European and Regional Studies Vol. 1, No. 1, 2010

Acta Universitatis Sapientiae The scientific journal of Sapientia University publishes original papers and surveys in several areas of sciences written in English.

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´ KASA Zolt´an

KELEMEN Andr´as VERESS Em˝od

Acta Universitatis Sapientiae European and Regional Studies Executive Editor ´ Barna (Sapientia University, Romania) BODO bodobarna@kv.sapientia.ro Editorial Board Gabriel ANDREESCU (National School of Political and Administrative Studies Bucharest, Romania) BAYER J´ozsef (E¨otv¨ os Lor´and University, Budapest, Hungary) BAKK Mikl´os (Babe¸s-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania) ´ BERENYI Zolt´an (University of Debrecen, Hungary) Vasile DOCEA (West University, Timi¸soara, Romania) GERGELY A. Andr´as (Institute of Political Science, Budapest, Hungary) LUPESCU Radu (Sapientia University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania) ´ MARACZ L´aszl´ o (University of Amsterdam, Netherlands) Christoph PAN (S¨ udtiroler Volksgruppen-Institut, Bozen, Italy) ´ SANDOR ´ SZALAYNE Erzs´ebet (University of P´ecs, Hungary) ´ SZILAGYI Istv´an (University of Pannonia, Veszpr´em, Hungary) TONK M´arton (Sapientia University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania)

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Acta Universitatis Sapientiae

European and Regional Studies Volume 1, Number 1, 2010

Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania Scientia Publishing House

Contents

´ KANTOR Zolt´ an Science or Politics? Reflections on the Concept of Nation . . . . . . . 5 ´ BAKK Mikl´ os, SZASZ Alp´ ar Zolt´ an Conflict and Convergence: Regionalisation Plans and Autonomy Movements in Romania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 ´ Tibor TORO Compatibilities and Incompatibilities in the Political Doctrines of Communism and Nationalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 ´ Barna BODO Internal Diaspora – Assimilation – Formation of the Internal Diaspora . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Vasile DOCEA History, Ideology and Collective Memory. Reconstructing the Identities of Timi¸soara by Means of Monographies and Street Names during the Communist Regime (1947-1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 ´ ESZ ´ TONK M´ arton, NAGY-MEH T¨ unde, Alexandru Virgil VOICU “Autonomy” of Sport Policy and Sport Activities in the European Union: Connections between Human Rights and Sports . . . . . . . 103 Book Reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Academy Affairs (News, Events) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

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Acta Universitatis Sapientiae European and Regional Studies, vol. 1, no. 1 (2010) 5 18

Science or Politics? Re ections on the Concept of Nation

KĂ NTOR ZoltĂĄn

Political Science Department PĂĄzmĂĄny PĂŠter Catholic University, Budapest email: zkantor@hiia.hu

There is no single state in Europe that is not based in a way or another on the principle of nationality. In di erent places, in di erent historical periods nationalism was, and is, present is various forms. I try to demonstrate that the term `nation' hinders much more social analysis, as it helps. The adjectives political, ethnic, cultural, civic, eastern, western, etc. do not clarify anything, even more they mislead theoretical thinking and empirical analysis. The issue of de nition of the nation is not only a scienti c issue, but a political one too.

The real question of social sciences targets the way societies transform and institutionalize. Even the most sophisticated de nition of the nation (if possible), the most perfect typology does not help us in understanding the ongoing social processes (globalization, EU enlargement, etc.). The main reason is that the nation is a static term, imagined as something really existing.

Abstract.

Keywords:

nation, nationalism, science

Questions regarding the de nition of nation have a very long history. The

th

rst attempts to de ne the nation can be dated to the middle of the 19

century. Even if the term was employed earlier, no de nition with scienti c intent can be recorded.

After the breakdown of the communist regimes in East-Central Europe, a new debate has arisen. Social scientists focused foremost on explaining postcommunist nationalism. Later, at the end of the millennium, kin-state activity brought into the light again debates on the de nition of nation.

Is the na-

tion political or cultural, which would be the de nition states should adopt,

Kรกntor Zoltรกn

6

and not least who, and based on which criteria, belongs or does not belong to a nation.

Ever since the signing of the peace treaties that put an end to World War I, minority rights and the settlement of minority questions have been a constant problem on the international agenda.

Looking at the issue in retrospect, it

might sound quite surprising that the concept of nation, especially the dilemma of a clear-cut de nition, only raised public attention in the late 20

th century.

This process was launched by a debate that evolved around the internationalization of the Hungarian status law. The legal and public debate in Hungary touched upon the de nition of the Hungarian nation itself. The con ict with neighboring countries such as Romania and Slovakia put the question of nation into the limelight. The last attempt to de ne nation on European level was

1

made by a report of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

If we analyze the problem deeper, we have to see that both science and politics are engaged in the game of de ning nation. The issue of the de nition of nation is not only a scienti c issue, but a political one, too. Moreover, it seems that science has misplaced the emphasis: for a century or more social scientists attempted to de ne the nation, however at least this is my point the de nition of nation is not a crucial social scienti c question! The real question of social sciences target how societies transform and institutionalize. Our main interest is how we can describe and interpret social change. For this we need concepts, and one of these concepts is the

nation.

Nation is regarded as

a central concept, what in my view is at least problematic. I consider that the central concept should be nationalism, and we should interpret nationalism as a neutral concept that describes the institutionalization of societies on national basis, recalling the nation as a central value.

It is worth reconsidering what has been written on the concept of nation since the rst attempts to de ne and typologize it. One must not forget that the article of Ernest Renan is an answer to the German historians who legitimized the conquest of Alsace-Loraine, invoking the objective elements that may de ne a nation. Renan's answer is built on the subjective element of a de nition, but one has not to forget that his main goal was to delegitimize the conquest. We may say that one of the rst debates on the de nition of nation was not of scienti c but of political interest.

Nationalism, as a perpetual project, institutionalizes the polity invoking the nation and involves a permanent de nition and rede nition of boundaries.

1

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe: The concept of nation Recommenth dation 1735 (2006). Text adopted by the Assembly on 26 January 2006 (7 Sitting).

Science or Politics? Re ections on the Concept of Nation

7

Since modernity, societies are institutionalized on a national basis, which is valid for both majorities and minorities. In Europe arguably everyone is nationalized. In Ernest Gellner's words: modern man is nationalist, and he/she is nationalist because he/she has to be. Nationalism is more than discourse or ideology, it is also institutionalization: a de nition with consequences for the organization of society.

The modern state is the protagonist of nationalism, and minorities answer with the same means. We hardly can encounter any group in Europe that does not de ne itself in national terms.

Tom Nairn's remark shows how central nationalism is in the contemporary world: [Gellner] demonstrated how industrialization produced modern political nationalities; yet did not go on to suggest that the true subject of modern philosophy might be, not industrialization as such, but its immensely complex and variegated aftershock - nationalism. (Naim 1997: 1)

th

Nationalism, according to most scholars, came into being in the 18-19 centuries.

Since then societies have been organized based on the principle

of nationality. principle.

The invocation of nation is perhaps the main legitimizing

Nationalism is inherently related to culture.

Nationalism comes

into being when culture replaces structure (Gellner 1983). George Schรถp in states: All cultures are collective; they include and exclude; they give us a particular set of identities; they allow us to make sense of the world; they o er us collective regulation and collective forms of knowledge; and they are bounded. These boundaries may shift but they will not vanish. They protect the culture in question and act as a lter through which new ideas are received and integrated. In addition, all cultures rely on broadly similar mechanisms to keep themselves in being. If threatened, they will redouble their e orts to protect cultural reproduction. (Schรถp in 2006) Nationalism emerged rst in Western Europe as a consequence of major transformations, explained di erently by the major authors. Gellner considers that nationalism is the outcome of the transition from agrarian society to industrial society, (Gellner 1983) while Benedict Anderson detects the emergence of national consciousness the nation as an imagined community as a result of the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human language . (Anderson 1983) In all these cases a new legitimation of the state occurred by institutionalizing nationalism as a principle of organizing society. Since nationalism emerged, the organization of societies is (also) based on the principle of nationality. In this respect, we may consider every European society as being nationalist. In the age of modernization, states tended to homogenize ethnically their societies, doing this in various ways.

Eugene

Kรกntor Zoltรกn

8

Weber, in his famous book, describes the way France linguistically (and nationally) homogenized the inhabitants of the country. Similar processes can be observed in other parts of Europe.

States, societies and culture became increasingly institutionalized. The standardization of language, the creation of high culture, the introduction of compulsory education and the nationalization of culture served the titular nation.

Non-dominant ethnic groups intended to create their own nation, with leaders from that particular nation, and intended to have their own state.

The na-

tionalists' programs and projects of nation-building/nationalizing usually were formulated and made in opposition to dominant groups/nations and other nationalizing processes.

That is the reason why one can speak about ancient

hatreds, old and lasting con icts. The change of state authority, of borders, created newer and newer frameworks, the former masters became servants and usually experienced similar treatment to what they had been responsible for when they had been the masters. The breakdown of empires, the division of states, and transitions recon gured political power and o ered new frameworks for nationalist politics.

According to Walker Connor, in Europe there are only two ethnically homogeneous states: Ireland and Portugal. (Connor 1994) All the other states include national minorities or ethnic groups.

The majority of the European

states have co-nationals living in other states. This is due to the peculiarity of European history. Those states that have co-nationals (kin-minorities) in other states have adopted a policy that supports nancially, culturally, or even politically their kin-minorities. The support of kin-minorities is based on the idea of the nation as an ethno-cultural entity, not on the political conception of it. It is assumed that the co-nationals have, or should have a special relation with the kin-state. The historical process of nation-formation can easily explain this, from the 18

th century on. Nations have been formed and have been

institutionalized. A sense of national identity emerged within the population usually due to the (often painful and aggressive) process of nation-building.

Forging the nation, (Colley, 1992) nationalizing culture (Lรถfgren 1989) and fabricating heritage (Lowenthal 1998) are the concepts scholars use to describe the process of national/ethnic homogenization.

The French process of mak-

ing Frenchmen from peasants, (Weber 1979) the Scandinavian culture-builders (Frykman-Lรถfgren 1987) and the politics of the Polish nationalizing state all

th and 20th centuries

re ect the state-driven nationalizing processes. In the 19

such politics created the modern European nation-states.

A strong sense of

national identity developed within the national groups in this way. Standardization of the language, o cial culture, mass-education and ethnic cleansing

Science or Politics? Re ections on the Concept of Nation

9

led to further homogenization and strengthened the signi cance of national identity.

The history of nationalism in East-Central Europe can be best understood if we analyze the di erent i.e., of the majority and of the minority nationbuilding, or nationalizing processes.

An important role in the nationalizing

process of the national minority is played by the external national homeland.

As the borders of states have often changed, di erent groups have experienced at di erent times the assimilationist or dissimilationist politics of the titular nation. In other words, they were the su ering subjects of nation-building processes, frequently with disastrous outcomes. A description of such policies is presented by Michael Mann, and a theoretical account (Mann 1999: 18-45) describing the mechanisms is o ered by John McGarry the settlement of majority groups in peripheral regions inhabited by minorities, relocation of minority groups within the state and expulsion of minorities from the state. (McGarry 1998: 613-638) Basically, every national minority which was once a component of the majority nation, or expressed nation-building goals within the new state, or at least showed a danger regarding the nation-building/nationalizing of the majority, experienced one or several of the processes described.

One possible approach to national con icts in Eastern Europe is to stress the parallel and often con icting processes of nation-building. Once the ideal of nation becomes important, there does not seem to be any sign that it will lose its signi cance. Nationalism may be transformed, but it remains an important organizational principle in our world. Nationalist politics is oriented partially on the strengthening of boundaries of the titular/majority nation, and by more or less hostile politics against national minorities.

As we see, for most scholars of nationalism, the crucial question is how and when nationalism emerged.

We rarely nd de nitions on nation in the

works of the major scholars. This suggests at least in my opinion that one may analyze the social processes without de ning nation.

We have to start

scholarly encounters with understanding the social processes and not the other way around: with the de nition of the nation. Gellner and Hobsbawm both consider that nationalism created the nation.

In this way, the nation is the

result of nationalization, basically the outcome of the institutionalization of the society on national basis, or in other words the result of socialization on national basis. From this perspective it is indi erent whether a particular nation is cultural or political.

It depends on the way how the state or the

political elite shaped its politics.

However, we have to go further. In my essay, I am going to ask the inevitable question whether the concept of nation has ever been a scienti c issue or it

10

Kรกntor Zoltรกn

emerged as a political one since the rst de nition of nation appeared. The problem remains in what theoretical framework and with which scienti c means questions related to the nation could be analyzed, especially those with respect to status law and the referendum on dual citizenship. First of all, one has to emphasize that we analyze not a scienti c question but a political process in which the de nition of nation has been given a central role.

Our research

question could refer to what a nation really is, how it could be de ned and how a typology of nations could be constructed.

I use the conditional here

since in my opinion, as opposed to numerous experts, the de nition of nation has never been a question of (social) science. We can also add that a precise scienti c de nition of nation or a precise typology would not get us closer to a better understanding of social and political processes, either.

The de nition of a certain nation has political consequences as a given state institutionalizes its society and de nes its relations to minorities living within its borders and fellow nationals living beyond its borders based on a concept that the state itself accepts. This has far-reaching political consequences. The attitude of a state to its own national question has di erent outcomes based on whether the concept of political or cultural nation is used as a starting point.

According to the cultural identity/de nition, a nation involves those

living outside the borders of a given state as well, taking them to belong to the majoritarian/titular nation, but this also implies that minorities that live on the territories of this state are not part of that particular nation.

The

political de nition regards people living in one state as the members of the nation, namely all citizens living on state territory, independent from ethnic or national origin. Those living beyond the borders of the majoritarian/titular nation are, however, not part of this particular nation. Based on the criteria of scienti c thinking, the concept of nation of a given state should be coherent.

Law also demands a similar coherence as harmony should prevail amongst laws of a state, as a matter of principle. Political practice o ers a di erent picture.

We can notice that the relation of states towards minorities living on state territories and fellow nationals de es any scienti c criteria or legal coherence.

Those who claim that nationalism appeared

again

after the regime changes

in the region are fundamentally wrong. Nationalism has always been present in Western Europe as much as in Central-Eastern Europe. Politicians of the regime changes did not use nation-based state reuni cation as a political slogan, one can only nd some references to the overall respect of the rights of national and ethnic minorities. In the light of the above, it might have seemed surprising that a nationalist rhetoric overwhelmed the public sphere only few months after the regime changes.

The birth of democratic institutions have

Science or Politics? Re ections on the Concept of Nation

11

fuelled intense debates in some states, while others shared a common understanding towards the national self-identi cation of states and rights to be given to or taken away from minorities.

It is obvious that post-communist societies, Western European politicians and opinion-maker (elites) were shocked by the emergence of nationalist rhetoric in the public sphere, and the wars in Yugoslavia and con icts following the breakup of the Soviet Union were often labelled `ethnic'. These were all part of the transition process. Every social transition and revolution, may it be velvet or bloody, is accompanied by a political restructuring along national lines.

It was not only the democratic institutions, market economy etc. that had to be created, an answer regarding the national characteristics of a state had to be constructed as well. The re-de nition of a state does not only mean that, from today on, the former communist/socialist state will be a market economy and the former one-party system will be a multi-party system etc. The state, previously calling itself socialist, that managed to solve the minority question had to face the fact that national minorities became more engaged on its territory and it had to accept that a decisive part of the political elite belonging to the majority (sometimes its de ning majority) wished to continue nation-building that was de ned as un nished .

2

Regardless whether this process involved

alterations to the old constitutions or constitutional national assemblies that edited a new constitution, the political elite had to provide a political answer concerning the rights to be given to national identities, what its stance towards fellow nationals living beyond its borders was and, last but not least, what the national self-determination would look like. The vast majority of states in the region opted for a nation-state identity and politics.

(Culic 2003:

38-58)

One can hardly nd a state in Europe where the problem of national minority does not gure at least occasionally on the political agenda. The protection of national minorities and the de nition of national/ethnic minorities have not until recently been linked to the issue of the de nition of motherland and of nation itself. From the viewpoint of a researcher, this is a clear misunderstanding of the problem, from a political standpoint, however, the linkages are easy to construct. Social sciences investigate the evolution of nationalism and the organization of (majoritarian and minoritarian) societies on a national basis,

2

These are exactly the reasons why Central-Eastern European left-wing parties face issues

related to nation, since antinationalist politics (or political rhetorics) was deeply embedded in successor parties as well. It lasts until recent days despite the fact that a part of today's left-wing political elite does not claim any continuity with the socialist party.

The other

reason why the left-wing has a hard time conceptualising its nation concept is that it was mainly `pre-reserved' by the left-wing.

KĂĄntor ZoltĂĄn

12

while politics seeks solutions to given questions. Politics on minority protection in the EU that are based on governmental considerations do not approach minority rights from the standpoint of minorities but look at stability rst.

(Kymlicka 2004; MajtĂŠnyi 2004) For about one or two centuries, literature on the concept of nation has been trying to de ne what a nation really is, but the attempt has constantly ran into some methodological obstacles. The way Daniele Conversi puts it is very precise: `Nationalism is both a process of border maintenance and creation.

Hence, it is a process of de nition. One of the problems stemming from the lack of a universally acceptable de nition of the nation and of nationalism derives precisely from the fact that the nation is itself a tool of de nition'.

(Conversi 1977: 77) Scholarly questions, on the other hand, refer to the description of processes and nding the most appropriate theoretical framework for their analysis: in my view, this framework is best called nationalism and nation-building.

We can only agree with Rogers Brubaker, who draws our

attention to the fact that We should not ask 'what is a nation' but rather: how is nationhood as a political and cultural form institutionalized within and among states?

How does nation work as practical category, as classi -

catory scheme, as cognitive frame? What makes the use of that category by or against states more or less resonant or e ective? What makes the nationevoking, nation-invoking e orts of political entrepreneurs more or less likely to succeed?

(Brubaker 1996: 16) If we accept therefore that our questions do

not refer to the nation but to social processes, national typology becomes a secondary question. Brubaker mainly states, and we have all reasons to agree, that social processes can be understood even without the real de nition of nation. Nation is only interesting regarding the nation concept based on which the given state institutionalizes its society and regulates relations between fellow nationals within and beyond the borders. In this respect, we can already talk about politics resting

on a political and/or cultural concept of the nation

and about politics institutionalized according to these.

In order to nd out

which national concept a state prefers, one has to look at the constitution, the law on citizenship and the laws applied to fellow nationals.

3

The history and political practice of nationalism is the politics of acceptance and discrimination. The de nition of nation is the result of and not the reason for this process. Nationalism, as a value-neutral and process-descriptive scienti c concept, can also be de ned as a political ght for the o cial determination of what the nation is (and the political practice stemming from this

3

Party laws and laws for education and culture can serve as further reference.

Science or Politics? Re ections on the Concept of Nation

13

ght). The concept of nation and the settlement of the relation between nation and state changes depending on the way a certain political party/side/ideology de nes those who belong to the nation and those to be discriminated. This intention can be traced in the constitution, the citizenship law, the minority law, the `status law' and laws related to education, culture etc.

The nation

concept of a certain state can basically be excellently derived from these laws and regulations.

Until the middle of the twentieth century, social sciences regarded the de nition of nation as a central problem. The theory of Ernest Gellner has pointed out that the central concept of social sciences is

nationalism, not nation.

That

is when emphasis was transferred from the de nition of the real essence of nation and nation typologies to the analysis of social institutionalization. The problematic nature of any de nition of the nation had already revealed itself in the nineteenth century, leading many scholars to try to specify the concept by linking nation and nationalism with a given characteristic.

That is

how classical typologies that still have not lost their political power were born.

Concerning typologies, the debate is mainly about whether objective or subjective features are decisive in delineating a nation.

Approaches in favor of

the de nitive nature of objective factors list culture, language or religion as national characteristics.

They further suppose, however, that the mere ex-

istence of these objective criteria does not alone generate a certain national identity.

Subjective approaches, not denying the importance of certain ob-

jective characteristics, look at belonging to a nation as the most important thing: one can only talk about a nation when the ones belonging to it claim and feel that they are part of that. It is without a doubt necessary to have some kind of objective features, but we do not nd any that would satisfy the needs of a theoretical de nition.

The debate between these two preconcep-

tions is the centerpiece of Ernest Renan's classical study. (Renan 1995) This essay is regarded as the rst formulation of the objective and the subjective de nition of nation. Although the terminology changed, the debate still raged on amongst various representatives of sciences. Renan was contributing to the Franco-German historical debate following the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine

4

and argued that the occupied territories belonged to France . In the debate,

4

See more details: Finkielkraut, Alain:

A gondolkodás veresége. [The Defeat of the Mind]

Budapest: Osiris, 1996. 39-47. Pokol, Béla: A nemzet fogalmának átértelmezése? [Reinterpreting the concept of nation?] In

Médiahatalom.

Budapest: Windsor, 1995. Ádám, Péter:

Renan nemzetfelfogása: Elzász-Lotharingiától a nemzeti önrendelkezésig, [The nation concept of Renan: From Alsace-Lorraine to national self-determination] In

Mi a nemzet ? BuInternational

dapest: Akadémiai, 1998. Smith, Anthony D.: Nationalism and the Historians.

Kรกntor Zoltรกn

14

all arguments are listed that are also typical of later interpretations and de nition attempts. It is therefore important to note that the rst debate on the real nature of nation is not a scienti c but a political one about a province changing hands! Friedrich Meinecke, (Meinecke 1970,10) Hans Kohn, (Kohn 1994:

162-165) John Plamenatz (Plamenatz 1973:

23-36) all o er di erent

typologies that are actually based on the same thought. They di erentiate between political and cultural, Western and Eastern and civil and ethnic nations.

We also have to see that their arguments rest on strong normative presumptions. The good and right political nation is opposed to the inappropriate and bad cultural nation and nationalism. All these typologies were created

5

when there was no theory available to explain the evolution of nationalism .

Alain Dieckho de nes civil and cultural nation preconceptions as follows: the civic, contractual, elective nation is the basis of the French idea of the nation, conceptualized by the philosophers of the Enlightenment and realized by the Great Revolution. In contrast, the second type is seen as the concretization of a historical community, the expression of an identity feeling, the re ection of a natural order. This cultural, organic, ascriptive nation is the basis of the German idea of the nation, nurtured by romanticism and embodied by the Second and the Third Reich.

(Dieckho 2005) The latter approach de nes nation

along ethnocultural lines, puts the emphasis on common language and culture, while the previous one regards those living in the same country belonging to the nation. These typologies listed above merely try to clear up the concept of nation that is hard to grasp as a category of social science. Constructing typologies does not bring us closer to the essence of the problem. We might say that these typologies cause more trouble than actually help in interpreting the question. On the one hand they con rm that the nation is a central category, an actual identity, on the other hand they create a simplistic category

6

that obstructs scienti c considerations on the question . No matter how many social phenomenons are used to clarify the two concepts, it does not bring us closer to the understanding of the political process itself.

It is by all means more productive to analyze nationalism and nationalisms, namely the processes of institutionalization since social transformation and various governmental, minority, home land politics become more understand-

Journal for Comparative Sociology, XXXIII, No. 1-2, 1992. 58-80.

5

I do not mean that we have a coherent nationalism theory approved by social sciences,

only that those who created the typology, especially according to the recent stance of science, did not understand essential questions concerning nation and the evolution of nationalism.

6

Naturally, contemporary literature questions the use of the cultural vs.

political di-

chotomy, but oddly, this theory has not yet spread in Western social scienti c mindset.

Science or Politics? Re ections on the Concept of Nation

15

7

able . Instead of using various typologies as a scheme, it would be more fruitful to investigate the evolution of a certain nationalism, a concept of nation that explains why the state prefers this or the other approach. It is almost obvious why a nationalism that is a result of a social transformation rather approaches the political model and why a nation-building that is initiated from above and puts its own language and culture to the central place stands closer to the cultural model.

Although nation is often the subject of social scienti c analysis, in my view, purely concentrating on nation does not bring us closer to the analysis of social transformation and political processes. It is almost nonsense to describe a given nation as a political or a cultural one, but nationalism as an institutionalization process can be examined with the help of these categories. This can be done by examining which concept of nation political actors refer to, more precisely, based on which concept of nation they wish to institutionalize society.

We

can get closer to the understanding of the national policy of a given state by examining law, political statements, and political activity, and, if we wish to, we can then decide whether a certain policy is closer to the cultural or rather to the political ideal type. Hungarian domestic debates can be analyzed very well in this framework. We have no reason to assume that the international debate is not political and that it is not about the European de nition of nation and nationality.

Conclusions In this paper I attempted to show that it is not only contemporary debates on the concept of nation that are political in nature, but in fact, ever since the beginning of such enterprises, de ning the nation has been a political question. I tried to demonstrate that this is not a question of social science but a political debate underpinned by arguments from social science.

Since

a given de nition of nationhood has political consequences, it is not neutral for politics which concept of the nation is used to institutionalize society and

7

It has to be detected behind the public debate of status law (and later `dual citizenship')

that it is about the national self-determination of the Hungarian state. Which one should be the legitimiate nation concept along which the Hungarian state should relate towards all minorities, including those in Hungary and those beyond the borders? The central question concerns on what (national) principles the Hungarian state should de ne itself and Hungarians in neighbouring countires and in other parts of the world. We can understand this process in the theoretical framework of nationalism, and those approaches that put nation as the central issue of analysis are essentially wrong.

KĂĄntor ZoltĂĄn

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how the question of who belongs and does not belong to a certain nation is answered. A certain concept of the nation legitimizes or delegitimizes certain political acts. Social sciences can de ne nations, they can set up typologies, but they serve as insu cient sources for the understanding of social processes and social transformation. Political debates evolving around the de nitions of nationhood and institutionalization are, as a direct consequence of the above, nothing more than the determination of what a given state accepts and what it discriminates against in terms of the identity choices of citizens. This is not a question for science, but one for politics.

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Mi a nemzet?

Budapest: AkadĂŠmiai KiadĂł.

Anderson, Benedict 1983 Imagined Communities:

and Spread of Nationalism. London:

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Brubaker, Rogers 1996 Nationalism Reframed:

Nationhood and the National

Question in the New Europe. Cambridge University Press.

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Acta Universitatis Sapientiae European and Regional Studies, vol. 1, no. 1 (2010) 19 32

Con ict and Convergence: Regionalisation Plans and Autonomy Movements in Romania BAKK Miklós

Political Science Department Babe³-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca email: bakkmiklos@gmail.com

SZÁSZ Alpár Zoltán

Political Science Department Babe³-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca email: szaszzo66@yahoo.co.uk

This paper examines the possibilities for regionalisation in Romania, a project that requires a break with Romania's present constitutional heritage. Regions can be constructed by creating their territorial, symbolic and institutional forms combined with the nal establishment of the entire regional system. For more than one-hundred years, Romania's historical regions have been subjected to a unifying process of Jacobin state-building. Even if this process resulted in serious hindrances to regionalisation, it could not do away neither with regional identities, nor with certain symbolic and institutional aspects of the regions. In the last few years, several plans for regionalisation have been devised. Arguably, the Hungarian community in Romania would bene t most from asymmetrical regionalisation, but in order to be successful the Szekler autonomy movement should formulate its goals using the language and concepts of regionalisation without reference to minority rights or cultural autonomy.

Abstract.

regionalism, regional identity, culturally `thin' and `thick' regions, regionalisation (symmetrical and asymmetrical), internal selfdetermination, administrative structure, decentralisation, state-building, (regional) autonomy, federalism, development regions, Romania Keywords:

It is commonplace that the development of the Romanian state from the `Old Kingdom' (i.e., Romania before the First World War) to interbellum Greater Romania meant not only territorial completion and achievement of nation-state unity, but entailed also a choice regarding the kind of political modernization to be accomplished, speci cally, the choice to continue with the Jacobin tradition

Bakk Miklรณs, Szรกsz Alpรกr Zoltรกn

20

adopted by the Romanian political elite in the 19

th century.

Moreover, in

spite or perhaps because of the Communist constitutionalism (that is, the period between 1948 and 1989 in uenced by Stalin's constitution from 1936), this tradition was resuscitated by the 1991 Constitution (Stanomir 2005: 228229). The present paper examines the possibilities and ways for regionalisation on the basis of this constitutional heritage.

Regional identities and state-building:

introductory

considerations The idea of regional identity has been present for a long while in traditional geographical approaches to regionalism. Regional identity was often seen as the primordial nature of regions, researchers belonging to this school of thought stressing the internal `harmony' of regions, which meant for them unity between the regions and their inhabitants (see Paasi 2003: 475-479).

But the

manner how this nature, this unity is constructed, albeit an old question, still elicits interest and is periodically revisited by geographers, anthropologists and political scientists alike. Generally, we may consider that regions preceded the rise of nation-states, but were later e ectively omitted or exploited depending on context by the emerging states while organising governance and control over their territories. Many strong modern states assimilated former regions and areas, transforming them in frames or parts of territorial governance linked, however, to a certain extent to historical and cultural contexts.

In

some states, regions became instruments of state power being de ned more or less `from above', and because of their administrative importance, remained culturally `thin' (Paasi 2001: 15). In this case, regional identity did not emerge as a separate and competing focus of political loyalties in contrast to the national identity constructed by the modern state. In other cases, regions were deeply rooted historical and cultural (`thick') entities, their existence becoming manifest not only through and in their identity, but also through various social and cultural institutions (Paasi 2001: 15). Consequently, such regions became powerful competitors in the struggle for capturing the political loyalty of a territorial community and challenged the loyalty pattern constructed and prescribed by the state. Regions wield such power in Spain, Italy and Belgium, and more recently in Great Britain, where the positions of Scotland and

1

Wales have been signi cantly strengthened during the last ten years .

1

The question of political competition for the loyalty of territorial communities is related to the recent debate on multicultural citizenship. (See Kymlicka Straehle 1999, Fowler 2004.)

Con ict and Convergence: Regionalisation Plans and Autonomy ...

21

These two ways of assimilating regions into the structures of governmental power distribution can be interpreted as two types of state construction.

Hechter (2000) made a clear distinction between primary states and secondary states.

th

Primary states are all the large states which existed before the 19

century and adopted indirect rule because of technical limits to central control.

Their political structure was based on indirect rule relying on the existence of groups mediating between individuals and the state (Hechter 2000: 40).

This type of rule allowed primary states to arise and function as growing and culturally diverse political units. Furthermore, Hechter called secondary states all the states that introduced direct rule with modern state-bureaucracy. However, the functioning of such states required legitimation by nationalism and, hence, forced these states to strive for cultural homogeneity.

It is clear that a state administration based on institutionalised regions exhibiting strong identities (i.e., `thick' cultural entities) inherited many of its features from a primary state. However, if regionalisation occurs as a political programme, every part of a centralist state may be regionalised (even if some parts were not considered `regions' previously). Yet, a sense of regional identity and cohesion as well as regionalist movements will emerge only if these can rely on a long-standing regional tradition, a common history and experience,

2

or a distinct language .

A region's construction may it be strong and `thick' or weak and `thin' is part of the perpetual transformation of the spatial system in which regions emerge, exist for some time and may then disappear. This process may be labelled the institutionalisation of regions and, analytically, presents four simultaneous aspects, which in practice are always di erent sides of the same process: 1) the creation of the territorial, 2) symbolic and 3) institutional forms of a region, as well as 4) its establishment as an entity in the regional system and the social consciousness of the society concerned. It is a process through which a territorial unit becomes an established entity in the spatial structure and is afterwards identi ed in institutionalised political, economic, cultural and administrative practices and social consciousness alike, while being continually reproduced in all these practices (Paasi 2001: 16).

In conclusion, Romania's regional perspectives should be analysed according to the above two ways of (creating and) embedding regions and the four simultaneous aspects of their institutionalisation.

2

See Hans-JĂźrgen Puhle Regions, Regionalism and Regionalization in 20th-Century Eu. [http://www.oslo2000.uio.no/program/papers/s9/s9-puhle.pdf], downloaded on 2 August 2009. rope

Bakk MiklĂłs, SzĂĄsz AlpĂĄr ZoltĂĄn

22

Romanian parties: symmetrical regionalisation `from above' In what regards the rst aspect mentioned by Paasi that is, territorial shaping Romania can be divided into so-called historical provinces: Transylvania, Banat, Partium (referred to in Romanian as •ara Cri³urilor or Cri³ana), Maramure³, Moldavia, Oltenia and Muntenia (composing together Wallachia or •ara Româneasc , in Romanian) as well as Dobruja.

The said provinces

re ect diverging historical-political evolutions, which left their mark on perceptions of spatial di erences as this can be gleaned both from local mentality and everyday discourse. Moreover, many daily practices contribute to the reproducing of the cultural di erences between these regions. Notwithstanding

th century

these di erences, the modernization of the Romanian state in the 19

th century as well as under Communist and later, in the third decade of the 20 rule, was based on a rather arti cial administrative-territorial division. This division generated new social practices (mainly during the Communist period), which altered the mentioned spatial di erences, however, only moderately and without being able to cancel them out. According to Sandu (2002), the di erences between various cultural areas interpreted as subdivisions of historical regions in Romania should be interpreted as sociability variables combined in speci c patterns.

(More precisely, the main regional types of sociability in

Romania are combinations of closeness or openness, context-conformity in relations with institutions and poverty or richness in network capital.) Bearing in mind that Paasi de ned the regions' boundaries not as xed, but saw them as resulting from processes in which territories and their contested meanings are socially and culturally constructed (Paasi 2001: 16), these cultural areas could be used for the formation of territorial units in a wider sense.

Turning to the second aspect, it should be noted that numerous symbolic elements of the cultural areas and historical regions making up Romania are

3

present in the public sphere , but the centralist ethos of the dominant Romanian parties constitutes a serious hindrance to their political usage. However, the political usage of regional symbols is an open question. Until now, only the Szeklerland's symbols gained political signi cance, thanks to an ethnoregional(ist) movement which emerged apparently in the last ve years.

One

may rightly hypothesise that if a regional(ist) party had obtained seats in the

3

The coat of arms of Romania contains the blazons of the most important historical regions; but the new coats of arms of counties and municipalities were created in a rather haphazard and arbitrary manner after 1990 (Cf. Heraldica_României, [http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heraldica_României], downloaded on 20 August 2009).

Con ict and Convergence: Regionalisation Plans and Autonomy ...

23

parliament or in important county councils, it would have used regional symbols and watchwords, and would have pushed for the enactment of regional policies.

But the Party of Moldavians (Partidul Moldovenilor ), founded in

late 1997, was rather short-lived since its leadership accepted the merger of this organisation into the Social Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat,

4

hereinafter PSD) in 2002 .

Another initiative aimed at the creation of the

Transylvanians' Party (Partidul Ardelenilor ) ended in failure because of the very restrictive registration criteria stipulated by the Romanian law on political parties and the arbitrary judicial practice which characterised the 2001-2004 parliamentary cycle.

The third aspect, institutional forms of regions, exists only in the cultural realm: important museums, universities and publishers bear names referring to historical regions or serve a manifestly regional function. The most obvious examples are Muzeul Banatului (Banat Museum), Muzeul Naµional de Istorie a Transilvaniei (National Museum of Transylvanian History) and Székely Nemzeti Múzeum (Székely National Museum). However, these institutional el-

ements may represent a good starting point for the development of the regions' social capital once the required political bodies and administrative structures have been established for these regions the fourth aspect mentioned by Paasi.

5 and be-

For various reasons to be found in Romanian political traditions

cause of the speci city of the Romanian party system and political régime described as administrative consensualism and patronage (Preda-Soare 2008: 50-57) , the larger parliamentary parties have no interest in launching a radical regional reform targeting the Romanian administrative system. Their ultimate

6

goal in this respect is a controlled symmetrical regionalisation .

Between 2000 and 2004, two conceptions regarding regionalisation have been formulated.

According to the views of the National Liberal Party (Partidul

Naµional Liberal ), the Romanian parliament should have passed an organic

law introducing symmetrical regionalisation with regions enjoying equal status.

The Liberals' proposal took into account the existing cultural and tra-

ditional boundaries of the regions, but remained very cautious in what concerns

4

See `Partidul Moldovenilor s-a înscris la Tribunal.' Ziarul de Ia³i (25 August 1998). [http://www.ziaruldeiasi.ro/national-extern/partidul-moldovenilor-s-a-inscris-la-tribunalnig8s] (downloaded on 20 August 2009) and Bakk 2003: 426.

5 On the traditions of Romanian political thinking see Barbu 2005: 11-24.

6 However, in recent years, several civic organisations raised the question of federalism or asymmetrical regionalism (e.g., the Pro Europa League/Liga Pro Europa / and the Provincia group ).

Bakk Miklós, Szász Alpár Zoltán

24

the degree of the decentralization. However, the Liberals organised no public debate on their proposal (Szokoly 2005b: 10).

Another conception was put forward by the PSD, even though the politicians belonging to this party could not agree on the precise form of regionalisation.

On the one hand Ioan Rus, the Transylvanian ideologist of the party, suggested a regional reform based on local autonomy and traditional-cultural delimitations, (Szokoly 2005b: 9-10) while on the other hand, Octav Cozmânc , the Minister of Administration, envisaged symmetrical regions created through merging two or three counties.

After 2004, only the idea of transforming the extant statistical and development regions into administrative regions (governed by elected political bodies) was present in political discourse. Needless to say, this is another method of achieving symmetrical decentralization.

The Hungarian minority's autonomy: pushing for an asymmetrical regional reform?

After the fall of Communism in December 1989, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség, hereinafter RMDSZ) was established as an ethnic party representing Hungarians in Romania. The RMDSZ, a party which for the last two decades has obtained the large majority of votes cast by ethnic Hungarians, raised the question of (regional) autonomy. However, no concrete guidelines for attaining this goal have been formulated initially. The clari cation of the party's conception occurred only later, after lengthy debate and controversy. In search for a workable and defensible conception, four types of proposals have been taken into account: a) the autonomy proposals put forward between the two World Wars; b) the Romanian Statute of Nationalities adopted in 1945; c) various international instruments and documents on human and minority rights, which attracted much attention recently because in the process of European integration the stipulations contained in these documents were regarded as requirements of European accession; d) examples of functioning autonomies in several member states of the European Union that have been regarded as good practices.

The rst proposals made by Hungarians, such as the concept of `internal self-determination' or the társnemzet

7

7 idea, mirrored an expectation regarding

This term, which translates approximately as `partner nation', suggests that a certain state, in our case Romania, is formed and inhabited by two (or more) national communities here the Romanian and the Hungarian national communities which are and behave

Con ict and Convergence: Regionalisation Plans and Autonomy ...

25

a possible rapid and fundamental change of the Romanian state structure in a manner which would have allowed the attainment of a collective legal status

by Hungarians. But in the early nineties, post-Communist Romanian parties and elites followed a nationalistic political course to legitimate their leading role. This state of facts put to the fore the Jacobin way of state organisation stipulated in Article 1 of the Constitution, de ning Romania as a unitary and indivisible national state . The consolidation of the Romanian moderate right including the RMDSZ in the second half of the nineties did not result in another de nition of the state and of the political community.

After the adoption of this new Constitution (in 1991) the RMDSZ, enjoying strong support from ethnic Hungarian voters, submitted to the Romanian parliament a bill on national minorities and autonomous communities in 1993.

It was the draft of a framework law de ning three possible forms of autonomy: personal autonomy, regional autonomy and special status for local governments.

As interpreted by the RMDSZ, the law did not contradict the Con-

stitution, and was meant to be only a regulatory frame on a conceptual level, while stipulating no concrete institutional solutions.

The bill was based on

the idea that autonomy represented a sustainable project both in the domestic and the international political arena. The reasons why Hungarian politicians in Romania reasoned in this manner were the following: rst, in those years, the Council of Europe apparently preferred policies aiming to augment special

8

minority rights through autonomy-based institutional solutions ; second, the RMDSZ was not `trapped' yet by the cooperation with center-right Romanian parties, a situation in which the ethnic Hungarian party was o ered coalition membership in 1996 provided it shelved its plans for achieving some form of autonomy.

After the rejection of the bill on autonomous communities, the topic became a marginal one within the RMDSZ, too; although the idea of autonomy has not been deleted from the political programme of the party. In fact, autonomy is still viewed in symbolic terms as a central identity trait of Hungarians in Romania, but ceased to be a source of political initiatives. Nonetheless, in 1995, a group elaborated a draft statute on Szeklerland's autonomy, but this has not been submitted to Parliament and remained a solitary initiative for many

like partners while enjoying equal constitutional status. (Put di erently, the tรกrsnemzet conception is aimed at avoiding the political situation in which members of a national minority are treated as second-rate citizens.)

8 Recommendation 1201 (1993) of the Parliamentary Assembly on an additional protocol on the rights of national minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights can rightly be interpreted in this way.

26

Bakk MiklĂłs, SzĂĄsz AlpĂĄr ZoltĂĄn

years. All in all, shelving the idea of autonomy meant that the politicians who between 1990 and 1995 argued for drafting and submitting various autonomy conceptions were gradually marginalised inside the RMDSZ. From 1996 onwards, the course of action taken by the RMDSZ was strongly in uenced by its (perceived) chances to participate in coalition governments.

This attitude towards government participation seems to be shared by most ethnic parties in Central and Eastern Europe, and appears to be a direct consequence of the European integration process and the basic treaties signed by the countries in question. A kind of `consociational strategy' replaced the barren autonomy strategy, and this orientation was supported by the process of European integration. The reason is that the European Union, in the absence of an acquis stipulating minority rights, was guided by a security-based approach which preferred the consensual settlement of disputes over the enforcement of universalistic norms (see Brusis 2003).

In the meantime, the short time-span before EU-accession o ered possibilities for nding a way towards an internal autonomy arrangement or, at least, of creating a framework for a later arrangement of this kind. (In this respect, reference was made to the Copenhagen criteria.)

In the case of Hungarians

in Transylvania, these opportunities presented themselves roughly at the same moment when new political organisations claiming to represent political alternatives to the RMDSZ have been founded.

In 2003, a splinter group that left the RMDSZ established the Hungarian National Council of Transylvania (ErdĂŠlyi Magyar Nemzeti TanĂĄcs, hereinafter EMNT). The goal of this (legally unregistered) organisation was to revive the autonomy conceptions, which were shelved and neglected by the RMDSZ. Somewhat later the Szekler National Council (SzĂŠkely Nemzeti TanĂĄcs, hereinafter SZNT) was also created, born out of the desire to push for the territorial autonomy of the Szeklerland.

At the beginning of 2008, a new Hungarian

party reuniting rst and foremost mayors and local councillors from the Szeklerland has been registered. This organisation, called Hungarian Civic Party (Magyar PolgĂĄri PĂĄrt, hereinafter MPP), focuses on Szekler territorial autonomy, too.

In the context of EU-accession and under the circumstances of erce competition between the four political organisations representing Hungarians in Transylvania, three strategic conceptions regarding the territorial autonomy of the Szeklerland have been formulated:

Con ict and Convergence: Regionalisation Plans and Autonomy ...

27

1) Considering the history of the proposals, one must mention rst the autonomy statute adopted by the SZNT since its original version has been elaborated in 1995, prior to the establishment of the organisation that eventually embraced it.

This proposal is based on the concept of

in-

ternal self-determination. The leading body of the SZNT brought some amendments to the initial draft stemming from 1995 and adopted it as an o cial document.

Finally, the bill was submitted to the Ro-

manian Parliament in February 2004. In fact, the SZNT, which initially was another unregistered civic organisation, could not introduce the bill.

Hence, the draft law was submitted to Parliament by a group of MPs belonging to the RMDSZ but maintaining informal political ties with the SZNT. Needless to say, their action attracted criticism from the RMDSZ leadership, but no severe crisis developed within the ranks of the party since, in March 2004, the Parliament rejected the bill.

2) During the Party Congress held by the RMDSZ in 2003, another strategic conception was outlined.

rial precedent.

This was based on the idea of

territo-

The advocates of this idea set out from the possi-

bility of transforming the extant regions of development into politicaladministrative regions or units. The present development regions created in 1998 without taking into account historical-cultural traditions within Romania do not have administrative competencies and correspond to NUTS II level divisions in EU member states. Consequently, the RMDSZ aims, as a rst step, to create the Szeklerland Development Region by reuniting three counties (Harghita, Covasna and MureÂł).

However, the SZNT criticises this idea because the three counties do not coincide with the historical territory of Szeklerland.

3) The third conception has been elaborated as part of the package deal o ered by the EMNT to the RMDSZ. This package contains three proposals: the draft of a framework law on regions (without specifying their geographical boundaries), a bill on the creation of the Szeklerland development region, which would enjoy special status and the draft statute of the Szeklerland region.

This whole package is rooted in a vision of

asymmetrical regionalism being in the meantime based on the assumption that the prospective Romanian regionalisation will be similar to the Spanish or the Italian one. Hence, the idea of Szeklerland's territorial autonomy should be included in a larger scheme regarding Romania's regionalisation, and should be put forward using the language and terminology of regionalism (not the language and terminology of `internal

Bakk Miklós, Szász Alpár Zoltán

28

self-determination'). This conception includes another presupposition as well, namely, the idea that such a conception will attract more support from ethnic Romanian political actors as opposed to other plans, which focus exclusively on the Szeklerland.

These proposals have not been submitted as bills to the Romanian parliament yet, but it should be noted that the expert commission on constitutional reform nominated by the head of state, President Traian B sescu, in the autumn of 2008 (the so called Stanomir Commission) drafted a lengthy and detailed report delineating a possible way for administrative reform and towards asymmetrical regionalism.

Apart from these proposals on territorial autonomy, two conceptions tackling the idea of cultural autonomy for Hungarians living outside the Szeklerland have been elaborated. First, in June 2004, the EMNT submitted to Parliament a draft framework law on personal cultural autonomy. If enacted, this bill could have served as the basis for the establishment and operation of autonomous cultural institutions in case of 15 autochthonous national minorities living in Romania. In what concerns Hungarians, the draft law did not specify clearly how Szeklerland's territorial autonomy shall be correlated with the cultural autonomy enjoyed by ethnic Hungarians who live outside the Szekler region.

The bill, lacking even the support of the RMDSZ, was eventually rejected by Parliament.

Nevertheless, the RMDSZ introduced later, as member of the coalition government formed in December 2004, another, similar bill. This bill did not pass either, because the coalition partners of the RMDSZ did not support it.

Conclusions and perspectives The society made up by ethnic Hungarians in Romania, due to its diverse ethno-demographic situation, regional-territorial fragmentation and intricate social structure, needs a combined autonomy arrangement based on the political consent of its members. Such a conception can be constructed only in time.

The relatively large number of autonomy conceptions elaborated by ethnic Hungarian political organisations mentioned in the present paper shows that no agreement necessary for putting forward and eventually enacting a certain arrangement has been reached, neither in what regards the required institutional framework nor in what regards the subsequent strategies. Although all political actors representing ethnic Hungarians accept this diagnosis, little ef-

Con ict and Convergence: Regionalisation Plans and Autonomy ...

29

fort has been spent in the last twenty years in order to reach at least a minimal consensus.

Romania's accession to the EU represented an important turning point because this period o ered some possibilities for political arm-twisting and for launching a negotiation process on autonomy arrangements. However, the political actors involved in the process seemed to be unable to practice consensusoriented politics and imagine creative policies. This statement holds true both for political parties in Hungary, the kin-state, and for the political groups which assumed the task of representing the Hungarian minority in Romania.

Now that Romania became a full member of the European Union, Szeklerland's regional autonomy can emerge as a successful political project only if treated as a completely separate matter, without connecting it to the topic of minority rights construed as individual rights or to the idea of cultural autonomy seen as a legal solution for the entire Hungarian national community living

9

in Romania . More precisely, success may be achieved only if the movement for Szekler autonomy will follow the models and the path taken by Western ethnoregional(ist) movements, which interpreted territorial autonomy as part of a larger regionalising process consonant with various national and EU-level policies. In this respect, the achievement of territorial autonomy by a speci c linguistic or cultural group is the result of mutual accommodation between two processes: one that is directed `from above' (like a reform of the state structure or of the administrative system) and another one which is coming `from below' (like a grassroots level communitarian movement).

This mutual ac-

commodation means that regional movements and parties must accommodate and rede ne their goals while the processes themselves are underway (Schrijver 2006). The manner how these processes evolve depends on the measure of decentralisation, on the available instruments of direct democracy (local initiatives and referenda etc.), on the community's identity as well as its internal solidarity.

All in all, it is a lengthy process involving various con icts, but

seeking convergence.

However, another set of questions also arises. Can the failure of autonomy conceptions be attributed to an inherent structural trait of our region? Is it somehow encoded in a speci c part of Central and Eastern Europe or, put differently, does it require a certain level or degree of democratic consolidation?

It is rather di cult to explain why in countries that until the early 1990s were parts of the former Soviet Union previously established territorial autonomies still operate and new ones were also created (Kolstø 2001), and in Western Eu-

9

It should be mentioned that the strategy of the RMDSZ combines these two ideas.

Bakk MiklĂłs, SzĂĄsz AlpĂĄr ZoltĂĄn

30

rope various autonomies contribute signi cantly to democratic consolidation, while in our region

10 , which is more developed and shares more features with

Western European countries as compared to non-Baltic republics of the former Soviet Union, plans for territorial autonomy usually fail.

An unfavourable ratio between the two powers of the state, the despotic and

11 , seems to o er a possible explanation. In the `more

the infrastructural one

Oriental' region of Central and Eastern Europe, where the despotic power of the state is greater, the state itself seems to be based on an agreement between territorial-oligarchical elite groups.

Here autonomy does not need

democratic legitimacy since it is well established and entrenched by this elite consensus. However, in Western Europe, autonomist movements targeted the territorial reorganisation of the state (structure), which in fact allowed them democratic access to a (proportional) share of infrastructural power.

More

importantly, as Western examples show, such arrangements eventually serve(d) the public weal.

Finally, in the `more Occidental' area of Central and Eastern Europe, democracy and democratic legitimacy weakened the despotic power of the state to such an extent that territorial-oligarchic elite groups cannot entirely control the state and restrain public (democratic) will. Nonetheless, this democratic consolidation occurring within the civil societal arena of democracy (cf. Linz Stepan 1996: 7-15) does not mean that the state is able to construct some kind of inter-group democratic legitimacy, embodied perhaps by a contractual power-sharing arrangement among several communities. Regionalisation based on territorial communities characterised by strong regional identities could be, however, a possible path towards instituting such a contractual power-sharing arrangement.

10

Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia (the Russian community in Narva and Sillamäe), Subcarpathia or Subcarpathian Ukraine (the Ruthenian and the Hungarian minorities), Slovakia (the Hungarian minority) and Romania (Hungarians in Transylvania) can be ranged in this category.

11 The despotic power of the state elite refers to the range of non-routinised actions that the elite is authorised to undertake, while the infrastructural power to the state's capacity to penetrate civil society and logistically implement political decisions on the whole territory of the country. (See Mann 1984: 185-201.)

Con ict and Convergence: Regionalisation Plans and Autonomy ...

31

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A

Framework for Interpreting the Hungarian `Status Law' as a New Form of Kin-state Policy in Central and Eastern Europe. In Kántor Zoltán et al. (eds.) The Hungarian Status Law: Nation Building and/or Minority Protection. Sapporo: Hokkaido University, Slavic Research Center.

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[Cosmopolitanism, Nation-States and Minority Nationalism: A Critical Review of Recent Literature.] Kellék. [Accessories.] no. 21, pp. 27-56.

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Acta Universitatis Sapientiae European and Regional Studies, vol. 1, no. 1 (2010) 33 58

Compatibilities and Incompatibilities in the Political Doctrines of Communism and Nationalism TORĂ“ Tibor

Department of European Studies, Sapientia University Cluj-Napoca email: torotibor@sapientia.ro

Some would say communism and nationalism are the most in uential political doctrines and ideologies of the 20th century, changing not only history itself, but the institutional, political, cultural and social framework of the Central and Eastern European states. Many of the scholars, taking in consideration only the early incompatibility of the two, argue that their simultaneous appearance, such as in the case of Romania of the 1970s and 1980s is an interesting anomaly, a particular deviation from the pattern, which needs to be studied separately from the whole. This paper argues that the relationship between communism and nationalism evolved gradually from a palpable incompatibility in the 19th century to a perceptible compatibility at the end of the 20th . Moreover, the concurrent appearance of the two doctrines does not represent a particular case, but it is rather the result of an organic ideological development which was triggered by the problems met by Marxism in deconstructing nationalism.

Abstract.

communism, nationalism, national question, political theory, Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Romania Keywords:

Introduction Some would say communism and nationalism are the most in uential politi-

th century, changing not only history itself,

cal doctrines and ideologies of the 20

but the institutional, political, cultural and social framework of the Central

34

Tor贸 Tibor

and Eastern European states. Beyond this, Marxism the theoretical basis of the socialist doctrine has become one of the leading analytical schools and methodologies in current social sciences and philosophy.

Many scholars, taking in consideration only the early incompatibility of the two, argue that their simultaneous appearance, such as in the case of Romania of the 1970s and 1980s, is an interesting anomaly, a particular deviation from the pattern, which needs to be studied separately from the whole. Even more, several social scientists who study Central and Eastern European nationalisms of the 1990s, explain this revitalization as a result of the communist repression of national feelings, making the disappearance of the regime the main trigger for the observed processes. This paper tries to argue against the above-mentioned hypothesis, showing that the relationship between communism and nationalism evolved gradually from a palpable incompatibility in the

th century to a perceptible compatibility at the end of the 20th . Moreover,

19

the concurrent appearance of the two doctrines does not represent a particular case, but it is rather the result of an organic ideological development, which was triggered by the problems met by Marxism in deconstructing nationalism.

The study has the following structure. In the rst part I brie y introduce the most important works that deal with the studied topic. The second part presents the two doctrines separately, underlining their particularities along three theoretical aspects. The third part analyzes how early Marxist literature tries to incorporate nationalism, by examining the most important works of Marx, Engels, Otto Bauer and the Austro-Marxists, Lenin, Stalin, some texts from and about Brezhnev and the Romanian or Polish communists, showing the possible organic changes occurred in their perceptions of the movement.

The fourth part of the study synthesizes its ndings not losing sight of the main hypothesis.

Communism and nationalism a rather understudied topic Although there are several scienti c works that study the relationship between communism and nationalism, many of them have a strong ideological charge as they were written in the 50s or the 60s, in the middle of the Cold War.

However, in the 80s and after, when the scienti c world overstepped

these di culties, several wider studies appeared. Many of these works study the relationship of the two doctrines from theoretical perspectives, from philosophical point of view, (Szporluk 1988; Nimni 1991) some of them concentrate

Compatibilities and Incompatibilities in the Political Doctrines ...

35

on one country or period (Connor 1985; Verdery 1991; Mevius 2005 and others) and only a few try to develop a comprehensive theory incorporating in their inquiry political theory and history as well (Zwick 1983; Kemp 1999).

As the goals of this paper are similar to the ones formulated by the authors in this last category, in this chapter I will present only these two works, focusing on their main arguments and conclusions.

National Communism,

a book

written by Peter Zwick in 1983, was probably inspired by the puzzle of the events occurred in Poland in 1981, which topped a long line of anti-Soviet activities in communist countries. The author argues that there was no inherent contradiction between national and communist sentiment , nationalism being the one that kept communism alive. Moreover, he believes that the only form of communism capable of surviving is national communism (Zwick 1983: 2).

In order to prove this, he reaches for historical facts, presenting documentation on the nationalization of the Peoples' Parties of the di erent Central and Eastern European States, and examines political theory as well. Zwick argues that even Marx, Lenin or Stalin had nationalist arguments. They believed that the best way to reach communism is through nationalism, thus communism has a di erent path in every state and it is linked to the speci cities of the nation (Zwick 1983: 3-11). An important aw of Zwick's theory was shown by history.

In a few years, most of the communist states vanished, showing

lack of viability of the communist state. Many consider that it left its place to nationalism. Therefore, national communism can be considered as a period of communism, but does not prove to be a general theory of the relationship between the two doctrines.

Another important work that tries to explain the relationship between na-

Nationalism and Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union: A Basic Contradiction, a book written by Walter Kemp

tionalism and communism is

in 1999. The puzzle that the author tries to decipher is how the fall of communism can be explained and what its relationship to nationalism is? Kemp argues that the relationship between the two can be explained as recurrent.

Communism tried to widen its legitimacy by supporting the self-determination movements of di erent nations. After getting popular support, they centralized the state, repressing and neutralizing national movements. The negative approach had as result an increasing pro-national sentiment, which caused the strengthening of nationalism and left communist parties with decreasing support. The lack of legitimacy compels communists to try a new reconciliation with nationalism (Kemp 1999: 83).

One of the main traits of this reconcil-

iation is the separation of the cultural and political aspects of nationalism.

Communism kept cultural nationalism language, literature, cultural recon-

36

Tor贸 Tibor

struction, identity , but oppressed its political characteristics, shaping this latter to its own views (Kemp 1999: 39). This, in Kemp's opinion, was the key of their failure because the two aspects of nationalism cannot be separated, the existence of one side strengthens the other. Beyond this, the need for reconciliation acted as a centrifugal power, distancing them from each other until communism was outfaced by nationalism. As Kemp puts it, the widening gap between the two, which manifested itself in a cyclical pattern of action and reaction (. . . ) pulled the regimes ever farther from legitimacy, breaking them in the end (Kemp 1999: 173).

Communism, nationalism birth, development and particularities In the following chapter I synthesize the main characteristics of the two doctrines by focusing on three important theoretical aspects:

1) historicity

of the two, 2) their relationship with power, and 3) their in uence on the individual social actors.

1. Theoretical aspects of nationalism Most of the scholars who study the phenomenon of nationalism agree that its birth is related exclusively to modernity. However, some authors think that it

1

reaches back to pre-modern social structures and cultural myths . Despite the fact that these critics have their own part of truth, in this paper I focus on the modernist paradigm as the referential time in which nationalism similarly to communism started to incorporate the masses as a direct result of the technical and social changes generated by industrialization.

A central point of national development is its relationship to power. From this point of view, one can distinguish two important strategies which focus on the state and its authority. In the rst case, the representatives of the national project already have state control, which they use to create the nation by uniting the people of the controlled territory. This was an important step from their perspective:

linguistic and cultural homogenization legitimized power,

cultural similarities consolidated the political ties, creating a sentiment of solidarity. Moreover, this cultural and linguistic homogenization was an important

1

More on this conception can be found at the so called ethno-symbolists and perenialists,

who argue that the essence of nations has been formed in the Middle Ages, modernism gave this essence a structural context (see Anthony D. Smith 1999).

Compatibilities and Incompatibilities in the Political Doctrines ...

37

condition for economic and technological development. As Gellner points out, the division of labor and its technical complexity stimulated the standardization of education and the reduction of social distance between di erent layers

2

of the society (Gellner 1998: 25-29).

In the second case, the elites do not control the state, only the means of cultural production and group solidarity.

In other words, the group which

they lead identi es itself as a nation. The political objectives in this case are related to the creation of an own sovereign state.

This can manifest itself

in several strategies: secession, the seizure of power, or uni cation (Breully

3

1993: 9) . Although these strategies are much diversi ed, they have several common points. First, group ascription is not related to territoriality but to collective culture, therefore it has a stronger cohesive force than the territorial case, and second, the creative power of the elites is not focused on nation creation, but on the justi cation of their claims of being state founders. They focus on the invention of such traditions

4 that would legitimize their claims

by connecting the group to the territory. Similar ndings are underlined by Ronald Grigor Suny, who by studying historiography argues that the main ideological tool for inventing traditions was the connection of the group to the territory by particularizing historical narratives from a national perspective.

These narratives not only present the crystallization of national histories, but they legitimize the nation's claims as well (Suny 2001: 337; 345-348).

Even though the two situations can be related to di erent processes or strategies, one important similarity can be observed: the political agenda of nationalism develops in its relationship to state or state-like territorial power without the need of universalization.

A last theoretical aspect which needs to be clari ed is the relationship between nationalism and the individual.

Nationalism changed individual rela-

tions; by its integrated perception of group solidarity it created a strong collective identity, which slowly replaced or overwrote the traditional identities.

Moreover, it changed the old social relations of the Middle Ages the rigid impenetrable social classes , and introduced horizontal social relations and equality between all members of the society (Bakk 2008).

Another aspect of individual relations is the capacity of people to imag-

2

The study on the process of nation-building can be found in the work of Anderson (1991),

Hobsbawm & Rangers (1992) or Weber (1976) as well.

3

Although Breully mentions three cases, one could talk about other national projects

which do not have state-formation as their nal objective. In these particular cases they want to control only a territorial part of a country, such as territorial autonomies or federalisms.

4

More on the invention of tradition see Hobsbawm and Rangers (1992).

38

TorĂł Tibor

ine the boundaries of the nation not only from a spatial but from a cultural perspective as well (see Anderson 1991).

Although this border-construction

can be found mostly in Frederik Barth's anthropological theory on ethnicity (see Barth 1969 and 1994), I will use the similar theory developed by MiklĂłs Bakk, who introduces a new concept in border construction: the concept of dual boundary, which signi es the productive tension between di erent types of national boundary constructions, such as political-administrational or cultural. Although these categories appear in several theories on nationalism, the novelty introduced by Bakk is that he considers the two types present at the same time and in continuous interaction, modelling the future projects and horizon of the nation (Bakk 2008: 166-177). This interaction is shaped by the di erent discourses and political interactions of the society.

2. Theoretical aspects of communism Before analyzing the communist doctrine according to the above-mentioned three theoretical categories, one must clear some probable misunderstandings.

From an analytical point of view, there is a di erence between communism as a doctrine in the classical sense, developed by Marx and Communism as a political system with the ideology constructed to support it. This separation is important on the one hand because this latter one is a practical usage, a development of the former, and on the other, because some parts of the original doctrine were modi ed by the institutional framework constructed on it.

Like nationalism, communism in its modern usage was formed in modernity, in the 17

th -19th centuries, as a response to the massive social changes gener-

5

ated by industrialization . A large mass of people found itself with no political rights, with neither social nor economical instruments.

Social idealism was

born as a reaction to these changes as a huge petition for justice, as a revolt against exploitation, as a hope that progress can be achieved rapidly, for everybody (Z pâr¾an 1994: 345). Marx considered that the only possible remedy is the instauration of communism. In his conception communism would have ful lled human liberation by introducing a society without classes, with no private property whatsoever, [where] the means of production would belong to the community (White eld 2001: 84-85). This liberation can be achieved only through revolution, the revolt of the exploited, who reached the consciousness

5

Although similar socio-political ideas can be found in the Middle Ages Liviu Z pâr¾an

is talking about almost one hundred utopist writings in the 16th-18th centuries (1994, 347) , none of these can be compared with the theoretical bases and complexity of the one developed by Marx.

Compatibilities and Incompatibilities in the Political Doctrines ...

39

of their own power. In Marx's perspective this class consciousness is a natural

6

development of capitalism .

Compared to nationalism, communism uses a di erent concept of power.

While the political agenda of nationalism focused on state power, communism sees state authority as a tool which would help to achieve its universal objectives.

In other words, reaching for power in one state would attract as in

domino theory the other states into the class struggle between bourgeoise and the proletariat. The premises of Marx and Engels' theory at this point are very important. In their perspective, the capitalist economic development has already reached globalization through world market and other similar insti-

7

tutions and the civilized countries are tied to each other (Engels 1847: 19 ).

Therefore, the extension of the revolution would be natural process, leaving the nations to dissolve themselves, just as the various estate and class distinctions must disappear through the abolition of their basis, private property (Engels 1847: 22).

Another example of the relationship between state and communism in the Marxian thought is given by David McLellan in the Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought.

Examining the ideas of Marx in

The Critics of Gotha

Project, one can conclude that the author did not excel in presenting the insides of a working communist society. However, one thing is sure, the need for the political will disappear from its organization (McLellan 2006: 485).

These

ideas appear later, in the Soviet version of communism as well. Trotsky in The

Permanent Revolution

a rms that the proletarian democracy as a result

of the socialist revolution begins on the national arena, it unfolds on the international arena, and is completed on the world arena (Trotsky 1931: 10).

The premise of the communist revolution, therefore, was an extreme polarization of the society between those who controlled the means of production and those who were propertyless and were obligated to sell their labor to the rst category (Engels 1847: 4). The two are in a continuous tension, the organization and activation in other words class consciousness of the working class will lead to the socialist revolution and the instauration of communism.

The communist individual was formed to identify itself against the Other; this resulted in polarized identity structures called by Koselleck asymmetrical

6

This idea appears most strikingly in the Manifesto of the Communist Party, where

he uses a deterministic approach to the development of human history and considers that capitalism will have similar fate to Feudalism, which was abolished by the bourgeoise, who reached for power (Marx and Engels 2008: 6-22).

7

In the case of online sources references are made to the chapter where the original texts

can be found.

40

TorĂł Tibor

counter-concepts (Koselleck 1997:

7-9).

In his conception, the existence of

the Other is not only needed for the self-identi cation, but it is a generalizing term for everybody who is not included in Our group, lled with contradictory and negative meanings.

Thus, the Other is not only an important element

of our identifying and value system, but is vital in this identi cation.

The

idea of the socialist revolution from this perspective becomes ambiguous, on the one hand it forms a Koselleckian identity-pair, but on the other hand it is destroying itself by an auto-induced crisis in its objectives: the abolishment of social classes. Another close related problem is the fact that the practical implication of the classless system dreamed by Marx and his epigons was never explained in totality (Singer 2001: 78). These two aws led to the development of the theory of permanent revolution, which kept the state already led by communist elite in an arti cial state of revolution, where newer and newer enemies would be localized.

This ideology of class struggle shaped individual relations as well, although one must di erentiate the normative and empirical implications of this relationship. From a normative point of view, Liviu Z pâr¾an observes correctly that most of the known socialist utopias have a rigorous organization of power, letting the state use it for the perfection of the new social organization (Z pâr¾an 1994: 348). Likewise, in the Marxian conception, communism would change the ethical bases of society, would abolish private property, and greed, egoism or envy would disappear (Singer 2001: 81).

From an empirical point of view, the two normative postulates have become

th century. The

possible through the technical-scienti c developments of the 20

communist power used these ndings to closely control its subjects, Stalinism the extreme form of communism had chosen a maximal implication, not only degrading interpersonal relationships, but introducing a permanent relativity in the conception of the future.

The communist individual needed to trust

nobody everybody could have been an agent of the secret service, everybody could have become the enemy of the state .

This uncertainty generated a

state of alienation (Thom 1996: 160), an even bigger one than described by Marx in the case of the capitalist system. Moreover, communism wanted to create a new type of man, one without individuality and controlled totally by the system (Boia 1999: 122-123).

* * *

Before analyzing the relationship and interaction of the two doctrines, a conclusion of the ndings is needed. Taking into account the three theoretical

Compatibilities and Incompatibilities in the Political Doctrines ...

41

aspects, one could say that communism and nationalism are incompatible from several perspectives.

First, from the point of view of their relationship to state power. Nationalism has state formation as its objective or the conservation of state power, it is not interested in expanding its in uence over other territories or states until these do not interfere with its political agenda. On the contrary, communism uses state power as an instrument in order to spread its doctrine worldwide. In their conception, the globalization of economy tied states together in such a way that communism from one capitalist state would expand to others in a very short time. Second, considering the relationship between the two doctrines and the individual, one can conclude that both doctrines wanted to reshape mankind.

However, while nationalism had a clear agenda on how to reformulate social con guration creating horizontal social structures, equality and strong group cohesion , early communism did not develop clear strategies, the main focal point of the doctrine remained class consciousness of the proletariat and social revolution with its self-destructive and ambiguous objective.

Last, taking into account the historicity of the two, although both doctrines

th -19th centuries, the mass-support of nation-

were structured mainly in the 18

alism rooted earlier in the states and societies of Europe, leaving communism just a marginal role for a large period of time.

Marxism, communism and the national question This chapter studies the attempts of Marxist authors to incorporate or explain the national question. I analyzed some selected works of Marx and Engels, Otto Bauer and the Austro-Marxists, Lenin and Stalin, Brezhnev and, last but not least, the Romanian and Polish communists, focusing on the compatibility and progression within their writings.

1. Marx and the national question The great scholar of nationalism, Walker Connor in his study on the relationship between communism and nationalism argues that from a philosophical perspective the two are incompatible because their world views are in contradiction. While nationalism imagines the world in vertical segments the nations of the world divided by boundaries , communism with the classes in con ict constructs it from horizontal ones (Connor 1985: 5).

It is clear, however,

th century could not have happened isolated,

that their development in the 19

without re ecting to each other. Examining Marx's work from this perspective,

42

Torรณ Tibor

Connor divides it into three main periods: 1848,

strategic Marxism

classical Marxism

before the year

takes into account the national question, support-

ing the self-determination of some nations which would sustain the communist cause, and

national Marxism

where nations are seen as the principle actors

of history (Connor 1985: 20).

Although in time Marx recognized the importance of nations, it has to be mentioned that he remained anti-national and anti-nationalist. This is stated already in the Manifesto of the Communist party, where he names the national character a bourgeois concept constructed to attract the masses to ght against the hegemony of the aristocracy. However, as a result of the constant extension of the means of production and capital, a new class was born, the modern working class, who live only so long as they nd work, and who nd work only so long as their labor increases capital (Marx and Engels 2005: 8).

Moreover, in Marx's conception, this new class, the proletariat will become conscious of its power and will organize itself politically. In this posture it will need no national framework because it will unite to nd the common oppressor and to achieve universal political supremacy. Only the communists can lead the proletariat because they can see the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality and they represent the interest of the movement as a whole (Marx and Engels 2005: 13). This universalism can be reached at a certain point of capitalism, thus, because not all nations are at the same level of development, they need to be approached with di erent strategies.

Despite these ideas, Marx underestimated the power of nationalism and the nations. In his early period he considered them just byproducts of capitalism, an ephemeral evolutionary stage toward a higher stage of development.

In

the second period he looked at them just as at strategic means of reaching the desired evolutionary stage. He supported some of the national movements, but

8 (Nimni 1991: 17). Thus, he considered

only those of the historical nations

that the national self-determination of bigger and stronger nations would be favorable for the proletariat's goals as well.

In his last period Marx recognized the historical importance of the nation state, but still did not reframe his ideology according to it (Szporluk 1988: 177). He recognized the role of nationalism and its connections to power or its border-constructing capacity, but saw this phenomenon inferior to the ones

8

In Marx and Engel's perception historical nations are those who managed to form or

are close to form their nation-state, while nationalities or non-historical nations are those nationalist movements that did not manage to form their states until a certain period of time. These, in Marx's idea, will never be able to do so (Nimni 1991: 23-27).

Compatibilities and Incompatibilities in the Political Doctrines ...

43

9

generated by communism . As Kemp points out, the problem was that Marx and Engels saw nationalism as something that was not really worth coming to term with (Kemp 1999: 22).

In their opinion, nations and states would

gradually disappear as the proletariat and communism installs in power.

Anderson, however, has a di erent point of view.

He considers that the

problem is not related to the fact that Marx ignored the importance of nationalism, but to the fact that in Marxist theory nationalism has proved an uncomfortable anomaly and has (. . . )

been largely elided, rather than con-

fronted (Anderson in Szporluk 1988: 67).

Marx failed to give a feasible explanation to nations and nationalism despite the fact that he believed that communist doctrine would be a stronger social organizer. However, the proven viability of nationalism and the lack of guideline developed for the practical usage of communism left no choice for Marxist writers but to face the nation.

2. Otto Bauer and the Austro-Marxists One of the most interesting Marxist approaches to the national question was developed by the Austro-Marxists as a resolution of the increasing tensions created by the national movements in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. These

th century, and have become the central problem of the

concretized in the 19

empire as a result of the increasing political activity struggle for national self-determination and political rights of di erent national elites.

Otto Bauer, one of the most important representatives of the Austro-Marxists, considered nationalism similarly to Marx a bourgeois weapon: national culture was produced by modern capitalism for the people as a whole in order to mobilize the masses in combating feudalism (Bauer 2000: 85).

Later, by

stressing the national speci city of the state and by dividing the proletariat into di erent nations, the bourgeoise tried to protect the existing social order (Bauer 2000: 131).

Despite these ideas, there is a novelty in Otto Bauer's work. He recognized the importance and the power of the nation and nationalism, and stated that if social-democrats took out the nationalist wind of the sails of the bourgeoise by resolving the question of national self-determination, there would be no obstacle in front of the proletariat to follow their objectives (Bauer 2000: 249).

9

A rather peculiar fact related to these beliefs is the fact that he never developed a

practical usage for his theory, nor images about the world and society after the revolution, except maybe some general ethical ideas related to the behavior of the social actors (Singer 2001: 78-81).

44

Torรณ Tibor

The exact strategy would be to grant national-cultural autonomy for every nationality, in which each nation, wherever its members resided, would form a body that independently administrated its own a airs (Bauer 2000: 281).

This autonomy concept is closely related to Bauer's own de nition of the nation, which likewise lacks territoriality: the nation is a community of character that has grown (. . . ) out of a community of fate (Bauer 2000: 101). As Nimni interprets it, nation [is] a process, rather than a xed one-dimensional relation of causality (Nimni 1991: 165). Therefore, national development has to be seen as a dynamic process not a static fact , which acts as a great integrating force on the social actors.

The Austro-Marxists recognized the power of nationalism and its dynamics compared to socialism, and, as Kemp puts it, they did not try to destroy the nation as Marx did, they tried to enhance it (Kemp 1999: 35). In other words, they recognized that national aspirations were higher forces than the one generated by class struggle. They thought that the resolution of the di erent problems of national self-determination would clear the way in front of the proletariat, leaving them to focus on the universal problem of the socialist revolution. Moreover, they believed that this would occur faster in a strong state.

Therefore, by defending the unity of the empire, socialism would be

easier to approach (Kemp 1999: 38). Some authors use this argument to point out the national a liations of the Austro-Marxists. This, however, is only half true. One could argue that Bauer and Renner believed that the only way to reach socialism is through the political nationalism of a strong Habsburg state, which needs to be kept together at any price.

3. Lenin and Stalin about the national problem Another interpretation of the national problem is the one given by Lenin and Stalin in the case of the Soviet Union. Being in a di erent situation than Marx or the Austro-Marxists, Lenin found himself leading a strong communist movement which not only challenged but overturned the tsarist leadership in Russia. Two important questions were needed to be solved: the problem of the nationalities, which could decisively help the communists in their cause, and the seizure of power in the state; this last aspect was not taken in consideration

by Marx when writing the Manifesto. When it was written, the worker movements were very weak or non-existent, they could not challenge state power (Kemp 1999: 23).

Therefore, Lenin had to rethink the communist theory by incorporating both of these puzzles in one coherent ideology, what made him if we remain at the

Compatibilities and Incompatibilities in the Political Doctrines ...

45

typology introduced by Walker Connor a strategic Marxist. In Lenin's point of view, self-determination of nations is important because the nation state is the best formation that can foster societies to pass from an early capitalist stage into the period of bourgeois-democratic society and state and fully formed capitalism, which is essential for the cleavage and class struggle between the bourgeois and the proletariat (Lenin 1914:

2).

Thus, the proletariat must

support the national bourgeoise only insofar as they ght the oppressor (Lenin 1914: 4).

Moreover, Lenin believed that a number of small countries could

be easily drowned into an integrating communist movement. Therefore, selfdetermination in his conception is the possible secession of cultural or ethnic groups from a multi-ethnic state, and it needs to be supported in every case.

Small nation-states can be helped to reach the revolutionary stage a lot faster than strong capitalist empires.

This new strategy had an immediate e ect

within the Russian Empire, the Bolsheviks raised their prestige higher than the `white' generals (Kemp 1999: 57).

Following this new logic, Lenin criticized Bauer and his cultural autonomy in several accounts. First he believed that communism needed to be reached by revolution, not by reformation or reconciliation as the Austro-Marxists tried.

In his conception, cultural autonomy was reconciliation with nation-

alism, which is not compatible with the universal objectives of communism, internationalism and the amalgamation of all nations in the higher unity (Lenin 1913: 4).

In other words, he considered Bauer's conception a stabi-

lization of the Empire, which is not compatible with Marxism. Although he criticized Bauer, Lenin saw the functional usages of the nation. His conception of internationalist culture is not non-national the nation with its common language and relation-system is needed to spread this culture, and in every national culture there is a democratic and socialist element , which can be integrated (Lenin 1913: 2).

Similarly, Lenin did not reject autonomy altogether.

The state, although

strongly centralized as regards general economic and political decisions, needs regional autonomy in purely local, regional questions. National-territorial autonomy seemed to be the best solution but only from the point of view of an economic reasoning: unitary national population is (. . . ) one of the most reliable factors for free commercial intercourse (Lenin 1913: 6). In other words, national-territorial autonomies would legitimate the communist movement. By stating the right to self-determination and granting territorial autonomy, he believed that the di erent nationalities could be kept in the empire, and they would not ght for their freedom in the Bolshevik regime (Kemp 1999: 51).

46

Torรณ Tibor

This, however, was not the case. Many of the nationalities opted for independence, giving a hard time to the Soviet Union to reincorporate them.

Although Stalin's conception is similar to the Leninist ideas presented above, there is an important aspect that needs to be underlined.

After stabilizing

the Soviet Union, the communist doctrine needed further adjustments in order to be usable in institutionalized form.

Neither Marx nor Lenin thought

about what a communist state should look like.

Although the idea of self-

determination o ered some insight, it created a long line of problems with the di erent nationalities living within the borders of the Russian Empire. In order to deal with the new dilemma, Stalin pushed communism even further toward nationalism by re-evaluating the question of national self-determination.

As

Nimni correctly observes, the Stalinist conception of self-determination is far less rigid than the Leninist version (Nimni 1991: 93).

The principle would

apply to those nationalities that would prefer to remain in the bond of a multinational state. For these cases Stalin proposes the regional autonomy, similar to the one described by Lenin (Stalin 1913: 7).

Moreover, as Kemp points

out, he parries the exit option of the nationalities by pronouncing the right of the proletariat to consolidate its power, and subordinates the right of selfdetermination to this former one (Kemp 1999:

72-73), not only stabilizing

state power but legitimating the later evolution of the Soviet Union. In other words, Stalin did not abolish the `exit option' of the nations, but introduced a `keep in' option for every national group.

Therefore, Stalin developed the socialism in one country paradigm, which tried to use the social structures created by nationalism to resolve the practical problems occurred when using the pure theoretical conceptions of Marx, who did not formulate any real solution for these cases.

The solution delivered

by the Soviet Union was nationalist in form, socialist in content (Lenin in Connor 1985: 37) and had three basic strategic principles (Connor 1985: 38): 1) support the right of national self-determination of all national groups with wide-ranging territorial autonomy for those who want to remain; 2) after securing power, end the `exit-possibility', begin assimilation with the help of the created territorial autonomies; 3) keep the party centralized and free of all nationalist proclivities .

Although this strategy could be one of a nation-state as well, there is one important aspect which one cannot leave out of consideration: the elites of the Soviet socialist party even those of the regional leadership could not identify themselves through their national identity, but in the prism of their

47

Compatibilities and Incompatibilities in the Political Doctrines ...

political one formed under a communist ideology.

However, as Connor and

10 .

Nimni observed, in reality this was very hard, almost impossible to realize

Some scholars have chosen to analyze how communism stabilized in the di erent countries, and what the communist elite's relationship was to nationalism.

Many of these argue that the socialism in one country policy and the newborn people's democracies kept a portion of national identity, some kind of socialist patriotism which was used by them as legitimizing power.

Each

and every communist party integrated itself in the national history creating an ideological patriotism, which would strengthen their power (Mevius 2005: 2).

However, these patriotic discourses were rather communist than nationalist.

The only analogy between the two is the fact that the communist system used the social and economical organizational structure of nationalism to keep state power. This argument is supported by the observations made by Kemp on the relationship between the di erent people's parties and Moscow (Kemp 1999: 123). In his opinion there is a basic contradiction and paradox in these relations. On the one hand the parties needed some sort of national commitment in order to legitimize their power, on the other hand they needed to keep their good relationship with the Soviet Union. Strengthening one of these policies jeopardized the other, leaving the party leaderships to control the usages of nationalism and their discourse to Moscow as well.

Therefore, the attitudinal change toward nationalism is more evident in the Stalinist and Leninist conception, they recognized and integrated the social and economic organizational power of nationalism, but rejected its cultural and ideological components. In other words, the ideological charge of the system is a universalist one, the national organization is used in order to integrate into the system the ethnic groups as a whole, not directly the individuals. This is an evident departure from the ideas presented by Marx, because in his conception nationalism as a bourgeois structure would disappear altogether, the individuals would be the ones who would connect themselves to the communist system.

10

Nimni shows nationalist rhetoric even in Stalin's position on national-territorial auton-

omy question: he talks about the solving of the national question by bringing the nations and nationalities under one common high culture, in this case the Russian one. One could argue, however, that this culture is a socialist internationalist one.

48

Torรณ Tibor

4. Beyond Leninism and Stalinism de-Stalinization and the Brezhnev-doctrine A further adjustment of communism to the national question and a clear aw of the Leninist-Stalinist theory comes from the period of Khrushchev and Brezhnev.

After the death of Stalin, a new reformulation was needed,

not only of the two doctrines but of communist state-building as well.

The

political struggles within the Soviet nomenclature left Khrushchev, who just rose to power, with two strategic options: 1) to continue the Stalinist legacy by close centralization and control over the other communist countries, or 2) to delimit himself from Stalin and his coercive politics, formulating a new communist doctrine.

One of Khrushchev's rst actions was the normalization of the Soviet-Yugoslav relations.

Tito, when creating the post-World War II Yugoslavia, did

not want to be in uenced by Stalin and his imperialist politics, and found a di erent road slightly changing the doctrine: he did not touch nationalism on regional level, but created a strong federal Yugoslav identity based on social, political, and cultural aspects. This new loyalty was catching mostly for the young people, who already socialized in the Titoist era (Shoup 1968: 263). In other words, Tito introduced a trans-national federal Yugoslav identity, which would have gradually abolished the national ones, in the end forming the national identity of the country . Stalin did not accept Yugoslav communism, leaving the two countries in an almost one decade con ict. Therefore, in order to `bring back Yugoslavia' Khrushchev needed to recognize their ways. In a pact called the Belgrade Declaration, signed in 1955, the Soviet Union accepted the right of each party to follow an independent path , however, within the Marxist-Leninist doctrine (Zwick 1983: 94).

The declaration recognized the

fact that there is not only one road for reaching Communism, each country needs to nd its own ways.

As a direct result of the Belgrade Declaration, many communist parties chose a more nationalistic approach. The Soviet Union interfered only when this reconciliation reached a certain level, as Zwick calls it, when a party failed to develop its own form of socialism (Zwick 1983: 104). This was the case of Hungary and partly Poland in 1956.

When the Soviet leaders have seen the strengthening of nationalism against communism as a probable result of the Belgrade Declaration , they tried to remedy the situation in 1959 with the Moscow Declaration. As Zwick points out, this document laid down the basic principles of communism that all countries should accept (Zwick 1983: 105).

This strategy had only one goal: to

Compatibilities and Incompatibilities in the Political Doctrines ...

49

limit the options of the di erent communist parties in their relationship with nationalism.

Another change came with the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia. Brezh-

11 , stated the following.

nev, in a discourse delivered for reasoning this action

By referring to the Leninist principle of ghting against small-nation narrowmindedness, seclusion and isolation, he introduces several new lines in the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. First and foremost, he restates that [e]ach Communist party is

free to apply

the basic principles of Marxism Leninism and

of socialism in its country, but it cannot depart from these principles (my italics). This is a clear shift from the classical Leninist interpretation of the nation because it allows a certain degree of freedom for the di erent national communist parties. Second, the phrasing itself is di erent from the classical vision, which usually referred to a single movement. In contrast with this discourse, the Brezhnev-doctrine lets the national factions choose their actions within their states as long as they act by Marxist-Leninist principles.

Zwick, in an interpretation delivered on this document, argues that the Brezhnev-doctrine not only limits national communism, but introduces a kind of collective responsibility, which orders all communist states members of the Warsaw Treaty to verify the politics of each other. In other words, the Soviet Union did not interfere in the policies adopted by one single state until it did not try to deviate from socialism.

Therefore, party policy was not an issue

until the country remained socialist in form and it declared and sustained its adherence to the movement (Zwick 1983: 114-115).

This conception is an evident withdrawal in the relationship between communism and nationalism. Brezhnev did not consider nationalism as an instrument of communism in order to achieve its universal objective, he rather acknowledged the fact that the doctrine of communism is not universally applicable, that it has become more an internal matter of every state.

In other words,

there is no universal communist movement, but several communist movements which coalesce in a single bloc and match their foreign policies. This shift is important because it is the rst time when communism or communists really recognized and used the capacity of vertical boundary creation of nationalism.

11 ern

The

whole

History

transcript

Sourcebook,

of under

the the

speech title

can 'The

be

http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1968brezhnev.html. from this text.

found

Brezhnev

online Doctrine'

in on

the the

Modpage

The quotes in this section are

50

TorĂł Tibor

5. Combining communism with nationalism the birth of nationalist-communism This last chapter presents the consequences of the Brezhnev-doctrine in two cases: Romania and the actions of the Romanian Communist Party and Poland and the workers' movement. Although the events in the two countries di er, there is an important similarity: in both cases nationalism manages to dominate the communist doctrine, leaving the two countries communist in form, but national in content.

A large number of scholars who focus on the research of Romania between 1945 and 1990 (Verdery 1991, King 1980, Gilberg 1990) agree that the shift of Romanian communism from the Marxist-Leninist doctrine to a slightly nation-

12 . King

alist one had begun in the year 1964, and became more evident in 1968

argues that this shift has three possible causes: 1) the Romanian Communist Party was looking for public support and legitimization, 2) the nationalist discourse of the Romanian political elites was used as a strategy to break away from the Soviet Union, and 3) strategically seemed appropriate to stimulate economic progress (King 1980: 125).

Katherine Verdery, in a book published on Romanian communism from an anthropological perspective, argues that the Party engaged three strategies of legitimation: remunerative, coercive, and symbolic-ideological (Verdery 1991: 83-87). This latter one the most important from our perspective involves the saturation of consciousness with certain symbols and ideological premises , which serve as foundation for the legitimacy of the system. These symbols and ideological premises, however, can take various shapes from classical Marxist class consciousness, through the importance of personal connections, even to the emphasizing of patriotism and sacri ce for the Nation (Verdery 1991: 86).

In her point of view, these symbolic-ideological strategies have become pronouncedly nationalist after 1968, when di erent aspects of the Nation invaded the public discourse (Verdery 1991: 86).

Beyond this, Verdery presents the basis of this strategy:

the usage of

economic principles such as monopolization or maximization in cultural production. In the rst step, the Party, by controling the educational system, produced more intellectuals than its labormarket could take up. The surplus

12

These dates are contested by Tism neanu and Boia, who argue that nationalism set-

tled in already in 1956, when Nikita Khrushchev declared the rupture of the Soviet Union with its Stalinist past.

As a result of this de-Stalinization , Gheorghiu Dej cleared the

Communist Party from all non-Romanian elements, consolidating its power at the same time (Tism neanu 2002: 31). This period, however, is an earlier one, the period of national communism or social patriotism mentioned by Mevius or Zwick.

Compatibilities and Incompatibilities in the Political Doctrines ...

51

forced the intellectuals to collaborate with the party, as a single chance of survival. Moreover, the limited space pressed them into a cutthroat competition, which assured the consumption of possible `dissident' producers (Verdery 1991: 91-92).

A rst step in the nationalization of the Party was the rede nition of its own past.

CeauÂłescu rehabilitated several purged communists of the end of

the 1940s, who were charged with rightist behavior (Tism neanu 2003: 199), denounced the party's interwar and 1940s politics, which was considered a result of the coercive power of the Comintern and the in uence of foreigners on party strategies (King 1980: 123).

Parallel to these events, the party ideologists were trying to demonstrate the continuity of national history and party history. First, the role of the nation was recognized in achieving progress and civilization in the world , and it was a rmed that only communism can help it to reach to the highest levels, not the bourgeois social order. This new approach not only reconciled communism with nationalism, but surrendered it to this latter one. Second, the role of the Communist Party was rede ned by stressing its national and not its universal role (King 1980: 125). From this perspective, CeauÂłescu's decision to openly confront the Soviet Union in 1968 on the issue of the Czechoslovak intervention was more an internal message than an international one.

The rewriting of the national history continued in order to combine the communist present with a nationalistic past. The reevaluation of the Daco-Roman theory, of the actions of some emblematic gures of Romanian history “tefan cel Mare, Mihai Viteazul, Vlad •epe³ , or the accentuation of some smaller events that could be interpreted as similar to the communist history, such as peasant-uprisings like the one of Horea, Clo³ca and Cri³an (1784), or the Uprising from Bobâlna (1437-1438) were all part of the national contextualization of the Communist Party (Gilberg 1990: 175 or Verdery 1991: 224-240).

The third part of the nationalistic symbolic-ideological strategy was a strong assimilationist policy against national minorities and the di erent regional groups. The declaration of the unitary national state principle and the separation of the concepts of nation and nationality all demonstrate this strategy. In the o cial ideology, the Romanian socialist nation incorporates all inhabitants of the country, while nationality represented ethnicity (Sha r 1985: 164).

In the promotion of this classi cation even some of the minority in-

telligentsia was involved.

In a highly propagandistic book about the Hun-

garians of Romania edited in 1981, one of the ethnic Hungarian party members, SĂĄndor KoppĂĄndi, demonstrates this stategy on the Hungarian minority.

52

TorĂł Tibor

By making the shift from minority to nationality he demonstrates the nationally unitary character of Romania in the following way: [After

presenting the demographic data on the Hungarians from Romania he writes ] The above data show that Romania is a unitary national state, in which along the Romanians the compelling majority live other nationalities as well. Thus, in the case of our country, we cannot talk about a multinational state [own translation ] (Koppandi & LÂŽrincz 1981: 10 ).

However, this `integrating policy' was just a façade. The repression of the minorities continued (and in some cases accentuated) with strong assimilation and forced emigration. cultural level.

This could be best exempli ed on educational and

The state limited minority language education: in the 1970s

restricted the Hungarian higher education in applied sciences and appointed new Hungarian academic stu to the BabeÂł-Bolyai University in a much lower rate. Similarly, in 1973, the new educational law discriminated minority education by setting a minimal number of 25 children for class organization, while Romanian language classes were organized regardless the number of pupils (SchĂśp in 1978: 10-11). Furthermore, the state started the Romanianization of Transylvanian history. This policy had a strong impact on the existing regional identities as well.

The Romanian regional di erences were abolished,

the publication of regional studies was banned and the usage of the original names of the provinces was forbidden as well (Boia 1997: 162).

The repression of the minorities culminated in the second part of the 1980s.

As Gilberg correctly puts it, the economic de ciencies radicalized the national discourse of the Party, pulling it to extreme chauvinism (Gilberg 1990: 179180).

In 1986, the proportion of Hungarian pupils studying in Hungarian

dropped to 23% (from 60% in 1980) and CeauÂłescu, with a `systematization' policy, planned to destroy a large number of villages mostly Hungarian ones in favor of `agro-industrial towns' (SchĂśp in&Poulton 1990: 17-18).

In conclusion, after 1968, the whole party ideology was rewritten, nationalism becoming the main legitimizing force mostly as a result of the boundaryconstructing capacity of nationalism. It corrected the ambiguities of the autodestructive strategy of the communist revolution, leaving the communist elite to embrace nationalism.

Another important example for the nationalization of communism comes from Poland. In 1980, as a result of the economic problems encountered by the state, the Solidarity movement was born, a civil workers' movement, which

Compatibilities and Incompatibilities in the Political Doctrines ...

53

openly protested against the policies of the communist party. However, Solidarity was not simply a social movement, but also a national one. As David Mason cites the movement's program, it is clear that beyond the material bene ts, Solidarity fought for democracy, truth, legality, human dignity and the repair of the republic (Mason 1989: 52), all goals that can be associated with nationalism as well.

The activity of the movement created an awkward situation for the Polish party leaders.

According to the Brezhnev-doctrine the Soviet Union would

not interfere in Polish home a airs as long as they stick to communism and to the Eastern Bloc. However, by ghting for democracy the Solidarity movement would have jeopardized this as well. Therefore, the government interfered only when the movement reached the critical point of possible democratization (Zwick 1983: 126-135). The introduction of martial law weakened the movement, but did not break it.

As history shows, several strikes, underground

activities were organized, which had an increasing nationalist character. Analyzing the underground stamps issued by the Solidarity movement, Kristi Evans argues that most of its iconography was articulated around events concerning Polish resistance and Polish culture, in opposition to the o cial history promoted by the government, which as the images argue was not Polish (Evans 1992: 749-750).

Furthermore, many stamps included the emblem of

the movement, which can clearly be linked with the one of the prewar Polish state. Evans considers that this imagery legitimizes Solidarity as the heir of the sovereign Poland (Evans 1992: 760).

In both cases nationalism managed to dominate the political sphere nearly a decade before the democratization of the country. This, in my opinion, was a direct result of the Brezhnev-doctrine, the last major adjustment made by communists to integrate nationalism.

Conclusions The case studies show that communism and nationalism are not incompatible, they can be present at the same time in one country or can even be reconciled. This is a result of the de ciencies caused by the practical usages of the Marxist theory and of the need of doctrinal renewal imposed by the continuous socio-political development of the Central and Eastern European communist states.

As the study tried to prove, this settlement was an out-

come of a long and organic transformation as di erent Marxist authors Otto Bauer, Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, Khruschev or Brezhnev in di erent phases of

54

TorĂł Tibor

development of the socialist doctrine tried to face the national question. The rst communist theories considered nationalism an ephemeral phase in human history that will be dissolved by the class struggle and communism. Later, it was seen as a tool in the hand of communist leaders, which could help them to achieve their universalistic goals. In the following phase, when the doctrine needed to be implemented on state level, the communists recognized the social organizational and centripetal power of nationalism, and used it to legitimize their own leadership.

However, in order to combine the two they needed to

reevaluate the universalistic approach, nationalizing the movement itself; every communist party had the liberty to create its own Marxist-Leninist principles.

This construction was nationalist in form but socialist in content. In the last phase also this settlement changed. In order to keep the unity of the communist bloc at any price, Brezhnev readjusted the doctrine, allowing it to become communist in form but nationalist in essence.

In my opinion, this linear shift from an evident incompatibility through an ideological compatibility to the domination of nationalism is rooted on the one hand in the incapacity of Marxism to explain the national phenomenon neither Marx nor his followers could set up a working analytical framework , and on the other hand in the di erent renewal capacity of the two doctrines. While communism is a rigid dogmatic construction, nationalism, with its horizontal social organization and dynamic development is capable of endless renewal. In other words, communism surrendered rst the organizational power to nationalism and then the ideological control as well, dissolving completely in the end.

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Acta Universitatis Sapientiae European and Regional Studies, vol. 1, no. 1 (2010) 59 82

Internal Diaspora Assimilation Formation of the Internal Diaspora

BODĂ“ Barna

Department of European Studies Sapientia University Cluj-Napoca email:

Abstract.

bodobarna@kv.sapientia.ro

The expression `internal diaspora' is a current term of our

days for Hungarian minorities living in Central-Eastern Europe. There is no exact de nition for the term. The de nitions there exist contain a series of exible (i.e., imprecise) elements. It is easy also because common people have experiences related to the internal diaspora and also interpretations of it.

Some are not rst hand experiences, but literary

ones, e.g., reports on the linguistic extremities (the Csangos, for example). Usually the term is associated with a certain situation characterized by several disadvantages, and it is used with comments on social equity and morality in an associative or demanding tone, but always with an intention for improvement . The present study is an attempt to compare assimilation in diasporas and internal diasporas and to describe the social psychology of the formation of internal diasporas.

Keywords: diaspora, internal diaspora, identity, assimilation, assimila-

tional situation, melting pot

1 is a highly fashionable term of our days.

The expression `internal diaspora'

We use and abuse it. And it is easy to do so since there is no exact de nition for the term. The de nitions there exist contain a series of exible (i.e., imprecise) elements. It is easy also because common people have experiences related to the internal diaspora and also interpretations of it. Some are not rst hand experiences, but literary ones, e.g., reports on the linguistic extremities (the Csangos, for example). Usually the term is associated with a certain situation

1

The terms `local diaspora` and `ethnic diaspora' are used by some researchers to describe

the same phenomenon. We opt for the variant `internal diaspora`.

60

Bodรณ Barna

characterized by several disadvantages, and it is used with comments on social equity and morality in an associative or demanding tone, but always with an intention for improvement .

And yet, there is no scienti c standpoint even regarding the basic terms related to this phenomenon; specialized scienti c texts hardly use it. Diaspora is di erent that is a point of interest with sociologists, politologists, anthropologists and psychologists at the same time. But the diaspora, the existence and essence of integrated, migrating ethnic groups formed as a consequence of the movement of people from a nation or group away from their own country, is something di erent. Internal diaspora (`szรณrvรกny' as Hungarians call it) is (was) formed as a consequence of historical processes (new circumstances caused by cataclysms, borders that have been moved).

In the case of the

members of internal diasporas events that caused their minority status just happen(ed), while being member of a diaspora is a matter of personal choice even in cases when there was a political pressure that caused it. Internal diaspora is the phenomenon of living in the same place despite of a changed political and ethnical medium. Internal diaspora means undertaking continuity. The question is: for how long? For how long can people undertake to live in an internal diaspora? How long will (can) an internal diaspora hold on? On what terms can an internal diaspora continue, be kept alive?

Those who think this is an unimportant issue on the table of national politics, being a matter that regards only (small) communities living at the linguistic extremities, are utterly mistaken. Internal diasporas made up of members of a nation are the boundaries of that nation.

And since the phenomenon of

internal diaspora is a non-static one and the formation of internal diasporas is a process, the conclusions are quite obvious: the linguistic and national borders are constantly moving along with the movement of the internal diasporas belonging to that nation. The question arises: is there any nation without internal diasporas? It is a question that ought to be asked despite the fact that no other European nation except Hungarians has a term for that phenomenon.

For one hundred years now, since American writer Israel Zangwill formulated (in 1908) the concept and metaphor of the melting pot, the diaspora has been a leading topic of social sciences. It took half a century to become obvious that no matter how good natured the discourse on that concept was it was still a social dead end. Ever since, assimilation is an important topic not only of social psychology, but also of political philosophy. The topic has several points of interest: what kind of changes do worldwide migrations induce within the host society, how long can newly comes identify themselves as foreigners what

Internal Diaspora Assimilation Formation of the Internal Diaspora

61

kind of relational strategies and social systems result from the state of being an outsider within ?

If some of the European nations mainly the Germans did not nd it necessary to present a speci c life situation and a political issue to public discourse and to the sciences by dealing with the term of internal diaspora, that does not mean the topic should be a menial one for Hungarian social scientists as well. Still, this is the case. For contemporary discourse on the topic of internal diasporas can be called everything moral, social, political but scienti c.

Although Milton Gordon's classical theory on assimilation was followed by a series of new and highly regarded theories, there is no general theory of the formation of internal diasporas i.e., of the assimilation in internal diasporas until this very day.

Therefore the present study is an attempt to compare assimilation in diasporas and internal diasporas and to describe the social psychology of the formation of internal diasporas.

Diaspora and internal diaspora Rogers Brubaker, an American sociologist familiar also with the situation of the internal diasporas in the countries neighbouring Hungary, has recently written an important roundup article on diasporas (Brubaker 2005). The article shows that even the greatest minds of nationalism theory, social psychology and anthropology (A. Cohen, J. Cli ord, B. Anderson, G. Baumann, W. Connor, St. Hall) tackled this subject, which thus gains a more and more complex meaning and interpretation. That is not surprising at all given the fact that we live in a world of increasing migration, where it is important to nd out whether the state of diaspora will come to an end, whether there is such a thing as perfect integration.

It is more and more di cult to answer the basic question due to the fact that the concept gains ever new meanings.

Referring back to the literature

of the eld, Brubaker mentions besides the classical ethnic diasporas also the Yankee, white and liberal diasporas. The author quotes a relatively new analysis, according to the ndings of which the concept of diaspora has 45 di erent meanings in the discourse of the various humanities and social sciences. The interpretations of the term have come up with diasporic consciousness, diasporic identity, diasporic nationalism, diasporic networks, diasporic culture, diasporic

Bodรณ Barna

62

2

religion and so on . This is hardly surprising if we take into consideration what the movements and networks of our globalized world are. And this kind of examples will take us directly to the question: if every kind of di erence constitutes a diaspora, what is diaspora in fact? Seeing the various situations that correlate with this term, one could expect also what Brubaker is warning against, i.e., although the example of the Jewish people is basic to analyzing the term of diaspora, this model is quite limited and un t for the interpretation of a series of new situations.

Since the 1960s a prestigious international professional journal has been dedicated to the topic:

Diaspora a Journal of Transnational Studies.

It

would be well worth reviewing some of the articles presented here as a proof of the variety of the contemporary literature on diaspora. But I will refrain from that for now and I will only mention a comment regarding the existence of the journal: the mobilization potential of the diasporas is growing into a timely topic of today's politics. Social movements of the present day show that migrants nd it more important to represent and maintain the elements that di erentiate them from the host society than to be accepted and to integrate into the host society as fully as possible. B. Anderson opines even that in many cases diaspora can be interpreted as long term nationalism (Anderson 1998) which, once accepted, will take us into a new dimension.

In his article Brubaker asks: how can we de ne diaspora, what are its

ing elements ?

de n-

He names three of them: territorial dispersion, an orientation

towards the native country and preservation of boundaries. I will not discuss territorial dispersion that is quite obvious. As for the orientation to the native country, it can imply the actual, physically existing country or an imaginary and idealized entity. The goal is to cherish and protect the collective memory of the native country, regardless of whether this also means a living cultural relationship or not.

The third element shows that members of the diaspora

wish to preserve and maintain their original identity, which is di erent from that of the host society, they wish to resist assimilation by the host society.

Most assumptions and dilemmas regard the modalities in which the various communities interpret the limits that protect their separate identity and the

2

Here is a quotation enumerating the concepts: There is the adjective `diasporist', des-

ignating a stance or position in a eld of debate or struggle. And there are the adjectives `diasporic' and `diasporan', which designate an attribute or modality as in diasporic citizenship, diasporic consciousness, diasporic identity, diasporic imagination, diasporic nationalism, diasporic networks, diasporic culture, diasporic religion, or even the diasporic self (to enumerate only some of the most common conceptual pairings found in recent academic articles).

Internal Diaspora Assimilation Formation of the Internal Diaspora

63

elements these limits are made up of. And yet we have to ask also what the features that turn these walls into porous, permeable entities are? How long can this state last? What will be the result of such an attitude considering the world-wide migration processes going on today?

Due to the discourse on the topic of diaspora, the term gained multiple meanings. Theoretical writings use the concept with various meanings in various contexts. It can refer to an actual community, in an abstract sense to a state of being, it can also name a process (diasporization, dediasporization) and a specialization (diasporology diaspora research).

Brubaker refers in his article also to the situation of the Hungarians, bringing it as an example, a particular case when diaspora was created not by the migration of the (members of the) community, but by the rede nition of the

3

borders . This takes us to what I have mentioned before: although Brubaker was a professor at the Central European University in Budapest and thus had the chance to gain a personal experience on the di erence in meaning between diaspora and internal diaspora, he does not consider it important to mention in the English context he communicates in that the two situations di er in more than their initial cause and that there are further di erences between the two life situations, which also de ne the di erent characteristics of the situations.

I will continue now by reviewing the interpretations of the Hungarian authors regarding the concept of internal diaspora.

Naturally, these authors do not

compare diaspora and internal diaspora, for them the di erence is so obvious that they do not even make any references to the diaspora. Let us see some of the classical de nitions.

The rst one who ought to be quoted on this

subject is Ă–dĂśn Nagy. Internal diaspora is the smaller or larger community or settlement of our brothers and sisters belonging to the same nation which came into being in the midst of people belonging to other nations or outside the centers of the compact Hungarian communities living in Romania, or which was preserved in territories that in some historical time used to be Hungarian territories. One of the de ning elements in the meaning of internal diaspora is the idea of dispersion both territorially and at the level of community life

communities de ned as internal diasporas do not function as organic parts of the Hungarian community because of their reduced number and lack of organization . (Nagy 1938)

and another, stronger de ning element is that

3

Diasporas have been seen to result from the migration of borders over people, and not

simply from that of people over borders.

Hungarians, Russians and other ethno-national

communities separated by a political frontier from their putative national homelands have been conceptualized as diasporas in this manner.

64

Bodรณ Barna

Of course, ร dรถn Nagy analyzes the issue as a Transylvanian, and even if he does not explain it, it is quite obvious that he considers the state of internal diaspora a particular case of minority life. He assumes there is a compact mass of Hungarians (he uses a di erent expression) and regards internal diaspora as an opposite of that, something that di ers from the compact mass.

An

important element in his de nition is the reference to the lack of organization, which is probably meant to refer to the institutional background, or rather to the lack of such a background. He then continues to de ne internal diaspora in detail and goes on as follows: Members of internal diasporas do not position themselves according to the focus of the main ethnic group, as iron powder nding the magnetic eld lines, but function outside of the main lines of the main ethnic group and thus take no part in the nation-building process of this latter. They are nothing but a virtual number, a disorganized mass within the body of the ethnic community, which constitutes a burden to the nation; they do not have any consequent relationship with the body of the nation and its culture, and they can be regarded as a channel letting thousands of members of the ethnic group leak out from the body of the nation into the powerful stream of another nation every year.

My own de nition of the internal diaspora is: The essence of the internal diaspora can be rendered properly by a

politological

interpretation, i.e., that

the internal diaspora is a state of daily decisions (Bodรณ 2005). This situation is present also when the member of an internal diaspora does not think of it, does not care for it, since it functions in each of their conscious and involuntary decisions from the language they use to the life partner they choose, from the friends they make to the workplaces they select. The background and context of each decision is the fact that members of internal diasporas cannot live as completely free social beings for they do not bene t from the natural feeling of being among those of their own kind, for they are being surrounded by members of another ethnic group living there in a compact mass they are under constant pressure. And that is the reason why the internal diaspora becomes a medium which favours assimilation. And also this is the context where the process of formation of local communities ending in taking up the language of the majority as main language, in leaving behind their own culture or even in ethnic adaptation becomes important. One cannot eliminate this constant urge for alignment from the lives of people. And these are circumstances which ought to be taken into consideration also by researchers of the eld and internal diaspora attendants. (Bodรณ 2007) So if we want to make progresses in describing internal diasporas, we need to study assimilation. How can assimilation processes of internal diasporas be

Internal Diaspora Assimilation Formation of the Internal Diaspora

65

described (or formation of internal diasporas, if we want to use a more friendly term), do they have any particular features and if so, what are these?

Assimilation Cambridge Dictionary gives three synonyms for the term to assimilate : to take in; to t into and to become similar. These three terms are a clear sign The

that in the English world-view there is no di erence between the active and passive nuances of the process of assimilation. The English term contains also the Latin and German approaches. Or, to put it more precisely, English applied the conclusions of German philosophical tradition to the descriptive meaning of the Latin term.

But despite of all appearances the situation is far from

being so unambiguous, there is a great deal of confusion in what assimilation means, which shows also in the usage of the term in modern social sciences.

Assimilation is a contradictory term: we think we know what assimilation means and yet its theoretical frame changes over time. There are an increasing number of signs that the classic interpretation of the term is in need of a revision. A general interpretation of assimilation would usually be that it is an ability of an ethnic majority to take in and to form into its own image another community of di erent culture (and language) living in the same area and having a minority status. There are also cases when the minority forms the majority into its own image as it happened in some of the formerly Saxon Transylvanian villages when the Gipsies constituting the majority took over many of the features of the traditional Saxon culture of the minority, (Biczรณ 2004: 19) but these are usually the exception.

According to the

Oxford Dictionary of Sociology

(Marshall 1998) assimi-

lation can be conventionally interpreted as a subordinate community taking over the values of the dominant community and thus integrating into the latter. More recent interpretations (Yinger 1994; Alba and Lee 1997) state that integration does not necessarily mean disappearance of the ethnic di erences and boundaries, but besides taking over the general values of the host culture the minority community can maintain its particular, di erentiating values.

Assimilation is a particular process of socialization and individualization, a type of identi cation when the individual does not interiorize (build into his own personality) simply an attitude, a value, a behavioral culture etc., but also the emotional, intellectual, volitional, cultural, political etc. values of another nation. This means he parallelly draws away from his former national identity, which is already built into his personality and constituted his former

Bodรณ Barna

66

self (Gordon 1964, Horowitz 1975).

He draws away, not breaks up with ev-

erything speci c to his former national identity. Human personality is not a board which can be simply wiped clean of all the signs and formulas formerly written onto it so that these could be replaced with new interests, evaluations and values speci c to the conscience, emotional and voluntary patterns of another nation. Despite of this fact we need to speak of the highly controversial term of assimilation of the national features so di cult to describe in scienti c terms, but still unquestionably present. The parallel process of dissimilation, i.e., taking o the former national identity and assimilation, i.e., taking over the new values is a great intellectual, voluntary and emotional performance, some even call it a second birth.

One of the classic gures of assimilation research, Milton Gordon expresses that this process can be described with three terms with very similar meaning:

assimilation, acculturation and incorporation.

All three describe the process

when persons with various cultural backgrounds come into contact and during this contact form a context for a common cultural life (Gordon 1964). Sociologists prefer to call the process assimilation, while anthropologists rather use the term acculturation.

Assimilation as a state and consequence takes place in the case when a member/members of a foreign or minority culture take over the language, customs and values of the host culture. In this context

similation

acculturation

means

cultural as-

and de nes the opportunities gained by the assimilated person as a

consequence of the assimilation as social (structural) integration. Describing acculturation as a solely cultural process can lead to misinterpretations since such a description would suggest that cultural integration can take place also as a process independent of the social network.

Assimilation

integrates,

it contains all the social and cultural changes char-

acterized by accommodation, adaptation to and acceptance of the dominant culture. Acculturation is both a social and cultural event for the concept of culture implies the society which legitimizes it and confers it its meaning. Sociocultural changes de ned by the terms assimilation and acculturation have an independent relationship. If we want to interpret them we could say acculturation is a special aspect of assimilation.

Recently, Brubaker has written a study on the problem of assimilation. According to this, the primary meaning of assimilation viewed from a general and abstract perspective is increasing resemblance and correspondence. Not sameness, but resemblance. To assimilate (as an intransitive verb) means to

become

alike, which leaves us with assimilation as a process of becoming alike, forming to be alike and treating alike.

From an organic point of view, to assimilate

Internal Diaspora Assimilation Formation of the Internal Diaspora

67

means to turn something into an entity having the same pattern as the agent's own nature, [. . . ] to incorporate into a system, to integrate (Oxford

Dictionary ).

English

In this respect assimilation means complete incorporation.

In

the case of the general and abstract meaning the process was more important than the result and that allowed degrees of assimilation. Assimilation in that respect meant

of similarity.

a direction for the change taking place

and not a certain

degree

The forming to be alike meaning of the verb to assimilate

refers to the state policy and programs of forced assimilation, to political goals

4

and programs which set as a target to assimilate people against their own will .

For a long time now one of the key concepts of public speech and current politics is di erentialism, the need for di erences as opposed to universalism.

This aspect, which marks the beginning of an era, was formulated by two well-known researchers of ethnicity, Nathan Glazer and Patrick Moynihan. In 1963 they put on paper a sentence that was going to become a classic in the eld: The main characteristic of a melting pot is its non-existence. (GlazerMoynihan 1963) Immigrants of the 1970s, 1980s and of the beginning of the 1990s were faced with a new, liberal policy which admitted cultural di erences (the policy of di erentiation).

Today pluralism has become a conventional

concept. The situation turned so much in favour of di erentialism that Glazer thought it was time to ask: Is Assimilation Dead? (Glazer 1993) But it seems that the liberal policy of di erentialism, which was too keen on emphasizing di erences, according to some, became outworn by the end of the 1990s and the demand for assimilation was in favour again. In Brubaker's opinion the cause for such a return was that the political attitude concentrating on pluralism became so strong that it threatened the existence of the host society, taking it to the edge of total disintegration. That is the reason for his statement that

5

today we are witnessing the return of assimilation .

In a broad sense (becoming alike, imitation, acceptance, realization: quasiassimilation (BiczĂł 2004)) assimilation and the history of its e ects show the high complexity of the matter, due to which the problem of assimilation is not only a phenomenological question, but concerns also hermeneutics and the ethics of values and ought to be analyzed from those perspectives as well.

However, I will refrain from that.

In conclusion, we could say that for the individual or the group living in a foreign culture

4

ve strategies are possible, all of which will result in an identity

See: Brubaker, Rogers: The return of assimilation? Changing perspectives on immigra-

tion and its sequels in France, Germany and the United States.

Ethnic and Racial Studies, Regio 2002 no.1)

24. vol. 2001. July. (Hungarian translation: Az asszimilĂĄciĂł visszatĂŠrĂŠse? In

5

See: Brubaker, op.cit.

BodĂł Barna

68 of di erent components.

In the case of

assimilation

the individual or the

group will lose his original cultural features and will identify himself only by the features of the majority. In case of

double bonds

the individual or group

will keep his original culture and will take over the culture of the host society as well, having in his identity elements from both the majority and the minority culture, one completing the other. As opposing assimilation the

strategy

dissociative

can appear as well, in which case the individual or group will mainly

de ne himself by the features of the minority culture.

marginal strategy

The essence of the

is that the individual or group does not de ne himself either

by the majority or the minority features, instead he will select a category of di erent type (i.e., his profession) to de ne himself. These four strategies can in fact be de ned as positive identities for they are based on the de nition of what one is. The fth strategy can be de ned also as a negative identity, in this case the individual is unable to identify himself with any dimension and goes through a long-lasting

identity crisis

(ErÂŽs 1998). The background for

such instances is usually that the elements composing an individual's identity are not compatible and result in cognitive dissonance. If the dissonance can be solved, the individual will choose one of the positive strategies mentioned above. If not, the result is a long-lasting disharmony.

The assimilational situation in general and in the internal diasporas Before analyzing the assimilational situation I want to re ect to a generally valid issue. In the former subchapter I have mentioned Brubaker's much quoted article which talks about the return, i.e., the approval of assimilation.

The reason for that is a fear in the host societies that plurality would lead to segmentation. And in this line takes there place also the rehabilitation of the concept of assimilation as we can well observe, its rst component being that assimilation is raised to the status of an operation, it is its instrumentality that is emphasized. This is an attempt to counterweight the former concept of assimilation referring to those who see assimilation as an ideology. However, it is important to note that instrumentality presupposes a goal: actions lead by certain interests. Assimilation is an instrument of the majority society in its attempt to achieve its (secret) goal (hardly ever mentioned in the social discourse): i.e., stability. The minority society has a di erent view on this. In the case of the minority the goal i.e., assimilational integration conferring stability is related to the evaluation of a situation, i.e., in what circumstances do

Internal Diaspora Assimilation Formation of the Internal Diaspora

69

courses of mobilization become accessible. Assimilation in the internal diasporas is therefore a reaction, an answer to a certain political and social situation implying both majority and minority components and both an individual and a group level. The fact that opportunities of social success are preconditioned by belonging to a certain group of people (identity) for accepting assimilation means just that opposes the ideals of both freedom and equality. Thus, rehabilitation of assimilation contrasts the basic values of our era.

According to Husserl, the relationship between the self and its environment can be described by the term lifeworld (Husserl 1984).

Self-de nition and

personal decisions of the self are conditioned in this lifeworld. The lifeworld has various levels cultural, ethnic, religious and linguistic dimensions, in other words , all of which can become the subject of the (sub)process of assimilation. The assimilant does not intend to take over another culture, but he simply acknowledges that in certain social situations taking over that other culture gives access to new courses in society.

The assimilant has an a rmative response to the situation for the response is formed under the in uence of a certain community and political program, even if the existence and the characteristics of this program are partly hidden by sociocultural and political factors.

Assimilation just as the lifeworld

is an intersubjective issue, the process is triggered in both cases by environmental changes. The individual reacts to the contradiction between the initial features of his lifeworld regarded as natural and the usually obscure and unclari ed perspectives of the future, de ning his future actions by giving a series of iterative answers. Although his decision is made individually, it is not independent of the community. The basis for the community features of individual responses is that people realize that the same situation is applicable to others as well (Heller 1997). The points of reference here are the I ( us ) and you ( you - pl.), still the opposition is not between the assimilator and the assimilant, but the lifeworld de ning the initial identity of the assimilant and the interpretation of the new (changed) situation in terms of the individual.

A de ning element of the assimilational situation is the foreigner who arrived yesterday and will stay for long as Simmel's classic de nition puts it (Simmel 1908). However, the question arises: Who is the foreigner in the case of internal diasporas? But this is not the place to discuss this aspect.

Classical tracts view assimilation as a negative phenomenon, as a process during which an initial value is lost.

This is so only if the outcome of the

process can be described as: A + B + C = A, i.e., if the dominant group (A) integrates minorities so that they leave behind their own values and behavioral

Bodรณ Barna

70

6

patterns and take over those of the majority (Schae er 1989) . Specialized literature de nes two methods of assimilation: forced assimilation and voluntary

7

assimilation . I am inclined to argue with that.

There is a question that cannot be avoided: can taking over of values be voluntary? What does it mean by their own free will in sentences like minority groups take over values of the majority by their own free will? I cannot regard this as a voluntary action.

Voluntarity implies an unrestricted decision.

I

would call it voluntarity that I become part of a peer group as a teenager or that I choose something to spend my spare time on all variants are equivalent, so the choice made by the individual shows a preference. I cannot apply this situation to assimilation. For example, when a youth living in the countryside has to enroll in the local school, which teaches members of the majority in the language of the majority, because his family does not have enough money to have him enrolled in the minority school in the town or at a considerable distance from his home, this is a decision made

structures

under the pressure of social

and it initiates a process. This is also a kind of constraint, a kind of

forced assimilation for the decision is not voluntary but forced in this direction by circumstances. In the program the individual sets for his life there is no such step as interim reprogramming of identity elements and if this still happens, it means there is a circumstance that triggered it.

In the case of an internal diaspora there are no voluntary decisions regarding the course of one's life for structures of the local society, the institutional frame of the minority and the less wide opportunities, which never reach the level of the opportunities o ered by the majority society, will always limit the

8

possibilities for decisions .

In general we can speak of Boas' cultural relativism, we can accept that no culture has an absolute set of criteria that could be the basis for qualifying the actions of another culture as bene cial or harmful .

The members of

every culture can judge their actions by the system of values of their own

6

Research on assimilation de nes four basic types according to viewpoints like whether the

assimilator or the assimilant community has the numerical majority, or who is the assimilator, the local community or the foreign one. In the case of the internal diaspora only the type discussed in the paper is valid. Even if it is more numerous, internal diaspora can only be an isolated community, and viewed from a higher level, that of microregion, this isolation no longer constitutes an opprotunity for social success.

7

See G. Coltescu (ed.)

Szรณtรกr plurรกlis tรกrsadalmaknak (The Dictionary for Pluralistic

Societies), headword: assimilation, http://tarstudszotar. adatbank.transindex.ro/?szo=106, downloaded on 7 February 2009.

8

The restricted circle of opportunities for the minority is not a politically planned state

of facts it simply derives from the situation.

Internal Diaspora Assimilation Formation of the Internal Diaspora

71

culture for members of each culture are both agents and observants in that culture. At the same time equivalence of cultures at a theoretical level does not automatically lead to a social equivalence between a dominant and subordinate culture. Compared to the minority, the majority has very di erent possibilities to live according to its own culture and preserve the values of its culture, to have a heritage. Assimilation is mainly the matter of this lack of balance and sometimes this is not a political matter, but an issue related rather to the institutional structure of a given society.

The subjectivity and free will of the individual is a basic feature and a precondition for assimilation to take place. is present on the problem horizon.

For the individual the other

In the course of communication various

elements t together, various elements are in contact and thus overlap occurs.

It cannot be in any di erent way for willingness to cooperate is a precondition for having a social life.

Di erences have to be acknowledged and accepted.

The ideal of society as sociocultural community lies within the di erences (Dilthey 1974). Viewed as such, society can be understood as the intentional community of individuals who cooperate led by the experience of having in common some of their goals, plans and opportunities. Free will refers to the theoretical possibility of accepting di erences and yet individual decisions are not made by free will .

It is never incidental whose goals are the same

and whose di er. This is always rooted in some action of the self-appreciation conditioning applied to the other .

Assimilation theories The rst theoretical approaches to assimilation corresponded to the theoretical frame shaped by the metaphor of the melting pot, created by the internationalist Israel Zangwill (in his drama of 1908), and the ideology based on it.

One of the rst theoreticians of the eld was Robert E. Park, who gave up journalism to become a sociologist. He created his marginal man theory in order to interpret the situation of people living at the border of two cultures. The theory studies the innovative patterns the foreigner who has just become part of a community uses to solve his con icts with the host community (Stichweh 1993). The

assimilation model

created by him was for a long time a paradigm

in the study of immigrant adaptation. Park stated that contact between people of various cultures leads to adaptation through competition and con ict, and results in assimilation. Assimilation means losing the former ethnic and cultural identity and thus fully integrating into the host society. This approach

BodĂł Barna

72

acculturation

states that assimilation supposes also a so-called process of

in

the course of which the immigrants change culture, i.e., they integrate into the host culture, and that is the price of adaptation. Park viewed assimilation as a linear process and considered it an inevitable consequence of the immigration of groups of various ethnic background although in di erent cases it would happen in di erent rhythms and with di erent di culty (Park 1928).

Park's theory of marginality was further developed by Robert K. Merton, who published in 1938 a hypothesis studying what happens when cultural con ict of groups and individuals becomes permanent due to the fact that the dominant culture refuses to integrate certain groups or persons. According to Merton's ndings, frozen marginality is rooted in the discrepancy between cultural o ers and the structural impossibility of accomplishing these, which results in anomia and deviance (Merton 1980).

While Merton draws the attention upon dangers, for the leading members of the famous Chicago school the successful adaptation of immigrant groups to the host society is a basic issue. I quoted the statement of A. W. Lloyd Warner and Leo Srole because in this context successful can be applied both to the individual/the group and the American society. This bipolarity based on an ideology is very interesting and it made a theory out of the opinion of those who stated that the future of American ethnic groups is limited since immigrants

9

are integrated by the Anglo-Saxon Protestant cultural ethos .

We need to

observe the complexity of this model for the idea and view of Americanization does not propose merely integration into the host society, but it is an option

10 . In American

for a social model which proved successful all over the world

textbooks the American lifestyle is presented as the right to life, freedom and the pursuit of happiness

11 .

Milton M. Gordon has written his classic book,

Life

(1964), under the in uence of this view.

Assimilation in American

According to Gordon, both

individual and group assimilation has certain phases and these are as follows: - acculturation - structural assimilation - marital assimilation

9

See: Warner, W. Lloyd & Srole, Leo (1945):

Groups, Yale University Press.

10

The Social Systems of American Ethnic

In our days the interpretation of the phenomenon of Americanization underwent serious

changes in the context and under the in uence of globalization studies.

11

See: TĂłth TamĂĄs (1996): VulgĂĄrmodernizmus ĂŠs posztmodernizmus vĂŠgletei kĂśzĂśtt (Be-

tween Two Extremes: Vulgar Modernism and Post-modernism), In:

LukĂĄcs ĂŠs a modernitĂĄs,

edited by SzabĂł Tibor, Szeged: A Szegedi LukĂĄcs KĂśr KiadĂĄsa, pp. 27-62.

Internal Diaspora Assimilation Formation of the Internal Diaspora

73

- identi cation assimilation - attitude reception assimilation - behavior reception assimilation - civic assimilation.

The Gordon model is one of the most frequently quoted assimilation models up to this day. It is a basis for comparison for nearly every later theoretical approach.

The question arises whether this is a valid statement in view of

the fact that the basic idea of this model has been controversial from the very beginning. I have mentioned earlier that Glazer and Moynihan questioned the validity of the melting pot theory already in 1963, one year before Gordon presented his theory, while three decades later Glazer was the one who wrote about assimilation that it was dead.

The key concept of the Gordon theory is acculturation.

Several scientists

attempted to de ne acculturation. I consider Kim's interpretation to be one of the most important de nitions for he broadens the concept allowing social elements to become part of the process beside the cultural ones, an innovation that changes the division to stages of the process.

According to Kim, the

process of acculturation begins with the identi cation of the de ning symbols of the host society. Then the immigrant familiarizes with these and projects them upon the values of his initial culture during the process of reception.

So the process of acculturation is based on communication and it implies a continuous contact and interaction between the immigrant and his social and cultural environment (Kim 1985: 378).

At the end of the 1980s Gibson suggests using

integration

instead of assim-

ilation (Gibson 1988) since, according to him, in the course of the majorityminority relationship accommodation settles in after the stages of contact and competition, and the process never reaches the phase of assimilation. This implies an

additive bicultural strategy

in the course of which the minority group

participates to the (political) life of the majority society by also maintaining the values, the linguistic, religious and cultural traditions of his own group.

Hutnik (1991) deals with assimilation viewing it within the relationship of the majority and minority. He introduces the concept of

dissociative strategy

as

a counterpoint to Gibson's term. Dissociative strategy means that the minority fully maintains its own culture totally disregarding the majority culture. In the process of acculturation the identity of the individual is made up equally of elements speci c to the minority and majority culture. If neither cultural element dominates and the individual describes himself using none of these dimensions, we call it marginal strategy.

BodĂł Barna

74

Gordon's one-dimensional model is more and more criticized for there is an increasing number of researchers who warn that an individual can become part of several cultures parallelly. Others criticize the concept of assimilation because it indirectly implies that the assimilant had a problem with the culture he was born into.

The latest researches show that individuals are capable

of joining in the cultural life of the dominant society and maintaining their own values at the same time and yet do not become marginalized (Berry, 1992; LaFromboise et al, 1993).

What means that acculturation should be

distinguished in its professional and casual meaning as well from assimilation, which is frequently its result, and also from of assimilation.

dissimilation, which is the opposite

In the process of acculturation the initial cultures are often

preserved (sometimes as subcultures).

The

concept

minority/migrant

strategy

proposed by Blalock (1967: 79-84) and Bonacich (1972). Merton's

theory of

social exchange

of

middleman

minority

is

a

can be viewed as its precedent ( rst issue: 1949). According

to this theory, individuals have contacts, transactions that are pro table to them. In this light members of a minority are considered to strive to lessen the disadvantages of their ethnic identity.

Another precedent to this theory

is the interpretation of Alfred SchĂźtz (Stichweh 1993).

He considers every

culture as an impenetrable universe and as such suggests that the problem of minority/foreigner

marginality

is not rooted in the cultural con ict, but in

the incomparability of the two cultures. According to SchĂźtz, the orientation crisis of the foreigner is caused by some kind of structural and situational constraint, and by analyzing this situation he came up with the term middleman minorities .

The concept of middleman minorities denominates migrants who, based on cross boundary ethnical networks, build up institutionalized positions in certain well-de ned areas of the economy between the higher and lower social strata and stay out of the hierarchy due to their foreigner status.

In these

cases the orientation of the minority, i.e., their constant and strong connection to their native country and its economic life, is of the utmost importance.

The 1990s is a period of revival for assimilation research.

In this period

important questions and several categories of Gordon's model were analyzed.

The theory of

segmented assimilation

migration waves of the 1970s.

o ered a theoretical answer to the

In that period immigrants were coming from

(mainly Asian) countries and societies so di erent from the American society that they did not integrate into it despite of the considerable in uence of the WASP (white Anglo-Saxon Protestant) society.

These immigrants

are the fastest growing segment of the population, they have considerably

Internal Diaspora Assimilation Formation of the Internal Diaspora

75

changed the social composition, culture and policy of several great American cities.

At present in the USA there live over 30 million people who were

born in another country.

Only in the period between the last two censuses

(1990 2000) there arrived 11,2 million grown ups and their children which is 70% of the population growth. According to the latest estimates, there are over 60 million people of foreign origin (from the rst and second generation) in the USA, which is 24% of the entire population (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2003). And what is more important: the immigration tendency continues to remain high.

A. Portes and M. Zhou (1993) identi ed three segmented adaptation patterns: straight-line, upward and downward spiral adaptation. Downward spiral adaptation means

cultural dissonance

and con ict, the immigrant marginalizes

and creates a subculture. Other authors call the patterns di erently, but interpret them in the same way (Wight 2005). Thus the three models are: 1) transition to the WASP main stream, the WASP society, 2) selective acculturation individuals connect to majority culture, but continue to value their initial ethnic community and 3)

dissonant acculturation

transition to a na-

tive minority lower class . The rst model is the straight-line assimilation, which is considered to have a high level human capital. I have already mentioned the advantages of the second model. In the case of the third model it is often signalled that the Gordon model does not work at all. The danger of this is the reason why many authors put down their vote for the second model.

They see it as the only way tensions and con icts entailing acculturation can be avoided (Portes, Rumbaut 2001: 313). In their opinion, it is mutually bene cial if minorities belong to strong cohesion communities and are still open to the culture of the majority.

Adherence to the native culture and the wish to preserve the initial culture in the case of second generation immigrants lead to the rethinking of the former theories.

Acculturation is viewed more and more as a bidimensional

construction. Some people consider it possible also to have multidimensional adherence. At the same time, the term acculturation is increasingly associated with that of enculturation (Rogler, Cortes & Malgady 1994). Enculturation means that the individual takes over and interiorizes the culture surrounding him through its objects, customs, models of action, behavioral patterns, styles of communication, the lexical aspect of the language, information, value and interest relations of the environment, through the medium of his immediate environment, his activities and actions in the course of socialization processes.

During this process of enculturation the individual grows into a mature personality. In this respect enculturation is a kind of growing into the culture,

Bodรณ Barna

76

becoming a man of culture, it is the most comprehensive learning process, which helps people acquire basic abilities which are absolutely necessary for every individual in every society. It is a more general term than socialization, it renders individuals t to integrate into the current society.

Special attention is needed for the interpretation of R. Alba and V. Nee, who propose a new theoretical frame and undertake to reformulate the entire assimilation theory (Alba, Nee 1997). They sustain that Gordon's theory had its merits, but it still has to be revised from the above mentioned points of view and several others. They build their analysis on the ethnic strati cation theory of Shibutani and Kwan. The ethnic competition of the various groups goes on at di erent levels and channels, this is the basis for strati cation.

Communication has several strata as well, an individual and a group level, and in this latter case there is also strati cation within and outside the group which in uences in every case the integration process. The main conclusion to be formulated based on this model is that even ethnic groups who were very

12 . The

hostile at the beginning learnt how to cohabit (Shibutani, Kwan 1965)

main thesis of Alba and Nee is that assimilation implies the disappearance of the ethnic di erences and ethnicity, while these di erences continue to exist.

In the model they propose the various minority groups enter the majority institutions taking with them their former links and the culture of their community.

At the same time, according to the Alba Nee theory, the process of inclusion is incremental, i.e., the process gets stronger and quicker as it proceeds (Alba, Nee 2003).

Last but not least, I will quote the theory of Milton Yinger. According to his interpretation, the measure of assimilation in a certain environment can be de ned by the intensity of four connected subprocesses (Yinger 1994). The four subprocesses are (cultural) acculturation, (psychological) identi cation, (structural) integration and (biological) interbreeding.

Acculturation is a process that appears when two or more groups come into contact and leads to an increased cultural similarity. The process a ects to a greater degree the smaller and weaker groups or the immigrants, but it has an e ect on all the interacting groups.

During the process of psychological identi cation individuals originating from di erent groups may think they are part of the same society, a new society that has grown out of the intermingling of the initial societies of the individuals participating in the process. These various processes have a cause-

12

I did not mention further elements of the theory of Shibutani and Kwan, e.g., that

assimilation has a social and settlement dimension.

Internal Diaspora Assimilation Formation of the Internal Diaspora

77

e ect relationship with acculturation, integration and interbreeding, but they are separated from these from an analytical point of view. Changes in identi cation are not going only one way, they are not part of a one-way process headed toward a greater and increasingly integrating group. Both for the self and the other it is very important to distinguish between the levels of the conscious and the involuntary identi cation. It may so happen that the two levels do not correspond to each other, and this will become obvious precisely through the changes in circumstances.

Yinger means by integration the process of structural assimilation, during which people coming from two or more formerly distinguished lower level social units arrive to the level of common interactions. These interactions can be quite varied depending on concrete situations, e.g., from relatively impersonal relationships in the economic and political institutions to very personal relationships like good neighbours, friends or spouses. During these changes integration can occur at various times.

The formation of internal diasporas and assimilation The overview of the specialized literature shows that the issue of internal diaspora is a speci cally Hungarian issue. Despite this fact it is still surprising that in other Central and Eastern-European languages no speci c term has formed to distinguish internal diaspora from diaspora. Especially that there is no nation in this area which does not have internal diasporas. In the case of Romanians there are nearly nothing but internal diasporas: in Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria and the Ukraine at least. Of course, the Moldavian Republic, which is an independent state, is another issue.

So if a culture does not produce

a speci c concept to name a certain phenomenon, the reason for that lies within the world-view of that culture: it means the members of that culture do not regard that situation as a speci c one (i.e., di erent from the diaspora, in this case) or that the entire situation is unimportant as far as they are concerned.

It is demonstrated that the Hungarian, Romanian and German

policy for minorities views the same problem very di erently, emphasizing di erent matters (Bodรณ 2004: 178-186).

The subject of internal diaspora has been continually present in the Hungarian specialized literature of the past fteen years. The issue was discussed at numerous conferences, at professional forums organized by universities and academic research institutions, by NGO institutions and sometimes even by political parties.

In the past several years a number of volumes have been

Bodรณ Barna

78

published in the eld; several publications of the Research Institute of Ethnic and National Minorities of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences appeared in a separate series dedicated to the problem of internal diasporas.

I needed to mention these rst because it is not clear to this very day whether the professional world wishes to distinguish between internal diaspora and diaspora or not. I want to quote two authors in this respect.

Gyรถrgyi Bindor er is one of the well-known identity researchers of Hungary.

I would draw attention upon her volumes on the Germans of Hungary, especially the one entitled

Kettยฎs identitรกs

(Double identity) (2001). This volume

contains the results of a research conducted on the ethnic identity components of the German community living in a small settlement (Dunabogdรกny, of approx.

3000 inhabitants, three quarters of which are Swabians) and the

theoretical part on which the research was based. This volume is one of those I use frequently in my work for it is a good basis for comparison and a professionally reliable source of information. Despite this fact or maybe precisely because of it a question keeps arising in my mind: why does the author use as a theoretical basis for her work Gordon's assimilation model?

Does this

mean that Gyรถrgyi Bindor er does not think it necessary to distinguish between internal diaspora and diaspora? Does she think integration at the level of internal diasporas and of diasporas are processes that can be dealt with using the same theoretical frame?

Gรกbor Biczรณ has published important studies on the research of both the internal diaspora and the diaspora (Biczรณ 2004, 2007). The practical and research part of his study in the eld of assimilation research examines a Transylvanian internal diaspora. Half of the research report published in one volume is theory on the subject and I think it is one of the best summaries of the Hungarian assimilation literature.

However this author does not think it necessary to

distinguish between the assimilation in the diaspora and the theoretical frame of the internal diasporas either.

My opinion di ers from that of these two excellent researchers, an attitude I have preserved during my entire study. I am compelled to state also that the theory of internal diasporas has not been born up to this day. I consider this a serious theoretical challenge and, as a continuation of the present study, I intend to create a model in order to trace the theory of the process of formation of internal diasporas.

Internal Diaspora Assimilation Formation of the Internal Diaspora

79

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Acta Universitatis Sapientiae European and Regional Studies, vol. 1, no. 1 (2010) 83 102 History, Ideology and Collective Memory Reconstructing the Identities of Timi続oara by Means of Monographies and Street Names during the Communist Regime (1947-1989)

Vasile DOCEA

Political Science Department West University Timi続oara email:

Abstract.

docea.vasile@polsci.uvt.ro

The rst theme of this paper is the relationship between

collective memory and the construction of identity.

Starting from the

case study of street names in Timi続oara, I looked at how urban identity is constructed by means of collective memory, and how collective memory is an expression of identity.

The second theme envisaged is ideological control. Starting from the successive changes in the streets' name, I investigated the manner in which the construction of identity is in uenced by ideology. The street names of Timi続oara were changed in several waves: rstly, after 1918, when the Banat was included in the Romanian state, when Hungarian or German street names were turned into Romanian ones; secondly, upon the installation of the communist regime, when the ideological in uence became a form of direct control, with streets being given names from the communist mythology ; thirdly, in the 1970s and the 1980s, during national-communism, when native names were preferred.

Finally, the

collapse of the communist regime in 1989 brought about a new wave of street names, when every reminder of the communist period was removed.

Keywords: identity, collective memory, ideological control, urban place

names

Prologue No one can argue that journalists have become a permanent presence in our lives. They do in uential things, they initiate and conclude, analyse and

84

Vasile Docea

develop, predict and prescribe. They hold the ultimate truth, absolute justice and many more.

They are omnipresent.

Paraphrasing a Romanian proverb

which says that one can hardly get rid of a disease or a marriage, we can argue that one can never get rid of journalists.

Like many everyday details, this study is also inspired by an incident involving journalists. A few months ago two local columnists carried out a survey about the name of a street in TimiÂłoara, well known to everybody as Filipescu Street . Though not an important avenue or meeting point, the street is placed in the central area and works as a secondary connection between two busy boulevards. It is, thus, well known at least to motorists. The two journalists had found two di erent address tags on the No. 10 building. The former read Nicu Filipescu Street , while the latter read Leonte Filipescu Street .

Two names for the same street two mysteries to decipher.

The journalists called two persons and asked them what they knew about the names on the two tags.

The criteria for choosing the two subjects were

quite obscure. They didn't contact the experts in the eld, but rather local VIPs. It happened that I was picked as one of the subjects, the other being a colleague from the Faculty of Economics, both of us working for the West University. The question took me by surprise. I was able to identify, on the telephone, only one of the names, that of Nicu Filipescu, who, to the best of my knowledge, was a Romanian politician at the end of the 19

th century,

one of the leaders of the Conservatory Party and, a few years later, mayor of Bucharest.

I couldn't pinpoint the other character.

However, my colleague

from the Faculty of Economics was able to inform the journalists that Leonte Filipescu was a member of the Romanian socialist movement , while being completely ignorant of Nicu Filipescu's biography.

Our selective individual

memory has preserved the information the other has forgotten (or has never been aware of ). Filipescu Street in TimiÂłoara meant one thing to me and a completely di erent one to my colleague.

I was thus prompted to investigate how the name of the street had changed in time.

In the interwar period the street was called Louis Barthou .

This

1 name appears on the 1936 city map . The street was named in honour of the

former French foreign secretary, Jean-Louis Barthou, assassinated in Marseille two years earlier, together with King Alexander I of Yugoslavia.

The name

escaped the Stalinist 1950s but was helpless under the nationalistic siege of

2

the 1970s, when it became Leonte Filipescu Street .

1

Planul oraÂłului TimiÂłoara.

1936.

Cu datele o ciale ale Serviciului tehnic al oraÂłului,

design by D. Dumitrache, lithography by Kheil & Baumstark, TimiÂłoara.

2

Ora³ul Timi³oara. Ghidul str zilor. 1980, Institutul Poligra c Banat, Timi³oara.

History, Ideology and Collective Memory

85

This historical gure has as much in common with the city of Timi³oara as J.L. Barthou. Leonte Filipescu (1895-1922) was born in Bârlad, Moldova. At the end of World War I he became a prominent representative of the Bolshevik wing of the Romanian socialist movement. Accused of espionage, he was arrested and died in prison. Consequently, he turned into a martyr in the communists' pantheon. Being a local hero, unlike most of the communist activists in the interwar period, he was rediscovered by Ceau³escu's propaganda system during the years of national communism. Thus, the name of a minor Bolshevik agent

3 and a street name in many Romanian towns.

became an encyclopedic entry

After the fall of communism, the new authorities gave up the street name that was too suggestive of totalitarian practices.

But, in order to spare the

citizens of Timi³oara who had already got accustomed to the abbreviated Filipescu Street from a radical transformation, the local administration preserved the surname and changed only the rst name, picking that of the Conservatory leader Nicu Filipescu. This is how the former Leonte Filipescu Street became Nicu Filipescu Street . The owners of the No. 10 building put up an address tag with the new name without giving up the old one. I am sure they meant to capitalize on how choosy collective memory is.

The Theme The present study is the result of interdisciplinary research at the crossroads of history, theory of history and cultural anthropology. My aim is to study a certain segment of collective memory, related to the space of Timi³oara. The segments envisaged are those represented by the city's historical monographies and the successive names given to streets and other public places.

The historical monographies are one of the ways in which collective memory becomes manifest. In this particular case they correspond to the explanations a city receives, explanations which, for the communist period, are under strict ideological control. I am basically interested in the way in which the ideological

lter resizes each and every time the nature of the information and explanations contained by monographies and the manner in which the same lter reshapes the public space, giving certain names to streets.

In what concerns the streets, I will, on the one hand, look at how place names change from one period to another and why. On the other hand, I will endeavour to explain why certain streets or public places preserve their old

3

For example, Mic dicµionar enciclopedic, the 3rd revised edition, Editura ³tiinµi c ³i

enciclopedic , Bucure³ti, 1986, p. 453.

86

Vasile Docea

names in the collective memory, even if o cially (in terms of administration measures) they have been replaced.

Therefore, the theme of this study is the construction and reconstruction of the identity of TimiÂłoara by means of collective memory, which is expressed in historical monographies and street names.

Exploring the Histories of the City 1. Insights into the past and the construction of multiple identities The analysis of the historiographical component of the identity discourse of TimiÂłoara implies a survey of the studies that aim at reconstructing partially or totally the past of the city. I refer to those authors who adopt a certain type of discourse the historical jargon which entails using certain research methods and speci c explanatory strategies. Although it belongs in its turn to the imaginary, like literature and ne arts, the historical work is di erent from them in the sense that it seeks to reconstruct reality a past, consumed reality.

In this it is similar to memoirs yet another expression of identity

, but on the other hand it di ers from those by striving to make a more rigorous reconstruction based on methods deemed by historians as scienti c , i.e. secure, and on the other hand, it goes deeper into the past, where individual memory has no access.

What a historian can say about TimiÂłoara is, for example, the fact that it has always had a tolerant past, that there were no major con icts between various ethnic and religious communities. To make himself credible, the historian will extract from the past those instances which can prove the harmony of the area, will talk about the fairly good economic evolution, the e cient institutions and the cultural life of the city.

But the same historian can argue that the city

didn't have a tolerant past, which he will prove by selecting past con icts and capitalizing on various kinds of persecution. Which of the two images is accurate?

Neither, of course, as there is no such thing as a true historical

image. Then, which of the two is more credible? Both, as each of them can be supported by a su cient number of historical arguments.

The various ethnic and religious communities of TimiÂłoara made up their own images of the past. Each of them had their own historians, who imagined the past so as to come up with arguments supporting the image the group wanted to have at a given moment. Resorting to the past is, thus, a way to

87

History, Ideology and Collective Memory

account for present aims.

The legitimized content of historical discourse is

given by its very circumstantial nature.

2. The ideological con scation of the past: Romanian historiography during the communist regime The monographies prior to the communist period also have an overt ideological component.

The freedom of ideological choice was absolute before

the installation of communism: some historians embraced conservative values, others were liberal. The situation changed dramatically after 1947.

For the communist historians, the ideological pressure was immense. It manifested itself directly and brutally all over the country. During the entire period (1947-1989), a complete propaganda apparatus made up of party academies , schools and boards of hierarchical structures of secretaries and executives took pains to annul the autonomy of research. Historians were forced to become mere propaganda instruments of the regime.

The mechanisms of this subjection varied from the publication of ideological texts in scienti c journals to the imprisonment of those who were reluctant to the model. In his analysis of Politics and History, Vlad Georgescu mentions among other examples the publication in the major historical journal of the 1950s, Studies of texts that explained in detail the ideas emitted by the communist party (then called the Romanian Workers' Party) for the consumption of the historians' front .

In 1952, for example, following a congress of

the Romanian Workers' Party, the role of the historian and of his discipline was explained in radical terms: the historical science is part of the ideological battle front of party . (Georgescu 1991: 19) The historians' mission was that of narrating the past according to a simple framework and the political aims of the day. (Boia 1999: 82-101) The 1950s were the years of Russolatry (Georgescu 1991: 31), a worshipping attitude towards Russia, especially its Soviet counterpart.

The o cial

propaganda considered the Soviet Union Romania's greatest friend and, sometimes, protector.

Russolatry was obviously present among historians, too.

One of the ideological historians of the period, General Zaharia wrote in 1955 about the Romanian people having been liberated by the Soviet Union, labelling the Eastern neighbour with a term common to all workers' assemblies a rampart of peace and socialism , whose mission was that of protecting the entire world from the cannibalistic plans of the aggressive imperialistic states and their accomplices . (Georgescu 1991: 41) The entire history was reinter-

88

Vasile Docea

preted then so as to comply with the communist, internationalist, pro-Soviet ideological notions.

The 1960s, conversely, with their more relaxed ideology, stood, in the view of the same Vlad Georgescu, for a reinterpretation of the newly reinterpreted historical truth!

(Georgescu 1991:51) It envisaged the issue of the Russian-

Romanian relations, but more timidly, the comment focusing almost exclusively on the moves of the communist party. The public debate was avoided, what can also be noticed in the manner in which Karl Marx's comments on the Romanians were edited and published in 1964. The anti-Russian opinions, so common in Marx's writings, were not mentioned at all by the historians who signed the introductory study. (Marx 1964) They felt protected by the authority of the founder of the received ideology, the only thinker who was allowed to state that at a given moment in the past the Russians had been the Romanians' enemies.

But soon a new reinterpretation of the past occurred. The 1970s and the 1980s witnessed an intensi cation of the nationalistic character of the o cial Romanian ideology. The internationalist communism had proved to be an economic failure and a social aberration. Something had to be made up to save the totalitarian regime and to re-legitimize Nicolae Ceau³escu's dictatorship.

Thus, the national communist formula was adopted, which had already been applied elsewhere, not just in the Soviet Union, but also in Albania, China and North Korea.

(Boia 1999: 90-101) In fact, the latest variant of Ceau³escu's

nationalistic discourse was not invented.

Katherine Verdery points out that

it had been there forever, moreover, that it had been competing permanently with other types of discourse speci c to totalitarianism.

What happened in

the 1970s and the 1980s was an enforcement of the nationalistic discourse, which started to dominate all the others, including the Marxist one. (Verdery 1994: 102-115) In the nationalistic atmosphere of the 1970s and the 1980s several authors were rediscovered , whose texts, written and published mostly in the interwar period, had been marginalized or even banned. This measure should not be surprising.

It was frequently employed by the communist party leadership.

Not only at that time, but also during other stages of the communist regime the leadership of the only party would stipulate which were the accepted works and which were the forbidden ones, just as they decided when an author should pass from one category to the other. (Mihalache 2003: 78) Full volumes are published in this period by Gheorghe Br tianu (who, as a matter of fact, died in a communist prison), Nicolae Iorga, Vasile Pârvan, A. D. Xenopol, etc.

Their works, varied in terms of theme, point of view and method, share only

History, Ideology and Collective Memory

89

the nationalist devotion characteristic of the authors' age. It is this devotion that brings them back to life and is expected to legitimize the new formula of national-communism.

3. Rewriting the history of the city: themes and gures The installation of the communist regime causes a gap in the historiography of Timi³oara.

The authors of monographies and historical studies of

the interwar period some of them still active in the early 1940s are silenced.

There are various reasons for this, all having to do, though, with

the mutations in the social and political context.

Nicolae Ilie³iu, for in-

stance, the author of the above-mentioned monography, who announced his intention to continue research and publish a monography of the entire Banat region, was prohibited.

He ran a series of local political newspapers in

the 1930s and the 1940s, which for the communist regime after 1947 was an unpardonable guilt.

He was unable to publish again until his death in

1963. Nicolae Ivan, the author of a monography published in 1936 (Ivan 1936) also stopped publishing.

The same happened to Traian Liviu Bir escu, au-

thor of a series of volumes on the history of Timi³oara and the Banat in the

4

Middle Ages .

Other authors, active historiographers before 1946, chose to

leave Romania. Aurel Bugariu, who published a very useful bibliography in 1943, (Bugariu 1943) was a POW on the Western front and chose to remain in Germany (where he wrote and translated literature under the pen name Nicolae Novac).

The German and Hungarian interwar authors disappeared

as a result of the war and the persecutions that followed. In short, the historiographic gap was caused by the death of some and the silencing of the others. The ground was prepared thus for the rewriting of the history and for the birth of a new generation, more willing to make ideological amends, more obedient to the newly installed communist regime.

Nevertheless, rewriting history was not a sudden phenomenon. In the 1950s there were no historical or monographic studies about Timi³oara which isolated the local historiography from that of Bucharest, Cluj or Ia³i. The reasons for this absence are numerous.

I shall mention only two of them, which I con-

sider to be the most important. Firstly, during the interwar period Timi³oara didn't have its own historiography school at an academic level. Consequently,

4

Traian Bir escu, Banatul sub turci. Timi³oara, 1934; idem, Timi³oara. Urbanismul ³i

higiena neamului , in Dacia, Timi³oara, 1939, No. 65; idem, Timi³oara de ieri ³i de azi , in Revista Institutului Social Banat-Cri³ana, Timi³oara, 1942, No. 1 (January-February) and others.

90

Vasile Docea

it wasn't imperative to replace one academic tradition with a new historical interpretation, as it happened in the other great academic centres.

On the

other hand, at the beginning of the communist period there was no University in TimiÂłoara with its own history department.

That was founded only

in the 1960s.

It was, thus, during the 1960s that the rewriting of the city's history began, in the communist regime's attempt to resize the collective memory.

Out of

the 66 historical studies and monographies published until 1989, 25 (37.8%) have a strong ideological component and focus on themes speci c to communist historiography: the installation of the communist regime, the history of the working class and of the communist movement, the industrialization, the collectivization of agriculture, etc. Nothing new is o ered, the motifs are the same in all the historiography of the time, as recommended by the communist propaganda apparatus.

One of the most popular historiographic themes with the communist propaganda revolves around an event that took place at the end of World War II, in September 1944, shortly after Romania turned against Germany and started to ght on the side of the Soviet Union, when several military units around TimiÂłoara were defending the city against the German troops which were moving back westwards.

The coup and the military uprising in Au-

gust 1944 were transformed by the communist propaganda into archetypal founding gestures of the new regime. The communist historiography considered August 1944 the beginning of the installation of communism in Romania.

The communists' involvement in the coup was exaggerated by the propaganda in order to legitimize the new regime. The historiography of TimiÂłoara tried to connect the past of the city to these events and hence, associate it with the very installation of the communist regime in Romania. With this in mind,

5 in which the military event of September 1944

many studies were published

was overrated, the communists being presented as the leaders of the soldiers who defended the city.

Another theme encouraged by the entire Romanian historiography was that of the tradition of the working class movement.

5

The communist party

Alexandru Galgoczy, Timi³oara, pe locurile unde s-a desf ³urat insurec¾ia armat , au-

gust 1944 , in Analele Institutului de istorie a Partidului de pe lâng C.C. al P.C.R., Bucure³ti, vol. 10, 1964, No. 4, p. 158-163; Dumitru Popescu, La por¾ile Timi³oarei. Septembrie 1944.

Bucure³ti, Editura Militar , 1968; Sorin Berghian, Un moment Însemnat din

istoria poporului român ap rarea Timi³oarei, septembrie 1944 , in Studii de istorie a Banatului, Timi³oara, vol. 11, 1985, p. 195-200; Oancea, Maria, Participarea oamenilor muncii al turi de armata român la ap rarea Timi³oarei septembrie 1944 , in Studii de istorie a Banatului, Timi³oara, vol. 11, 1985, p. 191-194.

91

History, Ideology and Collective Memory

needed more legitimacy and one way to achieve it was by promoting the notion that the entire party or at least some of its prominent members took part in the most prominent events or made the most fortunate, patriotic and advanced decisions. This tendency is present in the local historiography as well, latent during the entire communist period, more conspicuous in several pseudo-

6

scienti c articles . Another strategy was that of con scating the history of all social movements, as well as the history of various professions and social strata

th century craftsmen in Timi³oara is

(especially the poor ones). The life of 18

studied so as to justify their revolt against the urban patricians (Bardos 1961).

The strikes of the printers or of the railroad workers are recurrent subjects for

7

the communist historians .

The texts about the industrial tradition of Timi³oara belong to the same politically ordained ideological historiography. Communism was theoretically the ideology of the working class , itself a product of industrialization. In other words, if there were no industry, there would be no working class , this so-called avant-garde of the communism. And it would be quite hard to talk about communism without a working class.

That is why, also in the case

of the historiography of Timi³oara, historians were urged to write about the

8

development of various industrial institutions in the city .

Among the measures taken to consolidate the totalitarian regime was the so-called nationalization of the main industrial sectors , which was, in fact, the seizure of all factories and of most properties in the agricultural sector, as well as of a great number of residences.

This happened in June 1948.

At rst, the communist regime didn't need the historians to legitimize the

6

Traian Bunescu, Activitatea comitetelor cet µene³ti din Timi³oara, decembrie 1944-mai

1945 , in Studii de istorie a Banatului, Timi³oara, vol. 4, 1976, p. 121 134; Wiliam Marin, Aspecte ale activit µii revoluµionare desf ³urate de organizaµiile U.T.C. din Timi³oara în anii 1922-1944 , in Studii de istorie a Banatului, Timi³oara, vol. 4, 1976, p.74-91.

7

Traian Bunescu, and Gheorghe Radulovici, Din lupta muncitorilor tipogra din Tim-

i³oara împotriva exploat rii capitaliste, 1851-1947 , in Tibiscus, Timi³oara, vol.

2, 1972,

p. 131-139; Gheorghe Radulovici, Cu privire la organizarea ³i lupta muncitorilor tipogra din Timi³oara în perioada 1851-1918 , in Studii de loso e ³i socialism ³tiinµi c, Timi³oara, vol. 2, 1975, p. 361-374; Gheorghe Oancea, Greva muncitorilor feroviari din Timi³oara din aprilie 1904 ", in Studii de istorie a Banatului, Timi³oara, vol. 4, 1976, p. 58-73; Gheorghe Ruja, Cadre didactice ³i studenµi timi³oreni în lupta antifascist din România 1933-1940 , in Studii de istorie a Banatului, Timi³oara, vol. 11, 1985, p. 135-160.

8

(no author) Fabrica de µigarete Timi³oara.

Monogra e.

1848-1973, Timi³oara, 1973;

Vasile Zaberca, Gheorghe Ruja, Premiere ale industriei b n µene în a doua jum tate a secolului al XIX-lea , în Anuarul Muzeului tehnic prof.

dr.

ing.

A. Leonida, Bucure³ti,

1975, p. 173-180; (no author), Scurt monogra e a întreprinderii Tehnometal Timi³oara, 1879-1979, Timi³oara, 1982.

92

Vasile Docea

seizure. Later on, when the industrial production of these nationalized factories dropped constantly, reaching the verge of bankruptcy, in the context of a collapsed economy, the communist regime felt the need to justify the 1948 nationalization by propagandistic means. The more disastrous the economic situation grew, the more enthusiastic were the apparatchiks about the process of nationalization, which had actually caused the failure. In TimiÂłoara the historians of the regime celebrated various anniversaries related to the large-scale

9

seizure, trying to prove it had had the people's support .

The monographies of TimiÂłoara or of the Banat published during the communist period are pervaded by the obsession to capitalize on the di erences

10 . Almost everything in the past had been

between the past and the present

bad, poor, ugly, harmful, or, at best, mediocre.

The present, in exchange,

was the sum of all qualities. The myth of progress appears in these monographies to justify the totalitarian regime, which is responsible for all the positive changes, and of course, to hide the real nature of the regime.

The Street Names 1. The successive waves of street name changes The researcher interested in the evolution of the city of TimiÂłoara, in its streets and in this case in the street names must resort to the city maps.

Such maps are still available: the oldest ones, prior to World War I, at the State Archives in TimiÂłoara and in the Banat Museum, the newer ones in the

11 .

city libraries, in the archives of the City Council and in private collections

9

Vasile Duda³, Adeziunea clasei muncitoare din Timi³oara la Înf ptuirea actului istoric

al na¾ionaliz rii principalelor mijloace de produc¾ie , in vol. Actul na¾ionaliz rii În Banat, Re³i¾a, 1978, p. 53-58; Gheorghe Ruja, Aspecte ale na¾ionaliz rii principalelor mijloace de produc¾ie În jude¾ul Timi³ , in vol. Actul na¾ionaliz rii În Banat, Re³i¾a, 1978, p. 45-52.

10

(no author), Regiunea Banat În dou decenii de m re¾e Înf ptuiri 1944-1964, Timi³oara,

1964; N. Oprean, Timi³oara contemporan , Timi³oara, 1969; “tefan Pascu et al., Timi³oara 700. Pagini din trecut ³i de azi, Timi³oara, 1969; Al. Z nescu, I. Martin, Timi³oara ieri ³i azi, Timi³oara, 1969.

11

Without o ering an exhaustive enumeration of the city maps, I will mention here only

those I used directly in this research project: Timi³oara. Planul ora³ului cu numirile noi ale str zilor. Made by Major Thoma Darabas after the city's techical department plan. Design and lithography by I. Pregler, Timi³oara (1923); Planul municipiului Timi³oara. 1936. Conform datelor o ciale ale Serviciului Tehnic Municipal, design by D. Dumitrache, lithography by Kheil & Baumstark, Timi³oara; Municipiul Timi³oara.

Ghidul str zilor.

1980, Intreprinderea Poligra c Banat, Timi³oara;

Îndrum torul prin Timi³oara, cu noua denumire a str zilor, pie¾elor, podurilor ³i parcurilor,

93

History, Ideology and Collective Memory

There is little systematic research on street names. Some studies, though, are worth mentioning, such as those by Irina St nculescu about the street

12 . Though no reference is made to Timi³oara, they can

names in Bucharest

provide a good comparative perspective, thus broadening the horizon. For the street names in Timi³oara the necessary data are provided by two comparative

13 . But it only

charts. One of them was published by Octavian Le³cu in 2001

comprises the successive names, up to the present moment, of streets extant in the year 1900. The other one was made by the City Council of Timi³oara and

14 . It contains all current streets, but the identi cation

posted on its website

of the streets' previous names goes back in time only to 1936.

The change of street names in Timi³oara occurred in several waves. When I use the term wave, I do not have in mind, of course, attributing or changing names accidentally or occasionally. The waves are in direct connection with

th century the rst

the socio-political contexts and their alteration. In the 20

wave of changes took place immediately after 1919, when the city received Romanian administration. The second wave occurred in the late 1940s, after the installation of the communist totalitarian system. The third wave followed in the 1970s, when the o cial ideology became that of national-communism.

Last but not least, the fourth wave took place in the mid 1990s, after the collapse of the communist system.

2. The Romanian transformation Between 1867 and 1918 the period of the Austro-Hungarian dualism the streets of Timi³oara had German and Hungarian names. Many were the names

15 . The streets

of great personalities in the history of Hungary or Transylvania

in this period are a public procession of kings and noblemen (Attila utca, 1949; Ghidul ora³ului Timi³oara ³i planul ora³ului, 1959; Ghidul ora³ului Timi³oara, cu indicatorul alfabetic al str zilor, 1966; Municipiul Timi³oara. Ghidul str zilor, 1980; Timi³oara.

Ghidul str zilor, 1991; Hegedus Abel, Timi³oara, Cartographia, The Collection of Romanian city maps, Budapest (2001).

12

Irina St nculescu, Schimbarea reperelor memoriei colective. Bucure³ti, secolul XX , in

Buletinul Laboratorului Psihologia câmpului social , Universitatea Al. I. Cuza Ia³i, No. 4/1999, Editura Polirom, p.

55-73; idem, Apariµia ³i evoluµia denumirilor de str zi din

Bucure³ti , in Bucure³ti. Materiale de istorie ³i muzeogra e, vol. XIV, Muzeul municipiului Bucure³ti, 2000, p. 137-185.

13

Octavian Le³cu, Ghidul ora³ului Timi³oara de-a lungul timpului 1900-2000, Timi³oara,

2001, p. 20-63

14 15

At: www.primariatm.ro The information about street names presented in what follows resulted from the com-

parative analysis of the data found in the sources quoted in footnotes 61-64.

94

Vasile Docea

Árpád utca, Báthory utca, Hunyady tér, Korvin Mátyás utca, Széchényi utca, Zápolya utca, Rákóczy utca, Losonczy tér), of ministers (Andrássy utca, Teleky utca, Deák utca), of Hungarian leaders and generals of the 1848 Revolution (Kossuth Lajos tér, Klapka sor, Bem utca), of cultural and literary gures (Pet® utca, Jókai Mór utca).

Even the leader of a Transylvanian uprising

of about 1514, Dózsa György, who had been executed in Timi³oara, lent his name to a street and a square in the city. Many other streets not as many as the Hungarian ones had names evoking the city's Austrian past: names of Habsburg emperors and royalties (Elisabeth Gasse, Franz Josef Gasse, Josef Platz, Karl Gasse, Maria Theresia Gasse, Rudolf Gasse), names of Austrian generals and governors of the city of Timi³oara (Prinz Eugen Plaz, Mercy Gasse, Koronini Platz), or city mayors (Preyer Gasse) and cultural gures (Lenau Gasse).

At the end of World War I, after the abolition of the dual monarchy, the Banat was occupied by the Serbian army. The peace treaties of Paris-Versailles, though, decided that the Eastern part of the Banat, Timi³oara included, should belong to Romania. In August 1919, the Romanian troops marched into Timi³oara, followed by the new administration. Romania joined the war in 1916 against Austria-Hungary and Germany. When the war was over, the o cial attitude of the Romanian state towards the former enemies was far from friendly.

This was also perceived in Timi³oara, where the new local government soon did away with all the o cial street names and public places which reminded of the old times.

Until 1921, all the streets in Timi³oara were given Romanian names. The new names were chosen from elds of Romanian history and culture, often names of personalities or heroes who had nothing to do with the city's own history. The central area of the city (which contained the largest number of Habsburg emperors' names), came to host World War I generals or ghters in the older Romanian-Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878: General Praporgescu Street (former Báthory utca), General Dragalina Street (former Deák utca), General Grigorescu Street (former Franz Josef Gasse), General I. Odobescu Street (former Maria Theresia Gasse), General Traian Doda Street (former Prajkói utca), etc. The locations of World War I battle elds where the Romanian army had been victorious, also became popular: M r ³e³ti Street (former Elisabeth Gasse), M r ³ti Square (former Josef Platz), Oituz Square (former Nádor tér), etc. Streets were named also after the members of the royal family.

The former Park Strasse is named Queen Mary Boulevard after the very popular wife of King Ferdinand I. Another street, the former Hunyady ut, becomes Carol I Boulevard.

History, Ideology and Collective Memory

95

The streets or public places with neutral names are not spared either. The former Rekascher Strasse (the street that connected Timi³oara with the settlement Reca³, a famous local wining town about 25 km away from the city) became Calea Dorobanµilor in 1921. Dorobanµi was the name of the Romanian infantry in the second half of the 19

th century. Dorobanµi units made

history during the Independence War of 1877-1878, but none of these things had much to do with the past of Timi³oara.

Some streets receive the names of Moldavian or Wallachian medieval princes: tefan cel Mare Street (former Bad Gasse), Petru Rare³ Street (former Klein Platz), D. Cantemir Street (former Karl Gasse), epe³ Vod Square (former Lenau Platz), Mihai Viteazul Boulevard (former Bischof Gasse). It is worth mentioning here that none of these gures had anything to do with the history of the city. Many other streets are given the names of Romanian cultural gures:

George Co³buc Street (former Pet® utca), Gheorghe Laz r Street

(former Serben Gasse), Coriolan Brediceanu Street (former Széchényi utca), Eminescu Street (former Siebenburger Gasse), Ion Creang Street (former Nussblater Gasse), Barbu Delavrancea Street (former Tauben Gasse), Moise Nicoar Street (former Bad Gasse), Caragiale Street (former Jókai Mór utca), Eliade R dulescu Street (former Emmaus Gasse).

Some names remained unchanged: Griselini Street, Huniade Square (at a certain moment named Iancu de Hunedoara Square), Paul Chinezul Street (Kinizsi Gasse in the Austro-Hungarian period), Matei Corvin Street.

But

this is very little in contrast with everything that is changed. Keeping in mind that many of the new names had no connection with the history of the city, I may conclude that the gap between street names and the collective memory was huge.

3. The Stalinist transformation A new gap, no less dramatic, was about to occur at the end of World War II. Hardly had three decades elapsed since the Romanian administration's nationalization of street names and public places when another change took place.

The time was too short for the population to get familiar with the

great amount of names which, for many, were totally irrelevant. But this time the change was not national, but ideological. The communist administration would cleanse all the names which were unsuitable to the new ideology, the communist, Soviet-Stalinist one.

The classics of Marxism could not be omitted from the new list of street names.

Starting from 1947 such street names as Karl Marx Street (former

96

Vasile Docea

Fortress Street) and Friedrich Engels Street (former Mercy Street) appeared.

The two names were, in fact, omnipresent all around Romania, being employed for streets in the central areas of the cities. This observation is also valid for all the other East and Central European countries in the communist bloc.

The late 1940s were characterized by a massive Russianization of street names. The sources of these names were varied. They belonged to Russian cultural and scienti c gures (writers, philosophers, biologists, musicians, etc.), who were, of course, leftist: Lermontov Square (former epe³ Vod Square), Modest Musorgski Street (former Titu Maiorescu Street), Visarion Belinski Street (former aguna Street), Tchernyshevski Square (former Mitropolite uluµiu Square), Turgheniev Street (former Rev. Dragomir Street), Maxim Gorki Street (former Nistru Street), Pushkin Street (former General Mo³oiu Street), Timireazev Street (new street).

Dates from the history of the USSR are added to this massive phenomenon:

16 (former

7 November Street (former Bonaaz Street), 12 April 1961 Street

3 August Street), The Stalingrad Heroes' Boulevard (former Tache Ionescu Boulevard), Stalingrad Street (former Martyr Ioan Ciorda³ Street). The name of several Soviet political and military personalities complete the process: Malinovski Street (former Dimitrie Sturdza Street), Marshall F. I. Tolbuhin Square (former General Dragalina Square), Kalinin Street (former Alsacia Street), Vyshinski Street (new street).

The paradigm of renaming the streets by the new communist authorities includes the names of several leaders of the communist and socialist movement.

Some are foreign, and thus new street names are created:

Georgyi

Dimitrov Street (former Eugeniu de Savoya Street) and Marshall Tito Square (former Alexandru Lahovary Square).

The name of the Yugoslavian leader

was started to be used in 1948, but lasted only for a year because of the deterioration of the Romanian-Yugoslav relations.

Thus, in 1949, Marshall

Tito Square became Nicolae B lcescu Square. The new patron of the street

th century politician and radical ideologist, an important member of

was a 19

the European Masonry.

Although the Stalinist communists condemned and

persecuted masonry ever since they reached power positions, they were, in a curious way, still willing to rehabilitate a few such members from the past, appropriating them.

Other communist leaders who lent their names to streets were of Romanian origin. A few died in the interwar period or during the war and were considered heroes of the new political regime. Including them in the list of street names,

16

The date of the rst human cosmic ight, performed by I. Gagarin.

97

History, Ideology and Collective Memory

the regime was trying to make an inventory of communist martyrs. The list, which acquired almost mythical implications, included: Vasile Roait Square (former St. George, then for a while I. C. Br tianu Square), Bela Brainer Street (former Rev. Tr il Street), tefan Pl v µ Boulevard (former Regent Buzdugan Street), tefan Stânc -Street (former Chevalier Martini Street), Ocsko Terezia Street (former Homer Street).

High communist o cials also gave their names to streets:

Iosif Rangheµ

Street (former Preyer Street), Alexandru Dr ghici Street (new street in 1946), which would then become Nikolai Vasilievich Gogol Street (1956).

Finally, several street names refer to important dates in the history of the communist party and regime: 23 August Boulevard (former Queen Mary Boulevard), 1 May Street (former St. John Street), 6 March Boulevard (former Carol I Boulevard), Griviµa Ro³ie Street (former Domniµa B la³a Street), etc.

4. The native transformation under the pressure of national communism Less than two decades later, a new political change took place. The 1960s witnessed a reconsideration of communist Romania's attitude towards Moscow.

The transformation was gradual, from a discreet attempt to nationalize political decisions in the early 1960s (Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej's last years of leadership) to an open declaration of de ance towards Moscow, with communist leader Ceau³escu criticizing the military invasion of Czechoslovakia by the troops of the Warsaw Treaty states in 1968.

The political shift can also be observed in the new street names. Those of foreign communist leaders are given up: Georgyi Dimitrov Street, for example, becomes Ceahl u Street in the early 1960s. Similarly, the names of Russian or Soviet cultural gures disappear: Lermontov Square becomes Doice³ti Square, also in the early 1960s. Tchernyshevski Square becomes Vârful cu Dor Square in 1966, Maxim Gorki Street becomes Tu³nad Street, Pushkin Street becomes Pescarilor (Fishermen's) Street, Nikolai Vasilievich Gogol Street becomes Galaµi Street.

On this occasion, the names of some personalities are

not replaced by their Romanian counterparts. Despite the relative autonomy from Moscow, the Romanian communists didn't dare defy the Soviet Union by replacing their heroes. In Timi³oara the Russian names are thus replaced by names of mountains, towns, or professions.

Dates and events from the history of Russia and the USSR are also given up:

Stalingrad Street becomes Garibaldi Street already in the late 1950s

together with Malinovski Street, which becomes Gheorghe Crosnev Street

98

Vasile Docea

(then, from 1964 on, Mangalia Street), The Stalingrad Heroes' Boulevard becomes Tipogra lor (Printers') Street in 1964 (Leontin S l jan Boulevard in 1966), Kalinin Street regains its former name, Alsacia Street, Pavel Kisselef Street becomes Cocorilor (Cranes') Street, Vyshinski Street becomes Cerbului (Stag's) Street.

The communist nationalism also manifested itself in erasing the names of old Romanian communist activists of foreign origin (Jewish or Hungarian). Being martyrs didn't save their place among street names. Bela Breiner and Teresia Ocsko Streets are baptized, in the mid 1960s, with names of owers: Lalelelor (Tulips') and Narciselor (Da odils') respectively. National communism wished new green grass to grow onto the old internationalist mythology.

Conclusions The fall of the communist regime brings a new change to the social-political, economic and cultural context.

This novel age witnesses a series of muta-

tions both at the level of the historiography of TimiÂłoara and in the street names. The local university opens a history department, which expands the area of study and trains new researchers. A theme that becomes very popular with the historians of TimiÂłoara is that of the Revolution of December 1989, research supported by the publication of documents, reconstructions and inter-

17 . Older preoccupations are renewed in connection with the history 18 of the city in a traditional positivistic-descriptive manner , but new studies,

pretations

17

(no editor), TimiÂłoara 16 22 decembrie. TimiÂłoara, Editura Facla, 1990; Miodrag Milin

(ed.), Timi³oara 1 21 decembrie '89, Timi³oara, 1990; idem (ed.), Timi³oara În revolu¾ie ³i dup , Timi³oara, Editura Marineasa, 1997; idem (ed.), Timi³oara În arhivele Europei Libere , 17-20 decembrie 1989, Bucure³ti, Funda¾ia Academia Civic , 1999; Marius Mioc, Revolu¾ia din Timi³oara a³a cum a fost ³i falsi catorii istoriei revolu¾iei: m rturiile r ni¾ilor, aresta¾ilor, rudelor ³i prietenilor celor deceda¾i În revolu¾ie; Încerc rile de falsi care a istoriei revolu¾iei de c tre Ion Iliescu, Ion Cristoiu, Sergiu Nicolaescu..., Timi³oara, Sidonia, 1999; M. Milin (ed.), Procesul de la Timi³oara, vol. I-VI, Bucure³ti, Funda¾ia Academia Civic , 2004-2008.

From 2007 on, a periodical entitled Memorial 1989.

Buletin ÂłtiinÂľi c Âłi de

informare appears, edited by the TimiÂłoara Revolution Memorial.

18

For example: Costin Fene³an, Domeniul Cet ¾ii Timi³oara pân În 1552 , in Revista

istoric , Bucure³ti, New Series, 1997, no.

7-8; Marica V. Guy, TimiÂłoara ĂŽn secolul al

XVIII-lea , in Analele Banatului. Art , Timi³oara, New Series, vol. 3, 1998; Jancsó Arpåd, Istoricul podurilor din Timi³oara, Timi³oara, Editura Mirton, 2001; Ioan Munteanu, Presa din Timi³oara, 1771-1918 , in Studii de istorie a Banatului, Timi³oara, New Series, vol. 9 (23), 2001; Ioan Munteanu, Rodica Munteanu, Timi³oara. Monogra e. Timi³oara: Editura Mirton, 2002, etc.

History, Ideology and Collective Memory

99

19 , are also promoted. Another eld of scrutiny is that of 20 the history of anti-communist underground groups . Apart from the cognitive, based on oral history

historical motivation, this perspective also has a recovering purpose, which is sometimes explicitly stated, sometimes only implied: the communist historiography overrated the working class' movements and completely ignored the communists' opposition, so it was high time the historians revealed the latter category's contribution. The researchers are no longer limited by the political establishment. They have gained the freedom to deal with themes and topics which are interesting for the community. Thus, the relationship between the historian and the collective memory starts to be regulated.

The same thing happened to street names. Between 1990 and 1993 almost all names reminding somehow of the communist regime disappeared. The city's streets were given back their former kings and members of the royal family, the gures who had contributed to its history (Eugene of Savoy, Florimond de Mercy, Johann Nepomuk Preyer, etc.). Romanian as well as international writers and artists are also revived. The names of a few dozens of victims of the Revolution of December 1989 have joined the prestigious gallery of names, and so have various events related to this historic moment, which shows that the Revolution is already deeply rooted in the collective memory.

To conclude with, one may argue that, when it comes to the city of Timi³oara at least, the connection between the collective memory, the local historiography and the street names is far from simple.

It cannot be explained only

by means of identity or linear, mechanical conditioning. The three categories overlap, sometimes more deeply, sometimes more super cially, according to the social-political context. In some such cases both the local historiography and the street names can be regarded as explicit forms of collective memory: the historians write about subjects which are relevant to the community, while the streets and the public places bear the names of gures, events, or locations stored in the collective memory. This applies to the period before 1918 and to that after 1989, and only partially to the interwar period. On other occa-

19

Smaranda Vultur, Antonia Komlosi, Memorie ³i diversitate cultural , Timi³oara 1900 -

1945/Mémoire et diversité culturelle, Timi³oara 1900-1945, Ia³i, Polirom, 2001; Smaranda Vultur (ed.), Germanii din Banat prin povestirile lor, Bucure³ti, Paideia, 2000; idem (ed.), Memoria salvat . Evreii din Banat, ieri ³i azi, Ia³i, Polirom, 2002; Mihaela Sitariu, Oaza de libertate. Timi³oara, 30 octombrie 1956, Ia³i, Polirom, 2004 etc.

20

Mihaela Sitariu, Rezistenµa anticomunist .

Timi³oara 1956, Bucure³ti, Editura So a,

1998; C. Muµiu et al., Mi³c rile studenµe³ti anticomuniste din octombrie 1956 din Timi³oara , in Analele Sighet, Bucure³ti, vol. 8, 2000; Ioan Munteanu, Manifestaµia anticomunist a studenµilor de la Timi³oara din octombrie 1956. Semni caµia politic naµional , in Analele Sighet, Bucure³ti, vol. 8, 2000, p. 635-655.

100

Vasile Docea

sions there may be a total schism between the collective memory, on the one hand, and the local historiography and the street names, on the other, as it happened in the communist period. A partial schism was witnessed during the interwar period.

(Translated by Dana Percec)

References Boia, Lucian, 1999:

Mitologia ³tiinµi c a comunismului, Translated from

French, revised and adapted by the author, Bucure³ti: Humanitas.

Bugariu, Aurel, 1943: Bibliogra a Banatului 1918-1943, in Revista Institutului

Social Banat-Cri³ana, Timi³oara.

Duda³, Vasile, 1978: Adeziunea clasei muncitoare din Timi³oara la înf ptuirea actului istoric al naµionaliz rii principalelor mijloace de producµie, în Actul

naµionaliz rii în Banat, Re³iµa, p. 53-58.

Georgescu, Vlad, 1991: Politic ³i istorie. Cazul comuni³tilor români 1944-

1977, Bucure³ti: Humanitas.

Ivan, Nicolae, 1936: Timi³oara. Mic istorie a ora³ului. Timi³oara.

Le³cu, Octavian, 2001: Ghidul ora³ului Timi³oara de-a lungul timpului 1900-

2000, Timi³oara.

Marx, Karl, 1964: Însemn ri despre români (Manuscrise inedite), published

by A. Oµetea and S. Schwann, Introduction by A. Oµetea and Gh. Zane, Bucure³ti: Editura Academiei Republicii Populare Române.

Mihalache, Andi, 2003: Istorie ³i practici discursive în România democrat-

popular , Bucure³ti: Albatros.

Milin, Miodrag (ed.) 1990: Timi³oara 1-21 decembrie '89, Timi³oara.

Milin, Miodrag (ed.) 1997: Timi³oara în revoluµie ³i dup , Timi³oara, Marineasa.

Milin, Miodrag (ed.) 1999: Timi³oara în arhivele Europei Libere , 17-20 decembrie 1989, Bucure³ti, Fundaµia Academia Civic .

Milin, Miodrag (ed.) 2004-2008: Procesul de la Timi³oara, vol. I-VI, Bucure³ti, Fundaµia Academia Civic .

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Mioc, Marius, 1999: Revoluµia din Timi³oara a³a cum a fost ³i falsi catorii

istoriei revoluµiei : m rturiile r niµilor, arestaµilor, rudelor ³i prietenilor celor decedaµi în revoluµie; încerc rile de falsi care a istoriei revoluµiei de c tre Ion Iliescu, Ion Cristoiu, Sergiu Nicolaescu..., Timi³oara, Sidonia.

Munteanu, Ioan Munteanu, Rodica, 2002: Timi³oara. Monogra e. Timi³oara: Mirton.

Oprean, N. 1969: Timi³oara contemporan , Timi³oara.

Pascu, tefan et al., 1969: Timi³oara 700. Pagini din trecut ³i de azi, Timi³oara.

Popescu, Dumitru, 1968: La porµile Timi³oarei. Septembrie 1944. Bucure³ti: Editura Militar .

Ruja, Gheorghe, 1978: Aspecte ale naµionaliz rii principalelor mijloace de producµie în judeµul Timi³, în Actul naµionaliz rii în Banat, Re³iµa, p. 45-52.

St nculescu, Irina, 1999: Schimbarea reperelor memoriei colective. Bucure³ti, secolul XX, in Buletinul Laboratorului Psihologia câmpului social , Universitatea Al. I. Cuza Ia³i, No. 4/1999.

Sitariu, Mihaela, 1998: Rezistenµa anticomunist . Timi³oara 1956, Bucure³ti, So a.

Sitariu, Mihaela, 2004: Oaza de libertate. Timi³oara, 30 octombrie 1956, Ia³i, Polirom.

Verdery,

Katherine,

1994:

Compromis ³i rezistenµ . Cultura român sub

Ceau³escu, translated into Romanian by Mona Antohi and Sorin Antohi, Bucure³ti: Humanitas.

Vultur, Smaranda Komlosi, Antonia, 2001: Memorie ³i diversitate cultural , Timi³oara 1900 1945/Mémoire et diversité culturelle, Timi³oara 1900-1945, Ia³i, Polirom.

Vultur, Smaranda (ed.) 2000: Germanii din Banat prin povestirile lor, Bucure³ti, Paideia.

Vultur, Smaranda (ed.), 2002: Memoria salvat . Evreii din Banat, ieri ³i azi, Ia³i, Polirom.

Z nescu, Al. and Martin, I., 1969: Timi³oara ieri ³i azi, Timi³oara.

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(xxx) 1964: Regiunea Banat în dou decenii de m reµe înf ptuiri 1944-1964, Timi³oara. (xxx) 1973: Fabrica de µigarete Timi³oara. Monogra e. 1848-1973, Timi³oara. (xxx) 1982: Scurt monogra e a întreprinderii Tehnometal Timi³oara, 18791979, Timi³oara.

Acta Universitatis Sapientiae European and Regional Studies, vol. 1, no. 1 (2010) 103 120

Autonomy of Sport Policy and Sport Activities in the European Union: Connections between Human Rights and Sports∗

NAGY-MÉHÉSZ Tßnde

TONK MĂĄrton Department of European Studies

Department of European Studies

Sapientia University Cluj-Napoca

Sapientia University Cluj-Napoca

email:

email:

tonkmarci@sapientia.ro

nagyesztunde@yahoo.com

Alexandru Virgil VOICU Department of Individual Sports BabeÂł-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca email:

Abstract.

avoicu_ro@yahoo.com

With the increasing social role of sports, respectively its

ever more decisive economic role the matter of sports takes an increasingly distinguished rank in EU politics. In close connection with that, the organisations dealing with sports claim a special status for sport activities, one that is di erent from the general judicial practice of the European Union, one which represents an exception in many respects.

This phenomenon will the present study call the autonomy of sport activities . The special, autonomous nature of sport appears most of all perhaps in the legal con icts on the agenda of European Union level justice institutions; therefore the study lays a special emphasis on the analysis of these legal cases (e.g. Bosman Case , Abdelmajid Oulmers Case , 6+5 Rule ). At the same time, we seek answers to the question of what further types of directives are necessary within the sport policies of the European Union, from the point of view of the social and economic role of sport activities.

Keywords: human rights and sport, sport policy in the EU, autonomy

of sport activities ∗

The present manuscript was closed on 28 October 2009.

104

Tonk MĂĄrton, Nagy-MĂŠhĂŠsz TĂźnde, Alexandru Virgil Voicu

The broadcast of the Super Bowl, the championship game of the premier association of professional American football the American National Football League (NFL) is an annual most-watched event in world television broadcasting. Yet one must not go very far for an even handier example: football games of European and world championships, or even the competitions of the Olympic Games also make millions of viewers sit in front of televisions every time. A suggestive piece of information about the popularity of sport events is that the opening ceremony of the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing was watched by two billion people, even according to the most pessimistic estimates. In addition to the popularity of proper sport activities and events, the taking of steroids, hooliganism, or the issues of selling/buying players are also permanent topics of sport media. The legal aspects of these issues can at the same time also be found in legal or European Union discourse. Simultaneously with the increasing social role of sport, respectively its ever more decisive economic role (in the case of certain sport branches the invested amounts of money resulted in

1

real superpowers ) , the matter of sports takes an increasingly distinguished rank in EU politics. In close connection with that, the organisations and institutions dealing with sports, and sports clubs themselves not the least, claim a special status for sport activities, one that is di erent from the general judicial practice of the European Union, one which represents an exception in many respects. This phenomenon will the present study call the autonomy of sport activities , and at the same time the investigation of the matter will also be

2

the main purpose of our analyses below . The special, autonomous nature of sport, pointing beyond the legal and other type regulation framework of the European Community, appears most of all perhaps in the legal con icts on the agenda of European Union level justice institutions; therefore we lay a special emphasis in our paper on the analysis of these legal cases (e.g. Bosman Case , Abdelmajid Oulmers Case , 6+5 Rule ). At the same time, we seek answers to the question of what further types of directives, regulations are necessary

1

Sport as an economic activity produces circa 4% of the annual total output of the Euro-

pean Union, while in addition, it provides 15 million jobs on the level of the Member States.

2

The adequacy of the expression autonomy of sport activities is proven to an even larger

degree by a most recent development of sports diplomacy: the international sports diplomacy conference organised on 21 October 2009 in the building of the Hungarian Parliament attended by leading gures of international sports was given the title of International Conference on the Speci city and Autonomy of Sport in the European Union by its organisers. Later in the present paper we will discuss more about the closing declaration of this conference.

Budapest Declaration the

Autonomy of Sport Policy and Sport Activities in the European Union 105

within the sport policies of the European Union from the point of view of the social and economic role of sport activities.

Sports in community treaties and documents On a European Community level the EU Constitution, by now o the agenda in its original form, would have been the rst treaty to deal with sports issues - but because it has not been rati ed, the article on sports has not come into operation either.

Yet, the failure of the coming into force of the Constitu-

tional Treaty does not mean that the leading bodies of the European Union did nothing to remedy the challenges faced by sports. The events of the recent years, the increasing number of sport-related legal cases ending up in front of the European Court of Justice prove that sport policy and regulations become more and more a necessity in order to ensure the healthy and vigorous development of sports (Weatherill 2007: 34). The uncertain legal framework imposes increasing problems for commercialising and steadily and irreversibly developing sports. On the other hand, the enlargement of the EU also contributes to the necessity of further regulations, as the Member States adhering in 2004, and later in 2007 have all di erent cultures of sports organisation.

In 2005, during the British Presidency of the European Union, a decision has been taken to prepare an independent report on the speci c nature of sport, respectively based on European football to analyse the situation of sport and its problematic issues.

Sports related questions are not something new in the European Union.

Although the Founding Treaties do not include articles referring to sports, sport policy has increasingly gained ground in EU law, simultaneously with the recognition of the signi cance of the matter. Sport at the same time is also connected to many EU policies; moreover, if it appears as an economic activity, it becomes subject of EU legislation with the applicable rules of competition and of the internal market.

Thus, the classi cation of professional sport as

an economic activity for instance means that the economic regulations of the community apply to it and it must operate in accordance with those principles (Arnaut 2006.). The activities that can be quali ed as amateur or leisure time sports however, remain in the competence of the Member States, just as culture and education. Until the eighties sport was only de ned as an economic activity; yet in the early nineties this way of looking to it was extended, and the outstanding social signi cance of sports was recognised. As a result of the recognition of its social functions, the European Olympic Committee (EOC)

106

Tonk MĂĄrton, Nagy-MĂŠhĂŠsz TĂźnde, Alexandru Virgil Voicu

established the European Sports Forum, which functions as an advisory body.

The main task of this institution is to organise an annual meeting among the Member States, the civil sphere and the European Union, to create a forum for dialogue and consultations. The annual fora are commonly attended beside national delegations by representatives of the Member States' sports organisations and of international institutions; yet the representatives of European Union institutions (European Council, the Commission and the Parliament), and some delegations of non-member countries and of other concerning sectors (e.g. media, universities, sports requisites manufacturers) also partake. Sport made its way into the acquis for the rst time in 1997, when a Declaration

3 was attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam. The importance of the

on Sport

Declaration itself resides in the fact that it recognises the social signi cance of sport, and calls the attention of political leaders that when decisions in sport-related matters are taken, they should listen to sports associations.

The next important station of community sport policy is a Consultation Document issued in 1998 by the Commission, entitled The European Model

4

of Sport .

The document is in fact a situation assessment, which presents

the organisation model of European sport, its characteristic features and the emerging problems. In the document released in 1998 the Commission declares that in spite of the large diversity, it does not wish to make sport structures in the Member States become more uniform, but would like to maintain the existing di erences thus making the keynote based on which the relative autonomy of sport activities can later be claimed. Even if the Union did not set up a uniform model of sport organisation for the Member States, these organisations show great resemblance throughout the states of Europe. In its

5 the European Commission

report issued during the summit in 1999 in Helsinki

reinforces once again the acceptance of sport organisation models functioning in the Member States, yet in addition to that it further enlarges the sportsrelated thematic palette of EU policies. The document lays a special emphasis on the increased economic dimension of sport, which is especially due to television broadcasts. Beside the increased economic role, the report also renders an account about the negative tendencies a ecting sports.

It highlights the

spreading of violence in stadiums, hooliganism, corruption and doping practices, as well as the frequent exploitation of young sportsmen and -women, and it also indicates concrete sports policy objectives: the development of sports and physical education at school, the promotion of the subsequent switch to

Declaration on Sport. Amsterdam, 1997.

The European Model of Sport. European Commission, 1998.

5 The Helsinki Report on Sport. COM (1999) 644 nal.

3 4

Autonomy of Sport Policy and Sport Activities in the European Union 107

other employment and future integration onto the labour market of sportsmen and -women, respectively the promotion of the convergence between the training systems for sports workers in each Member State. Still, the most important objective set is the better and more detailed clari cation of the legal environment of sport within the framework of the European Union.

6 has also meant a step forward in the history of the

The Nice Declaration

EU from the point of view of sport activities: it recognised the speci c particularities and outstanding social functions of sports, which therefore would have to be taken into account when implementing community policies.

The

declaration is extremely important on the level of principles as it formulates that the Community must, in its action under the various Treaty provisions, take account of the social, educational and cultural functions inherent in sport (Nice Declaration 2000, Article 1). Sporting activity should be accessible to every man and woman, with especial regard to the physically or mentally disabled, as it provides a particularly favourable opening for rehabilitation and not incidentally social integration (Nice Declaration 2000, Article 5). Beside these, in the declaration the European Union encourages voluntary or social work in sport, and supports the independence of sport organisations and their right to organise themselves. Another important matter was touched upon by the declaration, namely the issue of ownership of sport clubs. The attention was called upon the fact that single ownership or nancial control of more than one sport club entering the same competition in the same sport may jeopardise fair competition.

In order to clear up the question, the Council

proposes that the sport federations may introduce arrangements for overseeing the management of clubs. Based on this recommendation for instance the UEFA initiated a rule that two clubs with the same owner cannot compete in the same competition within European championships. The Nice Declaration includes a reaction with reference to one of the most important problems of European sports - also from the point of view of our present paper: in matters related to player transfers the Council expressed its support for a permanent dialogue between EU institutions and organisations representing professional sportsmen and -women.

The latter recommendation was practically on par

with the increased role of the European Sports Forum.

Part III, Chapter V, Section 5 of the draft Constitutional Treaty of the European Union deals with education, vocational training, youth and sport.

According to the document the European Union can adopt co-ordinating, complementary or supporting regulations in the named areas with the aims nar-

6

Nice Declaration, 2000.

108

Tonk Márton, Nagy-Méhész Tünde, Alexandru Virgil Voicu

rowed down to our subject of developing a European dimension of sport, by promoting fairness and openness in sporting competitions and cooperation between bodies responsible for sports, and by protecting the physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen, especially children and young sportsmen and sportswomen. In the draft Constitution the Union turns away from the possibility of changing the existing European sports model, therefore this continues to remain within the sphere of authority of the Member States.

The Treaty of Lisbon, growing out of the Constitutional Treaty,

presently being in stage of rati cation (and possibly soon to be adopted) on the other hand can easily become the rst treaty in the history of the EU which will make a concrete mention of sport, and within it the special character of

7

sport activities .

The evolution, development of the sport policy of the European Union basically re ects the recognition of the fact that sport is not merely an economic activity, but by its social signi cance it is also part of European cultural heritage and an important educational tool. The latter feature of sport activities is important from the perspective of a uni ed European spirituality because the results of the educating function are social cohesion on a community level, and deepening and strengthening social integration. (As a result of this new outlook, year 2004 was declared the

European Year of Education through Sport,

and in 2007 a White Paper on Sport was published.)

The tendency taking

shape shows a developing European Union sport policy, while furthermore, a series of legal questions related to sports have been answered over the last decades. In spite of that, the obstacles still present in European sports create further challenges for the European Union and the sports organisations. The White Paper raises issues such as the licensing systems for clubs, ownership issues and nancial management of clubs, or the system of player transfers (White Paper 2007).

7

Article 124 of the Treaty of Lisbon establishes the following in connection with sports:

a) The Union shall contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, while taking account of the speci c nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social and educational function. ; b) Union action shall be aimed at developing the European dimension in sport, by promoting fairness and openness in sporting competitions and cooperation between bodies responsible for sports, and by protecting the physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen, especially the youngest sportsmen and sportswomen.

Autonomy of Sport Policy and Sport Activities in the European Union 109

The special character of sports:

the autonomy of

sport activities One of the main features of European sport is that its governing bodies enjoy legitimate autonomy. This independence does not mean that sports are beyond law but that in certain areas of sport a regulating autonomy must be taken into account and respected. There are cases when general law can be applied in sports, but even in these situations the concrete characteristics must be acknowledged. This aspect of sports has also been recognised by the Nice Declaration.

In other words, when we speak of the economic dimension of

sport, it is not sure that it should be treated as a business from a legal point of view. The speci cities of sports have also been recognised in the Declaration

by European heads of state and government, consequently the debate from now is not about questioning whether or not sports have a special character. The essential task is to nd those practical measures by which European legislation can take into account the speci c aspects of sport (Arnaut 2006:

10).

In

the legal disputes ending up in front of the European Court of Justice and the European Commission, this principle has already been applied, although erratically and on a case-by-case basis; yet no transparent legal environment has been built up in connection with the issue.

The lack of an adequate

regulation on the other hand resulted in situations when certain autonomous sport activities con icted with the uni ed European law and order or created a borderline case at best. A good example for that and later on we will discuss it more in detail because of its topicality is the issue of release of under-

8

contract players to play for national teams .

The aim of the international

bodies in order to attract as many spectators as possible is to have the best teams participate in the most important competitions. In football for instance the aim is to have the best composition of national teams participate in world and European championships.

The measure of releasing the players defends

the aims and e ectiveness of such championships, as well as the interests of smaller and poorer countries and public (Arnaut 2006: 12), yet it may hurt the interest of club teams, which can also be considered economic undertakings.

The same contradiction, but from an opposite direction is supported by a phenomenon not unfamiliar at all in the area of sport activities, i.e.

that

the results of the competition are solely determined by money. Although as

8

The regulation is speci cally European, as similar rules do not exist for instance in

the case of American professional leagues. Simultaneously with the ice hockey world championships for example, current NHL seasons are in full speed and foreign players do not participate in the world competitions.

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Tonk MĂĄrton, Nagy-MĂŠhĂŠsz TĂźnde, Alexandru Virgil Voicu

economic activities, sports events could also make reference to the theory of the "Invisible Hand" (i.e. the self-regulating mechanism of market forces); the FIFA has presented a draft regulation on domestic players, which will also be further discussed in the present paper due to its topicality and importance.

The proposal is the idea of the leaders of the international association, yet the issue is relevant mostly in European championships, as one can hardly talk of the employment of so many foreign players in the championships of other countries.

The proposal known as the 6+5 Rule stimulates the

training of players, and to a certain degree it restricts the trade with them.

The regulation of costs is also an issue connected to the proposal on domestic players.

The aim in this case is to prevent that the competitors with most

money, being able to buy the best players, rule the competitions. This is not in the interest of sport and the spectators, but it is important to mention that the aim is not to set restrictions regarding the upper limit of players' payments. A concrete solution for the extremely complex problem has not yet been found, one possible alternative would be that the general level of expenditure of a club should be proportionate with its turnover. Another alternative for cost regulation could be the strict payment ceiling applied in professional American leagues (NBA, NHL, NFL).

From all these it consequently becomes clear that on a Union level the special character of sport requires an application of law that is di erent from the one generally applied.

When applying the regulations one must observe the

autonomy and self-reliance of sport-governing bodies and sport activities, respectively the speci cities of sport.

Relationship between the fundamental human rights and sports When attempting to analyse the relationship between sports and fundamental human rights, the researcher has to confront the question whether and to what degree can sport be considered a human right.

The answer to the

question may even seem simple as none of the human rights declarations or agreements include articles on the performance of sport activities or on the accessibility of sports. In that light one can conclude that practising sports is not classi ed into the category of fundamental human rights. Sport, however, as a social activity can constitute a very important element of the fundamental human right of equal access to education and culture.

Autonomy of Sport Policy and Sport Activities in the European Union 111

The right to education is included in Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

It shall promote understanding, tolerance and

friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities [. . . ] for the maintenance of peace. man Rights,

2nd

(Universal Declaration of Hu-

paragraph). By its basic characteristics, sport develops the

self-respect of people, creates an opportunity for self-ful lment, and on a social level it promotes cohesion. The spirit of

fair play

in sport teaches respect for

work and performance, and also respect for the opponent or the other party.

The social solidarity e ect of sport can be witnessed every day, when sportsmen and -women and spectators with various cultural, religious backgrounds, speaking di erent languages rise above these di erences, helping to overcome social stereotypes, discrimination, intolerance. The fact that women can perform such typical male sport activities as football or weight-lifting can also give an impulse to combat discrimination against them (Voicu 1999).

Fundamental human rights can be enforced by sport, yet these can also be harmed by it.

The most frequent cases of the infringement of fundamental

human rights in sports are related to doping (Nรกdori 2007: 147). The use of arti cial performance-enhancing drugs endangers human health, and in addition to that they are in contradiction with the spirit of sports. Human dignity and the private sphere are harmed when sportsmen and sportswomen are submitted to examinations in order to check drug use. Knowing about the possible risks of achieving outstanding performances belongs to the basic rights, and in that context fundamental rights can also be harmed.

The processes go-

ing on today in sports often provide opportunities for some of the sponsors to exploit sportsmen and sportswomen, or in certain cases for the parents to make use of their children's talent, without paying attention to the e ects of sport activities on their physical and mental development. In recurrent cases talented young people are either physically or mentally worn down by their daily training and the burdens of responsibility during the competitions. The infringement of other types of human rights can result from the assertion by bribery of commercial or other interests on the race grounds.

Recent events have also proven that sports, politics and fundamental human rights are in close connection with one another.

The International Olympic

Committee was strongly criticised when it awarded the right of organising the 2008 Olympic Games to Beijing as it was common knowledge that the People's Republic of China had often failed to respect human rights. Yet the Olympiad was organised and after the event it can be concluded that the Chinese Olympic

112

Tonk MĂĄrton, Nagy-MĂŠhĂŠsz TĂźnde, Alexandru Virgil Voicu

Games at least provided an opportunity for basic human rights related issues to be debated at important fora. It is also the merit of the event that the Chinese State made an attempt to prove to the world the opposite of the allegations, therefore paying better attention to critical remarks. As Jacques Rogge formulated on the occasion of the closing ceremony: The world learned

9

more about China, and China learned more about the world .

One of the most frequent human rights element that keeps coming up in connection with sport activities is one of the four freedoms of the European Union, the free movement of persons. The freedom guaranteed in the Community Treaty is a prerequisite of the operation of the common market, therefore Article 2 of the Treaty rules on the elimination of all restrictions regarding the free movement of persons (SzalaynĂŠ 2008: 29).

The principle of free move-

ment of persons includes the free movement of workers, the freedom to pursue employment freely and the freedom to establish companies. Of the freedoms listed, it is primarily the free movement of workers that bears special relevance from the point of view of sport activities. Although the concept of a worker is not made clear by legal documents, the accepted de nition is that workers are those who carry out activities based on instructions, for being compensated/remunerated.

According to the de nition, employment can be linked

to many di erent types of activities, sport being one among these, provided that it results in economic consequences. As a result, the professional sportsmen and sportswomen, who carry out their activity by occupation, for compensation, are workers.

An important element of the free movement of workers is the interdiction of discrimination, be it even a positive discrimination for the bene t of own citizens.

Based on the legal practice of the European Court of Justice in

the past years, we can assert that on the grounds of the free movement of workers not only discrimination is prohibited, but all forms of obstructions and restrictions of the freedom. The Bosman case (1995) had the most signi cant contribution to the extension of these principles, as not the issue of employment was the most important aspect in this case, but the obstructive attitude of the club that had formerly employed the football player.

The Bosman case did

not only alter the basic principles of the Union, but also induced enormous changes in European sport (SzalaynÊ 2008). Jean-Marc Bosman had been the professional player of the Belgian team Liège RC until 1990.

Following the

expiration of his contract he refused the o er of a contract of employment proposed by the association, as it was disadvantageous to him.

9

24 August 2008

The club

Autonomy of Sport Policy and Sport Activities in the European Union 113

accordingly placed him on the list of players to be sold, and determined a transfer fee of 11,743,000 Belgian francs. This meant that the club that would employ him in the future would be obliged to pay that amount of money in order to employ him. The regulations regarding this huge amount of money,

10 made Bosman's

respectively those restricting the number of foreign players

situation impossible, therefore he was not hired by any of the clubs.

In the

case ending up in front of the European Court of Justice a judgment was passed on 15 December 1995, and beginning with that day a new chapter has started in the history of team games, but also in that of the autonomy of sport activities.

During the legal proceedings Bosman argued that as his

contract had expired in Liège, the club had no right to ask for a transfer fee, moreover, his Belgian employers had violated the article of the free movement of working force from the Treaty of Rome. In his decision, the European Court of Justice ruled in favour of the free movement of sportsmen and -women. On the one hand this meant that the clubs cannot request a transfer fee for the football players and sportsmen and sportswomen whose contracts had expired, while on the other hand it also meant that the restriction on the number of foreign players was against EU principles. The ruling in the Bosman case, the later Bosman rule in fact, declares that professional players from a legal point of view are not di erent at all from other employees, and the same rules must be applied in their case as in the case of any other citizens of the Union, performing any other profession. This second bearing of the rule was extended in 2003 to those countries for which bilateral agreements with the EU pronounce that citizenship cannot constitute a discriminative aspect with regard to employment (this was achieved by a Slovak handball player, Maros

11 .

Kolpak at the end of a similar case at the European Court of Justice in 2003)

The Bosman case is a copybook example of the tensions among the regulations on sport activities, the relative autonomy of sport, and community law (acquis communautaire) and in its decision the European Court of Justice

10

According to the rules of the UEFA at that time, the maximum number of foreign

players on the playing eld within one team at a time was limited to three players.

11

One of the rst victims of the regulations introduced as a consequence of the Bosman

case was the Dutch team Ajax Amsterdam.

The winner association of the Champions'

League Trophy in 1995 lost most of its best players within less than three years. Clarence Seedorf signed abroad before the Bosman case but by January 1998 the following players left Ajax: Edgar Davids, Michael Reiziger, Finidi George, Nwankwo Kanu, Patrick Kluivert, Marc Overmars, Winston Bogarde, Ronald and Frank de Boer. Three of them left the Dutch team without a transfer fee, after the expiration of their contracts.

The departure of the

other players was indirectly related to the e ects of the Bosman rule, i.e. to the fact that the wages of free football players reached astronomical amounts.

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Tonk MĂĄrton, Nagy-MĂŠhĂŠsz TĂźnde, Alexandru Virgil Voicu

maintained the unconditional application in the area of sports of the freedom of movement, the free movement of workforce and the freedom of employment.

Yet the decision raised further legal questions related to the special status of sport activities, of which the most representative and in its e ects the most important one was a type of a second Bosman case, the case that became famous under the name of Abdelmajid Oulmers . The latter legal case is still on the agenda of the European Court of Justice, and a decision in that matter may become a new milestone in the history of the status of sport activities in the European Union.

On 17 November 2004 the national football team of Morocco hosted the team of Burkina Faso at an exhibition game. The match ended with a score of 4:0, and the Moroccan Abdelmajid Oulmers playing in the Belgian team of Charleroi was injured. The injury, which seemed to be an easy one, turned out to be serious resulting in a forced rest of a minimum of eight months for the player. Oulmers had signed a contract with the Belgian club about a year earlier and played well during the whole season, therefore the club considered that it had su ered a provable loss as a result of the injury of its employee - so it sued the FIFA. The competent leaders of the International Federation of Association Football thought there was no connection between the injury of the player and the successfulness of the team, consequently they were not willing to pay what the Charleroi claimed. In the case that was submitted to the European Court of Justice the Belgian club argues following a simple logic, which makes the point that the international association by the conditions set forth clearly in its regulations on the employment and transfer of players, forces the clubs to allow their players to play at international matches in the competition agenda.

Yet the subsequent parts of the rules do not dispose that compensation should be paid in the event of an injury to the player during the match resulting in an in uence on the player's performance at the club team. The question here is not that the club continues to pay a wage to the player during the period of his/her injury, respectively provides rehabilitation expenses, but that the ability of the player to generate an income is reduced. It is important to stress that as sport increasingly ful ls a commercial role, the ability of a player to generate income is not only limited any more to his/her performance on the ground, but it also includes sponsorship, advertising, publicity-related commercial activities (DĂŠnes 2006.). During the legal dispute the Belgian club has been endorsed by the G-14

12

12 group compressing 14 European leading clubs

Members of the G14 group were: Ajax Amsterdam, FC Barcelona, Bayern MĂźnchen,

Borussia Dortmund, PSV Eindhoven, Internazionale Milan, Juventus, Liverpool, Manchester United, AC Milan, Olimpique Marseille, Paris Saint-Germain, FC Porto, Real Madrid.

Autonomy of Sport Policy and Sport Activities in the European Union 115

that has since then disbanded. At the proposal of the G-14 group, Charleroi determined the amount of the compensation requested to be 860 million Euros.

The interest of the club teams is unequivocal, on the other hand similar is the interest of the International Federation of Association Football, as the latter had consciously turned world and European championships, where national teams participate, (as well as the respective qualifying rounds) into commercial products. The most important positive feature of such sport events is that they require minimal nancial investment from the FIFA, as players are paid by the clubs, the infrastructure is given, and although there are certain renting and organising expenses, the revenues especially resulting from the royalties of television broadcasts are enormous. The European Court of Justice has not yet ruled in connection with the mentioned case, yet it is estimated that the sport clubs will win the case.

It is important nonetheless to draw as a conclusion that in connection with the Abdelmajid-Oulmers case the autonomy of sport activities (in this particular case the regulating monopoly of the FIFA and the continental sports associations) is questioned once again in comparison with Union legislation, or in other words an autonomy is questioned which can create rules and adopt regulations without taking national laws and international treaties into consideration.

Although the Oulmers case is still on the agenda of the European Court of Justice, together with the Bosman case it has got important in uence and bears signi cant consequences in another direction of sport legislation as well.

At the end of May 2008, at its congress held in Sydney the representatives of FIFA member states adopted the so-called 6+5 Rule , which is in contradiction with the basic principles of the Union, or to say the least, with the decision taken in the Bosman legal case discussed earlier. The initiative has not been put into practice ever since, exactly because of the series of disputes connected to it.

Leaders of the FIFA think that the rule is reconcilable with Union

law, yet the standpoint of the European Union is that the rule would harm community law, particularly the principle of the free ow of working force. The President of the most important football association proposes that the number of foreign players sent on the playing ground at the same time should again be restricted, namely in the sense that starting with the 2012-2013 season, each club must eld at least six players eligible to play for the national team of the country of the club, of the eleven players at the beginning of the match.

To avoid misinterpretations, it is important to emphasise right from the very

Further four teams joined in 2002: Arsenal, Bayer Leverkusen, Olympique Lyon, Valencia.

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Tonk MĂĄrton, Nagy-MĂŠhĂŠsz TĂźnde, Alexandru Virgil Voicu

beginning that the proposal as such cannot be considered as discriminative on grounds of nationality, as it rules about the national teams of the countries, where the eligibility to play for the national team is conditioned by citizenship, and not by belonging to one national group or another. It can happen that a player with a Spanish national background, but with a British passport, can play in the national team of Great Britain. In order to make the 6+5 Rule be accepted, the FIFA requested a fully independent expert team to study whether the stipulation was in harmony with European law. Five legal experts of the Institute for European A airs (INEA) declared after the examination of the matter that the rule was compatible with the system of regulations of the European Union. Namely, according to the report said to be independent the 6+5 restriction could at most constitute indirect discrimination because it is not directly based on the nationality of professional football players, but considers entitlement to play for the national team concerned, even if in the great majority of the cases these two mean the same thing.

Yet the situation is presently in stagnation, one could even say that we witness a real stalemate:

both parties insist on their own interests, and it

is hard to imagine they would be willing to alter their standpoints.

This is

supported by the latest developments connected to the 6+5 Rule , as the parties reinforced once more their previous standpoints at the conference on sport diplomacy in Budapest mentioned earlier, organised on 21 October 2009.

As Joseph Blatter representing FIFA put it, in case the introduction of the rule is widely supported by sport leaders, then the e ective provisions of law (i.e. the

aquis

of the European Community) should be changed, whereas the head

of the Sport Unit of the Education and Culture Directorate General of the EU, Michal Krejza declared that the Union will continue not to restrict the free ow of workforce. The closing document adopted by the conference (The

Budapest Declaration )

for that matter newly points out the tensions between

the autonomy of sport activities and the provisions of law and the policies on the level of the EU, and the signatories ask the European institutions and the Member States of the European Union to have the political will to support

13 .

decisions strengthening the speci city and the autonomy of sport

13

Articles 4-6 of the declaration include the following: 4. We commit ourselves to mobilize

our connections and our e orts to preserve the autonomy of sport respecting the principle of subsidiarity, the competences of the Member States as well as the pyramid of international sport.; 5.

We urge the decision-makers in Europe to recognize, realize and support the

speci city and the autonomy of sport in the light of the Article 165 of the

Lisbon Treaty

as we need to safeguard these principles, the fairness and the openness of the competitions, the training of young players, youth development at club level and the national teams in

Autonomy of Sport Policy and Sport Activities in the European Union 117

The experts of the eld on the other hand consider that the introduction of the rule would not change the present balance of power in football, as the richest clubs will continue to buy the best football players at the very most some of them will also have to receive citizenship. A major di erence would nonetheless be that the price of football players within one country would increase.

Yet the issue is a signi cant one indeed from the point of view of

professional sport, it is enough to say here that the degree of workforce migration among professional football players exceeds 45% at present. According to the report published on the o cial site of the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) the migration of labour force (i.e. proportion of foreign players ) is the largest in England, but almost all European championships show an increasing tendency (see Table 1).

Country

Proportion Average Number of Foreign of Foreign Players Players per Club

1. England

59.1 %

16

2. Portugal

53.7 %

13

3. Belgium

51.9 %

12

4. Germany

51.7 %

13

5. Greece

51.2 %

13

6. Russia

50.2 %

13

7. Switzerland

47.7 %

12

8. Scotland

42.4 %

10

9. Italy

40.6 %

10

10. Turkey

40.6 %

10

Romania

36.1 %

10.8

Hungary

24.0 %

6.5

Table 1. The proportion of foreign players playing in European championships

14

all sports, in the spirit of the Nice Declaration adopted in 2000, of the document presented in September 2008 by the Olympic and Sport Movement, of the Declaration adopted in Biarritz in November 2008 and of the action developed by the Swedish Presidency of the EU to promote these principles.; 6. We call upon the European Institutions and all of the EU Member States, in particular Spain, Belgium and Hungary, which will preside the European Union in 2010 and in the rst semester of 2011, to have the political will to support decisions strengthening the speci city and the autonomy of sport in the interest of future development for generations to come.

14

The proportion of foreign players playing in European championships

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Tonk Márton, Nagy-Méhész Tünde, Alexandru Virgil Voicu

It is clear from the table that the statistics is led by the English championship, which continues to be the strongest and at the same time the one most watched, in which most front rank teams employ only one or two domestic players. In the 2005 season for instance, the historic occurrence came about when no English (not even British) players appeared in the Arsenal team (neither among the beginning 11, nor on the substitutes' bench). The table released by UEFA was complemented with data referring to the Romanian and Hungarian championships; in these cases we used the respective statistics to calculate the proportion of foreign players playing in front rank teams. It can be concluded in the latter cases that while the Hungarian championship is below the European average (also) in this respect, the proportion of foreign players in the Romanian forefront is relatively high, and even extreme examples similar to the English Arsenal can be found: among the 29 players entered for the team of CFR from Cluj for the 2008/2009 championship season there were 22 foreign players. In the case of Romania, the accession to the European Union was also an outstanding moment in the growth of the number of foreign players employed by Romanian club teams: starting with the 2006/2007 championship season the number of foreign players increased drastically.

The European and world level tendencies shown by the above examples and statistics adequately re ect the importance and well-founded character of the debates around the 6+5 Rule , but also the ambitions of European sports organisations to claim a special, autonomous status for their sport activities, which tries to nd a way out from under the uniform legal regulation of the European Union, by making reference to the social, cultural, educational role of sports.

Conclusions A very important conclusion of our study may be formulated by the statement that community level regulations concerning sport activities, and generally the domain of sports are not in par with their signi cance and economic power. The speci c features of sports, the legal instruments and case studies presented above prove without exception that there is a real need for cooperation between EU institutions and sports organisations, and also for the creation of o cial structures that can form the basis of such cooperation. Because of the uncertain legal environment, only in the last ve years series of corruption and cross case scandals connected to sports pools or to the agencies managing player employments have occurred in Europe - Belgium, Finland, Germany,

Autonomy of Sport Policy and Sport Activities in the European Union 119

Italy and Portugal are the most important examples.

In Italy for instance,

even the elite clubs with the best traditions were involved in these practices, and the Juventus team was for example placed among the B Series for a season.

The referee bribery scandal in volleyball could a ect even the decisive match of the most prestigious European championship series, but criminal o ences are permanent also in tennis and cycling.

Another consequence of the legal

uncertainty is that many clubs and associations ended up in di cult nancial situations and have to deal with de cits of several millions.

The institutions of the European Union and the organs governing sports must cooperate in every respect in order to protect the speci c nature of sport activities and to safeguard legal security. It is the task of the highest European governing organs of sport branches to initiate a dialogue with the European Commission.

In football, the task of the UEFA is to maintain a dialogue

with the institutions of the EU, to elaborate the legal framework necessary for the security of football while respecting community law. The statement of sport lawyers that an o cial agreement is in any case necessary between the European Union and UEFA, in which the nature of the relationship between the parties is de ned is quite pertinent, and should be extended to other branches of sports.

Such contracts would make clear which in the di erent

sports branches are the organisations that are the negotiating partners of the Union, respectively these agreements should also include which institution is competent in which issue and what are the methods of cooperation. The European Union has already taken decisions with regard to cycling, basketball, volleyball, swimming, or judo, but the areas that should be regulated must be extended to all branches of sports, for the sake of uniformity and transparency.

At the same time, the sport model building from bottom up, in which all could participate, played an important part in the increasing social and economic role of sport. In the process of shaping legal security therefore one must be careful to protect the several decades old European sport model, so that its appreciation and esteem is further strengthened. Perhaps even by paying the price of the autonomy of sport activities.

References Arnaut, JosĂŠ Luis 2006

Independent European Sport Review

(Report). Execu-

tive Summary, October. Report by JosĂŠ Luis Arnaut. p. 41 DĂŠnes Ferenc 2006 LĂĄbĂĄtĂłl szaglik. Az Abdelmajid Oulmers-eset (The Abdelmajid-Oulmers Case).

Magyar Narancs

XVIII. 21. (25 May 2005).

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Nádori László Bátonyi Viola 2003

Union and Sport ).

Az Európai Unió és a sport (The European

Budapest Pécs, Dialóg Campus Kiadó, p. 215.

Az egyén jogi helyzete az Európai Unióban (Tansegédlet ) (The Legal Status of the Individual in the European Union University Course ). Manuscript. Pécsi Tudományegyetem, Állam- és Jog-

Szalayné Sándor Erzsébet 2008

tudományi Kar, p. 160.

R spunderea civil delictual cu privire la activitatea sportiv (Delinquent Civil Responsibility with Regard to Sport Activity ).

Voicu, Alexandru Virgil 1999

Bucure³ti, Editura Lumina Lex, p. 480.

Weatherill, Stephen 2007 European Sports Law.

Journal xxx 1948

The International Sports Law

1-2. 33-37.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

United Nations Orga-

nization. xxx 1997

Treaty of Amsterdam Declaration on Sport.

Publications O ce of

the European Union, O cial Journal C 340, 10/11/1997 P. 0136. xxx 1998

The European Model of Sport. European Commission Consultation

Document of DG X (Information, Communication, Culture, Audiovisual Media. Audiovisual policy, culture and sport), p. 28.

Report from the Commission to the European Council, with a view to safeguarding current sports structures and maintaining the social function of sport within the Community framework. The Helsinki Report on Sport.

xxx 1999

European Commission, COM(1999) 644 nal.

Declaration on the Speci c Characteristics of Sport and its Social Function in Europe, of Which Account Should be Taken in Implementing Common Policies. Presidency Conclusions, Nice European Council Meeting,

xxx 2000

7-9. December. xxx 2004

Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.

Publications O ce of

the European Union, O cial Journal, C310/01.

Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Communit y. Publications O ce of the Eu-

xxx 2007

ropean Union, O cial Journal C 306/01. xxx 2007

Fehér Könyv a Sportról (White Paper on Sport ).

Európai Bizottság,

Európai Közösségek Hivatalos Kiadványainak Hivatala, Luxembourg, p. 40.

Acta Universitatis Sapientiae European and Regional Studies, vol. 1, no. 1 (2010) 121 133

Book Reviews Interdisciplinary Scienti c Discourse and the Issue of Minorities A Review of the Volume

Nations and National Minorities in the European Union.

Ed. by Barna Bodó and Márton Tonk.

Cluj-Napoca: Scientia Publishing House, 2009.

SZÁSZ Alpár Zoltán

Babe³-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca

This volume comprising most of the papers presented at one of the rst international conferences organised by the Department of European Studies of the Sapientia University Faculty of Sciences and Arts Cluj will most probably make a peculiar rst impression to many readers because they might consider it rather eclectic. However, this eclecticism should not be construed as inviting criticism, but rather as a reason for praise. The organisers of the conference, who are by the way the editors of the book, may be commended since they bore in mind that the multitude of topics to be addressed when dealing with the issue of nations and national minorities leaves no viable alternative to the interdisciplinary approach, which pervades the pages of this publication.

Anthropologists, philosophers, experts in minority law, economists, linguists, political scientists and sociologists contributed to the volume. This resulted in multifariousness and richness of ideas both in terms of the topics dealt with by the authors and the approaches they deemed adequate for discussing their subjects.

The book is divided into three larger parts. The rst part addresses the wide area of issues related to the presence of national minorities in the member states of the European Union; the second seems to ask the question whether Europe

Book Reviews

122

is made up by languages and identities or, simply, languages and identities are merely present in Europe; while the last is a set of re ections on how current political practice is trying to nd solutions that observe the general normative requirement(s) of democracy to the plethora of 'problems' stemming from the co-existence of nation-states and national minorities.

Probably one way to adequately summarise the entire content and message of the volume is to quote the rst sentence of its introductory study: `Presently, Europe is made up of 47 states, in which one may nd 353 ethnic groups, or more precisely national or ethnic minorities, i.e., autochthonous population groups speaking a native language which is, in general, di erent from the o cial language of the respective state.' This situation may well be perceived as one generating enormous resources or unimaginable cultural richness for Europe, nonetheless, it may be interpreted as a problem, too, a threat to stability and security in the European Union and its 27 member states, or a security dilemma confronting the European Union itself. This is the context in which Christoph Pan chooses to place minorities and minority policy seen both as a foreign policy priority for the EU and as a challenge regarding the internal a airs of the EU. Bearing in mind that professor Pan's study was the keynote speech of the conference, these thoughts set the tone of debate and, in consequence, of the whole volume as well.

In their paper, Attila Demeter and Mรกrton Tonk continue one of the ideas set forth in the previous writing, namely the statement that the problem of national minorities is not part of and, may I add, cannot be part of the so-called

acquis communautaire.

Therefore, they turn their attention to inter-

national legal instruments adopted by the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the legal standards therein.

They regretfully observe that the policies adopted by international organisations with regard to issues or con icts related to national minorities are quite often dictated by speci c security policy considerations entailed by concrete situations that have to be dealt with rather urgently. This state of a airs leads to an ambivalent treatment of minority issues, or although the authors prefer to avoid such a sharp formulation to imposing a double standard. That is, international organisations seem to simultaneously stimulate and sti e ethnic activism and mobilisation; to present successful Western European models of ethnic autonomy as examples to be followed, while warning other countries of their implementation as if such a measure will necessarily lead to ethnic secession, and nally, uphold or dismiss 'the legitimacy of special minority rights' according to their momentary interests and considerations.

Book Reviews

123

The last two papers included in this initial part of the volume discuss national and/or regional minority movements and parties, and the idea of postnational minorities, respectively. We learn from BalĂĄzs VĂ­zi that the above international organisations, in spite of the subtle criticism levelled against them in the previous paper, are increasingly becoming fora where minority organisations and parties may represent themselves. In the meantime, ethnoregionalist movements seem to have given up, at least partly, their separatist claims and start focusing on the idea of shared sovereignty an opportunity that presents itself as a result of deepening European integration.

Notwithstanding the previous author's interest for changes in formal political organisations, AndrĂĄs A. Gergely investigates modi cations in informal political and communicational structures. His main contention is that in the absence of these changes, the national framework of political existence would still rule supreme and unchallenged making it di cult and risky for other forms of political existence and organisation (e.g., minority or local) to emerge while (`nationalising') identity policies are implemented by most nation-states. But this is not the case. We live in an increasingly globalised world in which an Asian bird disease or a computer virus devoid of national identity may a ect us all in many respects, and in a Europe characterised by integration on the national and regional levels and increasing disintegration on the level of local communities. Under these circumstances, local or minority identities still have a hard time in nding opportunities for self-expression, but not because national identities are strong.

Au contraire,

because they have been gradually

eroded and weakened! If we live indeed in an era characterised by the disintegration of various communities, one cannot overstate the importance of the Euro-Atlantic integration bridging the gap between West and East. Still, in A. Gergely's opinion, it is very di cult and also inappropriate to formulate other general and perhaps premature conclusions. Instead, we should content ourselves with asking a puzzling and crucial scienti c question, namely whether being a (post-national) minority is simply a state or an opportunity for integration, `or a [value-]choice born [out] of necessity or insight'.

The part trying to disentangle the relationships between identities and Europe comprises, on the one hand, papers discussing the question of mono-, biand multilingualism as well as the resulting challenges for a Europe undergoing various transformations, and on the other hand, writings on ethnic identity and identi cation. In what concerns the rst three papers of this section, the contribution written by Krisztina-MĂĄria SĂĄrosi-MĂĄrdirosz is unique of its kind.

An interesting fact is that the author, apart from being both a linguist and a political scientist, is also a practicing translator and interpreter.

Thus, it

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124

comes as no surprise that she writes about various aspects regarding the legal language and o cial (legal) translations involving the language pair made up by the Romanian and Hungarian languages.

In her paper, she stresses the

cultural-institutional and linguistic aspects generating di culties for translators when trying to nd o cially acceptable equivalents for various terms and names of institutions.

The striking fact regarding the two papers tackling the eld of socio-linguistics is the sharp contrast between the two versions or sides of reality seen and presented by their authors.

Both linguists, Orsolya Nรกdor and Lรกszlรณ Marรกcz,

agree that nation-states are characterised by linguistic disparities in what concerns the o cial, majority language and the languages of national minorities.

They are in agreement even with regard to their labelling of language policies as hegemonic. However, Orsolya Nรกdor is interested in singling out the motivations behind individuals' decisions to learn languages. She points out that persons belonging to the titular nation in a certain country learn foreign languages primarily if their native language is not a world language, such as English, French, German or Spanish. Hence, by learning at least one of the latter, they will augment their communication skills and possibilities. In contrast, members of national minorities (in Central and Eastern Europe) are forced by law and circumstances to acquire the o cial majority language rst and then proceed to studying other, widely used, languages. Finally, Nรกdor adds that no matter how bene cial this may be for mutual understanding, persons belonging to the titular nation of a state rarely learn a minority language. Nevertheless, Lรกszlรณ Marรกcz, considering the experiences of Hungarian-Hungarian relationships, positive examples of cross-border co-operation as well as various (statistical) data, asserts that `the Hungarian language has a good chance of becoming a

lingua franca

in the Carpathian Basin'.

In what concerns ethnic identity and identi cation, the paper written in German language by Vasile Docea a Romanian historian investigates the link between ethnic identi cation and the mental-symbolic image constructed by various ethnic groups of his city of residence: Temeswar/Timiยณoara/Temesvรกr.

More precisely, Docea marshalling historiographical sources stemming from the ethnic communities inhabiting the city studies the interplay between the narrative reconstruction of the past and the discourse on ethnic identity with a special focus on the interpretation of ethnically divisive historical events like the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence from 1848-1849, which, with some notable exceptions, pitted Hungarians against Germans.

In another paper targeting this topic, Mรกtyรกs Binder describes the three identity layers of the Boyash Gypsies in Hungary. His most interesting remark

Book Reviews concerns the situational-relational character of identity layers.

125 The Boyash

view themselves as Boyash, a respectable Gypsy group speaking an archaic dialect of the Romanian language, when they wish to di erentiate themselves from other ethno-social or occupational Gypsy groups of lower status and/or prestige. They see themselves as Gypsies when the relationship of state institutions to the whole Romani population in Hungary is the issue at hand, and nally, they identify themselves as Hungarians in case of o cial celebrations and sporting events involving Hungarians as a political nation.

The last part of the book discusses, on the one hand, elements as well as solutions present in current political practice regarding minorities and, on the other hand, addresses various aspects of minority life. Rather interestingly, it is introduced by a paper on the theoretical, philosophical and legal grounding of future solutions to the wide area of questions, which may arise from minority communal existence. In this rather optimistic study, PĂŠter Egyed marshals political declarations and legal instruments adopted in the last two decades.

These seem to embody a novel and more general conception of (positive) liberty equated with autonomy and self-determination, and summarised best by the phrase `[f ]reedom means diversity' or Isaiah Berlin's assertion that `paternalism is the greatest tyranny conceivable'. Nevertheless, as the author points out, some of these documents overstate and overgeneralise the `benevolence' of nation-states and their ethnic majorities and are also overcon dent in what regards the existence of immediate solutions. He argues that instead of nding solutions parties should try to initiate processes which may possibly lead in the long run to solutions. As for processes, he concludes that `the pressure of circumstances' most notably Kosovo's situation and the impetuous drive for increased autonomy in Catalunya will eventually force even EU legislators to seriously consider the idea of collective rights.

In the next paper, Thomas Benedikter examines the performance of autonomy solutions in 36 regions and territories belonging to 11 European countries.

According to him, autonomies perform well if they contribute to the establishment of harmonious relationships between ethnic groups sharing a certain territory and increase respect for minority rights while securing political stability and economic development. The author operationalises these four criteria through a set of indicators, termed by him `functions', and examines how these functions are ful lled by various autonomies. He concludes that three of the territories included in his analysis (the Åland and Farøe Islands as well as Greenland) have achieved quasi-statehood, while South Tyrol and the historical autonomous communities in Spain (Catalunya; Euskadi, i. e., the Basque Country and Galicia) enjoy very advanced forms of autonomy. A similar situa-

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126

tion can be observed in the only two non-EU territories, Crimea and Gagauzia.

In an important nal remark, Benedikter deems European autonomies success stories. The fact that cutting back the functions of autonomous regions has not been considered as a serious political and legal option in any of these eleven countries, rather conversely, the existing autonomy system has been `continuously improved and deepened' is a su cient proof for his statement.

Nevertheless, misgivings still exist and territorial autonomy solutions must be devised after careful consideration and taking account of the eleven lessons drawn from European experiences, which are enumerated at the very end of the article.

Apart from autonomy, the right of minorities to education in native language is another important concern. Barna Bodรณ deals with an interesting aspect of this issue in connection with the Hungarian community in Romania, an ethnic group which has had its own university for more than a decade even during the Communist regime that eventually abolished it in 1959. Four decades later, the reestablishment of this state- nanced university was perhaps the most clearly formulated aspiration of the respective community, which supported the envisaged measure unanimously. However, as compared to this in hindsight rather ambitious political goal, two decades of political struggle yielded modest results.

Moreover, under these circumstances, the political elite apparently

dropped the project, ethnic Hungarian academics `are waiting in confusion' and the community itself shows no reaction whatsoever. This state of a airs is a puzzle for any analyst, Bodรณ being no exception. Hence, he decomposes the dilemma into three questions: (1) was the initial goal setting a mistake; (2) were the means or the manner employed to achieve the goal inadequately chosen and can somebody be held, politically or personally, accountable for mishandling the issue; (3) how e ective is the Hungarian minority public sphere in Romania, inasmuch as a matter of this salience can be shelved with relative ease. In trying to answer these questions, the author carefully examines the socio-historical context and two decades of political developments particularly in the eld of education policy in post-Communist Romania. Terming, most probably justly, the Romanian political system institution-centred, he assigns the blame almost exclusively to the DAHR (RMDSZ).

The last three writings in the volume are dedicated to a socio-political phenomenon which is gradually lled with new content: cross-border relations.

The respective papers address various aspects of the questions, that is, linguistic, cultural, anthropological, economic and political-administrative.

Along

these lines, the encompassing aim of the study written by Szilvia Szotรกk is to delineate what changes did the Austrian and Hungarian accession to the Euro-

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127

pean Union entail with regard to the life and social network of local linguistic communities: the Hungarian, the Croatian and the Romani. Considering the interplay of various special circumstances the inexistence of a Romani external national homeland, the laggardness of Croatia in European integration as well as the strength of Hungarian traditions in Burgenland her paper is inescapably one sided. It is no wonder that positive changes can be observed exclusively in the case of Hungarians. For instance, the prestige of their language increased and their cultural life became livelier especially after 2004, although the intensi cation of cross-border cultural contacts started immediately after the fall of the Iron Curtain.

All this seems to underscore the

author's impression that Burgenland Hungarians di er (markedly) form other Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin and from Austrians, too. As opposed to the previous paper, ZoltĂĄn Simon's anthropological writing focuses on borders and on Transylvania-Hungary and/or Hungary-Transylvania discourses.

His

main contention is that the word and concept `Transylvanian(ism)' seems to be a stigma in the perception of Hungarians living in Hungary since it is often equated with Romanian, backward, poor, needy and arbitrary. His hope, however using a metaphor inspired by Georg Simmel is that, in the future, people will gradually cease to interpret borders as doors, which divide us, and see them as bridges, which connect and unite.

The nal study of the volume discusses the relationship between cross-border cooperation and minority policy. In the rather polarised arena of Hungarian domestic politics, cross-border cooperation has been perceived either as a replacement for traditional minority policy or as a somewhat ine cient instrument diverting energies and resources form `genuine' minority protection. In DĂĄniel HegedÂśs's opinion, neither of the above interpretations is entirely accurate. He thinks that, if adequately implemented, cross-border cooperation and minority policy can complement each other.

The rather intricate argument

presented by the author is based on new European legal instruments regarding territorial cooperation, which may be used even for supporting autonomy e orts of border regions and minorities.

The variety of the approaches, the richness of ideas and the merits of the arguments presented by most authors can impress any reader or reviewer. I do not wish to assert that while reading this book, one will hold a perfect nished product in her/his hands, but collecting and publishing these studies was certainly a worthwhile exercise.

All in all, the editors' hope that this

volume may represent a valuable contribution to minority studies and become a useful tool for anyone interested in the eld seems justi ed.

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128

Dilemmas, Thoughts about Diaspora and Life in Diaspora A Review of the Volume Bodó Barna: (Internal Diaspora and Language Border). Kisebbségkutatási Könyvek (Books on Minority Research), Lucidus Publishing House, Budapest, 2009.

Szórvány és nyelvhatár

FAZAKAS Emese

Babe³-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca

Perhaps the most serious problem of the Hungarian communities in neighbouring countries is the continuous diasporization because it leads to assimilation in the absence of positive discrimination. The author of the book, the Transylvanian professor Barna Bodó is perhaps the best expert of the diaspora research. In this work, he brings us new ideas in the theoretical grounding of the diaspora problem as well as in practical research and university education these sentences are written on the back of Barna Bodó's latest volume: Barna Bodó, although born in an area where the Hungarian population is in majority, left his home town early and settled in the Bánság (Banat), a diaspora region for Hungarians. This de ned and is de ning his career, his public activities, scienti c interests, perhaps even his teaching habits. The chairman of the Diaspora Foundation has more than 10 separate volumes, more than 80 studies and he is editor of more than 10 volumes. Among these works there are hardly any which do not in any way discuss the issues of diaspora, diasporization.

The author publishes in this volume 14 revised studies that were originally presented at conferences, symposiums during the last 15 years. Each study is treating diaspora issues, problems of the diaspora situation: the di culties, the attitude, the economic status, the education, the culture of the people living in diaspora. One of the most important issues, which over the years arose not only in Barna Bodó's studies, is: what is diaspora? In several places the author states that one has to make a distinction between the terms internal diaspora) and

diaszpóra

szórvány

(ethnic or

(migration diaspora). The rst community,

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129

the ethnic/internal diaspora, is an ethnic community that has not changed its habitation, and the diasporization process is in uenced by historical-social circumstances.

The second community, the migration diaspora, comes into

being as a consequence of immigration (mostly to overseas lands) and is made up by economic immigrants.

It is very important to clarify the usage and

meaning of these terms especially for non-Hungarian speakers. In this volume, whenever the term

szórvány

is used, it refers to the ethnic/internal diaspora.

The most important recurrent question has been left unanswered for long.

The de nition of internal diaspora is still pending despite the fact that the scholars who study the question of diaspora do know what they are dealing with, what and how they are researching and how the internal diaspora situation emerges. Recently, several typologies of the diaspora were created (see Nándor Bárdi's typology, which the author repeatedly refers to).

However,

Barna Bodó deservedly raises the question more than once: Where does the border lie, when and on what basis can we talk about internal diaspora?

He states that One has to make a distinction between diaspora and diasporization. If the cultural and political boundaries coincide, internal diasporas do not come into being.

As long as language borders do not coincide with

frontiers, internal diasporas will exist. If by fate political borders vary significantly in time, diasporization occurs. Perhaps it is not necessary to mention concrete examples to illustrate how the ethnic boundaries were 'enforced' in many places by introduction, relocation and shift of the population, by forced immigration. In the case of diasporization, the individual tends to disregard the relevancy of the existing connection, the possibilities and relations that determine self-identity, but he/she builds into his/her value judgement and self-evaluation a future-image based on the emerging process. Diasporization lls in the situation with direct political content, the individual does not respond to the current status, but he/she is driven by the occurring events, thus the process in uences him/her, moreover, it de nes his/her life. (...) Internal diaspora is the medium (...)

where the indicated process of language- and

cultural shift may seem natural, but never is. A comprehensive investigation about the diasporization process with respect to settlement type, settlement size and local institutionalization, about the extent to which these factors in uence the evolving situation has not been carried out concerning Hungarians in Transylvania. Due to some local research one has partial results, but these are incidental (p. 148-9.).

Barna Bodó cannot conduct alone a research to map all internal diaspora regions in Transylvania or Romania, so he is exploring the situation in the Banat. In his study entitled

Azonosulás, elitek, peremlét

(Identi cation, Elites,

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130

Existence along the Borderline) the author presents a wide survey conducted in 1996-1997.

The research examines the settlements in the Banat with re-

gard to demographic regression, economic potential, system of public utilities, education, culture. Let's see here the key conclusions. Demographically the village in general is losing ground, however, the restructuring of the industrial system forced a relatively large population to return to their home village.

This movement was not able to halt the demographic regression in villages, which is anyway part of the general decrease of population. (...) Education is on decline, school is losing its attractiveness as part of the general change in value orientation. (...) The position of public cultural institutions is determined by, one could say, a general tendency to turn away from culture (p.

48.). These ndings may apply not only to the internal diaspora. However, if we read all the conclusions regarding the self-identity, we immediately see the biggest problems of the internal diaspora (in respect of the economic, demographic and other indicators), which lead to diasporization, then to the loss of ethnic awareness. Narrowing the eld in which they can use their mother tongue. (...) Loosening ties to the native community. (...) Driving back the native culture. (...) The lack of leader gures is even more signi cant among Hungarians than among the majority Romanians. (...) The importance of the church should be mentioned along the school, but one-third of the analysed settlements has no local priests, and in two places the Catholic priest does not consider his task to support distinctively the Hungarian culture (p. 50-1.).

The study entitled

Elitek, modellek szerepek

(Elites, Models, Roles) presents

the results of a larger research. Besides the usual questions of a survey (age, sex, marital status, education) the researchers try to obtain answers regarding the following issues: the language of education, languages spoken within the family, knowledge of language, leisure activities, culture, inter-ethnic relations, vision of their future, community involvement. The researchers wanted to get some knowledge about the status of the Hungarian elite. The survey results were interesting: Although the notes suggest that it is di cult to assess the answers regarding the evaluation of the current situation according to a common standard, it is obvious that the local minority elite perceives the situation as positive and incorporates this perception into their life strategy (p. 73), and There is no consistency in role-formation as regards the behaviour inspired internal values and the tasks really undertaken (p. 84).

Within the pages of the essay

Szórványok kutatása

(Researching Internal

Diasporas), the author uses the work of Pál Péter Tóth written in the 1940s under the title In the Diaspora to re ect on the theoretical issues. The study

Jöv®tervezés és b¶nbánat

(Future-planning and Remorse) is closely linked to

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131

the previous one. Here the author tries to formulate solutions. In particular, he talks about the importance of maintaining education in mother tongue and the possibilities of the practical realization of this, as well as about how to keep the Hungarian-speaking children in Hungarian classes instead of forcing them to enrol into Romanian ones.

The study

SzĂłrvĂĄny ĂŠs dinamika

(Internal Diaspora and Dynamics) tackles

mostly theoretical issues, focusing especially on the terminology traps, which hinder or may in future hinder the dialogue between the majority and the minority.

There can also be found a brief but meaningful overview of act-

ing ethnopolitical approach in Romania, of the role, the involvement or noninvolvement of the DAHR. Other aspects of theoretical issues are discussed in the study entitled

SzĂłrvĂĄnydiskurzus ĂŠs tudomĂĄny

(Internal Diaspora-discourse

and Science). Besides the recurrent theoretical issues (what is an internal diaspora, the process of diasporization, the relationship of individual and community, status and law), the author points to the three nation-models which are dominant in terms of minorities in Romania. The German model of nationbuilding that encourages the immigration of all members of the German nation who can be identi ed on the basis of their family ties and the Romanian model of nation-building that at least implicitly envisages the uni cation of all geographical areas inhabited by Romanians are very close to each other, while the Romanian and the identity-based Hungarian model (of ethnoterritorial nation-building focusing on the preservation of the ethnic identity of all Hungarians coupled with their continuity in their current, historically determined settlement areas) are mutually exclusive. In these circumstances there is constant confusion; situations occur in which both parties feel o ended, in spite of the goodwill there are misunderstandings and communication fails. In the study entitled

SzĂłrvĂĄnynarratĂ­vĂĄk

(Narratives on the Internal Diaspora),

Barna BodĂł continues the line of the previous theoretical studies. In particular, he analyses the diaspora-typology of ZoltĂĄn IllyĂŠs and claims that this typology would be the most acceptable in terms of further research. The author returns to the issue of internal diaspora and diasporization, including the types of assimilation. The presentation of structural assimilation is followed by the conclusion: The pressure of the structural assimilation is one of the essential elements of diasporization. In addition, it is strengthened or weakened by the majority-minority discourse, which in respect of internal diaspora can be named diaspora-discourse. If TimiÂł (Temes) county or TimiÂłoara (TemesvĂĄr) is taken as an example, we can speak about a

permissive discourse

since the

majority acknowledges the existence of a minority and that's it. (...) The minority's response can be labelled as a

discourse of good manners :

they accept

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132

the situation, they accept their status as a group of second-rate citizens, and perhaps they are happy for not being hurt, for not being threatened in their minority status as far as there are examples of such a behaviour (p. 1401.). Within the pages of the study entitled

A szĂłrvĂĄny ĂŠs a Makkai-dilemma

(Internal Diaspora and the Makkai-dilemma) the author analyses the issues concerning the minority status emerged after the First World War. Starting from these problems he tackles the re-emerging issues which determine the current minority status, the ethnopolitical situation.

In the following essay,

ÉrtÊkek, nyelvhasznålat szórvåny

(Values, Language

Usage Internal Diaspora), Barna BodĂł focuses on identity research. While largely using the results of a survey carried out in September 2004 by the Max Weber Center for Advanced Cultural and Social Studies, BodĂł places the emphasis on language usage as the usage or non-usage of one's mother tongue in di erent areas is what determines the self-identity of an individual living in internal diaspora.

The individual is facing a decision:

if he/she chooses

to belong to a community (that is already given to him/her), he/she cannot be part of another (external, culturally di erent but strong) community (see p. 163.). The individual has to choose between a community determined by his/her family, mother tongue, historical heritage and a community with whom he/she has no such connections. The language of education is decisive in this dilemma situation, and so is the extent to which the individual appreciates his/her mother tongue, the way he/she regards the language of the majority, if he/she is ashamed or proud to be born Hungarian.

We live in a world of strategies ..., however, there is no strategy for internal diaspora in Transylvania states Barna BodĂł in the study entitled

stratĂŠgia nemzet

SzĂłrvĂĄny,

(Internal Diaspora, Strategy Nation). In order to develop

a strategy or some strategies, there are two questions to be answered: Who or what institution is or would be responsible for preparing such a programmatic document? To whom should be made such a document; the political elite or what social institutions would be responsible for the diaspora issue? (p. 192).

The author tries to answer these questions, and urges the researchers to study in detail the internal diaspora problem.

Barna BodĂł is forced to another return to the theoretical issues in his study entitled A szĂłrvĂĄnytĂłl a nemzetig ĂŠs vissza (From Internal Diaspora to Nation and Back) written in 2006. His goal is to give, nally, a de nition of internal diaspora, and in addition, the diaspora policy and the strategy outlined above are further elaborated here.

The essay

SzĂłrvĂĄny, identitĂĄs, civil tĂĄrsadalom

(Internal Diaspora, Identity, Civil Society) outlines the role of the civil society, the responsibilities to be taken by it; and in the last study,

SzĂłrvĂĄny asszim-

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133

(Internal Diaspora Assimilation Diasporization),

the author provides us with new theoretical aspects, the latest research results in order to rethink and study in detail the situation of internal diasporas, and perhaps to nd solutions.

Barna Bodó's book gives us a comprehensive picture of the rst tentative theories and of what has been or has not been achieved at both theoretical and practical level.

Acta Universitatis Sapientiae European and Regional Studies, vol. 1, no. 1 (2010) 134 143

Academy A airs (News, Events) Inter-institutional Agreement on Cooperation between the Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania and the Hungarian Institute of International A airs (Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvรกr, May 4, 2009)

On May 4, 2009 an inter-institutional agreement on cooperation was signed in Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvรกr between the Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania (Faculty of Sciences and Arts, Department of European Studies) and the Hungarian Institute of International A airs.

The signing of the agreement represents a further level in the joint activities carried out by these parties. It is su cient to mention in this respect the joint lectures held on November 5, 2008 at the Hungarian Institute of International A airs by Zoltรกn Kรกntor, Research Fellow on behalf of the Hungarian Institute of International A airs and Barna Bodรณ, Coordinator of Studies on behalf of the Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania, discussing the Romanian legislative elections held in 2008 (the latter presented the position of the Hungarian minority towards the elections, focusing on the relationship between minorities and foreign policy).

The two parties entering joint activities in the eld of teaching, research, and science were represented by Jรกnos Terรฉnyi, PhD, Director of the Hungarian Institute of International A airs, Lรกszlรณ Kiss J., Dr. habil., Research Director and Zoltรกn Kรกntor, Research Fellow; Mรกrton Tonk, PhD, Dean of the Faculty of Sciences and Arts, Cluj-Napoca, Sapientia University, Radu Lupescu, PhD, Head of the Department of European Studies, and Barna Bodรณ, PhD, Coordinator of Studies.

The agreement comprises joint activities in teaching and research: respecting the curricula of the two institutions, academics from the Hungarian Insti-

Academy A airs (News, Events)

135

tute of International A airs have been o ered the opportunity to hold lectures in the eld of international a airs and diplomacy.

The sta of the

Institute is also invited to participate in round-table discussions organized for the academic community of Cluj-Napoca/KolozsvĂĄr.

Likewise, the teaching

sta of the Sapientia University is invited to present lectures and reports at the Institute.

Joint research activities have a key role in the agreement: the parties agreed upon conducting joint researches, participating together in research grants and projects, inviting each other to conferences and workshops organized by the partner institutions, informing each other about the ongoing researches and the latest results, as well as facilitating individual researches conducted by the academics of the partner institutions in each other's home country.

The agreement refers also to joint editorial activity: members of the partner institutions

are

invited

to

publish

in

each

other's

scienti c

journals.

Exchange of publications will also be carried out via the libraries of the partner institutions.

Facilitating the work of students is also a very important issue in the agreement: students are o ered assistance with their research activity conducted in one of the partner institutions as well as use of the library and facilities, and students from Romania who have outstanding results may also opt for an internship at the Hungarian Institute of International A airs.

As a rst example of joint activities in the eld of education, both JĂĄnos TerĂŠnyi and LĂĄszlĂł Kiss J. presented lectures after the signing of the agreement: JĂĄnos TerĂŠnyi discussed the key issues of Hungary's international a airs in the last 20 years (o ering a brief survey on the main strategies, directives and events between 1989-2009), while the lecture From the Old to the New

Diplomacy. The Complex and Dual Character of Foreign A airs by LĂĄszlĂł Kiss J. addressed problems such as the theory and history of foreign a airs and international relations, Hungary's position in the eld of international policy after the fall of the old regime.

KOKOLY Zsolt Department of European Studies, Sapientia University Cluj-Napoca

Academy A airs (News, Events)

136

European and Regional Studies The ECPR Standing Group on Federalism and Regionalism and Minority Rights Research The Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) is an independent, scholarly association, established in 1970. It supports and encourages the training, research and cross-national co-operation of political scientists throughout Europe and beyond. The ECPR currently has nearly 350 European institutional members and associate members in over 40 countries, from as far a eld as New Zealand and Japan.

These members together form a network of thou-

sands of individual political scientists, international relations and European studies specialists.

th General Conference on 10-12

This fall I visited the 5

September 2009 that was held in Potsdam, Germany. I presented my paper on 'European tools of Con ict Management in Central European States with Hungarian Minorities' in the panel entitled 'Governing Divided Societies: Territorial and non-Territorial Tools of Con ict Management'. The abstract reads as follows:

Due to twentieth century peace treaties extensive Hungarian minorities live in the Central-European states Slovakia (600.000), Serbia (400.000), Romania (1.5 million) and Ukraine (300.000). These states are deeply divided along ethnic-linguistic, religious and cultural lines between the Hungarian versus nonHungarian, i.e., Slovak, Serb, Romanian and Ukrainian majority communities.

The situation of the Hungarian minorities and the relations of the Hungarians and the majority populations have not improved structurally after the fall of communism and the expansion of the European Union to Eastern Europe.

This state of a airs negatively a ects the relations between the states with Hungarian minorities and neighbouring kin state Hungary, jeopardizing cohesion in the European Union and risking safety and security in Central Europe and the Balkans. This paper presents an empirical investigation of the state of a airs in the territories inhabited by the Hungarian minorities, discussing the root, character and scope of the con icts. Emphasis will be put on the proposals for a solution put forward by the legitimate Hungarian representatives introducing all sort of concepts of territorial politics, like ethnic autonomy and minority rights. Secondly, the paper will analyse the architectural and legal options the EU o ers for governing these con icts, both territorial and non-territorial tools, including the spill-over e ects of independent statehood in the case of

Academy A airs (News, Events)

137

Kosovo and other frozen con icts. From the empirical data and the theoretical analysis a set of tools will be formulated tting the nature of the societies involved, contributing to the management of con icts in the Central European states with Hungarian minorities.

3 key words: territorial politics, Hungarian minorities in Central Europe; European tools The panel was chaired by Wilfried Swenden (University of Edinburgh) and Klaus Detterbeck (University of Magdeburg).

Further papers in this panel

included among other: Organizing for Stability: Strategic Choices and Dilemmas for State-wide Parties in Divided Societies by Wilfried Swenden (University of Edinburgh) and Klaus Detterbeck (University of Magdeburg); Why is Territorial Autonomy not Enough?

By Kris Deschouwer (Free University of

Brussel); Ethnic Federalism, Political Allegiance and the Right to Secede by Ian O'Flynn (University of Newcastle); The Politics of Territory in Ethnically Polarized Cities:

Looking for a Comparative Framework by Marco Allegra

(University of Torino); and the Perils of Post-Ethnic Political Mobilization: a Case Study of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Peter Vermeersch and Heleen Touquet (Catholic University Louvain).

One of the Standing Groups operating within the ECPR framework is the Standing Group on Federalism and Regionalism boarded by Wilfried Swenden, Klaus Detterbeck and Eve Hepburn. In the general meeting of this Standing Group at the end of the Potsdam conference my proposal to set up a Research Group on Central and East European National and Ethnic Minorities was accepted by the general meeting. In the September Newsletter of the SG (nr.

29) my Call to form a Research Group was published:

Call to form a Research Group on Minorities Amsterdam Dear friends, my name is Laszlo Maracz and I am a lecturer in East European Studies at the University of Amsterdam. I would like to invite researchers, scholars and other interested specialists to participate in a research group on 'Central and Eastern European national and ethnic minorities' (CEENEMRG). The CEENEM-RG will operate under the agship of the ECPR SG on Federalism and Regionalism.

CEENEM-RG research issues will include the

broadest dimensions of national and ethnic minorities in Central and East Europe (CEE), such as security and stability, the legal framework for minority rights' protection in the Union and related international European organizations (the Council of Europe, OCSE, etc.); case studies including social, polit-

138

Academy A airs (News, Events)

ical, linguistic, educational and religious aspects; stereotypes and images; and comparative analyses with West European national and ethnic minorities and federalization frameworks.

Hence, analysts from all sorts of scienti c disci-

plines covering social and political sciences, history, linguistics, law, economy and area studies are welcome to participate. The goal of CEENEM-RG is to pursue fundamental theoretical research in this eld. International collaboration in this eld creates possibilities for organizing workshops and panels in future ECPR meetings and preparing joint publications.

CEENEM-RG will

be able to apply for research grants in the framework of the ESF, the EU's KP8 and local, national research foundations. If you are interested in joining CEENEM-RG please send an email (with your name, a liation and a short CV) to me at: l.k.maracz@uva.nl.

MARĂ CZ LĂĄszlĂł European Studies, University of Amsterdam

Culture, Science and Nation in the Carpathian Region International Conference in VeszprĂŠm, Hungary (May 8, 2009) New opportunities for inter-institutional cooperation between the Faculty of Sciences and Arts, Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania, Cluj/ KolozsvĂĄr and the Faculty of Modern Philology and Social Sciences, University of Pannonia, VeszprĂŠm have been constantly looked for ever since the signing of the agreement on cooperation. Following a joint council meeting between the representatives of the two institutions (in September 2008), an invitation was extended to the teaching sta of the Sapientia University to take part in the international conference Culture, science and nation in the Carpathian

region that was to be held in VeszprĂŠm on May 8, 2009.

The international conference represented a novelty in the traditional celebration of the Gizella Napok (Gizella Days), one of the most important and complex events in VeszprĂŠm. The series of events is dedicated to Queen Gizella, wife to Saint Stephen, the rst Christian King of Hungary, as the city of VeszprĂŠm was o ered to her as a royal wedding gift. The festivities traditionally include high mass and procession, art events (concerts, exhibitions, theatre galas etc), fairs and salons.

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139

In 2009 Veszprรฉm (as well as Veszprรฉm County) celebrated 1000 years of existence and commemorated 950 years since the death of Queen Gizella. Thus, the organizers included in this year's program an international conference dedicated to questions in the eld of Hungarology, entitled Culture, science and

nation in the Carpathian region, and their intention is to have it organized biannually. The conference seeks to facilitate, implement and consolidate the cultural and scienti c cooperation of Hungarian scholars, researchers, as well as of scienti c institutions. It aims at shaping the role of Hungarian identity and self-consciousness in an era of globalized European cultures, as well as at presenting alternatives to the growing phenomenon of Americanization and technical isolation.

Organized under the auspices of the Veszprรฉm Academic Committee (one of the seven regional committees of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) and the City Hall of Veszprรฉm, the conference brought together at its rst edition an impressive number of 60 presentations, sustained by academics and researchers from Hungary and its neighboring countries (Romania, Ukraine, Slovakia, Croatia).

The Sapientia University was represented at this international event by professor Zoltรกn Kรกsa, assoc.

professor Mรกrton Tonk, dean of the Faculty of

Sciences and Arts, assoc. professor Barna Bodรณ, univ. lecturer Radu Lupescu, head of the Department of European Studies, as well as Jรกnos Kristรณf Murรกdin and Zsolt Kokoly, assistant lecturers at the Department of European Studies.

Given the high number of participants, the conference was organized in three panels comprising the following thematic groups: National identity in the

era of globalization, Culture, values and memory, Language, language policies and Hungarians, Literature, minorities and theatre, Institutions and destinies, Ethnology, cult, cultural heritage, Archives and Hungarica research, Hungarian philosophy (this last one was chaired by Mรกrton Tonk).

The presentations sustained by Zoltรกn Kรกsa, Jรกnos Kristรณf Murรกdin and Zsolt Kokoly were included into the thematic group Institutions and destinies.

Zoltรกn Kรกsa presented a synthesis of scienti c researches conducted at the Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania, pointing out the results obtained, the particularities of the research activity within the university, as well as future plans and perspectives for scienti c cooperation. Jรกnos Kristรณf Murรกdin and Zsolt Kokoly presented fragments of Transylvanian institutional history (history of Hungarian theatres in Transylvania between 1944 and 1948, respectively the history of Law studies in Cluj/Kolozsvรกr from 1581 to the present day).

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140

Barna Bodรณ presented a paper entitled Diaspora and the borderlines of a na-

tion. This presentation took part in the rst thematic group, National identity in the era of globalization, and was in dialogue with the other presentations, which were dealing with problems of national identity, cultural diplomacy in the 21

st century, paradigm shifts in the Carpathian region or political repre-

sentation of Hungarian interests in Brussels.

Similarly, an exciting dialogue

between the presentations was to be observed in the thematic group Language,

language policies and Hungarians : both the theoretical (language as a determinant factor of the acquisition of culture, language-promoting strategies in the EU) as well as the practical aspects of language policies (teaching Hungarian as a foreign language, di culties of Hungarian-language higher education in Ukraine, language as a career of nation-wide accepted and acclaimed values) were discussed.

In the further thematic groups iconic topics of the Hungarian self-consciousness were being discussed and presented in new perspectives, topics like: the Hungarian identity in the works of the philosopher Sรกndor Karรกcsony, Hungarian ethos in the medieval chronicles (in the Gesta Hungarorum and the Illustrated Chronicle), the means of projecting and shaping the cult of Hungary's great king Matthias Corvinus (this latter being detailed in the presentation of our colleague, Radu Lupescu), The tragedy of man, the landmark drama by Imre Madรกch, and why not, the rise and fall of the once famous Hungarian football.

The participants of the conference also had the opportunity to get acquainted with workshops and scienti c institutions of the Carpathian Region as detailed presentations on the athenaeum in Szatmรกr county, the public sphere in Serbia, the higher education network in Ukraine or the Transylvanian institutions of philosophy were o ered to the audience.

It is without any doubt that the exchange of information, the discussion of common problems and best practices, the debates that had place, the suggestions and recommendations that were made during the conference have created new possibilities of cooperation and of joint research, as well as reinforced and completed the existing ones.

KOKOLY Zsolt Department of European Studies, Sapientia University Cluj-Napoca

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Chronology of Political and Regional Science Events in Transylvania Romania January-December 2009

May 4-5, 2009 A formerly existing cooperation agreement between the Hungarian Institute of International A airs (Budapest, Hungary) and the Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania Faculty of Sciences and Arts, Cluj-Napoca (Romania) was reinforced and extended to the year 2009. The extended agreement was signed by JĂĄnos TerĂŠnyi, Director of the Hungarian Institute of International A airs and MĂĄrton Tonk, Dean of the Faculty of Sciences and Arts, Cluj-Napoca, Sapientia University. The event was followed by public lectures on the

Twenty years of Hungarian foreign policy by JĂĄnos TerĂŠnyi and The complexity and dual nature of foreign policy by LĂĄszlĂł J. Kiss at the Sapientia University.

May 14, 2009

Specialists and researchers from the Department of Politi-

cal Science BabeÂł-Bolyai University presented their

volume of studies

(Reprezentarea diasporei ³i votul românilor din str in tate ) on vote collection methods elaborated for Romanians abroad.

The edition of the

volume was initiated and supported by the Soros Foundation Romania.

May 26, 2009 Public lecture on Democracy in Europe by Philippe C. Schmitter at the Department of Political Science, BabeÂł-Bolyai University. The debate of the topic was moderated by Kinga-Koretta Sata, assistant lecturer of political science at the BabeÂł-Bolyai University.

June 10, 2009 A regional monography of Southern Transylvania and Banat was presented by its editor, Gyula HorvĂĄth, at the Hungarian University Federation of Cluj/KolozsvĂĄr. series

A KĂĄrpĂĄt-medence rĂŠgiĂłi

The monography is part of the

(Regions of Carpathian Basin) pub-

lished by the Centre for Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Co-authors of this volume are mostly scholars from Cluj-

Napoca/KolozsvĂĄr, researchers in regional science, sociology and political science.

June 18-20, 2009

The conference entitled Nyelv, identitĂĄs, tĂśbbnyelvÂś

lĂŠt ĂŠs oktatĂĄs-politikĂĄk (Language, Identity, Multilingualism and Educational Policies) was held in Miercurea-Ciuc/CsĂ­kszereda. Organizers:

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142

the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities from ClujNapoca and the Sapientia University Miercurea-Ciuc Department of Romanian Language and Literature English Language and Literature.

June 19, 2009

An international conference was held to evoke the ac-

tivity of the former Bolyai University. tation of the book

kĂĄlvĂĄriĂĄjĂĄrĂłl

The event included the presen-

FehĂŠr kĂśnyv az erdĂŠlyi magyar felsÂŽoktatĂĄs

(White Book of the Hungarian Language Higher Educa-

tion in Transylvania).

July 16, 2009

The

Romåniai Magyar ÉvkÜnyv 2007-2008

(Hun-

garian Yearbook from Romania 2007-2008) was presented by its editor, Barna BodĂł and co-authors at the Summer University and Student Camp in TuÂłnad/TusnĂĄd.

September 29, 2009 The international conference Minorities and Traditional Communities in Transition was organized by the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities and the Kriza JĂĄnos Ethnographical Society. The conference focused mainly on the question of `double identity' and the case of the Csango, Aromanian, Armenian and Jewish Communities. Lecturers were: IstvĂĄn HorvĂĄth, Lehel Peti, Corina Iosif, Attila GidĂł, Ilka Veress, Vilmos TĂĄnczos, Veronika Lajos, Chris Davis, CÂ lin Cotoi, Ferenc Pozsony.

October 15, 2009 Within the framework of the series World Politics in the 20th Century organized by the Sapientia University Department of European Studies a public lecture was held on Hungarian-Romanian Relations in the Past 20 Years by MĂĄtyĂĄs SzilĂĄgyi, Consul General of Hungary in Cluj-Napoca.

October 22, 2009 Within the framework of the series World Politics in the 20th Century a public debate was held on the topic Struggle and Construction. Remembering the 1989 Revolution with the participation of LĂĄszlĂł TÂŽkĂŠs, European MP. Moderators were MiklĂłs Bakk and Ă rpĂĄd Gazda.

November, 2009

The Department of European Studies, Faculty of Sci-

ences and Arts, Cluj Napoca, Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania became member of the

Research.

European Consortium for Political

This association based at the University of Essex (UK) was

established in 1970 and supports and encourages trainings, researches

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143

and cross-national co-operation of political scientists throughout Europe and beyond. In 2009 it numbered 352 member institutions from 47 different countries. The Department of European Studies of the Sapientia University is the second institution with membership from Romania.

November 20-21, 2009 The Transylvanian Museum Society organized The Day of Hungarian Science in Transylvania. On the second day of this anniversary conference (the Museum Society celebrated 150 years of its existence), several lectures were given on political and regional sciences by AlpĂĄr ZoltĂĄn SzĂĄsz, Timea Csetnek, Daniel Pop, MiklĂłs Bakk, Timea Draveczky, Barna BodĂł and TĂźnde SzĂŠkely in the panel Social and

Political Science.

December 3-4, 2009 An international conference was held on the topic European Union and the Challenges of Contemporary Society organized by the Sapientia University Department of European Studies.

The following books were presented at the conference:

BodĂł Barna

Nations and National Minorities in EU, Scientia, Cluj-Napoca/KolozsvĂĄr, 2009; Cseke PĂŠter (Ed.): KistĂŠrsĂŠgek nagy remĂŠnyek? (Microregions Great Expectations?), KompPress, Cluj-Napoca/KolozsvĂĄr, 2009 and SzilĂĄgyi IstvĂĄn: EurĂłpa ĂŠs a mediterrĂĄn vilĂĄg (Europe and the Mediterranean World), Aron, BuTonk MĂĄrton (Eds):

dapest, 2009.

December 15, 2009 The international conference Struggle and Construction the Twentieth Anniversary of the Regime-change organized by the Diaspora Foundation was held in TemesvĂĄr/TimiÂłoara.

Lecturers were: Imre Pozsgay (Szent LĂĄszlĂł Academy, Hungary), Markus Meckel (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Germany), Gabriel Andreescu (SNSPA,

BucureÂłti),

MiklĂłs

Bakk

(BabeÂł-Bolyai

University,

Cluj-

Napoca/KolozsvĂĄr). Moderator: Barna BodĂł (Sapientia University ClujNapoca/KolozsvĂĄr).

December, 2009 The ECPR Standing Group on Federalism and Regionalism together with the Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania and the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities (ISPMN) announced an international conference on

within the Europe of Regions, 2010 in Cluj-Napoca/KolozsvĂĄr.

Minority Politics

which will take place on June 17-20,

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