On Becoming Radical: Thinking About Potential Pathways for Syrian Refugee Women
Amanda Jessen M.A. Candidate, Conflict Resolution
SEST 602: Violent Non-State Actors Final Paper December 13, 2013
Georgetown University On Becoming Radical: Thinking About Potential Pathways for Syrian Refugee Women
2 Introduction At this juncture of the 21st century, the nation-state framework underpinning international governance, trade and socio-cultural interconnectivity is in a state of major flux. State authority is increasingly challenged by powerful Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs) whose political aims directly contradict the status quo. The VNSA that is most frequently on the minds and tongues of Western policymakers in the post-9/11 world is Al Qaeda. Over the past 11 years, leaders, policymakers and academics have endeavored to understand more completely the objectives, motivations, strategies and probable trajectory of a group whose genesis is both a product of and a reaction against U.S. involvement in Arab lands.1 Within the context of heightened attention to terrorism, perhaps the most important dynamic deserving of sharper and more insightful analysis is the process of radicalization, which in many ways is the key to understanding how Al Qaeda recruits new combatants. As it stands, however, much of the radicalization literature either perpetuates a gender-blind understanding of radicalization by aggregating individuals at the level of biological sex 2 or focuses only on samples of males who have moved in the direction of violent extremism 3. In effect, there is little dedicated research on women who have become radicalized actors or, alternatively, women who play a significant role in countering radicalization; in other words, very little is understood about the conditions under which women become radical actors, and consequently, how current counterterrorism interventions can leverage this knowledge to empower women to counter violent extremism. This paper seeks to address this rather glaring gap in the literature by suggesting that a serious and nuanced investigation of how and where women figure into radicalization schemes is past due. In order to do so, this paper will explore how the current media and policy emphasis on Al Qaeda fighters in Syria overlooks the potential for radicalization in urban and refugee spaces that have become home to a disproportionate percentage of women and children. In other words, in the context of women and children living vulnerably in communities that are not their own – 1 Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou (2010). “Al Qaeda: From the Near to the Far Enemy and Back.” Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics. Klejda Mulaj (ed.), Columbia University Press, p. 209. 2 See Max Taylor and John Horgan (2006). “A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of the Terrorist”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 18, No. 4. 3 See Colonel John M. Venhaus. (2010) “Why Youth Join Al Qaeda”, United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 236.
Georgetown University On Becoming Radical: Thinking About Potential Pathways for Syrian Refugee Women
3 and based on what is suggested about processes of radicalization – is it possible that the world is completely overlooking a demographic that is ripe for radicalization? Specifically, this paper will argue that Syrian women are at greatest risk for radicalization in terms of the following pathways: 1. Individual and group grievances; 2. Group polarization and isolation; 3. Love; and 4. Unfreezing. In closing, the paper will conclude by considering how counterterrorism policies can evolve to empower women in the fight against radicalization. Methodology and Scope To begin, this paper adopts the following definition for radicalization: “the social processes by which people are brought to condone, legitimize, support or carry out violence for political or religious objectives.”4 The methodology supporting this paper prioritizes two types of literature review with the objective of properly situating the reader ahead of a more case-specific analysis. First, this paper will review some of the major themes embedded in radicalization literature, but will focus most heavily on McCauley and Moskalenko’s 12-variable framework for radicalization.5 Because the case study references a community of forced migrants, what is known about radicalization in refugee populations will also be discussed. Next, the paper will explore some commonly accepted tropes of women as radical actors. In this section, profiles of women who fight as the “Black Widows” of Chechnya and who join(ed) the ranks of groups like the PKK and the Tamil Tigers will be vetted for applicability to the Syrian case. In terms of the case study itself, this paper will reference the following subjects in order to build out the argument: 1. Al Qaeda-affiliated groups currently fighting in Syria, notably Al Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq in Syria/the Islamic State of Iraq in the Levant; and, 2. Syrian refugees taking shelter in large border provinces of Turkey. 4 Sarah Ladbury. “Why do men join the Taliban and Hizb-I Islami? How much do local communities support them?” Independent Report for the Department of International Development: August, 14, 2009. 5 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko. Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us. Oxford University Press, 2011.
Georgetown University On Becoming Radical: Thinking About Potential Pathways for Syrian Refugee Women
4 Reference to the media’s emphasis on Al Qaeda fighters active in Syria will help create a backdrop against which alternative interpretations of the potential for an increase in violent extremism that focus on women can be constructed. To be clear, this paper does not explore whether Al Qaeda as an organization is ready or willing to begin recruiting newly radicalized women, but this is a subject that requires additional research if the academic and policy communities are truly serious about exploring the bounds of Al Qaeda’s commitment to innovation and mission success. At the time of this writing, there are over 2 million registered Syrian refugees (and an untold number of unregistered migrants) living in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt. 6 In the interest of narrowing the parameters of this inquiry – and, because the author spent the summer of 2013 collecting original research on Syrian women living in Turkish refugee camps – this paper will draw most heavily from the experience of Syrian women living in Turkey. Where there are gaps in information related to the Turkish theater of operations, accounts from neighboring Jordan and Lebanon will help to contextualize the analysis. The analysis that follows will look to the literature on radicalization with an eye toward gendered blind spots in order to map out how certain political, socio-economic and cultural dynamics might entice women to pursue pathways to violent extremism. Conversely, an understanding of these conditions will also enable interventionists to support greater participation of women in counterterrorism efforts. In other words, through an analysis of the potential for radicalization within communities of Syrian, female refugees, the paper will conclude by evaluating the following statement: Removing the factors that hamper women’s active participation in countering terrorism is necessary to facilitate the involvement of women’s organizations in identifying and addressing specific political, social, economic, cultural and educational concerns that may lead to violent extremism and radicalization.7 Finally, this paper will consider the value in strengthening awareness around women-centric processes that both enable and disable radicalization in violent conflict.
6 UNHCR. Syria Regional Refugee Response: Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal. Updated November 27, 2013. Accessed online at http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php. 7 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2013). “Women and Terrorist Radicalization Final Report”, p. 1. Accessed online at http://www.osce.org/atu/99919.
Georgetown University On Becoming Radical: Thinking About Potential Pathways for Syrian Refugee Women
5 Literature Review Radicalization Literature The United States’ Agency for International Development (USAID) takes a developmentalist and structuralist approach to mapping out macro drivers of orientation toward violent extremism. At the outset, the policy brief argues that drivers of violent extremism emanate from variable sets ranging from the perception of the innate injustice of the international system to poverty to seven political drivers, which include: (1) the denial of basic political and civil liberties; (2) authoritarian regimes that endorse the abuse of human rights; (3) perceptions of widespread corruption and impunity for ruling elites; (4) the inability of the state to effectively govern territory on the periphery; (5) the existence of protracted, violent conflict; (6) the perception that authoritarian regimes have derived authority and support from foreign patrons, like the United States; and, (7) the state-to-state provision of material support to insurgencies that may have supported the short-term goals of the sponsoring state, but whose objectives and political agenda now run counter to the former patron-state. Perhaps most importantly, the USAID directive acknowledges that most of these drivers have a force-multiplying effect on each other and that they more indirectly (rather than directly) impact on populations.8 In focusing more on the individual level of radicalization, a United States Institute for Peace report grapples with both the myths and observed truths underscoring radicalization. In his study of the types of (male) individual most likely to radicalize, Venhaus highlights five prevalent and misguided notions underpinning the popular understanding of how new recruits come to participate in Al Qaeda. The myths he draws attention to include the belief that recruits are: (1) crazy, (2) component of a one-dimensional economic profile, (3) radical because they are Muslim, (4) active after having been approached directly by an Al Qaeda operator, and (5) everywhere.9 Venhaus is right to begin his discussion of radicalization by addressing what it is not before he moves into his observations of the phenomenon itself. Much of the current radicalization literature focuses squarely on young males as the likeliest targets of indoctrination. Speaking directly about male adolescents, Venhaus builds out a typology of recruits based on interviews with 2,032 self-admitted Al Qaeda associates. 8 See Gulain Denouex and Lynn Carter of Management Systems International on Behalf of USAID. “Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism,� USAID. February, 2009. 9 Venhaus, pp. 4-5.
Georgetown University On Becoming Radical: Thinking About Potential Pathways for Syrian Refugee Women
6 According to his framework, the four different kinds of “seekers” (i.e. Al Qaeda recruits) join the organization for the following reasons: (1) to locate an outlet for frustration as a means of seeking revenge; (2) to achieve recognition in the quest for status; (3) to secure a sense of belonging through locking in an identity; and, (4) to enjoy the thrill of an adventure. 10 Based on these typologies, Venhaus offers his thoughts on how to construct a counter-terrorism strategy that “present[s] seekers with more choices and alternative definitions that allow them to find productive and positive self-definition.”11 Of the available literature on macro- and micro-drivers of radicalization, the 12-variable framework developed by McCauley and Moskalenko offers an exhaustive and adaptive approach for thinking through pathways to violent extremism, one that captures both structural and interpersonal motivations for seeking violent solutions to individual and group-level conflicts. Out of the 12 variables highlighted by McCauley and Moskalenko, the following steps offer the greatest explanatory power to a situation like the one facing Syrians in forced exile: (1) personal grievance, (2) group grievance, (3) love, (4) unfreezing, (5) group polarization, (6) group isolation; and (7) hatred. Grievances at the individual and group level function similarly; a grievance manifests “when someone wrongs us, [and] we want justice; often we want revenge... Justice means that the one who mistreats us should be punished. Revenge means that we should be the ones who do the punishing.”12 Radicalization vis-à-vis love involves moving toward radicalization because one romantically or platonically loves an already-radicalized individual. The pull of romantic and comradely love can be as strong as politics in moving individuals into an underground group...no terrorist wants to try to recruit someone who might betray the terrorists to the authorities. In practice, this means recruiting from the network of friends, lovers, and family.13 Unfreezing as understood by McCauley and Moskalenko may most accurately describe the process of radicalization most common in forced migration and refugee scenarios. Referencing Marc Sageman’s chronicling of the radicalization of Muslim immigrants in America, the authors note that societal dislocation and disconnection can, under the right circumstances, bear the fruit of radicalization. “Disconnected from everyday routines and 10 Ibid., pp. 8 - 11. 11 Ibid., p. 11. 12 McCauley and Moskalenko, p. 16. 13 Ibid., p. 54.
Georgetown University On Becoming Radical: Thinking About Potential Pathways for Syrian Refugee Women
7 relationships, an individual becomes an easy prospect for any group that offers friendship and security.”14 The authors go on to argue that in cases where a new social group offers an ideological fixation, the temptation to shed previous values and attachments in exchange for a new worldview becomes even more alluring. It is this particular pathway that may go the farthest in explaining the attraction to violent extremism within refugee communities, whose very existence is emblematic of involuntary dislocation and uprooting. Group polarization and group isolation occur when like-minded individuals co-radicalize each other within a bounded space and an isolated group acquires “unchecked value-setting power”15 capable of ratcheting up the stakes without restraint, respectively. Lastly, radicalization in the name of hatred is as straightforward as it sounds; individuals commit themselves to violent courses of action as a result of entertaining “the idea of the opposing side as less than human and therefore unworthy of compassion and dignity...”16 McCauley and Moskalenko illustrate each of these pathways through anecdotal narrative, which consists of reference to both men and women. In the section that follows, the author will explore some common themes that run throughout women-specific accounts of radicalization. Tropes of Women as Terrorists Having outlined the common core beliefs around group and individual radicalization without disaggregating based on gender, this section will briefly review some of the common explanations for why women radicalize in the hope that some parallels can be drawn to the potential future prospects for Syrian refugee women. In looking at the Chechen “Black Widows”, who join the anti-Russian, Chechen resistance most frequently as suicide bombers, Anna Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova argue that the “pervasive and widespread experience of trauma, loss and grievance” has exerted the strongest push influence over women toward radicalization.
17
This reading syncs up with both Venhaus and McCauley and Moskalenko’s
contention that a personal grievance often can be converted into radical, political action.
14 Ibid., p. 75. 15 Ibid., p. 139. 16 Ibid., p. 163. 17 Amanda Jessen. “Why Women Fight: From Chechnya to Turkish Kurdistan”, Gender and Peacebuilding, Final Paper. Spring 2013, p. 8.
Georgetown University On Becoming Radical: Thinking About Potential Pathways for Syrian Refugee Women
8 In looking at the prevalence of female combatants in the PKK, a Kurdish separatist group that has waged a slow-burning war against the Turkish Government since the 1970s, a host of different explanations factor into the magnetic pull of radicalization. First and foremost, female PKK combatants agree that unprecedented access to high-value positions in combat units drew them to join the ranks agitating for a free Kurdistan. In this case, it is almost impossible to understand the attraction of fighting without first looking to the options available to Kurdish women in their communities; in most cases, women in combat experience far greater respect, prestige and freedom than they would as civilians.18 An overview of the most common themes, however, reveals troubling gender biases throughout the discussion of women as radical and violent actors. For example, Mia Bloom points out that “most women who participate in suicide bombings are usually among the most socially vulnerable: widows and rape victims.”19 Whether enough evidence exists to support this contention, one resulting implication is that radicalization of women is most successful when women are the least capable of making a decision from a position of strength and invulnerability. A 2013 report from the OSCE offers a more balanced investigation into the radicalization of women. The report begins by drawing attention to the all-too-often cited contention that women are somehow inherently more prone to peace than their male counterparts, something that may be true in some spaces but ultimately, is wholly dependent on the context and actors involved. The following passage clearly delineates both the counterterrorism expert’s pitfall and extremists’ advantage in taking for granted the assumption that women are not a “natural” fit for terrorist activities: As a result, women are neither considered to be potential terrorists, nor perceived to be as dangerous as their male counterparts if they were to be involved in terrorism. However, a woman should not be assumed to be more or less dangerous, nor more prone to peace, dialogue, non-violence and co-operation than a man. In fact, the very image of the peaceful woman has been used by terrorist groups to recruit women and to claim an innocent and non-violent character by highlighting the involvement of women in their organizations.20 The report ruminates on the need for a more nuanced investigation into how and why women radicalize; in doing so, OSCE acknowledges that similar pathways to radicalization may appeal 18 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 19 Mia Bloom. “Female suicide bombers: a global trend”, Dadaelus, Winter 2007, p. 9. 20 OSCE, p. 3.
Georgetown University On Becoming Radical: Thinking About Potential Pathways for Syrian Refugee Women
9 to both men and women but that women may arrive at those pathways for different reasons, namely limited access to educational and economic opportunities, an inability to impact on their local political process, and dynamics of gender-based inequality, discrimination and violence against women.21 In other words, creating dynamics that funnel women away from violent extremism means addressing the gender-specific needs of women before those needs become grievances or linkages to already-radicalized actors. Exploring the Potential for Female Radicalization in Camps and Urban Areas The Context of Refugee Life in Turkey The dominant narrative supporting the media’s coverage of the Syrian civil war has focused exclusively on the threat of groups like ISIS and Al Nusra operating freely in northern Syria. Recent reports increasingly point to the proliferation of jihadist fighters in Syria as proofpositive that Al Qaeda is changing the course of the conflict between opposition forces and Assad’s government contingent. While there are 8,000 to 12,000 estimated foreign fighters operating in highly fragmented units in Syria,22 there is a surprising inattention to the conditions that many Syrian women and children face in neighboring, receiving countries, conditions whose effects could combine to generate movement toward radicalization. In looking at the refugee situation in Turkey, where the role of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) office is severely circumscribed by an under-funded and over-extended government bureaucracy, the experience of female and children refugees varies widely from region to region. In terms of the Syrians who are lucky enough to gain access to camp facilities, only 5 of the 21 camps consist of container facilities, leaving the remaining 16 camps characterized by tent living. While Turkish camps far outshine their Jordanian counterparts, new research suggests that programming for Syrian refugees – of whom 75% are women and children – suffers from a complete inattention to the differentiated health, education and income needs of women.23 And, this is to say nothing of the many more Syrian refugees who
21 Ibid., p. 3. 22 James Traub. “‘Everyone is Scared of ISIS’”, Foreign Policy, October 4, 2013. Accessed online at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/10/04/everyone_is_scared_of_isis_syria_rebels. 23 See Amanda Jessen. “The Government of Turkey and Syrian Refugees: A Gender Assessment of Humanitarian Assistance Programming”, Georgetown University’s Institute for Women, Peace and Security, October 2013. Accessed online at http://issuu.com/georgetownsfs/docs/jessen_2013_-_final.
Georgetown University On Becoming Radical: Thinking About Potential Pathways for Syrian Refugee Women
10 are unregistered and living unofficially in Turkish cities, and whose needs are largely unknown, even within the inner circles of UN officials. With respect to health needs, unknown but presumably high numbers of Syrian women living in camps are survivors of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV). In Syria, the threat of SGBV is such that many families are fleeing preemptively, with the full knowledge that staying in their homes risks almost certain injury to young children and women. Despite this high number, there is no accurate reporting or accounting of the number of women who need services, and no systematic and replicable referral process for women and children who are identified as having suffered an incident (or incidents) of SGBV. For the most part, Turkish staff are not properly trained to deal with survivors of SGBV and UN advisors are often apprised of SGBV incidents during exit interviews for Syrians exercising the right of return to Syria, often after it is too late to stage any sort of intervention on behalf of the interviewee.24 Reproductive services largely miss the mark in terms of what women need to stay healthy and in control of the size of their own families. A significant, but still unverifiable, number of women reported that camp management staff either knowingly withheld birth control or did not take steps to procure it for women interested in family planning services. In addition, women do not feel comfortable seeking medical attention from Turkish, male doctors and where female, Arabic-speaking physicians are not available, many women opt out of medical attention, even for events as critical as live birth, choosing instead to rely on Syrian midwifery to give birth in their tents.25 Income generation is at best limited and at worst exploitative for many Syrians living inside and outside of camps. Because refugees in Turkey fall under the legal regime of “Temporary Protection�, Syrians are not able to secure temporary work permits that would enable them to earn a living wage while in country. This legal obstruction leads to Syrian refugees either volunteering to fulfill important camp roles (e.g. primary school teaching positions) or accepting pay for work that is below market value. As jobs are increasingly scarce in areas with a high volume of refugees, like Hatay, Kilis, and Gaziantep, women find themselves at an even greater disadvantage, as many of them are the heads of household and in a
24 Ibid. 25 Ibid.
Georgetown University On Becoming Radical: Thinking About Potential Pathways for Syrian Refugee Women
11 position to compete with males who may be perceived to be more valuable in terms of hard labor – and, who may actually have a stronger and more differentiated skill set.26 Educational access varies widely from camp to camp but overall, many camp-based refugees have reported that there are not enough courses available to continue a robust and meaningful education; this feedback includes reference to education for both children and adult learners. One key hurdle to the provision of education for Syrian refugees is that the Turkish Government was slow to secure educators who could speak Arabic well enough to enable coursework to continue in Arabic. Overall, some women polled by UN officials argue that their inability to learn new skills and trades is preventing them from staying competitive in the narrow job market.27 According to one UN source, the relationship between Turks living in refugee-laden cities and the refugees themselves is growing tenser by the day. Housing and jobs are increasingly scarce and many socio-economically depressed Turks are quick to blame the influx of refugees for new strains on public services. Tumultuous cases of Turkish officials intervening to prevent child-and multiple-wife marriage show the cultural disconnect between Turkish authorities and service providers and the refugee communities they serve. In neighboring Jordan, economic conditions are such that many families find themselves in a position to sell their daughters through marriage to the highest bidder in an effort to both secure income and their family’s honor; while cases such as these have not been widely publicized in Turkey, parallel economic hardships may very well encourage refugees there to make similar choices.28 Potential Pathways to Radicalization Individual and Group Grievances As referenced earlier in this paper, personal and group grievances can catalyze the fullscale radicalization of those against whom the injustice is committed. In applying this model to Syrian refugees, it is clear enough that refugees – again, of whom 75% are women and their children – have no shortage of grievances to pull from. To begin, they have suffered the loss of their homes and ways of living through forced displacement to communities that are foreign to 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid.
Georgetown University On Becoming Radical: Thinking About Potential Pathways for Syrian Refugee Women
12 them. Women themselves have either suffered physical and gender-based and sexual violence or the threat of it, and an untold number of women will be widows by the end of the war. According to a Women Under Siege report, the list of personal, bodily grievances alone includes: attack by multiple perpetrators, rape, groping, sexual assault without penetration, detention for sexualized violence and acts that fall under the vague category of “additional consequences”. 29 In a conflict that has rapidly devolved from a non-violent movement to a deeply violent and highly fragmented civil war, the singling out of women for the levying of sexualized violence resembles what Sondra Hale calls “gendercide”, where, quoting Catherine MacKinnon, “rapes are committed by some men against certain women”.30 With this level of intentionality fueling systematic and organized violence against women, it is not unreasonable to expect that survivors may be driven to violent responses because of the development of the grievances described above. In these cases, women with personal grievances may be compelled to exact revenge on the symbolic sources of injury, which would likely be the group or groups perceived to have either committed or endorsed the crimes. Government perpetrators have allegedly committed the majority of the attacks we’ve been able to track: 60 percent of the attacks against men and women are reportedly by government forces, with another 17 percent carried out by government and shabiha (plainclothes militia) forces together. When it comes to the rape of women, government forces have allegedly carried out 54 percent of these attacks; shabiha have allegedly perpetrated 20 percent; government and shabiha working together 6 percent.31 Where such an overwhelming number of reported rapes has occurred at the hands of government forces, the obvious target for retaliation would be the government forces themselves. In this way, joining the ranks of jihadist fighters would help to service a revenge agenda on behalf of women moved to radicalization through the suffering of individual grievances. In cases where female refugees are coerced into trading sex or their daughters for badly needed income, falling behind in schooling because there are no available courses in which to enroll, or dealing with health concerns that are not adequately addressed by Turkish service 29 Lauren Wolfe. “Syria Has a Massive Rape Crisis”, The Atlantic, April 3, 2013. Available online at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/syria-has-a-massive-rape-crisis/274583/.
30 Sondra Hale. “Rape As a Marker of and Eraser of Difference”, Gender, War, and Militarism: Feminist Perspectives, Laura Sjoberg and Sandra Via, (eds.), Praeger, 2011, p. 109. 31 Wolfe, “Syria Has a Massive Rape Crisis”.
Georgetown University On Becoming Radical: Thinking About Potential Pathways for Syrian Refugee Women
13 providers, the potential for solidifying grievances against a host state that is not perceived as doing enough to assist and integrate primarily female refugees is high. In fact, a Harvard working paper on radicalization in schools suggests that access to well-rounded education [in refugee camps] is a powerful enough factor on its own to overcome these obstacles and significantly reduce radicalization and terrorist recruitment in crisis situations,32 which, in the reverse, suggests that an absence of well-rounded education almost invites radicalization into refugee scenarios. Speaking at a Women’s Foreign Policy Group briefing focused on the state of Syrian refugees in host countries, Zainab al-Suwaij, the founder of the American Islamic Congress, noted that many Syrian females -- particularly urban individuals -with whom she works are quickly moving down the path of radicalization despite her efforts to address the education gap in part through the provision of non-violence skills training (it is important to note that even though some important needs of Syrian women living in Turkish camps continue to go unmet, their overall access to secure facilities means a substantially higher quality of life than their urban counterparts). Al-Suwaij works closely with urban refuges in Gaziantep through programming efforts aligned with Cure Violence, a project operating out of the University of Chicago that reverses the spread of violence by using the methods and strategies associated with disease control – detection and interruption, identifying individuals involved in transmission, and changing social norms of the communities where it occurs.33 What is most surprising, according to al-Suwaij, is the caution that she and her co-workers have had to exercise in containing “the real danger in not screening for the right men and women to train” in social mobilization and organization techniques. Essentially, al-Suwaij has noticed an alarming trend of women “wanting to fight and kill” instead of working collaboratively to effect change through non-violence.34 Group Polarization and Isolation
32 Francisco Martin-Rayo. “Countering Radicalization in Refugee Camps: How Education Can Help Defeat AQAP”, Dubai Initiative – Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, p. 6. 33 Cure Violence. “What We Do”, accessed online at http://cureviolence.org/what-we-do/. 34 Zainab Al-Suwaij. “A Status Report on Syrian Refugees: Beyond the Headlines”, Women’s Foreign Policy Group Panel, October 15, 2013.
Georgetown University On Becoming Radical: Thinking About Potential Pathways for Syrian Refugee Women
14 The high occurrence of women not getting all of what they need in Turkish cities and camps, organizing socially to mobilize for change and becoming radicalized because of it emanates from a hybrid of the grievances and the group polarization pathways articulated by McCauley and Moskalenko. What Al-Suwaij touches on – in addition to her point that grievances abound in both camps and urban spaces – is that women are forming groups using the skills they are learning from lessons on non-violence, and instead of leveraging those skills as taught, they are radicalizing through increased polarization. Where Turkish and UN officials have no systematic way of tracking women who live outside of refugee camps, very little is known about how and to what end women are organizing. In other words, there is the very real potential (and, apparently, some evidence) that women are radicalizing through increased polarization, and to some extent, isolation. Love Another dynamic that has gone unexplored thus far is whether Syrian women might be compelled to radicalize in the name of love. As McCauley and Moskalenko suggest, individuals may move in the direction of intentional and extreme violence if their friends, lovers, or family have also moved in that direction. In refugee camps along the Turkish-Syrian border, Syrian refugee women enjoy high and consistent contact with male combatants of whom many are husbands, sons, brothers and fathers. In fact, the BBC reports that the Turkish Government currently operates several secret training camps for Free Syrian Army rebels, allegedly located in Adana.35 In addition, Free Syrian Army rebels regularly move in and out of Turkish refugee camps, often to recharge for several days only to return to the fighting. Where there is such a high degree of contact between militarized and violence-oriented men and their female family members, there is the very real, and as yet unexplored potential that women may be undergoing processes of radicalization out of a commitment and connection to the men they love. Unfreezing Underlying the above pathways to radicalization, however, is the overarching, “unfreezing” pathway. To rephrase, the “unfreezing” pathway to radicalization involves individuals who become susceptible to new norms and ideas in environments that are devoid of 35 Richard Galpin. “Syria crisis: Turkey training rebels, says FSA fighter”, BBC, August 4, 2012. Accessed online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19124810.
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15 familiar networks and values. Essentially, refugee communities anywhere in the world enable the unfreezing pathway to present itself as an alternative option to the loneliness and isolation of refugee life. Refugees have left behind familiar ways of living and norms of being and find themselves in foreign communities that may not treat them kindly or even welcome their stay. In the case of Turkey, most refugees do not speak the local language and are thus cut off from developing new social networks outside of their narrow base either within the camps or cities. In addition, many refugees are afraid to make inroads into their communities because they either are not legally registered in the country or fear the police for other reasons; concerns around being forcibly returned to Syria entrench their isolation and may feed into processes of group polarization. Where authorities are deliberately disallowing the Syrian cultural practices of child marriage and polygamy, some modes and methods of staying connected to “Syrianness� are no longer available, thus further speeding along the process of unfreezing. As radicalization unfurls and strengthens along various pathways, it becomes possible that a highly radicalized refugee population can provide a cadre of ideal volunteers for a terrorist organization, as they typically come from a violent environment and have fewer opportunities for personal advancement, thus making a terrorist organization more attractive.36 Ultimately, in the case of Syrians living as forcibly displaced refugees in Turkey, the process of unfreezing has an obvious and undeniable force-multiplying effect on the related but still different dynamics of developing grievances, emulating the steps of a loved one and isolating/polarizing as a group. Conclusion: Thoughts on Leveraging Women to Counter Radicalization Thus far, this paper has focused exclusively on the potential for radicalization of Syrian women living in Turkey on the basis of the following dynamics: (1) accumulating grievances directed at both Syrian government forces and the Turkish Government; (2) undergoing group polarization and isolation with the help of newly-acquired social mobilization and organization skills; (3) enjoying elevated and consistent access to male combatants who are fathers, husbands, brothers and sons, thereby rendering radicalization through love a real possibility; and (4)
36 Francisco Martin-Rayo, p. 4.
Georgetown University On Becoming Radical: Thinking About Potential Pathways for Syrian Refugee Women
16 experiencing the process of “unfreezing” wherein access to traditional and familiar norms, values and networks is closed off. Even though a serious consideration of how and why women radicalize is missing from the current literature, there is even less scholarship on what can be done to empower women to resist and reverse processes of radicalization in their own communities. The OSCE report on women and radicalization recommends the following key steps be taken to better enable women to counteract radicalization: (1) direct engagement with women’s grassroots organizations; (2) rethinking counterterrorism restrictions on financing so as to avoid gutting small-scale organizations that may have access and the ability to work constructively with violent extremists; (3) addressing the developmental needs of women so as to empower them on different levels; (4) providing safe spaces for women to express their views and experiences in dealing with violent extremism; and, (5) raising women’s awareness and understanding of violent extremism so as to enable them to take a stand against it.37 Most of these suggestions are rather intuitive and commonsensical and reflect just how little the counterterrorism community understands about women’s role as both actors and detractors of political violence. And, unless a more coordinated and committed effort is undertaken to look at the remaining 50 percent of the world’s population and how they interface with the twin processes of radicalization and terrorist recruitment, the hidden dangers of increased and dangerous violent extremism that currently reside beneath the surface in Syrian refugee communities will continue to proliferate in both this and future conflicts around the world.
37 OSCE, p. 9.