European and Regional Studies Vol. 8, 2015

Acta Universitatis Sapientiae The scientific journal of Sapientia University publishes original papers and surveys in several areas of sciences written in English.

Information about each series can be found at the Internet address http://www.acta.sapientia.ro.

Editor-in-Chief László DÁVID ldavid@ms.sapientia.ro Zoltán KÁSA Laura NISTOR

Main Editorial Board András KELEMEN

Ágnes PETHŐ Emőd VERESS

Acta Universitatis Sapientiae European and Regional Studies Executive Editor Barna BODÓ (Sapientia University, Romania), bodobarna@kv.sapientia.ro Guest Editor László MARÁCZ (University of Amsterdam, Netherland) Editorial Board Gabriel ANDREESCU (National School of Political and Administrative Studies Bucharest, Romania) József BAYER (Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary) Miklós BAKK (Universitatea Babeş-Bolyai, Cluj/Kolozsvár, Romania) Zoltán BERÉNYI (University of Debrecen, Hungary) Barna BODÓ (Sapientia University, Cluj/Kolozsvár, Romania) Magdalena DEMBINSKA (Université de Montréal, Canada) Vasile DOCEA (West University, Timişoara, Romania) András A. GERGELY (Institute of Political Science, Budapest, Hungary) László GULYÁS (University of Szeged, Hungary) Radu LUPESCU (Sapientia University, Cluj/Kolozsvár, Romania) László MARÁCZ (University of Amsterdam, Netherland) Christoph PAN (Volksgruppen Institut, Bozen, Italy) Erzsébet SZALAYNÉ SÁNDOR (University of Pécs, Hungary) István SZILÁGYI (University of Pécs, Hungary) Márton TONK (Sapientia University, Cluj/Kolozsvár, Romania)

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ISSN 2066-639X http://www.acta.sapientia.ro

Acta Universitatis Sapientiae

European and Regional Studies Volume 8, 2015

Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania Scientia Publishing House

Contents Selma K. SONNTAG, Linda CARDINAL State Traditions and Language Regimes: A Historical Institutionalism Approach to Language Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Frieder LEMPP, László MARÁCZ Using Logic to Model Interests in Ethnic Conflicts: The Case of the Hungarian Minority in Slovakia and Slovenia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Ágnes VASS If Yes, Why Not? Minority Language Use and Accommodation of Minority Language Rights in Slovakia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 György SZERBHORVÁTH Language Politics and Language Rights on the Territory of Former Yugoslavia the Today’s Serbia/Vojvodina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Christopher HOUTKAMP Beyond Assimilation and Integration: The Shift to ‘National’ and ‘Transnational’ Inclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Kamilla SHERYAZDANOVA Illegal Immigration and Fight against Illegal Migration in Member States of the European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 László MARÁCZ The Boundaries of the Transnationality Framework (Book Review) . . . . . 103 Tibor TORÓ The Memory of Gáspár Bíró. Minority Politics, National Politics, and the State (Book Review) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Miklós BAKK Minority Civil Society – A Specificity of What? (Book Review) . . . . . . . . . 111 ‘University Evenings’ Lecture Series . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 Tutoring Programme in 2015 – At the Department of European Studies . . . . 115

Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 8 (2015) 5–21

DOI: 10.1515/auseur-2015-0010

State Traditions and Language Regimes: A Historical Institutionalism Approach to Language Policy Selma K. SONNTAG Humboldt State University

Linda CARDINAL University of Ottawa

Abstract. This paper is an elaboration of a theoretical framework we developed in the introductory chapter of our co-edited volume, State Traditions and Language Regimes (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015). Using a historical institutionalism approach derived from political science, we argue that language policies need to be understood in terms of their historical and institutional context. The concept of ‘state tradition’ focuses our attention on the relative autonomy of the state in terms of its normative and institutional traditions that lead to particular path dependencies of language policy choices, subject to change at critical junctures. ‘Language regime’ is the conceptual link between state traditions and language policy choices: it allows us to analytically conceptualize how and why these choices are made and how and why they change. We suggest that our framework offers a more robust analysis of language politics than other approaches found in sociolinguistics and normative theory. It also challenges political science to become more engaged with scholarly debate on language policy and linguistic diversity.

Keywords: state, language policy, language regime, historical institutionalism, linguistic diversity

Language policies are eminently political. They can reinforce or diffuse conflict between language groups, function as instruments of inclusion or exclusion, promote solidarity or stoke intolerance, and play a role in civil strife and war or contribute to peace and intercultural dialogue. They can have a significant impact on people’s lives, in schools, in public services, in the economy, in the daily plebiscite that Ernest Renan so famously evoked. They can determine the criteria for community membership, be it local, regional, national, or global; likewise, they can discriminate against linguistic minorities and immigrant groups. They can accelerate language loss, just as they can favour revitalization and empowerment of linguistic minorities.

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We can group most studies of language policy under the rubric of sociolinguistic and normative approaches. These approaches guide a large part of the research on the vitality of languages (see, e.g. Nettle and Romaine 2000; Gilbert 2010), the multiple facets of linguistic landscapes (see, e.g. Gorter 2006; Kihato et al. 2010), and the effects of language policies on individuals and groups (see, e.g. Schiffman 1996; Fishman and Garcia 2010; Spolsky 2004). They also contribute to debate on the role of the state in governing languages and the links between nationalism, the nation-state, and minorities (see, e.g. Kymlicka and Patten 2003; May 2012).

However, these approaches often neglect the analysis of the reasons for language policy choices. Even when researchers recognize the key role that the state plays in the formation of language policies, they often omit studying the how and why of language policy choices. Although there are exceptions, such as the work of Stephen May (2012) and Peter Ives (2010), for the most part, the goal of sociolinguistics and normative theory is to delineate the socio-political and normative implications of the management of linguistic diversity rather than explain language policy choices.

We propose to overcome this lacuna in the language policy literature by employing a historical institutionalism approach derived from political science, a field that has been relatively absent in language policy debates (Sonntag 1996; Safran 2010). In using historical institutionalism, we can fill in the gaps in sociolinguistic and normative approaches and reinvigorate the study of language policy within political science. We develop the analytical concepts of ‘state tradition’ and ‘language regime’ to study language policy choices within their historical and institutional context.

This article is divided into three parts. We start with situating historical institutionalism within political science and making a case for it in analysing language policy choices. In the second section, we develop the concept of state tradition, followed in the third section with that of language regime. The objective of these two latter sections is to lay the foundation of constructing a theoretical framework for analysing the how and why of language policy choices. In the conclusion, we return to the issue of linguistic diversity. Given that the majority of researchers studying language policy often grapple with the question of diversity, the theoretical framework we develop below elucidates current debate.

Historical Institutionalism Political science has not been at the forefront of scholarship and debate on language policies. Even with the normative turn brought about by political philosophy and its recent interest in diversity issues, language policy remains understudied by political scientists. Will Kymlicka and Alan Patten’s edited collection, Language Rights and Political Theory (2003), is among the few books

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in political science that treats language policy, but it does so from a political theory perspective. Our conceptual framework of state traditions and language regimes is grounded in political science, more specifically in the sub-discipline of comparative politics. Since the 1980s, public policy and state action have become a major area of research within comparative politics (Skocpol 1985; Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992; Pierson 1994; Lecours 2005; Peters 2005).

We draw upon these advances in political science and apply them to state action in the field of language policy.

When Theda Skocpol and her colleagues ‘brought the state back in’ to the study of politics in the 1980s (Evans, Rueschmeyer, and Skocpol 1985), the potential impact on language policy studies was substantial. Yet, few political scientists extended this new paradigm, labelled ‘historical institutionalism’ or ‘neo-institutionalism’ to the politics of language. Among comparative political scientists who did study language policy, the tendency was to use the casestudy approach, which often included a description of institutional features as background to language politics but rarely employed an institutional analysis (see, e.g. McRae 1983, 1986, 1997; Weinstein 1990; Sonntag 1991; Brown and Ganguly 2003).1 In these studies, societal groups such as linguistic minorities, and not the state or its institutions, were the focus of analysis.

Another increasingly common tendency, particularly among American comparative political scientists, was to take a rational choice approach. David Laitin’s prominence in applying rational choice to language policy deserves special note.2 Laitin (e.g. 1988, 1992) lays out the ‘rational’ strategies employed by political elites and their mobilization of resources in the language domain.

His is an ahistorical, instrumentalist approach in which all states are deemed to have an overriding imperative of rationalization and efficiency, which translates to linguistic uniformity as long as political stability is not jeopardized. Rational choice has also been criticized for assuming that ethnic groups, including linguistic groups, are just one more type of interest group. In the rational choice model, ethnicity and language are preferences and convictions rather than identities.

By taking a historical institutionalism approach, we can build on the casestudy and rational choice approaches to the study of language policy within comparative politics. Our approach allows us to theorize across case studies and to historically contextualize state action. By analysing language policy choices in 1

2

One political science study of language policy that did take a more institutional approach was Raymond Tatalovich’s (1995) comparison of English-only legislation in different states within the United States. Given the sub-disciplinary divisions of political science in the United States, Tatalovich would be categorized as an Americanist rather than a comparativist.

Jonathan Pool (1990) advocates using formal modelling to analyse the relation between language regimes and political regimes. His analysis seeks to disclose the ‘mechanisms that ... drive the behavior of individuals and organizations’ (1990, 257), in some ways an even more ahistorical approach than other rational choice theorists.

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terms of how ‘these choices are… constrained by concepts of nation and national models [i.e. state traditions] that are implicit or explicit in [political] institutions’ (Bertrand 2004, 6), we can provide a more robust analysis. While sociolinguists have analysed linguistic regimes in the historical context of ideological conceptions of the nation, they have not provided an institutional context (see, e.g.

Gal 2012). For comparative political scientists, especially those taking a historical institutionalism approach, the institutional context is paramount because ‘[a]t a fundamental level, institutions reflect a particular national model’ (Bertrand 2004, 4); more specifically, ‘electoral systems, legislative structures, types of executives, and federalist or unitary systems embody a certain conception of the nation or relation between nations [in a multinational state]’ (Bertrand 2004, 10).

To this list of institutional structures, we should add court systems (Cardinal 2015), the bureaucracy (Turgeon and Gagnon 2013), political party systems (Dupré 2015), etc. By examining the evolution of institutional responses to societal multilingualism, we can compare and contrast different ‘nation’ models without privileging the monolingualism of the European nation-state model.

A premise of our historical institutionalism approach is that states have complex historical and normative traditions, reflective of each state’s national model, that guide and frame public policies, including language policies. Those public policies can be local, regional, national, or international. Public policy analysis, an increasingly prominent subfield of political science, when wedded to an institutional analysis (see, e.g. Corbeil 2007), can enrich the historical institutionalism approach within comparative politics. Policy analysts often focus on the broader public culture within which specific policies, including language policies, thrive or fail (see Gaspard 2015). Language policies, implemented through specific institutional pathways, play an important role in issues of economic solidarity and in the definition of new public cultures (Barbier 2012), not only at the national level but also, in Europe, at the EU level (Kraus 2008) as well as at the local and regional levels. A public policy approach can help clarify not only how language policy choices are made, but also how they interface with other public policy choices, how they are framed and implemented, what populations they target, and how categories of target populations are constructed (see Schneider and Ingram 1993). Much of the analysis of language policy from a public policy approach has been conducted by social scientists in disciplines other than political science (see, e.g. Grin (2003) in economics, Gazzola (2014) in communications, and Williams (2007) in geography), although their emphasis has been on implementation and evaluation of, and not on reasons for, language policy choices. We contend that analysing language policy as public policy through which the state governs linguistic diversity, and using a historical institutionalism approach based on the concepts of state tradition and language regime, can make a significant contribution to our understanding of language policy choices.

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State Tradition The concept of ‘state tradition’ is well grounded in political science (Loughlin 2005). Our use of state tradition is informed by historical institutionalism and draws upon powerful analytical tools of comparative politics such as ‘path dependency’ and ‘critical junctures’. Political institutions have long been an object of study in political science, although the behavioural revolution in social sciences, most apparent in the United States, effected a veering away from institutions toward the analysis of individual behaviour in the 1950s and 60s.

In political science, this led to a focus on individual and group interests being the driving force in politics. The ‘new’ historical institutionalism of Skocpol and others refocused research on the state rather than society (Skocpol 1985; Hall and Taylor 1996). While states do react to demands and pressures from society, historical institutionalism suggests that the state has a relative degree of autonomy. That autonomy, we argue, is best defined in terms of state traditions – the institutional and normative baggage and patterns of state action. Witness France, a state born of revolution, which enacts policies today that are still justified by its Jacobin roots. India self-identifies as a post-colonial state, although the weight of colonial legacy is still visible in state actions. India also shares with Anglo-American states institutions rooted in a liberal ideology, distinct from the social democratic tradition of continental Europe. The geographic expanse of the United States, the political and linguistic landscapes of Canada, and the cultural diversity of India are the contexts for the evolution of these states’ institutional structure of federalism. The relative autonomy of the state is derived from the state’s normative and institutionalized traditions which mark the path that states take in policy-making. Path dependency is an analytical tool to link state traditions to policy choices.

Recent European comparative political science has used the concept of state tradition mostly in studies of ‘new’ territorial patterns of governance initiated by small nations and regional governments in Europe (Keating 1998; Loughlin 2005; Keating, Loughlin and Deschouwer 2003). This research demonstrates how institutions influence political actors in these small nations and regional governments (Béland and Lecours 2012; McEwen 2006). In making policy choices, these actors follow a path dependent on normative and institutional traditions. Although policy pathways may be dependent on state traditions, policy choices are often made at junctions in the path. ‘Critical juncture’ is an analytical tool used by political scientists to home in on pivotal points of interaction between tradition and policy. A critical juncture may be presented by social, political, economic, or environmental crises or dramatic change. Most recently, globalization has precipitated critical junctures as noted by Europeanists studying small nations (see, e.g. Keating 1998). More generally, major historical

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shifts, such as decolonization, war, redrawing national borders, the dissolution of old states and the emergence of new ones, have instigated critical junctures and provoked the reinvention of state traditions. At critical junctures, new patterns of governance emerge, but never completely divorced from the old patterns and traditions in which they were formed. In other words, state traditions guide policy choices, including language policy choices, along already established pathways, but these pathways can take a different turn at times. State traditions frame how language policy choices are conceived without predetermining the specific content of these choices.

The notions of path dependency and critical junctures help flesh out the concept of state tradition in regard to language policy choices. Our concept of state tradition affords an additional element to the analysis of language policy choices. It broadens the research agenda to include analyses of language policy choices that grate against the dominant historiography of the nation-state in which homogeneity and uniformity are privileged by demonstrating the existence of other path dependencies formed at critical junctures (Albaugh 2014; Cardinal and Sonntag 2015; Loughlin and Williams 2007). While the Canadian and Swiss cases are well known, others can also illustrate the diversity of path dependencies established by state traditions. In her study of multilingualism in education in sub-Saharan Africa, Ericka Albaugh (2014) notes the absence of compulsion toward linguistic homogeneity in most post-colonial African states. In the plurilingual situation in Algeria, state traditions inherited from colonialism compete with an emerging tradition, formed at critical junctures in the nation’s recent history, which rejects this colonial heritage (see Lacoste 2007). Equally important for analysis are the post-communist cases of Eastern Europe, where state traditions formed during the Soviet era can be in conflict not only with the 19th-century European state tradition of linguistic nationalism but also with newer state traditions emerging in the context of Europeanization (see Csergo 2007), leading to different path dependencies for language policy.

Hence our concept of state tradition problematizes linguistic homogenization as the singular, ‘rational’ pathway of the dominant nation-state model in favour of a more complex understanding of the role of state action in governing linguistic diversity. We will return to this complexity in our conclusion.

Language Regime The concept of ‘language regime’ is relatively recent in the study of language policy. The best examples can be found in the work of Julien Fernand (2008) and François Grin (2007), who use the notion to describe juridical or legal aspects, as well as symbolic and functional dimensions, of language policy. Fernand (2008),

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who has surveyed 160 language regimes in the world, studies the modalities of language use in European Union communications (functional dimension), the integration of cultural elements of multilingualism in European institutions (symbolic dimension), and the forms of official recognition or the granted status of languages (juridical dimension). Grin (2007) refers to the notion of language regime in contextualizing language policies; language policies do not exist outside of a particular regime. Both Fernand and Grin use the concept of language regime for descriptive purposes. Furthermore, their work tends to conflate the notion of language regime with that of language planning. The heuristic value of their use of the concept is to further advance language planning in institutional structures such as the European Union, rather than identifying the political context in which such regimes develop.

In political science, the concept of language regime is not as well developed as that of state tradition. Amy Liu conceives of a language regime as ‘the set of rules that delineate which languages can be used when and where’ (Liu 2009, 24). As a political scientist who specializes in the language politics in Southeast Asia, she identifies three types of language regimes: (1) power-sharing regimes, (2) power-concentrating regimes, and (3) power-neutralizing regimes. According to Liu (2015), power-neutralizing language regimes are dependent on an exogenous lingua franca, those that are power-concentrating tend to reproduce the nationstate model, and power-sharing regimes secure the maintenance of linguistic diversity. Because she uses a rational choice approach, Liu (2015) emphasizes competing interests within political coalitions in Malaysia and Singapore in order to determine how this competition results in distinct language regimes at different critical junctures. For Liu, language regimes are the result of political competition. While her conception of language regimes as sets of rules is useful, she nevertheless neglects the institutional dimension of a language regime in favour of seeing it as simply a management tool for conflict between groups competing for political power.

In his recent book evaluating language regimes in the patent domain in Europe, Michele Gazzola conceives of a language regime as a ‘particular form of public policy’ (Gazzola 2014, 2). It is a ‘set of rules and arrangements implemented to manage multilingual communication, typically as regards to the choice of official languages of an organization and their respective use’ (Gazzola 2014, 10). Like Liu, Gazzola posits the importance of rules in his definition. In contrast, he applies the concept of language regime to organizations other than the state. In doing so, he neglects the historical and political context in which the rules and arrangements were originally adopted. Similarly to Fernand and Grin, Gazzola confines the analytical purchase of the notion of language regime to delineating specific language policy practices, although he situates rules and arrangements governing languages in their organizational and institutional context. Our notion

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of language regime offers a more encompassing concept that enables us to not only account for specific rules in a descriptive sense but also in terms of why and how these rules came about in the context of state traditions. In our conceptualization, a language regime can even mean an absence of rules: Sonntag (2015) ascribes the relative lack of rules in the American language regime to the United States’ liberal laissez-faire state tradition.

Sociolinguists often attribute language policies to dominant or hegemonic ideologies such as nationalism and neo-liberalism (see, e.g. Heller and Duchêne 2012). As such, language policies, or more broadly sociolinguistic regimes (Gal 2012), serve to justify or rationalize power hierarchies and the interests of elites or majorities (see, e.g. Ricento 2000). This notion of language ideology fails to account for the institutionalization of ideologies as state traditions and the institutional path dependency of specific language policies. Instead of examining institutional pathways and critical junctures in those pathways, sociolinguists tend to analyse discursive strategies by which ideologies are represented in society (Heller and Duchêne 2007; Woolard 1985). As a result, sociolinguists who are critical of the dominant power structure often ascribe explanatory power to large ‘macro sociopolitical’ and ‘macro-economic and political forces’ (Ricento 2000, 9, 16, 20), such as globalization and imperialism (Phillipson 1992), without analysing specific political actors such as the state and its institutions or, for example, political parties as institutional intermediaries between the state and society. Nor can they account for changes in or successful challenges to dominant language ideologies.

A historical institutionalism conceptualization of language regime, in contrast, provides analytical tools to show the important relations between how language policy is ideologically conceived and how it is practised. Historical institutionalism allows us to study language regimes not only as sets of rules for governing languages and the ideologies informing language policy choices but also the links between institutional and normative state traditions and language policy choices. Our conceptualization of language regime is more robust than many of the current approaches suggest. It leads us to analyse how and why rules and representations of language policies are linked to state tradition and how and why they can change.

Our concept of ‘language regime’ is derived from Jane Jenson’s compelling work on citizenship regimes (see, e.g. Jenson and Phillips 1996). Jenson and her colleagues use a ‘neo-institutionalist approach’ to analyse how the transformation in the Canadian political economy from Fordism to neo-liberalism has affected conceptions and practices of citizenship (Jenson and Phillips 2001, 71). These representations and practices of citizenship, embedded in political economy, constitute a regime.

Important to Jenson’s discussion is that conceptions and practices are subject to change. She argues that conceiving of citizens as representing collectivities

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in civil society, rooted in the collectivist consensus that emerged in many Western democracies after World War II, has given way to conceiving of citizens as representing individuals. State policies have changed from responding to the needs and demands of collectivities to enabling individual agency (Jenson 2013).

Individuals are empowered under neo-liberalism to make political claims on the state, which result in a dismantling of civil society, where groups of individuals with common interests were collectively empowered.

What makes Jenson’s concept of citizenship regimes particularly robust is that she links how citizenship is practised to how it is conceived. Furthermore, she links state practices and conceptions to citizens’ practices and conceptions. Hence, for Jenson (2000, 232), a citizenship regime is ‘institutional arrangements, rules and understandings that guide and shape [not only] concurrent policy decisions ... [and] problem definitions by states,’ but also ‘problem definitions by ... citizens, and claims-making by citizens’. This state–society linkage ‘encodes within it a paradigmatic representation’ of citizens’ identity and social relations between citizens and the state (Jenson and Phillips 2001, 72). In other words, a citizenship regime comprises not only institutions and rules but also a certain understanding of citizenship that informs the state’s decision-making and commitments as well as the way citizens give meaning to their claims (Dobrowolsky and Jenson 2004, 156). As Jacques Bertrand (2004, 14) notes, ‘the institutional environment ... defines how grievances can be expressed, repressed, or negotiated’.

In our conceptual framework, we reconfigure Jenson’s concept of a citizenship regime to analyse language policy choices. We posit that a language regime refers to language practices as well as conceptions and representations of language and language use as projected through state policies and as acted upon by language users. State traditions guide and frame those practices and conceptions and these, in turn, are acted upon by language users. Consider, for the sake of simplicity, a monolingual language regime informed by a Herderian state tradition of one language equals one nation. Such a regime would define language use in terms of a single national language. Language policies would reflect that definition and, for example, restrict the medium of instruction in schools to the national language. Most language users would adhere to the conception of a single language as the national one and would act accordingly.

Speakers of languages other than the national language would most likely experience language shift – that is, the intergenerational abandonment of one language by its speakers for another. In this case, language shift would indicate the ‘encod[ing] of the proper and legitimate social relations’ (Jenson 2000, 232) among a category of language users whose language is not recognized by state policy. These linguistic minorities are disempowered, and seek (even if unsuccessfully) empowerment by changing their language use to fit with the dominant representations. Their understanding of empowerment and their

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relationship with dominant language speakers and the state are embedded in the language regime. Language regimes empower certain language users more than others to make political claims on the state.3 This simple example presents a stable language regime. The notion of stability helps explain how seemingly contradictory relations succeed in acquiring relative permanence in time and space. Jenson (2000, 233) characterizes ‘a stable regime as one in which the status proffered and the status anticipated match’. In the case of language regimes, if the status proffered to users of a particular language matches their anticipations, then we can expect stability.

In our above example, if language shift does lead to empowerment, then we would expect the language regime to be stable. Whether there is a match or mismatch between proffered status and anticipated status is a hotly debated topic in language policy studies. Does language shift lead to economic and political empowerment for those who undertake it or is it a false promise (see Pogge 2003; May 2003)? Prominent in this debate is the case of an emerging global language regime. Does global English actually confer the status it seems to project (see Sonntag 2003; Wright 2004)?

Contradictions and inconsistencies in language regimes are often marked by specific practices and/or conceptions of language choice and use being in tension and at cross-purposes. A certain amount of contradiction can be managed within a language regime and in fact contribute to its stability. In a federal state, a language policy in effect at one level could be distinct from the language policy at another level. For example, in Canada, federal language policy is personalbased, while that of Quebec is territorial-based (Cardinal 2010). How well language policy choices articulate with other public policies, such as education, immigration, economic, and health policies, can also indicate the degree of stability and change of a language regime. In her analysis of education policy regarding foreign language teaching in France, Nuria Garcia (2015) demonstrates how discrepancies between education, immigration, and language policies are resolved within the overall gamut of a Jacobin language regime. In contrast, John Walsh (2015) suggests that coherence between language policy and other public policies in Ireland is difficult to achieve. Similarly, John Coakley (2007) notes that Ireland’s language policy works with other public policies in sectors where English is so dominant that Irish plays only a symbolic role.

A mismatch between the conferred status and anticipated status of a particular language can be acceptable, as in the Irish case. However, in most cases where there is a mismatch, there is an opening for ‘regime redesign’; critical to this redesign are ‘strategic choices about policy and alliances’ (Jenson 2000, 232).

3

Selma K. Sonntag (2010) argues that an emerging global language regime based on liberalism has legitimated individual claims for language rights. This resonates with Jenson’s analysis of neo-liberalism and adds in the global dimension to our conceptual framework.

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Influential political actors can form coalitions around strategic language policy choices that effect language regime change (see Turgeon and Gagnon, 2013).

Often these coalitions appear at critical junctures, when the state traditions underpinning the language regime are vulnerable and power relations reflected in status conferred in the language regime are susceptible to reconfiguration. For example, the aftermath of World War I and the enlargement of the franchise in Belgium led to a majority coalition in favour of language regime change based on enhancing the status of Flemish vis-à-vis French (Sonntag 1991). In a different example, Jean-François Dupré (2015) analyses the lack of language regime change in Taiwan despite recent democratization facilitating political bargaining and coalition-building over language policy. Taiwan’s political parties proved incapable of adopting a policy favouring linguistic diversity, thus furthering the stability of the existing language regime. According to Dupré, the path dependency of Taiwan’s language policy proved too enduring to allow for regime change, tied as it was to a state tradition of Mandarin dominance.

There is always a certain degree of discord between conceptions or representations of language and language use and the rules and practices of specific language policies. Ethnolinguistic mobilization can expose this discord and the discursive strategies or language ideology that masks it. This exposition through mobilization helps reconfigure how language and language use are represented in the language regime and modify language practices and policies that are institutionalized in the path dependency of the regime (see, e.g. Harguindéguy and Itçaina 2015). In this way, ethnolinguistic mobilization can disturb and disrupt power relations and, by extension, state traditions (Sonntag 1995).

In analysing incoherencies and inconsistencies, we can better understand the practices and representations of language and language use which either complement or challenge the existing language regime. The concept of language regime allows us to analyse language policy choices in terms of the underlying power relations embodied in state traditions. Along with state traditions, it provides a conceptual framework for analysing the dynamics – stability and change – of power relations and their representation in language policy.

Conclusion In inserting a political science perspective into a field of study dominated by other social sciences, particularly by sociolinguistics, we consider it important to return to the debate on linguistic diversity. There is tendency in political science to adopt a conservative bias in the study of language policy. Political scientists, particularly in the United States, tend to assume that monolingualism is the societal norm, while linguistic diversity is a deviation from this norm. This

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assumption usually stems from ignorance and unfamiliarity – from not realizing that most people in most of the world are multilingual in their everyday lives.4 In contrast, the political science analytical framework we propose is based on the recognition that linguistic diversity is a historical and contemporary fact in many communities, regions, countries, and on a global level. Thus, despite state traditions that have fostered, particularly in Europe, monolingualism – which political scientists tend to assume is natural – and despite global linguistic homogenization – which political theorists often defend (see, e.g. Van Parijs 2011) –, linguistic diversity endures. We believe that a political science perspective, such as the one we suggest adopting, contributes to a better understanding of state language policy choices in governing linguistic diversity locally, nationally, regionally, and globally. States intervene in linguistically diverse societies at all levels, even if the conception or representation of language use framed by state tradition is that of a monolingual speaker. Our analytical concept of language regime allows us to foreground linguistic diversity despite its dismissal in most of the political science literature on language policy. In this sense, then, we are challenging political scientists to learn from their counterparts in other social sciences who are more likely to understand linguistic diversity as both an empirical reality and a normative preference (see, e.g. Kjaer and Adamo 2011; May 2012; Romaine 2015).

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Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 8 (2015) 23–41

DOI: 10.1515/auseur-2015-0011

Using Logic to Model Interests in Ethnic Conflicts: The Case of the Hungarian Minority in Slovakia and Slovenia Frieder LEMPP

Massey University, Palmerston North

László MARÁCZ University of Amsterdam

Abstract. This article investigates the situation of Hungarian ethno-linguistic minorities in Slovenia and the Slovak Republic. It compares the extent to which the two minority groups’ interests are satisfied and provides an explanation for differences between their de facto statuses. The authors use a logic-based methodology to extract the key parties, issues, and interests.

Drawing on the analysis, the structure of each case (i.e. the dependencies between the parties’ interests) is displayed as a simple graph. Differences in the de facto status of the two groups can thus be explained by differences in the respective conflict structure. The authors argue that – as evidenced by the case of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia – a number of unresolved ethnolinguistic minority issues in Central Europe have a high conflict potential and may be a threat for security in the region and the European Union.

Keywords: Hungarian minorities, Slovakia, Slovenia, conflict analysis, modelling, interest-based negotiation

Introduction Following the Treaty of Trianon (1920), Hungarian linguistic minorities live in the neighbouring states of Hungary. The old kingdom of Hungary being part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy collapsed in the aftermath of the First World War and was partitioned into a series of nation-states. Due to the turbulent history of the European continent, the fragmentation into nation-states continued in the course of the twentieth century. Hence, due to the Trianon Treaty, World War II, and the collapse of communism, Hungarian ethno-linguistic minorities now live predominantly in concentrated territories in seven countries neighbouring

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Hungary, i.e. Slovakia (520,000), Romania (1,500,000), Ukraine (200,000), and smaller communities in Austria, Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia.1 In all these countries, the Hungarian language is recognized as an official language for communication between Hungarian speakers and the institutions of the state. However, the Hungarian language is restricted by special laws conditioning the use of the Hungarian language; there is no canonical norm in terms of recognition and the actual linguistic rights granted to speakers of Hungarian in these nation-states vary (Marácz 2014a, 2014b). While the situation of the Hungarian minorities has improved substantially after the Central and Eastern European states joined the EU in 2004, the ‘unresolved’ cases of ethnolinguistic diversity remain a source of conflict and tension (Skovgaard 2007).

Some of these states, like the Slovak Republic, have envisaged a fall-back in the sense that there is hardly a tolerant climate towards the implementation of ethnolinguist minority rights (Csergő 2007). These patterns accommodate to ‘Nelde’s Law,’ coined after the linguist Peter Nelde, who hypothesized that when two languages are in contact there will unavoidably be a conflict for hegemony (Nelde 1987). Marácz (2014a) argues – following a concept coined by Smith (2002) – that these ethno-linguistic conflicts are contextualized in a framework of international relations that can be called a ‘quadratic nexus’ including the ethno-linguistic minorities, the host- and kin-states, and the supranational organizations like the European Union, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (abbreviated in the following as EU, CoE, and OSCE respectively). It is the interplay between these four actors that will determine the consequences of a local conflict for the security and stability of bigger regions.

This paper will compare the cases of the Hungarian ethno-linguistic minorities in Slovenia and Slovakia. The comparison will demonstrate that, while there are some ‘minimum standards’ due to the interference of supranational organizations (Kymlicka 2007, 380), there are still big differences regarding the recognition of ethno-linguistic rights of autochthonous minority groups.2 Of the seven cases listed above, the Hungarian ethno-linguistic community enjoys ‘cultural autonomy’ in three cases only (Lapidoth 1996, 39). This is the case now in Serbia’s multilingual, multinational northern Province of Vojvodina, where next to Serbian five autochthonous languages, including Croatian, Slovak, Russine, Romanian, and Hungarian are officially recognized (Dembinska et al. 2014, 366–367), in the easternmost region of Slovenia, the so-called Pomurje region (in Hungarian: Muravidék), and in Croatia’s northern parts of Slavonia (Cabada 1

2

See for more data on the Hungarian minorities in the Central European countries Brubaker et al. (2006), Cabada (2011), Csergő (2007), Just (2007), Kirschbaum (2003), Marácz (2011a, 2011b, 2014a, 2014b), and Petőcz (2009).

See Marácz (2011a, 164) for a different language typology in terms of ‘inclusion’ or ‘exclusion’ using two vectors: ‘nationalist language policies’ and ‘multicultural language policies’.

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2011, Marácz 2014b). The ‘worst practice’ is offered by the Slovak case where a language law has been drafted to protect the majority language against the minority languages, e.g. Hungarian spoken in the country (Dembinska et al. 2014, 12). The implementation of the Slovak language law has caused much tension between the Hungarian-speaking community in Slovakia and successive Slovak governments but also in the international arena outlined by the quadratic nexus.

The structure of the article is as follows. First we provide an outline of the situation of the Hungarian ethno-linguistic minorities in Slovenia and Slovakia.

Second, we introduce the methodological framework used to analyse and compare the two conflict cases. Then we apply the methodology to the situation of Hungarian speakers in Slovenia and Slovakia respectively. This is followed by a comparison between the two cases and a brief discussion in which we provide some explanations for any differences observed. In conclusion, we present some high-level policy recommendation based on our findings.

Hungarian Ethno-Linguistic Communities in Slovenia There is a small community of Hungarians (around 6,000) living in the easternmost region of Slovenia, neighbouring Hungary. This region is called the Pomurje region, making up an area of less than 200 km2. The Pomurje Hungarians constitute only 0.32% of the total population of Slovenia (1,964,034). According to the census of 2002, 5,212 people declared themselves to be ethnic Hungarians and 6,237 regarded Hungarian as their mother tongue (Göncz 2014). The Hungarian minority enjoys a high level of legal protection in Slovenia: the Hungarian language has the status of a regional official language; the Slovenian Constitution, more precisely articles 11 and 64, grants the autochthonous Hungarian – and Italian – communities full linguistic and community rights in the Pomurje region (Göncz 2014, 106–107). The Hungarian community has a representative in the parliament, who has a right to veto in questions related to the Hungarian minority, and the educational programme for the Pomurje Hungarians grants a bilingual education programme implying that both languages are used as target and as medium.

Actually, the ethno-linguistic Hungarian community was granted the status of ‘cultural autonomy,’ meaning that they were recognized as an ethno-linguistic group enjoying collective linguistic and ethnic rights (Lapidoth 1996, 15).

The Pomurje Hungarians received cultural autonomy for two reasons. First of all, their size is rather small. Even compared to the total population of Slovenia, which is also small, the Pomurje Hungarian community is a fraction. Secondly, some 3,000 speakers of the Slovenian language live scattered in the southwest of Hungary. In order to stress the good neighbourliness and to arrange the linguistic rights of the ethnic Slovenes in Hungary and vice versa, the democratically

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elected Hungarian and Slovene governments concluded an inter-state agreement in 1992. Considering the size, there is actually a case of balance. Furthermore, the newly independent Slovenia did not want to risk a conflict with its two bigger neighbours, the kin-states, i.e. Hungary to the east and Italy to the west, because of their ethno-linguistic minorities. Furthermore, the Slovene government could gain ‘cultural autonomy’ for the dispersed Slovenian communities in Hungarian.

For the Hungarian government, a settlement with Slovenia over the linguistic and community rights of their ethnic communities is extremely important because it strengthens Hungary’s negotiation position in other arenas. A settlement with Slovenia could demonstrate to the other actors in its quadratic nexus – i.e.

Romania, Slovakia, and the supranational organizations – that Hungary is willing to compromise over ethnic minority rights.

Hungarian Ethno-Linguistic Communities in the Slovak Republic In contrast to the Hungarian community in Slovenia, the Hungarian community has suffered a traumatic history of persecution and oppression in the Czechoslovak Republic and later on in the Slovak Republic. The present-day ethnic conflict between Slovaks and Hungarians is deeply rooted in history (Just 2007). The Hungarians in Slovakia form a relatively large group. According to the 2011 census, 458,000 Slovak citizens declared themselves Hungarians, i.e. 8.5 percent of the total population (5,488,000).3 The Hungarians of Slovakia live in a strip of 30 kilometres from the Slovak-Hungarian border. This strip counts 650 kilometres all along the Hungarian-Slovak border. In this territory, the Hungarian communities are in very different situations, ranging from compact settlements with an absolute or relative Hungarian majority through mixed Hungarian-Slovak communities, where ethnic Hungarians are a minority and to scattered speakers of Hungarian living in a kind of an internal diaspora.

The Slovaks have been traumatized when the southern part was returned to Hungary under the so-called First Vienna Award in 1938. Slovakia and Hungary agreed to redraw their common borders mediated by the Axis Powers, i.e. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. In the Peace Treaty concluding the Second World War, the southern part of Slovakia with the Hungarian settlements were returned to Czechoslovakia. Slovakia is always afraid that the Hungarian community will follow a secessionist policy and will join the kin-state Hungary supporting or initiating such a policy. There is however no evidence that Hungary conducts 3

This section on the Hungarian minority in Slovakia was written while heavily relying on FialaButora (2014), Kirschbaum (2003), Marácz (2011a, b), Mikes (2010), Petőcz (2009), Petőcz et al.

(2013), Škrobák (2009), and Vass (2013).

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a revisionist policy, like Hungary pursued in the interwar period. The policy of the new democratic Hungary concerning its co-nationals in the neighbouring countries has been driven by the guidance of EU regulations and those of other supranational organizations, like the CoE and OSCE, to improve the legal situation of the Hungarians in Slovakia in the first place.

However, the policy of the Slovak government is characterized by an exclusion and discrimination of its Hungarian minority speakers. Firstly, the Slovak Constitution does not grant rights to the Hungarian community on the basis of collectivity. Linguistic minority rights are recognized in Slovakia only on individual basis. Secondly, a territorial division of Slovakia was designed in which the administrative districts are set up from north to south and not from east to west in order to prevent Hungarian majorities on the level of local administrative authorities. Thirdly, the second Mečiar-government (1994–1998) already drafted in 1995 a state language law ‘protecting’ the Slovak majority language against the ‘dominance’ of minority languages, including Hungarian but excluding the Czech language. The state language law was less restrictive concerning the Hungarian language under the centre right Christian democratic government of Mikuláš Dzurinda, which included the political representative of the Hungarian community, the Hungarian Coalition Party (Magyar Közösség Pártja (MKP)) as well. This had to do with the fact that the state language law had to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria for Slovakia’s accession to the European Union in 2004. The Dzurinda-government was succeeded by a centre left government under the leadership of Robert Fico. The Fico-government amended the state language law in 2009, drafting it in the style of Meciar’s 1995 law ‘protecting’ the official language of the state, i.e. the Slovak. The state language law has the effect of driving the use of the Hungarian language in Slovakia from the public domain to the private sphere. The result of the policy of exclusion towards the Hungarian communities in Slovakia has led to a continuous state of conflict and tension in the relations of Slovakia with its own Hungarian minority and Hungary.

The Hungarian community in Slovakia has not been very successful in resisting the Slovak policy of exclusion. The main reason is that the political representation of the Slovak Hungarians is divided into two political parties: the Hungarian Coalition Party and the party Most-Híd (Bridge). Both parties independently operate within the legal framework of the Slovak state. MKP is striving for Hungarian cultural autonomy in Slovakia and for equal rights of the Hungarian language in the multilingual, multinational south Slovakia. It lost its parliamentary representation in the 2010 parliamentary elections and did not reach the threshold in the elections of 2012. The Hungarian Coalition Party is represented with one representative in the European Parliament. Most-Híd won 13 seats in the Slovak National Council in the 2012 parliamentary elections.

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Although both parties are not in agreement with the language law, the Bridge Party has a more pragmatic stance and has been satisfied with slight modifications, actually cosmetic accommodations, of the law in 2011, when the party became a member of the centre right government under Prime Minister Iveta Radičová.

The Radičová-government was somewhat longer than a year in power before it fell in 2011. In 2012, the centre left party SMER of Robert Fico won the elections convincingly, and now it enjoys an absolute majority in the Slovak National Council. Under the Fico-government, the language law remains to discriminate the speakers of Hungarian in Slovakia.

The Slovak-Hungarian state relations are characterized by continuous tension.

Recently, the Hungarian Orbán-government offered double citizenship to persons who can prove their ancestors to have been Hungarian citizens. The Slovak government prevented that their Hungarians would receive a Hungarian-Slovak dual citizenship by adopting a law that makes this impossible and automatically strips Slovak citizens of their Slovak citizenship should they become a citizen of another country. This new Slovak law caused, however, problems for North American Slovaks that are quite often dual citizens. This issue is pending at the moment and causing serious stress in the Slovak-Hungarian relations. Interestingly, the Slovak minority in Hungary, which is living especially in the northern part of the country and is substantially bigger in size (around 100,000) than the Slovenian minority, does not play a neutralizing role in the Hungarian–Slovak conflict, comparable to the Slovenian minority in Hungary. Probably, the perceived threat of a much larger Hungarian community in Slovakia than the small size of the Hungarian community in Slovenia makes the difference between these two cases.4

Methodology The methodological framework within which the two conflict situations are analysed is Lempp’s logic-based model of conflict resolution (Lempp 2009, 2014).

This model is based on the idea that conflicts are constituted by sets of mutually incompatible interests pursued by a number of parties. The focus of the analysis is, therefore, placed on the reconstruction of the conflicting parties’ interests as propositions and an assessment of the relationships between those propositions as either being compatible or incompatible.

To describe the parties’ interests and the relationships between them, the model uses a semi-formal language. The following four questions provide a guideline for applying the propositional model to a specific conflict situation, such as the situation of Hungarian speakers in Slovakia and Slovenia: 1. Who are the parties involved in the conflict situation?

4

The authors are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for bringing up this issue.

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2. What are the issues (i.e. points of disagreement) in the conflict situation?

3. What are the parties’ interests in relation to those issues?

4. For any given pair of interests, are those interests mutually compatible or incompatible?

In providing answers to the above questions, it is necessary to adhere to the model’s specific propositional format. As to the first question, this means that each party involved in the conflict must be uniquely identified and represented by a corresponding party identifier (e.g. p1, p2, … pn).

Next, each issue in the conflict must be identified as a proposition and represented by a unique issue identifier (e.g. i1, i2, … in). Propositions are statements for which it makes sense to ask whether it is true or false (Russell 1919). Both argumentation theory (Fisher 1988) and content analysis (Holsti 1969) can provide useful guidance on how to systematically extract propositional statements from written or verbal materials.

Having represented the issues in the conflict as propositions, the next step is to reconstruct the parties’ interests as propositional attitudes, i.e. claims towards the truth or falsity of the propositions that represent the issues (Richard 1990).

In the simplest case, an interest implies the truth of a single issue. More complex interests can have the form of negations (i.e. the interest implies the falsity of an issue), conjunctions (i.e. the interest implies the simultaneous truth of two issues), disjunctions (i.e. the interest implies the truth of at least one of two issues), or conditionals (i.e. the interest implies the truth of an issue, given the truth of another issue). For an introduction to propositional logic, see for instance (Beall 2010, Copi et al. 2011). The term ‘interest’ is used in a broad sense for the purpose of this paper. Essentially, any goal, value, belief, emotion, etc. that is capable of making a propositional claim towards the issues can be considered an interest. Once all interests are identified as a propositional claim towards the issues, they are labelled by unique interest identifiers (e.g. c1, c2, … cn).

In the final step, for each pair of interests ci and cj, one needs to determine whether ci and cj are mutually compatible or incompatible. This is done by looking at the truth conditions of the interests. If it is possible to jointly satisfy ci and cj (i.e. it is possible for ci and cj to be simultaneously true), then ci and cj are considered compatible with each other. Otherwise, ci and cj are incompatible with each other.

The compatibility/incompatibility relations can be illustrated graphically in form of a graph which directly represents the structure of the conflict.

More specifically, to determine if two interests are compatible or incompatible, one needs to generate a list of all possible outcomes regarding the two interests.

This set comprises all outcomes that are logically possible. It is generated from the set of issues, which the interests are composed of, by considering for each issue ij the case that ij is true and the case that ij is false. For instance, if there are two issues, i1 and i2, there are four possible outcomes: one where both i1 and i2 are

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true, one where i1 is true and i1 is false, one where i1 is false and i2 is true, and one where both i1 and i2 are false. For each outcome, one can determine which, if any, of the two interests are satisfied. This depends on the propositional structure of the interests. For instance, a conjunctive interest (i.e. a propositional attitude towards the conjunction of two issues) is satisfied in all outcomes in which both issues the conjunction is composed of are true. A disjunctive interest, on the other hand, is satisfied in any outcome in which any one of the two issues the disjunction is composed of is true. If there exists at least one outcome in which both interests are satisfied, the two interests are compatible with each other. If no such outcome exists, the interests are incompatible with each other. Note that two interests that are concerned about fundamentally different basic issues are always compatible with each other as their satisfaction conditions are independent of each other and hence there is always a possible outcome in which they can both be satisfied.

Parties, Issues, and Interests in Slovenia The first step in the analysis is the identification of the parties. In the case of Slovenia, we identify the following three parties: 1. MIN: Hungarian community in Slovenia 2. SLN: Slovenian government 3. HUN: Hungarian government While each of those three parties is likely to be composed of a number of subgroups pursuing their own different interests, we treat them as homogeneous entities for the purposes of this paper.

In a second step, one needs to identify the key issues in conflict. On the basis of the narrative description of the situation in Slovenia provided earlier in the paper, we argue that the following issues are the most relevant: (I1) Hungarian is recognized as a regional official language in the Pomurje region.

(I2) The Hungarian community has comprehensive and special constitutional rights.

(I3) The Hungarian community has a parliamentary representative with veto rights regarding any question relating to the Hungarian minority.

(I4) There exists a bilingual educational programme for the Slovenian majority and the Hungarian minority to learn the respective other language.

(I5) The Hungarian community is recognized as a community with collective language rights.

(I6) The relationship between the Hungarian government and the Slovenian government is good.

(I7) Dispersed Slovenian communities in Hungary are recognized as a collective with collective language rights.

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(I8) The legal rights of the Hungarian community are practically implemented.

Each issue is expressed as a propositional statement (i.e. a statement for which it makes sense to ask whether it is true or false). This allows one to reconstruct the parties’ interests, such as their goals and beliefs, as propositional attitudes (Richard 1990).

In a third step, we now identify the parties’ interests. For the purposes of this paper, we identify two types of interests: goals pursued or beliefs held by the parties. Starting with MIN, the Hungarian community in Slovenia, the goals pursued by this party are: (MING1) MIN wants Hungarian to be recognized as a regional official language in the Pomurje region (i.e. MIN wants I1 to be true).

(MING2) MIN wants the Hungarian community to have comprehensive and special constitutional rights (i.e. MIN wants I2 to be true).

G (MIN 3) MIN wants the Hungarian community to have a parliamentary representative with veto rights regarding any question relating to the Hungarian minority (i.e. MIN wants I3 to be true).

(MING4) MIN wants there to be a bilingual educational programme for the Slovenian majority and the Hungarian minority to learn the respective other language (i.e. MIN wants I4 to be true).

(MING5) MIN wants the Hungarian community to be recognized as a collective with collective language rights (i.e. MIN wants I5 to be true).

G (MIN 6) MIN wants the legal rights of the Hungarian community to be practically implemented (i.e. MIN wants I8 to be true).

The Slovenian government, SLV, pursues two goals in this situation: (SLVG1) SLV wants the relationship between the Hungarian government and the Slovenian government to be good (i.e. SLV wants I6 to be true).

(SLVG2) SLV wants dispersed Slovenian communities in Hungary to be recognized as a collective with collective language rights (i.e. SLV wants I7 to be true).

Note that while SLV is not opposed to I1, I2, I3, I4, I5, or I8 to be realized, SLV does not pursue the realization of those propositions as a direct goal. We argue that SLV as a whole is indifferent towards those propositions.

The goals of the Hungarian government, HUN, regarding the issues in this situation are similar to those of MIN, but they also share a goal with SLV: (HUNG1) HUN wants Hungarian to be recognized as a regional official language in the Pomurje region (i.e. HUN wants I1 to be true).

(HUNG2) HUN wants the Hungarian community to have comprehensive and special constitutional rights (i.e. HUN wants I2 to be true).

G (HUN 3) HUN wants the Hungarian community to have a parliamentary representative with veto rights regarding any question relating to the Hungarian minority (i.e. HUN wants I3 to be true).

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(HUNG4) HUN wants the Hungarian community to be recognized as a community with collective language rights (i.e. MIN wants I5 to be true).

(HUNG5) HUN wants the relationship between the Hungarian government and the Slovenian government to be good (i.e. HUN wants I6 to be true).

Having identified the parties’ goals, we now turn to the parties’ beliefs. We identify two beliefs for SLV and HUN respectively. We argue that SLV believes that to realize its goal SLVG1 (good relationship with the Hungarian government) it needs to address the goals of the Hungarian government. Further, SLV believes that to realize its goal SLVG2 (recognition of dispersed Slovenian communities in Hungary as a collective with collective language rights) it also needs to address the goals of the Hungarian government. These two beliefs of SLV can be expressed by the following propositions: (SLVB1) SLV believes that IF I6 THEN (I1 AND I2 AND I3 AND I5); (SLVB2) SLV believes that IF I7 THEN (I1 AND I2 AND I3 AND I5).

The two beliefs, SLVB1 and SLVB2, held by the Slovenian government together with its two goals, SLVG1 and SLVG2, provide an explanation as to why it facilitates the realization of I1, I2, I3, and I5. This is because the Slovenian government believes that the realization of those propositions is necessary for the achievement of its goals SLVG1 and SLVG2.

We identify two beliefs held by the Hungarian government as follows: (HUNB1) HUN believes that IF I7 THEN I6; (HUNB2) HUN believes that IF I6 THEN (I1 AND I2 AND I3 AND I5).

HUNB1 expresses the Hungarian government’s belief that if it recognizes dispersed Slovenian communities in Hungary as a collective with collective language rights (I7), then it has a good relationship with the Slovenian government (I6). The second belief, HUNB2, stands for the Hungarian government’s belief that good relationships with the Slovenian government (I6) will ensure that its goals relating to the Hungarian community in Slovenia (HUNG1, HUNG2, HUNG3, HUNG4) are achieved. Again, the two beliefs explain why the Hungarian government is not opposed to realizing I7, even if this is not one of its immediate goals.

Parties, Issues, and Interests in Slovakia In the case of Slovakia, we apply our analysis to three parties as follows: 1. MIN: Hungarian community in Slovakia; 2. SLK: Slovakian government; 3. HUN: Hungarian government.

As in the previous case, the parties are assumed to be homogeneous for the purposes of this paper.

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In terms of the main issues that can be extracted from our narrative description of the situation in Slovakia above, we consider the following ten issues as crucial: (I1) The Hungarian community is granted collective language rights.

(I2) The Hungarian community is granted individual but no collective language rights.

(I3) The Hungarian and Slovak languages are granted equal rights.

(I4) European Union regulations are used as a means to improve the situation of the Hungarian community.

(I5) Members of the Hungarian community are granted double citizenship.

(I6) The Hungarian community follows a separatist policy aimed at joining the kin-state Hungary.

(I7) There exists a Hungarian autonomy within Slovakia.

(I8) The administrative division of Slovakia ensures that there exists no administrative area with a Hungarian majority.

(I9) The Slovak language is legally protected as the majority language.

(I10) The relationship between the Hungarian government and the Slovak government is good.

Having expressed the key issues as propositional statements, we can now reconstruct the parties’ goals and beliefs as attitudes towards those propositions.

Starting with the goals of the Hungarian community in Slovakia, we can identify the following six goals: (MING1) MIN wants the Hungarian community to be granted collective language rights (i.e. MIN wants I1 to be true).

(MING2) MIN does not want the Hungarian community to be granted individual but collective language rights (i.e. MIN wants NOT-I2 to be true).

G (MIN 3) MIN wants the Hungarian and Slovak languages to be granted equal rights (i.e. MIN wants I3 to be true).

(MING4) MIN wants the European Union regulations to be used as a means to improve the situation of the Hungarian community (i.e. MIN wants I4 to be true).

(MING5) MIN wants members of the Hungarian community to be granted double citizenship (i.e. MIN wants I5 to be true).

(MING6) MIN does not want the administrative division of Slovakia to ensure that there exists no administrative area with a Hungarian majority (i.e. MIN wants NOT-I8 to be true).

For the Slovakian government, we identify the following goals: (SLKG1) SLK does not want the Hungarian community to be granted collective language rights (i.e. SLK wants NOT-I1 to be true).

(SLKG2) SLK wants the Hungarian community to be granted individual but no collective language rights (i.e. SLK wants I2 to be true).

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(SLKG3) SLK does not want the Hungarian and Slovak languages to be granted equal rights (i.e. SLK wants NOT-I3 to be true).

(SLKG4) SLK does not want the European Union regulations to be used as a means to improve the situation of the Hungarian community (i.e. SLK wants NOT-I4 to be true).

G (SLK 5) SLK does not want members of the Hungarian community to be granted double citizenship (i.e. SLK wants NOT-I5 to be true).

(SLKG6) SLK does not want the Hungarian community to follow a separatist policy aimed at joining the kin-state Hungary (i.e. SLK wants NOT-I6 to be true).

G (SLK 7) SLK does not want there to exist a Hungarian autonomy within Slovakia (i.e. SLK wants NOT-I7 to be true).

(SLKG8) SLK wants the administrative division of Slovakia to ensure that there exists no administrative area with a Hungarian majority (i.e. SLK wants I8 to be true).

(SLKG9) SLK wants the Slovak language to be legally protected as the majority language (i.e. SLK wants I9 to be true).

(SLKG10) SLK wants the relationship between the Hungarian government and the Slovak government to be good (i.e. SLK wants I10 to be true).

For the Hungarian government, we identify the following goals: (HUNG1) HUN wants the Hungarian community to be granted collective language rights (i.e. HUN wants I1 to be true).

G (HUN 2) HUN wants the Hungarian and Slovak languages to be granted equal rights (i.e. HUN wants I3 to be true).

(HUNG3) HUN wants members of the Hungarian community to be granted double citizenship (i.e. HUN wants I5 to be true).

G (HUN 4) HUN wants the relationship between the Hungarian government and the Slovak government to be good (i.e. HUN wants I10 to be true).

Following from the parties’ goals, one can identify their beliefs in the final step.

As in the case of Slovenia, the reconstruction of beliefs provides an explanation for the parties’ positions in the situation. We only identify beliefs for the Slovakian government as the other parties’ beliefs are less prominent in the situation. We argue that the Slovakian government is likely to hold the following beliefs: (SLKB1) SLK believes that I6; (SLKB2) SLK believes that IF (I1 AND I3 AND I4 AND I5) THEN I6; (SLKB3) SLK believes that IF (I1 AND I3 AND I4 AND I5) THEN I7; (SLKB4) SLK believes that IF (I8 AND I9) THEN NOT-I6; (SLKB5) SLK believes that IF (I8 AND I9) THEN NOT-I7.

The first belief, SLKB1, expresses that the Slovakian government assumes that the Hungarian community in Slovakia is pursuing a separatist policy aimed at joining its kin-state Hungary. SLKB2 stands for the belief that if the Hungarian community were granted collective language rights the Hungarian and Slovak languages were

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granted equal rights, the European Union regulations were used as a means to improve the situation of the Hungarian community, and members of the Hungarian community were granted double citizenship, and then the Hungarian community would be supported in following a separatist policy aimed at joining the kinstate Hungary. SLKB3 stands for the belief that if those actions were taken then the Hungarian community would be supported in creating a Hungarian autonomy within Slovakia. The last two beliefs, SLKB4 and SLKB5, stand for the belief that the pursuit of a separatist policy and the creation of a Hungarian autonomy in Slovakia can be prevented by making sure that the administrative division of Slovakia ensures that there exists no administrative area with a Hungarian majority and by legally protecting the Slovak language as the majority language.

Evaluation and Comparison Having identified the parties’ interests (goals and beliefs) in the situation in Slovenia and Slovakia, we now move on to the final step of evaluating and comparing the two cases. The evaluation involves an assessment of all pairs of positions as to the compatibility of those positions. Positions are identified as compatible (if it is possible to simultaneously satisfy both positions) or incompatible (if the positions cannot be satisfied at the same time).

In the case of the 13 goals identified for the situation in Slovenia, any pair of those goals is simultaneously satisfiable. As outlined in the methodology section above, this is because each of those goals relates to the truth or falsity of a simple proposition which is independent of the truth or falsity of the propositions the other goals relate to. Consequently, the parties’ goals in this situation are all mutually compatible. Graphically, this can be illustrated as shown in Figure 1 below:

Figure 1. Goal structure in Slovenia

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In Figure 1, the three parties’ goals are represented by dots. There are no lines between the dots as all goals are mutually compatible. All beliefs of the parties in Slovenia are also mutually compatible.

In the case of the 20 goals identified for the situation in Slovakia, the following pairs of goals are incompatible, respectively: (1) MING1 is incompatible with SLVG1 (2) MING2 is incompatible with SLVG2 (3) MING3 is incompatible with SLVG3 (4) MING4 is incompatible with SLVG4 (5) MING5 is incompatible with SLVG5 (6) MING6 is incompatible with SLVG8 (7) HUNG1 is incompatible with SLVG1 (8) HUNG2 is incompatible with SLVG3 (9) HUNG3 is incompatible with SLVG5.

All other pairs of goals and beliefs are compatible. The evaluation of pairs of goals/beliefs in terms of their compatibility was conducted in line with the methodology described in the Methodology section above. For each pair, the set of all possible outcomes was generated on the basis of the propositions contained in the respective goals/beliefs. If there was an outcome, in which both goals/ beliefs of a pair were satisfied, then the respective goals/beliefs were considered compatible. Otherwise they were considered incompatible. For instance, the pair MING1 is incompatible with SLVG1 because the latter one is the negation of the former one. Hence, there is no possible outcome in which both goals are satisfied.

The goal structure of the situation in Slovakia can be illustrated by the following graph:

Figure 2. Goal structure in Slovakia

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Note that goals are represented by dots; pairs of incompatible goals are connected by lines.

When comparing the two graphs with each other, it is obvious that the parties’ goals are significantly more incompatible in the case of Slovakia than in the case of Slovenia. In the former country, all parties’ goals are compatible with one another, whereas in the latter country there are nine pairs of incompatible goals.

This suggests that the parties in Slovenia are not in conflict with each other, whereas the parties’ in Slovakia face a conflict situation. The main explanation as to why the parties in Slovakia are faced with a conflict is provided by looking at the beliefs held by the Slovakian government. Most of the goals pursued by SLK are a result of their assumption that the Hungarian community in Slovakia pursues a separatist policy and aims at creating an autonomy within Slovakia.

Conclusion This paper applied a logic-based methodology to analyse the goals pursued and beliefs held by three parties, respectively, in the minority language disputes faced by the Hungarian minorities in Slovenia and Slovakia. The analysis showed that, while all parties’ goals in Slovenia are mutually compatible, the parties’ goals in Slovakia are in many instances incompatible with each other. This suggests that the parties in Slovakia face a conflict, whereas the parties in Slovenia do not face a conflict where conflicts are defined as situations in which parties are faced with incompatible interests. Further, our analysis of the parties’ beliefs reveals some of the underlying assumptions made by the parties and the parties’ rationale for the goals they pursue.

The graphic representations in figures 1 and 2 allow us to define and compare the conflicting goals and beliefs and their structures more precisely. Each dot in the two figures represents a party’s goal. A red line between two dots means that the two goals represented by the dots are incompatible with each other. In the case of Slovenia, it turns out that there are no conflicting goals and beliefs between the parties involved. Thus, there are no red lines between any of the dots in Figure 1. In the case of Slovakia, the conflict potential is high with nine conflicting pairs of goals among the parties involved. Here we can observe nine red lines in Figure 2. Clearly, the more red lines (i.e. the more conflicting goals) there are in a graph, the higher is the level of conflict in the situation depicted by the graph. In that sense, our analysis provides a deeper insight into the question as to why the level of conflict is higher in Slovakia than in Slovenia. There are simply more conflicting pairs (nine in total) depicted by the red lines in the case of Slovakia and no red lines in the case of the Slovenia. In sum, the propositional logic is an effective tool to define and make visible the belief and goal structure of ethnic conflict in an international setting.

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Our model also provides guidance into the direction where conflict deescalation should be sought. The Hungarian minority – backed by its kin-state Hungary – should (it can be argued) address those assumptions to de-escalate the situation. It is important that the Hungarian side signal to the Slovakian government that they do not have the intention to pursue a separatist policy and create a Hungarian territorial autonomy within Slovakia. More precisely, the Hungarian community and the Hungarian government should refrain from claiming the Territoriality Principle, i.e. claiming minority rights to be implemented territorially, and should rather pursue the Personality Principle, i.e. rights attached to individuals instead of being attached to territory (Dembinska et al. 2014, 56). Those signals may change the Slovakian government’s perception and might result in a more comprehensive granting of inclusive rights for the Hungarian community in Slovakia. This might imply that instead of contested territorial rights more favourable language rights can be negotiated.

Another reason to refrain from territorial rights is that the conflict potential in Slovakia might affect the rise of extremist-nationalist politics among all the parties involved in this triadic nexus, i.e. in the ranks of the minority, host-state, and kin-state concerned. As a result of a political swing to extremist views, there can be a threat to the peaceful equilibrium in the Central European region.

In that case, ethnic tensions from Slovakia will spill over to other cases with concentrated Hungarian minorities referred to in the introduction above.

The recent outbreak of violence among Ukrainians and Russian-speaking minorities in the eastern part of Ukraine refutes the opinion that in the case of seemingly peaceful ethnic relations where the conditions for a ‘security dilemma’ are not fulfilled violent clashes are unlikely to happen. Security scholars like Posen (1993, 38–43) have argued that numerous conditions to prevent an ‘Eastern Ukrainian security dilemma’ were present, e.g.: Russian speakers in the eastern parts of Ukraine were allowed to use their own language; Russian-speaking minorities and Ukrainians had no traumatic inter-group history; the presence of former Soviet nuclear forces acted as stabilizers in both Russia and Ukraine; geographic patterns created comparatively less pressure for offensive action as Russians in Ukraine are not settled in vulnerable islands and can be protected in numerous ways; no violent bands engaging in communal terror emerged; no shifts in relative power could be expected; external factors reinforced restraint in Russian-Ukrainian forces, and so on. The conditions can change or can be overruled by other factors, and, unexpectedly, the security dilemma might arise after all.

But even if the ‘worst case scenario’ in such cases, an ethnically driven war and ethnic cleansing, will not arise the constant state of conflict will paralyse the system of international relations. Note that all the states involved with Hungarian minorities are member or candidate states of the European Union and NATO and co-operate in regional coalitions, such as the Visegrad-Cooperation (i.e. the co-

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operation of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary), to harmonize their security and European policy. If anti-democratic tendencies in the Central European region will prevail, however, it certainly will hamper the functioning of these international entities at the expense of European political, economic cooperation, peace and stability.

Note The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under Grant Agreement No 613344.

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Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 8 (2015) 43–56

DOI: 10.1515/auseur-2015-0012

If Yes, Why Not? Minority Language Use and Accommodation of Minority Language Rights in Slovakia Ă gnes VASS

Institute for Minority Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Abstract. This article gives an overview of the actual situation of language rights in Slovakia, focusing mainly on the minority language usage. The status of minority languages in Slovakia is still a politicized question and a series of conflicts arose especially between Slovak political elites and the representatives of ethnic Hungarians because of the controversial legislation of minority language rights. Slovakia was subjected in the field of minority protection and heavily criticized during the adoption of the State Language Law. Strict regulations on the use of state language have negative effects on the use of minority languages as well. In spite of the fact that in 1999 the Law on Use of Minority Languages was adopted and Slovakia ratified all of the international agreements in this field, the problem of minority language usage was not solved. This legal vacuum motivated the Hungarian civil sphere to take alternative actions in order to ensure bilingualism and promote the use of minority languages in official communication. Summarizing the legal accommodation of minority language rights, this paper is devoted to examine a recently less-observed civil activism supporting the use of regional languages in Slovakia.

Keywords: language rights, ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia, State Language Law, bilingualism

It is indisputable that the use of minority language is vitally important for minority communities and minority language rights influence both directly and indirectly the everyday life and future prospects of members of such communities.

Since democratization, minority language use and the struggle for language rights have been almost permanent features of politics and public life in Slovakia (Csergő 2007). This is unsurprising given that in the most recent census 12 per cent of the population identified themselves as non-Slovaks based on ethnicity. The census data also shows that 14 per cent of the population does not consider Slovak to be their native language, 10 per cent do not use the Slovak language in public life, and around 12 per cent use a language other than Slovak at home.

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Since the fall of communism, in particular, minority language use and the protection of the official language have been controversial issues under almost all governments and numerous legal regulations have been adopted to settle these issues. Nevertheless, Slovakia offers only minimal language guarantees to the minority communities living within its borders. As the ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia have been the most active in this matter, it is not surprising that the Hungarian language has come to be regarded as a source of conflict in political life and that language regulation and guaranteed language rights have become, over the decades, both a legal issue and a significant factor in politics.

After 1989, Slovakia’s official language policy has often been overtly hostile to Hungarian, but the rhetoric has changed in the post-Mečiar era. The adoption and amendment of the Law on Minority Language Use has failed to bring the anticipated progress although it has clearly resulted in positive changes in certain fields (Berényi 1994). In such areas as bilingualism, official language use, and minority language rights, Hungarian civil society actors have set in motion a number of unprecedented civil initiatives. Such initiatives are indicative of the importance of the issue and of the need to deal with unresolved problems. Despite all this, Slovakia’s political leadership argues that the country provides highlevel guarantees for minority languages in accordance with European standards and that it is the minority community who have failed to make use of their legally guaranteed rights – either because they are passive or because they have limited knowledge of the law (Szabómihály 2006). Experience has shown, however, that such rights represent merely the starting point for efforts to establish better and more viable (legal) regulations.

Development of Language Rights after 1989 After the system changes, ethnic tensions that had been swept under the carpet during the communist period came to the surface and the issue of minority language use got a key importance. The opportunities for use of Hungarian (and other minority languages) have changed significantly; however, language use and the associated legislative process have risen stormy debates among politicians, in the media, and in public life as well.

In the newly independent Slovakia, none of the minority languages were granted official status. The direction and thrust of Slovak language policy was signalled by the 1990 Law on the Official Language, adopted before Czechoslovakia would split into two countries. Language policy was based on two main principles: firstly, to give priority to the Slovak language; secondly, to regulate the use of minority languages by law. This reflected the desire of the Hungarian minority community to give greater role for their language in both public and official

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settings. The Language Law of 1995 may even be understood as the logical consequence of the idea of the Slovak political leadership. The Slovak language also received a prominent role among the government’s political aims. Under the Mečiar government (1993–1998), protection of the state language was regarded as a precondition for the realization of Slovakia’s national interest. The Language Law of 1995, which was subsequently amended, stipulated that Slovak language had to be both the state language and the manifestation of state sovereignty.

The Language Law also defined language as an identifying characteristic of the Slovak nation, one that should be protected and given preference over all other languages. In the Slovak view, the Slovak language had been neglected under communism and then suppressed during the years of democratization by private media companies that were hostile to Slovaks (Chudzíková 2011).

Existence and activity of Hungarian schools and cultural institutions in Southern Slovakia were unacceptable for some populist and nationalist political leaders, who claimed that young ethnic Hungarians were dismissive of their right to learn Slovak language on high level. These decision makers assumed that the introduction of a strict language law will ‘solve’ this problem effectively.

The election victory of the anti-Mečiar Blue Coalition have brought subsequent changes in Slovakia’s political climate, which positively influenced the rhetoric of the language policy. In the 2000s, the ‘Hungarian issue’ gradually disappeared from statements made on language policy and language rights. At the time of the Dzurinda government (1998–2006), the issue was no longer so divisive. The departure point for language policy continued to be the Language Law of 1995.

Government Decree 131/2001 may be considered as a basic policy document of official language policy in the post-Mečiar period. The strategy attempted once again to justify the Language Law: it claimed that the Slovak language was ‘a basic identifying mark’ of the Slovak nation and that it was thus logical for the ‘language of the state-forming nation’ to be declared as the state language. Slovak language was seen as a means for the state to uphold domestic stability in cultural, social, and political sense. Slovak language was viewed as a ‘means of contact that binds together, unites, and makes equal’ the citizens in Slovakia. It seems that those citizens who do not speak Slovak are not equal with those who speak the Slovak language. The law also specifically addressed the relationship between the state language and the minority languages. On this issue, it declared that, for the sake of efficiency in public administration and the uninterrupted flow of information, the status of the state language must be guaranteed. However, it then added that the state also recognizes ‘the rights of persons speaking a minority language’.

Thus, Slovakia’s language policy does not primarily recognize linguistic rights; rather, it recognizes individuals’ rights, some of which are linguistic rights.

Slovakia has ratified all relevant international agreements and the right to use a minority language is even mentioned in the Constitution. Even so, the

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complaints of the minorities living in Slovakia are still legitimate: compared with other minorities elsewhere, the minorities in Slovakia lag behind in terms of their language rights.

What Does the Language Law Regulate?

The Language Law adopted in 1990 was conceptualized to establish the status of the official language, but it did not mention the term of ‘state language’. The law was not the result of a government initiative but arose as the outcome of developments in society. In October 1990, demonstrators at a mass protest outside the parliament building demanded the granting of official status to Slovak as a response to the increased appearance of advertisements in Hungarian in those settlements where ethnic Hungarians were in majority. A draft bill submitted by the Slovak National Party and by Matica slovenská1 failed to be adopted, but the Parliament approved a bill submitted by the political movement Public against Violence (Verejnosť proti násiliu). The law permitted the use of minority language in official proceedings in settlements where the percentage of inhabitants belonging to a national minority was 20 percent or higher. It did not, however, stipulate that civil servants working in offices and institutions in these settlements must speak minority language; their competence was just to consider whether the minority language might be used officially or not.

The term ‘state language’ was introduced by the Constitution of 1992, on which basis the subsequent language law was adopted. Article 34 of the Constitution guarantees for citizens representing national minorities or ethnic groups the right to develop their own culture, the right to disseminate and receive information in their mother tongue, and also the right to set up and maintain educational and cultural institutions. However, the Constitution also states that the implementation and application of minority rights must not threaten Slovakia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In addition to the Language Law, there were several other laws and regulations relating to the use of language. However, none of them were specifically concerned with minority language use. Act No 29/1984 on elementary schools and high schools was replaced in 2003 with the adoption of Act 596/2003 on the state educational system and the self-governing bodies of schools. According to the law, in elementary and high schools where the language of education is not Slovak, the official school records must be bilingual. Concerning the use of minority languages in the courts, the law allows interpretation for those who do not speak Slovak during the proceedings; however, the language of the proceedings must be Slovak.

1

It is a scientific and cultural institution in Slovakia, established in 1863.

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The Act on the Constitutional Court (1993) and the Act on Guaranteeing Civil and Human Rights (2001) allowed for private individuals to communicate with the ombudsman and with the Constitutional Court in their native language.

Although the Mečiar government’s language policy was openly against the use of minority languages, there were some positive exceptions that need to be mentioned. One of these exceptions is Act No 300/1993, which allowed the official use of non-Slovak given names and surnames. Before the adoption of the law, it was an obligation to use and write non-Slovak names according to the Slovak grammar (e.g. the ‘-ova’ suffix on women’s surnames was required). It is important to highlight that not only national minorities were supporting this amendment, but Slovak women also openly expressed their satisfaction with this legal decision. One year later, the government adopted Act No 154/1994 on registers and Act No 191/1994 on road signs. The latter law permitted to use bilingual road signs in those municipalities where 20 percent of the local population is native minority language speaker. Despite the subsequent adoption of the Law on Minority Language Use, these three laws contain the most comprehensive provisions on these issues. These positively evaluated developments were the results of international pressure, and due to these laws Slovakia’s accession to the Council of Europe was also successful (Sutaj, Sápos 2008).

The State Language Act adopted in 1995 by an overwhelming majority was accepted in order to ensure superiority of the Slovak language in public and semi-public spheres. However, the adoption of the law has another symbolic meaning: it was accepted as a reaction to the adoption of the Slovak-Hungarian Basic Treaty2 signed in the same year.

Regulations of language law are based on the philosophy represented by the Slovak Nationalist Party (SNS), which says that in Slovakia only the Slovak language must have priority and it must be the only language spoken in all official spheres. According to their slogan “Na Slovensku po Slovensky” (“In Slovakia speak Slovak”), Slovak language must be the general vehicle of communication of all Slovak citizens living in the country. The law was regarded as the strictest language law in Europe and heavily criticized by the international community.

In general, Slovakia was not able to prove its commitment to the European Union and, after accepting the State Language Law, the country was excluded from the group of states invited to start the accession negotiations (Hughes, Sasse 2003).

The State Language Law obliged state authorities, government ordinances, territorial self-government authorities and also legal and certain physical entities 2

In 1995, after a long-lasting negotiation, the Bilateral Treaty on Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation was signed between Slovakia and Hungary. This treaty was heavily criticized by the Slovak nationalist parties. Due to this, the Slovak government attached to the treaty its reservations regarding the collective rights of minorities and the implementation of the treaty was also delayed.

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to use Slovak language in public communication. Using Slovak language was also required for the employees working in state transportation services, in post offices, in telecommunication and in the armed forces, armed security corps, and fire brigades as well. All legal and official documents issued by state authorities had to be written in Slovak. The same was valid for the citizens as well: in written and oral communication with public and legal administration, the use of Slovak language was also required. The whole documentation of public administration and information intended for the public was obliged to be in Slovak. It meant that minority languages were excluded from public and official communication as well. What is more, the above mentioned 20 per cent threshold also ceased to exist after the adoption of the law. In spite of the fact that the previously adopted Act on Official Language (Act No 428/1990) entitled members belonging to minorities to use their native language in official and public communication in those municipalities where minorities exceed 20 per cent of the population, the State Language Act stated that the legal guarantees of using minority languages would be regulated by a separate law. However, there was no such legislation in Slovakia in that time. It means that the State Language Act created a legal vacuum which existed till the adoption of the act on minority language use in 1999 (LanstyĂĄk 1999, Kopanic 1999).

The Slovak language was superior to all other languages and was required to be used in education as well. One of the biggest changes introduced by the law was that the educational documentation must be written in Slovak even in schools where the language of instruction is other than Slovak.

The State Language Law also prescribed the use of Slovak language in mass media, at cultural events, and in public meetings as well. Art. 5 concerned language use in radio and television broadcasting. According to this, all of the programmes must be conducted in Slovak; however, broadcasting productions in foreign language must be equipped with Slovak subtitles. Creating another legal vacuum, the State Language Law stated that broadcasting in minority languages must be administered by other specific regulations.

Cultural and educational events too must be conducted in Slovak, but cultural events of minorities are an exception. These events could be conducted in their own languages; however, conferential introduction of the programmes must be performed in Slovak first and then in the original language. The law strictly regulates the language use in the case of occasional publications, catalogues of galleries, museums, libraries, and programme sheets as well. These kinds of documents must be issued in Slovak or can be bilingual; however, in the latter case, any other language version must be printed only after the Slovak version and cannot be longer or written with other fonts than the Slovak version. The violation of the law could entail financial sanctions which are imposable not only on authorities but also on legal entities and natural persons as well. These

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penalties were cancelled by Act No 184/1999 on the use of minority languages but reintroduced by the amendment of the State Language Law in 2009. The maximum amount of financial sanction was later decreased (Daftary, GĂĄl 2009).

The amendment of the law in 2009 made several provisions stricter; however, there are some positive changes as well. One of the improvements made in the field of official communication was that the proof of Slovak language knowledge is no longer condition for employment in the civil services. The law allows to use other languages in the public sphere and also allows to display information intended to the public in minority languages as well. The changes applied on documentation in schools and educational institutions are controversial – in those schools where the language of instruction is other than Slovak the documentations must be bilingual. It can be evaluated as a positive development; however, the administrative obligations of teachers in these schools are higher than in other schools.

Similarly to the 1995 State Language Act, some absurd legal provisions can be explored in the 2009 version of the law as well. One of these is the Art. 5, which prescribes that the inscriptions on monuments and historical buildings as well as memorial plaques have to be written in the state language. Inscriptions written in other languages must be displayed only after the Slovak inscription and must be written with the same or smaller fonts. What is more, the developer is obliged to request a binding opinion from the Ministry of Culture as to whether the inscription is in compliance with the law or not. Despite that this clause is not valid for historical inscriptions on monuments and memorials, the absurdity of the law was hardly acceptable.

The law also allowed the use of minority language in healthcare and social services; however, these provisions are also controversial. In case the patient does not understand Slovak, it is allowed to conduct the communication in other languages as well. However, it is not required that the employees of healthcare and social service facilities shall speak any of the minority languages. According to the amendment, persons belonging to minorities are allowed to use their mother tongue in healthcare and social services in those municipalities where minorities exceed 20 per cent of the population. This is controversial because it does not protect minority language use in those municipalities where the rate of minorities is lower than 20 per cent. However, language use could be guaranteed and protected especially in these municipalities.

Despite that some of the controversial provisions were repealed, most of them are still valid. What is more, Slovakia signed and ratified all of the international documents which are protecting the language rights of minority communities. In the same year when the State Language Law was adopted, Slovakia also ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, and six years later the European Charter for Regional and Minority

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Languages was also signed. In the context of the State Language Law, the last two documents are the most important.

The European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities adopted under the auspices of the Council of Europe is regarded as the most comprehensive international standard in the field of minority rights.

The framework is a soft-law instrument constructed as a series of principles and objectives for states to guide their minority population. Slovakia undertook to recognize that every person belonging to a national minority has the right to use his/her mother tongue both in private and public life as well. The framework set out a monitoring mechanism obliging states to submit periodic reports for examination. In connection with the State Language Law, the experiment report highlighted that Slovakia was not able to ensure proper use of minority languages and curtailed the rights of minority communities as well. The reaction of Slovakia was that minority languages cannot have priority over state language usage.

Reports of the Advisory Committee of the Framework convention highlighted that the promotion of minority rights in Slovakia are stagnating and the State Language Law discourage people to use their languages. The Committee also asked the government to give lex specialis priority to the Law on the Use of Languages of National Minorities, and also recommended not to stick to the census data when deciding about the conditions of minority language usage (Gyuricsek 2002).

The European Charter on Regional and Minority Languages signed in 2001 allows for the states to design their own legislation – they can ‘choose’ those obligations that are appropriate for their circumstances. The Charter was signed due to the effort of the Hungarian Coalition Party. The first version of the Charter prepared by the Cultural Ministry did not use the concept of ‘regional languages’ – the statement of the ministry was that in Slovakia there are no languages which are used regionally. Except the state language, all languages spoken by the minorities were not distinguished from each other; so, it meant that the Hungarian language spoken by half a million citizens of Slovakia would get the same conditions as the German language with a few thousands of speakers.

Taking into consideration the remarks prepared by the SMK, the new version of the law was much friendlier and flexible with minority languages. Instead of the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was responsible for the ratification of the law. The new version of the law gave special status to the Hungarian language and also recognized the existence of regional languages in Slovakia. Slovakia undertook to guarantee the use of minority languages in front of the court and during the proceedings. Furthermore, Slovakia also undertook to grant broadcasting programmes in minority languages in the national media.

Minority language use would be guaranteed also official contacts, especially in hospitals and in other institutes of public services. Slovakia also added that these obligations would be fulfilled only with the recognition of the usage of Slovak

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language. The Slovak Nationalist Party evaluated the ratification of the Charter as the first step towards the proclamation of territorial autonomy of Hungarians living in Slovakia (Vogl 2009).

In spite of the fact that Slovakia undertook important and remarkable commitments and obligations, the ratification of these international legal norms did not lead to any significant changes and the real implementation of these obligations was insufficient. The amendment of the language law in 2009 was heavily criticized not only in Slovakia but also on the international level as well.

Due to this, the then Slovak Government formally requested the OSCE High Commissioners to analyse the law. The OSCE High Commissioner highlighted the legitimate purpose of the amendment; however, he also mentioned some problematic issues. He criticized that the amendment of the law creates legal uncertainty by referring to areas which are not regulated by the Law on the Minority Languages. He fully recognized the government’s standpoint according to which without sanctions the law could be ignored. However, he also added that the application of the law could be ensured by other tools, and not with sanctions. The Slovak government declared this opinion as Slovakia’s victory which declared the importance of the law. The Venice Commission’s analyses of the language law were published only after the elections held in 2010. The new government led by Iveta Radicová responded to the critiques by preparing the amendment of the law on the use of minority languages.

Legislation on the Use of the Minority Languages The legal background of minority language use and the accommodation of linguistic rights of minority communities was enlisted to the short-term objectives of Slovakia’s European integration. The experts of CoE, EC, and OSCE High Commissioner assisted the preparation of the law; however, the coalition partners were not able to reach a consensus about the law. Despite that some of the suggestions made by the Hungarian party were incorporated into the law, it was unacceptable for the SMK; so, in the end, the law was adopted without their support. The purpose of the law was to set down those legal conditions under which members of the minority communities could use their language in official contacts (Kemp, 2001).

The law entitled national minorities to use their language in official communication: the law allowed for them to submit official requests in their own language and administrative bodies are obliged to respond in the same language. According to the law, resolutions and official forms must be available in the minority languages as well. Governing boards and local administrative bodies are allowed to use other languages than Slovak at their meetings if all of

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the participants agree with that. In spite of the fact that the public administrative bodies may use minority languages in official communication, it is not required for them to speak the minority language (Cúth 2011). It is also controversial that the official forms may be written in minority language as well, but the law does not clarify who is responsible to print these documents in these languages. The control of correct implementation of the law is also lacking. In spite of the fact that the ideology of the law re-introduced the pre-Mečiar practices and is based on the Slovak conceptualization of nation-state according to which minority language rights are weakening the rights of using the Slovak language, the EU welcomed the adoptions and Slovakia joined to the ‘fast-track group’ of the states joining the EU.

20 per Cent – Enough for What?

The 20 per cent threshold for the application of minority language rights is also mentioned in the Law on the Use of Languages of National Minorities. This number shows in which municipalities is allowed to use minority languages in official contacts. In those municipalities where the rate of the members of minorities exceeds 20 per cent of the population, they are entitled to use their language in official communication. However, this threshold is problematic not only from the minority perspective, but it was also criticized in the expert reports prepared by the CoE or by the OSCE. This threshold was implemented by the Law on Official Language Usage in 1990. Obligations undertaken in the Law on the Use of Languages of National Minorities and also in the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages are implemented only in municipalities exceeding the 20 per cent threshold. If this threshold is enough or not is hard to decide. According to the report of the Committee of Experts of the European Charter, this threshold is too high, while in the view of the OSCE High Commissioner this number is in line with the international standards. However, this threshold in Slovakia allows to practise and implement linguistic rights only at local level. As we can see in the following examples, this threshold is hardly reached in bigger cities or in the regional centres. Consequently, Hungarian language in 503 municipalities, the Romani in 54 municipalities, the Ruthenian language in 83 municipalities, and the Ukrainian language in six municipalities was allowed to be used as official language. We can also find municipalities where not only one but at least two minorities exceeded 20 per cent of the population (these are mainly Hungarian and Romani or Romani and Ruthenian villages); however, the official use of these minority languages is doubted. Data of the 2011 census show us that the number of municipalities in which Hungarian language might be used as official langue decreased (470 municipalities), but the number of municipalities with Roma or Ruthenian majorities increased. According to these data, we can say that 85%

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of ethnic Hungarians, 25% of Roma population, 40% of Ruthenians, and 3% of Ukrainians are allowed to use their mother tongue in official communication.

However, on regional level, these numbers are lower. While in 2001 the Hungarian language was allowed to be used in 13 districts (in Hungarian: jรกrรกs), in 2011, this number was 11. On regional level, only 60 per cent of ethnic Hungarians and 23 per cent of Ruthenians are allowed to use their own language in official contacts.

Table 1. Census data from 2001 and 2011 based on the results of the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 2011 2001 Nationality Mother tongue Nationality Mother tongue Slovak 4 352 775 4 240 453 4 614 854 4 512 217 Hungarian 458 467 508 714 520 526 572 929 Roma 105 738 122 518 89 920 99 448 Ruthenian 33 55 469 24 201 54 907 Ukrainian 7 430 568 10 814 787 Czech 30 35 216 44 620 48 201 German 4 690 518 540 634 Polish 3 084 311 260 273 Croatian 1 022 123 890 988 Bulgarian 1 051 132 117 100 Another problem is that national self-identification and language use is not the same. Census data prove that the number of native speakers of minority languages is higher than the number of national minorities. This tendency was highlighted by the international experts as well, who recommended Slovakia not to stick so exclusively to the census data. Despite that the amendment of the Law on the Use of Languages of National Minorities lowered the 20 per cent threshold to 15 per cent, this will be implemented only from 2021.

If Yes, Why Not? Although positive development can be observed in the field of minority language use in Slovakia, some issues are still unsolved. Despite the amendment of the State Language Law, the ratification of the most important international legal documents, and the acceptance of the Law on the Use of Languages of National Minorities, significant progress is not visible. Politicians often argue that the legal background is given, the real implementation of the law depends only on the minority communities. The legislation of the use of minority languages is controversial; the implementation of minority language law is mainly an option

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and not an obligation. Since there are no sanctions in order to achieve the correct application of the minority language rights, the law could be easily ignored.

Citizens are not informed well in which situations and when it is allowed to use their own language. In spite of the fact that even official forms could be issued in minority languages, in a few cases, these documents are not accepted as official documents. What is more, employees of administrative bodies are not able to express themselves in their minority language because they have learnt only the Slovak (official) terminology.

The 2009 amendment of the State Language Law triggered a reaction of the Hungarian civil society, and new civil initiations were founded. One of them is the Roundtable of Hungarians living in Slovakia, but the Civil Initiation for Bilingual Southern Slovakia must also be mentioned. Roundtable is an umbrella organization of Hungarian NGO-s in Slovakia and was created to articulate the interests of the Hungarian community. The Civil Initiation of Bilingual Southern Slovakia is a bottom-up initiative – they are supporting bilingualism and the use of Hungarian language in the southern part of Slovakia, where the Hungarian population is dominant. Their campaign is creative and friendly, what attracts citizens, but their activity has an important message both for the Slovak majority and the Hungarian minority. Their campaigns focus mainly on the problem of missing bilingual road signs in those municipalities where bilingualism is legally allowed. In their Nameless Villages Project, they called the attention of legal authorities to the missing road signs in more than 30 municipalities in the southern region. They also created the first road sign in Slovakia, which was removed within three days by the state authorities. The aim of their campaign is to fill the gap and call the attention of the citizens for the correct application of the Law of the Use of Languages in National Minorities. Although the association has been active for only less than two and a half years so far, they have been contributing to strengthening the Hungarian civil society, on the one hand, while, on the other hand, their campaigns contribute to making the best of the advantages of using Hungarian language where the law makes it possible, and not let it remain only on paper.

Summarizing the development of rights of the regional languages in Slovakia, we can say that more than twenty years were not enough to create a multicultural society in Slovakia. Minority language use is still a political issue and mainly the Hungarian language is seen as the ‘language of conflicts’. The problem of minority language use is not solved and the implementation of minority language rights is still highly polarized. On the other hand, it is also important to add that there is no consensus even within the Hungarian political parties in the matter of language rights. The Híd-Most and the SMK are not sharing the same opinion on how effective the given legal conditions are for minority language use. There is a need for a consequent, detailed, and clear language policy; however, Hungarian

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political parties have not been able to create it so far. Another problem is that minority communities (except the above mentioned initiatives) did not start a campaign to emphasize the advantages of bilingualism. The political dead-lock would be changed by civil initiatives; however, the question is how much time is needed for political elites to change their attitude toward this issue.

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CÚTH, Csaba. 2011. A kisebbségi nyelvhasználati jogi keretei és megvalósulásának körülményei a szlovákiai helyi önkormányzatokban 1999 és 2011 között.

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CSERGŐ, Zsuzsa. 2007. Talk of the Nation: Language and Conflict in Romania and Slovakia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

DAFTARAY, Farimah–GÁL Kinga. 2004. The 1999 Slovak Minority Language Law: Internal or External Politics? In: Farimah Daftray–Francois Grin (eds), Nation-building, Ethnicity and Language Politics in Transition Countries.

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GYURICSEK, Piroska. 2002. Analyza k implementácií Európskej charty regionálnych alebo mensinovych jazykov. In: Stav mensinovej legislatívy na Slovensku 2001/2002. Bratislava: Nadácia Kalligram.

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KEMP, A. Walter. 2001, Quite Diplomacy in Action: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.

KOPANIC, Michael J. 1999. The New Minority Language Law in Slovakia. Central Europe Review 1(2).

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SUTAJ, Stefan–SÁPOS, Aranka. 2009. A nemzeti kisebbségek helyzete 2008-ban Szlovákiában. Nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségek Szlovákiában. Samorín: Fórum Kisebbségkutató Intézet.

SZABÓMIHÁLY, Gizella. 2006. A szlovák nyelvpolitika és a kisebbségek anyanyelvhasználati lehetőségei és törekvései. Romániai Magyar Jogtudományi Közlöny. IV(2): 43–49.

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Commission of the European Communities. 1998 Regular Report on Slovakia’s Progress towards Accession.

Predpis č. 184/1999 Z. z. Zákon o pouzívaní jazykov národnostnych menšín.

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Predpis c 596/2003 Z. z. Zákon o státnej správe v skolstve a skolskej samospráve a o zmene a doplnení niektorych zákonov.

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Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 8 (2015) 57–72

DOI: 10.1515/auseur-2015-0013

Language Politics and Language Rights on the Territory of Former Yugoslavia the Today’s Serbia/Vojvodina György SZERBHORVÁTH Institute for Minority Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Abstract. In this paper, we will attempt to outline the process of how the nationality/minority rights, especially the minority language rights, were changed in the former Yugoslavia in the next period of times: … and how they have changed in Serbia since 1990, and in Vojvodina. We present the most significant constitutional and legal changes, their impact on the institutional and everyday life, and the language policy tendencies.

Finally, we discuss how the formation of the Serbian National Councils have shaped the linguistic rights of minorities in Vojvodina, in particularly after 2009, through examining the work, experiences, and the strategy of the Hungarian National Council and the Hungarians living there.

Keywords: Serbia, Yugoslavia, Vojvodina, autonomy, minority, language policy

Without Minorities Since its formation, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (1918), which was named Yugoslavian Kingdom between 1929 and 1941, followed an assimilating minority policy and strongly preferred the Serbo-Croatian language. In the meantime, a different situation emerged gradually in Tito’s south Slavic state.

It consisted of six federal republics and two autonomous provinces that belonged to Serbia. The federal republic became more decentralized over time.

This meant that, although the official language of the federal institutions (the party headquarters, military, police) was the Serbo-Croatian, or the Croatian-Serbian, the republics and provinces could determine themselves their official languages, while in the provinces the minorities’ languages became official languages (Albanian in Kosovo, Hungarian, Romanian, Slovak, and Rusyn – besides the Serbo-Croatian – in Vojvodina). This was particularly true in municipalities where a certain minority group was at higher rates.

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Minority and Language Policy of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1945–1990) One of the aims of Tito’s policy was precisely to build a new nation, called the Yugoslav, and thus to create a supranational society. In 1954, the so-called Novi Sad Agreement declared that both languages, the Serbian and the Croatian, should be equally considered in the everyday use. As a result of this attempt to unify the two languages, the so-called Serbo-Croatian, or Croatian-Serbian language was created (see Radovanović 2004). And it was due to the radio and television stations that a standardized version of the Serbo-Croatian was created. (Although eventually each republic and province had its own radio and television stations and newspapers, they presented each other’s news programmes and shows. But the standard version of the Serbo-Croatian language was mostly spread through the programmes, films, and sports programmes of the unified Yugoslav Radio Television. In addition, Slovenes, Macedonians, and even peoples of the South Slavic ethnic groups like the Albanians or the Hungarians and the other minorities learned the language (or at least understood it) rather and primarily from the YRT shows and newspapers than in the school.)

In the case of young people, the military became a linguistic melting pot and the youth work action (Omladinske radne akcije) also mattered in this question.

The prestige of the Serbo-Croatian language grew, but after 1991 its meaning changed in a specifically negative way, it has almost meant a swear-word (PožgajHadži, Balažić Bulc Miheljak 2013, 37–66).

The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution contains the main and positive changes.1 It stresses that everyone is equal before the law, regardless of nationality, race, sex, language, religion, educational level, or social status.2 Article 170 also includes that ‘all Citizens shall be guaranteed the right to opt for a nation or nationality, to express their national culture, and to use their language and alphabet freely’.

Article 171 is even clearer: ‘Members of nationalities shall, in conformity with the constitution and statute, have the right to use their language and alphabet in the exercise of their rights and duties and in proceedings before state agencies and organizations exercising public powers. Members of the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia shall, on the territory of each Republic/Autonomous Province, have the right to instruction in their own language in conformity with statute.’

The 1974 Constitution, Article 214 also stresses that ‘Not speaking the language in which the official proceedings are taking place cannot be an obstacle for the 1

2

Službeni list SFRJ, 3 (1974), February 21, 1974. See the parts concerning the minorities and language of: Ustav Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije 1974 (February 21, 1974) http://dediserver.eu/hosting/ethnodoc/data/YU19740221-2.pdf.

Article II, Chapter III, Section 154.

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citizens and organizations to exercise and protect their rights and interests. (…) Everyone has the right to use their own language before the court or other public authorities and to access information in their own language in judicial proceedings.’

Practically, in the third part of the Constitution, which is about the relations between the federal states,3 the same is repeated by stressing that ‘The languages and the alphabets of the nations and nationalities shall be equal throughout the territory of Yugoslavia.’

In reality, the Serbo-Croatian/Croatian-Serbian language became increasingly dominant in the everyday use due to the effect of the media and also to the communication of the companies, the military, the youth work action and cultural events, etc. However, regarding the subsequent discussions, it is important to point out that concerning sociolinguistic aspects the 1974 Federal Constitution stipulates both pronunciations, Ekavski and Ijekavski, and both scripts, Cyrillic and Latin, of the Serbo-Croatian language in the official use as equal.

In addition, minorities could request the use of their own languages at municipalities, courts, etc.; translating and interpreting services were set up.

However, in practice, this did not mean that minority citizens could use their mother tongue in any situation without any obstacles. That period of time had the same problem as it is today: though minority citizens had/have the right to use their own language, in case if this was not possible, no sanctions were imposed.

If there was no interpreter in the court or the police officers and officials of the police station did not speak the language of a certain minority or in case there was no Hungarian-speaking teacher in the school, it was an infringement but did not have any legal and practical consequences.

The Autonomy of Vojvodina Besides the Federal Constitution, it is important to point out that the Constitution of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina4 (created in January 30, 1974, based on the Federal Constitution) authorized the establishment of its own constitution, constitutional court, legislature, police, courts, national banks, etc., which meant a better chance to achieve the realization of minority and language rights as well.5 But in terms of our topic the important periods are the period after 1969, when the Constitution of the Socialist Autonomous Vojvodina was created and the era after 3 4 5

Odnosi u Federaciji i prava dužnosti Federacije. Part I, sections 245, 246, and 247.

Ustav SAP Vojvodine. Službeni list SFRJ, 1974. http://www.slobodnavojvodina.com/index.php/index.php?option=com_content&view =article&id=349:dok-je-imala-svoj-ustav-vojvodini-je-ostajalo-90-njenog-novca&catid=5:akcent i&Itemid=40.

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1974. At this time, the authority of the Constitution of Vojvodina was extended with state power authorities as we mentioned it earlier. But still, the laws and the Constitution of the Socialist Autonomous Vojvodina – the Statute – had to be in harmony with the Serbian Constitution and the Federal Constitution and laws.

Language rights essentially were not different from languages rights on federal level.

Centralization and War in Serbia after 1990 A radically different system developed after 1990, when the break-up of the federal system occurred. First, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was dissolved at its 14th Congress in January 1990. But already after the so-called anti-bureaucratic Serbian revolution (coup) in the fall of 1988 Serbian nationalist supporters of Milošević were brought to power in the provinces and in most of the municipalities too. From that time on, it was practically not relevant what was written in the Constitution of Yugoslavia, of Serbia, or of Vojvodina. A state of emergency was imposed in Kosovo.

The situation in Vojvodina was less tense, but the rest of the story is well known: after the outbreak of the wars in 1991, partly due to the constraints of military mobilizations, tens of thousands of minorities at military age fled from Vojvodina, mostly Hungarians and Croats. This context fundamentally determined the situation and the rights of the minorities, while from 1990, after the introduction of the multi-party system, minority rights organizations, and later on parties, were formed.

The new Serbian Constitution,6 which deprived significant laws from the provinces (state authorities such as national banks, police, constitutional court, etc.), was adopted in 1990.

It is interesting to note that, according to the first phase: ‘The Republic of Serbia is a democratic State of all citizens living within it’;7 so, it does not specifically define which nation’s country it talks about. And Article 8 states that: ‘In the Republic of Serbia, the Serbo-Croatian language and the Cyrillic alphabet shall be officially used, while the Latin alphabet shall be officially used in the manner established by law.’

The authorities of the provinces were reduced, but in the meantime the Constitution and laws of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) were still valid, and so the Serbian Constitution’s provision on language use hit the Federal’s.

6

7

Ustav Republike Srbije, 1990. Službeni glasnik RS, 1990.1. Voltaképpen cirill betűkkel kell itt jeleznünk, hiszen immár ez a hivatalos írásmód: Устав Републике Србије. („Службени гласник РС”, број: 1/90) http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN019071.pdf

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The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as the legal successor of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was declared by Serbia and Montenegro on April 27, 1992. Its Constitution8 does not define either on the ground of nationality whose state it is, but according to Article15: ‘In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Serbian language in its ekavian and ijekavian dialects and the Cyrillic script shall be official, while the Latin script shall be in official use as provided for by the Constitution and law.’

The Serbian Law on the Official Use of Languages and Scripts was accepted on 27 July 1991.9 According to that: ‘The Serbo-Croatian language is also called Serbian language (hereinafter referred to as the Serbian language) as far as its pronunciations Ekavski and Ijekavski are concerned.’

This invalidates the Constitutional provision for the binomial name of the language and lets the monomial name take its place, and thus the Serbo-Croatian language ceases to exist in the official language use. But according to experts it still exists.

The Struggle of Languages, or Language Policy, in Serbia since 1991 Ranko Bugarski writes in his work On Old Language and New Languages (Bugarski 2007, 122–127) that in terms of linguistics and communication the SerboCroatian language still exists even after the Serbo-Croatian language became four languages after 1990, so that in the respective republics the Serbian, the Croatian, the Bosnian and, from 2007, the Montenegrin became official languages.

Croatian linguist Dubravko Škiljan (Škiljan 1998, 2002) shared this opinion too. That is, the Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, and Montenegrin are political languages, they are the dialects and variants of the Serbo-Croatian/CroatianSerbian language. So, there was only a little change in the standard version of the language.

The nationalist Croatian politics of the nineties, and later on the Bosnian politics, also sought to explore more and more archaic croatism and turcism. In fact, such specific terms and forms became mandatory in the official discourse that only the users, administrators, and citizens do not and did not understand.

(For information, see: Bugarski 1995, and my review of the book: Horváth 1996.)

The struggle of languages, or the struggle for autonomous language, could be regarded as a ridiculous and irrelevant problem, but since members of the Croatian minority live in Vojvodina and they have the right to use the Croatian 8 9

Ustav Savezne Republike Jugoslavije. Službeni list SRJ, br.1/92, 1992.05.01.

Zakon o službenoj upotrebi jezika i pisama. Službeni Glasnik RS, br. 45/91.

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language (so, it is among the official languages in Subotica too) it is important what the standard Croatian language in Croatia is.

Various dictionaries were published, the Croatian Radio-Television issued a language manual in 1992 which prohibited the use of certain words, saying they were not Croatian but Serbian expressions. This went on until it became absurd: Self-proclaimed linguists began to clean the Croatian language from all ‘Serbisms,’ but they went from one extreme to the other and even declared some loanwords of Latin, Greek, German, English, and also Hungarian origin to be of Serbian origin (Granick 2013, 76).

But the vehement professional and lay debate on the question of how many languages we can speak about did not take place in the public discourse alone.

As we will see, this problem has consequences in the practical use of language at places where the language of the South Slavs as a minority becomes official, and so they have the right to use their own language.

The Montenegrins introduced two new sounds and the letters that indicate them (since they have both the Cyrillic and the Latin as valid scripts, in the Cyrillic script, these denote the letter c and the number 3 and in the Latin script the letters ś and ź). We talk about all of this not only because it is interesting but also because this is an evidence for a symbolic battle: the Montenegrins also do everything to separate their own language.

Again, this is not merely a curiosity in Serbia, where Montenegrins were immigrated especially to Vojvodina after 1945 (mainly to replace the Germans) – and although currently there is only one municipality, Kishegyes/Mali Idoš, where the Montenegrin is an official language, according to the law, Montenegrins have the right to use their mother tongue; so, in practice, this means that HungarianMontenegrin and Serbian-Montenegrin translators should work in the selfgovernment. However, there is no such expert working there (in the latter case, it is highly doubtful what would translation mean), so ad absurdum a Hungarian translates the Serbian text to Montenegrin or vice versa.

In addition, this is a very small municipality where, due to the continuous emigration, there are only ten thousand permanent residents and Montenegrins make up about 20% of them. In a larger municipality called Verbász/Vrbas – where Montenegrins make up 25% of the residents –, there is a political fight over whether to include the Montenegrin language among the official languages of the municipality or not. The Montenegrins themselves are also divided in this question because although some of them declare themselves as Montenegrins, they consider the Serbian their mother tongue. The debate (which exists within Montenegro too) about whether the Montenegrins are an independent nation or are one of the Serb tribes is a very old, or – one might say – ancient debate.

The same debate is taking place about the Bunjevci and Šokci, who also live in Vojvodina, and the question is whether they are Croatians or the descendants of

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Croatian tribes or they are an independent nation or even there is an alternative which claims that they are Catholic Serbs.

Bugarski says that the best language provisions were introduced in 1974. The ones introduced in 1990–91 were somewhat weaker and the third version in 2006 was especially the worst. He thinks that the Serbian stayed as the Serbo-Croatian language (there is still no new spelling) and it changed the least, just like the socalled Croatian, Bosnian, or the Montenegrin.

The inaccurate remark that refers to experts does not mention how many times the law has been modified or that the laws on the use of minority languages are often not followed and infringements are not monitored and/or sanctioned.

The expert Ivan Klajn thinks that the Cyrillic script will become archaic. In fact, its decline began in 1918, and with reference to a newer research in 2014 he claims that 47% of the residents use the Latin script, while 36% use the Cyrillic script. One of its reasons is that in terms of English, Latin, and other foreign languages as well as in the field of mathematics, chemistry, and computer technology or even education, it could not be otherwise.

In the meantime, he argues that all official documents should be written in the Cyrillic script, but this cannot be required in the case of private texts. Cyrillic script is rather used in eastern and southern Serbia, but the process is more evident if we consider that 47% of the 20–29-year-olds use the Latin script, while 60% of the 70–75-year-olds use the Cyrillic script.

Language Policy and Language Use after 2010 It is not worth particularly dealing with the Milosevic era because it was considered a police state, which was disguised as parliamentary democracy, but could hardly be called a rule of law state. After his fall, a hopeful period began, which was ended by another coup: the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. The new nationalist government created the new Serbian Constitution10 in 2006 after the breakdown of the barely functioning Constitution of Serbia and Montenegro (declared in 2003). The Koštunica-government was highly against autonomy and could not be seen by any standards as following a minorityfriendly policy.

The constitution defines Serbia as a nation-state: ‘Republic of Serbia, the Serbian people and state of all Citizens who live in it’.11 Therefore, it highlights the expression Serbian people, but the term minority is not mentioned here. However, Article 79 determines that: ‘Members of national 10 11

Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. The official bulletin of the Republic of Serbia. No 98/2006. http://www.srbija.gov.rs/cinjenice_o_srbiji/ustav_odredbe.php?id=217.

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minorities shall have a right to: expression, preservation, fostering, developing and public expression of national, ethnic, cultural, religious specificity; use of their symbols in public places; use of their language and script; have proceedings also conducted in their languages before state bodies, organizations with delegated public powers, bodies of autonomous provinces and local self-government units, in areas where they make a significant majority of population; education in their languages in public institutions and institutions of autonomous provinces; founding private educational institutions; use of their name and family name in their language; traditional local names, names of streets, settlements and topographic names also written in their languages, in areas where they make a significant majority of population; complete, timely and objective information in their language, including the right to expression, receiving, sending and exchange of information and ideas; establishing their own mass media, in accordance with the Law.’12 In other words, after Serbia inherited high standards from the SFRY regarding the use of minority languages and the field of linguistic rights, practically, if not legally, the application of these rights suffered a severe setback.

Still, we can conclude that, after Serbia together with Crna Gora had ratified the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages in 2005, the situation in many aspects became much better than in some of the neighbouring countries.

According to the first article of the Serbian Law of 1991 on the Official Use of Languages and Scripts,13 which was amended many times (last time in 2010), the official language of Serbia is the Serbian and the official script is the Cyrillic, while the Latin script is regulated. As we could see, in practice, the law fails many times concerning the script, but it contains details of other rights such as: – Besides Cyrillic script, words can be written anywhere in Latin script as well, but words used as signals can be written only with the Latin (Section 4); – Traffic signs of the international and main roads, place names, and geographic names should be written with Cyrillic and Latin script as well (Section 5); – In all official proceedings, citizens have the right to use their own language (Section 6); – The language of a national minority can become part of the official languages of the local government if the proportion of the certain minority reaches 15% in the latest census (this census was introduced only after the modification of the Serbian Law on the Official Use of Languages and Scripts in 2010). Being an official language means that members of the national minority can use their own language in official and legal matters, in communication with judicial bodies, in official and other documents, filling out ballot-papers in case of voting. In case the proportion of a minority does not reach 2% at the level of the Republic, 12 13

http://www.srbija.gov.rs/cinjenice_o_srbiji/ustav_odredbe.php?id=218.

Zakon o službenoj upotrebi jezika i pisama. Službeni glasnik, br. 45/91, 53/93, 67/93, 48/94, 101/2005 – dr. zakon i 30/2010.

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then its members can communicate through the local government in case their mother tongue is part of the official languages (Section 11). The same section provides that the member of a minority group which reaches 2% in the territory of the Republic can turn to the organizations of the Republic in their own mother tongue and they have the right to get answers in that language.

– The minorities have the right to use their name as they write it in their own language (e.g. personal documents) (Section 18).

– This applies to the place and street names, traffic signs, official notifications, and to the companies (sections 19 and 20).

– It is important that the once acquired language rights cannot be withdrawn if the proportion of the minority group decreases at the latest census under 15% on local level and 2% on republic level.

Part V of the law regulates the control of these language rights: the public institutions responsible for administrative, public traffic, urban and communal, education, cultural, and healthcare services are responsible for respecting language rights provisions as well (Art. 22). For the violation of language use provisions the law envisages a fine ranging between 1,000 dinars (cca 8 euros) and 1 million dinars (cca 8,000 euros) depending on the offence – the gravest offences are missing traffic signs and place-name signs.

The Assembly of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina further expanded the minority language use rights in 2003:14 for example, where a minority language is a local official language, bills issued by public firms and by suppliers (like post, electricity suppliers, etc.) shall be written in the minority language as well. Nevertheless, as practice shows, even in settlements where Hungarian is recognized as an official language (Kishegyes/Mali Idoš), electricity bills are issued only in Serbian and in the Cyrillic script, while telephone bills are issued in Serbian and Latin script. It may be even more interesting to note that the leaders of the local government are partly the representatives of the Hungarian Alliance of Vojvodina and other members of the local council are also almost exclusively Hungarians, just like the employees of the local public service company – even though the bills of the local public service company are issued only in Serbian.

It means that the law is not applied faithfully even in places where there are minority-language-speaking employees.

Art. 8 of the law offers an additional opportunity for local governments where the proportion of inhabitants belonging to a minority on the entire territory of the local government is below 15%, but in one smaller administrative unit within the settlement (in a village or community) they reach 25%, in which case in that area of local government the minority language can gain official status.

14

Határozat a nemzeti kisebbségek nyelvének és írásának Vajdaság Autonóm Területén való hivatalos használatával kapcsolatos egyes kérdések részletezéséről. VAT Hivatalos Lapja, Újvidék, May 22, 2003, No 8.

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Furthermore, even if the most recent census shows that the proportion of a minority population has dropped below 15%, but their language was recognized as official language before, it shall remain so. Nevertheless, lawyers formulated serious criticism against the lack of respect for the equality of languages – until 2010, ‘in general, there was not any equality between the status of Serbian and other official languages (the Constitution does not guarantee the principle of the equality of languages, although within the context of the prohibition of linguistic discrimination it lists specific minority rights including language rights)’ (Beretka 2014, 174). According to Katinka Beretka, the legislator found a liberal solution by ignoring questions of language use in the fields of culture, media, in certain parts of education, and the public activities of private companies.

Due to recent legislative reforms and the adoption of new laws – largely motivated by Serbia’s aspirations to access the European Union –, the legislative environment has improved a lot, e.g. new ombudsman institutions have been set up at national, provincial and even municipal administrative level, having competence also in claims regarding language rights. However, at national level, the ministry of minority issues was abolished and replaced by a Government Office for Human and Minority Rights, while at provincial level in Vojvodina the tasks of the Provincial Secretary for Minorities have been extended to other policy areas not related to minorities. One of the main challenges is the continuous battle for competences between the central government and the provincial government (largely depending on opposite political coalitions in power), and the central government makes serious attempts at limiting provincial competences even in the field of language rights. Till today – reinforced by the relevant decisions of the Constitutional Court –, in Vojvodina, public education (from kindergarten to university) has been still under provincial competence and the province’s privileges in language rights have also been acknowledged by the Constitutional Court (Beretka 2014, 178). Another positive development was that local governments have been entitled not only to safeguard minority rights, but also to promote them – even if the term ‘promotion’ is a soft-law expression (Beretka 2014, 179). Today, Serbian is the only official language in 7 out of Vojvodina’s 45 municipalities and seven other languages are recognized as official languages: Hungarian is an official language in 31 municipalities and in certain settlements on the territory of other 3 municipalities; Slovak is official in 10 municipalities, Romanian in 8, Rusyn in 5, Croatian, Czech, and Montenegrin are official languages in 1 municipality each. On the territory of Vojvodina, education is carried out in a minority language (or minority languages) in 539 elementary schools and 110 secondary schools – but the number of minority language students is dropping every year, which obviously also influences the number of classes functioning in the minority language.

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The relatively new law on the protection of the rights and freedoms of national minorities15 defines persons belonging to minorities as follows: ‘A national minority for the purpose of this Law shall be any group of citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia numerically sufficiently representative and, although representing a minority in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, belonging to a group of residents having a long[-]term and firm bond with the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and possessing characteristics such as language, culture, national or ethnic affiliation, origin or confession, differentiating them from the majority of the population and whose members are distinguished by care to collectively nurture their common identity, including their culture, tradition, language or religion.’16 The Law guarantees equal status for all citizens irrespectively of their ethnic background, and declares the freedom to choose and use personal names in the minority language, to use the mother tongue of every citizen belonging to a minority, the right to receive education in mother tongue, various rights in the field of culture and the preservation of traditions. The same law provides regulation on the creation of National Councils. Specific provisions are codified in other sectoral laws: e.g. the law on education regulates the establishment of minority education institutions.17 These legal provisions have been extended

by Art. 26 of the Statute of Vojvodina Autonomous Province, which declares that besides Serbian and the Cyrillic writing at the work places of the provincial authorities, institutions, Croatian, Hungarian, Slovak, Romanian, and Rusyn languages are also in official usage. In this framework, provincial institutions may prescribe additional language criteria for their employees.

National Councils and Language Issues From their creation in 2002, National Councils had limited competences and legitimacy since they were elected by electors – thus, their role has increased following the adoption of the new law in 2009.18 Both in 2010 and 2014 members of minorities could elect directly their National Councils and the number of the members of each national council (ranging between 15 and 35) depends on the latest census results of the population of each minority community. The new law 15 16 17 18

A JSZK Hivatalos Lapja 11/2002, Szerbia és Montenegró Államközösség Hivatalos Lapja, 1/2003. Alkotmányos Alapokmány és a SZK Hivatalos Közlönye 72/2009.

The text of the law quoted from its English translation: http://www.refworld.org/ docid/4b5d97562.html, accessed on 1 March 2015.

Zakon o osnovama sistema obrazovanja i vaspitanja. Službeni glasnik RS, br. 72/2009, 52/2011 i 55/2013.

Törvény a nemzeti kisebbségek nemzeti tanácsairól [Law on the National Councils of National Minorities]. A SZK Hivatalos Közlönye, 72/2009.

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broadened also the public competences of National Councils which covers mainly four key areas: education, public media, culture, and language use. In regard to the official language use of minority languages, the National Councils have the competence to determine the traditional denomination of minority settlements and other geographic names in minority languages – in regard to those municipalities, settlements, or local communities where the given minority language is recognized as official language. National Councils may also formulate proposals to the municipalities to give official language status to a minority language, may propose to change street signs, names of institutions, municipal districts, etc. where they see a vital interest for the recognition of minority language. National Councils are also entitled to promote the use of minority language in the public authorities’ offices and may propose the adoption of specific instruments, provisions to enhance the use of official minority languages and to further the translation of legal documents, laws, and other legislation into minority languages. In the field of education, National Councils may make proposals for specific textbooks to be used in schools, especially for the education of history, literature, and mother tongue.

In the case of the Hungarian National Council, both the election and the composition of the Council can be characterized by the overwhelming dominance of one political party, the Hungarian Alliance of Vojvodina, since 2002. This dominance caused some political tensions, especially regarding the selection for the leading positions of minority institutions under the administration of the National Council. Nevertheless, in the field of language policies, the Hungarian National Council proved to be rather efficient. Due to the discrepancies characterizing the use of minority languages in public life – like in the translation or dissemination of legal regulations and other information in minority languages –, the National Council started to actively monitor the practices of public institutions. There are serious problems with the implementation of existing legal standards in minority languages: according to Art. 77 of the Constitution of Serbia, every citizen has the right to ask and receive information from public authorities in his/her mother tongue, but this barely happens in the everyday life. Even in the field of education, while minorities have the right to receive secondary education in their mother tongue, there are no guarantees for the employment of teachers who speak the language of that minority. Thus, even in schools where a minority language is officially recognized as the language of education – in lack of professional minority-language-speaking teachers –, the effective implementation of minority education rights is hindered.

In order to discover such problems, the Hungarian National Council set up a language-monitoring team to control both at municipal level and in the single institutions the effective implementation of language rights. This language-monitoring team of two officials designated by the National Council systematically overview the practice of all municipalities where Hungarian

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is an official language and the three municipalities where Hungarian is only partly recognized as official language. The idea of the ten-month mission is to examine the implementation of all relevant – national, provincial, or local – legal provisions affecting the use of Hungarian language. The mission was launched in 2014; the results of this survey, however, are not yet accessible. Nevertheless, this shows that the effective implementation of legal provisions may often be incomplete and problematic and the National Councils may launch pro-active initiatives to improve the situation.

Multilingualism in Vojvodina – Experiences from the Past to Present and the Language Strategy of the Hungarian National Council There are no reliable survey data available on the situation of multilingualism in Vojvodina today, but the results of the previous research conducted by Lajos Göncz are still relevant. Göncz (1999) identified various challenges and tendencies that characterize the use of Hungarian as a minority language since Tito’s era: – on the one hand, Hungarian has a low social prestige; it is not seen as a practical tool of communication in the everyday life (e.g. in business life, commerce, etc.). On the other hand, there are some sporadic extreme cases where speakers tend to strongly prefer Hungarian language, totally excluding Serbian language from all public communication; – the number of minority-language speakers is steadily diminishing even among the members of the minority community; – a deteriorated dual lingualism emerges when speakers do not speak well neither their mother tongue nor the state language; – a special semilingualism emerges when an individual who speaks two languages does not speak any of the two languages as well as other mono-language speakers in the society (Göncz 2004, 37); – the contrast between Hungarian-language speakers living in areas where they form a majority and those who live in diasporas is becoming more visible, especially in the individual’s relation to Serbian; – the lack of Hungarian university education for lawyers results in the strong deterioration of Hungarian translations of public documents, laws, even so much that the Hungarian versions remain incomprehensible (Göncz 1999).

The Hungarian National Council has been aware of these social changes in Vojvodina, especially keeping an eye on the lack of effective implementation of existing legal provisions on language use, adopting a special strategy paper on linguistic rights.

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The strategy was adopted in 2012 for the period of 2012–2017, and it first evaluates the existing legislation on linguistic rights. The strategy paper states that ‘today a large number of legal sources regulate in details certain areas of official language usage which result often in the adoption of contradicting legal norms’ (Language Strategy: 27).19 Besides serious terminological confusion characterizing this area of legislation and problems related to the hierarchy of norms, the most critical element of language rights norms is that they are in most cases merely declarative norms. This implies that the legislator does not require any concrete action for the respect of language rights or that for the violation of these norms it did not introduce sanctions or other instruments motivating local entities, authorities, and individuals to implement these norms. In addition, both the sources and motivation are missing from effectively implementing in practice the language rights recognized by the law (Language Strategy: 12).

The strategy paper calls attention to the decreasing proportion of Hungarians among public servants employed by municipalities: in 2003–2004, their number reached 14.7-14.9%, while by 2010 it diminished to 12.5%. Even if the law offers opportunities for the use of minority language, the real possibility for official oral communication is limited: in municipalities where Hungarians form the majority, usually all official communication is conducted in Hungarian – although the author gained contradictory experiences as well –, while in municipalities where Hungarians form a minority even the members of the Hungarian community rarely address public authorities in Hungarian. Data collected in the strategy paper shows that the number of people requiring dual-language birth certificates was dropping till 2010 (Language Strategy: 17 – the trend has changed only because Hungarian citizenship has become more easily accessible). In written communication, 24.44% of first-grade administrative procedures were conducted in Hungarian by the municipalities in 2010, but only 0.63% of the appeals were presented in Hungarian (Language Strategy: 27). However, statistical data show that the Hungarian language was used dominantly in three municipalities where the number of first-grade procedures was significantly high: Szabadka/ Subotica (58%), Magyarkanizsa/Kanjiza (35%), and Zenta/Senta (93%), while in other municipalities there were very few positive experiences in this regard.

Apparently, Hungarian language can be used only where Hungarians live in absolute or relative majority and where Hungarian-speaking public servants are available as well. In regard to judicial authorities, the situation is similarly gloomy: only 8% of the local judges speak Hungarian in the province. The strategy paper underlines that ‘the lack of coordinated control mechanisms does not only create insecurity but also results in inefficiency and the diminished authority of public institutions’ (Language Strategy: 28).

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Language Strategy: 27. Accessible online at: http://www.mnt.org.rs/dokumentumok/strategiak/ nyelvhasznalati-strategia-2012-2017.

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As it could be seen above, the language policies and the situation of minority language rights altered significantly in former Yugoslavia and in Serbia/Vojvodina alike. As a conclusion, it can be said that the legal framework of minority language rights offers an acceptable level of protection and a liberal approach inasmuch as persons belonging to minorities may officially use their mother tongue. But everyday practice reveals that municipalities are not offering the opportunities recognized by law – this may happen even in municipalities where a minority forms the majority. The reasons behind that are manifold, but it seems to be sure that the lack of qualified personnel and the lack of financial resources (e.g. for translation) are influential. On the other hand, even the members of minorities do not have enough information on their own rights.

Bibliography BERETKA, Katalin. 2011. Nyelvi jogaink Szerbiában. Anyanyelv-használati útmutató. Szabadka, Magyar Nemzeti Tanács.

2014. A hatalmi szintek közötti hatáskörmegosztás problémaköre. Doktori értekezés. Győr.

BUGARSKI, Ranko. 1997. Jezik od mira do rata. Beograd: Čigoja Štampa XX vek, Sabrana del.

2005. Jezik i kultura. Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek, 147.

2009. Evropa u jeziku. Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek, 176.

2011. Lica jezika. Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek, 116.

GÖNCZ, Lajos. 1999. A magyar nyelv Jugoszláviában (Vajdaságban). Budapest: Osiris, MTA Kisebbségkutató Műhely; Újvidék: Forum.

2004. A vajdasági magyarság kétnyelvűsége. Szabadka: MTT Könyvtár 8.

GRANIĆ, Jagoda. 2013. Pogled na noviju hrvatsku standardnojezičnuj praksu.

In: Požgaj Hadži, Vesna (ed.): Jezik između lingvistike i politike: Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek, 210: 67–89.

HORVÁTH, György. 1996. Szociolingvisztika a háború előtt és alatt. Holmi 7: 1032–1037.

ISAILOVIĆ, Neven: Ko su bili Jugosloveni? Peščanik, September 29, 2011. http:// pescanik.net/ko-su-bili-jugosloveni/.

LANGUAGE STRATEGY, 2012: Magyar Nemzeti Tanács Nyelvhasználati Stratégia 2012–2017. http://www.mnt.org.rs/dokumentumok/strategiak/ nyelvhasznalati-strategia-2012-2017.

PETROVIĆ, Jelena. 2009. Jezička pollitika i ideologija jugoslovenstva u (medju) ratom periodu. Monitor XI(1): 35–54.

POŽGAJ-HADŽI, Vesna. 2013. Jezik između lingvistike i politike: Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek, 210.k.

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POŽGAJ-HADŽI, Vesna–BALAĆIĆ Bulc, Tatjana–MIHELJAK, Vlado. 2013.

Srpskohrvatki jezik iz slovenske perspektive. In: POŽGAJ-HADŽI, Vesna (ed.), Jezik između lingvistike i politike: Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek, 210: 37–65.

RADOVANOVIĆ, Milorad. 2004. Planiranje jezika i drugi spisi. Sremski KarlovciNovi Sad: Izdavačka kuća knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića. ŠKILJAN, Dubravko. 1998. Javni jezik. Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek.

2002. Govor nacije: Jezik, nacija, Hrvati. Zagreb: Golden Markting. .

Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 8 (2015) 73–87

DOI: 10.1515/auseur-2015-0014

Beyond Assimilation and Integration: The Shift to ‘National’ and ‘Transnational’ Inclusion Christopher HOUTKAMP University of Amsterdam

Abstract. One of the key concepts of the MIME (Mobility and Inclusion in Multilingual Europe) project is, obviously, ‘inclusion’. However, precisely describing what the concept means is not as straightforward as it may seem. It has been used in different contexts in scientific literature. This paper attempts to contribute to the enfolding MIME-framework by critically reflecting upon the definition of ‘inclusion’. Drawing upon theories of acculturation, three core concepts in minority literature, namely ‘assimilation,’ ‘integration,’ and ‘inclusion’ will be examined, and their differences demarcated. In the light of recent developments, such as transnationalism, it will be determined which concept is best suited to analyse contemporary accommodation processes of minorities in their countries of residence. After examining the trade-off between mobility and inclusion, a central topic in all MIMErelated research, some general conclusions about ‘inclusion’ and diversitymanagement will be drawn.

Keywords: inclusion, integration, assimilation, diversity policy, mobilityinclusion trade-off

Introduction The MIME project’s (Mobility and Inclusion in Multilingual Europe) main goal is to design a linguistic policy framework that grants all EU citizens, including immigrants and national minorities, a vast amount of mobility options, whilst at the same time ensuring inclusion in their country of residence. It needs to be said that the concept of ‘minorities’ is quite vague since it encompasses groups that differ significantly from each other. There are many categorizations conceivable in order to distinguish between different kinds of minorities. To name a few examples: old/new minorities, territorial/non-territorial minorities (as is proposed in one of the MIME inceptions reports), national minorities/ immigrants (the distinction that is used by Kymlicka (1995) among others).

These categorizations have at least one major problem: it is complicated to set up criteria that determine which minority belongs to which category. For instance,

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are Turkish immigrants who have lived for three generations in the same area old or new minorities? MIME has not yet developed a solid vocabulary describing different types of minorities for the MIME-framework is still enfolding.

One of the first questions that immediately comes to mind when reflecting upon ‘inclusion’ is what the concept actually entails. Can it, for example, be compared to the widely used concept of ‘integration’ or does it mean something different?

This question is central to this paper. We will attempt to clearly demarcate the differences between concepts often used in literature on diversity management: assimilation, integration, and inclusion.

To address this issue, we will make a brief historical analysis of these concepts.

If we look at www.thesaurus.com – one of the biggest online English synonym dictionaries –, ‘integration’ yields as its first result ‘assimilation’. In other words: the website treats integration and assimilation as synonyms. This result is symbolic to how these two concepts are being confounded in public opinion.

In this paper, it will be attempted to separate them, which is needed to examine their role in current studies on diversity management.

Furthermore, it will be investigated whether ‘integration’ is the most appropriate concept to use when designing current minority policy. Recent developments of transnationalism, which stimulate cross-border activities and strengthen the identification of minority group members with their ethnic peers in other countries, and the similarities in the public eye of ‘integration’ and ‘assimilation,’ could compel us to critically review the concept. ‘Inclusion’ might be a more suitable term to analyse present-day issues surrounding cultural and linguistic diversity.

Finally, the concept of inclusion will be problematized. It is not a new concept and it has been used in different contexts with different meanings. These varying contexts have to be acknowledged if we wish to formulate our own interpretation of the concept. After sharpening our understanding of its effects, we can maybe take a more nuanced look at the trade-off between mobility and inclusion as outlined in the MIME position paper (Grin et al. 2014).

From Assimilation to Integration to Assimilation In order to understand the current usage of ‘integration’ as a concept, it is needed to delve into post-war scientific contributions on the adaptation process of minorities in majority cultures. One of the major texts on this topic has been written by the sociologist Milton Gordon (1964). In his Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins, Gordon analyses the socioeconomic and cultural adaptation of immigrants in North-America. He concludes that immigrants proceed through seven stages of assimilation (Gordon 1964):

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1. ‘Acculturation:1 newcomers adopt language, dress, and daily customs of the host society (including values and norms).

2. Structural assimilation: large-scale entrance of minorities into cliques, clubs, and institutions in the host society.

3. Marital assimilation: widespread intermarriage.

4. Identification assimilation: the minority feels bonded to the dominant culture.

5. Attitude reception assimilation refers to the absence of prejudice.

6. Behavior reception assimilation refers to the absence of discrimination.

7. Civic assimilation occurs when there is an absence of values and power struggles.”

Gordon considered his seven-stage model an empirical reality rather than a normative policy ambition. His view on assimilation could be seen as a natural law: it is inevitable that all minority groups, both autochthonous minorities (e.g. black people in the U.S.) and immigrants (e.g. Puerto-Ricans) go through these seven stages of assimilation. This is naturally only the case if the majority (or in a few historical cases the minority (e.g. the Romans in Gaul, Hellenic culture in the Middle-East)) group is socio-culturally and politically dominant. Gordon’s text was rather revolutionary in his time for it is one of the first works that emphasizes the importance of ‘culture’ in research on assimilation and citizenship.

Gordon’s view has been criticized both on normative and empirical grounds.

Starting with the latter category, social psychologist Berry observed that the adaptation process of immigrants is more complex than suggested in Gordon’s theory. He formulated an alternative model, which he refers to as the ‘four strategies of acculturation’ (Berry 1980). Acculturation needs to be understood as ‘the dual process of cultural and psychological change that takes place as a result of contact between two or more cultural groups and their individual members’ (Berry 2005). Contrary to Gordon, he argues that if different cultural groups come into contact, potential cultural clashes might emerge, which need to be solved through negotiation in order to achieve outcomes that are acceptable for all parties involved. Immigrants can opt for four different acculturation strategies, namely ‘assimilation,’ ‘separation,’ ‘marginalization,’ and ‘integration’. The individual’s chosen strategy will be determined by (1) a preference for the majority or for the heritage culture and (2) a preference for having contact with and participating in society with other cultural groups (Berry 1980). Assimilation generally still has the same meaning as in Gordon’s work: complete adaptation of the minority to the majority culture. Those who opt for this strategy have a preference for the 1

The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013) under Grant Agreement No 613344.

Gordon’s definition of ‘acculturation’ should not be confounded with Berry’s interpretation of that concept. The latter will be discussed further in the article.

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majority culture and actively wish to engage with other groups. Separation means that individuals wish to exclusively orient themselves towards their heritage culture, having little desire to come into frequent contact with other groups.

Marginalization occurs when new arrivals deny both their heritage culture and other cultural groups in society, resulting in a solitary cultural existence.

Concerning integration, this strategy is preferred among those who both value their own cultural heritage but also wish to get in contact with other groups.

Berry was one of the first to define the concept of integration, which has been widely used in the public and scientific debate ever since. For example, the Dutch integration policy of the 1980’s, which promoted ‘integration with preservation of the own identity,’ could have been inspired by Berry’s work. By carrying out a survey research, he investigated the effect of each strategy on ‘acculturative stress’ (loosely defined as ‘the psychological, somatic, and social difficulties that may accompany acculturation processes, often manifesting in anxiety, depression and other forms of mental and physical maladaptation’ (Berry 2006)). Integration yielded the ‘best’ results: those who opted for this strategy suffered the least from acculturative stress. In contrast, marginalization and assimilation were the sources of relatively high stress levels (Berry 2006).

Berry’s theory is not undisputed. His model has been criticized both on theoretical and empirical (e.g. the ‘marginalized’ group has never been found) grounds. One point of criticism is particularly relevant for our analysis, namely Berry’s original assumption that individuals have considerable amount of agency to ‘pick’ the acculturation strategy of their choosing. In other words, the core of Berry’s model is somewhat based on free choice. However, in practice, the range of choices is frequently quite limited, as Berry later agreed with himself (Berry 1990, 1997). It is questionable whether cultural minorities in general are in the position to freely choose their own acculturation strategy. The society in which they live might have already pre-established norms on how to manage diversity and could (gently) force its newer members to adapt to them, effectively limiting freedom of choice.

Bourhis et al. (1997) succeeded in making a model which accounts for the contextual factors that are somewhat lacking in Berry’s theory. They designed the ‘Interactive Acculturation Model’ (IAM) to explain changes in norms of diversity by looking at the stance of the majority culture, the minority cultures, and the government. The model can be found in Figure 1.

The model offers a perspective on how factors other than the immigrants’ own preference can influence their acculturation process. Without elaborately discussing all different concepts mentioned, it is important to realize that Bourhis et al. view the norms and values on dealing with diversity as intrinsically dynamic and interactive. Norms of the best way to manage diversity are not set in stone and the three main actors (the government, members of the majority, and members of the minorities) constantly influence each other’s stances.

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GOVERNMENT DECISION MAKERS

STATE IMMIGRATION POLICIES

STATE AGENCIES DEALING WITH IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION Research and Planning

Policy Decision

Policy

Implementation

Evaluation

STATE INTEGRATION POLICIES Pluralism Ideology

Civic Ideology

Assimilation Ideology

Ethnist Ideology

Dominant Host Majority Acculturation Orientations

Immigrant Communities Acculturation Orientations

Integration, Assimilation, Segregation, Exclusion, Individualism

Integration, Assimilation, Segregation, Exclusion, Individualism

RELATIONAL OUTCOMES Consensual

Problematic

Conflictual

Figure 1. Bourhis et al.’s Interactive Acculturation Model (Bourhis et al. 1997) The model can provide clarification in the conceptual debate on ‘integration’ if we take into account two empirical findings. First of all, members of the minority culture generally have a strong preference for ‘integration’ as a desirable acculturative strategy (Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver 2003, Hehman et al. 2011, Rojas et al. 2014). Secondly, members of the majority culture usually favour immigrants to follow the ‘assimilation’ and in some instances the ‘integration’ strategy (Horenczyk 1996, Van Oudenhoven, Prins & Buunk 1998, Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver 2003). Some analyses found a clear connection between the preference for assimilation and the degree of prejudice towards minorities (Kosic et al. 2005, Zagefka et al. 2014, López-Rodríguez et al. 2014, Rojas et al. 2014).

It seems inevitable that these different stances of majority and minority group members spark conflict. An important question then would be what kind of state ideology – the government being the third major actor – of the management of diversity is in place. Answering this question takes us a step closer towards tracing the evolution of the concept integration in the public and scientific debate.

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To address this issue, we need to shortly review the four state ideologies as distinguished by Bourhis et al. (1997). Pluralism refers to an ideology that seeks to actively promote cultural diversity. Citizens should be granted much freedom to express their own cultural identity. An important distinction between pluralism and the other ideologies is that the state is willing to support private initiatives of cultural minorities, hereby thus effectively helping them gain a foothold in society. Pluralism is inspired by the ideas of communitarian philosophers such as Charles Taylor, who is a strong advocate of a ‘politics of difference’ wherein minority culture vitality is guaranteed by the state (Taylor 1994). The civic ideology, which seems inspired by Jürgen Habermas’ ‘politics of dignity’ (Habermas 1994), shares almost all premises with pluralism. Cultural minorities do have the freedom to organize themselves within the ‘civic’ framework. However, unlike pluralism, this ideology advocates a strict policy of non-intervention in the cultural identity of all citizens, and thus financially supporting them is not an option. The assimilation ideology expects the state to intervene in some areas of its citizens’ private values. Minorities are expected to forsake their cultural and linguistic identities and adapt themselves to the prevailing norms and values of their country of residence. This adaptation could happen naturally (in line with what Gordon observed) but can also be imposed via laws and regulations. Lastly, the ethnist ideology, which is related to ethnic nationalism, also expects immigrants to completely adapt themselves to the norms and values of the cultural majority. However, in some cases, it is impossible for ‘outsiders’ to ever become a genuine part of the nation. Policies of ius sanguinis can prevent immigrants to be fully accepted for they do not share the same ethnic kinship as the autochthonous population.

Analysing a country’s state ideology is of crucial importance in understanding its policy towards minorities. Similar to the acculturative preferences of minority and majority group members, state ideologies on acculturation are subject to change. Many European states are currently converging towards an assimilation ideology. Since approximately fifteen years, mandatory citizenship courses in most European states aim to teach immigrants the host society’s language and the presumed highlights of the dominant culture (e.g. important national historical events, norms and values). The citizenship regime in Europe has been described

by Van Houdt, Suvavierol & Schinkel (2011) as ‘neo-liberal communitarianism’: immigrants are expected to willingly assimilate completely within the dominant culture. Still, despite the shift towards assimilation ideology, most countries still refer to their approach as ‘integration policy’. These changes partly explain why the concept of ‘integration’ has deviated from Berry’s original definition (engaging with both the heritage and majority culture) in the public debate, and thus consequently show why a new concept may be more appropriate.

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Beyond ‘Integration,’ towards ‘Inclusion’ The shift towards assimilation as a policy principle in our current time is problematic. In order for assimilation to succeed, immigrants need to forsake their cultural identity. This has always been complicated, but in present time assimilation becomes even more difficult. Due to advancement in communication, transport, and media technology, it is simpler than a few decades ago to maintain long-distance contact with friends and relatives in the country of origin or with other immigrant communities in western societies.2 This development is recently commonly understood as ‘transnationalism’. Transnationalism, or ‘the process by which migrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement’ (Basch, Glick Schiller & Szanton Blanc 2008), is an important development to consider when analysing minority adaptation processes. Vertovec (1999) points out that due to the connectivity of individuals through increased physical mobility, but also via the Internet, telecommunications, and satellite TV, notions of ‘place’ and ‘locality’ are reconstructed: current communication technology allows individuals to form their own transnational ‘fora’ to communicate and express their identity.

Minorities can easily read newspapers in their native language on the Internet, contact their relatives in their country of origin (or their ‘heritage’ country in the case of some autochthonous minorities) via Skype, and cheaply travel as well, a process which is called ‘virtual mobility’ by Urry (2002). In this respect, national boundaries are steadily losing part of their relevance. This evolution has consequences for concepts such as integration and inclusion, which are tightly intertwined with the nation-state.

Striving for a near-complete adaptation of minority communities has therefore become near impossible. The question whether or not it is desirable for minorities to maintain their own cultural identity has become largely irrelevant due to technological advancement. Instead, it might be wise to reflect upon new ways to cope with diversity. This need to renew our thinking on the acculturation of minorities is one of the most important reasons for promoting MIME’s concept of inclusion that may better mark the change from a statecentric to a transnational view.

Inclusion: Contemporary Issues Obviously, simply replacing ‘integration’ with ‘inclusion’ does not solve all potential analytical problems. Taking a brief look at the conceptual history of ‘inclusion,’ it is apparent that the concept has been used in different contexts, 2

Manuel Castells (2011) described this development in his work The Rise of the Network Society.

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in many different fields (e.g. health justice, organization science, education). In the study of minorities, inclusion usually entails feelings of belonging (when analysing the minorities’ perspective), the acceptance of minorities in institutions (e.g. the army (Burk 1995)), the judicial system (Potash 1973), politics (Pedrini, Bächtiger & Steenbergen 2013)), or an observation of their participation in society (Markus, Steele & Steele 2000, Habermas 2008). Deriving one precise definition from all these different fields is complicated. However, the different acceptations do share one common characteristic: inclusion entails a degree adaptation of the majority group, be it a company, the army, the political community or society as a whole, to accommodate members of the minority. It usually refers to the efforts society makes to allow minorities to participate. We could illustrate this interpretation of inclusion with how many societies try to ‘include’ people with disabilities: it is logically not asked of the latter to adapt to the former. Instead, facilities are set up to allow the disabled to participate in society as well. Inclusion is in its ‘classical’ meaning mostly a one-way process, from majority to minority.3 Concerning our field of investigation, the incorporation of immigrants and the willingness of society to accommodate and accept cultural minorities is also an important aspect of inclusion. It can be expected of an inclusive society to facilitate the cultural and linguistic expression of all its citizens, by, for instance, making room for minority-language acquisition in education curricula and/ or implementing a multilingual civil service. However, our interpretation of inclusion involves a two-way relationship: minorities are also required to adapt to their country of residence to a certain extent, without resorting to complete forced assimilation. The precise adaptation requirements will vary depending on social context, but in most cases learning the dominant language and respecting (not necessarily adopting) the values of the majority culture will be two of the most important pillars. This idea of adaptation as a reciprocal process is similar to Berry’s original concept of ‘integration’. Since integration in popular understanding has deviated from its original definition, we propose to replace the concept with ‘national inclusion’. ‘National inclusion’ would be defined as an acculturation process wherein a nation-state facilitates the cultural and linguistic expression of its minorities, whilst the minorities in turn adapt to the mainstream society. However, in the age of transnationalism, mere national inclusion will suffice neither as a policy goal nor as an analytical lens. We therefore propose to add ‘transnational inclusion’ to the scientific vocabulary.

Admittedly, transnational inclusion is a bit vaguer than its national counterpart. It can be defined as ‘the possibilities of cultural minorities to express their heritage culture across the borders of the nation-state’. Policy goals of national inclusion 3

A second definition of inclusion refers to the incorporation of minorities in their country of residence (Hugo 2005). Inclusion is then simply a container concept for all different kinds of adaptation strategies, comparable to acculturation.

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and transnational inclusion might overlap (e.g. facilitating minority-language education can improve both national and transnational inclusion), but separating the two concepts underlines that we come to terms with the new transnational reality. ‘Inclusion’ would thus have a ‘national’ and ‘transnational’ component, hereby marking the shift to the paradigm of transnationalism.

After fine-tuning our definition of ‘inclusion,’ there are still some issues remaining that we need to discuss. Firstly, we need to acknowledge the connection between citizenship and inclusion. Even though we established that our interpretation of ‘inclusion’ is very similar to Berry’s ideas on ‘integration,’ opinions on ‘the best road to inclusion’ may vary in different social contexts.

Practical realizations of inclusion are dependent on three actors: government, members of the majority, and the minorities. Inclusion, as we have defined, is a two-way process, wherein belonging but also acceptance by the majority group members are important. It can be questioned whether acceptance by the state – by providing basic cultural and linguistic rights to minorities – is enough to forge an inclusive society. Or is it worthwhile to strive for a deeper bond between citizens, sometimes referred to as ‘social cohesion’?

A second issue is of a more practical and empirical nature: namely, what would the concrete effects of an ‘inclusion-proof’ policy be for both the majority and minority members? A few characteristics of an ideal type of inclusion policy can be distinguished. First of all, as a policy principle, transnationalism should not be rejected but embraced because transnational identities will inevitably form in our current time. Trying to prevent this development will only result in frustration for all three actors. The minority population would experience a lack of acceptance and discrimination of its heritage culture, whilst the majority population and the state will be frustrated because their assimilation efforts cannot change new realities. Denying transnationalism can thus potentially be a recipe for cultural tension. Secondly, if we focus on linguistic inclusion, the state should facilitate the education of minority languages to the second generation and not exclusively emphasize national language acquisition. Thirdly, empirical evidence shows that the effects of current ‘integration’ policies are shrouded in a veil of uncertainty.

The beneficial effect of citizenship courses has barely been proven convincingly (Ruedin & D’Amato 2011). This does not necessarily mean that those courses are by definition ineffective, it just implies that their usefulness is uncertain.

Acculturation is a psychological process that all immigrants have to face.

Berry and many of his peers investigated the relationship between policies and the psychological disposition of immigrants. Changes generate a considerable amount of ‘acculturative stress,’ sometimes resulting in serious mental health problems (Sirin et al. 2012, Goforth et al. 2014, Yoon et al. 2013). Putnam (2007) has highlighted the potential advantages of what he calls ‘bonding’ social capital: immigrants can benefit from an already existing ethnic network that facilitates

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adaptation in the host society. After having spent some time within their own ethnic niche, the step towards connecting with mainstream society (‘bridging’ social capital) is relatively small. Evidence of this development has been found among Poles in England (Ryan et al. 2008). Furthermore, Wright and Bloemraad (2012) concluded that there is no connection between strict assimilation policies and feelings of belonging to the majority culture among minorities. In addition, minorities living under a multicultural system do not significantly feel less attached to the majority culture compared to their peers residing in ‘assimilation countries’. These results would thus suggest that policies of multiculturalism have many benefits and few disadvantages for both immigrants and the society.

However, when looking at the socio-economic aspect of inclusion, results are slightly different. Swedish integration policy is often cited as an ideal model for EU countries. Sweden is one of the few countries that did not implement compulsory citizenship courses. In addition, it provides many opportunities for minority languages to be integrated in the official education system. Koopmans (2010) and Wiesbrock (2011) investigated the effects of this policy and both concluded that policies allowing for much cultural diversity are not necessarily in the best economic interest of the minorities. This shows that diversity-promoting policies can have unpredictable and not always positive effects. Further reflection on how to retain the positive effects whilst minimizing the downsides is necessary.

Trade-off Mobility versus Inclusion One of the key challenges faced by MIME is the trade-off between ‘mobility’ and ‘inclusion’. Mobility is preferred over migration since the former concept can better explain movement in the transnational world (e.g. see the discussion on mobility vs. migration in Grin et al. 2014 and Houtkamp 2014). It does not only refer to the physical movement from one country to another, but it also implies a virtual aspect: virtual mobility (i.e. communication through the Internet) as described by Urry (2002) is gaining in importance in our era. The core idea of the trade-off is that mobility and inclusion can pull in non-converging, potentially opposite directions (Grin et al. 2014). For example, highly mobile individuals might simply lack the time or the need to fully become acquainted with the cultural norms and values of the country wherein they reside.

Mobility-enhancing policies can thus sometimes have negative effects on inclusion. Another example concerns promoting the acquisition of several languages, which can evidently increase one’s mobility options. This may mostly benefit the higher educated part of the population, deepening the rift between social classes in society. In addition, promoting mobility will obviously not diminish the perceived threat of migration present among populist voters, which will not

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improve the inclusion of minorities. These observations show the required delicacy when dealing with the mobility-inclusion trade-off. However, some remarks can be made in the light of our previous fine-tuning of the concept of ‘inclusion’.

To better understand the trade-off, we should not ask the question ‘do mobility and inclusion pull in non-converging directions,’ but instead ‘what kind of mobility pulls what kind of inclusion in non-converging directions’. The realization that the two concepts have both different, context-dependent meanings is vital. For instance, does virtual mobility, e.g. a migrant skyping with relatives from his/her country of origin, always pose a threat to his/her transnational inclusion? The answer will most likely be negative. Virtual mobility has actually the potential to render frequent corporeal mobility unneeded since minorities can easily remain in touch with their social network in the country of origin via technological means.

The question whether this kind of mobility would hamper – or improve – national inclusion is not simple to answer because of the variety of societal contexts.

Many of the important factors when assessing the trade-off are mentioned in the acculturation scheme as outlined by Berry and Bourhis et al. It is important to know the preferred acculturation strategy of the state, the majority population and the minorities. If both state and majority population prefer minorities to assimilate in order for them to be ‘included,’ then nearly all kind of mobility, both corporeal and virtual, may be considered a threat. Maintaining relations with the country of origin is then a sign of a lack of adaptation. There are numerous different mobilityinclusion trade-offs that could be formulated. In addition, one can wonder whether a totally cohesive society, which would be the result of inclusion, can and should actually exist. Social cohesion could be defined by ‘the fact that individuals feel [to be] part of society and trust each other. This means that different groups are accepted as full members of society’ (Ruedin & D’Amato 2011). In social cohesion literature, the distinction is sometimes made between ‘communities’ (based on close social ties) and ‘associations’ (based on collective support for laws and values) (Tönnies 1974). Different countries may lean more towards one of these ‘ideal types’. The ‘chosen’ form of social cohesion in a country has implications for the required adaptation of minorities: in the case of associations, less adaptation is needed than in the case of communities. Whether minorities live in an ‘association’ or a ‘community’ will have consequences for the mobility-inclusion trade-off.

Conclusion This paper aimed to disentangle some key concepts in the ‘diversity management’ debate: assimilation, integration, and inclusion. Assimilation and integration are often confounded. Berry’s original definition of integration as an acculturation strategy wherein both heritage and majority cultures are valued can barely be heard

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in the political debate. To better understand how concepts such as ‘integration’ and ‘assimilation’ can develop over time, Bourhis et al.’s model is a useful framework. It helps analyse the development of acculturation regimes, emphasizing the dynamic and interactive nature of integration policy. A wide array of factors can explain the convergence in Europe towards assimilation-oriented approaches.

However, due to the rise of transnationalism – a consequence of globalization –, assimilating minorities within a national culture is becoming increasingly problematic. For that reason, it is proposed to critically review the concept of assimilation and its present-day euphemism, ‘integration,’ and to speak of ‘inclusion’ instead. Simply making this semantic shift is obviously not sufficient to solve all problems with diversity management, but it is more than a merely symbolic gesture: it should mark the shift to a transnational way of thinking.

A key challenge for scholars and policy-makers is to design a diversity policy that can (1) be accepted by both majority and minority cultures, (2) is fit for the new transnational times, and (3) combines successful participation with a feeling of belonging and acceptance among the minorities. A fourth important consideration is the trade-off between mobility and inclusion. It is likely that in the globalizing world people will tend to be more mobile, which can have a detrimental effect to their inclusion in their countries of residence. We outlined the complexities involved when the trade-off is formulated in general terms: both ‘mobility’ and ‘inclusion’ are context-dependent concepts. Each trade-off should therefore be subject to a very judicious analysis, while differences in individual and social contexts should also be taken into account. Depending on what the key-concepts actually mean per situation, the trade-off could pan out in diverse ways. The challenge for scholars and policy-makers is to promote the ‘right’ kind of mobility and inclusion to reach the optimal ‘trade-off’ result.4 Additional empirical research on, for instance, the effects of multilingual education, the effectiveness of citizenship courses, and the perspectives of immigrants on these issues could provide necessary clarification.

An important consideration for all those who either make diversity policy or formulate policy proposals is the stance towards migrants of majority populations.

In many countries, they have a preference for minorities to assimilate within the dominant culture. We could wonder whether in such a socio-political climate even a well-developed diversity policy is beneficial for minority inclusion. The question how diversity policy can be implemented and accepted by a public opinion that clearly favours assimilation is probably as important as the actual policy content.

4

An issue to reflect upon regarding the trade-off could be whether it can be defined in ‘implicational’ terms. To name an example: is an increasing amount of immigrant school children associated with a decreasing amount of autochthonous school children? What social factors would influence this relationship? Posing such questions could grant a more refined insight in the mechanisms of the trade-off.

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Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 8 (2015) 89–102

DOI: 10.1515/auseur-2015-0015

Illegal Immigration and Fight against Illegal Migration in Member States of the European Union Kamilla SHERYAZDANOVA

Academy of Public Administration, Astana, Kazakhstan

Abstract. In the modern world, processes of migration are expected to contribute to economic development, the interchange of progressive technologies and knowledge as well as the blending of cultures.

Solving the problems linked to migration processes is an important task to be accomplished by various state policies of European Union member countries. Both internal and external reasons explain why such policies are treated with much consideration nowadays.

The present paper describes the development of European Union regulations on immigration and asylum, while tackling certain – primarily legal – aspects of immigration policies, too. Its conclusion based on the discussion of processes and legal provisions relates to the possible future of Europe.

Keywords: processes of migration, European Union, illegal migration, regulation of migration

Introduction The concept ‘illegal migration’ applies to a number of distinct phenomena. The term designates primarily – actions of (groups of) – citizens stemming from third countries, who illegally enter the territory of a Member State of the European Union (hereinafter, also EU) by land, water, or air (the latter case includes the transit zones of airports, too.) In most situations, the act itself is carried out either using counterfeit travel documents, or facilitated by organized criminal networks involved in smuggling various merchandise or in human trafficking. Furthermore, a large number of people possessing valid visas or enjoying the visa-free regime applicable to their countries travel legally to EU Member States for short visits. However, some of them choose to stay in the respective countries for longer periods than the ones specified in their visas or allowed by the visa-free regime, while others change the purpose of their stay without official permission. Finally, the term is also used for

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those asylum-seekers, who refuse to leave their target countries although a final negative decision has been taken in what concerns their applications.

Illegal migration streams can be estimated using various quantitative indicators; e.g., the number of entry denials, the number of illegal immigrants detained on the borders or within the territory of EU countries, the number of petitions for naturalization and asylum as well as the number of rejected applications and expulsions. Taking into account the significant number of persons, who legally enter EU countries and then ‘overstay’ their legal periods is also useful. Several assessments of annual illegal immigration streams targeting the EU that were carried out on the basis of these indicators yielded six-digit numbers.1

Legal Milestones in Regulating Contemporary Migration Processes in Europe In recent years, illegal immigration became part of EU member states’ internal lives, although various laws forbidding illegal stay and employment of aliens have been adopted. Moreover, it became obvious that illegal migrants represent a threat to the national security of both the accepting and the transit countries, since the states cannot keep records of these people, while they are excluded from the system of official employment, taxation, and social protection. Other negative phenomena are also linked to illegal migration. Namely: it provides labour force for the shadow economy; it represents a potential source of criminal activities; it involves epidemiological risks; and, finally, it tends to aggravate ethnicallybased conflicts in society, while being considered a nutrient of xenophobia and radical nationalism. Transnational criminal communities help roughly 1 million illegal immigrants yearly to leave their countries. According to available data, the annual global income generated by the smuggling of people (and/or human trafficking) exceeds 7 billion US dollars. The fact that illegal immigrants willingly accept all terms offered to them in exchange for the possibility to travel to Europe and get a job explains this state of affairs. However, why do employers take the risk of hiring illegal workers possessing no documents? They do so not because the migrant is a better employee than somebody else, but because (s)he accepts a lower wage, is always obedient, will never refuse to work and if the employer becomes dissatisfied with her/him, (s)he will be able to dismiss the illegal worker without any consequences.2 1 2

Юдина Т.Н. О социологическом анализе миграционных процессов // Социологические исследования.

– 2002. – №10. – С. 22.

Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a common policy on illegal immigration. (COM/2001/0672 final) [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

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The Plan of Tampere was adopted in 1999. According to the Plan, the European Union started to develop a uniform system of providing political asylum and allowing legal entry to certain immigrants while strengthening her external borders to block the access of illegal immigrants. In July 2001, the Commission initiated a new method of open co-ordination between Member States in the area of immigration and asylum policy. The Commission’s intention was to encourage information exchange about practical results and plans. Furthermore, the main purpose of this new method was to gradually harmonize legislation and policies of Member States, which was deemed necessary, above all else, as a first step towards laying the foundations of a general system for providing political asylum.3 The latter system had a threefold purpose: (1) defining uniform standards for considering applications for asylum; (2) mandatory record keeping of people, who expect an answer to their applications, and of their situations, too; (3) harmonization of national legislations in terms of defining refugee status.

The Hague Programme was adopted in 2004 and defined the following objectives regarding immigration policy: – to develop an all-European system of political asylum, including the general procedure of providing it; – to create employment possibilities for aliens within the European Union, taking into account various requirements of labour markets; – to establish all-European standards for integration of migrants in host countries; – to strengthen partnerships with third countries in order to regulate illegal immigration; – to develop policies for returning illegal immigrants to their home countries; – to use biometric and information systems more effectively.

In December 2005, the Council adopted – as part of the Hague Programme – a directive on the status of refugees.4 This was an important step in further developing the Dublin Convention,5 towards creating the all-European regulation on political asylum. The said Directive includes regulations regarding the harmonization of granting and withdrawing refugee status in EU member countries. These regulations are laid down as minimum standards applicable to the respective procedures. In February 2006, the Commission also established 3 4

5

content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX: 52001DC0672], accessed on the 25th of December 2015.

The Hague Programme. 10 priorities for the next five years. [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri= uriserv:l16002], accessed on the 25th of December 2015.

Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status. [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/GA/TXT/?uri=URISERV:l33140], accessed on the 27th of December 2015.

Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities – Dublin Convention. (97/C 254/01) [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A41997A0819%2801%29], accessed on the 27th of December 2015.

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measures for strengthening co-operation in terms of receiving political asylumseekers. Thus, the Commission offered a working programme of expeditious interaction between countries in order to achieve better co-operation efficiency.

The EU’s plan of global actions against illegal immigration and human trafficking6 was adopted by the Council in February 2002. The main points of the plan tackle the improvement of visa policies, the exchange and analysis of data on immigration as well as various measures regulating the regime of border crossing and repatriation. All these issues have been considered when developing the European Union’s strategy of fighting illegal immigration.

At the beginning of 2002 and on the basis of the said Plan, the Commission published a document7 dealing with the prospective return policy on illegal migrants. Its intent was to open and generate debate on measures for returning illegal immigrants to their home countries as a component of European immigration policy and, further, on the integration of immigration policy into a comprehensive foreign policy of the European Union. Furthermore, the High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration – consisting of high officials and set up during the summit in Tampere – submitted a report on actions regarding third countries that are not interested to co-operate with the EU in combating illegal immigration.

It is rather obvious and various legal instruments adopted by the EU also state that the protection of the Union’s external borders is the most important mechanism for counteracting illegal immigration. Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement stipulates the conditions governing foreigners’ entry to EU territory. Among other things, this regulation establishes white and black lists for citizens of third countries.

The intensive process of developing uniform rules for border protection started on the eve of the EU’s expansion to the East. In 2001, the Commission proposed the creation of a European Border Guard. Banking on preparatory work carried out by the Commission and the relevant committees of the Council, the Plan for the Joint EU Border Protection was elaborated by June 2002.

The decision that external borders shall be protected by joint efforts of all EU Member States was unanimously made. Implementation of the aforementioned plan progressed gradually. In the beginning, the reference textbook including the detailed description of rules and procedures ensuring uniform external border protection was published. Presently, joint border guard training sessions on 6

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Proposal for a comprehensive plan to combat illegal immigration and trafficking of human beings in the European Union. Official Journal, C 142, 14 June 2002. [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV: l33191b], accessed on the 25th of December 2015.

Green paper on a community return policy on illegal residents. (COM/2002/175 final) [http:// eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52002DC0175], accessed on the 25th of December 2015.

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general rules and on using methods of uniform practice are being planned. The European Academy of Border Guards was set up in order to accomplish these tasks. The exchange of experts, consultants, and communication officers who will be involved in training the future students of the Academy is a necessary preparatory stage. Finally, the last step in this process of preparation will be the creation of international teams to patrol the external borders of the EU, but only in addition to national border guards, without replacing the latter.8 The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (hereinafter, Frontex – from the French expression Frontières extérieures meaning external borders), having its seat in Warsaw, started functioning in June 2005. The Agency’s tasks are the following: (a) to co-ordinate co-operation between Member States in terms of border protection, (b) to help establishing border divisions, and (c) to establish uniform standards of border protection. For the future, the European Commission plans various adjustments to the functioning of the European surveillance system (hereinafter, Eurosur), which uses drones, reconnaissance aircraft, offshore and satellite remote sensors in order to track illegal immigration into European Union countries.9 Thus, cooperation within the Frontex agency will be enhanced and it will be possible to implement interaction between the relevant national structures of all EU Member States. To support the attainment of this objective, the Commission increased the annual budget of the agency to 60 million euros in 2008. Moreover, in emergency situations, the resources of the External Borders Fund10 may also be used.

At the EU Summit in December 2005, the Council defined the Global Approach to Migration as ‘the complex of priority actions for reduction of inflow of illegal immigrants, which is followed by loss of human life and also for ensuring the return of migrants home’.11 This approach was offered by the Council as an effective solution to the migration issue since it is related to different areas of policy within the European Union; that is, not only to the Union’s self-identification as a ‘space of freedom, safety and justice’ but also to the elaboration of policies, to international relations, employment and neighbourhood issues.

The strategy adopted by the EU gave the next political impulse to developing such a supranational approach, which includes the regulation of (illegal and legal labour) migration of citizens stemming from third countries as well as external 8

9 10

11

Кудрина Л. В. Пространство свободы, безопасности и правопорядка. // Европейский Союз: факты и комментарии. – №48. [http://www.edcaes.ru/site/ru/union/archive/vipusk_48.html], accessed on the 1st of October 2015.

Wikipedia. The Free Encyclopedia. sv Eurosur. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurosur], accessed on the 25th of December 2015.

European Commission: Migration and Home Affairs. External Borders Fund. [http://ec.europa. eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/external-borders-fund/ index_en.htm], accessed on the 25th of December 2015. Потёмкина О. Иммиграционная политика ЕС: от Амстердама до Лиссабона // МЭ и МО. – 2010. – № 4. – С. 48.

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measurement of immigration policy indicators. The vote on the project of creating the European Return Fund12 – aimed at improving the return management regarding migrants – took place in November 2007 in the Civil Liberties Committee of the European Parliament. Furthermore, Members of the European Parliament supported the idea of voluntary return and proposed closer co-operation with local authorities as well as financial aid to citizens of third countries, who made the decision to return home voluntarily. An important step regarding both the protection of rights enjoyed on the territory of the European Union by illegal immigrants and the fight against illegal immigration was the framework decision on introducing uniform criminal sanctions applicable to employers using the work of illegal immigrants, adopted on the 16th of May 2007.13 The shadow economy using the work of illegal immigrants in agriculture, construction, and the sector of services contributes in this manner with a proportion of 7–16% to the GDP of the member states. Nevertheless, most illegal employees work in conditions reminding of forced labour. Only 3% of European companies are subjected to annual checks regarding the use of illegal labour, whereas for ensuring a minimum level of state oversight it is necessary to carry out inspections at not less than 10% of all companies and certain employers. These figures prove that the relevant governmental institutions practically do not supervise this activity.

The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum was unanimously approved by the leaders of the 27 Member States on the 16th of October 2008 during the Summit of the European Council in Brussels. The document is a political agreement made

by EU member states on supporting the involvement of highly qualified specialists from third countries in the fight against illegal immigration, in the strengthening of border control measures, and in the co-ordination of policies regarding political asylum. The Pact states that legal migration shall reflect the wills of both the migrant and the country to which (s)he travels (for mutual benefit). Hence, this legal instrument stipulates that each and every Member State is free to independently lay down the conditions of inviting legal migrants and to limit their numbers. However, it also specifies that legal migration quotas shall be established in partnership with the migrants’ countries of origin. Finally, in my opinion, the two most important principles laid down in the Pact are: (i) the co-operation between the Member States, the Commission, and the countries of origin from where migrants come and (ii) the requirement that all Member States shall ‘readmit their own nationals who are staying illegally on the territory of another State’.14 12

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[European Commission: Migration and Home Affairs.] Return Fund. [http://ec.europa.eu/ dgs/home-affairs/ financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/return-fund/index_en.htm], accessed on the 25th of December 2015. Потёмкина О. Сотрудничества в сфере внутренних дел и правосудия // Европейский союз на пороге XXI века: выбор стратегии развития / Под ред. Борко Ю. А. и Буториной О. В. – М.: Эдиториал УРСС, 2001. – C. 45.

[Council of the European Union:] European Pact on Immigration and Asylum. [http://register.

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Furthermore, in order to limit the illegal inflow of labour force to EU territory, a document binding almost all Member States, namely the Directive 2009/52/ EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals, was adopted on the 18th of June 2009. In fact, the directive practically bans any kind of employment of illegal immigrants and stipulates a number of sanctions as well as a wide range of preventive, recovery, and retaliatory measures. For instance: – employers are bound to make sure that citizens of third countries, who work for them, are legally staying on the territory of the respective Member State and to inform the competent authorities on employing legal migrants; – employers shall pay penalties depending on the number of employed illegal immigrants and cover the expenses of their return trip, too; – employers of illegal immigrants shall be deprived of certain rights and privileges such as the right to receive aids and grants from public authorities, the right to participate in public procurement procedures and be awarded state contracts, etc.; – Member States shall carry out ‘effective and appropriate inspections’ on their territories in order ‘to ensure a satisfactory level of enforcement of the Directive’.15 However, the Directive does not regulate the responsibility of illegal workers.

Instead, this matter shall be regulated independently by the Member States.

Nonetheless, the document contains a set of rules which protect the interests of immigrants. For example, employers are obliged to pay them full salaries and to make other payments connected to their employment (i.e., taxes and benefits) as if they worked on legal grounds. Last but not least, after the deadline set for transposing the Directive into national legislation (the 20th of July 2011), its provisions shall apply on the entire territory of the European Union, except for three member states (Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom), which opted out in accordance with the Treaties of the European Union.16 Still, one must preliminarily conclude that until now the European Union has failed to set up a network of institutions dealing with the various aspects of migration. For now, all specific issues connected to migration are dealt with on national level, while only the framework regulations on migratory processes

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consilium.europa. eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2013440%202008%20INIT], accessed on the 25th of December 2015. p. 7. Потёмкина О. Сотрудничества в сфере внутренних дел и правосудия // Европейский союз на пороге XXI века: выбор стратегии развития / Под ред. Борко Ю.А и Буториной О. В. - М.: Эдиториал УРСС, 2001. – C. 49. Потёмкина О. Сотрудничества в сфере внутренних дел и правосудия // Европейский союз на пороге XXI века: выбор стратегии развития / Под ред. Борко Ю.А и Буториной О. В. – М.: Эдиториал УРСС, 2001. – C. 51.

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have been adopted at EU level. The regulation of migratory processes is being interpreted as a specific and peculiar area of social policies carried out by states through intricate systems of administrative, legal, organizational, economic, and informational methods. It is important to note that national regulations, fortunately, take into account apparent tendencies of interstate and external migration.

Regulation of external labour migration is the most important element of migration policy. The main stipulations in this respect refer to: – the legal, political, and professional status of migrant workers; – various institutional services dealing with migrant workers; – interstate agreements on migrant workers.

Each country independently establishes and defines the number of allowed immigrants, their professional qualifications, the age and gender structure of migrant workers as well as their period of stay. At present, EU Member States face a number of challenges and the future of the European Union might depend on the manner how the actors in the process will cope with these challenges. The main challenges (or problems) are listed below: 1) Regulation of immigration streams that evolved from the status of an incidental phenomenon to being a constant concern; 2) Development and implementation of measures for adaptation of immigrants to working conditions, life, and culture in the country of residence; 3) Correction of the relationship established with illegal immigrants and the redefinition of the refugee status as required by contemporary conditions; 4) Searching for long-term solutions to mitigate the pressure exerted by various demographic factors upon economic development by means of internationally adopted measures in the field of investments, trade, co-operation, and observance of fundamental human rights.

Fight against these problems occurs on two levels: the national and the regional level. The increased scale and intricate structure of migration imposed the reinterpretation of concepts like refugees and illegal immigrants. According to the Dublin Convention, refusal by any EU Member State to grant political asylum to a migrant does not allow the ‘refused person’ to submit a similar application to the authorities of another EU country.17 I. Tsapenko notes that drastic (punitive) measures are applied against carriers of illegal migrants. According to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (1948) and the Schengen Agreement (1990), air carriers in EU countries are responsible for appropriately checking the entry documents of passengers, while government bodies shall exercise control of foreigners and assist air carrier companies. Furthermore, air carriers shall return ‘illegal’ aliens to their points of departure or another place where they can be accepted.

17

Гудвин-Гилл Г.С. Статус беженца в международном праве. М., 1997.

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Arrest and deportation of illegal immigrants are extreme measures. In this line of reasoning, critics consider the deportation procedure inhumane and stress that it involves considerable expenses, too. Still, let us briefly examine various penalties stipulated in French legislation. In accordance with it, an alien who illegally arrives to the country and does not possess identification documents shall be imprisoned for a period of seven to ten days. If, after this period, (s)he still refuses to identify her/himself by name, (s)he can be deprived of her/his freedom for two or three months on the basis of a ruling made by the Correctional Court. Finally, extremely severe measures are adopted against foreign criminals.18 Host countries insist that responsibility for illegal immigrants should be borne by the countries crossed by them before arrival. Bilateral agreements recognizing such a responsibility were concluded during the 1990s between Spain and Morocco, the Netherlands and Morocco, Germany and Vietnam as well as Germany and the Czech Republic.

Article 19 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union forbids collective expulsions (of certain categories of persons – for example, citizens of a certain state – without consideration of each individual case).19 The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 contains no information about the right to a constant place of residence in a given country and offers no guarantees against the possibility of expulsion from that country. Article 4 of the Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950, however, forbids mass expulsion of foreigners: ‘Collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited’. Even the wording is identical with the one featuring in the Charter.20 Thus, according to paragraph 3 of Article 52 of the Charter, the prohibition of collective expulsions – stipulated in Article 19 of the Charter – shall apply in the same manner and under the same conditions as the identical prohibition stipulated in Article 4 of Protocol No 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950.21 Furthermore, Article 19 of the Charter forbids the expulsion or extradition of any person to a State ‘where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture, or other inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment’. These provisions of paragraph 2 of the said article can be logically derived from the stipulations of articles 2 and 4 of the Charter, and represent a recognition of the case practice of the European Court of Human Rights in 18 19 20 21

Цапенко И.П. Как противостоять нелегальной миграции // Вопросы экономики. – 2001. – №9. – С.

147–148.

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. (2000/C 364/01) [http://www.europarl. europa.eu/ charter/pdf/text_en.pdf], accessed on the 27th of December 2015. Ильин Ю. Д. Лекции по истории и праву Европейского Союза. – М.: Спарк, 2002.

European Convention on Human Rights. [http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ ENG. pdf], accessed on the 27th of December 2015.

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interpretation of Article 4 of Protocol No 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950.

Pleas submitted by immigrants challenging the resolution of a Member State to expel or deport them are considered by the European Court on Human Rights.

These pleas usually invoke possible violations of Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950, referring to the prohibition of torture and inhumane treatment. Nevertheless, the Commission envisaged measures applicable to cases where there are reasons to believe that the person will be treated as it is forbidden by Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950. Furthermore, it is the Commission’s competence and right to estimate the risks, which will be incurred by various individuals after expulsion or deportation. (However, Article 16 of the Basic Law of Germany, Article 13 of the Constitution of Spain, Article 19 of the Constitution of Romania, and Article 47 of the Constitution of Slovenia provide protection against expulsion and extradition.)

In 2005–2006, the EU countries founded the Frontex agency. 30 million euros were allocated for this project. The purpose of this agency is to reduce the inflow of economic migrants to EU territory. National governments are expected to deal with all legal issues concerning repatriation, while the Agency is responsible for organizing the departure of illegal immigrants. Besides allocating annual budgets to the Agency, the representatives of the European Commission are also active in terms of developing departure rules for persons who failed to obtain a new citizenship and of elaborating departure procedures which do not violate the civil rights of the respective persons. The frequency and the destinations of flights will depend on the needs of European Union countries. The EU has already concluded agreements on readmission of citizens with Albania, Hong Kong, Macau, and Sri Lanka.22

Conclusion (Based on Extant Legislation) It is necessary to consider three sets of basic elements regarding the organization of immigration. These are explained in detail below.

1) Measures aiming to protect the interests of migrant workers: – Simplification of departure conditions and of readmission to the countries of origin by means of amending national legislations. Dismantling, where this is the case, state monopoly in the field of labour export management; the creation of national-level private agencies by firms engaged in international employment mediation and/or admitting foreign organizations engaged in such activities to various countries could serve the same purpose.

22

Нелегальных иммигрантов будут вывозить из Европы на чартерных рейсах // [htpp://pda.lenta.ru/ world/2004/01/25charter/], accessed on the 1st of October 2015.

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– Establishment of minimum requirements regarding the content of employment contracts (e.g., general terms, duration, salary, taxation, and insurance); – Protection of rights enjoyed by migrant workers in their host countries (conclusion of multi- and bilateral intergovernmental agreements on relevant matters); – Supporting the expeditious and productive adaptation of migrant workers to the new working conditions extant in the host countries and re-adaptation on return to their countries of origin. The comprehensive activities aimed at presenting and explaining working conditions and life abroad, the language teaching and vocational training programmes preceding the migrants’ trips abroad solve the first problem. The second is solved by assistance in terms of welfare provision after return.23 2) Measures aiming to protect the state interests of labour donor countries: – Licences issued by public administration authorities to companies organizing export of labour. The purpose is to restrict the right of mediating employment abroad only to organizations that have sufficient knowledge as well as experience in the field and are also capable of assuming pecuniary as well as legal responsibility for the results of this activity.

– Regulating (both the quantitative and qualitative) parameters of labour outflow. Such policies are required for protecting national labour markets from the ‘flight’ of professionals trained in rare specialties and for preventing various negative consequences of emigration on demographic processes in the respective country. This can be achieved by a wide range of measures, such as: restrictions on issuing international passports and express prohibition of departure or introduction of migratory quotas for certain categories of specialists. Economic methods may be applied, too; for example: differentiation – depending on the migrant workers’ professions – of wages paid in foreign currency. A system of penalties may also be introduced, the most severe punitive measure being the confiscation of property for unauthorized departure from the country.

– Attraction of currency to the country. Foreign currency stems in this case, first of all, from the migrant workers themselves, who are bound to transfer a certain part of their earnings in foreign currency to their countries of origin or to make investments in their homelands.

3) Measures for the mutual protection of labour importing and exporting countries: – Multi- and bilateral agreements on labour migration, which stipulate that migrant workers shall return to their home countries after the duration of their contracts has expired; 23

Тарлецкая Л. Международная миграция и социально-экономическое развитие // МЭиМО. – 1998. – №7.

– С. 140.

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– Carrying out joint, co-ordinated actions with the purpose of minimizing illegal migration.24 It should be noted that people will not leave their home countries if three main conditions are met: the respective country’s economy develops dynamically; social living conditions gradually improve; a safe life combined with the observance of civil rights and political freedoms can be secured within the borders of their home countries.25 The inefficiency of certain instruments, similar to the ones listed above, is practically always explained by the fact that they influence only separate parameters, and not the entire complex of reasons for migratory mobility.

Similarly, certain measures may also be ineffective if they are applied separately, in isolation from one another, or if they are not reinforced and enforced by political means and are not applied in concert with the latter when it is necessary.

Finally, the matters regarding the organization of immigration, as presented in this paper, raise an interesting question: will the modern Europe evolve to be a new civilization synthesising traditional values and representations of European peoples as well as the civilization values of immigrants (who come primarily from Muslim countries) or the united Europe will develop effective mechanisms of civilization absorption targeting the people who (will) arrive to its territory?

References Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. (2000/C 364/01) [http:// www.europarl. europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf], accessed on the 25th of December 2015.

Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a Common Policy on Illegal Immigration (COM /2001/ 0672 final). [http:// eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX: 52001DC0672], accessed on the 25th of December 2015.

Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of the European Communities – Dublin Convention. (97/C 254/01) [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A41997A0819% 2801%29], accessed on the 27th of December 2015.

Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member States for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status.

24

25

Пахомова Н. Регулируемая миграция как инструмент демографической политики. Диалог. UA, 25 ноября, 2005. [htpp://dialogs.org.ua/ru/material/full/2/4146], accessed on the 1st of October 2015. Цапенко И. П. От миграционного контроля к управлению миграционными процессами // МЭиМО.

–2001. – №10. – C. 32

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[http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/GA/TXT/?uri=URISERV:l33140], accessed on the 27th of December 2015.

[Council of the European Union:] European Pact on Immigration and Asylum. [http://register.consilium.europa. eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2013440%20 2008%20INIT], accessed on the 25th of December 2015.

Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 Listing the Third Countries Whose Nationals Must Be in Possession of Visas When Crossing the External Borders and Those Whose Nationals Are Exempt from That Requirement. [http:// eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32001R0539], accessed on the 25th of December 2015.

Directive 2009/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 Providing for Minimum Standards on Sanctions and Measures against Employers of Illegally Staying Third-Country Nationals. [http://eur-lex.europa. eu/legal-content/GA/TXT/?uri=celex: 32009L0052], accessed on the 25th of December 2015.

[European Commission: Migration and Home Affairs.] External Borders Fund. [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylumborders/external-borders-fund/index_en.htm], accessed on the 25th of December 2015.

[European Commission: Migration and Home Affairs.] Return Fund. [http:// ec.europa.eu/ dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylumborders/return-fund/index_en.htm], accessed on the 25th of December 2015.

European Convention on Human Rights. [http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/ Convention_ENG. pdf], accessed on the 25th of December 2015.

Green Paper on a Community Return Policy on Illegal Residents.

(COM/2002/175 final) [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/ TXT/?uri=celex:52002DC0175], accessed on the 25th of December 2015.

The Hague Programme. 10 Priorities for the Next Five Years. [http://eur-lex. europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri= uriserv:l16002], accessed on the 25th of December 2015.

Proposal for a Comprehensive Plan to Combat Illegal Immigration and Trafficking of Human Beings in the European Union. Official Journal, C 142, 14 June 2002. [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV: l33191b], th accessed on the 25 of December 2015. Нелегальных иммигрантов будут вывозить из Европы на чартерных рейсах // [htpp:// pda.lenta.ru/world/2004/01/25charter/], accessed on the 1st of October 2015. Гудвин-Гилл Г.С. Статус беженца в международном праве. М., 1997. Юдина Т.Н. О социологическом анализе миграционных процессов // Социологические исследования. – 2002. – №10. – С. 19–25. Ильин Ю. Д. Лекции по истории и праву Европейского Союза. – М.: Спарк, 2002.

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Кудрина Л.В. Пространство свободы, безопасности и правопорядка. // Европейский Союз: факты и комментарии. – №48. // [http://www.edcaes.ru/site/ru/union/ archive/ vipusk_48.html], accessed on the 1st of October 2015. Потёмкина О. Иммиграционная политика ЕС: от Амстердама до Лиссабона // МЭ и МО. – 2010. – № 4. – С. 42–51. Потёмкина О. Сотрудничества в сфере внутренних дел и правосудия // Европейский союз на пороге XXI века: выбор стратегии развития / Под ред. Борко Ю. А и Буториной О. В. – М.: Эдиториал УРСС, 2001. – C. 210. Пахомова Н. Регулируемая миграция как инструмент демографической политики. Диалог. UA, 25 ноября, 2005. [htpp://dialogs.org.ua/ru/material/full/2/4146], accessed on the 1st of October 2015. Тарлецкая Л. Международная миграция и социально-экономическое развитие // МЭиМО. – 1998. – №7. – С. 140 Цапенко И. П. Как противостоять нелегальной миграции // Вопросы экономики. – 2001. – №9. – С. 147–148. Цапенко И. П. От миграционного контроля к управлению миграционными процессами // МЭиМО. – 2001. – №10. – C. 32.

Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 8 (2015) 103–106

The Boundaries of the Transnationality Framework Book Review Tristan James Mabry, John McGarry, Margaret Moore, Brendan O’Leary (eds).

2013. Divided Nations and European Integration. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 405 pp.

‘David Nations and European Integration’ (henceforth ‘David Nations’) is an important book because it breaks with the post-Second World War framework to account for ‘divided nations’. It proposes a paradigmatic shift to which scholars of Central and Eastern European history can subscribe to. Although the concept of ‘divided nations’ has been around in the scientific literature (see for example Stephen Borsody (ed.), The Hungarians: a Divided Nation. New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1988), it has been contested and it certainly has not been represented in mainstream scholarly literature. The postSecond World War consensus on ethno-linguistic allegiances has been dependent on the Westphalian arrangement for European inter-state relations. In accordance with this, the editors of ‘Divided Nations’ distinguish two positions, including the integrationist position, namely its stronger version stating that a state can only host one nation at a time, and its weaker form, the accommodationist position, that allows ethno-linguist minority groups some sort of space for maintaining and cultivating their language and culture different from the majority nation. However, the Westphalian system is undermined by ‘transnationality’ as one of the defining features of globalization what has led to the ‘softening’ of borders. As a result, the whole concept of ‘ethno-linguistic allegiances’ straddling borders is on the agenda again. The topic has been put on the agenda by influential scholars, such as Roger Brubakers and Will Kymlicka, who have been accommodating ethno-linguistic allegiances, minority rights and groups within a liberal democratic framework in which group rights are normally perceived as problematic.

‘Divided Nations,’ edited by Tristan James Mabry, John McCarry, Margaret Moore, and Brendan O’Leary, goes beyond the premises of Brubaker and Kymlicka reflecting upon the boundaries of the transnationality framework, although taking the work of Brubaker and Kymlicka as a starting-point. The editors of this volume consider ethno-linguistic allegiances equally legitimate as

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a means for creating cohesive structures as nation-states dominated by a majority culture as an outcome of the Westphalian axioms. Much of the empirical case studies in ‘Divided Nations’ are related to the European Union, more precisely to its expansionist programme of integrating new states, which is a transnational strategy par excellence. Due to the integrative process, the ethno-linguistic groups and minorities are ‘reunited’ with their kin-state, so to speak.

It is too easy to accuse the editors of embracing the ideology of ‘nationalism’ that has been the main motivation to get rid of the ‘divided nations’ in the Westphalian framework in the first place. ‘Nationalism’ has been seen in the EU as a menace for stability and peace if nation-states are internally divided or nationstates expand into neighbouring states. The latter has been excluded almost totally by the fact that the rights of the kin-state to protect its external minorities in the international system of states has not been self-evident in the Westphalian age. In the primordial versus modernist debate, Mabry et al. adopt the modernist interpretation of nation-states. They consider nations to be constructed, but they hasten to add that they are real entities which can be studied insightfully in a political-social theory (p. 5), and in fact they should be studied because the present-day transnationalist framework offers a reliable paradigm to understand the political-social discourse that is enfolding. The Brubakerian triadic nexus, or its extension, the quadratic nexus, including supranational organizations, replaces the formerly branded ‘kin-state irredentism’. After nailing down the starting position of this study on divided nations, the case studies fall into place.

The subject of the book is carefully described in the introductory chapter by John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary. According to them, ‘Divided Nations’ discusses ‘the development of nations and national homelands divided by sovereign borders within and around the current and prospective frontier of the European Union (EU)’ (p. 2). They define ‘divided nations’ as follows: ‘Divided nations are nations separated by states’ (p. 4). Definitions and terminology are relevant because the new transnationalist paradigm requires a different nomenclature from the Westphalian one. Hence, you can find phrases in the book for indicating ‘national and ethnic minorities that have a kin-state’ drafted as ‘segments of divided nations’ or to underline the clear transnational dimension as ‘divided nations straddle states, or borders’. Examples of divided nations to be discussed in the book are the Hungarians in Central and Eastern Europe, including Hungary, Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Austria and the Irish in Northern Ireland as part of the UK and the Irish Republic (p. 3).

Apart from the Introduction and Conclusion – which are both written by John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary –, the book includes another ten chapters. Chapter 1 and 2 are written by Margaret Moore and Tristan James Mabry respectively.

Moore places the issue of divided nations in the context of global justice theory and Mabry relates divided nations to language politics and provides a taxonomy

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for language types distinguishing concepts such as ‘official’ language, ‘national’ language, ‘minority’ language, and so on (pp. 58–59). The taxonomy helps us to understand that the language law in the EU member-state Slovakia, i.e. the Slovak Language Act, is exclusive and counter to the spirit of the EU. The Act turns the use of non-Slovak languages in the official public space on the territory of Slovakia illegal. This is a clear violation of the minority rights of Hungarians, Germans, Roma, Ruthenians, and other nationalities (p. 81). The other eight chapters in the book discuss case studies. In these case studies, the ‘divided nations’ framework’ outlined by McGarry and O’Leary is more or less adopted by the authors.

The case studies can be ordered into three groups, including firstly divided nations that are within the borders of the EU, such as Irish (compare Etain Tannam, Chapter 8), Basques (see Zoe Bray and Michael Keating, Chapter 4), Germans (see Stefan Wolff, Chapter 9), and Greeks (see Tozun Bahcheli and Sid Noel, Chapter 10); secondly, divided nations that are partly within the European Union, such as Hungarians (Zsuzsa Csergő and James M. Goldgeier, Chapter 3) and Croats (Marsaili Fraser, Chapter 7); and thirdly, divided nations that are not yet within the EU but are on its borders and near its prospective borders, such as Albanians (consider Alexandra Channer, Chapter 5), Serbs (see Marsaili Fraser, Chapter 7), Kurds (see David Romano, Chapter 6), and Turks (consider Tozun Bahcheli and Sid Noel, Chapter 10). Most of the authors operate with concepts like triadic and quadratic nexus, including the nationalizing state, kin-state, its external minority and the role and function of supranational organizations (see also László Marácz, The Politics of Multilingual Communication: Case Studies and Research Agendas, in: Sarah Craze and Frieder Lempp, eds, Communicating Conflict: A Multidisciplinary Perspective, Oxford: Inter-Disciplinary Press, 45– 63). Note furthermore that there is a rich variation of kin-state strategies.

This point is elaborated extensively in an interesting paper by Csergő and Goldgeier, which touches upon important methodological issues (Chapter 3). The authors compare the kin-state strategies of Russia, Hungary, and Romania (p. 92).

They observe that these three kin-states pursue a different policy with respect to their external minorities. The two extreme cases are Hungary and Russia, while Romania is positioned somewhere in the middle. Hungary has been most active in supporting its external Hungarian minorities in Central and Eastern Europe, while Russia – although opting for the status of a regional power – has not demonstrated much interest in its external minorities for nation-building (p.

97). The differences in attitude between the kin-states are explained in the paper in terms of a set of vectors, like national canon, the historiography, geography, and demographic statistics that can vary and may be of importance in the process of nation-building. These vectors can not only change from kin-state to kin-state but they can also change over time, as the recent conflict between Ukraine and

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Russia over the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine clearly demonstrates. Although the Russian kin-state did not demonstrate much interest in its external kin-minorities for nation-building until now, due to security reasons, Russia has changed its attitude towards its Russian co-nationals in Eastern Ukraine from almost passive into pro-active or even aggressive.

In the closing chapter of McGarry and O’Leary, The Exaggerated Impact of European Integration on the Politics of Divided Nations, the authors point out that fundamental rights do not hold in the EU, like the respect for the right to territorial self-government, the most essential demand of any sizable national minority (p. 357); the territorial integrity and sovereignty of neighbouring states is not universally respected across the EU (p. 346). Both cases have resulted in continuous tensions and instabilities in the old Westphalian framework. The questions are not solved by the European integration either. The impact of the European integration has been uneven and the authors even claim that the politics of divided nations has been exaggerated (p. 361). A number of delicate issues in the domain of divided nations are in limbo. Hence, generalizations including all the above case studies are not easy to make. McGarry and O’Leary argue convincingly that the distinction between ethnic Eastern European nationalism and civic Western nationalism, as has been argued by Hans Kohn and others, is artificial and incorrect (p. 362). France takes an assimilationist position towards its own internal minorities comparable to Greece and the kin-state Ireland follows an expansive strategy towards Northern Ireland, comparable to Serbia which wants to include the Bosnian Republika Serpska. McGarry and O’Leary convincingly demonstrate that it is not the different type of nationalism what counts but a different path of nation-building or self-projection of the nationalidentity that is responsible for the differences in Europe (p. 366). Taking into account this all-over-Europe point of view, the Hungarian historic Szeklerland (Hungarian: Székelyföld, Romanian: Ţinutul Secuiesc), consisting of the Romanian provinces Harghita, Covasna, and Mureş, where Hungarians claim to have a majority in the Romanian region of Transylvania, is in fact a non-recognized sub-national or regional exclave. However, Szeklerland is no longer an exotic, far-away territory in Transylvania. It can be insightfully studied and classified by positioning Szeklerland – where Hungarians enjoy general personal language rights, although restricted by territorial conditions – between the Spanish Basque Country (Basque: Euskadi, Spanish: País Vasco) that enjoys territorial autonomy and the French Basque Country (Basque: Iparralde, French: Pays basque français) that is an anathema for France (p. 361).

László MARÁCZ European Studies, University of Amsterdam

Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 8 (2015) 107–109

The Memory of Gáspár Bíró. Minority Politics, National Politics, and the State Book Review Fábián Gyula – Jakab Albert Zsolt: Bíró Gáspár emlékkönyv. Kisebbségi identitás és önrendelkezés a globalizmusban, Nemzeti Kisebbségkutató Intézet – MTA TK Kisebbségkutató Intézet, Kolozsvár, 2015 (Fábián Gyula – Jakab Albert Zsolt: Bíró Gáspár Memorandum-Book. Minority Identity and Self-Determination in the Age of Globalism) Gáspár Bíró, Transylvanian-born jurist and political scientist, Professor of Law at Department of the Eötvös Lóránd University. In the 1990s, he became a member of the ad hoc committee on human rights of the UN and between 1992 and 1998 on behalf of this committee he was the rapporteur on Sudan. In the 2000s, he becomes a member of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities twice, being its vice-president between 1998 and 2004. Although not writing and publishing much, there is no question that Gáspár Bíró was one of the prominent Hungarian experts on minority rights and the state. He died tragically at the age of 56.

The book presented in this review is a memorial to his memory, a homage to his work, written mostly by scholars who work in similar fields and who knew him personally (colleagues, PhD students, research partners, etc.) and even considered to be his friend. Furthermore, to underline its symbolic nature, it was published through a joint collaboration of two prestigious institutes in minority studies, the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities from ClujNapoca and the Hungarian Academy of Science Institute for Minority Studies from Budapest.

In concordance with these abovementioned objectives, the book does not have any thematic structure or focus. It is more a Tower of Babel of articles, where the editors included a wide variety of topics, from essayistic writings on one week’s events of Hungarian national policies (József Bálint-Pataki: Egy hét magyarságpolitikai írásaiból (február 19–25.) / One week of Hungarian Politics (February 19–25)) through minority politics (Barna Bodó: Kisebbségi civil társadalom / Minority Civil Society, Réka Horváth: Le representation de la minorité hongroise de Roumanie entre 1990–2004 / The Representation of

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the Hungarian Minority in Romania between 1990 and 2004, Márton Tonk – Tünde Székely: Hungarian Minority and Minority Higher Education System in Romania, Gyula Fábián: Kisebbségi nyelvű felsőoktatás a nemzetközi gyakorlatban / Legal Higher Education in the Language of National Minorities in the International Practice), minority rights (Levente Salat: The Chances of Ethnic Autonomy in Romania – between Theory and Practice, Erzsébet Szalayné Sándor: Nemzetközi jog a kisebbségvédelem szolgálatában – hard law, soft law és egy kis gyakorlat / International Law in the Service of the Protection of Minorities – Hard Law, Soft Law, and Some Practice, Gruber Ines: Die Rechte der Minderheiten im Völkerecht under Europarecht / Minority Rights in International and European Law), language rights (Miklós Bakk: Nyelvi jogok, nyelvi rezsim és a demokrácia modelljei / Linguistic Rights, Linguistic Regime and the Models of Democracy), or international relations (Zoé Adrienn Király: Stabilitás vs. biztonsági kihívás. Afganisztán: a kisebbségek országa / Stability vs. Security Challenges: Afghanistan, the Country of Minorities, Anna Ujvári: A 2014-es izraeli-gázai konfliktusban felmerült háborús bűnökkel kapcsolatos vádakról és a konfliktus kommunikációjáról / On the Accusations of War Crimes in the 2014 Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and its Communication) to legal theory (A nemzetközi jog és alkotmányjog kölcsönhatásának folyamatai (avagy az alkotmányjog nemzetköziesítése és a nemzetközi jog alkotmányosodása) / Interaction Processes between International Law and Constitutional Law (or the Internationalization of Constitutional Law and the Constitutionalization of International Law), pieces on the legal analysis of victimology (Bodea Radu: Consideraţii teoretice privind victimologia / Theoretical Considerations of Victimology, László Nánási: A kisebbségeket védő büntető jogalkotás Magyarországon 1877–2012 / Legislation Protecting Minorities in the Field of Criminal Justice in Hungary, 1878–2012) or on classic Roman law (Tamás Nótári: Adalékok a bellum iustum ideológiájához és a hadüzenet szimbolikájához az ókori Rómában / Some Remarks on the Ideology of the Bellum Iustum and the Symbolism of war Declarations in Ancient Rome). Also, in a similar logic, the articles were written in several languages, in function of the author’s nationality or choice. Most of the articles are in Hungarian, but there are studies in Romanian, German, French, and English as well. Although many of the studies are interesting, the reading is made difficult by the fact that the articles are not organized in thematic structure but in alphabetical order by the authors’ names.

Most of the studies are original contributions written exclusively to this volume – some articles appeared elsewhere, or were written a long time ago. Beyond their professional contribution, some authors also have a few personal words on the memory Gáspár Bíró.

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All in all, the book is an impressive muster for the memory of a great scholar, however, not necessarily one that will be read from the beginning to the end by everyone. As the studies presented in this book cover a wide thematic area, most of us will look only at excerpts, will read only some of the articles, which are close to the research or interest of each and every one of us.

Tibor TORĂ“ Department of International Relations and European Studies Sapientia University, Cluj-Napoca/KolozsvĂĄr

Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 8 (2015) 111–112

Minority Civil Society – A Specificity of What?

Book Review Erdélyi Magyar Civil Évkönyv – 2014 (Transylvanian Hungarian Civil Year-Book – 2014), Ed.: Barna Bodó, Gordian, Cluj/Kolozsvár, 2014.

The reviewed volume covers a very interesting and somewhat scientifically neglected field of social life: the specific ‘world’ of the civil society in minority societies. Nine studies of the volume focus on the theoretical aspects of the minority civil societies and examine some peculiar respects of the Hungarian minorities’ civil society life in Transylvania (Romania), Slovakia, Vojvodina (Serbia), and the Subcarpathian region of Ukraine.

Tünde Székely in her study deals with the definitional questions and dilemmas of the concept ‘minority civil society’. The set of notions related to this issue consists – according to Székely – of concepts as cultural heterogeneity, multiculturalism, identity, nation-state, minority groups, multinational state, polyethnic state, policy of recognition, and others. She underlines the significance of the so-called ‘dilemma of modernization’. How must the minority civil society be seen: is it a ‘minority civil society’ or a ‘civil minority society’? What is the determining feature of this social form: an identity-motivated solidarity or a culturally framed response to the challenges of the social plurality? There is no unique definition for the variety of the historical and political situations in which several minority groups (societies) are included.

Orsolya Varga’s essay follows the significance of the concept ‘subsidiarity’ from its theological definition launched by Pope Leo XIII to its nowadays used European definition as a basic principle of democracy in the European Union. One of the conclusions formulated by the author is that the principle of subsidiarity must be implemented in such a way to assure a reasonable power-sharing with a clear and minimal setting and – at the same time – an optimal frame for the civil participation and the validation of a large spectrum of the interests.

A research paper signed by Réka Zsuzsánna Máthé focuses on the relationship between the NGOs and the governmental institutes and the efficiency of the public finances in this relationship. What is an essential hardship in this relationship regarding the minority civil societies is the personal and more ethnicized connection with the Romanian governmental authorities. Another

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research paper written by Nóra-Csilla Veress examines the relationship between the NGOs and the authorities of the local self-governments, with a case study on Cluj-Napoca / Kolozsvár and based on a bulk of interviews with several actors of the Hungarian minority civil societies. The study highlights the fact that there is not a real partnership (on a long-term basis) between the city hall and the civil society. The same question was examined by Boróka Pápay, with special focus on two foundations having a special role in the minority civil society support.

Three studies (signed by Géza Tokár, András Ritz, and Mónika Bayerné Sipos) offer perspectives for an edifying comparison between three different regions: Vojvodina (Serbia), South-Slovakia, and the Subcarpathian region (Ukraine).

The study signed by Sarolta Borzási is only partly connected to the main topic of the volume. It is a short summary of the literature on the study of lobbying and it is completed with a short research on how the legislation of lobbying was implemented in Romania and accessed by the ethnic Hungarian civil society in Transylvania.

An important remark on this volume must be made regarding the authors.

Most of them are young ethnic Hungarian researchers and some are civil society leaders. So, they are completing the scientific approach with a special emphasis on social activism.

Challenging the young researchers was a conscious tenor of the editor of the volume, Barna Bodó. Prefacing the volume, he emphasized the importance of having workshops gathering young researchers in this field.

Miklós BAKK Department of Political Science Babeş–Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár

Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 8 (2015) 113

‘University Evenings’ Lecture Series ‘University Evenings’ always offer interesting lectures for the audience as the invited experts are usually well-known scientists, researchers from home or abroad, and the topics discussed are relevant, interesting, awareness-raising. These events are advertised in several ways in order to access the larger audience from ClujNapoca or other places, as the lectures are open not only for the students and the staff of our university but anybody interested is welcome to attend the presentations.

In the first semester of the academic year 2015–2016, the Department of International Relations and European Studies invited two well-known experts from Hungary to hold a presentation within the framework of the ‘University Evenings’.

On 22 September 2015, Prof. Dr Máté Szabó from the Eötvös Loránd University, Faculty of Law, Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, former Parliamentary Commissioner for Civil Rights and former general Ombudsman of Hungary, held an interesting lecture entitled: Ombudsmans for the Human Rights: Europe, Hungary and Romania. Problems and Results. The lecture offered a comprehensive insight into the functioning, role, and activities of the ombudsman institution, revealing aspects and details in an international comparison, focusing primarily on the Hungarian and Romanian case.

Our second invited lecturer was Dr Levente Püski, historian, Associate Professor at the University of Debrecen, Faculty of Arts and Humanities. The presentation took place on 4th November 2015 and it was entitled The Opposition Parties’ Political Possibilities in the Hungarian Parliament between the Two World Wars. The lecture covered a wide range of interesting topics as, for example: the composition of the Hungarian parliament and the relation of the government party and the opposite parties in the period between the two world wars, the politics and influencing possibilities of the opposite parties, the characteristics of the parliamentary work: the style of the speeches and debates, the course of the legislative work, the method of the parliamentary boycott, and so on.

Organizers of the ‘University Evenings’ were the Faculty of Sciences and Arts of the Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania, the Robert Schuman Association, and the Students’ Organization of the faculty from Cluj-Napoca.

Emese BALLA Department of International Relations and European Studies Sapientia University, Cluj-Napoca / Kolozsvár

Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 8 (2015) 115

Tutoring Programme in 2015 – At the Department of European Studies The Department announced its first tutoring programme in 2011, when six MA students began the research activity under the teachers’ professional and educational supervision. The first announcement already showed that the weaknesses of the programme consist in maintaining and stabilizing the enrolled students. Therefore, in the subsequent years, we introduced new elements of cooperation with the students, and the programme became more stable.

In the academic year 2015/16, the fifth year in the programme’s history, students’ interest turned out to be bigger than before: 11 MA and 2 BA students were enrolled in the talent-supporting programme. Among the chosen research topics, there are both classical, e.g. civil society, and actual ones, e.g. migration.

The programme started on November 28, 2015, and the students expressed their wish to visit political and scientific institutions in Bucharest.

Finally, here is the list of participant students in the tutorial programme; in parentheses are the names of supervising instructors: Blanka Fazakas (Márton Tonk – Tünde Székely), Emőke Fodor (Tibor Toró), Anett Hevel (Márton Tonk – Tünde Székely, Elizabeth Esther Clement (Tibor Toró), Szilvia Varga (Tibor Toró) – 1st-year students; Gábor Varga (Dezső Szenkovics – Tünde Székely) – 2nd-year students; Krisztina Brînzan–Antal (Barna Bodó), Kinga Kovács (Dezső Szenkovics), Lóránd Pleiner (Tibor Toró), Eszter Simon (Tibor Toró), Karola Veres (Barna Bodó) – 3rd-year students; Adél Bedő (Dezső Szenkovics), Viktória Nóra László (Dezső Szenkovics) – BA students.

B. B.

Instructions for authors Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies publishes original papers and surveys concerning the historical development, the economic, societal, political and philosophical dimensions of the European integration project. The European and Regional Studies provides an independent forum for informed debate and discussion of European affairs.

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