Migration

EVA THINK TANK TAORMINA FORUM

Migration and mobility: joint strategic management between Europe and Africa

Position Paper “Developing the Regions of Africa and Europe” Project Taormina Forum, October 6-7, 2011

 By modifying migratory flows between Europe, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, the events in North Africa have brought to the fore the limits of European politics in managing a phenomenon on a bi-continental scale.  The EU must take advantage of this situation to adopt a common migration policy that reflects a long-term strategy capable of taking into account world economic and demographic trends.  Proper regulation of European-African migration must occur within a win-win policy on a bi-continental scale that provides for the strategic management of migratory flows and places center-stage African economic development and employment.  New operational proposals must be developed, such as the creation of a European Migration Agency which would be an outgrowth of FRONTEX.

Prepared on the basis of the results of research carried out for the Fondazione Banco di Sicilia by The European House-Ambrosetti, in collaboration with the Comunità di Sant’Egidio.

The events currently under way in North Africa have revolutionized the dynamics of the migratory system between Europe and Africa, sharpening social and political tensions.

2. Since the beginning of the so called “Arab Spring” at the end of 2010: As of August 2011, the landings on European shores (virtually all in Italy) have exceeded 52,000 individuals1;

Existing European and African migration policies have generally shown themselves to be inadequate: the EU’s “passive” block does not allow for effective management of mobility, including within the context of medium- and long-term demographic and economic needs, and Africa is basically unprepared to handle the overall complexity of the phenomenon.

on the African side, the war in Libya alone has caused nearly 900,000 people to emigrate from the country2 (see figure 1).

Adoption of a common European policy regarding migration is the necessary strategic step towards managing emergency situations in a more effective manner and capitalizing on mobility on a bi-continental level, which could also benefit Africa.

Taking as its starting point the processes triggered by the revolutions in North Africa, this document will examine European-African migratory dynamics and their strategic implications, while proposing a new approach for European policy and the creation of a European Migration Agency that would represent the evolution of the current FRONTEX agency as the EU operational instrument for meeting these objectives.

1. The events under way in North Africa have revolutionized the “Europe – North Africa – SubSaharan Africa” migratory system

Figure 1 – Focus on Libya: impact on intra-African migration (Source: The European House-Ambrosetti based on Comunità di Sant’Egidio data)

3. The flows have had an impact both upand downstream of the Europe –North Africa – Sub-Saharan Africa systemic chain.

4. Downstream (in Africa) the reorganization currently underway has modified the regional migratory status quo, thus opening new routes between transit and destination countries, while initiating a transformation in the migratory profile of the North African region and the entire continent.

5. Upstream (on the European side), the landings have created internal tensions in member states, and on a EU-wide level have:

1. The events in North Africa have modified the mobility dynamics along the Europe-Africa axis, creating tensions (particularly in Europe) and waves of migration (particularly in Africa).

revealed the problematic areas in crisis management, detention facilities and repatriation procedures;

1

Source: UNHCR. Comunità di Sant’Egidio, 2011.

2 Source:

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emergency situations in the past.5 The interest generated by the situation in North Africa is more connected to the strategic nature of the region within the Mediterranean and African migratory circuit, than to “quantitative” considerations. In fact, the processes under way have underscored the role played by the Maghreb over the last twenty years as a:

exacerbated the cultural and political nature of the debate in Europe on the immigration issue, accentuating the fear of an “African invasion”; highlighted the contradictions in migration policies structured around bilateral agreements of containment/blockage of flows;3 caused the emergence of EC tensions over sharing the burden of the emergency, calling into question the cornerstones of the Schengen Treaty.4

i. bridge for immigration from Africa towards Europe; ii. restrictive “safety cordon” for African migratory flows; iii. central intersection point for intraAfrican migration because of its role as a pole of internal migration.

Figure 2 – Immigrants landed in Italy as of August 2011 (Source: The European House-Ambrosetti based on Italian Interior Ministry and UNHCR data)

6.

From a historical perspective, the number of people landing in Europe following the so-called “Arab Spring” is lower than in

For example, the 2003 Spain-Morocco accords, the agreements signed with Tunisia starting in 2000 and Italian-Libyan relations between 2004 and 2008. The bilateral pacts mentioned provide for controls by the North Africa countries in exchange for economic aid (390 million to Tunisia) and investment (5 billion euros negotiated between Gaddafi and the Italian government in the Italy-Libya Friendship Treaty).

4 French-Italian relations felt the effects of crossborder pressures which were solved by the proposal to modify the Schengen Treaty. The two countries wrote a joint letter in which it was proposed to lower the restrictions for adopting measures to close national borders in the event of emergency.

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7. Immigration is a complex interrelational issue between Europe, North Africa and SubSaharan Africa. The emergency in North Africa and its impact on Africa highlight the need for Europe to comprehend (and regulate) the interrelationships between migration, political stability and economic growth on the African continent.

8. The fluidity of the current situation opens the way for a reconfiguration of the EU’s migration policies following canons of enhanced efficiency and transparency – as well as the role and relationship with Africa as a copartner in the process.

2. African migration is primarily an intra-continental phenomenon with dynamics that are differentiated and complex 9. The processes at work in North Africa have highlighted the necessity to fully 5

For example, in the first few months of the Balkan War, Germany alone was forced to accept 350,000 refugees in just a few months.

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comprehend the logic behind mobility within the continent in order to evaluate the economic, political and social impacts on a continental, European and international level.

90% of migrants in West Africa migrate towards neighboring countries and the same is true for 65% of migrants in Southern Africa and 50% of those in Central Africa; lower, but still significant percentages were recorded for East Africa (46.6%) and North Africa (20.6%).9

10. African migrants show limited international mobility while displaying high rates of internal mobility; according to the World Bank6: migrants of African origin throughout the world (including those both in Africa and resident abroad) are 30.6 million and represent 3% of the African population; African migrants (including foreigners resident on the continent) are 19 million, 9% of the world's migrant population.

11. Over the last twenty years, African migration has increased, but the continent continues to have low levels of external immigration, except for some (often small) countries where it is over 10%7.

12. The African continent is a “system of regional migratory systems”: 53% of total African migrants move along intra-continental routes (see figure 3); if taken separately from North Africa – the region in which 90% of migrants choose to emigrate to other continents – Sub-Saharan Africa is the most mobile area on the continent (65% of SubSaharan migrants move along internal routes, compared with 59% in Europe and 55% in Asia8);

Estimates regarding African migration are limited by the lack of a precise, continent-wide data base. The figures in this section have been taken from the World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix 2011.

7 Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, the Seychelles, Sao Tome and Principe, Lesotho and Mali. Source: Ratha, D. et al.(2011), Leveraging Migration for Africa, World Bank.

8 Source: World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix 2011.

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Figure 3 - Intra-African migration (Source: The European House-Ambrosetti based on World Bank data, 2010)

13. The phenomenon of intra-African migration is constantly changing. The routes change, following in the wake of continental economic growth and conflicts in progress.

Internal instability and differences in growth between countries constitute the two main driving forces of mobility on the continent.

14. There exist traditional “hubs” for continental migration: Libya, Nigeria, Ivory Coast,10 Tanzania and South Africa.11 Alongside these, other countries are emerging that are becoming new reception points:

Source: Shimeles, A. (2010) Migration Patterns, Trends and Policy Issues in Africa, African Development Bank Group, Working Paper no.119, December 2010.

10 2.4 million migrants, 11.2% of the population.

11 Source: Comunità di Sant’Egidio, 2011.

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Ghana, which in just a few years has arrived at hosting 1.8 million migrants, 7.5% of the total population (the same percentage as Italy); Mozambique, which from being a country with a historically high level of emigration to South Africa (also due to the 1976-1992 war) today attracts increasing numbers of migrants, thanks to levels of economic growth over 8%;12 Morocco, which, starting in the late 1990s, has shifted from being a transit country for migration towards Europe and one of high emigration, is gradually becoming a point of destination;13

Saharan migrants going towards Morocco, Libya and Europe.14 16. The reasons behind migration from and within the continent are diversified and depend on whether the push to migrate originates with factors of political/environmental instability or the search for better economic conditions:

i. Refugees. In Africa there are 11 million,

about one third of the world population of refugees; of these, 2 million fall into the category of political refugees15 and 1 million that of environmental refugees.16

ii. IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons). eople forced to leave their homes for environmental and political reasons, but who continue to live in their native countries. Of the 27 million IDPs in the world, almost half live in Africa (in Sudan alone there are nearly 2 million, in Somalia 1.5 million and in the Ivory Coast 320,000).17

Gabon, which since 2008 has been considered one of the new internal migration centers (as shown by the continued landings on its shores); Kenya, which is particularly hit by refugee flows (350,000 according to 2010 UNHCR estimates; with the current crisis in the Horn of Africa, these flows are expected to rise).

iii. Economic

migrants.

There are approximately 9 million in Africa, motivated by the desire/necessity to find a better economic/employment situation.18

As well as being very strong areas of illegal traffic.

According to the UN definition, a refugee is anyone “who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the country of his former habitual residence […].”

16 A generally-accepted definition of this type of migrant has yet to be developed. It involves flows of people who can no longer guarantee themselves the means of sustenance in their home countries due to adverse environmental factors (drought, soil erosion, desertification, deforestation, floods and earthquakes).

17 Source: Comunità di Sant’Egidio based on 2011 World Bank data.

18 For example, female workers from Morocco who work in France earn 16 times what they would in 14 15

Figure 4 – Migration in West Africa (Source: Comunità di Sant’Egidio)

15. A significant role in the African migratory circuit is played by Sahel countries: Niger and Mali are transit zones for Sub-

Referring to the period 1993-2008.

This phenomenon involves above all the cities of Fez and Casablanca..

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17. The destination of intra-African migratory flows is primarily cities. By 2020, it is estimated that 50% of the African population will live in urban centers, with explosive effects on social, housing, environmental and infrastructure sustainability.

19. Migration has a two-fold aspect for Africa (and for the world). It constitutes both a driver for development (if backed by adequate strategies and policies)and a source of emergencies and deprivation of human capital (if not managed or inadequately managed).

20. As a driver for growth, migrants:

18. Migration is also an economic phenomenon. The remittances of African migrants:

are a stable source of income for their home countries, making a significant contribution in the fight against poverty;

total 40 billion dollars (at 2010 values), contributing 4.2% to the GDP of North Africa and 2.5% of Sub-Saharan Africa; they are the second largest flow of funds towards the continent after foreign direct investment (52 billion dollars in 202019); they are a fundamental element in the economic support of many countries (for example, in Lesotho, they are 30% of GDP,20 and even in major countries such as Senegal and Morocco, they amount to more than 8%)21.

provide support for trade and investment in their home countries; constitute a resource with major potential in terms of the transfer of skills and technology.

21. As a “crisis” factor, the effects can destabilize entire regional areas. On an African level, just the “brain drain” (without considering the economic and social costs associated with other crises), costs the continent 4 billion dollars per year (UNDP estimates). The phenomenon is dramatic: each year, professionals;22

Africa

loses

20,000

one out of every eight African college graduates lives in an OECD country;23 three-quarters of the 211,00024 college students who each year choose to study abroad do not return to their home countries.25 Figure 5 – Remittances and other sources of financing (Source: The European House-Ambrosetti based on World Bank Global Development Finance, 2010 database)

22. Africa needs to reconfigure its migration policies to regulate the entry of refugees, build This diaspora of professionals makes it necessary to seek skilled personnel outside of Africa: each year in Africa, 100,000 foreign professionals are hired for a total cost of 4 billion dollars.

23 6 of the 10 countries with the highest percentage of college graduates who live abroad are African.

24 Above all France, the United States, England and Germany. The flow towards China is growing (21,000 in 2010).

25 Source: Comunità di Sant’Egidio, 2011.

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their own country, and the men about six times more.

The wages of immigrants from Algeria and Tunisia are four to eight times higher.

19 Source: UNCTAD. 20 Source: Comunità di Sant’Egidio based on 2011 IMF data.

21 Ibid.

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on the positive impacts of economic migration and minimize the negative ones.

3. Immigration from Africa into Europe is overestimated and there are some “myths” to be discredited

25. In many European countries, even those with a history of African immigration, the African communities (with the exception of some North African ones) do not constitute the majority of the immigrant population: In France – the most attractive country for African immigrants (1.8 million, 35% of total immigrants) – the Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian communities are the largest, while Sub-Saharan immigrants are only 12% of the total.

23. The emergency in North Africa has generated new fears and reinforced the perception of an “African invasion”. At the start of the uprisings in the Maghreb, the European press hypothesized that the changes in the region would have generated the landing of between 500,000 and 1.5 million people.

In Italy – a country that plays a key role as the hinge between Europe and Africa – the number of African immigrants decreased by 13% between 1992 and 2009, dropping from 35.1% to 20% of the total immigrant population.

24. The figures regarding immigrant communities in Europe contradict this perception and reveal a very different situation: in the EU27, over 50% of foreign citizens are of European origin26, while migrants from Africa are the 15%.27

In Spain – a country where African immigration is more recent – immigrants from that continent are 1.2 million, but Sub-Saharan immigrants are just slightly over 240,000, 3.5% of total immigrants.

26. The costs and risks involved in reaching Europe are a barrier to migratory flows from Africa, especially the Sub-Sahara: the journey lasts 2-3 years with many stops along the way (especially in Sudan and Libya);

Figure 6 – Main routes towards Europe (Source: The European House-Ambrosetti based on World Bank data, 2010) The largest immigrants communities in Europe are Turkish (2,5 million), Romanian (over 2 million) and Italian (1,4 million). Source: Comunità di Sant’Egidio.

27 24.

Europe is still the primary destination for immigration outside of Africa, especially for North Africans (7.3 million, 29.4% of total African immigrants)while Sub-Saharan citizens comprise a minority of immigrants from Africa (11% of the total immigrant population). Source: Eurostat 2011.

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the cost of the boat trip is between 1,000 and 2,000 euros (an amount often several times the average annual wage); 27. estimates of the number of people who have died or gone missing in the Mediterranean from 1990 to the present are 17,597.28

28

Source: Comunità di Sant’Egidio

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significant contribution to global wealth and China alone will carry weight equivalent to that of Europe and the United States. 31

Figure 7– Dead and missing in the Mediterranean (Source: Comunità di Sant’Egidio, 2011)

28. African immigration to Europe primarily involves the younger age brackets of the population29 of middle-income countries in African terms and with an education above primary school level.30 This refutes yet another commonly-held belief that migration from Africa consists of people who are "desperate".

4. Global demographic and economic scenarios make it necessary to reconfigure European and African migration strategies 29. Global migration scenarios are in the process of changing due to the shifting of the world's economic center of gravity from the West to the East and the demographic trends currently in progress.

30. The transformation of the world's economic balances of power will change the poles of attraction for immigrants very rapidly. Already in 2010, 75% of GDP growth was produced by emerging countries. In 2015, the emerging economies will be making a The average age of African immigrants is 32.3 years, compared with the European average age of 40.6 years. Source: Comunità di Sant’Egidio 2011.

30 Source: OECD Global Migration Outlook 2011.

29

Figure 8 – Breakdown of world GDP, comparison 19922015 (Source: The European House-Ambrosetti reelaboration of IMF and WEF data, 2011)

31. The collapse of the birthrate and aging of the population in Europe, North America and Asia will push countries to compete to attract immigrants. There will be a shortage in the working age population (see figure 8) which will have profound impact on the management of the economies in developed and emerging countries.

32. By 2050, given current trends, the deficit of the global population of working age will be an estimated 200 million people. Only 15% of this will be able to be met by immigration,32 which will make it even more urgent and difficult to rely on external employment “reservoirs”.

The year in which China will overtake the GDP of the United States is being constantly moved up. This should take place in 2020 and there are those who say that by 2030 the Chinese economy will wield the same economic weight globally as the US in the 1970s.

32 Source: Shimbeles 2010.

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2050 (669 million people will be of working age).

Figure 9 – Percentage of the population of working age (20-65) in the various regions of the world (Source: UN 2010)

35. In terms of migration, this will also have effects on Africa. Without an acceleration in GDP that could offer new employment opportunities, the continent will be hit by flows towards countries with higher growth and African countries that are stronger economically. This will mean negative consequences on social stability and accumulation of human capital by many African countries.

36. In light of these scenarios34, Europe and African have complementary needs: Europe needs to attract immigrants on a selective basis over the medium-term (thus facing growing international competition) and, at the same time, limit emergency or illegal flows from Africa.

33. This phenomenon will be felt especially in Europe where the demographic gap of 91 million inhabitants from now to 2050 (Figure 9) will begin to be felt in 2018. In 2050, there will be a shortfall of 48 million workers.33 Without significant migratory flows, these trends will make sustainability of the economy and welfare system extremely problematic.

Africa needs to regulate internal and external migratory flows, design action models to limit the negative effects of the brain drain and prepare action plans for how to accommodate refugees on a continent-wide scale.

37. The policies offered by both continents are not coherent with the needs outlined above.

38. The limits of the efficacy of the European initiative can be traced to: Inadequacy of the currently-existing institutional framework. Migration issues are handled by the Home Affairs Commission from a perspective that is largely "preventive" in terms of illegal immigration and in strict correlation with security and anti-terrorism policies.

Figure 9 – EU27 population (Source: The European House-Ambrosetti elaboration of Eurostat data)

34. Africa will be one of the few continental areas – together with southern Asia – where there will be a surplus of working age population. The so-called “African population bomb” will mean a doubling of the population between 14 and 65 years of age from now to 33

Source: Eurostat 2010.

By 2050 the African inhabitants will be 2 billion, while the European population will represent only 7% of world population, composed for one third of elderly people, Africans will be young (even today the average age is 18, against 43 in Europe). Source: UN 34

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integration, regional economic organizations (COMESA, ECOWAS, EEC, SACU and SADEC), as well as even the African Union and NEPAD do not have available trans-frontier tools and plans to manage regular and emergency migratory flows.

Fragmentation of the legal-administrative systems. Despite a number of attempts currently in progress to bring them into line,35 the differences between national legislative systems block any truly EUwide initiative regarding migration.

Limited operational tools. FRONTEX,36 the only EU-wide tool, operates on the basis of “passive� measures of simple border control that do not take into consideration aspects of normal planning and management of migratory flows.

Political differences between member states.

The intrinsically political nature of the immigration issue and its overlap with the social and economic policies of each state make it difficult to act on a communitywide basis.

39. On an African level, the problems involving management of migratory flows are even broader. The need for coordination between countries is even greater given the extent of intra-continental migratory flows.

Among the basic limitations are: Lack of legal-institutional support on a nationwide level. In fact, only a small number of governments have developed and implemented tools for regulating flows of immigrants and refugees.

Lack of operational plans for supra-national management. Although they promote greater continental and regional Some progress has been made (Tampere Programme / Hague Programme / Stockholm Programme) in terms of harmonizing legislation regarding family reunification, flows of skilled immigrants and procedures regarding granting of political asylum, but often they are directives which, for the moment, have little operational relevance.

36 The European agency that oversees international cooperation at foreign borders. Created in 2004, FRONTEX is headquartered in Warsaw and is involved in checks, patrols and monitoring of external borders, joint repatriation operations and providing crisis intervention groups in emergency situations.

40. For both continents, the growth of Africa and its political stabilization constitute the strategic "recipe" for regulating (in Africa) and controlling (in Europe) immigration from the southern shore of the Mediterranean.

41. The limitations of European and African policies regarding migration must lead to a reconfiguration of the European migration strategy that is capable of solving the contradictions of current plans and is able through the inclusion of migration policies in broader plans of bi-continental cooperation of creating win-win policies for the two continents.

5. Towards a common migration policy and a European Migration Agency 42. Migration is a complex issue that requires EU-wide management and governance for long-term strategic planning.37 43. Europe must adopt a common migration policy which, in line with the most recent official declarations,38 is based on: i. elaboration of a strategic approach to relations with third party countries regarding migration, mobility and security;

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For Europe, this is essential for the common market to function correctly.

38 Source: Justice and Home Affairs Council. Brussels, May 12, 2011, European Parliament Resolution dated April 5, 2011.

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ii. development of an overall migration strategy which takes into consideration the requirements of the domestic market, the capacity of each state to accept immigrants and the needs of partner countries.

44. Elaboration of a common migration policy conforms with the goals established by the European Commission in 2006 and the Lisbon Treaty39 to: i. facilitate demographic renewal; ii. promote employment; iii. facilitate European productivity and dynamism;

human capital, economic growth and innovation.

46. European policy regarding migration must be supported by suitable and coherent operational tools structured to attain the goals outlined above.

47. Based on the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality between member states and the EU, FRONTEX needs to be transformed into a European Agency for Migration and Mobility41 which, following a logic of “active management” and taking into account the prerogatives of individual European countries in this area, would have among its main tasks:

iv. welcome and integrate immigrants in Europe, by also putting a brake on illegal traffic;

creation of a unified entry system on a European level42 (currently, similar mechanisms are operative in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Denmark, but they function in different ways and modes);

v. guarantee sustainable public finances from generation-to-generation.40 45. Specifically in terms of Europe-Africa relations, the adoption of a common migration policy must be aimed at managing flows on a bi-continental level, with win-win impacts: In Europe: it will lead to defusing a political/social “bomb”, thus satisfying long-term strategic needs and contributing to the relaunching of Europe-Africa relations.

For Africa: a common European migration policy will be linked to the implementation of measures supporting governments and supra-national bodies in the creation of coordinated migration policies.

In both continents, the new migration policy will guarantee the activation of a “positive mobility circle” in terms of Source: COM (2006), 571 final.

One of the problems resulting from a shortage in the working age population is that of being able to sustain the current model of public spending.

39 40

planning of migratory flows negotiation of country quotas;

and

calculation of European requirements by country/business sector for the creation of a unified waiting list (with the possibility of indicating preferences) to meet the The Agency as established by Art. 3 of the Maastricht Treaty, would operate to the extent to which: “the goals of its action "cannot be performed to a sufficient extent by member states, either on a national or regional and local level but which, due to the extent or effects of the action in question, could be better carried out on a Union-wide level”.

42The pioneer country in this area was Canada which was the first to adopt this type of system in 1967. In the United Kingdom and Denmark, the point system entered into force in 2008 and in the Netherlands in 2009. This system assigns points to each applicant on the basis of a series of criteria established on a national basis and requires a minimum threshold for admittance. Briefly, the characteristics evaluated fall into 5 areas: level of instruction, professional and specialist training, work history and income and knowledge of the language of the country of immigration.

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demand for manpower not covered by recruitment by name from individual countries;43

acting as a control room for on-going bicontinental management of regular and emergency flows;

negotiation with member countries of annual solidarity quotas (refugees, etc.);

increase in protection of migrants and refugees, including through combating illegal traffic;

management, relocation and transfer of refugees and displaced persons.44 preparation and study migration programs”.45

of

“circular

48. To render the goal of managing flows on a bi-continental scale concrete, Africa must be actively involved and the Agency must be a reference point and partner for Africa. From this standpoint, there must be an organized network of Agency offices in those areas of maximum strategic importance, organized on two levels:

create co-responsibility of the migrant’s home country and transit country in adopting development aid, investment, state-building and training policies; create a direct point-of-reference for European companies; promote initiatives to combat the negative effects of the brain drain in Africa.

hubs in internal migration centers and points of transit towards Europe (e.g., Morocco, Ghana, Kenya and Mozambique); info-points in the home countries of migrants (e.g., Somalia, West Africa) to provide potential immigrants with information about the process for entering European countries.46

% IMMIGRANTS

49. Among the major benefits the Agency offers Europe and Africa are: Incoming migratory flows would be managed in such a way as to respect the workforce needs of member states and leaving to them the decision of how to utilize recruitment by name.

44 This would guarantee a decrease in illegal immigrant traffic.

45 By this is meant temporary migration programs that meet the needs of the destination market and the willingness of migrants to return to their home countries. Circular migration programs are the result of European experience. In fact, it was Germany who first used them in the 1960s and 1970s with Italian and Turkish workers.

46 This could help to combat the traffic of illegal immigrants that is closely tied to the lack of information available to aspiring African immigrants.

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Figure 10 – Operational structure of the European Migration Agency: regional/local hubs

50. A common European policy for migration and mobility with its “operational branch” being the European Agency is a strategic step that Europe, together with Africa, must take to transform the migration crisis into an opportunity for joint development and growth, including on a cultural level.

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