A Collective Identity Forged in the Fires of War: The Azerbaijani Experience of the Ongoing Conflict Over Nagorno-Karabakh
Amanda Jessen M.A. Candidate
Conflict Resolution PSYC-498 December 5th, 2012
The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, a region both claimed by and situated between the post-Soviet republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Southern Caucasus, is one of the least popularized and longest running conflicts in today’s global theatre. The initial rumblings of conflict preceded the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and according to the perspective of Thomas de Waal in his historical look at the birth and endurance of the conflict in Black Garden, the evolution of the conflict helped to destabilize and, ultimately, bring the USSR to its breaking point. 1 With the Soviet Union in disarray, a declaration from Armenian Karabakhis that they wished to secede from territorial Azerbaijan, and widespread upset in Azerbaijan over what it perceived as a meddling and illegitimate Armenian influence in the region, the stage was effectively set for what would be several years of intense and violent fighting followed by almost two decades of a political and military stalemate. While both Armenian and Azerbaijani national identities were substantially influenced by contestations over territory, this paper will focus primarily on how Azerbaijanis experienced their respective national identity throughout the course of the birth, escalation, and ongoing stalemate of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Key to this discussion will be the contention that Azerbaijani collective identity did not form in a vacuum, but was instead created against the backdrop of decolonization and an escalation of cross border tensions and direct manipulation between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Turkey, and post-Soviet Russia. Two other actors – Iran and the United States – have also played and continue to play a significant role in positioning (and being positioned by) Azerbaijan as it has struggled to understand itself in a collective sense.
1 Thomas de Waal. Black Garden, (New York: New York University Press, 2003). 2
As I will further develop in subsequent paragraphs, positioning theory as it is understood by Harré and Moghaddam 2 will guide some levels of inquiry into how Azerbaijan positions and is positioned by five key actors – Turkey, the United States, Armenia, Iran, and Russia - and to what degree these constellations of acts, storylines, and subsequent positions have shaped an Azerbaijani collective identity. It will be important to identify some of the roots of Azerbaijani collective identity in order to set the stage for a discussion of the primary and cross-cutting driver of identity: the war with Armenia over control of Nagorno-Karabakh. I will guide the reader through a series of events related directly to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, both past and ongoing, that have forged what I will argue is an Azerbaijani collective identity predicated on sustained victimhood and suffering. Once I have established a timeline and analysis of events that have shaped a collective identity born of loss, struggle, and the centrality of redemption, I will outline the implications of such an identity for a country led by the dictatorship of President Ilham Aliyev. Central to this discussion will be an interrogation of materialist theories that seek to explain how power elites co-opt, carve out, and leverage ideology to further their material interests. For example, the reminder that thousands of Azerbaijanis still live in refugee settlements along the border of Nagorno-Karabakh continues to sustain anti-Armenian war cries, yet the government raked in 63 billion dollars in oil revenue last year, 3 with obviously not enough of those proceeds used to implement promises to mainstream IDPs. Methodology and Theoretical Framework
2 Fathali Moghaddam, Rom Harré, Naomi Lee. “Positioning and Conflict: An Introduction”, Global Conflict Resolution Through Positioning Analysis, (Marion, OH: Springer, 2010), 9. 3 World Bank Group. “Azerbaijan GDP”, (Located at http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ azerbaijan/gdp. Accessed on December 1, 2012). 3
Much of what substantiates the argument that the ongoing war with Armenia first and foremost conditions how Azerbaijanis collectively identify is pulled from an exhaustive literature review, which includes histories and journalistic reports of the conflict. Both Black Garden and Azerbaijan Diary, written by Thomas de Waal and Thomas Goltz respectively, provide a hard look at the impacts of Russian colonization and Turkish and Iranian influence on the situation, as well as a discussion of political, economic, and social events that led up to the outbreak of violence between Azerbaijan and Armenia. De Waal’s investigation will shine light on the development and shifting of narratives that are still used to justify and legitimize each side’s claim to the region. Goltz’s account will contribute on-the-ground observations of watershed moments of the war, like the massacre at Xocali, that figure prominently into a nationally sanctioned narrative of victimhood. Beyond a literature review of two singular accounts of how Azerbaijan has individuated in the wake of the break up of the USSR, I will utilize media coverage of two events that further crystallized an Azerbaijani collective identity as diametrically and energetically opposed to that of “the Armenian”: the alleged felling of 45 Armenian soldiers by Mubariz Ibrahimov and the happenings following the extradition of Ramil Safarov to Azerbaijan eight years after receiving a life sentence for beheading an Armenian counterpart at a NATO conference in Hungary. Many of these articles were pulled from major international online publications as well as Azerbaijani state media sources themselves. These accounts, particularly the articles written by Azerbaijani journalists, are most telling in terms of how Azerbaijanis view increasingly brutal violence against Armenians as crucial for their survival.
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Several important psychological theories will more clearly explain how this intergroup conflict evolved to its current state, and the degree to which power elites are capable of and have succeeded in manipulating the parties involved to their advantage. In reviewing how groups place themselves vis-á-vis others to justify places along a convenient historical continuum, I will rely heavily on positioning theory as an explanatory mechanism. The power of legitimizing narratives will help underscore how this region became worthy of a violent and long-lasting war. Lastly, I will spend a considerable amount of time investigating how an Azerbaijani collective identity has formed since it declared independence from the USSR and what the nature of this collective identity means for component individuals. Without some sort of common theoretical thread woven through the series of events dating back to the early 20th century, much of what has transpired in the region lacks coherence. In order to address this, I will use positioning theory to underscore how various acts and positions have created storylines that feed back into a particular position. In many cases, the positions that substantiate and verify these storylines are advantageous to those with enough power and influence to create the storyline in the first place. In other words, it will be important to understand how positions and storylines “underpin the capacity for social influence,”4 a tool of persuasion imperative for any group in competition with another to acquire something. Positioning theory will also help to benchmark several events critical to the creation and strengthening of an Azerbaijani collective identity in the wake of the war with Armenia. I will highlight a number of turning points both during and after the war that provided the opportunity for the power elite to assume and allocate positions in order to either preserve or 4 Winnifred Lewis. “Intergroup Positioning and Power”, Global Conflict Resolution Through Positioning Analysis, (Marion, OH: Springer, 2010), 30. 5
refute supportive or competing narratives respectively as well as reify the rights and duties of the parties involved. Positioning theory will also be important to a discussion of how outside actors factored into what - on the surface - appears to be a conflict between two states as well as what level of impact external intervention and manipulation had on Azerbaijani identity. How Armenia and Azerbaijan positioned outsiders within their respective, larger narratives will also help to explain the identity options Azerbaijan has pursued over the years. Alongside positioning theory, theories of identity formation are obviously central to any discussion of how one particular group sees itself alongside another. In his look at how minority groups in post-colonial settings continue to fare socio-economically and politically, Donald Taylor reimagines the source of unhealthy individual identity as one emanating from a weak or unarticulated collective identity. He refers to the collective identity as a person’s “primary psychological blueprint,” 5 one that, if not properly understood or rooted in group values and mores, creates a situation in which “the individual has no clearly established template upon which to articulate personal identity or self-esteem.” 6 Taylor goes on to assert that the collective identity exported to colonized peoples by the colonizing body directly impacts and has potential to run counter to the colonized community’s understanding of itself. It is the power differential between these two players, he says, that makes reconciliation between collective identities difficult 7, and that can result in the strategic subjugation and elimination of the subordinate community’s values, language, customs, and other cultural elements. An understanding of the primacy of a healthy collective identity for the development of healthy individual identity, and the related challenge of securing a healthy collective identity 5 Donald M. Taylor. The Quest for Identity, (London: Praeger, 2002), 33. 6 Ibid, 40. 7 Ibid, 71. 6
for formerly colonized communities, will lay the framework for understanding how a postSoviet, nascent Azerbaijani identity was particularly susceptible to formation along unhealthy lines, and later, to co-optation by power elites. This will also explain some of the systemic social apathy and malaise I observed while serving in Azerbaijan as a Peace Corps Volunteer. Peripherally, materialist and positioning theories that seek to explain the evolution of conflict as a function of elite ownership of ideology and the narratives that shape it will help anchor an understanding of how the meaning of Karabakh engendered a willingness to inflict violence on communities that previously co-existed relatively peacefully in heterogeneous areas within both Armenia and Azerbaijan. The power elites relevant to this discussion include prominent groups from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iran and the United States. The powerful within each bounded space have spun, re-spun and continue to spin narratives that sustain an ideology aligned with their respective agendas for and interests in the conflict. Commentary on My Own Positionality In an effort to honestly and comprehensively regard the methodology used to further this inquiry, I have a responsibility to acknowledge my own position vis-å-vis this subject. It is critical to draw attention to the not unimportant fact that I served in the United States Peace Corps in Azerbaijan from 2009 – 2011. This means that I was perceived as an agent of a Western entity that was often believed to be disinterested in at best and pro-Armenian at worst with regard to the conflict. This reality very likely set the tone for conversations and interactions that I had with Azerbaijanis both within and outside of my assigned community, and could very well have conditioned how much access I enjoyed to raw thinking and feeling about the conflict.
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While I will rely heavily on the accounts provided by authors and subject matter experts who have spent considerable time researching the conflict through some lens or another, some shades of analysis will derive from my own experience with and observations of Azerbaijani culture, identity, and politics. For example, my experience with the education system will help explain how the former Soviet system of learning has evolved into a broken and endemically corrupt laboratory for anti-Armenia propaganda. The Xocali remembrance ceremonies and “historical” accounts of the war in English language texts will serve to enhance my argument that power elites in the education system inherited an educational apparatus from the Soviets, and rather than reform and improve it, they have instead imbued much of what is learned with overt and sometimes silly criticism and condemnation of Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. The Actors Involved – Country Profiles Taking a brief look at country profiles of the major players involved in this conflict should properly situate the reader for the forthcoming analysis of positions and interests of these actors in terms of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan Azerbaijan, a country of roughly 9.5 million inhabitants bordering the Caspian Sea, is situated in the Caucasus to the south of Russia, southeast of Georgia, north of Iran and east of Armenia. It is the only country in the entire world with a non-contiguous exclave (Naxchivan) featured as a part of the nation-state. The country is 93.4% Shi’ite Muslim and is home to a handful of ethnic groups, namely the Lezgi, Talysh, and Dagestani groups. The primary language is Azerbaijani, but most of the educated elite speaks Russian in formal sector scenarios.
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Since independence in 1991, Azerbaijan has struggled to diversify and strengthen its economy, despite high economic growth from 2006-2008 due in large part to booming oil exportation, which is currently 90% of its overall export portfolio. The country is rich in oil and natural gas deposits, but a .2% blow to economic growth has signaled a plateau in oil production. The CIA World Factbook insists that ongoing growth depends on Azerbaijan’s ability to attract foreign direct investment as well as the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia.8 The World Bank points to additional areas critical to overall improvement of quality of life, namely: an overhaul in the education system; more effective infrastructure to establish reliable linkages between rural and urban areas, and; conservation of important agricultural spaces as a means to ensure jobs and food security. 9 Armenia Armenia is a landlocked country bounded by Iran, Georgia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. The country is almost exclusively ethnically Armenian with a small enclave of Kurdish Armenians living primarily adjacent to the Iranian border. Armenians are 94.7% Apostolic Christian and are proud to acknowledge that they were the first nation to formally adopt Christianity in the early 4th century. Following the Armenian Genocide committed by the Ottoman Turks in 1915, millions of Armenians fled the country and constitute what is now one of the most unified and powerful diasporas in the world. Since Azerbaijan imposed a total blockade of its border with Armenia, Armenia has sought to stabilize its economy, largely with the help of major multilateral donors and diaspora sponsors. Because its borders are closed with both Turkey and Azerbaijan, Armenia 8 CIA. “Azerbaijan”, World Factbook, (Located at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications /the-world-factbook/geos/aj.html. Accessed on November 29, 2012). 9 World Bank Group. “Azerbaijan Overview”, (Located at http://www.worldbank.org/en /country/azerbaijan/overview. Accessed on November 29, 2012). 9
is largely dependent on Russian commercial and governmental support. The CIA World Handbook argues that Armenia will need to aggressively bolster the rule of law and reform economic structures in order to survive economic isolation in the region. 10 According to the World Bank, Armenia’s most important priorities include “increasing the country’s resilience to external shocks,” a strategy that will hopefully counteract increasing poverty rates and unpredictable downturns in remittances from abroad as a result from shifts in the global economy.11 Russia From the Mongols, to the Romanovs, to the Bolsheviks, Russia is now technically a democracy with a sphere of influence that continues to impact many of its former republicsturned-independent states. With a population of 142,517,670 million people, 79.8% of the population is ethnically Russian, 3.8% ethnically Tatar, 2% Ukrainian, 1.2% Bashkir, 1.1% Chuvash and 1.1% other, which includes Chechens and Dagestanis. In terms of economic change, Russia has radically shifted from a centralized, command economy to a globally integrated market economy since the break up of the Soviet Union. In 2011, Russia became the world’s leading oil producer and the second –largest natural gas producer. Despite large reserves of natural resources and heavy investment in the technology and services industries, Russia was hit hard by the 2009 – 2010 recession and was forced to receive an aid package from World Bank that totaled 6.7% of its GDP. 12
10 CIA. “Armenia”, World Factbook, (Located at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications /the-world-factbook/geos/am.html. Accessed on November 29, 2012). 11 World Bank Group. “Armenia Overview”, (Located at http://www.worldbank.org/en /country/armenia/overview. Accessed on November 29, 2012). 12 CIA. “Russia”, World Factbook, (Located at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications /theworld-factbook/geos/rs.html. Accessed on November 29, 2012). 10
Many international headlines in the past two decades related to Russia involve Russia’s continued involvement in the internal affairs of former Soviet republics. In 2008, Russia was largely condemned by the international community for its involvement in intensifying conflict in the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia has also played a hand in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia, sometimes overtly supporting one side over another. Currently, many observers fear that Russia’s postcommunist democratization efforts are being steadily undermined by an increasingly autocratic Putin administration. Turkey Turkey is a country sandwiched by both Europe and Asia and bordered by the Aegean, Black and Mediterranean seas. It also shares a border with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The population, at 79,749,461 million people, is 70-75% ethnically Turkish, 18% Kurdish and 7-12% other. The vast majority of the population (99.8%) identifies as Sunni Muslim although the state is energetically secular. Turkey is relatively stable politically and economically and has been heavily courted by foreign direct investors for some time now. Turkey’s bid to join the European Union is a development that many predict will yield even more lucrative benefits for the country. Drawbacks to stability include political unrest in the region and the ongoing conflict with ethnic Kurds in the south. 13 Iran Iran, a country slightly smaller than Alaska, borders the Gulf of Oman, the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea and is situated between Iraq and Pakistan. The country enjoys a strategic 13 CIA. “Turkey”, World Factbook, (Located at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications /the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html. Accessed on November 29, 2012). 11
position on the Persian Gulf and Straight of Hormuz, a geopolitical reality that has benefited Iran militarily in the past. The Iranian population, clocking in at almost 79 million people, is ethnically and linguistically mixed with the population divided along the following lines: 61% Persian, 16% Azeri, 10% Kurd, 6% Lur, 2% Baloch, 2% Arab, and 2-3% Turkmen or Turkic tribes. Iran is an Islamic Republic whose legal system is predicated on sharia law. Following the ouster of the Shah in 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini rose to power and ushered in an era of strict religious and moral adherence. The Iranian economy relies heavily on oil exports to the detriment of a more diversified, capable economy. Unemployment and underemployment remain high and currency devaluation has resulted in major food shortages throughout the country.14 The Ahmadinejad Administration continues to pursue plans to build nuclear facilities despite international sanctions and condemnation of these efforts. Azerbaijan and Turkey and Azerbaijan and Iran: Snapshots of History An understanding of the historical relationship between Turkey and Azerbaijan is helpful inasmuch as it offers the first window through which Azerbaijanis searched for identity after breaking away from the Soviet Union. Research on the historical origins of Azerbaijan conducted by the Library of Congress Country Studies reveals the following events to have been crucial to the Turkification that occurred ahead of Russian domination of the area: Between the seventh and eleventh centuries, Arabs controlled Azerbaijan, bringing with them the precepts of Islam. In the mid-eleventh century, Turkic-speaking groups, including the Oghuz tribes and their Seljuk Turkish dynasty, ended Arab control by invading Azerbaijan from Central Asia and asserting political domination. The Seljuks brought with them the
14 CIA. “Iran�, World Factbook, (Located at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications /theworld-factbook/geos/ir.html. Accessed on November 29, 2012). 12
Turkish language and Turkish customs. By the thirteenth century, the basic characteristics of the Azerbaijani nation had been established. 15
The transference of the Turkish language and culture to this area served as the planted seeds of pan-Turkism that would bloom later for Azerbaijan, and also created a fertile environment for Turkish intervention in modern political and economic affairs. The Turkmenchay Treaty of 1828 effectively divided the Azeri population between imperial Russia and Persia, a demographic split that continues to generate implications for both Azerbaijan and Iran today. With 32 million Azeris (approximately four times as many as live in Azerbaijan proper) living in northern Iran, Persian influence on Azerbaijani affairs continues to impact the Azeri communities inside both Iran and Azerbaijan. Moving further back in history, the Library of Congress Country Studies profile of Azerbaijan describes initial elements of Persian influence on Azerbaijani identity: A century later, the Medes, who were related ethnically to the Persians, established an empire that included southernmost Azerbaijan. In the sixth century B.C., the Archaemenid Persians, under Cyrus the Great, took over the western part of Azerbaijan when they subdued the Assyrian Empire to the west. In 330 B.C., Alexander the Great absorbed the entire Archaemenid Empire into his holdings, leaving Persian satraps to govern as they advanced eastward. According to one account, Atropates, a Persian general in Alexander's command, whose name means "protected by fire," lent his name to the region when Alexander made him its governor. Another legend explains that Azerbaijan's name derives from the Persian words meaning "the land of fire," a reference either to the natural burning of surface oil deposits or to the oil-fueled fires in temples of the once-dominant Zoroastrian religion.16
Based on a shared history grounded in Persian dominance of the area, Azerbaijan and Iran both spring from a similar heritage and historical narrative. Life as Part of the Soviet System
15 Library of Congress Country Studies. “Turkish Influences – Azerbaijan”, (Located at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+az0015. Accessed on November 20, 2012). 16 Library of Congress Country Studies. “Persian and Greek Influences – Azerbaijan”, (Located at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+az0014. Accessed on November 20, 2012). 13
When the Bolsheviks invaded Azerbaijan in 1920, over seven decades of Soviet imperial rule would immediately follow. At first, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia were lumped into a Transcaucasian federated republic in which independent control over foreign policy, trade, finances, and other state functions was transferred to the Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Authority. Under the Stalin Constitution of 1936, the three component parts of the TSFSR were parsed out and assigned the status of separate republics. 17 The issues of allocating the contested areas of Naxchivan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Zangezur were three initial sticking points that plagued Soviet organizers in the early years of building the Union. At first, all three areas were allocated to the Supreme Soviet of Armenia, but following an anti-Bolshevik uprising in 1921, Moscow was less interested in awarding Armenia with additional land. In place of a decision grounded in the rule of law, Zangezur was taken by force by Dashnak-led Armenians and Naxchivan landed safely in control of Azerbaijan. The Treaty of Moscow effectively sealed the fate of Naxchivan as part of Azerbaijan moving forward. 18 Thomas de Waal writes that the decision to award Nagorno-Karabakh to the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan was a decision likely motivated by the political machinations of Soviet enterprise in the region. Although Karabakh was overwhelmingly ethnically Armenian and had a strong history of Armenian self-rule, it is true that at the time, Karabakh was better integrated into Azerbaijan’s economy. He refutes the contention that the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO), as it was ultimately named by the Bolsheviks, was created as a “divide and rule” tactic, a strategy for Moscow to consolidate its authority by setting one 17 Library of Congress Country Studies. “Determination of Borders – Azerbaijan,” (Located at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+az0020. Accessed on November 20, 2012). 18 Thomas de Waal. Black Garden, (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 129. 14
group against another. Instead, he argues that Karabakh ended up in Azerbaijan’s hands as a way to model the meshing of ethnically divergent groups into one, viable, economic unit in which participants would subjugate claims to ethnic identity to ever-exalted notions of classbased solidarity.19 Nagorno-Karabakh – The Conflict Itself Rather than dive into the excruciating details of the back-and-forth of the NagornoKarabakh War, I will simply begin by re-creating a timeline of events critical to this discussion: In February of 1988, the government in NKAO appeals to the USSR Supreme Soviet for the transfer of NKAO to the Armenian SSR. The demonstrations that follow are the firstever spontaneous public demonstrations in the history of the USSR. In a city called Sumqayit near Baku, Azerbaijani uprisings in the streets result in the death of at least 30 Armenians living in tenement housing throughout the city. In March of that same year, Mikhael Gorbachev denies Karabakhis their request to join the Armenian SSR. In the summer of 1988, the Supreme Soviet of Armenia appeals to the USSR Supreme Soviet to grant NKAO the right of transfer to Armenia. The Azerbaijani SSR reacts angrily, charging the Armenian SSR with unlawful intervention in internal affairs. Again, the request to transfer is denied. Shortly after the second request, interethnic violence erupts in the fall of 1988 and Azerbaijanis begin to flee en masse from NKAO and Armenia to Azerbaijan. As tensions continue to rise, Moscow announces that it will directly rule NKAO, but reverses course later in the year. Anger mounts steadily in Baku and large demonstrations give rise to the Azerbaijan Popular Front, a political party critical of Moscow’s involvement in Azerbaijani affairs. It is at this point that Azerbaijan votes to blockade rail traffic into Armenia and NKAO, severely 19 Ibid. 15
crippling the Armenian SSR economy and motivating the Armenian SSR to strengthen its ties with the USSR Supreme Soviet. In January of 1990, anti-Armenian violence becomes such that Soviet leadership declares a state of emergency in NKAO and sends tanks into Baku, which results in the death of 130 Azerbaijanis, most of whom are civilians. Anti-Soviet sentiment in Azerbaijan is energetically galvanized and Azerbaijan’s first president, Ayaz Mutalibov, is elected in September of that same year. In June 1991, Soviet Army and Azerbaijani special police troops implement Operation RING, resulting in the forced deportation of thousands of Armenians from northern NKAO villages. As the fighting intensifies, the parallel events of NKAO’s declaration of independence from Azerbaijan and Armenia’s secession from the USSR mark significant turning points in the conflict. In response to NKAO’s declaration, the Azerbaijani SSR voids the autonomous status of NKAO at the same time that a local referendum in NKAO makes clear the overwhelming support for secession from Azerbaijan. In 1992, the Soviet Union collapses and marks the beginning of full-scale, violent conflict between Karabakh and Azerbaijan. At this point, evidence begins to surface that allegedly rogue Soviet soldiers are fighting with both sides of the conflict, that large Soviet arms surpluses are being sold to the highest bidder in the region, and that Armenian soldiers are fighting openly on behalf of the Karabakhi cause. Amidst rising casualties and political turmoil in Baku, Karabakh Armenians attack the village of Xocali and massacre hundreds of fleeing civilians. This event is perhaps the most important in terms of winning Azerbaijani hearts and minds over to the cause of war. The outcry in Baku forces Mutalibov into resignation, Abulfez Elchibey of the Azerbaijan Popular
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Front into power, and succeeds in distracting Azerbaijani attention from the war theatre, a circumstance that enables the Karabakh Armenians to overrun the town of Shusha and take control of the Lachin corridor linking Karabakh to Armenia. The loss of Shusha is a catastrophe for Azerbaijanis who regard it as the birthplace of Azerbaijani music and poetry. In an effort to strike back, the Azerbaijani army launches an offensive in June 1992 that empties Merdakert of approximately 40,000 Armenians. Just six months later, Armenians regroup and retake Merdakert. They push on to take control of Kelbajar, a development that rattles Elchibey from power and paves the way for the uprising of Colonel Surat Huseinov, which ultimately leads to the return of Heydar Aliyev, former Politburo member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, to the presidency. Armenians initiate a series of advances that move them into Qubatli, Jebrayli and Fizuli, Azerbaijani districts long the Iranian border in 1993. A ceasefire is temporarily implemented by Russian envoy Vladimir Kazimirov, but the ceasefire fails in October of the same year when Azerbaijan launches an offensive on Armenian forces that backfires and results in a further loss of the Zangelan district. To the relief of many, a ceasefire is signed during talks between Armenia, Azerbaijan, NKAO representatives and the CIS in May 1994. For the next 12 years, a series of false starts amid slow progress characterizes the shaky peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Internecine fighting in the region and near the borders continues, but is sporadic and does not escalate into full-scale war. 20 The Development of Legitimizing Historical Narratives Throughout the War
20 Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. “Nagorno-Karabakh: Timeline of the Long Road to Peace�, February 10th, 2006, (Located at http://www.rferl.org/content/article/ 1065626.html. Accessed on November 15, 2012). 17
While the above timeline succeeds in highlighting the events critical to the beginning and intensification of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, it does not adequately offer explanation into how each side came to care about the contested area. On the surface it appears that the conflict responsible for the total destabilization of two relatively weak, new nations following the collapse of the Soviet Union has been waged over a sliver of land 1,700 square miles in area with no remarkable natural resources to speak of. This is not to suggest that claims to the land are baseless, but rather to suggest that they derive from interests that are not materially driven, as in cases where control of access to oil or diamonds is at stake. The historical narratives construed by each side as the legitimizing vehicle for claims to the territory were most effective in mobilizing support for and driving the war. Take the Armenian claim to righteousness with regard to the conflict, for example: De Waal argues that at the time of the outbreak of war, many Armenians casually referred to Azerbaijanis as “Turks�, a categorical distinction that evoked the collective memory of the near destruction they faced at the hands of the Ottomans in 1915. When in 1998 the Sumqayit pogroms took place and Armenians were singled out by an angry mob of Azerbaijani laborers, Armenians responded by calling the incident another genocide committed by the Turks.
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*So as early as
the first year of real tension between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Karabakh, Armenians were beginning to invoke and refresh a collective narrative of victimization at the hands of Turkish peoples, and it is in this way that Armenia implicates both Turkey and Azerbaijan with one fell swoop of nationalist narrative, moving back in time to paint an old narrative of Turkish aggression with the new face of Azerbaijani oppression. 21 de Waal. 78. *Interestingly, the Azerbaijani government has since responded that there was no such genocide of the Armenians in 1915, a claim that has deeply enraged Armenians throughout the world.
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In terms of the land itself, Armenians regard Karabakh as part of an “unbroken lineage of Armenian dominion”22 stretching back to the ancient kingdom of Artsakh over two thousand years ago. Nationalist historians point to the wealth of monuments and inscriptions in stone dating back centuries as evidence that Armenia was there first. These same authors point to nomadic Azerbaijanis living in the area as somehow inferior to the Armenians who lived more sedentary lives. They also suggest that because Azerbaijan as a state is an “invention” of the last 100 years, it is less entitled to historical claims than Armenia, a state that has enjoyed relatively more permanence.23 Azerbaijani nationalist authors, like Ziya Buniatov, have responded by poking holes in the notion that Armenia enjoys an unbroken presence in Karabakh. By pointing out that many Armenians in both Armenia and Karabakh can be traced to 19 th century immigrants resettled in the area by Russians, nationalist historians have worked to discredit the idea that Armenians of any variety are indigenous to Karabakh and hence, have no inviolable historical claim to the area. Some have gone even farther and suggested that all Armenians were transplanted to the area in 1820, which makes illegitimate Armenian claims to any part of the area both inside and outside of Karabakh.24 Azerbaijani intellectuals have devised other methods to endorse their natural and divine claims to the land in question. For example, Ziya Buniatov has formulated the theory that Karabakh Armenian rulers, the meliks, were in fact not ethnically Armenian, but instead were “Armenianized Albanians.” It is important to note that the Albanians referenced here are not of the Balkan origin, but are Caucasian individuals named as such by the Romans of the 1 st
22 Thomas Goltz. Azerbaijan Diary, (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 149. 23 Ibid. 24 Goltz.151. 19
century B.C.25 He argues that these so-called Albanians were prominent in the Caucasus and gave rise to the bulk of the Azerbaijani population. Alongside this contention, he put forth that Karabakh, as well as large swaths of present-day Armenia, were actually Albanian in nature, and therefore, actually belong to Azerbaijanis in an ethnic sense. In true nationalist fashion, we see intellectuals taking hold of and manipulating historical interpretations of ethnic and ancestral origin in order to justify each side’s claims to a shared space. As members of the intelligentsia and therefore, part of the power elite, these individuals leveraged access to influence in order to manufacture and disseminate legitimizing ideologies. That reproducers of each narrative are still widely quoted and revered for their contribution to “national literature” indicates the degree to which these narratives have taken root in collective memory. That Azerbaijan was ultimately on the losing end of the armed fighting laid the groundwork for ongoing positioning of Armenians as aggressors and illegal tenants on Azerbaijani land. This ultimately created a fertile environment from which an Azerbaijani collective identity based on victimhood and suffering could flourish. Acts, Storylines, and Narratives – The Power of Positioning As a lead up to the delineation of Azerbaijani identity formation, it is important to analyze a few key events that occurred during the full-scale fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia. In the interest of time and to respect the scope of this paper, I will focus primarily on how Azerbaijan positioned and continues to position itself and others in a consistent way from event to event. The Sumqayit Pogrom of 1988 The outbreak of violence in the Azerbaijani city of Sumqayit that claimed the lives of nearly 30 Armenians is widely acknowledged to be the responsibility of Azerbaijanis 25 de Waal. 152. 20
themselves. As mentioned previously, Armenians look at this situation as an extension of Turkic violence toward Armenians, events seen as “a new act of ‘genocide’ against the Armenian people and organized by Azerbaijan state and Party leaders.” 26 The Azerbaijani re-telling of the event, however, would have the observer believe that the pogrom was actually instigated by an Armenian himself, and if not an Armenian, than the KGB with the intention of provoking an anti-Armenian backlash. Again, Ziya Buniatov is credited with crafting a story that alleges that the violence was planned by Armenians interested in discrediting Azerbaijan and injecting new energy in the Armenian national cause.27 In this case, Azerbaijani intellectuals position Armenians as shifty, lying saboteurs and secondarily position the Soviet KGB as playing a potential role in the affair. Azerbaijanis are victims of conspiracy, collusion, and mistruths propagated by the enemy. Xocali According to most accounts, the massacre at Xocali is the single bloodiest event of the entire war over Nagorno-Karabakh. As Armenian forces descended on the town, Azerbaijani civilians were herded into a narrow pass regarded as the only plausible escape route from the area. As villagers hurried to safety, Armenian soldiers positioned on a ridge above the pass opened fire and killed between 600 and 1,000 Azerbaijanis, most of whom were noncombatants. This event single-handedly shook the country into action and resulted in political outcry serious enough to unseat President Mutalibov. To this day, Xocali is the most widely commemorated event within both Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani diaspora. Schools throughout the country honor the fallen with assemblies 26 Kristine Barseghyan. “Changing Turkish Other in Post-Soviet Armenian Discourse on National Identity”, Polish Sociological Review, No. 159, (Polish Sociological Association, 2007), 290. 27 de Waal. 43. 21
that often turn into fora for anti-Armenian hate speech. Pictures of dying women are painted in frescos of every school I have ever visited and tales of Armenian soldiers raping, dismembering, and cannibalizing small children are commonplace when the discussion turns to the viciousness of the Armenian Other. The Xocali tragedy is referred to as a “genocide” against Azerbaijanis and Azerbaijani leaders continue to call for international recognition of the event, despite the fact that based on the criteria and definition of genocide 28, the event does not come close to registering as an act of genocidal proportions, no matter how horrible the event truly was. In my view, Xocali was and continues to be the single most unifying image of Armenian evil and continues to serve as a reminder of the degree to which Azerbaijanis have been victimized by the ruthlessness of their neighbor. The Role of Russian Military Support The role that post-Soviet Russia has assumed in the playing out of events cannot be overlooked in terms of how it has fallen into the hands of the influence-wielding power elite. At various points throughout the conflict, each side charged the other with receiving patronage from Mother Russia. Perhaps more resonant, though, were Azerbaijani cries that Russia was directly and deliberately intervening on behalf of the Armenians. Thomas Goltz tells of a situation in which six Russian mercenaries were apprehended in Karabakh by Azerbaijani villagers. The men initially claimed to be AWOL, but in discovering that Russian commanders neglected to report the men missing from their ranks until one year after their
28 Center on Law and Globalization. “How to Know Genocide When I See It”, (Located at http://clg.portalxm.com/library/keytext.cfm?keytext_id=162. Accessed on November 27, 2012). 22
“disappearance,” the evidence seems to suggest that Russians were at least aware that enlisted men were fighting Azerbaijanis on behalf of the Armenians. 29 Azerbaijanis look to circumstantial evidence such as this when speaking about the role Russia has played in undermining their efforts. Inasmuch as Azerbaijan is a victim of Armenian aggression, they also actively blame Russia for the military defeat they suffered in the early 1990’s. I heard countless times during my Peace Corps service that the Russians were no better than the Armenians and were certainly not be trusted with Azerbaijani interests. Here, Russia is positioned as a patron of Armenia, complicit in the atrocities committed against Azerbaijanis, and equally guilty for the suffering endured by survivors of the war. Amendment to Section 907 The Amendment to Section 907 of the Freedom to Support Act, adopted by the US Congress in 1992, stipulates that Azerbaijan would not receive any sort of bilateral aid until it ceased hostilities and aggression toward Armenians over Nagorno-Karabakh. The adoption of this amendment motivated Azerbaijanis to charge Armenians in diaspora with unfair play in the US arena and to charge the United States with unfair support of criminal Armenian aggression. An article posted to the Garabagh.net website claims the passing of the amendment is one of the “consequences of the information war carried out by Armenians against Azerbaijan in foreign countries.”30 Again, we see Azerbaijanis position Armenians as manipulators and liars and in effect, position themselves as victims of an aggressive and deceptive propaganda campaign abroad. Influences on Azerbaijani National Identity 29 Thomas Goltz. “Letter from Eurasia: The Hidden Russian Hand”, Foreign Policy, No. 92, (Washington, DC: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, Autumn 1993), 103. 30 Garabagh.net. “Amendment to the Freedom Support Act”, (Located at http://garabagh. net/content _110_en.html. Accessed on November 28, 2012). 23
In terms of ferreting out the most compelling claim to Azerbaijani identity, Thomas Goltz effectively sums up the interests of three competing powers in co-opting and shaping Azerbaijani identity: Turkey, Iran and Russia. The very newness (and relative complexity) of the Azeri identity left it open to manipulation by three outside powers: Turkey, by dint of the strong pull of language; Iran, due to geographic, cultural and religious proximity; and Russia, which could project itself as the ‘traditional’ economic partner as well as protector of the diverse non-Turkic/Shi’ite elements in society”31 As with other cases of new states born of broken empires, Azerbaijan, as a newly liberated piece of a shattered USSR, looked to its ethnic roots for clues as to which identity would be the best cultural fit. Despite not being an official part of either the Ottoman Empire or the Republic of Turkey, a shared language with relatively few dialectic differences has served as the basis for a close relationship between the two Muslim nations. The phrase “one nation, two states” is often attributed to the pan-Turkic attitude that favors an ironclad bond between Turkey and Azerbaijan.32 In fact, one will often hear Azerbaijanis speak warmly about their “Big Turkish Brother” to the West, a loving and benevolent secular light guiding Azerbaijan through sometimes-murky Islamic waters. Whether or not Turkey shares this sense of fraternity, though, is another thing all together. The Iranian element of Azerbaijani identity is one that is as complex as it is compelling. As mentioned before, there are strong Persian elements underlying the history of the Azerbaijani people. Both Azerbaijanis and Iranians identify as Shiite Muslims and many of the spiritual colloquialisms so central to day-to-day conversations in Azeri homes are informed by 31 Goltz. Azerbaijan Diary, 254. 32 Center for Eurasian Policy. “Azerbaijan-Turkey-US Relationship and its Importance for Eurasia,” December 10, 2007, (Located at http://www.hudson.org/files/documents/ Event %20Summary%20(EN).pdf. Accessed on November 26, 2012), 10). 24
the kind of religious piety displayed by modern Iranians. On top of this, four times as many Azeris live in Iran as in Azerbaijan, so close contact between cultures is consistent and often cuts across families split by the border carved out by the Treaty of Turkmenchay. A more obvious influence, of course, is that of the remaining Russian influence in the area. With the Russian language still the pre-eminent language in intellectual circles and Russia’s ongoing bid to keep Azerbaijan a geopolitically close ally, the Russians have an overt interest in seeing the Russian element within Azerbaijani identity emerge as the most prominent among others. And in some cases, it is clear that Azerbaijanis long for a time when life was more Soviet than not. Several conversations with older Azerbaijanis revealed that nostalgia for a Soviet system in which jobs were secure, education was competitive, and housing was guaranteed is still alive and strong. More than anything, some Azerbaijanis wish to return to that era, even if it means shedding other layers of identity more consistent with national independence. Turkic, Russian, and Persian Roots Aside; Hatred of the Armenian Rings the Loudest With three origins of identity vying for primacy in the Azerbaijani understanding of collective self, one might wonder which of the three stands astride of the others. My answer is that none of them are as compelling, unifying, or universally adopted as a collective identity based on distrust of and disgust for Armenians as a result of the Karabakh war. Admittedly, many Azerbaijanis do closely identify with their Turkish counterparts, but there are some gaps in that association that warrant further inquiry. For example, when Elchibey redefined the national language as Turkic, many reacted angrily at the perceived adoption of “Turkish� as the national language, something that reeked of an attempt to annul
25
local culture.33 So while Azerbaijanis have no problem highlighting their close relationship with Turkey, many are not prepared to consider themselves Turkish by any means. In the case of Iran, many Azerbaijanis are terrified of the Islamic fundamentalism enshrined by the sharia law endorsed by Ayatollah Khomeini and President Ahmadinejad; Iran regards Azerbaijan’s interpretation of Islam with similar hostility. In 2012, Azerbaijan hosted the Eurovision contest in Baku, which was rather ridiculously regarded as a “gay parade” by mullahs in Iran. Azerbaijan responded by accusing Iran of slander, which then prompted Iran to remove its ambassador to Azerbaijan. 34 This is just one example of hostility between the two nations over the disjuncture in the interpretation of Islamic moral order, and serves to underline a major point of contention between Persian and Azerbaijani identity. Last, but not least, Azerbaijanis are in no rush to elevate the Russian element of their collective identity. Starting with President Elchibey’s decision to dump the Cyrillic alphabet in favor of the Latin one, Azerbaijani elites have taken charge of a movement to de-Russify Azerbaijani society.35 Many Azerbaijanis living in Baku have dropped the Russian “-ov” and “ova” suffix from their last names and refuse to conduct professional events in Russian. With a concerted move toward reclaiming the Azerbaijani language while, in parallel, advocating in some corners for a total eclipse of the Russian language, Azerbaijani elites have largely decided that a Russified identity is simply not for them. So what does this leave for a collective identity in the wake of decolonization and a war with Armenia? In my view, it leaves a collective identity based on just that: a war with a neighbor over a heavily disputed tract of land. I did not meet one, single Azerbaijani over the 33 Goltz. 257. 34 Edmund Broch. “Iran recalls ambassador to Azerbaijan over Eurovision ‘gay parade’”, Pink News, May 23, 2012, (Located at http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2012/05/23/iran-recallsambassador-to-azerbaijan-over-eurovision-gay-parade/. Accessed on November 30 2012). 35 Goltz. 256. 26
course of two years who did not espouse a complete and total disavowal of Armenia over the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh. The state media actively engages in anti-Armenian propaganda that is enthusiastically digested by Azerbaijanis all over the country. Evening news broadcasts begin with a brief caption that flashes just ahead of headline news, a caption that reaffirms Armenian responsibility for the war and reminds the viewer that twenty percent of Azerbaijani land is still in the hands of the enemy. This collective identity born of loss and based on victimhood has been overwhelmingly reaffirmed by two notable moments: the events surrounding the death of Mubariz Ibrahimov and the extradition of Ramil Safarov to Azerbaijan. Mubariz Ibrahimov was a soldier credited with taking down 45 Armenians before falling to his death. He is now regarded as a National Hero of Azerbaijan and commemorated yearly for his contribution to war efforts. In news articles related to his death and living memory, journalists extol his fulfillment of his duty to Azerbaijan in a way that encourages those enlisted to do the same.
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The narrative of
defeating the Armenian creates a very real space in which young men have the duty to give their lives if need be. His death served as a rallying cry of what could be accomplished when Azerbaijanis set their minds to dealing effectively with the enemy. The recent regional discord over the extradition of Ramil Safarov, convicted of beheading an Armenian solider at a NATO conference in Hungary, to Azerbaijan is yet another example of the grip that anti-Armenian sentiment has on Azerbaijani identity. Upon his return to Azerbaijan, Safarov was re-instated to the army, promoted, given years of back wages, and made a Hero of Azerbaijan. YouTube videos of exuberate villagers show near total acceptance
36 News.Az. “Two years pass since National Hero Mubariz Ibrahimov’s death”, June 18, 2012, (Located at http://www.news.az/articles/society/62567. Accessed on November 28, 2012). 27
of his murder of an Armenian as a favorable move to protect Azerbaijani pride. 37 Safarov represents the resolve and determination of a people beset by years of suffering and victimhood at the hand of the enemy. I argue that a collective identity based on supreme hatred of the Other is one that is as unsustainable as it is unhealthy. The flipside of the Other being the aggressor and military victor is that Azerbaijanis are the victims, an identity that does not offer much in the way of notable achievement. Svante Cornell concurs: “The sense of humiliation in Azerbaijan also led to the creation of a pernicious culture of victimization.” 38 Donald Taylor recounts some of the implications of a weakly articulated collective identity in his look at Inuit communities in Canada and while there are a host of environmental and demographic differences between the Inuit and Azerbaijanis, I observed several indicators that an Azerbaijani collective identity suffers from a maladaptive cohesiveness grounded in hatred and despair. To begin, a collective identity predicated on an ongoing war with another has the perhaps unintended effect of allowing the ruling elite wide latitude to make decisions that would protect that identity. In this case, this means that an anti-Armenian identity and mentality in some ways gives license to the power elite to remain at war. In many of my conversations with Azerbaijanis, my question of what life might look like with peace in the picture was often met with blank confusion. When I asked my counterpart to translate a drawing exercise for our students in which they were asked to draw a picture of what peace would look like between the two countries, she flatly told me that that would never be a
37 Hebib Muntezir. “AZTV-nin Ramil Seferov reportaji”, YouTube, August 31, 2012 (Located at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_M0lHc9YUMo&feature=related. Accessed on November 12, 2012). 38 Svante Cornell. Azerbaijan Since Independence, (New York: M.E. Sharpe. 2011), 131. 28
reality. I developed a clear sense that Azerbaijanis without a war with Armenia would not be Azerbaijanis at all. This, of course, presents the ruling elite, currently headed by President Ilham Aliyev, with an almost blank check in terms of decision-making power. In 2009, a referendum was passed that abolished term limits, effectively allowing President Ilham Aliyev to remain in power indefinitely. Much of how he leads, in fact, is possible because of the near-total control his administration exerts over the media. Most interesting, though, is the assertion that the media is tightly controlled in order to limit the amount of impact “outside influences” might have on destabilizing the country. 39 “Outside influences”, of course, refers to Armenian saboteurs. My counterpart provided another example one afternoon over tea. When I asked her if she thought that police crackdowns on protestors was undemocratic, she responded that the crackdown itself was a necessary protective measure to ensure that Armenians were not able to stir up trouble in the capital. This sort of manipulation of anti-Armenian sentiment has the very real effect of consolidating power and influence in the hands of the ruling elite to the very real detriment of individual Azerbaijanis determined to push on with life.
39 BBC News. “Azeris end president’s term limit”, March 19th, 2009, (Located at http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7949327.stm. Accessed on November 28, 2012). 29
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6. CIA. “Armenia,” World Factbook, (Located at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications /the-world-factbook/geos/am.html. Accessed on November 29, 2012). 7. CIA. “Azerbaijan,” World Factbook, (Located at https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications /the-world-factbook/geos/aj.html. Accessed on November 29, 2012). 8. CIA, “Iran,” World Factbook. (Located at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications /theworld-factbook/geos/ir.html. Accessed on November 29, 2012). 9. CIA. “Russia,” World Factbook, (Located at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications /the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html. Accessed on November 29, 2012). 10. CIA. “Turkey,” World Factbook, (Located at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications /the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html. Accessed on November 29, 2012). 11. Cornell, Svante. Azerbaijan Since Independence, (New York: M.E. Sharpe. 2011). 12. De Waal, Thomas. Black Garden, (New York: New York University Press, 2003). 13. Garabagh.net. “Amendment to the Freedom Support Act”, (Located at http:// garabagh.net/content _110_en.html. Accessed on November 28, 2012). 14. Goltz, Thomas. Azerbaijan Diary, (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1998). 15. Goltz, Thomas. “Letter from Eurasia: The Hidden Russian Hand,” Foreign Policy, No. 92, (Washington, DC: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, Autumn 1993). 16. Harré, Rom, Moghaddam, Fathali, Lee, Naomi. Global Conflict Resolution Through Positioning Analysis, “Positioning and Conflict: An Introduction”, (Marion, OH: Springer, 2010). 17. Lewis, Winnifred. “Intergroup Positioning and Power”, Global Conflict Resolution Through Positioning Analysis, (Marion, OH: Springer, 2010). 18. Library of Congress Country Studies. “Determination of Borders – Azerbaijan,” (Located at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+az0020. Accessed on November 20, 2012). 19. Library of Congress Country Studies. “Persian and Greek Influences – Azerbaijan,” (Located at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+az0014. Accessed on November 20, 2012). 20. Library of Congress Country Studies. “Turkish Influences – Azerbaijan”, (Located at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+az0015. Accessed on November 20, 2012).
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21. Muntezir, Hebib. “AZTV-nin Ramil Seferov reportaji”, YouTube, August 31, 2012 (Located at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_M0lHc9YUMo&feature=related. Accessed on November 12, 2012). 22. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. “Nagorno-Karabakh: Timeline of the Long Road to Peace”, February 10th, 2006. (Located at http://www.rferl.org/content/article/ 1065626.html. Accessed on November 15, 2012). 23. Taylor, Donald. The Quest for Identity, (London: Praeger, 2002), 24. World Bank Group. “Armenia Overview,” (Located at http://www.world bank.org/en /country/armenia/overview. Accessed on November 29, 2012). 25. World Bank Group. “Azerbaijan GDP,” (Located at http://www.tradingeconomics. Com/azerbaijan/gdp. Accessed on December 1, 2012).
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