Rationalising a response to the free distribution of facts

Rationalising a Response to the Free Distribution of Facts: Feminist Agency or Objectivist Equality?

Introduction ‘Planners who provide just the facts, or information about procedures, to anyone who asks for them seem to treat everyone equally. Yet where severe inequalities exist, treating the strong and the weak alike ensures only that the strong remain strong and the weak remain weak. The planner who pretends to act as a neutral regulator may sound egalitarian but is nevertheless acting, ironically, to perpetuate and ignore existing inequalities’ (Forester, 1989).

The very beginning of the RTPI code of professional conduct (2011), paragraph 1(d), states that members ‘shall not discriminate on the grounds of race, sex, sexual orientation, creed, religion, disability or age and shall seek to eliminate such discrimination by others and to promote equality of opportunity’ (emphasis mine). This essay argues that personal rationalization of the terms of ‘promotion of equality’ would hold the ‘neutral regulator’ either valid or fallible.

Equality and equity are difficult concepts to rationalise in the chaotic and multi-faceted field of real-world decision making. It is often easy to rely on the relative justifiability of figures and weighing of data to reach a decision. However, as Forester writes above, decision making in a stagnant, static-normative structural system merely entrenches the existing power structures. Instead, he writes (Forester, 1993, p.6), planning should aspire to be the ‘situated practical, politically charged organising of attention’.

In this essay, feminist theories of planning code will be examined with regard to the free distribution of facts and procedural information by planners. This raises issues of the structural position of those in power and the debateable necessity of the empowerment of minorities to fairly respond to larger voices. As one of Hendler’s

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focus group participants’ states, ‘all of our theories, everything is geared for the neutral human being’ (Hendler, 2005, p.61). Ultimately, is there a need for a new normative – one in which equality is not necessarily synonymous with equity in the planners’ ethical judgement of information dissemination?

However, these arguments focus on the case for an equitable outcome, a fairer future, but one in which processes and resources are asymmetrically allocated to ‘nudge’ structures towards a new normative. In opposition to this is the argument that the ends should not justify the means, and instead an equal judgment should be made to all regardless of situation or personal judgement. This ethical case would hold that distributing facts and information equally is an objectivist viewpoint and ethically justifiable.

At its core, this dilemma is one of deontological framing. The rightness of the action taken concerns ‘whether an action is in itself right or wrong and not with its consequences’ (Campbell and Marshall, 1999, p.467). This focus on process, and emphasis on rules, provides the starting point to contrast feminist and objectivist ethical codes.

Feminist Planning Theory: View to a Code In discussing feminist theory in the context of planning ethics, this essay agrees with the definition utilised by Hendler (2005, p.55) that ‘girls and women are legally, politically, and socially disadvantaged on the grounds of their sex; the ethical stance that this oppression is morally wrong; and [for] the pragmatic commitment to ending injustice to all female human beings’ (Overall, 1998, p.15, quoted in Hendler, 2005, p.55). Further, this definition is expanded to hold within its borders issues of power and structural oppression critical to a discussion of ‘fair’ and equitable information dissemination: ‘it does not shirk from the challenge to understand how “sexism is and is not related to all the other ‘isms’ that plague human beings (racism,

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ageism, ethnocentrism, ableism, heterosexism, and naturism)”’ (Tong, 1998, p.8, quote in Hendler, 2005, p.56).

To serve in the ‘public interest’, laid out by the RPTI code of conduct, one has to consider the necessities and positions of the ‘-ism’ communities, the unempowered minorities. More specifically, a feminist view of planning code would argue that beyond considering, the ethical requirement of the planner would be to remove ‘injustice’ within planning as a spatial imposition into lives.

Ultimately, a feminist approach to planning process would be the avocation of the ‘development of more equitable, empowering relationships in which ‘expert’ knowledge is made accessible to professionals and lay people alike’ (Hendler, 2005, p.56) towards ‘feminist objectives of trying to behave so as to end oppression of all kinds’ (ibid., p.56). This is reinforced by Rawls’ belief (1971, quoted in Campbell and Marshall, 1999, p.467) that ‘not all individuals start on equal terms and […] it may be appropriate in a just society that the least advantaged should receive the greatest benefit’.

Feminist theory, therefore, sets out an ‘explicit orientation towards social change’ (Hendler, 2005, p.58), that planners can integrate into their whole and inform a weighted decision making process towards an idealistic normative. Indeed, as revealed in Hendler’s focus group with self-identified planners, one quote emerged, that ‘[planners] need to take responsibility for having a strong power relationship with a lot of groups’ Hendler, 2005, p.60, emphasis mine). What this reveals is a tension between groups, positioning the planner between as a mediator of interests. By providing agency to the planner, a feminist code assists in critically evaluating and responding to difficult equity dilemmas.

Together with issues of racism and sexism, disabled people’s interests are no less important in consideration than those of anyone else (Singer, 2011, p.45).

However, disability (Imrie, 1997) is often ill defined and poorly represented in traditional planning power structures. Quoting himself, Imrie (1996, in Imrie, 1997, 3

p.424) describes the built environment as ‘characterised by a “design apartheid” where building form and design are inscribed with the values of a society which seeks to project and prioritise the dominant values of the “able-bodied”’.

For individual councils and policies, responses range from arguing that the responsibility is for the individual – ‘for Curry [the former Minister for Local Government], disability is an individual and largely private concern which has cost implications for wider society. It is a potential burden on society which should not be borne by employers, developers or investors’ (Imrie, 1997, p.425). On the other side of the spectrum, ignorance masks potential progress, with one authority reporting ‘disabled people means people who have an impairment which limits their ability to walk or requires them to use a wheelchair’ (ibid., p.429) which potentially ‘reinforces the notion that impairments, and the experiences of disability, are uniform and homogeneous’ (ibid.). By poorly defining disability, large portions of the community are misrepresented, or not represented at all, through policy decisions made on this evidence base.

The power of definition as a form of representation calls back to the RTPI code of conduct quoted in the introduction in this essay, particularly to ‘promote equality of opportunity’. This draws in line with feminist ideology discussed above, that ‘not all individuals start on equal terms and […] it may be appropriate in a just society that the least advantaged should receive the greatest benefit’.

Advocacy, Collaboration, Communication and Participation in the Face of Power: Dissemination of Theory and Availability of Information As one participant in Hendler’s focus group (2005, p.60) attests, they ‘struggled… with trying to figure out what is feminist planning as opposed to participatory planning.’ This section seeks to illuminate this statement, and explore how these theories can assist in rationalising information dissemination.

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Davidoff’s advocacy planning meanwhile argues that planners should be ‘free to engage in the political process as advocates of the interests, not only of government, but of other groups, organisations or individuals… a plural society needs plural plans’ (Davidoff, 1965, p.332). In a critique of advocacy planning, Friedmann (1965, p.300, quoted in Campbell and Marshall, 1999, p.473) argued that the scheme was in fact not ‘radical’ and merely gave ‘the poor a professional voice to defend their “interests” in an arena where other, better-endowed groups were already busy with advocates of their own contending for a share of the available resources’.

Davidoff’s advocacy planning therefore operates within the existing power structures of inequality, instead lending the planner’s voice to the weak groups to lift to higher powers of opposition. Instead, argues Friedmann and feminist theory discussed above, radical change sees the move from voicing for a group, to helping the group truly help themselves – shifting the structures of power to equalise levels.

At its core, the issue is of power through control. By voicing weaker groups, planners on the surface empower misrepresented groups, yet retain traditional power. Through true radical change, power is instead distributing, empowering others, yet weakening the control of the original power holders. Discussing information, Forester, (quoted in Campbell and Marshall, 1999, p.474), conceptualises it as ‘a complex source of power, and in so far as planners control and manipulate information they are not acting in a neutral way’.

Feminist planners, and indeed Healey’s collaborative planning theory, argue that information should be freely distributed to all, beyond power boundaries. The egalitarian approach discussed in the opening quote avoids the second qualifier, that information distributed as ‘just the facts’ would instead operate within traditional structures of privileged knowledge, with existing divides between ‘experts’ and laypersons. Traditionally associated with technocratic ‘representative’ governance, planners as ‘experts […] separated from interested parties […] where only a few powerful interests are involved in the collaboration’ (Healy, 2006, p.244), ensure power remains static. Through Larson’s ‘certified knower’ boundaries, the planning 5

professional remains a community removed from other by knowledge borders (Larson, 1990, p.31).

The issue, then, is how to shift the balance (or re-balance) of power from corporatist’s with access to these ‘certified knowers’ within governance or private practice to those outside.

Meanwhile, Healy argues that the ‘most powerful strategies achieve their impact by entering the consciousness of the political and organisational culture of a place’ (2006, p.245). She argues that once embedded within key players, implementation becomes ‘part of the routine rather than through deliberate mobilisation and struggle (ibid, p.245).

This returns to the argument made in the prior section regarding failures of misrepresenting groups through improper definition. Agency with the aim of empowering these groups can begin to change expectations and embed new power relationships for these multi-faceted groups.

Planners, situated between the wider political consciousness and misrepresented groups have two opportunities to act as ‘certified knowers’. First, as agent advocator, they can be the voice of groups that can begin the process of consciousness embedding. Second, the sharing of knowledge beyond traditional power to these same groups can provide specialist information beyond ‘just the facts’ of the initial premise. As Krumholz and Forester (1990, p.222) put it, ‘they can supply community organisations with information about opportunities to make their needs felt’.

Equity vs Equality: Ethically Making a Decision ‘Fairness usually means even-handedness between fairly organised interest groups’ comments a participant in Hendler’s focus group (Hendler, 2005, p.62).

As we have discussed in the sections above, even-handedness is a valueladen proposition, one in which many strands of theory would argue is not sufficiently serving the greater public interests. In this final section, we look at ethical routes 6

toward making a decision, how to apply agency without discrimination, and how the case can be made for the apparent asymmetric treatment of groups.

A perceived critical failing with communicative planning is that ‘once all voices have been given the opportunity to be heard, the planner has no ethical basis for action if the outcome appears unjust’ (Campbell and Marshall, 1999, p.473). By considering all arguments as ‘equally valid,’ any basis for criticism is removed (ibid.).

Singer (2011, p.21) writes that the ‘principle of equal consideration of interests acts like a pair of scales, weighing interests impartially. True scales favour the side where the interest is stronger or where several interests combine to outweigh a smaller number of similar interests, but they take no account of whose interests they are weighing’. Singer’s argument of declining marginal utility (2011, p.23) would argue that for a comparatively sized ‘gift’, the group for whom the gift represents a larger percentage increase in experience will be greater effected by the gift.

In terms of the current argument, what this means is that for those already in positions of traditional privileged power, the receipt of further privileged (here referring to analysis held by planners) information (‘facts’), represents a smaller power gain than an under-privileged group receiving that same privileged information. Doubly so if the information is in fact value-added as discussed in Section 2.

Making value-laden decisions to treat some groups differently from others is what Singer (2011, p.39) calls ‘affirmative action’ and counters the unrealisable nature of equal opportunity within current societal structures (ibid.). ‘The important point is that affirmative action, whether by quotas or some other method, is not contrary to any sound principle of equality and does not violate any rights of those excluded by it’, Singer argues (2011, p.44).

He continues, arguing that ‘higher intelligence […] carries no right or justifiable claim to more of the good things that our society offers’ (ibid., p.42). As these claims are unjustifiable, the only reasoning is that those in power in society favour goals that 7

are advanced by this position (ibid.). Affirmative action, therefore, when properly applied, merely reframes the goals that are desirable, and if fortunate beneficiaries before gained through no special claim, and now find this unfair, it is merely because they are accustomed to the old process (ibid.). What this reframing achieves is the revealing that the ‘power of “the powerful” is itself contingent and vulnerable’, (Krumholz and Forester, 1990, p.222) and can thus be affected for such action for egalitarian ends.

Applied to planning decisions, I would argue that traditional power structures favour corporations and entrenched bodies more through access to capital and privileged information than any societal right to be empowered. As Krumholz and Forester (1990, p.220) point out, ‘developers, banks, mayors, and other politicians are not all-knowing, fully autonomous, and independent. These actors depend on the cooperation of many others to sustain their power, and so they are vulnerable to the organising of constituencies, clients, neighbourhoods, workers, and others.’

Applying affirmative action therefore to this circumstance merely argues that misrepresented groups should have access, through value-added distribution of this privileged information, to enable a level playing field within current systems.

The critique of the above arguments is that it is optimistic and presumptive of individual change. Instead, we recognise that planners cannot single-handedly change the political landscape of our cities, especially that which only broader ‘social movements can accomplish (Krumholz and Forester, 1990, p.210). However, they can, and should be expected to make more of a difference in the face of inequality. ‘Equityoriented planning […] can complement and support, not substitute for, broader political organising to address urban poverty, community needs, and public policy’ (ibid., p.211).

Planners, within this complementing broader movements, do have power to begin this nudging process, perhaps snowballing to the necessary social movements.

In the meantime, planners can ‘enable public scrutiny of a developer’s inflated 8

promises. They might help to publicize alternatives to a privately lucrative but publicly costly construction project. They might support equity-oriented coalitions. In all these ways, planners might counteract established power and press an equity-planning agenda forward’ (Krumholz and Forester, 1990, p.220).

Discussion Ultimately, Forester’s quote that titles and drives this paper is set within the Rawlsian tradition, one that is concerned not with the substantive ends (Campbell and Marshall, 1999, p.474), but instead the need for a feminist counterbalance of power to create a ‘fairer’ process for mediation and resolve (ibid.). In short, the ethical dilemma posed by Forester is argued in terms of appropriate frameworks, being approaches to feminist affirmative action and the ethical rationalisation of such.

In this, the author agrees with Porter’s editorial (2011) that ‘the very core of planning is praxis’ and yet it is ‘disturbingly unable to judge the politics of change’s outcomes’. Using Chantal Mouffe’s definition of the “political” as “the sense of having to decide in an undecidable terrain” (2005, p.12, quoted in Porter, 2011, p.477), the author argues that the planner as ‘neutral regulator’ (Forester, 1989) is indeed not egalitarian but instead acting apolitically.

As Porter continues (2011, p.478), ‘we are not looking for consensus. We are looking for the proper locations of struggle, of the political, in planning’. ‘Instead, we are in a depressing TINA (“there is no alternative”) mode of planning’ (Porter, 2011, p.479) but ‘are we discussing what these choices are actually about, and the different value sets (positions) they represent?’ (ibid.).

We would contend the emphasis of concern has swung too far towards subjectivity and relativity, resulting in an often stultifying debate which place procedural concerns above consideration of the consequences of the actions

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taken. Focus on just process has tended to obscure sensitivity towards just outcomes.’ (Campbell and Marshall, 1999, p.476).

With the words of Campbell and Marshall in mind, the discussion takes a turn from the deontological frameworks discussed above toward looking at the consequences. The ‘neutral regulator’ may well attempt an egalitarian process, but in not questioning political definitions of groups, or challenging the structures of oppression defined in feminist theories, this author argues that the planner has failed to ‘seek to eliminate such discrimination’ as discussed above, nor promoted ‘equality of opportunity’, and hence has not adhered to the code of conduct of the RTPI (2011).

Returning to the original quote, planners who provide just the facts to anyone who asks operate within existing power structures and does not act sufficiently politically, or with agency, to disrupt these structures. In conclusion, briefly, the author would recommend maintaining professional equality through the distribution of facts to all parties as requested, but encourage the agency of empowerment through collaboration, consultation and recognition of ‘the weak’ to move toward a more egalitarian normative. The second move is to communicate inequality structurally ‘upwards’, dispelling misrepresentations and arguing for deeper understanding of the needs of the less fortunate. The ultimate aim would be to recognise the current inequalities and adjust planning structures to empower the weak until a level field is reached. In the meantime, (see Hill, 2012, for strategies to move from individual agency to strategic change), the empowerment of the under-represented through value-added information dissemination is a necessary affirmative move to allow these groups to formulate a voice, in opposition or not, to be heard in the political field of planning decisions.

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References Campbell, H., and Marshall, R., 1999. Ethical Frameworks and Planning Theory, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 23(3), pp.464-478.

Campbell, H. and, Marshall, R., 2000a. Public involvement and planning: looking beyond the one to the many, International Planning Studies, 5(3), pp.321-344.

Campbell, H., and Marshall, R., 2000b. Moral obligations, planning and the public interest: a commentary on current British practice, Environment and Planning B, 27(2), pp.297-312.

Campbell, H., and Marshall, R., 2002. Utilitarianism’s bad breadth? A re-evaluation of the public interest justification for planning, Planning Theory, 1(2), pp.163-187 Davidoff, P., 1965. Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning, Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 31(4), pp.331-338.

Forester, J., 1989. Planning in the Face of Power, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Forester, J., 1993. Critical theory, public policy and planning practice: toward a critical pragmatism. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Healey, P., 2006. Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies (2nd ed.), Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hendler, S., 2005. Towards a feminist code of planning ethics, Planning Theory and Practice, 6(1), pp.53-69.

Hill, D., 2012. Dark Matter and Trojan Horses – a Strategic Design Vocabulary. Moscow: Strelka.

Imrie, R., 1997. Challenging disabled access in the built environment, Town Planning Review, 68(4), pp.423-447.

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Krumholz, N., and J. Forester 1990. Making Equity Planning Work: Leadership in the Public Sector, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Temple University Press.

Larson, M. S., 1977. The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis. Berkley: University of California Press.

Porter, L., 2011. The Point is to Change it, Planning Theory & Practice, 12(4), pp.477480.

Royal Town Planners Institute, 2011. Code of Professional Conduct. London: RTPI. Sayer, A., and Storper, M., 1997. Guest Editorial Essay: Ethics Unbound: for a normative turn in social theory. Environment and Planning D, 15(1), pp.1-17.

Singer, P., 2011. Practical Ethics (3rd ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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