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FRIENDS FEEDBACK
We received quite a bit of feedback on the stories in our Summer issue…
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS ALERT
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We owe the author of this story an apology — we listed him as Don, when he should have been listed correctly as Maj Delmar Pullins, USAF (Ret).
We also received a correction to wording in that same story. Capt Larry Robinson noted that the Genie (AIR-2) was a rocket, not a missile. “It’s the only question I missed at Block 8 in Munitions Offi cer School,” he added. Thank you for the note, Larry. We apologize for the error but are glad to know we were in good company.
TESTING AIRMUNITIONS DAVE CHATFIELD WROTE:
USAF photo
“On page 15, in the piece by Don Boldt, a reference about the Snark missile reminded me of a story from my days at the Cape during Mace B launch crew training. Our launch pads 21 and 22 were close to the Snark launch pads and I recall the diffi culty in launching the Snark — as the article stated, the intercontinental cruise missile was so big it required two solid rocket boosters, one on each side for launch, which had to ignite at precisely the same instant and with identical thrust or the missile would pinwheel — which happened numerous times, causing the missiles to crash offshore into the water. The area became known as ‘Snark infested waters.’”
FORTRESSES ON THE DECK ONE OF OUR EAGLE-EYED READERS, LT COL GARY HOE, USAF (RET), WROTE:
“In the Summer 2022 Journal, there is a picture of the YB-17 on page 41. There are no visible insignia or other easy identifi er, but the propeller blades look like they are set to turn clockwise when viewed from the front (as in the picture). That is the opposite direction from how they actually turned. Was that picture printed backwards?” Good catch, Gary. The photo was inadvertently fl ipped during production.
THE FLIGHT ENGINEER AND THE NOSE WHEEL
Several readers wrote to share that they had used the Dzus tool in the Collection Connection piece on page 50.
MSGT BILL BROCKMAN, USAF (RET) COMMENTED:
“We used these tools a lot on the F-15’s. I can’t recall the F-105’s or F-4’s using them. Later, working on B-1B’s and F-16C/D’s, I never saw one since they didn’t use the type fasteners. We called them “Snoopy tools.” Perhaps you can see why. I never heard of Dzus tool until I saw your picture.”
AND DAVID BRAGG, A RETIRED AF CREW CHIEF, WROTE:
“Some people still used these in the early 1970s, when I was in aircraft maintenance. F-4 guys called it a “Snoopy” because it looked like Charlie Brown’s dog.” ☛
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IGLOO WHITE
The article about Operation Igloo White, by Steve Umland, garnered more feedback than any article we have published in recent years. The comments were from participants whose involvement covered a range of roles in the operation.
DELMAR PULLINS, WHO ALSO HAD A STORY IN THE LAST ISSUE, WROTE:
“In early 1968 I was assigned to fl y the A-1E with the 1st Air Commando Squadron out of Pleiku AB in South Vietnam. Prior to my arrival the squadron moved to Nakhon Phanom AB (NKP) in Thailand. Upon my arrival I learned that our primary mission was putting mines in Laos and escorting the helicopters that were placing the sensors in the areas of the mines.
These missions were almost all over the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and were fl own by A-1E aircraft and helicopters. The initial pilots in the squadron were almost all seasoned pilots and fl ying in their 2nd or 3rd war. The younger pilots in the squadron (I was one) listened and learned from the old heads.
“The squadron had developed a unique method to put the mines in place. They called it a “Swoop”, (which I will explain later). A mission involved 4 mine layers, two escorts, and a forward air controller (FAC). The mine layers had 6 tubs of mines each. The escorts were A-1E’s armed to suppress any ground fi re the mine layers and helicopters should encounter.
At the briefi ng the FAC was requested to put in a marker where he wanted the mines to start. Then he would just send a marker down range in the direction he wanted the mines to be laid. In the meantime, the Hobo fl ight of layer aircraft would be between 8,000 and 10,000 feet. As the marker went in Lead would call for Hobo flight, “Go trail, push them up and set them up.” Immediately, Lead would roll in to a vertical dive pointed at the starting Pullins marker. Numbers
Pullins
two, three, and four, and the two escorts would follow. This was where the name “Swoop” came about. Lead and those following would level out on the treetops at about 310 knots [about 357 mph]. As soon as our aircraft was level and pointed in the direction the mines were to be laid, we would press the fi re button and empty all our mines in the direction we wanted them to go. Each aircraft would be straight and level for approximately 10 seconds. Then our tubs would be empty and we would pull off target and watch our airspeed drop from 250 to approximately 150 knots [288 to 173 mph]. At this point all of us were jinking to avoid any ground fi re. The next thing we would do was check the box between the seats to see if any lights were on. If any were it meant that “tub” had not emptied and had to be jettisoned. We then looked each other over as we climbed out to make sure there was no battle damage. In the meantime, the escorts would join the FAC and go looking for targets. The maneuver resulting in the vertical dive to put in the mines had been labeled by the squadron as the “Swoop.”
“Later as a tongue in cheek look at the 100-mission patches that were awarded to those who survived 100 missions over North Vietnam the squadron designed a 100-swoop patch. It was awarded to any pilot who survived 100 swoops in the 1st SOS. Of course, none of those were over North Vietnam.
“While I was there, we only lost 3 aircraft putting in mines. One was to ground fi re, and that pilot violated the rule never to attempt mine laying under a cloud deck lower than 5,000 feet. The other two were
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lost when lead turned off of the run between two karsts and was unable to clear the top. One and two collided with the ground with the loss of two aircraft and two men.
“The mines we put in were one of two types. One was shaped like a piece of pie and was about that size. The other was the size of a postage stamp and served as a noise maker. The larger one would take off a tire on a truck and in both cases the noise created was to be transmitted by the sensors so a strike could be sent in on the location of the noise. Although this was done immediately the reaction of a strike mission took too long to be dispatched. Thus, the mine laying and the sensors were not as effective as they could have been.
“We never learned the number of mines put in on a four-plane swoop. They were contained in seven tubes within each tub. Each aircraft carried six tubs. Thus, four aircraft would empty 24 tubs on each swoop. The main safety factor for the pilot was the mines were packed in Freon and did not become active until they dried out. Thus, if your control panel indicated that a particular tub had not emptied it was necessary that you jettison that tub as it could blow up on its own. We continued putting these mines and sensors in until late 1968. “Some ideas work out well, and other times it is just an effort. I was personally never informed of a success with this system.”
MAJ GEN GARY L. CURTIN, USAF (RET), WROTE:
“I enjoyed the Igloo White article in your Summer 2022 edition of Friends Journal. Steven Umland provided an excellent description of the Task Force Alpha/Igloo White operation. However, I want to point out one minor error in his discussion of the evolution of airborne monitoring of the sensors planted on the trail.
“He correctly indicates that the sensors were originally monitored by EC-121 aircraft, which were replaced by QU-22 aircraft. Then he indicates that the monitoring mission was taken over by C-130s flying out of NKP. In fact, the C-130s were part of the 7th Airborne Command and Control Squadron at Udorn RTAFB. The 7th ACCS provided airborne command and control of strike operations along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and also for CIA-sponsored ground operations by Laotian forces in northern Laos. The EC-130E aircraft carried a trailer-like capsule containing the airborne battlestaff and their radio gear. Each mission was 12 hours on orbit over northern Laos or over southern Laos. The day orbit over northern Laos was given callsign ‘Cricket’ and the night orbit was ‘Alley Cat’. The corresponding southern Laos orbits were ‘Hillsboro’ and ‘Moonbeam.’ “In November 1971, a fifth C-130 orbit was added to monitor the Igloo White sensors. Equipment was placed in some additional C-130s that joined the 7th ACCS, although no battlestaff crews were used. Everything was automatically collected and relayed to NKP. The fifth orbit mission had the callsign of ‘Trump.’
“As squadron intelligence officer, I flew on all the orbits, except Trump. The history of the 7th ACCS is one of the USAF’s untold stories, although the mission continued from the Vietnam War through numerous other military operations in Southwest Asia, Europe, and elsewhere. It’s ABCCC mission was finally disbanded in 1991 and the unit designation transferred to the Looking Glass mission flown out of Offutt AFB in Omaha, Nebraska.”
We appreciate all the feedback and insight into the flying side of the operation and know that the minor errors will be excused as slips due to the passage of time.
MAJ KENNETH F. SCHANKE, USAF (RET) SHARED HIS OWN STORY:
“I would like to comment on Steven Umland’s article, ‘Operation Igloo White,’ in the Summer 2022 issue of the Friends Journal. He did an excellent job talking about Task Force Alpha and the overall program. “There was a second part of the program that took place at Ubon Royal Thai Air Force Base, just down the road apiece from NKP. The 25th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Assam’s Dragons, had the task of delivering the sensors that made up the strings along the routes in Laos. The individual sensors were loaded in a modified flare dispenser. It was a dangerous mission as it required a low-level, straight-line delivery. Near the end of my tour with the 433rd TFS, the 25th lost two aircraft in two weeks. On Feb 3, 1971, Lt Col Standerwick (KIA) and Major Norbert Gotner (POW) were shot down ☛
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while laying a string. During the rescue attempt, on two days in a row, one of my flights was diverted to assist the SAR. A little over a week later, on Feb 16, another aircraft was lost, but the crew was recovered safely.
“The 433rd, Satan’s Angles, played a role in Igloo White. Early in my tour at Ubon, the squadron selected me to be the teacher on using the LORAN bombing and navigation system installed in most of the 25th squadron aircraft. Before I could teach, I had to learn the system. I received a lot of help from (then) Major Bob Benbow and (then) Capt Roger Johnston. I also spent a lot of time in the LORAN maintenance hangar practicing with the system. All went well, and soon a number of our crews were using the LORAN for night bombing missions, and daytime pathfinder missions. The problem with the original LORAN system was maintaining a lockon. Flying near another aircraft, i.e. the tanker, or executing maneuvers over 15 degrees of pitch or bank would cause the ‘Settling’ light to illuminate indicating the system was not locked on and could not be used for accurate bombing. Sometimes it took 5-10 minutes to reestablish a lockon. Still, we were able to work around the problem and use it successfully.
“Again, with help from the 25th squadron, I was taught to fly LORAN ‘Flasher’ missions that had us directly in contact with TFA, call sign Copperhead. These were by far the most time demanding missions flown out of Ubon. The aircraft were loaded with 9 cans of CBU24 cluster bombs with radar activated fuses, and the aircraft were modified to use a longer duration intervalometer to increase the time between individual releases to about a half second separation. This mod allowed the weapons to be spaced along a longer section of target road. All the missions were flown at night because that was the time the trucks were moving and being detected by the sensors.
“Basically, this is how the whole thing worked: a convoy of vehicles or just people was detected along a string, and the data was transmitted to an orbiting aircraft, either manned or unmanned depending on the threat level in the target area. The aircraft would relay the data to TFA, and the operators would use travel speed and location to predict where the convoy would be in 15-20 minutes. We always flew single ship and were established in a racetrack holding pattern over central Laos. You could pick your own altitude, but I liked 10,000 AGL [above ground level]. Copperhead would come up on frequency with traffic information. It was broadcast as a coded 5-digit alpha numeric message. Using a simple decoder wheel (secret) it would provide a 5-digit message. The first three digits indicated the preplanned IP and Target, while the last two digits indicated the time in minutes after the hour for the Time over Target (TOT). We opened a book of some 20-25 preplanned missions, found the one with the matching code, and entered the IP and target information into the LORAN system. With little time to work and limited to shallow banked (slow) turns we had to commit to Copperhead that we were able to make the time, or that it would be impossible to get there given where we were at the time. Once committed to a live run, we could control airspeed to adjust TOT. We got very good at it. Once on the final approach to the release point, Copperhead could adjust the release point based on changes in target speed. In the last minute or so before release, Copperhead could confirm release short or long by some distance to make a final correction. A short release was easy as we could select release advance with our bombing system. For a long release we relied on manual backup using the ‘One potato, two potato’ adjustment to WAG the release point. “To sum this up, the sensor located, the signal was data linked, the computers and operators at TFA did their thing. The target info was radioed to the bombing aircraft, the WSO entered the info into the LORAN computer, and the crew navigated to the target and destroyed it.
“Most nights there was enough cloud cover below us to just be able to see the sparkle of the bomblets exploding. Occasionally there would be a larger flash, a secondary explosion, or many secondaries. On a clear night it was very satisfying to see the first doughnut (when the bomblets dispersed from the opened canister, they spread out to form a doughnut pattern with few to no bomblets in the center hole). The subsequent weapons filled in the holes from the previous ones, so the result was a ¼ mile wide by about 2 miles long impact area on the ground. With only one set of bombs per aircraft, once the run was complete it was time to head home. On most nights Copperhead would provide us with an observed bomb damage assessment on the way home. Some were like ‘five secondaries heard; no movement detected after attack’ others were simply RNO (Results Not Observed). During my year at Ubon (April 1970 to April 1971), I must have flown 25 Flasher missions. We did more than just find the target; we worked hard to kill it.”
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DAYTY ON 12:00 PM OIHO
COL RON SCHLOEMER, USAF (RET), SHARED:
“I enjoyed reading Steven Umland’s “Operation Igloo White, 1969-1970” in the Summer 2022 edition of Friends Journal. As one who planted those seismic and acoustic sensors via F-4D’s, it was interesting to learn more of what was being done at NKP to analyze the data they generated. I would like to clarify a couple of points raised by the author, however. First, the F-4D’s used to deliver the sensors along the Ho Chi Minh Trail belonged to the 25 Tactical Fighter Squadron at Ubon, Thailand — not Udorn. The 25 TFS became the dedicated Igloo White squadron sometime in late 1967 while still based at Eglin AFB, Florida. The entire unit deployed in late May 1968 and became part of the 8 Tactical Fighter Wing at Ubon.
“The second point regards the classifi cation level of Igloo White. As best as I recall, there was little at the squadron level that was considered Top Secret. Secret, perhaps, but not Top Secret. What looked like a “bomb,” for example, was simply a shaped cannister to carry four acoustic sensors. The seismic sensors, or ADSIDs, [Editor’s Note: Air Delivered Seismic Intrusion Detector] were carried openly on the underwing ejector racks. I’m sure that Mr. Umland’s work at Task Force Alpha, along with the work being done by the intelligence analysts was classifi ed at the TS level. “All in all, Steven Umland has given us a most interesting and informative insight as to what went on at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, as part of Operation Igloo White.”
AIR FORCE 50TH STAMP IN THE LAST ISSUE
Philip Handleman wrote to correct an error concerning the date of issue in the write up about the stamp in our last issue. “The 1957 stamp marked the 50th anniversary of the U.S. Army order creating the Aeronautical Division of the Signal Corps. That was on August 1, 1907, which explains the stamp’s issuance on August 1, 1957.” The error was mine — at the time I was also researching this issue’s stamp and crossed my facts. Thanks for the correction, and thanks for making this issue’s stamp possible.
THIS ISSUE’S STAMP
The stamp in this issue is a 1997 32cent stamp “commemorates the 50th anniversary of the establishment in 1947 of the U.S. Air Force as a separate service from the Army,” according to the Postal Bulleting. The stamp was based on a photograph taken by Philip Handleman, featuring four U.S. Air Force Thunderbird aerial demonstration planes in fl ight, in a classic diamond formation. The stamp “was issued on September 18, 1997, in the courtyard of the Pentagon,” Handleman explained. “That day was chosen because it corresponded to the day in 1947 when Stuart Symington took the oath of offi ce as the fi rst Secretary of the Air Force (which is commonly considered the beginning date of the Air Force as a separate military service). The 1997 stamp is distinguished from the 1957 stamp by being said to honor the anniversary of the Department of the Air Force (with its roots stretching back to 1947) as opposed to the U.S. Air Force (with its roots stretching back to 1907).” Thank you for the background, Philip, and for the wonderful photo and stamp.
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