Geopolitics

EVA THINK TANK TAORMINA FORUM

Europe and Africa: a strategic pact for growth The change triggered by North Africa is a historic opportunity

Position Paper “Developing the Regions of Africa and Europe” Project Taormina Forum, October 6-7, 2011

 The North African realignment has caused the emergence of new social-political dynamics in an area that is strategic for Europe-Africa relations.  Europe can seize this opportunity to relaunch relations with Africa, while at the same time regaining international influence.  Europe must overcome its areas of disagreement and propose to Africa a “European Consensus” that is credible, mutually advantageous and an alternative to that of other geopolitical players.  Action must be taken on three levels: i. Political, by formalizing a “Common Europe-Africa Pact for Growth”. ii. Economic, including Special Zones for European-African Economic-Industrial Cooperation. iii. Social, starting from a joint European policy for migration and mobility.

Prepared on the basis of the results of research carried out for the Fondazione Banco di Sicilia by The European House-Ambrosetti, in collaboration with Prof. Vittorio Emanuele Parsi.

The change currently under way in North Africa is epoch-making. The emergence of new social/political dynamics has revolutionized a strategic geopolitical space forcing the repositioning of the region vis-à-vis Europe and the African continent.

This makes it a “historic” window of opportunity for Europe to relaunch a mutually advantageous bi-continental Euro-African strategy for growth.

which, on average, had been in power for more than 35 years.

iii. Broad scale: the systemic effects and

“contagious” aspects2 have involved (and continue to involve) in differing ways and intensity, the entirety of North Africa and have also extended into areas of the Middle East and Near East, as well as Sub-Saharan Africa.

This document will examine the processes currently in progress in North Africa, offer an analysis of their impact on Europe-Africa relations and propose recommendations for guidelines for European policy towards Africa.

Figure 1 – Countries involved (to-date) in the "Arab Spring” uprisings

1. The uprisings in North Africa have opened up new prospects in a geopolitical space that is strategic for relations with Africa

3. From the events in North Africa some fundamental new elements have emerged:

1. The protests and riots that began in North Africa at the end of 2010 (and are still on-going) have triggered processes of historic/strategic importance.

i. The element triggering the revolts was an endogenous push from below (and not directed from the outside) for liberalization of the political regimes.

2. The dynamics characterizing the “Arab Spring” are:

i. Unpredictability: the uprisings generally

took by surprise intelligence forces, governments and observers in the West and elsewhere, demonstrating the limited ability to grasp the “weak signals” coming from the area.

ii. Speed: in the arc of just a few months,

the protests which began in Tunisia1 spread, leading to the fall of regimes

The event which catalyzed the protests leading to the fall of President Ben Ali (on January 14, 2011), in power for 24 years, occurred on December 17, 2010 when Mohamed Bouazizi, a street vendor, set himself on fire in protest against police confiscation of his goods.

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2 There are four structural characteristics common to the societies involved in the revolts: 1) “Patrimonial” states in which access to the economic circuit is dependent upon privileged access to the political circuit managed exclusively by those in power; 2) low institutional performance which leads to a high level of exposure to “external” factors/risks that can cause broad-ranging negative systemic effects; 3) fragile economic/demographic situation with economies that are state-controlled with limited diversification, redistribution policies that are either inefficient or completely lacking, high unemployment levels (especially for young people and women) and explosive demographic trends; 4) very low median age with the younger generations better-educated than their parents' generations (the period during which the power of the authoritarian regimes was consolidated) and more oriented towards the use of new technologies (which during the riots generated information that was difficult to censure).

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ii. The protests had an “internal” perspective, rejecting the commonlyused scapegoat of the outside “enemy” (typically the “West” and its allies) as a cover for the responsibilities of the local political elite.3 4. These dynamics have modified the structure of the political demand of the area along norms and values that are not divergent, or antagonistic, to those of the “North of the world”.4 This is the first sign of discontinuity in the last twenty years.

5. In North Africa – due to the complex web of economic, social and political dynamics found there – this is a key link in a chain of strategic relationships on an intraand supra-regional level: i. interrelationship and structural interdependence of the North African social/political and economic systems on a local and supra-regional scale;

Figure 2 – Strategic vectors in North Africa

7. A) Euro-Mediterranean vector (“Gateway” to Europe). The millennia-long (the “mare nostrum” of Ancient Rome) mutual attraction between North Africa and Europe can be seen today in major economic/financial relations and a significant flow of goods and people between the shores of the Mediterranean: Europe is North Africa’s no. 1 trading partner (154 billion dollars, 53% of trade) and no.1 investor with 76 billion dollars (40% of foreign investment;5)

ii. competition between external geopolitical players with primary strategic interests, the most important being energy;

there are (an estimated) additional 15,000 European companies (large corporations and small- and medium-sized companies) that operate in North Africa in the telecommunications, energy, agrifood, construction and textile sectors;

iii. central geographic position in terms of dynamics (e.g., migration) fundamental to security and stability.

North Africa is the no. 2 supplier of oil to Europe (13.3%) and no. 3 of natural gas (16.7%) with a strategic presence of European energy multinationals;6

6. For historic and geo-economic reasons, three strategic vectors continue to occupy the North African social/political space.

The attempt by some governments (e.g., Syria and Iran) to divert the protest towards (or unite it with) other more chronic motives for Arab discontent (for example, the Arab-Israeli conflict or the imperialist and neo-colonialist West) do not seem, to-date, to have been successful.

4 Requests for freedom, dignity, equality of economic opportunity and transparency in the decision-making process are seen in a range of forms and to varying extent.

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North African exports towards Europe are 59.4% of the total (69% are fossil fuels and the rest semiprocessed goods); North African imports from Europe are 48.5% of the total (40% machinery and vehicles, 20% consumer goods). Source: Uncomtrade and World Bank; UNCTAD; 2010 figures.

6 Eighty-five percent of oil production in Algeria and Libya is controlled by Total, Royal Dutch Shell, ENI and BP; ENI is the largest foreign investor in Libya.

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North Africa is a key intersection of migratory routes towards Europe,7 and regulates them.8 8. B) Islamic vector (latitudinal push).

Arab-Islamic penetration – a process that began in ancient times – is the differentiating aspect, including in terms of identity, from Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. Along this line of thrust, North Africa has resisted considering itself the northern-most offspring of Africa, preferring to see itself, within the political space, as the extreme west of the Arab world. Within the renewed interest for Africa,9 in recent years North Africa has seen a strengthening in its relations with the Gulf States who are increasingly interested in diversifying their investments,10 in the promotion of new trading relationships and implementation of security and “good neighbor” cooperation strategies11 that are fundamental for guaranteeing the protection of the oil resources on which their economies are based. At the same time, Turkey has promoted renewed activism, reinforced by the “appeal” of its model of democratic Islam.

partially resisted Arab penetration, tends to bring together the Maghreb and SubSaharan Africa to create a mixture of cultural, religious, economic and political elements. Today, compared with SubSaharan Africa, North Africa has an economic12 and political influence (for example, Egypt and Libya) and is a hub for migration with the dual function of a transit area and destination for intra-African flows.13 10. The simultaneous presence of these impulses, sometimes in competition with each other, make the stability of North Africa fundamental for Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Gulf States, with direct "chain-reaction" impacts.

11. Strategic interests of other geopolitical players – the United States, China, Russia, India and Brazil – also continue in this region, countries that over varying lengths of time and in different ways have consolidated their presence within a more general strategy of strengthening their relations with the African continent.

9. C) African vector (longitudinal push).

The push of “Africanness” which has To-date, there have been 8 million African immigrants into Europe, found primarily in France, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands.

8 Following the Italian-Libyan Friendship Treaty, the immigrants landing in Italy dropped from 36,951 in 2008 to 4,406 in 2010. Source: Italian Ministry of the Interior.

9 Trade with Africa rose from 2.7 billion dollars in 1990 to “peak” at 26 billion dollars in 2008. Source: Gulf Research Center, October 2010.

10 The sectors of primary interest are energy, minerals, metals and agricultural products which are extremely important for the Gulf States.

11 Including aid for development and fighting poverty, thanks above all to funds from the Islamic Development Bank. The Gulf States also founded the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (ABEDA) which is to manage funds earmarked for the continent.

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Figure 3 – Major interests in North Africa North Africa generates 35.3% of African GDP and 40% of FDIs to Africa, despite the fact it represents only 16% of the population. North Africa is also a net investor in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2006, Libya created a 5 billion dollar sovereign fund through the Libya Arab Africa Investment Company. Egyptian companies invest in Algeria, Nigeria, Tunisia and Zimbabwe, and Moroccan companies invest in Senegal, Congo, Gabon, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali and Equatorial Guinea.

13 In North Africa, there are between 3 and 4 million African immigrants.

Source: Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011, World Bank.

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12. These interests (with concerted acceleration of emerging powers since the 1990s) have taken their place alongside the former European colonial powers, reducing the space traditionally held by them.

Figure 4 – Foreign Direct Investment in North Africa; 2009 figures (Source: The European House-Ambrosetti)

2. The potential impact of the realignment of North Africa could be supra-continental in scale 13. The events in North Africa are “game changers” of the traditional alliances and relations in the area.

14. They open a window of opportunity to reconfigure the political, economic and strategic relationships of international players with North Africa and, through this, with the continent of Africa which, in turn, is increasingly relevant to global balances of power.

15. From the transition from the bi-polar world of the Cold War in which it was an area of "low-intensity" conflict between the super-powers, to the multi-polar world currently taking shape, Africa has become a central component14 in the political/economic For example, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Africa rose from 16 billion dollars in 2002 to 72 billion dollars in 2008. Despite the International crisis, FDIs 14

strategies of the traditional and emerging global players with which Europe must compete: Within the grand strategy for global primacy of the “Washington Consensus”,15 the US has relaunched16 its African policy. The Obama administration has also focused special attention on Africa (even if difficult to decipher in its entirety), while avoiding any involvement that is too direct or excessively marked exposure, as the North Africa crisis showed.

China, through major economic and political investment, is aiming at becoming Africa's partner and 17 "Amphitryon", thus strengthening its international influence (promotion of the “Beijing Consensus”18 as an alternative to have remained high (55 billion in 2010). Source: UNCTAD. 15 The US geopolitical proposal involves a number of basic principles in three areas: economic (less government/more market, rapid liberalization, universal nature of the development model); political/institutional (reduced central government, democracy as the best political "recipe" for development, interference in state affairs with "exportation" of good governance and democracy); cultural/formative – “soft power” (democracy and Western lifestyle as a reference model, strong cultural relations, although these are currently in relative decline).

16 The return to a policy for Africa is connected to the successful attempt to promote a non-francophile solution in the final phase of the Congo civil war.

17 Over the period 2000 to 2008, Chinese-African trade grew by 96 billion dollars; in 2009 alone, Chinese exports to African countries doubled, while imports increased by 81%. At this pace, in five years, China will be Africa’s no. 1 trading partner.

18 The geopolitical proposal from the emerging power, China, that wants to play a leading role on an international level. It proposes an alternative to the Western model (see footnote 15) in three main areas: economic (strong government presence, gradualism, experimentalism and localization); political/institutional (strong central government, democracy not a mandatory pre-requisite for development, “5 principles of peaceful coexistence”:

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Washington’s) and ensuring the resources needed for its development.19 India is attempting to insert itself into the trend of potential competition between the BRICSs on African soil, offering a model of “post-colonial democracy”. Also thanks to the grass-roots presence of large Indian communities, it can offer itself as an alternative trading partner and political player to China while aiming at building a common Afro-Indian identity.

Following its failed attempt to be recognized as the leader among Latin American countries, Brazil has adopted a policy with a global perspective (capitalizing on its shoreline) along the relationship axes with the BRICSs and South of the world;20 within this context, relations with Africa have intensified since the mid-1990s along an “antiChinese” strategy.21

South Africa is faced with a strategic alternative (“exit or voice”) to either continue along the line of South-South integration outside Africa with other BRICs, or become the coalescing/stabilizing pole for Africa. How the situation will evolve is uncertain for the moment in light of the country’s interest/ability to follow one or other of the two alternatives and the potential resistance of the other countries to accept the prospect of Pretoria’s leadership (just as happened with Brazil).

Africa Mediterranea Africa Centrale

Terzo Mondo

India Africa del Sud

Cina

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respect for political territorial sovereignty, nonaggression, non-interference, equality and mutual benefits, peaceful co-existence); cultural/formative (China as the "champion" of developing countries, promotion of cultural relations key to economic relations).

19 China imports oil from Angola (which supplies 50% of the crude oil that goes from Africa to China), Sudan (in which for the last four years it has a monopoly of the wells in Darfour, providing them with 40% of crude oil exports) and Nigeria (from which it receives 30,000 barrels a day thanks to an agreement signed in 2005).

In addition, it imports cotton from Benin, Mali, Togo and Cameroon, lumber from Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Liberia, cobalt and coltan from Congo and Zambia, uranium from Niger, and iron, coal, nickel and aluminum from a number of countries. A similar trend is seen with land and agricultural products. From 1996 to 2009, China lost 8 million hectares of arable land due to industrialization, while Africa has 733 million (6 times that of China).

20 Brazil is presenting itself as the lynchpin for a new way of conceiving international relations that could also push aside the relationship with the North of the world.

21 Brazil promotes policies of employing African workers in the infrastructure projects it finances, as well as trade cooperation policies aimed at providing an

Iran

Asia Centrale

U.R.S.S.

Israele Medio Oriente

Australia

America Latina

Est Europa

Europa

Figure 5 – The Cold War world: major players and relationships

Sud Est Asiatico

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Brasile

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Turchia

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Australia Arabia Saudita

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Sudafrica

Figure 6 – The multi-polar world (tendency): major players and relationships impulse for African industrial development, in clear contradiction to the Chinese approach.

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16. Despite uncertainty regarding the outcome of the dynamics underway in North Africa, there are three scenarios about how they could evolve, with a chain-reaction of effects for North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and international players.

Figure 7 – Potential scenarios of how the situation in North Africa could evolve and the geopolitical impacts

17. SCENARIO A) Instability in North Africa and Africa as a “failing continent”.

This is the absolutely worst scenario with protracted instability in North Africa and worst practices of the African and international elite. In it, North Africa would be a potential “continental detonator” with a domino effect seen in crises of local major players (e.g., Congo, Nigeria and Egypt), failure of the South African attempt to build a workable catalyzer not directed from the outside for stabilization of African regions and, in the worst case, the cementing of a belt of political instability and humanitarian crises that would cut the continent in two.

With its development process interrupted, Africa would run the risk of becoming an "agglomeration of hinterlands" with negative effects that would transcend the confines of the continent itself: institutions unable to withstand the impact of the changes; failure to control migratory flows; negative economic/employment repercussions on a vast scale;

penetration of extremists and radicals into new areas in the north and south.

From the European standpoint, the effects of this scenario (political instability in the Mediterranean and Sub-Sahara area, migratory pressures, loss of potential markets, etc.) would bring about a worsening of the tension and disagreements within the European Union, with the resulting risk of a weakening of its political identity.

18. SCENARIO B) Stabilization of North Africa and reinforcement of the continent’s development circle If the transition in North Africa were to be managed in such a way as to channel and exploit the new demands emerging from the “Arab Spring”, it would create further stimulus for the development of the continent with advantages (alliances, special relationships, etc.) for those able to act as partners of reference in this process.

This scenario could unfold with or without Europe, thus creating two sub-scenarios which, from a European perspective would see: B1) A Europe which, failing to connect with Africa, would favor “others”: a) its role would be increasingly marginal and peripheral in a world in which the center of gravity is moving along other longitudes; b) it would suffer from direct conflict of interest with the Chinese area of influence, consolidated in Africa and, therefore, too close. These aspects would have negative effects on the internal cohesion of the EU.22 B2) A Europe which, offering a shore for the new demand from the Maghreb and “hooking” Africa – thus consolidating growth, stability, liberalization and modernization – could face the structural emergencies (migration, rebalancing of population/employment Given current dynamics, including division on the European front, this is the most probable scenario.

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gaps,23 and economic decline), to create opportunities for joint development and business, and regain political subjectivity and international “clout”.

between 1993 and 2010, the level of European contribution to world GDP (purchasing power being equal) decreased from 26% to 21%, against an increase in the Chinese contribution from 5% to 13%;24

Europe has the opportunity to relaunch relations with Africa (as well as its own development and global “clout”)

the European population, which was 22% of the world total in 1950, is now (2010) 11%; in 2050 it will be 8%;25

19. The world is changing with a gradual shifting of the political/economic center of gravity away from the West. In 2010:

between 1990 and 2008, Europe-Africa trade declined from 57% to 38% of the total, while trade between Africa and the “South” of the world grew, from 17% to 39%.26

the emerging economies contributed the same amount as developed countries to world GDP and 3/4 of the growth;

21. It is the general opinion that this trend will continue in the near future, if all remains equal.

“South-South” trade was 38% of the world total, establishing an alternate axis to that of the “North”.

20. Europe is in relative decline in its relations with Africa and, more generally, in the international system as a whole: Figure 10 – Distribution of global power; 100 = overall world power (Source: US National Intelligence Council, 2011)

Figure 8 – World trade in 2000; billions of dollars (Source: The European House-Ambrosetti)

Figure 9 – World trade in 2010; billions of dollars (Source: The European House-Ambrosetti) By 2050, Europe will be short 48 million workers with destabilizing effects on the economy and welfare state. Source: European Commission.

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22. The North African crisis found Europe unprepared (it was thinking “only” of the immigration problem) and it caused a crisis of legitimacy within the EU, putting the spotlight on its differences. While the Arab world is shaken by new political demands, Europe seems incapable of taking the initiative (as a unified body) and taking on the role its position and history would ask of it. This represents a potential strategic “own goal”.

Source: World Bank.

Source: World Population Prospect, 2011.

26 Source: World Trade Organization, Chatham House.

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23. Management of the North African transition is an opportunity for Europe to reaffirm its proposal for partnership to the Mediterranean and Africa. These two aspects cannot be separated given the interrelationship between the economic and social dynamics of the two areas, both between each other and with Europe.

France relaunched its strategy of power (also as a way of counter-balancing the weight of Germany within the EU), offering itself to Africa as a provider of peace and security and taking an increasingly independent position in international gatherings, with unilateral actions that exploit the privileged relations it has with its former colonies.

24. In implementing the geopolitical plan, starting from the contingent events in North Africa, there are two opposed negative results Europe should avoid:

Driven by predominantly commercial interests, since 2000 in particular, Germany has re-defined the strategic concept of its relations with Africa, focusing in particular on multilateralism and the adoption of an African strategy within the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy – CFSP (also to thwart the autonomous ambitions of France).

i. “Convergence” between the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa and its separation from Europe, in other words, the prevailing of the “Islam vector” (including radical elements) which would feed programmatic separation from Western “corruption” and would facilitate penetration of other political and economic players into the African continent.

Also in order to defend its bilateral trade interests,27 Great Britain is only marginally involved in the intricate French-German footwork in their disagreement over African policies, while generally aligning itself with the view from across the Atlantic tied to the US desire to oppose Chinese expansion into Africa.

ii. “Convergence” of the Maghreb with Europe and a distancing of Africa, in other words the prevailing of the “EuroMediterranean vector” that would accentuate the ungluing of Africa from Europe through the gradual inclusion of the Maghreb within it (economically and through trade rather than political or institutional means). This way, Europe would lose Africa under the illusion that greater integration and enhanced coordination of the policies of Europe and the Maghreb would be sufficient to revitalize and put in order the prospects for development of both areas.

25. With the alternative being a bicontinental dialogue consisting of bilateral relationships which often perpetuate the old colonial ties, Europe must avoid the sticky problem of national interests and internal interests that have emerged forcefully from events in North Africa:

Italy, which has traditionally aimed at maintaining its privileged relationship with its former colonies28 and supply of strategic commodities at competitive prices, today suffers the effects of the lack of broad-ranging, incisive policies that is only partially counter-balanced by the actions of industrial and other private parties.

26. Reconfiguration of relations between the two shores of the Mediterranean cannot be limited to merely putting a brake on Over 20 billion pounds starting in 2009. Source: Corporate Africa, “UK-Africa trade accelerates”, 2010.

28 Somalia, Eritrea through Ethiopia and Libya.

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migration. Common, broad-ranging and long-term strategies are needed on a number of related levels: political, economic and cultural. This transcends the context of bilateral relations between individual countries.

a “next-door neighbor” and natural partner in the defense against impending risks (radical Islam, waves of migration, political instability, etc.); a market for exports and commodity and energy supplies, consumer goods and investment;

27. Individual European states do not have the “critical mass” (economic resources, political influence, global “reach”, etc.) to undertake incisive action with Africa and other competitors outside Europe. In our global world, competition plays out on the level of continental systems. Action towards Africa must necessarily be European-wide.

28. The geopolitical interests of Europe (consolidate itself as an entity and acquire the ability to maneuver as a primary player) and Africa (stabilize and integrate itself in order to develop and acquire political and economic independence) could find a winning and mutually advantageous synthesis in a North-South integration model that is an alternative to the South-South one.

29. For Africa, Europe is: a “next-door neighbor” as a destination point and cultural “humus”; a potential political-institutional partner not interested in seeing Africa fragmented29 and as a possible point-ofreference for the new political demand emerging in North Africa (see paragraph 4); a more “accessible” economic/industrial partner with a synergic economic/production model (integration of supply chains and orientation towards SMEs, economic/customs agreements and support for economic regionalization).

30. For Europe, Africa is: The process of pan-African integration does not form a part of the interests of other international players (Chinese, Brazilian, Indian, etc.).

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an opportunity to get back into the geopolitical game because of the “withdrawal” of the United States and to oppose China.

4. Europe must make Africa winning geopolitical offer

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31. Europe’s strategy towards Africa has evolved over time30, but the efficacy of its action has run up against structural limits: Three phases: 1) 1960-1989 (the era of “development”) with the Yaoundé I (1961) and II (1975), Lomé I (1975), II (1979) and III (1984) conventions. The focus of the action was the launching of the North-South cooperation model with a system of preferential trade and initial development funding, application of liberal economic models for Africa (no political strings and “development” as a weapon against Communism) and the first separation of policies for the Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan Africa; 2) 1989/90-2000 (the era of “democratization”), marked by the Lomé IV convention (1989), the Barcelona Process (1995) and the Cotonou agreement (2000), the primary innovations being the introduction of social and cultural cooperation and protection of human rights as a central element for stability and development, adoption of a system of conditional aid, and separation of policies for the Maghreb and Africa; 3) 2000/1-present (era of "partnership") as seen in the Cairo Summit (2000), European Neighbourhood Policy-ENP (2004), Africa-EU Joint Strategy-AEJS (2006) and the Lisbon (2006) and Sirte (2010) summits.

Among the characteristic elements: good governance and resolution of political aspects at the center of the new Africa-EU Joint Strategy, on-going aid on the basis of country performance, push for African regionalism (AU/NEPAD), and the principle of “Treat Africa as one” (ENP countries inserted into the AEJS negotiating process).

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i. Lack of “European” leadership (“one voice”), with fragmentation of initiatives, policies and strategies and existing relations managed primarily on a bilateral basis (see paragraph 25).

iii. mark a definitive break with the colonial stereotype.

ii. Lack of a real “African” policy, that has

hardened the dichotomy of the structure of Europe-Maghreb and Europe-SubSaharan Africa relations,31 failing to grasp the strategic dimension of Africa as a continent (while necessarily recognizing the structural diversities of the two areas) and missing the opportunity for convergence of African and European economic structures.

iii. Implementation problems, with coordination difficulties between the different governance levels (member states, EU commissions, society at-large) lack of integration between levels of action and funds not channeled effectively.

32. The increased penetration of Africa by non-European players challenges the (European) conviction that the cornerstone of African development must necessarily lie in relations with Europe.

33. Europe must convince Africa by offering a political formula – a “European Consensus” – that is an alternative to the proposals of other geopolitical players. This formula must: i. be credible and advantageous for Africa (as well as for Europe);

Figure 11 – The “race” for Africa: primary nonEuropean players and lines of penetration

34. The final objectives of the European action to benefit the win-win relationships with Africa must be to: i. Stabilize Africa and its institutions. ii. Allow Africa to gain “critical mass” (by initiating integration processes) to oppose the interests of non-European countries and fragment these interests.

iii. Position

Europe as the politicalinstitutional partner of Africa.

iv. Create a bi-continental economic area.

35. To meet these objectives, Europe must focus on (guidelines):

ii. exploit bilateral relationships;

Starting from the process of independence, Europe made a conceptual and strategic differentiation between the two sub-regions of North Africa and SubSaharan Africa, placing the former within the context of Mediterranean policies and the latter in a long process which, starting from the Treaty of Rome, included Africa with the context of a common strategy for Pacific and Caribbean countries (ACP).

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i. Providing help in creating states and institutions (state-building) irrespective32 of the political system of the partner countries (low institutional performance

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The tendency to “impose” European values as-is without taking into consideration the actual African demand should be avoided. This is an attitude which, over time, has not shown itself to be effective.

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of African states is one of the main impediments to development). ii. Promoting regionalism (and the prospect of “continentalization”) in Africa33 (the regionalization of their economies is not just a trend, it is the only real way to compete in the global international economic system). iii. Economic integration of Europe and Africa to create a co-development area. iv. Taking strategic advantage of migratory flows. v. Strategic relations.

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36. These guidelines are coherent with the goals and lines of action of the African Union (created in 2002) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development – NEPAD (launched in 2001).34 37. Europe must act on three levels: i. Political, by formalizing a “Common Europe-Africa Pact for Growth” that calls for providing Africa a number of great projects in four areas of intervention key for the EU: transport, telecommunications, energy and youth.

Cooperation,35 designed to create an environment favorable to the promotion of European investments, experimental industrialization pilot projects and stimulus for local business (private initiative and SMEs as a driver for growth and employment). iii. Social, starting from a European migration policy (currently managed primarily on a national basis with fragmentation of the legaladministrative systems and political differences between member states) and the creation of a European Migration Agency to promote regular strategic management of mobility (and the benefits this entails), thus defusing the political/humanitarian “bomb” and triggering a positive circle for Europe and Africa, while building a EuroAfrican identity.36 38. Policy determines geography: it can create opportunities, just as it can create problems. It is up to decision-makers to seize the moments offered by history.

ii. Economic, including through promotion in Africa (by negotiating with individual countries) of special-status Zones for Euro-African Economic-Industrial The main obstacles for Africa in the process of regional integration are: 1) differences in the economic structures of the various countries; 2) lack of diversification in exports that almost exclusively consist of agricultural products, minerals and commodities ("resource curse"); 3) lack of infrastructure; and 4) political instability, corruption and wars.

34 Both operate around a central goal – unity – and two principles: democratization and good governance conceived as basic pre-conditions for the launching of stable, long-term development. The African Union has the additional goal of the economic integration of Africa.

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Among the proposals are: a) legal independence; .b) observation of law and promotion of legality and transparency including in supra-national control authorities; c) incentives and guarantees of financial return for companies through providing funds and financing.

36 The agency would be a further evolution of FRONTEX, until now the EU’s operational arm for migration with the task of “defending” its borders according to a “passive” approach. See The European House-Ambrosetti position paper “Migrazioni e mobilità: una gestione strategica comune tra Europa e Africa”, 2011.

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