Peace and security: what will the AU prioritise in 2023?

Kinkoh

WHERE progress was made last year in dealing with conflicts and security threats in Africa, the risks of backsliding have spilt into 2023, leaving the outlook precarious. As such, this year promises to be another challenging one for policymaking on peace and security in Africa.

The outlook was defined by some worrying dynamics. The scourge of armed conflict and generalised violence manifested in Ethiopia, South Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR), and in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo

(DRC) following the resurgence of the March 23 Movement (M23).

The threat of violent extremism and activities of terrorist groups intensified in the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin, Somalia and the northern Mozambican province of Cabo Delgado.

Meanwhile, unconstitutional changes of governments (UCGs) persisted across the continent, with five coups staged, two of which succeeded in Burkina Faso while three failed in Guinea Bissau, The Gambia and Sao Tome and Principe.

This signalled a continuation of the trend in 2021 where coup attempts in Chad, Mali, Guinea, Sudan and Niger slowed democratic gains on the continent. This outlook further rendered political transitions complex and protracted.

In Sudan, South Sudan, CAR, Chad and Libya, the timelines for implementation of peace agreements in this regard have been delayed. Further tainting this outlook are ramifications of the converging fiscal fallout from the Covid-19 pandemic, the Russo-Ukrainian war, prolonged drought in the Horn of Africa and climate change-related shocks.

Within this context, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) stepped up conflict management partnership for realising peaceful elections on the continent.

The continental body is also directly and democratic consolidation efforts with relative success especially in terms of AUled diplomacy, AU-backed Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and the development of normative frameworks relating to governance like the Accra and Malabo Declarations.

From the AU’s engagements in Ethiopia and Sudan, noticeable progress was registered in the signing of peace agreements to end years of internal conflict. Its constructive role in elections observation was evident following relatively successful elections and peaceful transfers of power in Kenya, and elsewhere, highlighting the utility of AUREC (Regional Economic Commission) engaged in finding solutions to various country- and region-specific conflicts via different mechanisms, missions and representatives. Several country- and region-specific conflicts that were a priority for the AU over the last few years still show signs of needing greater attention in 2023.

The PSC met 32 times last year to discuss various conflicts and countries in transition, with nearly half (47 per cent) of the Council’s deliberations (15 out of 32) focusing on the situation in the Sahel (Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea and Mali).

Discussions with PSC members indicate that its agenda will continue to be dominated by the situations in the DRC and the Great Lakes Region, Libya, South Sudan, Sudan, Ethiopia, CAR and the Sahel. We expect these conflicts to become a central theme in the AUC Chairperson’s communiqués.

The alarming uptick of violence in eastern DRC and the resurgence of the

M23, whose attacks have sharply widened the rift between the DRC and Rwanda, will certainly keep the DRC high on the PSC agenda. The precipitous escalation of tensions between the two neighbours, risks reigniting what could become the sole interstate conflict on the continent, heightening instability in the Great Lakes region in its wake.

Meanwhile, the deteriorating situation in the east could also be used as a pretext to postpone planned presidential and national assembly elections slated for the end of December.

Myriad crises in the Sahel and elsewhere will also occupy central place on the Council’s agenda. Failed and successful military takeovers in Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Chad and Sudan have all connived to drive instability and complicate political transitions on the continent.

Slow implementation of peace agreements in South Sudan, CAR and Libya and the delay in meeting the timetable for complex political transitions in Sudan and Chad continue to increase chances of military actors’ disengagement from processes underway, thus heightening the risk of military takeovers and protracted civil unrest.

The AU will also continue to contend with the threat of violent extremism and terrorism in various regions of the continent. In the Sahel, jihadists have expanded their activities to the region’s coastal states including Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, and Togo.

Al-Shabaab remains a potent military force across significant parts of Somalia despite the progress registered under President Hassan Sheik Mohamud. Repeated attacks by Boko Haram splinter groups will continue to wreak havoc in the Lake Chad Basin.

The surge in armed attacks on military posts, civilian population and basic infrastructure by an Islamist insurgency in Mozambique’s northern province of Cabo Delgado continues to undermine the smooth operationalisation of the transition process underway in the country.

High on its agenda will also be the AU’s management of ongoing peace processes in South Sudan, Libya, CAR, and Ethiopia. Ongoing conflict and sporadic violence in South Sudan, exacerbated by tensions and military confrontations between armed and opposition groups, continues to undermine stability, and has led to the extension of the timeline for implementing the fragile peace deal signed in 2018.

In Libya, the political and security situation had deteriorated since the indefinite postponement of elections in December 2021, deepening the political stalemate and division in the country. It still lacks unified national institutions, a widely accepted constitution, and an electoral framework.

Despite the implications of this situation for North Africa, Southern Africa and the Mediterranean the AU has not prioritised it. Last year, Libya only made it to the PSC agenda once, in June.

The political climate in CAR largely remains tense and charged with contestations between the government, opposition political parties and armed groups intensifying. Despite the convening of a dialogue process and the launch of other peace and reconciliation efforts by President Faustin-Archange Touadéra in March 2022, violence is likely to increase after the Constitutional Court cleared the way for a constitutional referendum that could see Touadéra potentially run for third term.

In Ethiopia, political stability remains fragile despite the AU-led mediation that culminated in the November agreement ending the two-year-long war in the northern Tigray region, although some progress is observable.

The AU will also aim to scale up efforts to promote electoral democracy in Africa with at least 15 countries set to hold presidential, parliamentary and local elections in 2023. The fragile political context in which elections in Guinea Bissau and DRC will be held, and the lack of trust in electoral management bodies (EMBs) in countries such as Zimbabwe could create flashpoints for electoral dispute and violence taking various forms, including political protests, mass demonstrations, strikes and riots which are usually met with heavy-handed responses by security forces.

Despite this worrying outlook, the PSC has the capacity to address these issues. In the DRC, various international, continental and regional mediation initiatives have adopted resolutions and roadmaps although they are facing implementation challenges.

In addition to these efforts, the East African Community (EAC) heads of state summit held on February 4 stressed the need for parties to de-escalate tensions and use established mechanisms to resolve disputes in the implementation of peace in eastern DRC. The leaders also called on all parties to cease hostilities; for all foreign armed groups to withdraw; and the development of appropriate deployment matrix by chiefs of defence forces in DRC, to be accompanied by dialogue.

The AU also has a role to play in terms of supporting dialogue and regional peacebuilding initiatives by fostering inter-regional cooperation between EAC, ICGLR and SADC in the spirit of complementarity of efforts. As a guarantor of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) agreement for the DRC and the region, signed in Addis Ababa in February 2013 (alongside ICGLR, SADC and UN), the AU should urge the actors to sustain the momentum for peace and stability in order to stop the risk of prolonged interstate conflict between Rwanda and DRC. It should also facilitate constructive dialogue between Kinshasa and Kigali under the framework of the Luanda Roadmap.

The AU will need to demonstrate its unwavering commitment to addressing drivers of UCGs and guiding the return to constitutional order in countries facing protracted and complex political transitions. The AU’s decision not to sanction Chad following the UCG in 2021 set a dangerous precedent that has seen countries currently sanctioned clamouring for a repeal of the suspension from the AU.

But there does not seem to be evidence that sanctions are producing their desired effect, so there is no guarantee this approach will work. As such, the AU will need to resist the temptation of readmitting suspended countries into the AU before the security and political challenges leading to their suspension have been addressed.

Within this context, expediting the activation of the sanctions sub-committee to standardise the engagement with sanctioned countries and developing a monitoring and evaluation framework to guide the repeal of sanctions and readmission into the AU will be critical. The AU should step up implementation of the outcomes of the Accra and Malabo declarations by pressing all actors to abide by their commitments, while also deploying preventive diplomacy efforts through the Panel of the Wise.

Providing political, technical, and financial support to all the countries in political transition (including Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan) to prepare for and hold inclusive, transparent and credible elections at the end of their respective transitions will be equally important. The support should also extend to speedily addressing issues relating to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), Security Sector Reform (SSR), and institutional reform and inclusive dialogue to ensure peace and stability and the legitimacy of civilian governments formed post-transition.

Despite AU-led and AU-backed PSOs in the countries and regions affected by violent extremism, attacks by terrorists continue to drive displacements, and human rights violations by armed groups and military personnel. Beating back violent extremists in all regions of the continent will constitute another priority for the AU in 2023 as will ensuring PSOs are carried out within a framework of respect for human rights.

But limited financing for peace support operations will challenge the extent to which AU efforts will be successful. Mobilising sustained financing for PSOs, therefore, will have to be a key priority for the AU within a context of shrinking EU support for PSOs in Africa. Expediting the operationalisation of PSC mechanisms to combat terrorism will be critical in this regard.

The AU’s response to the Ethiopian conflict, although belated, showed that with political will, it can fulfil its conflict management role effectively. The AU will have to do more to support Ethiopia-led parallel initiatives of national dialogue, transitional justice and DDR to de-risk possibilities of renewed conflict and increase prospects of building sustainable peace.

While the AU brokered a peace deal between the CAR government and 14 armed groups in 2019, it faces considerable implementation challenges. The AU should consider exploring options for inclusive dialogue to resolve some of the country’s political differences and advance national reconciliation for peace and economic recovery for CAR. It should talk with armed groups to determine the conditions that could persuade them to lay down their arms.

The primary concern of the Libyan people at the moment is security. This would guarantee the creation of a conducive environment for the organisation of free, fair and credible elections. Given the importance of, and complexity surrounding, the conduct of elections in Libya, the AU may also prioritise engaging the parties to reach consensus on a constitutional framework and timeline for credible elections, ceasefire monitoring, and assisting the Libyan 5+5 Joint Military Commission in overseeing the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces.

Disputed elections will heighten questions around the utility of AU elections observer missions. The AU should prioritise implementing previous recommendations from its own observer missions and step up preventive diplomacy and early warning engagements by supporting the work of the members of the Panel of the Wise.

While the AU can effectively address these peace and security challenges, its efforts are likely to be frustrated by dynamics within the PSC. In recent years, member states obstructed attempts to raise issues affecting them at PSC sessions, making it hard to find common ground on critical matters.

As such, conflict/crisis situations in Tunisia, Mozambique and Cameroon, among others, did not feature on the Council’s agenda despite indications of political crises and armed conflict escalating. These countries are again conspicuously absent from the PSC’s annual indicative programme of activities for 2023, sparking questions about the AU’s institutional reform and its institutional capacity for peacebuilding.

Sovereignty was also often invoked to repel PSC efforts to intervene in conflicts, and this principle of non-interference saw the AU’s peacebuilding mandate being handed to regional economic communities like ECOWAS, SADC and the EAC. This dynamic complicated the Council’s decision-making on conflicts, and is likely to complicate prospects for the resolution of peace and security challenges in 2023.

How the AU manages these will be important in determining the extent to which it can deliver on its mandate to bring peace and stability to the continent.