the fort, leaving it to the religious orders. ‘The nearby town of Munkács (and its landowners, including Péter Petrovics in our case) had a predominant influence on the fate of Berehove in terms of military policy, taxation, and military tactics. By the end of the 16th century, the settlement’s town status had gone into eclipse despite still enjoying its many freedoms – the town became a privately owned estate (Takács 2015: 11). In 1549, there were five landlords altogether who shared in its fields/meadows and the peasantry living off these lands with each other. This was one of the reasons why the population was unable to protect the civic interests and entrust its administration as well as jurisdiction to the administrative/legislative body of their choice. Thus passes the glory of the worldly, i.e. sic transit gloria mundi…

In 2019, the archaeological expedition of Uzhhorod National University made excavations in the courtyard and the cellar of the Bethlen–Rákóczi Castle in Berehove, during which several wall remains were found that clearly predate the courtyard of the manor house built in 1628 (Ферков 2020: 134). The findings made at the excavation site suggest that these buildings must have formed part of the sotermed block of church buildings and may have belonged in particular to some of the monasteries.

Research results let us conclude that the city of Lampertszász/Beregszász has undergone a settlement history development that is characteristic of the region and that was in line with the general features that history formulated in this context.

Indeed, what should we understand by city? Bálint Hóman and Gyula Kristó take the view that the formation of cities is connected to trade (Hóman 1908, Kristó 2007). In other words, cities were situated along trade routes, thereby serving as marketplaces at the same time. The formation of cities on the territory of Hungary can be dated to the 12th-13th centuries, foreign population groups having played a decisive role in their development. During the implementation of the settlement policy making use of the hospites (here the Saxons), the kings of the House of Árpád granted town privileges in a bid to form settlement ‘blocks’ (holding the population together). First of all, we are talking about economic privileges here, as well as granting jurisdiction. In the case of Lampertszásza, these conditions came to be fulfilled in the year 1247, when Béla IV granted it the status (and the associated rights) of free royal city. Throughout the history of its development, the town was part of the group of cluster-type settlements that included several towns/villages, and, since no county centre or castle was established in this area, it was most of all church institutions (monasteries) operated with royal support that contributed to

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the formation of the townscape/settlement structure. Bearing in mind that exactly these relevant institutions – with considerable economic background – disappeared over the course of the 16th-century Reformation, it can reasonably be assumed that the urban bourgeoisie was no longer capable of confronting the landlords. This latter process was probably also accelerated by the weakening of the central royal power and the privatization of the (former royal) estate of Munkács. It can be concluded that Beregszász, although it started off its journey on the pages of history as a town under the king’s and queen’s protection, it was lagging behind in development by the 16th century and eventually degraded into a privately owned country town.

Figure 1. Map of Beregszász [Берегове/Berehove]

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References FEHÉR, Mátyás J. 1971. A beregszászi dömés kolostor története (1327–1556). Magyar Történelmi Szemle 2: 393–419.

HÓMAN, Bálint. 1908. A magyar városok az Árpádok korában. Budapest.

KOLLÁR, Tibor (ed.). 2013. Középkori templomok a Tiszától a Kárpátokig. Középkori templomok útja Szabolcsban, Beregben és Kárpátalján. Nyíregyháza: SzabolcsSzatmár-Bereg Megyei Területfejlesztési és Környezetgazdálkodási Ügynökség Nonprofit Kft. KRISTÓ, Gyula. 2007. Magyarország története 895–1301. Budapest: Osiris.

LEHOCZKY, Tivadar. 1881. Beregvármegye monographiája. Vol. III. Ungvár.

RUPP, Jakab. 1870–1876. Magyarország helyrajzi története I–III. Budapest.

SEBESTYÉN, Zsolt. 2020. Kárpátalja helységnevei. Nyíregyháza.

TAKÁCS, Péter. 2015. Legendák és valóság Beregszász keletkezéséről.

Emlékkonferencia Beregszász alapításának 950., visszatérésének 75. évfordulója alkalmából. KMMI-füzetek XX: 4–15.

ZÁGORHIDI CZIGÁNY, Balázs. 2000. A domonkosok a középkori Beregszászon – Fehér Mátyás kritikája. A Nyíregyházi Jósa András Múzeum Évkönyve XLII: 149–153.

ZUBÁNICS, László. 2010. „Perli-e még ezt a hont más?”. Ezer évig tényleg nem volt itt semmi? Vagy mégis?! Honismereti tanulmányok. Budapest–Ungvár: Intermix Kiadó.

2011. Tájba írt történelem. Kultúrtörténeti időutazás Kárpátalja legmagyarabb városában és vonzáskörzetében. Budapest–Ungvár: Intermix Kiadó. ФЕРКОВ, О. В. 2020. Історія середньовічного монастиря ордену св. Домініка в Берегові: сучасні проблеми та перспективи дослідження [Текст] / О. В. Ферков, В. В. Мойжес // Науковий вісник Ужгородського університету : серія: Історія / редкол.: Ю. В. Данилець (головний редактор) та ін. Ужгород : Говерла. Вип. 1(42): 127–136.

Book Review

Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 19 (2021) 98–104

DOI: 10.2478/auseur-2021-0007

Courage, Success, Faith…? But Now What Is Courage in Politics?

Nóra BARNUCZ

University of Public Service, Faculty of Law Enforcement, Department of Foreign Languages for Specific Purposes e-mail: barnucz.nora@uni-nke.hu

A Review of the Volume Ferenc Bódi, Andrea Ragusa, Ralitsa Savova (eds.): Courage in Politics1 The review is written about the volume Courage in Politics. Its editors are Ferenc Bódi, Andrea Ragusa, and Ralitsa Savova. Ferenc Bódi, PhD – senior researcher at the Institute for Political Science at the Centre for Social Sciences – obtained his PhD degree at Budapest University of Economic Sciences and Public Administration (Corvinus University) in 2013. Andrea Ragusa (1974–2018) was a professor of contemporary history at the Department of International and Political Science at the University of Siena, where he was also the Director of the Interuniversity Center for Social Change and Innovation. He was member of the editorial boards of the scientific journals Ricerche Storiche and Storia e Futuro and member of the Board of Directors of Fondazione di Studi Storici ‘Filippo Turati’ in Florence. Ralitsa Savova is an External Associate at the Center for Social Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. She is also member of the editorial committee of the above mentioned Storia e Futuro, member of the International Scientific Committee of Amelio Tagliaferri, and an official representative for Central and Eastern Europe of the European cultural route Longobard Ways across Europe. She is a lecturer in cultural tourism in Bulgaria and Hungary. Ralitsa Savova is a doctoral candidate in the Social and Economic Contexts of Human Resources Program at István Széchenyi Doctoral School of Management and Organizational Sciences of the University of West Hungary. The reviewer of the volume is Mihály Fónai, PhD, professor of sociology at the Faculty of Law of the University of Debrecen, who has an MA degree in history and cultural studies.

The title of the review is related to the way of thinking that the authors also emphasize on the back of the cover, as they intended the volume to provide a platform for an interdisciplinary approach to courage in politics, discussing it from 1

Published by Pacini Editore Srl., Saggistica, 2020. ISBN 978-88-6995-729-1.

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different points of view. It can be stated that the authors made an excellent use of this opportunity as each study approaches the theme of the book from different aspects, emphasizing the rich and important research areas of the discipline and drawing the reader’s attention to this. The discipline is highlighted from the aspects of success, faith, virtue, the excellent metaphor of the top of the mountain, the different personal characteristics or gender differences. Due to this, it is clear that the theme discussed in the book is a sufficiently complex set of factors.

The 200-page book published by Saggistica contains ten studies by nine authors, including the introduction. Ferenc Bódi and Árpád Szécsi are the authors of two independent studies. It includes a three-authored study written by Andrea Toldi, Gergely Fábián, and Thomas R. Lawson. The studies essentially present historical events with the aim of going beyond the scope of the current interpretation, applying new perspectives in order to offer the revealed historical events in a new way of reading. The studies seek to approach the theme of political courage from several aspects while highlighting the bold and remarkable actors of different eras, who, at that time, approached politics recklessly and made their decisions in the enlightenment of the authors.

The book was basically created in the honour and memory of Associate Professor Andrea Ragusa. Although Andrea Ragusa is one of the co-authors of the volume, unfortunately he could not live the publication of the book as he died unexpectedly on 13 October 2018, at the age of 44, due to his illness. For this reason, it begins with a brief presentation of Andrea’s life, in which the reader can learn about the main stages of the author’s life. Andrea Ragusa was born on 25 May 1974 in Orbetello, Italy. He graduated from the University of Siena with a degree in history.

After graduation, he specialized in Germany and France. In 2005, he became an Associate Professor of Contemporary History at the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Siena. Since 2011, he had been the Director of the Inter-University Centre for the History of Social Change and Innovation and Member of the Scientific Committee and of the Board of the Filippo Turati Historical Research Foundation in Florence. Thanks to his talent and hard work, he became a prominent figure in the field of history and cultural heritage, had a successful academic career as a university professor, and his research achievements have been widely recognized both nationally in Italy and internationally in Europe.

Ferenc Bódi’s study Courage in Politics focuses on two elements of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. On the one hand, the author studies the motives for courage as a virtue, which is the supposed moral motivation of freedom fighters; on the other hand, he interprets the elements of injustice, counterfeiting, the phenomenon of the fake revolutionary, and the typical leading characters of crises and crisis solutions. The research focuses on the profile of the Hungarian freedom fighter and on the personality of János Kádár, who, by accepting the power offered by Moscow, became the leading trickster of the restoration without any compromises.

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The author aims to go beyond the scope of the current interpretation, apply new perspectives, and give the already explored historical events a new reading. The aim of the author is to present the reconstruction after the revolution, which is also valid in a more general framework, because it is not only observed in the case of the Hungarian revolution. The events of 1956 outlined that communism is the product of the typical ‘trickster’ phenomenon, the embodiment of a false development that disguised a terrible tyrannical system since tricksters show up in all political sides, this being a peculiar form of behaviour. The period in question (1963–1978) is also called the Kádár era, or goulash communism. The mentioned time-span is the peak period of the Kádár era since between 1956 and 1962 and between 1978 and 1988 Kádár was also the actual leader of Hungary. New reforms were triggered by the latent effect of the 1956 revolution launched in Hungary, making the country more liveable in the Eastern Bloc.

In his following study, Ferenc Bódi deals with the political and anthropological interpretation of the 1956 Hungarian revolution, in which the author’s aim is to arouse the reader’s interest in whether participation in the revolution is a sign of courage or recklessness. He seeks to provide an answer to the explanation of the revolution after the Kádár retaliation and during the Kádár restoration by contrasting the opposites of ‘Falsehood and Deception’. The author emphasizes that the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 ended without a real compromise, the new system created a false world, raised a false value system over true virtues, and in this new world courage was replaced by compromise and righteousness by falsehood. The greatest lesson of the upheaval of the 20th century is the compliance with the moral criteria, which promotes the possibility of effective negotiations and the chance of lasting agreements on which our culture is built. The good political practice and the fair profit economy can work only within a given and unified moral framework.

Thomas R. Lawson, PhD, is a Professor Director of International Programs at the University of Louisville in the United States and staff member of the University of Applied Sciences in Munich. The President of Hungary awarded him the title of Knight’s Cross of the Order of Merit. He was appointed a Distinguished Professor of the International Service by the University of Louisville. He has published more than 50 articles, book chapters, and books in many countries, including Russia, Poland, England, South Africa, Hungary, and Germany. The American professor approaches the subject of political courage from a completely different viewpoint.

The paper titled The Promised Land, A Mountaintop and Political Courage: A View from The Ground reveals that the author applies the endowments of nature to examine the subject of political courage. The first question of the paper is rather generic: ‘Courage – political courage – what is it, how do we recognize it, how can we do it?’2 (Lawson 2020: 39). After raising the question, the author takes the reader 2

Thomas R. Lawson (2020). The Promised Land, a Mountaintop and Political Courage: A View From The Ground. In: Bódi, Ferenc–Ragusa, Andrea–Savova, Ralitsa (eds.), Courage in Politics.

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closer and closer to the topic and to the answer to the question. To reach this aim, however, he distinguishes between the interpretations of the concepts of courage and political courage. He explains that, in general, in countries and different cultures, people who oppose oppression, lies, and subjugation as well as those who have stifled self-expression and the human spirit have been considered as brave since time immemorial. In contrast, political courage in the specific sense appears when people are helped out to reach the hilltop, the place where they are no longer oppressed, subjugated, that is, where they do not have to follow falsehoods, a place where their spirits can live and express themselves. Climbing the hilltop requires political courage. However, the great virtue and worthy conclusion of the study is the author’s idea that political courage can make the hilltop the residence for everyone, not just the powerful or the élite. Regardless of name, political courage is needed to be able to help others get to the top of the hill so that they can live in the glorious city and live in the promised land.

Nuno Morgado, PhD, is an expert in geopolitics and foreign policy. He is an external researcher at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences as well as a postdoctoral researcher at Corvinus University of Budapest and an Assistant Professor of geopolitical studies at Charles University, Prague. The main aim of his research was to test the impact of the geographical setting on foreign policy. The purpose of his study titled Anti-Communism in Salazar’s Portugal and the Hungarian Uprising of 1956 is to examine the response of the Portuguese government and society to the Hungarian Uprising of 1956. The main research question of the study is how the Portugal government and society reacted to the Hungarian Uprising of 1956.

According to the author, Salazar was characterized by the hallmarks of honesty, rectitude, and decency, and he was a successful academic, a Catholic, patriot, and proponent of the traditional and limited political power.

János Előd Kávássy, PhD, is a research fellow at the Research Institute and Archives for the History of the Hungarian Regime Change, with more than 40 publications. In 2013, he defended his PhD dissertation on the Hungarian–American relations at Pázmány Péter Catholic University. In his study From Sound to Square Silence, he also focuses on the tragedy of the Hungarian Revolution and the War of Independence of 1956. According to the author’s basic hypothesis, many efforts were made in the last thirty years in order to make this period a profound part of our national memory, yet there is still a lack of the complete and valid story that can be absorbed into the Hungarian psyche and become part of it. The study seeks to unfold an unusual character, one of the forgotten heroes of 1956. Márton Rajki was a key figure in the local revolution of Újpest, a family-centred man who did his best to reach a reasonable compromise between the parties in dispute for the sake of humanity. Márton Rajki was a man of principles, devoted to Christian ideals; he rejected armed conflicts in order to prevent the Soviet military invasion in Újpest.

He sought peace at all costs, which eventually cost his life. If Márton Rajki was

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‘guilty’ of anything when he died on 30 July 1959, it was his benevolent naivety, as he was always looking for compromises and peaceful solutions, consciously avoiding the possibility of violence. He believed that dialogue and consensus could replace the oppression and terror of the ruling communist regime and self-defence.

The protagonist’s behaviour reflected the lessons he learned throughout his devoted Christian life about the moral values represented by Christianity, from his deep conviction that the peaceful good always overcomes the aggressive impulses of evil.

Dániel Oross, PhD, is a political scientist. He received his PhD in political sciences at Corvinus University of Budapest in 2015. He has been a researcher at the Institute of Political Science in the Centre for Social Sciences since 2011 and member of the Management Committee of COST Action (constitution-making and deliberative democracy) since 2018. His research interests include political participation, youth policy, political socialization, and democratic innovations. In his study Youth Policy between 1956 and 2016 in Hungary, he shares the opinion that youth policy is a product of modern societies that have recognized the need for an integrated approach to young people’s needs and demands. The spread of this policy has provoked conflicts in several countries, claiming that young people are usually less bound by social responsibilities than other groups of society. Youth played an important role in the revolutionary changes of the Hungarian history, but as this brief overview has shown, beyond the revolutionary changes, their political representation has always been weak. The study presents the role of young people in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, and the author gives a brief explanation of how Hungarian decision-makers have understood the need for a new approach to young people in order to avoid similar rebellions. The protracted transformation of the Hungarian youth policy (from youth camps to youth festivals) is far from being finished: due to the results of the recent youth studies, new challenges have to be faced as the Hungarian young people became screenagers in the 2010s.

After the historical presentation of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the War of Independence, we can read the study Female Courage dealing with gendercentred social policy issues of political courage, written by (1) Andrea Toldi. She is a language teacher, has worked as the network coordinator of the Division for Strategic Educational Planning and CEEPUS of the Faculty of Health Sciences at the University of Debrecen and currently works at the Department of Training Development at the Faculty; (2) Gergely Fábián, PhD, sociologist – is the Head of the Department of Social Sciences at the Faculty of Health, University of Debrecen.

He received his PhD at Eichstätt Catholic University in Germany and became a habilitated doctor at the University of Debrecen in 2010; and (3) American Professor Thomas R. Lawson. The study begins with a quote from Sir Winston Churchill: ‘Success is not final; failure is not fatal: it is the courage to continue that counts.’

At the beginning of the study, the authors point out that anyone at any time can list great, charismatic politicians or historians, statesmen, generals, kings; however,

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female politicians or women who have been influenced by history, cannot really be named. Apparently, a man can be a great king, a battle leader, a general, or a knight, but for a woman to be a politician, to take the lead, or to raise her voice for something or someone, requires courage. The authors emphasize that today more and more women are taking an active role in political life or are playing the role of a historian, while in the countries of the Middle or Far East it is still surprising if a woman becomes a prime minister or attains a high political position. In Europe or in the United States, it seems more accepted or more natural if a woman is elected to be the president of a country or the president of the European Commission or the Chairman of the European Central Bank.

In their study, the authors conclude that when a woman tries to step out of a traditional family role, she immediately faces obstacles and is considered as being strange, ‘different’, or rebellious. The authors conclude that women are motivated by different characteristics to perform courageous actions – namely faith, love, passion, compassion, inner conviction, motherhood, or patriotism, but these can also be the results of external forces. Inner beliefs can motivate women to confront injustice in order to stand up for the weak. Faith can make them fight for their own truth and belief, compassion can lead to forgiveness, and patriotism can be the engine of heroic actions for the nation. Of course, these motivational factors cannot be separated; they occur in different combinations, and their strengths can be additive and may lead to courageous actions. Sir Winston Churchill’s quotations in this article are universal, inspiring everyone regardless of gender as the character strengths and virtues cannot be understood exclusively by one gender. The connection between the two pillars of the article can be well illustrated through one of Churchill’s famous sentences: ‘All the great things are simple, and many can be expressed in a single word: freedom, justice, honor, duty, mercy, hope’ (Sir Winston Churchill).

The author of the last two studies is Árpád Szécsi, PhD, candidate at the Doctoral School of Political Science at the Faculty of Law, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest. His research topic focuses on the early period of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF), the leading party of the freely elected governing coalition in 1990.

In his study Pre-History of the Hungarian Democratic Forum as an Intellectual and Political Movement, the author concentrates on the pre-history of the party winning the first free general elections in 1990, namely the Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF), provides an overview of the intellectual and political antecedents and of the decisive period of its becoming a latent network, and describes the preparation for the famous Lakitelek Conference in September 1987, where the HDF was founded. In the second study, titled From the Tent to the Parliament. The Early Period of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (1987–1990), the author states that the roots of the HDF go back to the 1956 revolution both in the spiritual and moral dimensions, having been grown into a national organization of more than thirty

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thousand members and become a political party in the summer of 1989. In the spring of 1990, the HDF was elected as the party with the most numerous mandates, continuing its historic journey ‘from the Tent to the Parliament’. The number of members of the movement grew intensively, and it became a major political power of the regime change, eventually winning the free ‘founding elections’ in 1990. To achieve all this, risks had to be taken, either by the organizers/leaders or by those who sometimes had to endure discrimination and punishment. Therefore, it was the way of political courage that led to the restoration of freedom.

In addition to the personal purpose of writing the book, it is useful for any professional who deals with or wishes to deal with political science or historical research. The authors recommend it to all who wish to observe factual historical events from a critical and new perspective. The authors studied ‘political courage’ from different aspects regarding courage in certain eras and situations. A significant part of the examples deal with the Hungarian history specifically or indirectly.

Moreover, they also capture the general human aspects of ‘courage’. In the light of the above, the message of the volume evokes mixed emotions in the reader and draws the reader’s attention to courage on the one hand, and it highlights the importance of fair, honest norms, which can only more or less prevail in reality on the other hand.

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