The Spatial Effects of Development Aid

T h e S p at i al E ffe c ts o f D e v e lo p m e n t Aid A n Exam ination of Four Sub- Sahar an Afr ic an Developm ent Aid Pr oje c ts Alexander Gogl

1

I : I n t r o d u c t i o n

Development aid transforms the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of physical environment, landscape, and architectural space. This work examines the advantages and disadvantages of these spatial effects from four development aid projects in Sub-Saharan Africa. The projects range from small ones like upgrades of informal settlements in an urban discrict of Accra, Ghana to huge ones like the construction of the Merowe Dam in Sudan that influenced 6,364km2 of space and landscape.

Development Aid Development aid1 is defined by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as “[g] rants or loans to [...] developing countries [...] and to multilateral agencies which are (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms[.] (OECD 2013)” where the goal is to encourage lasting transformations. In contrast, humanitarian aid intervenes in a situation which mostly emerged by disasters, to alleviate issues immediately and for a shorter period of time.

a global standard for developing countries. It measures development by means of technical and economical characteristics such as the GDP (gross domestic product), life expectancy and education. This viewpoint leads to a bias in the evaluation of the development level of a country: Ziai (ibid.) criticizes the narrowness of this criteria and argues that a more comprehensive approach incorporating a broader set of criteria must be taken. He claims that criteria such as equality of rights, distribution of income, suicide rates, racism, sustainability practices, or the consumption of resources would alter our perception of development so drasti-

According to Aram Ziai (2010:23-29) development aid is an Eurocentric construct, which assumes that there are developed and developing nation-states. The latter are often described with disparage terms such as underdeveloped and structurally weak. It is important to note that within this viewpoint the West sees itself as

cally that nations considered to be highly developed – such as the United States2 – would be evaluated as being developing. Therefore, development aid is a Western concept, that assists the „developing“ world to move towards Western standards. Due to its limitation towards solely technical solutions, development aid

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is also depoliticized. It ignores the fundamental problems confronting developing countries such as power asymmetry and distribution conflicts (ibid.). Many case studies show, that a solely technical development of countries, can lead to major disadvantages of the affected people. This will be shown in detail at section V, the Merowe Dam development in Sudan.

to facilitate the gathering of evidence, the timeframe of research is limited to events between 2000 and 2013.

The projects were all initiated and terminated within this period.

1. The official term used by the OCED is Official Development Assistance (OECD 2013).

2. An average US citizen produces five times more CO2 emissions than an average person (McCandless 2009:26-27).

Applied Methodology In order to be able to make a statement in the given time, the projects were selected by the following: Firstly, it is a development aid project taking place in Sub-Saharan Africa. Secondly, the examined project must have direct spatial effects on the place. Thirdly, spatial effects must be locatable. Evidence is provided by satellite images, plans, diagrams, statistics, photographs, and field reports. Fourthly, four projects are investigated to keep the results very specific. This restricts the analysis from making any general statements on the spatial effects of development aid. In order to broaden the analysis, distinctive projects, that provide a wide spectrum of characteristics were selected. This spectrum includes duration, spatial effects, amount of funding, transformation of settlement areas and or landscape, development structure, and the kind of development aid. The duration describes the time period when the project took place (project start until project end). In these examples the duration is between three and nine years. The spatial effects determines how much space has been affected by the project. These effects range from the exchange of individual buildings in a particular district to transforming the habitat of sixty thousand people. Development structure discusses the management of the aid project and kind relates to what the project aims to develop (i.e. knowledge, infrastructure, ecology). More details can be found in the following section. Fifthly, in order 3

GHANA

(1) Accra Settlement Upgrade

0 250 500

GDP

Population

rural % of country export

100%

0.32 Bn

1.81 Bn

3.44 Bn

32.2 Bn

Cocoa beans, whole

urban

Ghana

GDP

3 most valuable export goods

Billion USD

Billion USD

Million People

Country Snapshot Overview

Population

24.4 MM

ATLANTIC OCEAN

Cocoa paste not defatted

Gold Cement

Petroleum oils, refined

(3) Mangrove Afforestation

Gold

0.32 Bn

0.21 Bn 0.20 Bn

12.4 MM

12.9 Bn GDP

100% Population

Senegal

SENEGAL

100%

Metals, Stones Consumables Oil

1000

3000km

Project Overview and Comparison of Countries The map (fig. 2) shows where the selected projects are located geographically and compares the countries in which the projects took place. Facts such as

countries. A common feature is their economy’s focus on the trade of raw materials. This is rooted in the repression of industrialization by the governing western

the total and urban population size, GDP, and the most important exporting goods are illustrated with the infographics adjacent to each country on the map.

This com­pares the development aid projects in a roughly defined socio-economic framework providing obser­vations on a wide variety of characteristics of the

nations during colonialism (Conchiglia 2009:8).

In project one an Informal Settlement in a district of Accra has been selectively upgraded. A comparison between Ghana and Tanzania demonstrates that the population living in urban settlements is double in Ghana. In project two the extension of the port in

4

Sudan

100%

Tanzania

Sheep Other oil seeds

7.35 Bn Petroleum oils, crude

100%

0.39 Bn 0.22 Bn Precious metal ores and concentrates Tobacco, raw

Gold

GDP

(2) Daressalaam Resettlement

Population

TANZANIA

0.97 Bn

22.9 Bn

44.8 MM

INDIAN OCEAN

0.18 Bn 0.16 Bn

67.00 Bn 33.6 MM Population

SUDAN

GDP

(4) Merowe Dam

2 Fig. 2: Project location and country comparison.

Daressalaam leads to the demolition of Informal Settlements leaving about 36,000 inhabitants homeless.

In this example a new settlement was built at the city‘s

people and reshapes 500km2 of landscape.

At first glance, no relationship is found between the ratio of people living in urban areas compared to those

periphery for a part of these people. Project three is about the afforestation of a desolate mangrove forests.

In Sudan, the fourth project, a development aid project supports the construction of a huge dam in Merowe giving a new impetus to the electrification of the country and therefore transforms the habitat of at least 60,000

living in rural areas and the GDP. Sudan has the highest GDP, but it’s population is concentrated in rural areas. Ghana on the other hand, which is the most rural country in our selection, has the second highest GDP. The GDP of Senegal is the smallest, however, when compared with the population size, Tanzania is 5

the poorest country out of the four.

As explained in the applied methodology part, projects were selected in order to meet a wide range of characteristics: The upgrade in Accra with a duration lasting three years is the shortest project. The longest project lasting nine years is the dam construction project in Sudan. The size of the areas directly affected by the development aid also show the greatest difference. Some projects only transform settlement structures, others only the landscape, and others change both to different degrees. Types of development aid are distinguished between infrastructure, ecology and know­ledge. In order to be able to formulate these categories, we have to know the aims of the respective projects. It is possible that a project relates to more than just one category. The term infrastructure is applied more widely than normal: It includes in addition to classical infrastructure, such as streets and energy supply, also buildings and industrial plants. The afforestation pro­ject in Senegal is categorized as ecology and knowledge. Although it is clearly an ecological project which aims to change the environment, rele­ vant knowledge must be passed on to the population to create a sustainable mangrove forest. The development aid structure describes the structure of power between the planning or capital giving top and the affected bottom. If the top exercises absolute power on the objectives and procedures throughout the whole project, it is called a top-down approach. The top defines what and how it is done. If the top consults with the bottom and as a result the aid receivers can have an influence on what and how something is done, then it is a consensual approach. If the bottom has a greater influence than the top, it is a bottom-up approach.

Such an approach can be observed in the resettlement project in Daressalaam where the affected population decides together with the NGOs on the design of the new settlement and also helps in constructing it. The population consequently has a great influence on the spatial effect. Finally, there is the financial participation. Here we differentiate between NGOs, companies, affected people, and affected countries nationally and 6

internationally. Apart from the third project enough sources were found in order to depict the financial structure completely. In project three estimations were made based on knowing that the project had been funded by companies and on indications given by observers of the project. This allowed me to approximate expenses.2 Figure 3 puts all analysed characteristics of the projects in comparison to each other. The single cells of the funding row is not in relation to the other projects and therefore a comparison of them could be misleading. Because of that, the following figures (4-7) depict the financing structure based on absolute values in order to be able to compare them and emphasize their different financial dimensions.

3. In total 150MM trees (Sall 2012:4) were planted in an area of 108km2 (Oceanium-Dakar 2013, UNFCCC-CDM 2012:16). The workers received per hectare EUR 7.5 and per bag of seed EUR 1.5 (Sall 2012:3). Based on the size of the bag and the seeds, we assume that one bag holds around 500 seeds. 150MM trees would add up to EUR 450,000. The afforestation has been compensated with EUR 81,000. The project ran from 2006 until 2011. Supposing a remaining budget of EUR 10,000 per month, taking into account the entire time period, we would come to an amount of EUR 600,000. Based on our estimation the project costed EUR 1.132MM in total.

Fig. 3: The Project Grid puts various characteristics of the four projects into comparison to gain a quick overview of the similarities and differences. Mind, that the funding cells are not put into relation to the other projects, but to their own funding shares. See fig. 4-7 for absolute values.

Fig. 4: The Informal Settlement upgrade in Accra, Ghana (chapter II) has a significant share of fundings contributed by the UN-HABITAT SUF. Fig. 5: The funding of the relocation project in Daressalaam, Tanzania (chapter III) is a tight cooperation between loans provided by the NGO and direct contributions done by the affected people.

Fig. 6: Senegal‘s afforestation project (chapter IV) was funded entirely by companies, such as the Danone Fund for Nature.

Fig. 7: The Merowe Dam construction (chapter V) was the most expensive development aid project in the selection. A major share of its funding was done by foreign countries, primary

by China.

02 04 06 08 8 10 12 2004-12 14

3

02 04 06 08 6 10 12 2006-12 14

4 9

TIME

02 04 06 08 10 3 12 2009-12 14

2

2000-09

AREA

02 04 06 08 10 12 14

1

181ha

500k

23k

108km2

6,364km2

TRANSFORM

668m2

settlement

landscape

DEV-KIND

infastructure ecology

STRUCTURE

knowledge top-down consensual

1.375Bn

NGO Coorporation Affected People Affected Country Foreign Country

FUNDING [USD]

bottom-up

20k

37k

17k

1.13MM (ASM)

575MM

3

7

∑ USD 0.524MM

Project N°1

Informal Settlement Upgrade Accra, Ghana

UN Loans USD 500k Government of Ghana USD 20k Community USD 37k

4

8

∑ USD 0.04MM

Project N°2

Relocation of an Informal Settlement Daressalaam, Tanzania

UN Loans USD 17,6k Community USD 23k

5

9

∑ USD 1.132MM

Project N°3

Mangrove Afforestation Senegal

790k 10

Danone Fund for Nature and Yves Rocher Foundation and Insolites bâtisseurs, and others USD 1.132MM (ASM)

6

∑ USD 1,950MM

Project N°4 Dam Merowe, Sudan

EXIM Bank (Export Import Bank, China) USD 519MM

AFESD (Arab Fund for Economic & Social Development) USD 250MM

Saudi Arabia USD 200MM

Abu Dhabi USD 150MM

KFAED (Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development) USD 150MM

Oman USD 106MM

Sudan USD 575MM

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I I : I n f o r m a l S e ttl emen t Up g r a d e i n Accra, Gh a n a

8 Fig. 8: Impression of the affected Informal Settlement in Amui Djor, Accra, Ghana.

Overview In Amui Djor, an informal district of Accra, informal buildings have been substituted by multi-storey and multi-functional buildings between 2009 and 2012 by TAMSUF1. In the analysis we will discuss successes, deficiencies and risks of the intervention.

1. TAMSUF is a financial institution situated in Ghana and partner of UN-HABITAT SUF (UN-HABITAT 2009a:11).

Informal Settlement When Informal Settlements are discussed, they are usually referred to as slums, shanty towns or favelas.

These terms are not adequate for the following reasons: The term is culturally determined. This means, 12

it is only appropriate in portuguese-speaking cultures - such as for example Brazil - to use the term Favelas.

In English-speaking cultures one normally describes them as slums. In addition, these terms are judgmental. This implies, that whenever we refer to an Informal Settlement as slum or favela, we would denigrate the whole settlement including their inhabitants: Favela is the Portuguese and slum the Irish word for a wretched quarter. As we will see in the second project in this analysis, the general term “Informal Settlement� is more appropriate. It describes settlement structures, which are built outside the formal order or have become illegal through legal amendments.

Informal settlements have been defined by UNHABITAT (2007:1) as an urban form of dwelling, which can be described by five criteria. Most of the people living in Informal Settlements in the world live in Sub-

Saharan Africa.2 82% of these people meet one or two of the following criteria (ibid.):3 • • • • •

no consistent building structure, with a provisional character there are more than three people living in one room there is no access to enough affordable clean drinking water there is no access to adequate sanitation, like private or public toilets shared by a reasonable number of users there is no security of tenure, which prevents forced eviction of the inhabitants

2. 199.5MM people (61% of the total urban population) (UN-HABITAT 2010b:1).

3. 49% (1), 33% (2), 15% (3), 3% (all 4 criteria).

The Emergence of Informal Settlements Now that we have drawn a line between Informal Settlements and other living forms, we can ask ourselves, how Africa has come to this enormously high proportion of Informal Settlements. As we are already in Ghana, we will use Ghana and in particular Accra as example for displaying the factors: The degradation of the living situation of the rural population leads to an internal migration.4 The rural population hence moves in areas, where there are more sufficient means to earn a living (Danso-Wiredu 2013:5, Ploner 2010:4748). Most of the times, these are urban areas such as cities and suburbs. This migration results in an erratic population increase in urban regions. As the state normally doesn’t take care of creating living areas for internal migrants, Informal Settlements grow denser and spread (Danso-Wiredu 2013:5-6). This can also be only temporarily in the case where migrants sustain their bond with their native place and the migration destination only serves for income and education (Ploner 2010:47-48).

As many other development countries Ghana introduced upon insistency by IMF the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), which lead to drastic cutbacks in the public sector, administrative services and a devaluation of the Ghanian Cedi. Through the structural change resulting from SAP, sources for higher income became rarer and credit awards for farmers more difficult. The rural population, confronted by the reduction of the labour market due to the shortcuts in the agriculture sector, was impelled to seek for other

income opportunities in urban regions. Therefore a rural depopulation was set in motion. This forced parts of the population into the Informal Economy,5 where income is irregular and low. Especially the internal migrants are greatly affected by the structural change.

The demand for low-price living areas has increased in the urban regions, without the building sector adapting to this need (Danso-Wiredu 2013:1, 7-8). In order to save money, the tenants use their living rooms also as working space. This multiple usage was disapproved by the building sectors and house owners (UN-HABITAT 2011:5). In order to cover the requirements for flexible and low-price living area, the population has put up provisional and non-authorized flats on unbuilt areas. This resulted in an increase of Informal Settlements in the urban regions of Ghana (ibid.).

When Informal Settlements develop, it plays an important role how the area can be owned by the population. The property system varies from country to country, which we will see in the following studies. In Ghana there are four possibilities how to own land: The stool or skin land, the family land, the state land and the private land. The stool or skin land is a land, which is owned by a community.6 80% of the property in Accra is owned by customary law7 and is stool land of indigenous tribes (UN-HABITAT 2009:29).

The social structures of these tribes are traditional and hierarchical: although the land is owned by the whole tribe, it is managed by the heads. They decide on who owns land, who is allowed to build and where something is built. As the land is bound to the tribe, it is usually not sold, which hinders the development of projects taking place on stool land. An appreciation of the land in urban regions however exceptionally leads to the vending of land through paying “Drink Money”.

Drink Money is in its original meaning capital used for the cultural act of property transfer by the tribe. In the meantime drink money has attained the level of an official market value of the properties. The family land defines the land where a family owns and manages the property, as does the state with the state land, and private land is owned by a single person (UN-HABITAT 2011: 30, 77). As 80% of the properties in Ghana is stool land under customary law (ibid.: 31), there is no clear property situation in Informal Settlements. The inhabitants lease the properties from the tribe, but can lose these informal rights at all times. This would transfer immobile goods into the ownership of the tribe. In Tanzania on the other hand, the whole land is owned by the public. The president holds the administrative and decision power (Ndezi 2009a:80). As we will see in chapter III of our analysis, this condition leads to the fact, that the president can enforce expropriation for 13

people in 2001 and 5.8MM people in 2010 lived in InSUDAN formal Settlements in Ghana. This is a yearly increase of 1.83% (Danso-Wiredu 2013:2).

GHANA

9

3.44 Bn

14

1.81 Bn

0.32 Bn

Cocoa paste not defatted

Gold

executing public interests.

This legal insecurity is one of the main reasons for the provisional character of the buildings in the analysed Informal Settlements in Ghana and Tanzania.

100% in the section Both characteristics are as mentioned Informal Settlements two of the five criteria defined by UN-HABITAT which describe an Informal Settlement.

In this case it was especially the legal insecurity which has lead to the provisional character of the buildings.

This means that a focus in solving this issue should be prioritized over the development of stable houses. An interview with a former inhabitant of Amui Djor confirms this (Terry 2013).

As we have pointed out earlier, the demand for lowprice houses in urban Ghana has increased due to the SAP and the internal migration. In total 1.5MM flats were lacking in Ghana in 2000 (UN-HABITAT 2011:2).

Danso Wiredu (2013:2) mentions, that the need for houses increases in Ghana by 120,000 per year, but only 40,000 are built. Private real estate developers focus on providing the small upper class and middle class with high quality living area. The developers often build Gated Communities8: Wiredu estimates, that between 2004 and 2007 23 Gated Communities with 3.644 dwellings and a market value of USD 434.8MM were constructed. An amount, which would allow to build 17,300 middle class buildings and a multiple thereof of low-price flats for the migrating rural population. In fact, the informal building sector creates 80% of the dwellings (Danso-Wiredu 2013:7-8). The situation is getting worse as increasing wealth leads to a rapid growth of gated communities (Adjaye 2010:49). The refusal of the building sector and the government to create low-price living area lead to the reality that 5MM Cocoa beans, whole

32.2 Bn

(1) Accra Settlement Upgrade

GDP

Population

24.4 MM

GAL

4. Here we ignore individual reasons for migration and focus on the reasons which concerns the majority of the migrants. The internal migration describes the emigration of a group of people within a determined area (country, federation, state union).

5. Currently more than 50% of the total African population works in the Informal Economy (Danso-Wiredu 2013:9).

6. It is called stool or skin land, as the land is bound to the stool of the chief or the skin of the tribe.

7. The customary law is not stipulated by the state, but by the participants through continuous practice.

8. Gated Communities are closed housing areas with access limitations. Their private character is contrary to the public area in a city and they can only be entered by members.

Description of the Place

TANZANIA

Ghana is situated at the Atlantic (fig.9). In front of its coast oil has been found some years ago, which has lead to an economic boom in these regions.9 The boom increased the rural migration to agglomerations near the coast such as Accra. Ghana is now classified by the World Bank as a country with middle income (UN-HABITAT 2011:3). 50% of the urban region belongs to the high density low class: In this area the population has a great ethnic variety. There live primarily migrants, who dispose of a very low income.

The infrastructure is badly developed and the buildings are sometimes provisional wooden shacks (UN-HABITAT 2011:9, 11). According to UN-HABITAT (ibid:5-6) houses in Ghana are „reasonably well built“ and have secure tenure. This contradicts especially the situation in Amui Djor, where the government tried to solve the problems of Informal Settlements with expulsion or the threatening of expulsion (Danso-Wiredu 2013:7, Terry 2013).

Multiple cultural mechanisms lead in Ghana to a good social and sanitary basis: The personal hygiene is culturally highly appreciated, which decreases the danger of infectious diseases. Additionally, the living situation is improved as the population normally cooks outside (UN-HABITAT 2011:6). The family-system in Ghana prevents homelessness as practically everyone has a place which he or she can call home. This system is particularly in the urban area well developed and very much appreciated by UN-HABITAT (2011:8).

53,9% of all living rooms in Accra are traditional compound houses. Hereby the rooms are arranged

(2) Re

11

10

around a common free space. This free space can be an atrium or a courtyard, which is divided by fences or walls from the public space (fig. 10-11). Generally, either a family, a community, or strangers live in these compound houses together. Newly established Informal Settlements follow this traditional building type of compound houses (ibid.:45-46). It is attractive for the population for various reasons: Most households can’t afford building an entire house. In 2000, for instance, the share of one-room households in Accra was between 61 and 65% (Danso-Wiredu 2013:4). In compound houses, as mentioned before, one-room households are situated next to each other in a compound (Danso-Wiredu 2013:9). This means that the rooms although inhabited by different people are built side by side to define a territory. This is an effective method for acquiring properties in legally insecure areas. The enclosed free areas of the courtyards are protected against others building on these (fig. 11). This free spaces surrounded by fences or walls are built-up later on according to the need of the community. Commonly used rooms such as the kitchen, the wet room, and free areas are shared among the other inhabitants for further cost reduction. This makes the building of compound houses cheaper than those of detached houses (ibid.). This allows the low-income population to obtain property. In Accra 64% of all one-room

12

13 Fig. 9: Accra is next to the Atlantic.

Fig. 10: Layout of a typical Compound House (UNHABITAT:2011b:46). Notice the arangement and the various sizes of the one-room dwellings around the large inner courtyard.

Fig. 11: Contour of a Compound House in Amui Djor, Accra. Mind the entry.

Fig. 12: A groud-level sewer in Amui Djor. It raises the danger of infections.

Fig. 13: Because the waste collection service is hardly affordable for the inhabitants of the Informal Settlements in Amui Djor, they burn or dump it on the street.

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There are primarily „[…] makeshift wooden homes with no bathrooms or water (Terry 2013)“. The effluent and waste disposal is problematic. The open sewers (fig. 12) leads to a high danger of infectious diseases and the spreading of malaria and cholera. Moreover, the population burn their waste as they can’t afford the garbage collection (ebid) (fig. 13). The organization Slum Dwellers International, taking part in the upgrade, describes the district as „[...] a lively, buzzing, and tight-knit collection of communities with a thriving informal economy, a harmonious environment (Torresi 2012)“. Commerce is taking place foremost on the streets, which makes the culture appear very lively (fig.

14).

14

9. The GDP has trippled between 2000 and 2008: USD 4.97Bn (2000), USD 16.12Bn (2008).

10. The population density of the city of Accra: 250.73 people / hectare; Informal Settlement Accra: 607.8 people / hectare (DansoWiredu 2013:5).

11. Ashley Terry is a senior producer at globalnews.ca. She was in 2013 with Journalists for Human Rights for the purpose of Shaw Africa Project in Ghana.

Project Description

15

households are occupied by more than 3 persons (UN-HABITAT 2011:64). Furthermore the population density of Informal Settlements in Accra is more than twice as high than the city of Accra has.10 The Informal Settlements hence take up a third of the urban population of Greater Accra (Danso-Wiredu 2013:5). The Bank of Ghana claims to reduce the population density to a maximum of two people per room. If we wanted to implement this, we would have to create in Ghana between 2010 and 2020 5.7MM rooms (Dano-Wiredu 2013:10).

The perception of our analysis on Amui Djor is diverging: UN-HABITAT describes it as a district, which is well served with water, electricity and public toilets (UN-HABITAT 2009:19-20). Ashley Terry, a Canadian reporter,11 who has visited the district after its upgrade, documents a different side of Amui Djor: 16

The discussed development aid concerns an upgrading of an Informal Settlement also called a slum upgrade. In order to evaluate the success and failure of this project, we first define the upgrade of an Informal Settlement in general: Informal Settlements as described in the section Informal Settlements have many problems which challenges the life of its inhabitants. An upgrade solves or diminishes these problems. If for example in an Informal Settlement there is not sufficient drinking water, building a well could resolve this problem. As we have demonstrated in the part Description of the Place Amui Djor has problems concerning the effluent and waste disposal, the security of tenure and the provisional construction of most of the buildings. The upgrade aims to improve all three issues locally. There are three project phases: First, a smaller demonstration project with six flats and two shops were built. With the gained knowledge, the bigger pilot project, what is the focus of this chapter, should have been constructed with 18 flats and six shops on a 27x24m big plot (UN-HABITAT 2013a). If the pilot project was successful, bigger projects of the same type would be built to supply the whole informal district (fig. 15).12 When comparing the requirements for the pilot proj-

ect in its conceptualization phase to the established project, we observe great differences: Although the size of the plot area stayed the same, the number of flats increased from 18 to 31 and the number of shops from 6 to 15 (UN-Habitat 2013a, SDI 2013). As the living area with 18m2 (Tweneboa 2011:Slide 9) is relatively small for a household, we can assume that the size of the flats has been reduced during the project development. The twelve toilets and six bathrooms on the ground floor are commercial. Inhabitants of the informal district must pay for their usage. The project creates property but only in a limited way, as the land of Amui Djor is stool land (cf. section The development of Informal Settlements).

Ownership remains difficult to access.13 The tenants of the Informal Settlements belong to the Tema Traditional Council and pay rent to them. They construct the buildings on the leased property (UN-HABITAT 2009:61). If the lease agreement is not prolonged or rescinded, the property including all immobile goods goes into the ownership of Tema Traditional Council.

It comes as no surprise why the buildings in Amui Djor are foremost of provisional character: Who would invest more capital and effort into a building, which stands on rented ground? This causes social pressure.

Simultaneously, is the land property of Tema Development Corporation that threatens the population with the expulsion of the Informal Settlements (Terry 2013).

The claim of ownership by both parties makes the legal situation for the inhabitants insecure. This is why the inhabitants of Amui Djor demand the state to transform the stool land to parceled private property,14 so they can develop more freely (ebid).

12. „The project has been conceived as a trust-building pilot to demonstrate the approach and facilitate the scaling-up to serve the entire settlement‘s needs (UN-HABITAT 2009:19).“ 13. In Amui Djor 60% of the inhabitants are tenants (UN-HABITAT 2009:31).

14. The inhabitants call it their 50x50, a standard size for properties.

Protests in 2012 claimed for it (Terry 2013).

16

17

18 Fig. 14: A street scene with markets in Amui Djor. The merchants are selling and processing the goods at the market.

Fig. 15: The map (M 1:25.000) shows the locations of the current and future upgrades of the quarter. The bigger circle marks the analysed project, which is bigger than the previous pilot project (small circle to the northwest).

Fig. 16: The three storey high pilot project after its completion.

Notice the shops at the ground level floor.

Fig. 17: The completely enclosed inner court yard with access balconies and the stairwell.

Fig. 18: Two dwellings of the project.

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The Structure of Development Aid

Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation

UN-HABITAT SUF Goverment

Guarantee

TAMSUF

Repayment

$

Loan

There are 10 different organizations which took part in the project: UN-HABITAT SUF,15 TAMSUF, Ghana Federation of the Urban Poor, Tema Traditional Council, Ghana Homeless Federation, Amui Djor Housing Cooperative Society, Ashaiman Municipality, Tema Metropolitan Assembly, Tema Development Cooperation and the Indian architectural office Tekton Consultants (fig. 19). The most important project participants are: UN-HABITAT SUF and TAMSUF are both financial institutions for the upgrading of Informal Settlements.

The latter is a merger of the participating organizations (UN-HABITAT 2009a:11) and a local partner of the former in Ghana. Tema Traditional Council, Ashaiman Municipality and Tema Metropolitan Assembly are governmental organizations. The Tema Traditional Council (TMC) is the representative for the tribe, that owns the stool land and also the Tema Development Corporation (TDC) claims ownership of the land (Terry 2013). The TMC acquired the land through practiced customary law. The TDC is tenant of the land through a political decree of 1952 for 125 years (TDC 2013). The Amui Djor Housing Cooperative Society is a housing cooperation, which consists of the lessee of the flats.

The structural diagram demonstrates the relationships between the project partners and the financial flow (fig. 20): TAMSUF is at the center: It guarantees with its capital for bank loans of the Housing Cooperation. TAMSUF receives USD 500,000, which equals 96% of the total capital, for the bond from the international SUF (Tweneboa 2011:Slide 7). From the government of Ghana it gets the last 4%, USD 20,000 (SDI 2013). The bank lends money to the Housing Cooperation, that finances the building costs16 with this money. Recalculating17 we note that after 10 years the total costs are nearly paid off.18 The earnings from the income go to the bank, which releases step by step the

UN-HABITAT SUF

TAMSUF Housing Cooperation

Ghana Federation of Urban Poor

Ashaiman Municipal Assembly

Tema Traditional Council

Ghana Homeless Federation

Tema Metropolitan Assembly

Tema Development Corporation

Goverment

Property Owner

Deposit

$

Hire Purchase

Housing Cooperation

Tekton Consultants Implementing

Finance Facility

19

18

20

Resident

21

Fig. 19: Participating organisations and companies, grouped by their role within the project.

Fig. 20: A cash flow diagram, which represents the guarantee, loan and repayment process. The most fundings were supplied

by UN-HABITAT SUF. Fig. 21: The figure ground plan displays the part of Amui Djor, where the project took place in 2009. The buildings within the dashed red line are cleared away for the pilot project.

Fig. 22: The developed pilot project in 2013. Compare the prior courtyard situation with the new.

by TAMSUF bailed for guarantees (Tweneboa 2011).

15. SUF... Slum Upgrading Facility 16. According to the final report of TAMSUF, the total costs add up to USD 238,904 (Tweneboa 2011:Slide 21). In 2009 a total of USD 130,000 have been estimated for the development of the pilot project by UN-HABITAT (UN-HABITAT 2009:19).

17. Sanitary installations = USD 240 / month; Office rent = USD 601 / month; Hire purchase of all flats = USD 133,920; -238,904 + 133,920 + (240 + 601) * 12 month * 10 years = USD -4,064 (Tweneboa 2011).

18. When letting aside the interests of the loan and the appreciation of the shops.

22

Spatial Consequences The structural change of the district is illustrated by the two figure ground plans (fig. 21-22): Figure 21 shows how the buildings related to each other before the interference. The red line marks the property of the pilot project. The fences and walls have not been included in the figure ground plans. However, we can still notice that the buildings stand in a way which allows them to enclose several free spaces of different sizes: two bigger courtyards are facing away from the streets. Figure 11, which we have shown in the section Description of the Place illustrates clearly, that the courtyards are collectively used free spaces: There is a tree, laundry is dried and as we know from the same section, it is also used for cooking. It is a place, which is important for the inhabitants. In figure 22, on the contrary, the construction of the pilot project removed this free space. It has been substituted by a completely closed building.

The building isn’t situated on the same building line as the other buildings of the neighborhood, but is relocated away from the street, probably to create parking 19

23 Fig. 23: Locals preparing Fufu, the national dish of Ghana, which is frequently served as a side dish.

spaces. We don’t know whether the inhabitants of the demolished buildings19 were compensated or if only the tribe has received compensation.

19. It concerns seven houses, which are clearly differentiable from each other in the figure ground plan. As the buildings are big, we can assume, that it affected at least 7 households.

Evaluation of the Project As we have talked in the section Description of the place about a lively street commerce, it appears strange to us, that a development aid project for the upgrading of an Informal Settlement involves the creation of 15 indoor shops. UN-HABITAT (2009:39) points out, that shops on the ground floor don’t only bring advantages but also disadvantages: The hire20

purchase price per flat is reduced by the money generated through the sales of the shops, but it bears the risk that the housing community will not tolerate strangers in their property. We will now argue that shifting the market away from the streets to closed shops created more problems than originally assumed by UN-HABITAT: The trade on the streets is more flexible.

The merchants either don’t have to pay anything for the stand, as it is directly situated in front of their house or they only pay when they have to sell something.

A merchant doesn’t have everyday the same amount of goods available for offer. It is common that he may have sold so much on Monday that on Tuesday he only needs half the space and from Thursday onwards doesn’t need the stand at all. On the contrary, others may have only every second week enough goods to sell them. The merchant pays a daily rate, or at least for a shorter timeframe than renting a shop, whose fee also depends on the space he occupies. This is why the market on the street is more flexible. The second project of our analysis (chapter III, section Description of the Project) will allow us to have a deeper look at this. We should now ask ourselves the following questions: Which shops generate enough profit in an Informal Settlement, to be able to pay continuously rent for the shops? Which products must be offered at which prices, to be profitable? This question we can’t answer immediately, without becoming too general. But we can turn the question around, which makes it easier to answer: Who can’t afford to rent their own shops?

More than half of the total African population, who are engaged mainly in the Informal Economy (Danso-Wiredu 2013:9). As explained in the section The Development of Informal Settlements in Accra there is a great demand for low-price living areas, which is flexible enough to also serve as working space. We have also mentioned that the share of one-room households in Accra lays between 60 and 64% and 64% of those are occupied by more than 3 people (cf. section Description of the Place). It is very unlikely, that someone, who lives from an irregular income from engaging in the Informal Economy and sharing a room with more than three people rents a shop.20 Looking at the building and its context (cf. section Description of the place) we see that the house very much differs from those in its neighborhood: The buildings in the informal settlement are almost exclusively one-storey makeshift wooden bungalows with tin roofs, while the pilot project is a three-storey house made of concrete (fig. 8, 16). The concrete construction also has fluent water, wet rooms and kitchens (SDI 2013, Terry 2013). The vending takes place against the cultural habit not in front but within the building. It seems

as if there are privileged people living in the concrete building. We must also ask, why a development aid project, which aims to improve the sanitary situation of an Informal Settlement, charges for toilets and bathrooms? Also we wonder about the little number of toilets. An inhabitant describes the sanitary situation as follows: “in the mornings, the lineup for the toilets is so long that people end up defecating on themselves or are forced to go outside“ (Terry 2013).” Looking at the investment structure of the project in the section Development aid structure, we see that the income which comes from the shops and the sanitary installations helps to finance the flats. This reduces the price of the flats. This is why we can argue, that the main aim of the development aid project is the Creation of property. The building of sanitary installations is more a means for financing the property than an actual approach to improve the sanitary situation of the district.

Therefore, the upgrade of the Informal Settlement is only partly successful: Secure property in a stable building has been created. Unfortunately, this building is more a social housing complex of western cultures than a building which adapts to the cultural features of the local population: The ceilings of the dwellings are too low.21 It lacks the common open courtyard, in which the social life of the house can take place.22 The closed shops don’t correspond to the lived market culture of streets. The sanitary situation has only been improved slightly, loses however its effectiveness through charges for their usage and their small number. Despite these highlighted deficiencies the project has won two prices in Accra on the Conference for Housing Excellence (UN-HABITAT 2011a).23 The building should serve as a prototype for the supply of the informal district. If we take into account all the deficiencies of the pilot project, we must doubt the supply ability of this building type for the district. The construction of more similar houses for the upgrading of the district is unlikely, as the negotiations between the owners and developers were cancelled (Terry 2013). The stool land makes it difficult to privatize land.

A documented parcelling, which conforms to the actual development, is missing. In Amui Djor the property for the pilot project was pitched and measured locally, so the representatives of the stool land and the developers were able to communicate on where and how much ground can be privatized (UN-HABITAT 2009:34, 43).

According to Wiredu (2013:6) a reasonable solution for the habitat problem in Ghana can only come from the state. As we have seen, the problems come mainly from the unsecure legal situation of the properties for private ownership and the refusal of the building indus-

try to create flexible low-price living space. Therefore, an improvement of the situation can only come from an institution strong in capital and law-changing such as the state. In addition, a political unity is needed. As politic in Ghana is divided in ethnic parties, an unity becomes difficult: The population votes their politicians mainly based on their own ethnic affiliation and not because of their political programs. A change of the situation through the will of the constituents is hence unlikely (Danso-Wiredu 2013:7).

20. Monthly rent for the shop is USD 40 (Tweneboa 2011:Slide 10).

21. The height of the room is too low for traditional cooking methods: Fufu, the national dish in Ghana, which is a side dish of many meals, is made with a big mortar. In order to pound the tough dough, the pestle must have a significant size (compare fig. 23 with fig.18).

22. The traditional compound house with courtyard has proved itself in the culture of Ghana (cf. section Description of the Place).

23. „Best social innovative housing project for the urban poor and low income people and best designed architectural concept for a mixed use development in social housing for the urban poor (UN-HABITAT 2011a).“ The jury consisted of representatives of British organizations and companies.

Discussion on the Relationship between Development Aid and Space At the analysed development aid project a direct relationship between development aid and space can be observed: The development aid has substituted a flexible and from the local culture influenced informal habitat by a formal habitat based on western standards. Furthermore, it improved the life for the informal population only poorly and doesn’t offer any general solutions to the problems. The conflicts concerning the property rights remain unsolved. The critic mentioned in the section Development Aid of chapter I on the concept of a purely technical development aid oriented towards western standards is also applicable to this case.

21

I I I : I n f o r m a l R ese ttl emen t i n D a r e s s a l a a m, Ta n za n i a

24

Overview The redevelopment of the harbour district in Daressalaam, Tanzania from 2004 to 2012, led to the resettlement and eviction of 36,000 inhabitants of Informal Settlements (fig. 24). Besides the measures taken by the government to deal with the evicted people the Tanzania Federation of the Urban Poor and the Centre for Community Initiatives started their own resettlement programme for those affected people who were not supported by the government. In doing so, they used a “community-driven approach to urban development (Ndezi 2009a:87).� The study will discuss the spatial impact of the two resettlement programs, in particular the latter one.

Description of the Place Daressalaam, the capital of Tanzania, is located at the Indian Ocean (fig. 25). Its harbour is a very important junction for the international commerce of the landlocked African countries1 (Mero 2011:1). This com22

merce takes up about 50% of the total trade volume of the harbour (Mero 2011:4) and increased strongly between 2001 and 2002.2 In spite of Daressalaams large industry sector (Mero 2011:2), the agriculture is the most important economy of Tanzania: 63% of the total population is primarily engaged in it, and more than 50% of the country’s GDP are accounted to it (Ndezi 2009:3). However, the majority of the urban population is engaged in the Informal Economy (UN-HABITAT 2013). The earnings in the agriculture sector are low and the ones in the Informal Economy are unsteady.

As a consequence of this, up to 50% of the total population lives beyond the poverty line.3 Tanzania experienced a rapid urban growth in the last 50 years (fig. 26). In 2007, for instance, 14 times more people lived in urban areas, than in 1967,4 and in 2013 it was a quarter of Tanzanias total population (ibid.). The population increase and a strong annual urban growth rate of 7 to 11% (ibid.) led to the demand of 80,000 urban dwellings per year. About 61,000 or 76% of those are tenements (Ndezi 2009:5). This high

44.8 MM 22.9 Bn

25

70%

MM 50 45

60%

za

nia

Inform. Settlem. Growth Rate in Daressalam

40

pT an

30

20

10 Pop Daressalaam

4.5 MM 0

1960

1985

2010

0% 26

Fig. 24: A partly cleared Informal Settlement next to a development in Daressalaam.

Fig. 25: Daressalaam is the capitol of Tanzania and is located at the Indian Ocean.

Fig. 26: A diagram comparing the population growth of Tanzania and Daresalaam to the growth rate of Informal Settlements in Daressalaam.

23

GDP

Population

(2) Daressalaam Resettlement

Po

0.32 Bn

Cocoa paste not defatted

TANZANIA

Population

1.81 Bn

Gold

Cocoa beans, whole

share of tenements points out, that in Tanzania, as well as we have seen in Ghana (chapter II), there is few private property. A majority of the population lives in Informal Settlements: In 2009, it were about 59% throughout Tanzania (Ndezi 2009a:70). The share is generally higher in cities than on the countryside, whereby 70% 100% of Daressalaam are afof the 4 million inhabitants fected (Ndezi 2009:1). This high portion is due to the design of the property law, which makes it hard for people to get access to private property: The land of Tanzania is, generally speaking, owned by the public and is vested in the President (UN-HABITAT 2009:29).

However, access to land is given by three distinctive kinds: The Statutory Tenures, the traditional Customary Tenures and the Informal Tenures (ibid.). The first one is a long term lease for a maximum of 99 years by granting a “Right of Occupancy” certificate by the state (Ndezi 2009a:78-79). If the property is located within an urban administrative district and the tenant doesn’t own an officially recognized Right of Occupancy then it is called an Informal Tenure. The traditional Customary Tenure is done by carrying out customary law by a community (cf. definition at footnote 9 in section The Emergence of Informal Settlements of chapter II) and not by owning an official certificate. In 1998 the Court of Appeals ruled that the ownership of urban land by customary law is illegal.5 This turned 70% of Daressalaams dwellers into squatters, and therefore pushed them into illegality (UN-HABITAT 2009:29-30). Now the legal occupation of land by Customary Law can only happen outside of urban districts. Acquiring a Right of Occupancy and a building permission is expansive and time consuming (Ndezi 2009:1), hence the common way of acquiring land is done by Customary Tenure outside and Informal Tenure inside city boundaries.

Therefore we have to conclude that there are only two legal kinds of possessing land in Tanzania and one of them is only valid if the property is outside the city, but because city boarders are shifting outwards due to the rapid urban growth the formerly rightful possessed Customary Tenures are rendered illegal by this (UN-HABITAT 2009:30). Furthermore the state has the right to expropriate every property,6 if it is in the common interest of the country. This includes a protocol for compensation, but only for those who have a valid Right of Occupancy document (Ndezi 2009a:80). The attempts done by the state to improve the situation of Informal Settlements were not successful: There have been clearings during the 60ies to make way for highstandard buildings for the urban poor, but because of the high social and economical cost of the approach lesser dwellings have been constructed than people turned homeless by the clearings. It became obvious 3.44 Bn

32.2 Bn GDP

Population

24.4 MM

(1) Accra Settlement Upgrade

that tis approach is unsustainable (Ndezi 2009a:78).

Since 2004 the state attempts to regulate Informal Settlements by issuing temporary occupation licences, but only 270,000 licences have been distributed in Daressalaam between 2004 and 2008 (UN-HABITAT 2009:30). This is little compared to the estimated 2.7 million informal dwellers in Daressalaam in 2007 (Ndezi 2009:1), but is chiefly due to the high administrative effort which is attended by the issuing.

The affected harbour area Kurasini Ward is located at a bay of Daressalaam, nearby the centre of the city.

In it’s five settlement areas, there live about 36,000 inhabitants (Bachmayer 2012:8), which mainly reside there, because the rents are lower than in the rest of the city (Home. Int. 2013b), and because its industry offers a lot formal and informal occupation possibilities. The settlements occupies 195 hectare (30%) of Kurasini Ward. 35 to 80% of those are informal.7 The harbour itself takes up about 332 hectare (50%) of the total area (Mero 2011:6-8). Due to the weak building sector in Tanzania and because the National Housing Cooperation, which is the only public organization that is responsible for the creation of housing space, had not managed to create enough dwellings for the migrating and increasing urban population, most individuals built dwellings on the empty properties and in the building gaps (Ndezi 2009:5). But the situation of those Informal Settlements is precarious: The waste water disposal is weak and oxidation ponds are adjoining it and a market (fig. 27-28). During strong rainfall the untreated content of the ponds are flooding both, 24

what increases the danger of infections. Furthermore the water supply is done by power driven pump wells, which fail during power jams and therefore water shortage happens regularly (Mero 2011:11).

1. Malawi, Zambia, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, East-DRC (Mero 2011:1).

2. The total trading volume of the harbour fluctuated between 3.7 and 4.4 million tons between 1993 and 2001. From 2001 to 2002 it increased by 22% to 5MM tons (Mero 2011:5 Chart No. 2.2).

3. UN-HABITAT (2013) mentions that 50% of Tanzanias population has an income lower than USD 1 a day. Ndezi (2009:3) speaks about 36% of the total and 50% of the urban population in Informal Settlements of Daressalaam (Ndezi 2009a:77-78). The real figure is probably between.

4. 1967: 685,000 (6.4%); 2002: MM 7.6 (22.6%); 2007: MM 9.5 (Ndezi 2009:5); 5. „no person has the right to own urban land under customary law [and that] anyone who owns land in an urban area without a granted right of occupancy was a squatter without title (Kironde and Lusugga, 2009 in UN-HABITAT 2009:29-30).“ 6. Land Act of 1999: Residential Licences; These licences are valid for six month to twelve years and can be renewed (UN-HABITAT 2009:30).

7. Mero (2011:6) states in the official redevelopment statement of the government about 35% Informal Settlements in Kurasini Ward. Ndezi (2009:6) and Bachmayer (2012:6), both part of CCI, are speaking about 70 to 80%.

27 Fig. 27: In the foreground of the image is a building site, where once was an Informal Settlement. An existing one is in the upper left part of the image. Next to it are the three oxidation ponds with a total surface area of 3.7 hectare (Mero 2011:11).

Fig. 28: A figure ground plan illustrates the intervention done by the governments harbor redevelopment to the settlement structure. It also locates the oxidation ponds within the settlement.

28

25

Description of the Project

29

30

26

The main reasons for the redevelopment of the harbour area is the increasing cargo traffic and the non-harbour-compatible occupations of the area in Kurasini Ward, both mentioned in section Description of the Place. The most conflicting ones are the Informal Settlements, which are frequently built within high risk zones, adjoining train tracks, oil and normal storage buildings (Mero 2011:1). These places are overcrowded and narrow (Home. Int. 2013b), which renders emergency missions nearly impossible, because vehicles get stuck due to the narrowness of the streets, and furthermore are highly fire hazardous. In particular the latter endangers not only the inhabitants, but also the harbour itself: A fire would destroy goods and limit the port operations, which hinders the growth of it and repelles investors.

Informal Settlements are regularly cleared and their inhabitants expelled, if the harbour grows. This led in Kurasini Ward to a population decrease of 4,000 people (Mero 2011:4), whereas the total population of Daressalaam increased by 82% between 1988 and 2000 (fig. 26). The redevelopment plans to extend the harbour by 68 hectare. The settlement area will be decreased by 83 hectare, what almost exclusively affects Informal Settlements (Mero 2011:12-13) (fig. 2930). Comparing the land usage schemes (fig. 31-32) elucidates the extension of the port area between 2009 and 2012: Some of the settlements have been already cleared and the unoccupied areas, as well as those became empty by the clearance are now occupied by port facilities. By this, the areas allocated to it are not exclusively filled up by buildings, but are rather used for the temporary storage and sorting of cargo which is an important key for a frictionless port operation (Ndezi 2009a:81, Mero 2011:1) (fig. 29-30). The spatial consequence of this is that formerly dense settled areas become fenced empty spaces which – dependent on the current cargo volume of the port – are either empty barren land or with cargo crowded spaces. Either way, both dominate the urban landscape (fig. 27-28, 31-32).

The IFC (2002) Handbook for Preparing a Resettlement Action Plan recommends to choose a resettlement destination close to the place of origin to avert breaking existing economic and social connections. If this is not possible, then a place has to be found, that has comparable income and social structures (Ndezi 2009a:80). The government of Tanzania promised to resettle the affected people with little social disruption.8 Comparing this with its intervention introduces two discrepancies: Firstly, the Ministry of Lands has announced to only compensate the building owners (ibid.:82) what produces big social problems, because

70% of all inhabitants of Kurasini Ward are tenants and not owners (Ndezi 2009:6). Therefore a main part of the inhabitants doesn’t get a compensation. Their only way to claim an entitlement to it can be done by their landlords (Ndezi 2009a:82), though the latter will probably avoid this, because the compensation budget is way too low: Ndezi (ibid.) estimates the budget, which is necessary to compensate for the whole port area at USD 70MM. In contrast to this, the Ministry of Lands only appointed USD 840,000 to it (Mero 2011:16).

A further side effect of this is that the government is not able to compensate the affected landlords within the 6 month time limit (Ndezi 2009a:83), which is laid down by law. Moreover the government is forced to sell some of the cleared properties to use a part of the profit to compensate the expropriated landlords (ibid.:82). This delay slows down the advancement of the resettlement. Secondly, the governments resettlement destination areas Kitunda and Kibada are on the other side of the harbour bay (fig. 35) and there is no bridge connecting both sides. Therefore the resettled inhabitants are cut off of the port area. A bridge is proposed by Mero (2011:14-15) which connects both bay banks, but there is no evidence of a construction start (2013).9 The redevelopment arrangements of the government don’t support or consider the needs of the majority of the affected people. Therefore a part of the evicted resettle at the city’s periphery (Ndezi 2009a:83) or on the last free spots in the imperiled settlement.

That yields a strong redensification of the existing Informal Settlements in Kurasini Ward (fig. 28, 33-34).

A reason for this is the circumstance that a major part of the inhabitants are too dependent from the port economy to separate from it,10 and as a consequence rather resettle in the building gaps of the existing Informal Settlements nearby their former residence.11 However, this redensification is only a short-term solution, because the redevelopment scheme plans to remove all Informal Settlements in Kurasini Ward (fig.

29-30) whereby these high dense ones are also going to be cleared. If the government would have explained the scheme to its full extend to the affected inhabitants, provided a place to resettle which has a similar economy as the place of origin or one from which the inhabitants can commute to the port easily, and compensate the tenants according to their lost and in time, then there would not have been such a strong redensification within an already imperiled area.

The Tanzania Federation of the Urban Poor (TFUP) developed together with the Centre for Community Initiatives (CCI) an additional solution for this unconsidered 70% of the affected population: TFUP created a community savings and loan scheme (UN-HABITAT

31

32

Fig. 29: The land use prior to the redevelopment in Kurasini Ward. The bold white line outlines the Informal Settlements.

Fig. 30: Planned land use (the redevelopment scheme).

Fig. 31: Settlement and industry areas in Kurasini Ward prior to the execution of the redevelopment scheme in 2009.

Fig. 32: AM in 2012. During the execution.

27

33

28

Fig. 33: A figure ground plan of Kurasini Ward in 2004.

The black solids are Informal Buildings. The yellow ones are industry buildings like storage depots.

Fig. 34: AM in 2012. Mind the large fenced open areas (yellow lines) surrounding the cleared buildings (black outline). The newly developed informal buildings (red solid) are filling the gaps of the existing settlements and are therefore densifying it, what makes the living conditions worse.

34

29

35

2013) and is mobilizing the affected inhabitants together with CCI since 2004 (Ndezi 2009a:81). Every member of the savings scheme puts a small amount of money into the pot every month, thereby the federation becomes much more credit-worthy than a single member, because it has – due to the number of its members – a much higher equity capital than one member by itself. As a result, it gets better credit terms from banks. 2007 TFUP acquired a 30 hectare property in Chamazi (ibid.:84-85), which is 9km to the southwest of the harbour (fig. 35). The property was mainly barren land and the roads network was weakly developed prior to the resettlement (fig. 36, 39, 42), but within one year a widely ramified traffic network was established which forms parcels between the streets (fig. 37,40).

On these the inhabitants are slowly developing their houses. At the same time, the development of houses is happening much faster outside the plot (fig. 39-41).

The socioeconomic data collected in Kurasini Ward by TFUP indicates, that the plot sizes of Informal Settle30

ments are between 60 and 200m2. Therefore the real plot sizes of Informal Settlements are 2 to 6.5 times smaller than the standard laid down by law (Ndezi 2009a:83-84).12 This is a problem for creating low budget dwelling space, because it hinders the creation of small buildings, which would be in accordance with the budget of the inhabitants of former Informal Settlements. Finally TFUP managed to convince the government to allow smaller plot sizes for Chamazi (ibid.:86).

There, 300 dwellings will be built for the displaced families and 200 for renting (Home. Int. 2013). A horticulture market, workshops, a health center, a school and a roofed market will also be constructed (UN-HABITAT 2013). The market and the tenements will generate income (UN-HABITAT 2009:39), what is going to accelerate the growth of the settlement and the local economy. The market (fig. 48) has a flexible concept which fits to the needs of a broad bandwidth of merchants: It offers stalls which can be rented per month or week, but also a central empty space where people

36

37

38 Fig. 35: A map representing the main roads of Daressalaam, the settlement and industry area, the demolished area in the city’s centre, the two resettlement destination areas defined by the government (Kitunda and Kibada), and the discussed resettlement destination area defined by the NGO (Chamazi). Compare the shortest commutation paths between the resettlement areas and the harbour.

Fig. 36: Settlement area and streets of Chamazi in 2004.

Fig. 37: AM. in 2005. Notice the rapid street development.

Fig. 38: AM. in 2012.

31

39 Fig. 39: A figure ground plan of Chamazi in 2004.

Fig. 40: AM in 2005. Again, notice the rapid street development.

Fig. 41: AM in 2012.

can offer their goods for a daily charge or for people who don‘t need much space. It is flexible, because it’s construction is an one storey column grid – similar to a warehouse. The market stands are divided by easily mountable security screens between the columns, and are therefore easily adjustable to the needs of the merchants (Bachmayer 2012:11). For this reason, this market outmatches the retail spaces in Amui Djor (cf. chapter II, Evaluation of the Project).

Small adaptable building systems have been developed in order to reduce the costs of the buildings (ibid.:18) (fig. 44-47, 49-54). This is very important, because this allows completing a less expensive inhabitable basic module of the whole building within a shorter time than completing the final building, whose financing can take several years. The detached houses are built close to each other (fig. 43), because the narrow streets give shade during the hot days in Daressalaam, the sharing of walls reduces the building costs, and it also reduces the construction and maintenance costs of the infrastructure for the whole settle32

ment.13 Only few residents own a car, therefore open public spaces are in favor to parking lots. Usually free spaces are going to be illegally occupied by buildings in Informal Settlements to gain additional income by leasing them. In contrary to that, CCI expects that if a free space belongs to a community (fig. 44-47, 52-54) then the common interest in it is likely to prevent it from getting occupied (Bachmayer 2012:19-20).

The inhabitants are involved in many parts of the development and construction of the settlement: They assist in the selection of the building materials, take part in the foundation works, and even produce construction material by themselves (Home. Int. 2013c, Home. Int. 2013a, Home. Int. 2013b).14 This increases their satisfaction towards the buildings and makes it easier for them to identify with the place. Additionally, the growth of the settlement is accelerated, because the construction costs are reduced and a main part of the money stays within the community, or because the members are getting interdependent by promised debts: If a community member is participating at the

40

41

33

Fig. 42: Barren land in Chamazi in 2010.

Fig. 43: Construction site of the development in Chamazi in 2010.

construction works, then either he gets money from the building owner or the latter promises the former to help him constructing his building as well.

A downside of the place is that the part of the population which is dependent from the harbour has to commute 13km to get there (fig. 35). This is especially bad for people who are engaging mostly in the Informal Economy, because their earnings are low and irregular. Commuting costs time and extra money.

The more difficult it gets for those to keep up with the engagement in the harbour district, the more likely a new economy will emerge in Chamazi. If the resettled population would have found a similar economy in Chamazi as it is in Kurasini Ward, then the integration would happen quicker and more frictionless. Because this is not the case, the people have to create their own economy, adapt their occupation to the economy of the new place, or continue working in Kurasini Ward under more difficult circumstances than before. All three scenarios can be found within the project: Fatma, a resettled mother, started to produce bricks for the settlement buildings (Home. Int. 2013b). Others work as builders in the settlement. This would not have been possible, if the houses would be constructed by com34

panies from the building industry, because the money paid to them would have been dropped out of the community’s money flow and therefore necessitates a capital balancing: Either by redistribution of capital within the settlement, by injecting capital of outsiders like banks and funding organizations, or by an income increase of the inhabitants who are working outside of the settlement. A redistribution is not advisable, because it would lead to an imbalance within the community, what produces social pressure. An increase of the money the people earn outside their community is very unlikely, because the resettlement made it harder for them to keep up their business in the harbour than it was before. The injection of outside capital by donations and bank loans would be the most practicable option, but it would not be a sustainable one, because it hinders the emergence and growth of a local economy. The inhabitants would remain dependent of the fundings. It is ironical that the micro-economy of the settlement benefits from the weak building industry of Tanzania. Rose Liheta has established a small shop in Chamazi, where she sells goods for the daily need (Home. Int. 2013c). This would also not be possible, if big discounters would be in the neighborhood. From

42

43

35

44

48

this it follows that the weak infrastructure of Chamazi

45

46

47

36

was an opportunity for the resettled people to create their own infrastructure, which enables an inwardfocused circulation of capital that nurtures the settlement. On the contrary, the husband of Constansia commutes on a daily basis to the harbour to work as a painter, but he hopes to find work close to Chamasi in the near future (Home. Int. 2013a).

It is noteworthy, that the settlement of Chamazi is not connected to the city sewer, because it is too remote from it (Ndezi 2009a:86). Hence, the inhabitants have built a weed waste-water-processing-plant to treat the sewage on a sustainable basis (Home. Int. 2013c).

The construction works of the settlements started in March 2010 (Bachmayer 2012:10), but the high inflation rate in Tanzania (23%) stopped it. Nevertheless, the people have started to live inside the unfinished houses. In 2012 there has been only one complete building (Bachmayer 2012:16). In this context, the design concept which splits up the whole buildings into smaller stages is clearly superior to standard building concepts, because it is more independent against extrinsic influences.

8. “[...E]nsure that the affected families are resettled in acceptable manner with little social disruption (Mero 2011:1).�

9. A bridge, which connects both bay banks was already planned in 1988 to extend the port to the eastern bank of the bay (Mero

Fig. 44: The layout of a fully developed Type D building block.

Fig. 45: A visualisation of Type D’s first development stage.

Fig. 46: The second development stage encloses the inner courtyard, rendering it private.

Fig. 47: The final development stage.

Fig. 48: The layout of the market building. Notice the free space in the centre and the cells - which can be divided on demand - surrounding it.

Fig. 49: A Layout of the first stage of a Type D dwelling. It contains a bathroom and a single sleeping / living room.

Fig. 50: The second development stage adjoins a separate bedroom to the dwelling.

Fig. 51: The final development stage adds another bedroom on the opposite side of the dwelling.

Fig. 52: A visualisation of the first stage of a Type C building block.

The arrangement of the buildings forms a neighbourhood with streetlike yards.

Fig. 53: The second development stage emphasises the linear streetlike character.

Fig. 54: The final development stage breaks the linearity of the arrangement. Compare the different accesses of the inner courtyard with the Type C building block.

2011:2). Given that till today (2013) no bridge was built and due to the fact that the bridging would have been a much more lucrative infrastructure development in 1988 than now – just connecting both banks for the sake of granting the resettled population access to the harbour area – it is very unlikely to be built in the next years at all.

10. 85% of the harbour inhabitants are working in the Informal Economy, which renders them dependent from the industry located in the harbour area. By relocating them they lose their source of income (Ndezi 2009:13-14). For example, the Informal Economy includes: “Small petty business”, grocery commerce, secondhand trade, handcraft, carpenter (ibid.:5, Home. Int. 2013a).

11. Hawa Ramadhani, a tenant says that „...the resettlement of Kurasini has indeed affected our future plans. Myself, I am a widow with five children and have always depended on small business close to the harbour for my livelihood. With this eviction, I don‘t know how I will survive with my children. The government needs to help as well (Ndezi 2009a:83).“ 12. Standard high-density plot size = 400m2 13. Water, sewage water, electricity, streets 14. The inhabitants are producing bricks on site by using simple methods. To manufacture one brick costs USD 0.19 and it is sold

by USD 0.22. The machine costs USD 280 and can produce between 300 and 500 pieces in 8h (Bachmayer 2012:12-13).

Consequently, such a machine could be paid off within 31 days.

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Development Aid Structure The participants are: Tanzania Federation of the Urban Poor (TUFP), the Centre for Community Initiatives (CCI), Homeless International, Temeke Municipality, National Housing and Building Research Agency, and UN-HABITAT-SUF (Bachmayer 2012:7). TUFP is part of the Slum Dwellers International (SDI), and is together with the CCI the most important project partner. The SDI is an international network of local urban poor organizations that exchange ideas and experiences about the development of their projects.

In practice, the experiences made by South African organizations were the starting decisive of TUFP for the saving schemes in 2004. In 2009 there where already 50 saving schemes with a total value of USD 52,000 and 1,700 to 2,000 active members in Tanzania (Ndezi 2009a:80). The NPO CCI was founded in 2004, has a staff of five people from different areas of expertise,15 and 5,000 members. It focuses on the development of sustainable solutions for the “urban poor” (Ndezi 2009:11-12).

15. Engineers, architects, sociologist, urban planners and Accountants.

Relationship Development Aid and Space Compared to the little funding, the development aid has transformed the space strongly: Infrastructures, buildings, and a local economy have been emerged on an area in Chamazi, which has been barren land before. The growing inflation in Tanzania and the low portion of loan capital are decelerating the growth of the settlement. But the small steps design concept – which suits the context very well – made it possible that not yet finished buildings are inhabitable. Furthermore the residents can identify themselves with it and are proud of what they have reached so far. If the design would have followed common methods, then Chamazi would be full of uninhabitable building shells.

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I V: M a n g r o v e Affo resta ti on , Se n e g a l

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Overview Between 2006 and 2011 one of the world’s biggest Mangroves afforestation programs took place in Senegal (Sall 2012: 2). The NGO Oceanium Dakar was able to mobilize more than 190,000 people from over 400 villages in a participative process to take part in this project (Oceanium-Dakar 2013). A basis for a 108km2 artificial landscape has been created (ibid., UNFCCCCDM 2012:16) which now may change Senegal’s future land use extensively. The project was supported at various points of time by different companies which used the cooperation either for marketing reasons or the trade with carbon-credits.

Mangroves and Human Habitat Mangroves grow primarily in tropical and subtropical coast areas as those in Senegal, where in 2006 they covered a surface of 1,287km2 (ibid.:24). The 40

worldwide population however has decreased in the last decades. From 1980 until 2006 Senegal has lost 403km2 Mangrove forest.2 Yet, they are very important for Senegal’s ecosystem: They extract salt from the sea water which during high tide floods the river deltas and moves upcountry. A lower salt content makes the cultivation of these regions possible (fig. 55).

The reasons for the great decrease are mainly manmade,3 however also result from exceptional climatic phenomena: The drought in the 70ies and 80ies were disastrous. Thereto comes a destructive farming and a street development which is not appropriate for the environment.4 Solely in Casamance Delta 67,000 hectare of Mangrove forest have disappeared since 1980 (Sall 2012:4) (fig. 56-57).

Additionally a global relation has been found between the loss of mangrove forests and an increasing scarcity of resources in the affected areas (JG-Kairo 2001:383). This shortage increases poverty of those who depend on agriculture: „When we plant the rice

now, it doesn‘t grow because there is so much salt in the water (IRIN 2008)“. Not only the agriculture is suffering but also the water economy worries about the waning biodiversity: „We sell fish, shrimp and oysters in the market and can earn up to US$20 a day from this, which greatly benefits our families[.] Now it is difficult for fish-sellers [...] to earn even US$4 a day because there is so little fish left to sell (IRIN 2008).“ (fig.

58). This affects especially women, who are greatly involved in the fisheries.

From an ecologically point of view, a difference must be made between afforestation and reforestation.

Afforestation is some kind of restoration, where the forest is not restored to its original state but rather to a desired state. The aim of most afforestation projects include restoring lost habitat, but also improving soil, protecting coasts against erosion or making harvest more efficient (JG-Kairo 2001: 383). In most cases the latter concerns a change of habitat, which must be regarded critically, as it changes an already working habitat into one which better fits human needs, but also bears ecological risks in it (Erftemeijer 1999). On the example of the afforestation of intertidal mudflat land Paul Erftemeijer (ibid..) explains how a for global processes important habitat has been transformed under great efforts and with little chances for success and therefore endangering a working ecosystem. John Eichelsheim, project manager of IDEE-Casamance is aware of this: „The more mangroves there are here, the more fish, shrimp and oysters there will be to eat and sell.“, but „Locals need to be very clear where and how to plant each, otherwise it risks damaging the ecosystem.” (IRIN 2008). Most of the areas affected by the mangrove afforestation program are degenerated mangrove forests and therefore not foreign to mangroves.

In general increasing the mangrove population is in the interest of the affected people, but a “the more the better”-approach poses a great risk on the long term.

Nevertheless, from an ecological point of view the question should always be answered in the first place why at the affected areas there is no natural growth anymore, before concerning an re- or afforestation.

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1. Before 1959 75% of the tropic coastal areas have been covered by mangrove forests globally. Since 1983 its share has declined to 50% (JG-Kairo 2001: 384).

2. 1980: 1690km2, 2006: 1287km2 mangrove forests (UNFCCCCDM 2012:24). This is a loss of 2% in 26 years and in average 16km2 per year.

3. Aquaculture such as shrimp farms present worldwide the greatest risks for mangrove forests. In Tanga and Ngomeni salines have left deserted areas which are so salty that a reforestation

58 Fig. 55: Vast rice fields embraced by mangrove forests in Senegal.

Fig. 56: A dead mangrove forest.

Fig. 57: Shrinking mangrove woods in Senegal.

Fig. 58: Oysters sticking to mangrove roots.

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with mangroves is not possible anymore. In Zambezi (Mozambique) the growth of the cities and construction along the coastal regions has led to a decline of mangroves (JG-Kairo 2001:384).

4. If dams are constructed for building streets, which divide rivers, mutflats dry out and therefore mangroves loose their habitat.

Description of the Place The affected region is near the coast and the river deltas of Thies, Fatick, Kaloack in Sine Saloum and Ziguinchor, Kolda in Casamance (UNFCCC-CDM 2012: 4-5). It is mainly rural (fig. 59-60), with small settlements situated in greater distance to each other.

However, there are also a few small cities. The size of the farmlands differs and primarily rice is cultivated.

The farmlands are big and connected or they are made up of differently sized fragments. As agriculture plays an important role, multiple settlements are grouped around big rice fields. In general, farming takes up much more area than the villages who cultivate them (fig. 61).

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Project Description

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Settlement

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Fig. 67-68 Farming Farming

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Afforestation 61

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The aim of the project is to restore destroyed mangrove areas and afforest other regions. At the same time, a part of the population should be trained, so they become able to cultivate the mangrove forests in a sustainable way (ibid.:3). The afforestation itself does not generate any additional income, as the forest can not be used to generate a profitable forestry. However, the developers hope for a profit-bringing side effect: The desalination of the sea water should make the soil more profit-yielding for rice cultivation. Additionally, the roots of the mangroves are a popular habitat for fish, mussels, crustaceans and improves the soil, which protects against erosion (ibid.:49, 51).5 As Mangroves can store up to 90% CO2 of its mass (Sall 2012:4), they can gain a commercial value through a carbon trade agreement. This was a key argument when looking for investors, which we will see later on.

This development aid project is Senegal’s first afforestation project, which has been developed together by local communities, a local NGO (Oceanium Dakar) and international experts (IUCN) (UNFCCC-CDM 2012:27). The knowledge of experts was very important for the project implementation, because the choice of where the afforestation project takes place is very difficult, as multiple criteria must be met for a maximum of seedlings to survive. In Tanzania for example many afforestation attempts failed, as the wrong mangrove types were selected for over-salted and over-acidified

soils (JG-Kairo 2001:385).6 In 2009 missing technical knowledge from Oceanium’s side led also to many failures in afforestation. Only the financial support by Danone Fund for Nature in 2009 made it possible to involve IUCN in the project. It were responsible for the selection of tree species and appropriate afforestation areas (UNFCCC-CDM 2012:27). Oceanium Dakar took care of supplying the infrastructure and took over the coordination. Without it the population would have never been able to implement an afforestation project of this size. During the realization phase the population was greatly involved, which means that they took part in the preselection of the areas and tree species as well as they were paid for collecting the seeds and planting seedlings (fig. 62) (ibid.:12, 54).

Although involving the population in the implementation of the afforestation project saves time and money knowledge transfer is the key, as the success and speed of the process is mainly dependent on how much of the needed knowledge the population has and how complex the workflow is. Therefor the population is trained in “planting techniques, management techniques, and conservation protection measures”

by Oceanium (ibid.:16). The knowledge transfer is mutual: Oceanium gains new knowledge through the discussion with the population and their experience which changes the procedures of the NGO (ibid.). The participation of the population at the project allowed a greater acceptance of the change of their habitat (JGKairo 2001:385). Some even say that it helped to bring peace to the region of Casamance, which has been affected in civil war (UNFCCC-CDM 2012:53). Within three years more than 180,000 people have been participating in the project (Oceanium-Dakar 2013).7 To achieve this, a region-wide and fast communication was essential for the mobilization and organization of the workforce. Solely in 2009 80,000 people in 322 villages had to be coordinated for three months (ibid.). The only available long distance communication tool was the radio, which plays an important role in Senegal’s society, because there are only radios on the countryside. Oceanium invited once or twice a week on five different radio stations, for 9 weeks in a row influential Senegalese people for a discussion in which they were talking about the importance of the project and the significance of the Mangroves for the region (UNFCCC-CDM 2012:14). A second communication tool was the cinéma-débat. It is a travelling cinema, that tours with multiple multimedia trucks through the country (fig. 65). Two months before the actual afforestation begins, it starts to elucidate the population. Firstly, attention is attracted from the visited community: For this a colorfully printed multimedia

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64 Fig. 59: Satellite image of a rural settlement.

Fig. 60: A smaller settlement in the same region.

Fig. 61: A small settlement cultivating the adjacent rice fields. Notice the ratio of the former and the latter. The white solid marks an afforested area (fig. 67-68).

Fig. 62: Local participants planting the mangrove seedlings.

Fig. 63: A colorfully printed multimedia truck.

Fig. 64: A cinéma-débat screening.

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truck (fig. 63) drives through the settlement or village, playing music at high volume, and broadcasting messages (Rouviere 2009: 4:16 - 4:55). When enough inhabitants have gathered together on a central place, the open-air cinema starts (fig. 64). In this movie the attention of the people is drawn to the problems of the concerned areas nearby the village and the procedure of an afforestation are shown. Afterwards, afforestation techniques are explained. Finally there is a discussion and the participants are recruited (UNFCCC-CDM 2012:12-13).

The afforestation follows a simple structure: After the afforestation zones have been selected, seeds of existing mangrove forests are yielded. This paid work is done mostly by women and increases their income.

When the seeds and workers arrive at the target area, the actual afforestation begins. Thereby the workers plant the seedlings in a matrix of 1x1m into the muddy ground (Sall 2012: 3-4, Oceanium-Dakar n.d.) (fig. 66).

5. In Florida Mangrove afforestation is done in order to protect the coasts against erosion (JG-Kairo 2001: 384).

6. Only little fruitful pioneer species would have been able to survive and improve the soil.

7. 2008: 32,500, 2009: 45,000, 2010: 110,000 people.

The Structure of the Development Aid Besides the already mentioned project participants Oceanium Dakar and IUCN, there are eight more known partners: In 2008 Yves Rocher Foundation was supporting the project, in 2009 it was Insolites bâtisseurs and the Danone fund for Nature. The latter made a Carbon Trade Agreement with the local NGO Oceanium Dakar, where the company saved approximately EUR 1.4MM of CO2 taxes.8 Additionally, the company used this project for advertising (Rouviere 2009, Danone 2013, Hegarat 2011). Furthermore Evian, Fondation d’Entreprise Voayageurs, Fondation Maria & Alain Phillippson, FIBA, Fonds Français pour l’Envritonnement Mondial and Kirène supported the project (Oceanium-Dakar n.d.:12).

8. During the agreement (2008-2037) 2,704t per year and in total 81,132.86t CO2 are bound (UNFCCC-CDM 2012:21-22). The CO2 tax for French companies was EUR 17 per t CO2 in 2009 (Chrisafis 2009). This saves the company EUR 46,000 per year.

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Fig. 65: A map representing the places where the afforestation and the accompanying actions of the project took place. The NGO Oceanium Dakar has its headquarter in Dakar, but also established two regional project bases for the coordination of the execution. The red spots mark an afforestation where we could not find any visual evidence of it’s success.

On the contrary, the yellow ones show afforestations with found visual evidence (fig. 67-70). Both indicate by their diameter the size of the afforestation, which were evaluated by the official afforestation documentary (c.f. UNFCCCCDM 2012:59-83). The blue spots locate the places where cinéma-débats took place. The four frames mark the places which were analysed by us in detail. They were selected, because the found visual evidence and the vicinity to villages where cinéma-débats took place and rice fields appeared to us more interesting than others. The frame with the caption fig. 71-73 was also selected, because it is a place where a natural afforestation took place, what enables us to compare its spatial outcomes with the artificial ones.

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The Spatial Consequence Although statistics foresee a mortality rate as high as 75% for the seedlings, the afforestation leads to a mangrove culture whose artificial origin can clearly be differentiated from the natural landscape by the gridlike distribution of the seedlings and their similar size resulting from being planted in the same year (fig. 6670). This provided between 2006 and 2011 the basis for the development of an artificial forest of a minimum size of 108km2.9 Should experts be right10 and mangroves are land-builders, then a part of the unused intertidal mudflat could be directly used for agriculture or buildings in the future.

Nevertheless, mangroves desalinate the sea water, which moves country inwards during the high tides. It is also assumed that besides the water quality also the biodiversity will increase significantly (UNFCCC-CDM 2012:48, JG-Kairo 2001:386). This may lead to the growth of the rural areas and slow down the migration into cities. If the CO2 taxes are getting higher in the industrial nations, the investment in mangrove forests will also become more lucrative for other companies which again would speed up the mangrove afforestation. Moreover, if the CO2 tax laws are laid down in a way that makes it possible to rent CO2 through a preservation agreement, then landscape becomes a trading good.

If we look at fallow grounds cultivated beforehand where mangrove afforestation took place naturally (fig.

71-73), a direct relationship between the cultivation of the changed landscape and the distribution of the mangroves can be observed: The afforestation takes place quicker in the man-made irrigation ditches of the rice fields than in the rice fields themselves. Therefore, the natural growth of the mangroves upon the artificial landscape gives reference to its earlier usage even decades later and therefore is a Third Landscape (Clement 2010).

9. 2008: 149.18ha (Oceanium-Dakar 2013), 2009: 1,699.88ha (UNFCCC-CDM 2012:16), 2010: 5,000ha, 2011: 4,000ha (Oceanium-Dakar 2013).

10. Mangroves weaken the tidal energy and the eroded material is partially retained by their roots what hardens the soil (JG-Kairo 2001:384-385, UNFCCC-CDM 2012:49, 51), but experts don’t agree upon whether or not they contribute to the yield of land (Erftemeijer 1999:2-3).

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68 Fig. 66: The 1x1m matrix of planted mangrove trees emphasise their artificial origin.

Fig. 67: A former rice field next to the settlement of figure 61 in May 2004.

Fig. 68: The same rice field in April 2012.

Fig. 69: A satellite image of an afforested area where we illustrate the directions of the planted tree matrix.

Fig. 70: An afforested area close to the sea with a clearly recognizable matrix.

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Discussion on the Relation Between Development Aid and Space The development aid project directly influenced the effects on the landscape. The more financial resources are available, the faster artificial mangrove forests are developed. If in addition, they gain continuously value through the carbon trade agreement for the population or the landowners, the transformation of the landscape accelerates even more. As mentioned, there are biologists who regard these fast afforestation programs rather critically as they can destroy working habitats like intertidal mudflats which are vital for the fishing industry and important food sources for migrating birds.

73 Fig. 71: A large area with former rice fields in April 2003. There are hardly any mangroves outside the areas outlined by the dashed line. The rice fields are outlined by a black solid line.

Fig. 72: The same area after years of natural afforestation in April 2012. Notice the strange artificial growth patterns of the emerged mangroves.

Fig. 73: A close-up of the area indicates the stronger growth of the mangroves inside the irrigation canals between the rice fields. Therefore we could say, that the mangroves utilise the artificial landscape for their spreading, but the mangroves don’t do it on conscious. So it is rather more a place, where the chances of survival are higher or where the seedlings get stuck. Nevertheless, more new mangroves are found within canals than on plain rice fields. Therefore the mangroves emphasise the artificiality of the landscape they overgrow.

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V: Da m D e v e l op men t in M e r o w e , S ud a n

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Overview The Merowe Dam was constructed between 2002 and 2009 in Southern Sudan. Currently it is the largest of its kind in Africa (Carroll 2011:2, ECCHR 2010:1).

Due to the size of the overall development, it has a huge impact on the local landscape, the settlement structure, and the life of 60,000 Sudanese people.1 But despite it’s immense spatial and social effects, it made a very important contribution to the electrification of the country by the duplication of it’s overall power production.2 China played a major role in the development aid process, because it is the second largest investor and it’s companies were the most important contractors during the construction.

1. The actual number of the affected people is uncertain: ECCHR (2010:1) estimates about 38,000 to 78,000, Failer (2011:15) speaks about 70,000 and Carroll (2011:2) mentions about 60,000 people. Therefore we suggest to estimate the size of the affected people to 60,000.

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2. In 2010 the dam produced 1,250MW, what equals to 60% of the power consumption of the Sudan (Failer 2011:10).

Description of the Region The Merowe Dam impounds the Nile, which runs through the Sudan to Egypt where it joins the Mediterranean Sea (fig. 75). In Egypt it becomes a large delta.

It’s headwaters are the White Nile,the Blue Nile, and the Atbara River.3 The floodplains along the river form very fertile areas and are therefore used for agriculture. Because of that it was possible for tribes to settle in otherwise deserted regions like the Sahara.

Despite two small towns - Merowe and Karima - the region is very rural. There are a lot of small villages and settlements, which align to the course of the Nile, and therefore form on both sides of it a stretched parallel settlement zone (fig. 78). Because the vicinity of the river is essential for surviving in hot and arid

Fig. 74: The completed Merowe Dam with its building site equipment in 2009.

Fig. 75: The map represents the course of the river Nile, which has its headwater in Ethiopia and in the Victoria Lake. It also shows similiar dam projects like the completed Aswan Dam in Egypt and the future Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. The huge border-crossing lake to the south of the Aswan Dam is Africa‘s largest artificial lake.

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areas like these,4 the settlement zone is narrow and never widens more than absolute necessary. Beside this, the people don’t have the resources to build large branched irrigation canals or water pipes to fertilise the back country.5 The natural branches of the Nile created several small and large islands which are inhabited (fig. 78, 83). The houses are adjacent to the floodplains and are one storey high court yard houses with 2 to 6 rooms (fig. 76) (Sayed 2007:34). The court yard is fortified by an one storey high wall (fig. 77, 91-92) to protect livestock from predators. The buildings are made of clay. Because the materials are autochthonous the residents extend or transform the building on demand to tailor it to their needs. The majority of the inhabitants is engaged in agriculture or trading (ibid:23, ECCHR 2010:1). Granaries are very important buildings within the towns (fig. 76), because the harvest fluctuates during the year. There is trading between the villages and the towns (Sayed 2007:34), but the trading routes are unpaved dirt roads (fig. 76). Only offroad vehicles are able to travel between the towns and the villages. An average trip to one of the towns, where the public administration, medical supply and schools are, takes up to three hours (ibid.).

The missing infrastructure and the fact that the towns were not able to create a good labour market were the main reasons which resulted in the decline of urban population in the region: Before the creation of the dam, Merowe was in a desolate condition. Most of the people found the city “disgusting�, and therefore rejected to live there (ibid.:23-24). The demand for paved 52

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Fig. 76: An autochthonous settlement before the creation of the reservoir. They are connected with each other by unpaved dirt roads. Therefore off-road vehicles are needed to manage the transport. The houses are mainly one storey high and surrounded by walls to protect the livestock from predators during the night. Notice the granary, where the harvested food is stored.

Fig. 77: A detail of one of those walled estates.

Fig. 78: The map displays a section of the course of the river Nile where the Merowe Dam has the most impact on space and landscape. The blue solid represents the former course of the river. The blue outlines the new course with the emerged reservoir to the north of the dam. Notice the evenly allocated existing settlements along both sides of the river, the sunken ones within the reservoirs, and the newly developed ones nearby existing ones or the ones, which emerged in totally new areas. Also mind the developed power grid, which supplies other places of the country with the produced power of the dam (Dongola to the nothwest, Karthoum to the south, Altbara to the west, and Port Sudan at the Red Sea (africa500-Pseudo 2007)).

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streets, secure water, and electricity supply was far away from being fulfilled by the public administration.

The unemployment rate was high and some houses were not occupied since more than 30 years. Just one single public autobus was connecting Merowe and Karima with other regions of the country once a day, and a travel to the federal capital took 12 hours (Sayed 2007:23-24).

In sum the situation of the region was defined by an underdeveloped infrastructure, shrinking and declining cities, and a predominant rural settlement structure aligned parallel to the Nile and separated randomly from each other by sinks and hills.

3. The White Nile has its headwaters in the Victoria Lake. The Blue Nile and the Atbara River have their origin in Ethiopia 4. The people collect the water for drinking and usage untreated from the Nile (Sayed 2007:36).

5. The lack of affordable electricity made it impossible to run pumping stations. But there were occasional diesel generators, which operated for some hours a day to run refrigerators in shops (ibid.:35).

Description of the Project The main reason for the development of the dam is the electrification of the country. Regarding this, the irrigation and flooding control capabilities of the dam, although it’s capacity is large enough to irrigate 380,000 hectare of farmland (Failer 2011:10),6 are of lesser importance (Sayed 2007:14). The reservoir of the Merowe Dam floods an area of about 500km2 (fig. 1, 80) and therefore creates the second largest industrial lake of Africa.7 The reservoir and the accompanying 54

arrangements directly influence an area of 6,364km2 (ECCHR 2010:1).8 Currently, two big dams are located at the Nile: the Aswan Dam in Egypt and the Merowe Dam, but Ethiopia is going to build the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on one of the headwaters of the Nile (fig. 75). It is going to be four times larger than the Merowe Dam and international observers call it to become “Africa’s most destructive dam project” (Carroll 2011:3). Furthermore 90% of the water allotment rights for the River Nile are divided up on Egypt and the Sudan by a treaty between them (ibid.).9 Due to the increased interest of Ethiopia in the usage of one of the Niles headwaters it becomes obvious that this could lead to huge disadvantages for Sudan and Egypt (fig. 75).10 But there would have been alternatives for the Sudan, one of the hottest countries in Africa: Solar energy, an independent way of power production with much less impact on landscape and ecology than dams. From a technological point of view it also would not had made a big difference, because the Sudan was as dependent from foreign countries and companies during the development of the Merowe Dam, as it would have been by developing a solar power plant. Only the question of how to store the power for peak times would have been left to solve. Comparing the risks with the mentioned possibilities of alternative energy production methods, the Sudan’s decision to produce energy by water power appears shortsighted.

6. 8.3MM m3 of water.

7. The biggest one is the Aswan Reservoir. That is the huge boarder-crossing lake next to the Merowe Reservoir on fig. 75.

8. A presidential decree expropriates 6,364km2 for the purpose of the Merowe Dam project in 2002 (ECCHR 2010:1).

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A0 1:500.000

1:25 Mio Water

9. Ethiopia was no contract partner during the negotiation in 1959, and therefore is not bound legally to the contract (Swain 2002).

10. Despite former disputes between Sudan, Egypt, and Ethiopia about the water allocation of the Nile, Sudan’s recent politics shifted away from Egypt towards a pro Ethiopia politic, expecting benefits from Ethiopia’s Dam project (Young 2013, Malone 2013).

Fig. 79: The new reservoir seen from the Dam. Fig. 80: A map that compares the former and the current river course. Notice the size of the reservoir (500km2) compared to the the former course and compare the size and amount of the (white) islands before and after the emerging of the reservoir. The upstream area of the dam is, as usual, transformed much larger than the downstream area.

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Spatial Impact The accompanying projects enhanced the infrastructure of the region in order to speed up the construction process of the dam: To get important foreign contractors quickly to the building site, the inner state airport in Merowe was demolished and the Merowe International Airport was built. Existing dirt roads have been tarred and new highways and bridges connecting Merowe with important places of the country have been constructed.11 These infrastructure upgrades, the need for getting people quickly to the working sites of the dam, and the creation of dam related jobs led to a growing transport service branch in Merowe (Sayed 2007:58): We mentioned in section Description of the Region that there was only one autobus connecting Merowe with the surrounding areas and the state capitol, but since 2007 additional private buses and vans are interconnecting the region (ibid.:25). Furthermore a building material production plant (fig. 74), a train station, and a workers settlement has been established next to the dam. The workers settlement, also called The Dam City, has a size of 25 hectare and consists of 70 Houses and a Hotel – both occupied by consultants and workers during the dam construction – a hospital, 56

a sports club, a mosque, a water treatment plant, and administration buildings (ibid.:15).

The creation of the reservoir destroyed traditional farmland which adjoined the Nile and was spreading out along it, but it also created artificial farmland on the downstream of the Nile (fig. 82). In this case artificial means that the farmland is rather arranged along manmade irrigation lines than following the natural course of the river. This led to the extension of farmland and settlements next to existing settlements (fig. 82A,B), but also to the creation of new farmland and settlements in complete barren land (fig. 82C).

Large-scale projects like this cause internal migrations if large parts of the population become seasonal labourer. If those find the conditions of the working place better than in their place of origin, then they start to settle down at the new place and cut the bounds of their former home. A good example for this process is the Aljazeera Project, also located in Sudan: It is Sudan’s largest agriculture project with a total size of MM 2 hectare. From 1973 to 74 336,000 seasonal labourer were employed to collect cotton. They settled down at Aljazeera later (ibid.:17-18). Likewise the rising labour

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82

Settlements 1:200.000 Water Canal Farm Land

Fig. 81: The downstream area with the settlements, which emerged because of the dam construction (red spots). The area outlined by a dashed line marks the area of figure 82.

Fig. 82: A map, that focuses on the transformation of the landscape and the settlements on the downstream area of the dam.

The displayed irrigation canals (blue lines) have been mainly developed during the dam construction. They became possible, because the dam supplies the needed electricity for the water pumps and it also provides the water for the irrigation canals by a second sluice used for irrigation and flood control.

Fig. 82A: In the town to the north of Merowe, the barren land was

82C

irrigated by the construction of water canals on the northern river bank, and former mud roads have been tarred or newly constructed. Furthermore the town expanded further into the barren land to the west. From top to bottom: 2004, 2012.

Fig. 82B: Merowe also got a huge boost by the construction of the dam: An airport, irrigation canals and a lot of housing have been built. From top to bottom: 2004, 2012.

Fig. 82C: A huge artificially irrigated farmland emerged in the barren land. Notice the irrigation circles in the southwest and the settlements arranged around the farmland. From top to bottom: 2004, 2009.

57

market led to an internal migration during the construction of the Merowe Dam. The towns, and in particular Merowe benefitted from this: The market value of the city property before and after the dam construction significantly increased. Prior the creation of the dam the value of town properties was very low, because there was in general little demand for it. But in 2003 the value starts to rise rapidly (fig. 84). Within the following 7 years the value increased up to 60 times and the rents by 10 times (Sayed 207:26-28).12 Migration can be further divided into an autonomous migration and into a forced migration, where the people of the former can migrate and the people of the latter have to migrate. 90% of the area flooded by the reservoir is desert (fig. 83) (Failer 2010:10), and therefore it affected “only� 60,000 inhabitants. They deal differently with the transformation of their habitat: Some cooperate with the government and therefore were moved to new settlements, and others opposed it, what led to killings during protests (EHCCR 2010:2, Carroll 2011:2). Furthermore the rising water lavel of the reservoir transformed space and landscape to that extend that settlements sank (fig. 83, 83B, 85) or were divided into islands (fig. 83D, 88, 90). Some islands are still occupied and connected by simple bridges, small earth dams, or ferries. Those inhabitants that have left their settlements have founded new unplanned settlements along the new banks of the reservoir, or have been sent to planned prototype settlements by the government. Unplanned settlements always emerged nearby the old settlements, whereas the planned ones were often founded far away from the origin of the migrating population. The government founded fifteen resettlement areas, with occupying a total area of 624km2 (Failer 2011:16). Seven of them are situated in Northern and eight in Southern Sudan (DIU 2011).13 But founding settlements along banks of a reservoir with a flat basin is risky, because the location of the bank chiefly depends on the amount of water stored in the reservoir and therefore also depends on the quantity of water extracted by the hydro power and irrigation facilities. Prior to the dam construction the water level changed slowly and the phases were fairly predictable for the inhabitants themselves. Now the change is controlled by the operators of the dam and also happens rapidly. This fluctuation can easily be observed at one of the new reservoir bank settlements: If the riverside is as flat as it is here, then a small water level change leads to a massive shift of the shore line.

The inhabitants loose their direct access to water (fig.

83C, 86-87, 89).

The biggest long-term danger of the project is an 58

Fig. 83: A map, that focuses on the transformation of the landscape and the settlements in the upstream area of the dam. Notice the sunken settlements and the emerged ones, espacially those that were founded on the new islands or reservoir bank to the northeast of the map.

Fig. 83A: Besides the emerging reservoir the construciton of the dam itself also transformed the landscape enormously.

From top to bottom: 2003 (prior the construction), 2006, 2011.

Fig. 83B: These two settlements sunk completly. From top to bottom: 2003, 2011.

A0 1:25Mio 83A

Dam Construction

Settlements 1:200.000 Water existing Settlements demolished developed Power Grid

A0 SETTLEMENTS 1:500.000

83

Fig. 83C: Some people which turned homeless by the creation of the reservoir, migrated to the new bank of it. Although the position of it is unstable what turned the area waterless the year after. From top to bottom: 2002, 2010, 2011.

Fig. 83D: Here, a bigger island was transformed into a smaller one. The inhabitants moved further inland. Some of their houses disappeared in the floods. From top to bottom: 2002, 2010.

Fig. 84: The market value of city properties in Merowe. It rises sharply after the construction of the dam begins.

MM 3 Dam Project Launch 2 1 MM 0

84

2003

2005

2007

no settlement data

no settlement data

SHIFT 83D A0 RIVERBANK (2002, 2010)

SUNKEN SETTLEMENT 83B A0 (2003, 2011)

SHIFT 83C A0 RIVERBANK (2002, 2010, 2011)

59

inappropriate dealing with the people turned homeless by the construction of the dam: For example the construction of the Egyptian Aswan Dam in 1964 has led to the resettlement of Nubian tribes within the Sudan.

But the resettlement area wasn’t similar to their former habitat, and therefore incapable to suit their lifestyle and needs. The new situation was so unbearable for them that they have left it 40 years later (Sayed 2007:57). A strong unplanned internal migration can stress a country, because it can cause growing Informal Settlements, and therefore contribute to the uncontrolled growth of cities.

The transformation of the landscape and the settlements by the dam happened incremental: 2006 a flood destroyed and damaged several upriver settlements, because the main branch of the Nile was blocked by construction works. 2,740 families were affected by this. Because the authorities didn’t forewarned the affected people the damage was tremendous high: 700 houses have been destroyed and 380 have been severe damaged. Farmland of 12 villages has been flooded and 12,000 pieces of farm animals have been killed. Their dead bodies were floating on the Nile and therefore increased the risk of infections for the population. Experts estimate the damage to USD 6.2MM. In 2008 further 15,000 people turned homeless, 22 villages have been damaged or destroyed,14 and 170,000 pieces of farm animals have been killed (ECCHR 2010:3).

Comparing the structure of the former autochthonous settlements with the one of the new planned prototype settlements shows great differences: The houses are allocated by a simple geometric grid. This became possible, because man-made irrigation canals and water pipes give the settlements independence from the river and therefore they were mainly founded on the flat area which is further away from the river basin. The new buildings still use some of the former formal language like the fortified court yard, but the size per household has been decreased a lot (fig. 91-94). Furthermore the uniformal design lacks to satisfy the needs of the residents, because they were used to tailor their houses to their needs (Sayed 2007:59-60). Now, because industrial materials have replaced the autochthonous ones (ibid. 2007:45), it became nearly impossible for the residents to match the buildings towards their needs by themselves. For most of the adjustments a skilled craftsman is needed. Compared with the industrial buildings the clay buildings had a higher flexibility, because it only needed low technology, the people had direct access to the material, and foremost the whole construction process was, due to the possibility of self-made, more flexible and more affordable than industrial buildings.

60

85

86

87

88

89

90 Fig. 85: A map that illustrates the sinking of the settlements of figure 83B. Fig. 86: The emerged reservoir bank and the buildings developed by the migrants of figure 83C in 2010.

Fig. 87: The dissapeared reservoir bank in 2011.

Fig. 88: The migration that is happening on the transformed island of figure 83D in 2010.

Fig. 89: A closeup sattelite image of figure 83C in 2010.

Fig. 90: A closeup sattelite image of figure 83D in 2010.

61

Settlement

Farming Water

Farming

Water

Farming

91

Besides this, the quality of the industrial buildings is so low that some of them need renovation after just two years. Even though it is easier to supply a compact settlement structure with water, electricity, medicine, education, and culture, than a stretched linear settlements, they are still poorly supplied: There is neither a waste collection (Sayed 2007:60) nor enough drinking water of good quality (ibid.:54-55).15 The overall sanitary situation has been improved only moderately: A majority of the houses still use pit latrines (ibid.:61).

11. Four bridges, a 16km long rail road branch, and 646km streets have been built which are establishing the following connections: Merowe - Dam - Shiryan Alshimal Highway, Dam - Atbara - Port of Sudan, Dam - Karima - Dongola (state capital) (Sayed 2007:15-16).

12. It raised from 50,000 to 400,000 Sudanese Pounds / month.

13. Goshabi-Abu Dom, Wadi Muqaddam, Abu Hamed, Wadi Mukarab (Geus 2003:33) and New Amri (Failer 2011:16), as well as Wadi

92

62

Almugadam, the 60,000 hectare large Almukabrab/Kaheila East (southeast of Aldamer) and the 35,000 hectare large New Alhamdab (former El-Multaga, south of Aldaba) (Sayed 2007:37, 43, 49).

14. Among the destroyed or damaged buildings were 20 schools, 20 medical care facilities and several mosques (ECCHR 2010:4).

15. Some settlements have only for three hours a day access to drinking water, which is so foul that drinking it leads to diarrhea (Sayed 2007:55).

nt

ing rm

Fa

Wa te

r

me ttle Se

93 Fig. 91: A sattelite image of one of the sunken autochthonous settlements (fig. 83B, 85). It has grown step by step and its buildings were adjacent to the farmland. The latter was next to the river which was flooded from time to time and therefore keept futile. The Buildings were arranged to each other and the landscape to form a compact settlement with several free squares on wich trading took place.

Fig. 92: A figure ground plan of the settlement in figure 91. Every estate is walled and has several buildings on it. Both have various shapes and sizes, reflecting an utilitarian design approach.

Fig. 93: A sattelite image of one of the planned prototype settlements in the developed artificially irrigated farmland area.

It is aligned to a grid and seperated of the farmland by an irrigation canal or tarred streets. Although the settlement is nearby the farmland, its bulidings are not aligned to it, but rather to its internal grid. This is odd, because the former is its main source of income.

Fig. 94: A figure ground plan of the planned prototype settlement of figure 93. Apart from the comunity buildings, all estates and buildings are of the same size and shape, reflecting an uniform design approach which lacks in adaptability. Notice that the size of an estate and the occupying buildings are much smaller compared to the autochonous settlements of figure 92.

94

63

Development Aid Structure The majority of the total costs of the dam project (USD 1.8Bn) are paid by foreign investors (fig. 3, 7), where Chinas Exim Bank16 contributed the biggest share (USD 519MM) (Carroll 2011:2). This contribution is a development aid loan (Nour 2010:16), which has a high return of the investment, because a lot of the construction work is done by Chinese companies (fig. 95). China’s development aid is in general focusing on the infrastructure sector.17 Some critics say it aims mostly at accelerating the exploitation of Africa’s resources to supply Chinas growing industry (Carroll 2011:1). At present the Chinese company Sinohydro is the worlds largest dam construction company, even though Chinese companies entered the sector very late (Int. Rivers 2012:4-5).18 A reason for its success is the growing public criticism against large dam developments in the Western world.19 Traditional investors like the World Bank are leaving the business because of this and therefore Chinas Exim Bank became a major financier of large dam developments (ibid.:3-5).

But we have to admit that Chinese companies have to act within a field of difficult circumstances, because most countries which are going to develop large dam projects like these are heavily corrupted and are lacking in environmental protection and human rights agreements. It is hard for them to enforce international standards which don’t match with the ones of the project country, because on the one hand they don’t want to interfere with politics, according to Chinese “policy of non-interference” (Carroll 2011:1), and on the other hand are compelled by the Chinese foreign ministry to stick to the laws of the project country (Int. Rivers 2012:5, 20-21). Even European companies are breaking international conventions: The German company Lahmeyer International, which was commissioned to do the feasibility studies in 2000 and all engineering services concerning the construction of the Merowe Dam in 2002 (Failer 2011:11), was accused

by ECCHR for the contribution in violating several international recognized human rights.20 The reason why international operating companies are violating internationally acknowledged conventions without punishment is mainly due to issues of the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction.21 It is dealing with the question if and how the country where the company is based, should ensure the abidance of its laws by the company within a foreign country.

Besides that, it is noteworthy that Chinese companies have won several invitation for bids of later Sudanese dam and infrastructure projects. Either this is an argument for a high competitive power of Chinese companies, or – because most of the projects are co64

$

95

Fig. 95: A cash flow diagram representing who funded how much by the size of the flag and who received how much by the thickness of the arrow. Mind that Chinese state owned companies were the main contractors during the development process and therefore received USD 1,277MM (Failer 2011:11, Nour 2010:15-17), what is a big share of the total fundings of USD 1,950MM (fig. 7). The France company Alstom received USD 372MM for the electro-mechanical equipment of the dam (Failer 2011:11, ECCHR 2010:1) and the Germain Lahmeyer International was commissioned to do the feasibility studies and all engineering services.

funded by the Chinese Exim Bank22 – is an indication of a competitive distortion by the Sudanese government in favor for Chinese companies.23 16. Export Import Bank.

17. Chinese investments in Sudan in descending order of their total funding: Electricity, Water and Irrigation, Refinery, Agriculture, Roads and Bridges. China gave USD 3.4Bn of development aid to the Sudan between 1997 and 2008. 83% of the investments were infrastructure projects (Nour 2010:14, 16).

18. 308 Chinese dam projects were recorded in 2012. 85 of them were in Africa (Int. Rivers 2012:4).

19. Some large dams with severe social and ecological impacts: Merowe Dam, Gibe III in Ethiopia, Bakun Dam in Malaysia (ibid.:5).

20. Lahmeyer International created an Environmental Assessment Report in 2000 where possible social and ecological dangers have to be documented. Even though it stated the lack of a resettlement scheme for the affected population and several organizations warned of forced evictions (Corner House, International Rivers Network, Society for Threatened Peoples), Lahmeyer International gave clearance to the construction works six months later.

21. Companies often have a large political power when they operate within countries with weak national economies and a poorly shaped law framework. John Ruggie, the former United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Business and Human Rights, created a Responsibility Framework for companies called “protect, respect and remedy-framework”, which received overwhelming international recognition (ECCHR 2010:7-8). He outlines the problem of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction as following: „What message should home countries send the victims of corporate-related human rights abuses in those situations? Sorry? Good luck? Or that, at a minimum, we will work harder to ensure that companies based in our jurisdictions do not contribute to the human rights abuses that so often accompany such conflicts, and to help remedy them when they do occur? Surely the last is preferable. (...) And so we have the oddity of home states promoting investments abroad—extraterritorially, if you will—often in conflict affected regions where bad things are known to happen, but not requiring adequate due diligence from companies because doing so may be perceived as exercising extra-territorial jurisdiction. This status quo does no favors to victims of corporate-related human rights abuse; to

Sinohydro + China International Water & Electric, USD 396MM), Upper Atbara Project (2010, China International Water & Electric Corp. + China Three Gorges Corp., USD 838MM, co-funded

by Exim Bank), Kajbar Dam (2010, Sinohydro, USD 705MM), Shereik Dam (2010, Gezhouba Corporation, USD 711MM). In total: USD 2.650Bn (Carroll 2011:2-3).

Relationship Development Aid and Space The social and ecological problems that are occurring during the construction of a dam of such enormous dimensions repelled traditional investors. After decades the Sudan was finally able to convince Chinese and Arabic investors willing to give development aid.

Chinas Exim Bank provided the biggest part of the foreign capital to the undertaking, and furthermore Chinese companies have won numerous invitation for bids of the construction parts and accompanying projects.

Due to the significant part China played in the funding and constructing process, we are able to argue that the development aid project would never had become into existence without China. Without its capital and its know-how it would never had come to the forced resettlement of the inhabitants and the severe destruction of the fertile Nile River basin. But there are also benefits: Small towns like Merowe grew due to the economic growth of the region. The infrastructure was improved and extended a lot. The building of a power grid made it possible to pump the water through wide ranging, branched irrigation canals and to create new uniformal settlements in the barren lands. The power production of the country has doubled. The settlement area along the fertile river bank of the Nile was reduced and constructed anew as compact point settlements in the artificially irrigated barren land. Alas the quality of the new buildings is lower as the former autochthonous ones and even the predicted better supply of the population isn’t as good as expected.

host governments that may lack the capacity for dealing with the consequences; to companies that may face operational disruptions or find themselves in an Alien Tort Statute suit for the next decade; or to the home country itself, whose own reputation is on the line (Ruggie 2009:5-6)”.

22. Synohydro is a state-owned-enterprise (Int. Rivers 2012:4).

23. Chinese companies won additional invitation for bids of infrastructure projects in Sudan: Raising of Roseires Dam (2008,

65

V I : Su m m a r y

In all examples evidence had been found to prove that development aid can have a direct impact on space and landscape. This impact can be small-scale (cf. chapter II) or large-scale (cf. chapter II, IV, V). The transformation of the existing structure can be alien (cf.

II, III, V) or subtle (cf. IV). Landscape and space can be transformed rapid (cf. V) or continuously (cf. IV).

The structure of development aid influences how the region and the affected people are dealt with: There were three projects with a top-down approach, each of them varying in degree, and one bottom-up approach.

The top-down methods range from an autocrat (cf.

V) to a consensus oriented leadership style (cf. IV).

Consequently the population had a different level of influence on the spatial change in each project: When the approach was very autocratic, such as in the dam construction project in Merowe (cf. V), where the goals and procedures were clearly defined by the government, and only companies were participating in the implementation, the majority of the population had hardly any influence on the spatial change. A particular example of this is shown by the failure of public protests against the project (EHCCR 2010:2, Carroll 2011:2). In the Informal Settlement upgrade project in Ghana (cf.

II) there were discussions with the population. However their opinion was weighed much less than the opinion of participating organizations. Therefore, they had little influence on the outcome of the spatial change.

In Senegal (cf. IV) a consensus oriented top-down approach was used, and the affected people were partly able to influence the project on several levels: They could refuse the Carbon-Trade-Agreement (UNFCCCCDM 2012:17) or hinder cooperation during the implementation of the project. Furthermore, the inhabitants helped to preselect the afforestation areas, and their experience had an impact on the procedures of the 66

NGO Oceanium Dakar (UNFCCC-CDM 2012:54).

In Tanzania (cf. III) a bottom-up approach was used, where the goals were defined and modified in cooperation with NGOs and in accordance with the affected people. Companies were responsible for the execution of the tasks, but the greater part of the task was done by the people themselves. They could influence the spatial change indirectly by finding an accord with the NGO and directly by working on the project (Home. Int. 2013a, Home. Int. 2013b, Home. Int. 2013c).

If we consider the spatial environment in which the development aid project took place as a pattern, and the projects as a change of its structure, we can define four different structural changes: Firstly, in Senegal (cf. IV) a huge onedimensional transformation of landscape happened within a very short timeframe. A transformed pattern emerged where its parts became homogeneous to their environment (fig. 96). The origin of the transformation is obviously artificial. There is a break between the existing and the new which can only be identified by the alien-like appearance of the structure: the symmetric arrangement and uniform growth of the trees. The individual parts of the new structure resemble the old one. Secondly, the Informal Settlement upgrade project in Ghana (cf. II) formalized little parts of an urban informal district within a few years. The spatial appearance is heterogeneous. The buildings are characterised according to their typology (closed, multi-storey, solitary - semi-open, singlestorey, compounded), materiality (industrial reinforced concrete construction - creatively connecting available materials) and their alignment to the environment (forecourt - patio) like an alien element with a repertoire of single parts distinguished from an existing environment (fig. 97). Thirdly, in Tanzania (cf. III) the development aid project has led to a large, slow, and multidimen-

Fig. 96: The pattern representing the spatial outcome of the mangrove afforestation development aid project in Senegal of chapter IV. Notice how the regular arrangement of the spots distinguishes from the irregular arrangement of the naturally grown mangrove trees.

Fig. 97: The pattern of the Informal Settlement upgrade in Accra, Ghana of chapter II. The upgrade building is alien to its environment and therefore symbolised by a star.

Fig. 98: The one of the informal resettlement project in Daressalaam, Tanzania of chapter III. Mind the different layers of the transformation: The lines represent the streets, which were constructed within a year and provided the framework for the further development. The buildings are not alien to their envirionment, but their regular arangement is.

Fig. 99: The pattern displaying the spatial transformation of the Merowe Dam development aid project in Sudan of chapter V. The existing settlements are represented by the dots aligned on both sides of the line, which represents the river Nile course. The big bubble in the middle broke the continuous settlement-river-line. The dam is represented as a big star and the planned prototype settlements, which are also alien to this envirionment, are as well stars. Furthermore the new irrigated areas are pushed away from the natural course of the river and therefore established new furtile areas in uncommon places.

sional transformation of landscape and settlement structure. Regarding the basic infrastructure which has been developed quickly, the settlement areas are changing ever more slowly. The spatial appearance of the pattern differs from the existing environment, but the repertoire of the single parts is like the one of the environment (fig. 98). Fourthly, in Sudan (cf. V) a huge, rapid, and multidimensional transformation of landscape and settlement structure has taken place.

The spatial appearance of this transformation differs greatly from its environment. It is like a big alien element with its own repertoire of single parts embedded in the existing pattern (fig. 99). The emerged settlements differ in their structure (orthogonal matrix - free arrangement), materiality (industrial - autochthonous) and their alignment to the environment (remote and mostly isolated - tangible linear) from the destroyed and existing settlements. Moreover, totally new nonlocal infrastructures such as tarred streets, high-voltage power lines, and the dam itself have emerged.

If we compare the structure of the development aid with the effects on space, we find that the type of development aid has an influence on how space is transformed. Looking at the autocrat top-down approach of the Merowe-project, we notice that through the absolute leadership style a huge area has been enormously

Senegal 96

Ghana 97

Tanzania 98

Sudan

99

67

transformed in a short period of time without the adoption of autochthonous structures or conventions.

A tabula-rasa par excellence. Apart from the difference in size, the slum revaluation in Ghana can be put into the same category. The bottom-up approach in Tanzania led to a big spatial change. In contrast to Sudan, autochthonous structures and conventions have been widely adopted. This can be especially well-observed at the development of small building typologies which are developed step-by-step, to avoid becoming an uninhabitable shell and therefore becoming useless for dwelling. The consensus oriented top-down approach in Senegal led to the afforestation of many little abandoned areas nearby settlements instead of few large ones for the creation of a carbon-credit account. This approach allowed workers from settlements near the afforestation spots to participate, and for the trees to become the property of those settlements.

Due to the focus on Sub-Saharan Africa and the limitation on a small number of projects, the image drawn by the work covers not a comprehensive view of the spatial impact of development aid. Therefore further research is needed to answer the questions that have been left open or untouched by it. The projects investigated in this work pointed out that most of the problems they are dealing with have their roots in political decissions, like the legal system that defines how property is owned rightfully and who is a squatter. As a result of this, a further research should primary concern the design of a contemporary development aid framework that allows solving problems at it’s core, even if that would mean to stop supporting technical solutions to the developing countries and to start acting politically. If spatial change becomes necessary, it’s design has to be integrative to become broadly accepted and maintainable by the local culture, because acceptance is the best starting point for a self-sustainable change of their environment. Therefore it has to respect the technology standards, the available materials, and techniques given by the place and culture. One of the most important parts of the framework will be the draft of a flexible and reliable relationship scheme between the managing, the executing, and the affected party.

But as we have seen, this distinguishing is not really up to date anymore: It brings big advantage to the development process if the affected party takes responsibility in the other parts (chapter III) or the execution is done by locals (chapter III, IV). In particular at projects that aim at the improvement of the living conditions of the poorest, it is necessary to let them do as much as possible by themselves, because manpower and local knowledge is the major and often solely thing they can contribute. Also the ever occurring process-slowing ob68

stacles of local lobyism needs to be solved to advance projects before the driving momentum starts to slow down.

Some of the analysed projects made clear that participating architects have to deal with huge challenges if they want to create a successful design. They can not simply reuse their high technologised designs, due to the fact that it has to be built and maintained in a culture where certain technical solutions will simply not work, because they can either not be sufficiently implemented or maintained by the local people at a reasonable level of cost and effort. They simply can‘t afford to get a Western expert to fix the design every time it is broken. Additionally further fundamental things separate designs taking place in Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa: Firstly, a design placed in Europe can always rely on a working infrastructure to plug itself into. Secondly, it is confronted with completely different climate conditions than it is in Sub-Saharan Africa: It has to deal with high temperature, drought, and heavy rain fall that floods whole city quarters without relying on a working infrastructure that brings the building constant electricity and transports dirt and meteor water away.

Therefore big challenges are awaiting every architect that wants to participate in sustainable design for development countries.

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V I I : B i b l i o g r a ph y

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VII: FIgures

All figures not mentioned below are edited or produced by the author of this work and therefore belong to him. However, the figures may be used and edited by others if the author is mentioned in publications.

Fig. 1

Merowe Dam, Nile River, Republic of the Sudan. (2010) [Online image]. Available from: Wikimedia <http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e0/Merowe_Dam,_Nile_River,_Republic_of_the_Sudan.JPG> [Accessed 01.06.2013].

Fig. 8, 13-14

Torresi, B. (2012) Information is Power: Ashaiman Residents Drive Profiling in Greater Accra, Ghana [Internet]. Slum Dwellers International. Available from: <http://www.sdinet.org/ blog/2012/08/16/information-power-ashaiman-accra-residents-drive-p/> [Accessed 08.08.2013].

Fig. 10

UN-HABITAT (2011) Ghana Housing Profile, Research Report: UN-HABITAT, Nairobi, Kenya, pp.

46.

Fig. 12, 16

Terry, A. (2013) Housing Project Brings Water, Sanitation to Amui Dzor Slum. Global News [Internet], 26.04. Available from: <http://globalnews.ca/news/513539/housing-project-brings-watersanitation-to-amui-dzor-slum/> [Accessed 08.08.2013].

Fig. 17-18

African Union for Housing Finance Conference, Johannesburg, South Africa (2011). TAMSUFâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Role in Providing Affordable Housing in Ghana [Internet], Tweneboa, A. auth. Available from: African Union for Housing Finance <http://www.auhf.co.za/wordpress/assets/TAMSUFS-ROLEIN-PROVIDING-AFFORDABLE-HOUSING.pdf> [Accessed 06.02.2014].

Fig. 23

Pounding Fufu in Ghana. (2006) [Online image]. Available from: Wikimedia <http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/88/Pounding_Fufu_in_Ghana.jpg> [Accessed 01.06.2013].

Fig. 24

Port Expansion Eviction. (2011) [Online image]. Available from: Panoramio <http://www.panoramio.com/photo/57190060?tag=Port%20Expansion%20Evictions> [Accessed: 01.07.2013].

Fig. 27

Dar es Salaam Port development. Panorama. (2009) [Online image]. Available from: Flickr <http://www.flickr.com/photos/le_korrigan/5015977538/in/photostream/> [Accessed 01.06.2013].

Fig. 29-30

Mero, C. S. (2011) Kurasini Area Redevelopment Plan Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania. Ministry Report: Ministry of Lands Housing and Human Settlements Development Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, pp. 9, 14.

76

Fig. 42

Chamazi panorama 2. (2010) [Online image]. Available from: Flickr <http://www.flickr.com/photos/le_korrigan/5015373267/> [Accessed 01.06.2013].

Fig. 43

Chamazi panorama 3. (2010) [Online image]. Available from: Flickr <http://www.flickr.com/photos/le_korrigan/5015375819/> [Accessed 01.06.2013].

Fig. 44-54

Bachmayer, G. (2012) Kurasini - Chamazi Resettlement [Internet]. Available from: SDINET <http://www.sdinet.org/media/upload/documents/Chamazi_Resettlement.pdf> [Accessed 01.10.2013], pp. 15, 18, 20-21 25.

Fig. 55

Casamnce [sic]. (2003) [Online image]. Available from: Flickr <http://www.flickr.com/photos/livelihoodsact/7643385992/> [Accessed 01.06.2013].

Fig. 56

Mangrove reforestation. (2008) [Online image]. Available from: Flickr <http://www.flickr.com/photos/livelihoodsact/7643387848/> [Accessed 01.06.2013].

Fig. 57

Casamance. (2005) [Online image]. Available from: Flickr <http://www.flickr.com/photos/livelihoodsact/7643390102/> [Accessed 01.06.2013].

Fig. 58

L’AMPC du Bamboung et son écolodge. (2012) [Online image]. Available from: Google Plus <https://plus.google.com/photos/110922499596226953172/albums/5711559894608998977/5712 555586874152050?banner=pwa&pid=5712555586874152050&oid=110922499596226953172> [Accessed 12.09.2013].

Fig. 62

Mangrove reforestation. Plantation de palétuvier à Djibonker. (2008) [Online image]. Available from: Flickr <http://www.flickr.com/photos/64403610> [Accessed 01.06.2013]

Fig. 63

Opération de reforestation de palétuviers. (2008) [Online image]. Available from: Flickr <http:// www.flickr.com/photos/livelihoodsact/5954873040/> [Accessed 01.06.2013].

Fig. 64

Communication sociale. (2005) [Online image]. Available from: Google Plus <https://plus.google.com/photos/110922499596226953172/albums/5714873968664909329 /5714874001971274978> [Accessed 06.02.2014].

Fig. 66

L’ampc du Bamboung et son écolodge. (2012) [Online image]. Available from: Google Plus <https://plus.google.com/photos/110922499596226953172/albums/5711559894608998977/5712 555281842812018?banner=pwa&pid=5712555281842812018&oid=110922499596226953172> [Accessed 27.07.2013].

Fig. 74

Merowe Dam and it’s Construction Facilities. (2009) [Online image]. Available from: Skyscraper City <http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=971082&page=4> [Accessed 01.06.2013].

Fig. 76

View from Gebel us 2. (2011) [Online image]. Available from: Flickr <http://www.flickr.com/photos/haberlah/42217099/in/set-928563> [Accessed 10.06.2013].

Fig. 77

Mansuri Farm Estate. (2005) [Online image]. Available from: Flickr <http://www.flickr.com/photos/ haberlah/41639906/in/set-928563> [Accessed 01.06.2013].

Fig. 79

View of the Merowe Reservoir. (2008) [Online image]. Available from: Skyscrapercity <http:// www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=971082&page=4> [Accessed 01.06.2013].

77