[32]mood distribution and the cp domain of subjunctive clauses in spa by Ambrosio

University of Iowa

Iowa Research Online Theses and Dissertations

2015

Mood distribution and the CP domain of subjunctive clauses in Spanish Elizabeth Ann Gielau University of Iowa

Copyright 2015 Elizabeth Ann Gielau This dissertation is available at Iowa Research Online: http://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/1606 Recommended Citation Gielau, Elizabeth Ann. "Mood distribution and the CP domain of subjunctive clauses in Spanish." PhD (Doctor of Philosophy) thesis, University of Iowa, 2015. http://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/1606.

Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.uiowa.edu/etd Part of the Spanish and Portuguese Language and Literature Commons

MOOD DISTRIBUTION AND THE CP DOMAIN OF SUBJUNCTIVE CLAUSES IN SPANISH

by Elizabeth Ann Gielau

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Spanish in the Graduate College of The University of Iowa May 2015 Thesis Supervisor: Associate Professor Paula Kempchinsky

Graduate College The University of Iowa Iowa City, Iowa

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL ____________________________

PH.D. THESIS

_________________ This is to certify that the Ph.D thesis of

Elizabeth Ann Gielau has been approved by the Examining Committee for the thesis requirement for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Spanish at the May 2015 graduation.

Thesis Committee:

____________________________________________ Paula Kempchinsky, Thesis Supervisor

____________________________________________ Alice Davison

____________________________________________ Christine Shea ____________________________________________ Mercedes Ni単o-Murcia

____________________________________________ Judith Liskin-Gasparro

To my parents, Tom and Elaine, and my husband Adam

The job of the linguist, like that of the biologist or the botanist, is not to tell us how nature should behave, or what its creations should look like, but to describe those creations in all their messy glory and try to figure out what they can teach us about life, the world and, especially in the case of linguistics, the workings of the human mind.

Arika Okrent In the Land of Invented Languages: Esperanto Rock Stars, Klingon Poets, Loglan Lovers, and the Mad Dreamers who Tried to Build a Perfect Language

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Like all that have preceded it, this dissertation is the product of guidance and support from various people and resources, many of whom I will unintentionally neglect to mention here, for which I apologize in advance. The most essential person in my graduate experience has been my advisor and mentor, Paula Kempchinsky, who fostered in me a love of syntax and fascination with mood distribution. This dissertation would not have been possible without her wisdom, expertise and guidance. Paula has been instrumental in my research endeavors, as well as a professional role model and friend. She has provided me with countless hours of discussion, recommendations for the direction of my research, thorough and timely feedback, a bedroom for sanctuary in bad weather, countless laughs and many linguini gatherings. I cannot thank her enough for her invaluable professional and personal support. Much debt is owed to Alice Davison, whose feedback has been instrumental in the completion of this work. This thesis has benefited immeasurably from her suggestions regarding organization, clarity and theoretical assumptions, particularly with respect to the semantic components of the analysis, for which her help was vital. Her consultations and probing questions have greatly improved the argumentation and clarity of the dissertation, and have provided me with a better foundation from which to understand the interface properties involved in mood distribution. For her contributions and guidance, I am extremely grateful. I thank Christine Shea for her professional and emotional guidance. Christine has taught me various approaches to studying linguistic representation, which have made me a better-rounded linguist. She has also listened to me give many conference practice sessions; her feedback has made me a stronger presenter.

I feel privileged to have studied under Mercedes Niño-Murcia, who has inspired me to always consider the sociolinguistic implications of my arguments. I also thank her for her positivity and kindness, which warm the ambience of Phillips Hall. I am grateful to have benefited from the guidance and insight of Judy Liskin-Gasparro. Extending theoretical analysis to the improvement of teaching methods is an important and inevitable task in academia. Any ability of mine to do so must be accredited to Judy’s expertise and guidance. I would also like to thank Jason Rothman, from whom I have gained much knowledge and perspective in the field of language acquisition. My graduate school experience would not have been fulfilling, personally or academically, without my fellow graduate students. During the M.A., I was extremely lucky to have the pleasure of sharing the experience with Sarah (Ashby), Travis, Jordan, Heather and Lindsey, with whom I grew intellectually and formed deep friendships. Throughout the Ph.D., I am very fortunate to have benefited from the friendship of Sarah O’Neill, with whom I can always bounce ideas and discuss my research. Sarah consistently provides thoughtful feedback, and her sharp intellect has challenged and pushed me to improve my own. I will never forget our countless coffee shop dates, girls nights and, of course, theme parties. I am also grateful to Emily LaFlash for being a loyal confidant and purveyor of laughter. A special thanks to the other members of the girls’ night crew as well, who have been my best friends during my Ph.D. experience, and provided me at least one night a week to relax and enjoy their lovely personalities: Mayme, Mayela, Cynthia and Stacey. I owe a debt to Jeff Renaud, whose encouragement, interest, and genuine desire to help are truly inspirational qualities, and have eased much anxiety during these years. I must also thank Rajiv for many discussions and insights, and being my fellow syntax nerd. I have had the pleasure of comradery with many other fellow graduate students, from whom I have learned much and benefited in countless ways: Fernando, Jialing, Anastasia, Raychel,

Farzad, StĂ¨ve, Shin, Jennifer, Cortney, Mark, Sergio, JosĂŠ-Pablo, Elizabeth, Pablo, Tania, Mike, Tiffany, Christian, Tatiana, and all my literature colleagues as well. I am also grateful to my fellow World Languages Graduate Organization members, from whom I have learned the skills of event planning and team work. Finally, I thank my volleyball friends, for providing me one night a week of competition, physical activity and companionship: Nick, Margaret, Lindsay, Bridget, Mike, Mandy, Matt, Abby and Corey. A debt of gratitude is owed to all professors in the Spanish and Portuguese and Linguistics departments at the University of Iowa for their support. I also must thank the delightful and kind staff of Phillips Hall: Merry Powell, Jeanne Mullen, Jessie Trepanier and Matt Lively. Although my interest in linguistics did not fully develop until graduate school, my curiosity and quest for knowledge and scholarship was fostered by a number of wonderful teachers and professors. Specifically, I owe a huge debt of gratitude to Barbara Lipnick for inspiring a fascination and love for the Spanish language. I am also grateful to Kathy Fox, my advisor at St. Ambrose University, who encouraged me to pursue this field, and pushed me to improve my Spanish skills and knowledge of Spanish literature. I am also grateful to Cornelio Chaidez for imparting his knowledge and kindness at St. Ambrose University. Completion of this thesis would have been difficult without the 2014-2015 Ballard Seashore Fellowship from the Graduate College at the University of Iowa. This work was also funded by the 2013 Ruth Davis Fellowship award, a 2014 University of Iowa International Travel Grant and a 2011 Strategic Initiative Fund, for which I am very appreciative. While those mentioned above played a direct role in my scholarship endeavors and graduate experience, there are others to whom I owe thanks in my personal development. To my lifelong friend Jackie Gregory, I owe many laughs and fond memories. I am grateful to Vic and Gale, my

other aunts and uncles and my extended family, who have always supported, encouraged and motivated me to succeed. To my sister Laura, brothers James and Tom, and their spouses, for happy demeanors and words of encouragement. I owe a tremendous debt to my parents, Tom and Elaine. Words cannot express my gratitude for their emotional, financial and intellectual contributions, as well as the support system and love that they have provided throughout the years. Finally, I am eternally grateful to my best friend and husband, Adam, for his unconditional love and support, for forgiving the weekends and nights spent working, for picking up my slack on the chores at times, and never complaining. His positivity and selflessness deserve much credit for the completion of this thesis. While each person mentioned has influenced and guided my academic experience, I take full responsibility for the content herein. All opinions, conclusions, arguments and errors are my own.

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ABSTRACT The goal of this dissertation is to formulate a novel characterization of subjunctive complements in Spanish, based on semantico-pragmatic and syntactic evidence. The analysis is informed by, and has consequences for, theories that the pragmatic and semantic components of the grammar interface with the syntax. Thus, the proposal carries implications for the interpretive components of the grammar at the C-I interface. I argue that the indicative mood, in Romance, corresponds to propositions which carry assertive force. Data from Greek and Bulgarian provide evidence for a syntactic representation of this feature. I provide evidence for a novel tripartite classification of subjunctive clauses: (i) those that are lexically-selected by volitional verbs and carry strongly intensional semantics, (ii) those licensed by a non-veridical operator (i.e. negation) and carry anti-veridical semantics and (iii) those which lack illocutionary force, with the subjunctive mood surfacing as the default (uninformative) mood in complements to emotives and negated epistemics. Complements to emotive and negated epistemic predicates are the only subjunctive complements which may be extensionally anchored (to the real world), yet are incompatible with â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;point of viewâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; phenomena, which is unexpected in extensional contexts. The data indicate that the subjunctive surfaces in uninformative contexts, in the absence of (intensional or assertive) illocutionary force. The observations lead to a novel syntactic analysis, relying on Speas and Tennyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (2003) representation of pragmatic arguments, which captures the fact that subjunctive clauses are anchored to a particular individual (either the matrix subject or the speaker). I propose that subject obviation occurs only in deontic and causative contexts, a novel hypothesis supported by data which illustrate that the addition of an evaluative component (an epistemic ordering source) renders subject obviation violable. I argue that a feature-checking

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relationship between the subordinate Seat of Knowledge position and matrix deontic or causative v anchors the complement proposition to the matrix subjectâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s model of evaluation. Co-reference is then banned due to a semantico-pragmatic parameter setting in Romance which disallows a de se (self-ascribing) reading in finite contexts, which facilitates the processing of pronominal reference. I argue that the semantico-pragmatic status of subjunctive complements to negated epistemic predicates overlaps with those to both emotives, which are evaluative, and those to other negated predicates (i.e. perception verbs, verbs of reported speech), which are evidential. Their dual status accounts for the (previously unobserved) overlapping syntactic and semantic properties exhibited in their subjunctive complements. Parteeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (1991, 1995) proposal for a tripartite structure of negation elegantly captures the interpretive facts. Subjunctive complements to negated evidential predicates are interpreted in the scope of negation, while those to evaluative (emotive) predicates are interpreted in the restrictor, with those to negated epistemics allowing both options. Two different types of negation are identified, following Hornâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (1989) analysis. The pragmatic classification of the predicate as either evidential or evaluative determines the type of negation with which it may surface. Metalinguistic negation surfaces with evaluative predicates, and does not scope into the complement clause. True negation-triggered subjunctive (i.e. evidential contexts) results from the scope of descriptive negation into the complement clause, which carries a negative clause-type feature. I show that negation-triggered subjunctive clauses constitute unbounded events, which is attributed to their anti-veridical status. In conclusion, the analysis characterizes subjunctive clauses in Spanish, and carries implications for cross-linguistic analysis. More research is needed to verify the claims crosslinguistically, and the analysis lacks a precise characterization of indicative complement clauses which, like subjunctive clauses, require a more fine-grained characterization.

PUBLIC ABSTRACT Investigations in generative linguistics focus on understanding the nature of human language. Among those who study Romance languages, there has recently been considerable debate regarding how syntactic structure affects and interacts with the formal properties of semantic interpretation. Many languages, including Spanish, distinguish clauses in the indicative mood from clauses in the subjunctive mood, and the mood determines the interpretation of the expression. In a mood distinguishing language, verbs such as ‘want’ and ‘order’ (“volitional” verbs), invariably display the subjunctive mood in the clause expressing the desire. Because desires do not necessarily hold in the actual world, the subjunctive was traditionally thought to represent the “irrealis” mood, while the indicative mood represents the “realis” mood. However, several problems have been raised against this division, which have motivated more fine-grained semantic and syntactic proposals. Nonetheless, many analyses have encountered problems, particularly in explaining the subjunctive mood in emotional contexts, under verbs like ‘regret’ and ‘like’, which denote true situations. The current proposal reconciles these empirical issues by claiming that the subjunctive mood is the ‘default’ mood in evaluative contexts, due to their unassertive status. The results of this dissertation can have a significant impact for teaching Spanish as a second language, since the ways in which the subjunctive mood is taught to learners is often misleading and/or erroneous, with little connection to actual usage. My analysis thereby facilitates pedagogical goals, as well as contributing to a deeper understanding of the human cognitive system.

TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................ xv LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................................... xvi CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ............................ 1 1.1. Introduction: Approaches to Mood Distribution and Research Questions .......................... 1 1.2. Setting the Scene: Defining Intensionality ........................................................................... 7 1.3. Intensional vs. Polarity Subjunctive ................................................................................... 11 1.4. Previous Analyses .............................................................................................................. 17 1.4.1. Semantic Approaches: Realis vs. Irrealis .................................................................... 17 1.4.2. Assertion vs. Non-Assertion ........................................................................................ 18 1.4.3. Strong vs. Weak Intensional Predicates (Farkas 1985, 1992) ..................................... 18 1.4.4. Veridical vs. Non-veridical Contexts (Giannakidou 1997, 1998, 1999) ..................... 20 1.4.5. Subjunctive Selected by Focus Operator with Degree Argument (Villalta 2008) ...... 21 1.4.6. Mood as Model Shift (Quer 1998, 2001) .................................................................... 24 1.4.7. Null vs. Non-null Ordering Sources (Giorgi and Pianesi 1997).................................. 27 1.4.8. The Referential Approach (Schlenker 2005) ............................................................... 30 1.4.9. Syntactic Analyses: Binding Theory Approaches ....................................................... 31 1.4.10. The Subjunctive Mood as an Imperative Operator (Kempchinsky 1986, 1987, ______1990, 2009) ................................................................................................................ 35 1.4.11. Subjunctive as a Dependent Nominal (Tsoulas 1994, 1995)..................................... 37 1.5. Theoretical Assumptions .................................................................................................... 40 1.5.1. Modality....................................................................................................................... 40 1.5.2. Conversational Semantics and Model Theory ............................................................. 43 1.5.3. Basic Clausal Architecture .......................................................................................... 50 1.6. Road Map of the Dissertation............................................................................................. 51 CHAPTER 2

ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE AND A SYNTAX FOR SENTIENCE IN COMPLEMENT CLAUSES ......................................................................... 55 2.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 55 2.2. The Indicative Mood as Denoting Assertive Propositions in Romance............................. 57 2.2.1. Characterizing the Notion of “Assertion” ................................................................... 57 2.2.2. Potential Problems for “Assertion” as Corresponding to the Indicative Mood ........... 62 2.2.3. The Indicative Mood in Cross-linguistic Contexts ...................................................... 65 xi

2.3. Truth Conditions and Intensionality in Subjunctive Complements ................................... 73 2.3.1. Subjunctive-Selecting Predicate Types ....................................................................... 74 2.3.2. Negation-triggered Subjunctive does not form a uniform class .................................. 76 2.3.3. The de re vs. de dicto Distinction and the Intensionality of Subjunctive _____Complements ............................................................................................................... 80 2.3.4. ‘Point of View’ Anchoring in Complement Clauses ................................................... 85 2.3.5. The Intensionality of Causative Predicates ................................................................. 91 2.4. Previous Accounts: The Syntax of ‘Point of View’ and the Left Periphery ...................... 94 2.4.1. Bianchi (2001) ............................................................................................................. 97 2.4.2. Kempchinsky (2009) ................................................................................................. 100 2.4.3. Speas and Tenny’s (2003) Proposal for Syntactic Sentience .................................... 104 2.4.4. A Revision to S&T (2003): The Embedded Sentience Domain ................................ 109 2.4.5. S&T’s argument for [-Finite] Tense in Subjunctive Clauses .................................... 113 2.5. On the Syntax of Complement Clauses............................................................................ 116 2.5.1. The Syntax of Indicative and Lexically-Selected Subjunctive Clauses .................... 116 2.5.2. The Nature of Speech Act Phrase and Subordinator Phrase ..................................... 123 2.6. Some Loose Ends ............................................................................................................. 125 2.6.1. “Dependent” Tense in Lexically-Selected Subjunctive Clauses ............................... 126 2.6.2. “Double Mood Selection” of Verbs of Reported Speech .......................................... 129 2.7. Conclusion........................................................................................................................ 134 CHAPTER 3 MODALITY AND SUBJECT OBVIATION ................................................. 140 3.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 140 3.2. Background Assumptions, Previous Analyses and the Idiosyncratic Nature of SDR ..... 142 3.2.1. Background Assumptions .......................................................................................... 142 3.2.2. Previous Analyses: SDR ruled out by Principle B .................................................... 146 3.2.2. Previous Analyses: SDR ruled out as a Principle of Economy ................................. 149 3.2.3. On the Idiosyncratic Nature of SDR.......................................................................... 150 3.3. Deontic, Epistemic and Causative Modality .................................................................... 152 3.3.1. Modality: Background Assumptions ......................................................................... 152 3.3.2. Epistemic vs. Deontic Modality in Volitionals ......................................................... 154 3.3.3. Causative Modality .................................................................................................... 161 xii

3.4. Little v and Modality ........................................................................................................ 163 3.5. On ‘Point of View’ in Causative and Deontic Contexts .................................................. 170 3.5.1. The Logophoric Nature of the Seat of Knowledge.................................................... 171 3.5.2. Evidence from Mandarin Chinese: A Parametric Difference .................................... 176 3.6. The Syntax of SDR .......................................................................................................... 182 3.6.1. The Logophoric Nature of Causative and Deontic v ................................................. 182 3.6.2. The Syntax of Emotives ............................................................................................ 186 3.6.3. The gustar class ......................................................................................................... 187 3.6.4. The preocupar class ................................................................................................... 189 3.6.5. Transitive Emotives ................................................................................................... 190 3.6.6. The Syntax of Causatives .......................................................................................... 192 3.6.7. Sentience in Nominals ............................................................................................... 195 3.6.8. The Sentience Domain of Negated Epistemics ......................................................... 199 3.7. On the Idiosyncratic Nature of Emotive Complements ................................................... 204 3.7.1. Mood Variation in Emotive Complement Clauses .................................................... 204 3.7.2. On the Compatibility of Emotive Predicates with Epistemic v ................................. 207 3.7.3. Characterizing the Sentience Domain ....................................................................... 214 3.8. Conclusion........................................................................................................................ 217 CHAPTER 4 THE DUAL IDENTITY OF NEGATED EPISTEMICS ................................ 222 4.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 222 4.2. Characterizing Negation-Triggered Subjunctive Complements ...................................... 225 4.2.1. Negation-triggered Subjunctive Clauses are Not Uniform........................................ 226 4.2.2. Properties Shared by all Negation-triggered Subjunctive Clauses ............................ 230 4.3. The Pragmatic Classification of Predicates ...................................................................... 234 4.4. The p Level Status of Epistemic Predicates and the Scope of Negation.......................... 241 4.4.1. Evidence from Positive Polarity Items and the de re vs. de dicto Distinction .......... 242 4.4.2. The Scope of Negation and Subjunctive Complements to Negated Epistemic _____Predicates ................................................................................................................... 246 4.5. Negation and the Subjunctive Mood ................................................................................ 249 4.5.1. Partee’s (1991, 1995) Analysis of Negation .............................................................. 249 4.5.2. The Scope of Negation in Clause-selecting Contexts ............................................... 252 xiii

4.6. Conclusion........................................................................................................................ 257 CHAPTER 5

NEGATION, ASPECT AND THE SYNTAX OF NEGATION-TRIGGERED SUBJUNCTIVE ................................................. 260 5.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 260 5.2. The Dual Function of Negation ........................................................................................ 262 5.2.1. Background Assumptions .......................................................................................... 262 5.2.2. Metalinguistic vs. Descriptive Negation ................................................................... 265 5.3. On the Variable Pragmatic Status of Negated Epistemics ............................................... 272 5.4. The Syntax and Semantics of Negation-triggered Subjunctive ....................................... 278 5.4.1. Evidence for Negative Clause-typing ........................................................................ 278 5.4.2. On the Semantic Import of W.................................................................................... 282 5.5. On the Unboundedness of Negation-Triggered Subjunctive Events ............................... 287 5.5.1. Background Assumptions: “Stativizing” Negation and Topological Closure ........... 288 5.5.2. On the (Un)boundedness of Subjunctive Complements to Negated F level _____Predicates ................................................................................................................... 292 5.5.3. Durative Modification in Presupposed Contexts ....................................................... 300 5.5.4. Imperfectivity and the Subjunctive Mood in Negation-triggered Contexts .............. 309 5.5.5. A Syntax for the Spatio-Temporal Properties of Negation-triggered Subjunctive ... 315 5.6. Conclusion........................................................................................................................ 319

REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................... 325

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LIST OF TABLES Table 1-1. Properties of Subjunctive Complement Clauses ......................................................................... 16 Table 1-2. Basic Clausal Architecture .................................................................................................... 50 Table 2-1. Speaker Truth Conditions of Subjunctive Complements in Real World (WR) .................................. 80 Table 2-2. Intensional vs. Extensional Nature of Subjunctive Complements .................................................. 85 Table 2-3. Truth Conditions, Intensionality & â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Point of Viewâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; in Subjunctive Complements

............................ 89

Table 2-4. Illocutionary Status of Complement Clauses in Spanish .............................................................. 94 Table 3-1. Matrix Predicate Compatibility with Modal Value on v ............................................................. 169 Table 3-2. Acceptance rates of SDR violations in emotive contexts (Kempchinsky 2007)

.............................. 210

Table 3-3. Matrix Predicate Compatibility with Modal Value on v ............................................................. 218 Table 4-1. Differences Between Negation-triggered Subjunctive Clauses .................................................... 229 Table 4-2. Properties of Subjunctive Complement Clauses to Predicate Types ............................................. 233 Table 4-3. Pragmatic Classification of Predicate Types

........................................................................... 240

Table 4-4. Properties Shared by Negated Epistemics and Other Predicates .................................................. 246 Table 5-1. Overlapping Properties of Negated Epistemics with F and p level Predicates ................................ 272 Table 5-2. Illocutionary Specification of Subjunctive Complement Clauses ................................................. 324

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS SUB = subjunctive mood IND = indicative mood IMP = imperative mood DEF = definite INDEF = indefinite CL = clitic ACC = accusative DAT = dative REFL = reflexive PRES = present tense PAST = past tense PART = participle IMPERF = imperfective aspect PERF = perfective aspect PLPERF = pluperfect aspect PROG = progressive aspect 1 = 1st person (verbal/pronoun agreement) 2 = 2nd person (verbal/pronoun agreement) 3 = 3rd person (verbal/pronoun agreement) SG = singular person agreement PL = plural person agreement

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1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 1.1. Introduction: Approaches to Mood Distribution and Research Questions The need to distinguish different sorts of subjunctive complements has a long tradition in the literature, and the precise characterization of these complements has proven to be a tremendous challenge for generative linguists. Identifying which components of the grammar play a role in the determination of mood and identifying the precise nature of its distribution have been the sources of much debate since the earliest years of analysis, prompting a number of taxonomies that rest either on semantic, pragmatic or syntactic labels from which the interpretive properties of the predicate (or subjunctive-triggering operator) are derived. To exacerbate matters further, we find that the subjunctive is clearly not a unified category cross-linguistically, manifesting in different contexts even across the Romance languages. The goals of this dissertation are to provide new insights and, in doing so, formalize a more adequate characterization of mood distribution in Spanish. The analysis carries implications for the interactions between the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic components of the grammar, as well as the structure of the embedded left periphery. The concept of â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;moodâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; is a linguistic expression of modality, and is typically thought to define the relationship between a proposition and its truth value. Mood in Spanish is generally assumed to consist of three classes: indicative (1a), subjunctive (1b) and imperative (1c): 1

Throughout the dissertation, to the end of the first clause, I will not always provide a strict morpheme to morpheme gloss, as the focus is generally on the mood of the embedded verb.

2 (1)

Vienes ahora. (indicative) come.IND.2SG now ‘You are coming (IND) now.’ Que vengas ahora. (subjunctive) that come.SUB.2SG now ‘(I hope) that you come (SUB) now.’ Ven ahora (imperative) come.IMP.2SG now ‘Come (IMP) now.’

Following Palmer (1986), I limit the concept of mood to modality encoded in the inflectional verbal morphology as illustrated in (1), focusing particularly on the subjunctive/indicative mood alternation in complement clauses. In Spanish, the indicative mood is selected in complement clauses to epistemic verbs (e.g. creer ‘to believe’, pensar ‘to think’) (2a), verbs of perception (e.g. ver ‘to see’, oír ‘to hear’) (2b), cognitive-factive verbs (e.g. saber ‘to know’, darse cuenta ‘to realize’) (2c), verbs of reported speech (e.g. decir ‘to say’, reportar ‘to report’) (2d), verbs of mental judgment (e.g. entender ‘to understand’, comprender ‘to understand’) (2e), comissive verbs (e.g. prometer ‘to promise’) (2f), and fiction verbs (e.g. soñar ‘to dream’, imaginar ‘to imagine’) (2g): (2)

Indicative Contexts a. Epistemic Verb María cree que su profesor está enfermo. ‘Mary believes that her professor is (IND) sick.’ b. Verb of Perception María ve que su profesor está enfermo. ‘Mary sees that her professor is (IND) sick.’ c. Cognitive-factive Verb María sabe que su profesor está enfermo. ‘Mary knows that her professor is (IND) sick.’ d. Verb of Reported Speech María dice que su profesor está enfermo. ‘Mary says that her professor is (IND) sick.’ e. Verb of Mental Judgment María entiende que su profesor está enfermo. ‘Mary understands that her professor is (IND) sick.’

3 f. Comissive Verb María promote que viene a la reunión. ‘Mary promises that (she) is coming (IND) to the meeting.’ g. Fiction Verb María soñó con que su profesor estuvo enfermo. ‘Mary dreamt that her professor was (IND) sick.’ The subjunctive mood is selected by volitional verbs (e.g. querer ‘to want’, desear ‘to desire’) (3a), directive verbs (e.g. pedir ‘to request’, ordenar ‘to order’) (3b), causative verbs (e.g. forzar ‘to force’, hacer ‘to make’) (3c), and emotive verbs (e.g. lamentar ‘to regret’, gustar ‘to like’) (3d). (3)

Subjunctive Contexts a. Volitional verb María quiere que sus estudiantes lleguen temprano. ‘Mary wants that her students arrive (SUB) early.’ b. Directive verb María pide que sus estudiantes lleguen temprano. ‘Mary requrests that her students arrive (SUB) early.’ c. Causative verb María hace que sus estudiantes lleguen temprano. ‘Mary makes that her students arrive (SUB) early.’ d. Emotive verb María lamenta que sus estudiantes siempre lleguen tarde. ‘Mary regrets that her students always arrive (SUB) late.’

Furthermore, matrix negation can trigger the presence of the subjunctive mood in the complement clauses which exhibit the indicative mood in non-negated contexts, though the subjunctive mood is not required in the complement clause. This is shown below with a negated epistemic (4a), perception verb (4b), cognitive-factive (4c) and verb of reported speech (4d). (4)

4 c. Negated Cognitive-factive María no supo que su profesor esté enfermo. ‘Mary didn’t know/find out that her professor is (SUB) sick.’ d. Negated Verb of Reported Speech María no dijo que su profesor esté enfermo. ‘Mary didn’t say that her professor is (SUB) sick.’ Finally, the subjunctive mood also manifests in purpose clauses (5a) introduced by para que ‘in order that’, complements to modal expressions (e.g. es posible ‘it is possible’) (5b), and nonspecific relative clauses (5c): (5)

Other Subjunctive Contexts a. Purpose Clause María se queda en su cuarto para que su hijo no se despierte. ‘Mary is staying in her room in order that her son not wake up (SUB).’ b. Modal Context Es posible que llueva por la tarde. ‘It is possible that it will rain (SUB) through the afternoon.’ c. Relative Clause Busco una mujer que hable español. ‘I am looking for a woman who speaks (SUB) Spanish.’

While the analysis and hypotheses put forth in this dissertation carry implications for the manifestation of the subjunctive mood in (5), these clauses are not the focus of the current work. The main focus is mood distribution in complement clauses to verbal predicates and in negated contexts; i.e. the indicative vs. subjunctive alternation in examples (2) – (4). It has long been supposed that the subjunctive mood, as opposed to the indicative, is the mood of subordination. This is because the subjunctive occurs only in subordinate clauses and often shows tense dependencies, leading to a sequence of tense phenomenon (discussed in section 3).2 The sequence of tense phenomenon has led to the development of many syntactic

The let’s construction is sometimes thought of as an instance of the subjunctive mood in a root clause in Spanish. However, it appears to form part of the imperative class, as clitic placement follows the verb (like imperatives) (i-a), rather than before the verb, as with subjunctive clauses, shown in (i-b): 2

5 analyses in an attempt to explain its appearance. These types of approaches often resort to special licensing mechanisms (operators) contributed by the subjunctive or the predicate that selects the subjunctive (Laka 1990, Motapanyane 1994, Poletto 1993, Kempchinsky 1997, to name a few). Others have analyzed the subjunctive as a dependent clause akin to ‘dependent’ nominals, due to their narrow scope properties in relation to some other element (Tsoulas 1994, 1995) or as clauses with indefinite (deficient) tense (Picallo 1984, 1985, Manzini 1996, Santos 1997). These types of approaches, however, are unable to accommodate the entire spectrum of properties involved in mood distribution, as will be discussed in section 4.2. Various semantic approaches have attempted a unified analysis of the contexts in which the subjunctive appears. Traditionally, it was thought that the indicative is the “realis” mood, signaling the representation of the proposition in worlds close to the actual one. The subjunctive, then, represents the “irrealis” mood, signaling quantification over worlds that are impossible, or at least more distant from the actual one. However, several problems have been raised against this division, which have motivated more fine-grained semantic proposals for the subjunctive mood, based on modality (Farkas 1985, 1992, 2003), non-veridicality (Giannakidou 1994, 1997, 1998, 1999), model shift (Quer 1998), illocutionary force (Rivero and Terzi 1995), situation semantics (Portner 1997), or a non-null modal ordering source (Giorgi and Pianesi 1997). Despite many valuable insights, a unified semantic approach has proven difficult. Mood distribution does not constitute a uniform category cross-linguistically, and the modal value and

(i)

a. Hagámoslo! do.IMP.1PL-CL.ACC ‘Let’s do (IMP) it!’ b.*Lo hagamos! CL.ACC do.IMP.1PL ‘Let’s do it!’

6 truth conditions of subjunctive complements also exhibit inter-linguistic inconsistencies in Romance. I review these approaches in section 4.2. Under the assumption that the grammar is modular, linguists are faced with the additional challenge of determining to what extent each module is responsible for the computation of mood distribution. For instance, the syntax of subjunctive clauses seems to be intrinsically connected to their semantic import, leading syntactic analyses to focus on the nature of the syntax-semantics interface. Since Pollock’s (1989) seminal work, the selection (or triggering) and locus of the specification for mood choice and related features have been sources of much debate, as Tense and Mood features, once considered constituent features of IP, became amenable to an analysis as independent heads. There has since been extensive research on the functional structure of the clause in the CP and TP domains (Rizzi 1997, 2001, Alexiadou 1997, Cinque 1999, etc.), and what role each plays in the distribution of mood. Other analyses have focused on the information structure and pragmatic status of subjunctive clauses, frequently referring to notions such as presupposition to account for the appearance of the subjunctive (Dam and Dam-Jensen 2010, Mejías-Bikandi 1998, among others). The range of predicate types which select subjunctive complements in Spanish, and the accompanying cross-linguistic variation, obscure the question of whether there is a “core” case of subjunctive complements, and if there is a way to identify the properties which determine mood distribution more generally. Furthermore, if syntactic, semantic and pragmatic factors play a role in the derivation of subjunctive clauses, to what extent are such properties represented in the syntax? Moreover, to what extent does mood choice itself contribute to the meaning of the sentence? Does the subjunctive morphology itself carry semantic import (Quer 1998), or is it a by-product of a semantic operation or feature (Villalta 2008, Giannakidou 1997, 1998, 1999)? In

7 addition, is such an operation or feature present in the syntactic representation (Kempchinsky 2009)? What is the clausal structure of different types of complement clauses, and to what extent does the structure and feature composition of the left periphery affect the mood and interpretation of the proposition? This dissertation will help clarify these important and controversial empirical issues, which are often overlooked or side-stepped in the literature. Specifically, I focus on what role each component of the grammar plays in the selection (or triggering) of the subjunctive mood, and the extent to which semantic and pragmatic features are represented in the syntax of these clauses. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: in section 2, I review the concept of intensionality, how it has been used in previous analyses to explain mood distribution, and the current assumptions regarding reference to this term in the dissertation. Section 3 reviews the ways in which lexically-selected subjunctive complements differ from negation-triggered subjunctive clauses, a necessary first step toward an accurate characterization of mood. The research questions of the dissertation are detailed in this section. In section 4, I review previous accounts of mood choice, identifying their contributions and shortcomings. I begin with semantic analyses, before reviewing syntactic and pragmatic approaches. Section 5 outlines some theoretical assumptions of the dissertation. I discuss how reference to modality is used (following Kratzer 1981, 1991). The basic framework of conversation semantics (Stalnaker 1978) and model theory (Quer 1998) are outlined, as well as the foundational syntactic assumptions. The chapter ends with a road map of the dissertation in section 6. 1.2. Setting the Scene: Defining Intensionality The term intensional is often used when describing subjunctive clauses. We can think of intensional environments as those which introduce a set of possible worlds, following von Fintel

8 and Heim (2011), while extensional semantics signifies the set of things that a word denotes in the actual world. So, a simple declarative like ‘it is raining’ is a denotation of the real world and, therefore, simple declaratives denote extensional situations. On the other hand, a sentence like ‘I want it to rain’ encodes intensional semantics, in the sense that the rain event exists only in a set of possible desire worlds. This is an idea originally outlined by Farkas (1992), who elaborated the idea that the indicative is related to realis assertion (extensional environments) defined in (6), whereas the subjunctive is the mood of irrealis (intensional environments) defined in (7): (6)

Definition 1: Extensional Environments A proposition is extensionally anchored iff the modal anchor is a single world, i.e. the proposition is interpreted with respect to one particular world, the one introduced by the extensional predicate.

(7)

Definition 2: Intensional Environments A proposition is intensionally anchored iff the modal anchor constitutes a set of worlds. The subjunctive mood is frequently called the ‘subjective’ mood, as its appearance is

often attributed to the intensional (alternate worlds) semantics introduced by the matrix predicate. This generalization results from the fact that, in all languages which exhibit the subjunctive vs. indicative mood alternation, the subjunctive mood invariably surfaces in complement clauses to volitional (2a) and directive predicates (2b), leading many to posit that these contexts are the so-called “core” subjunctive contexts. Following von Fintel and Heim (2011), extensional modality signifies that, for any expression α, we have ⟦α⟧w,g, the semantic value of α in w, also known as the EXTENSION of α in w. We can also calculate λw.⟦α⟧w,g, the function that assigns to any world w the extension of α in that world. This is called the INTENSION of α, denoted in (8): (8)

9 Since the definition of intension abstracts over the evaluation world, intensions are not world-dependent. We now have a semantic system that allows us to calculate extensions for a given possible world w as well as intensions for all interpretable expressions. Reference to intensionality and extensionality in this dissertation is conceived in the light of von Fintel and Heim’s (2011) and Farka’s (2002) analyses. The indicative mood surfaces in complements to epistemic verbs in Spanish, which are considered by Farkas (2002) to be weakly intensional, in the sense that the set of worlds introduced by the predicate may include the actual world. Heim’s (1992) notion of weak intensional semantics is often assumed in the semantics literature. She defines weakly intensional semantics as introducing a set of a possible worlds which includes the set of doxastic (belief) alternatives of the believer. Consider, for example, a sentence like (9): (9)

John believes that it is raining.

A sentence like (9) is true in a world w if it is raining in every world w' that is doxastically accessible to John in w. 'Doxastically accessible' means that a world w' is accessible for person x in (the real) world w iff w' is compatible with the beliefs that x holds in w.3

In Spanish, and most other Romance languages, the presence of matrix negation is required to license the subjunctive mood in complements to belief verbs: (i)

a. Creen que Andrea está/*esté muy cansada. ‘They believe that Andrea is (IND/SUB) very tired.’ b. No creen que Andrea está/esté muy cansada. ‘They don’t believe that Andrea is (IND/SUB) very tired.’

Spanish

Italian, however, does not follow this generalization. Matrix negation is not necessary to license a subjunctive complement clause to a belief verb: (ii)

a. Credono che Andrea é/sia molto stanco. ‘They believe that Andrea is (IND/SUB) very tired.’ b. Non credono che Andrea é/sia molto stanco. ‘They don’t believe that Andrea is (IND/SUB) very tired.’ (Quer 2001: 92)

Italian

Thus, the strong vs. weak intensional divide does not account for the cross-linguistic variation in mood choice. I return to the status of the subjunctive mood in Italian in chapter 2, section 2.2.

10 According to Quer, weakly intensional predicates (i.e. predicates which introduce a set of doxastic alternatives) include the verbs creer ‘to believe’, pensar ‘to think’, and verbs of reported speech. These verbs signal that the speaker is asserting that the truth of the propositional complements is anchored to the epistemic model of the matrix subject, and not the speaker. Strongly intensional predicates include the verbs querer ‘to want’ and desear ‘to desire’. These predicates do not entail (nor indeed imply) the truth of their complement from within any epistemic model (neither the speaker, hearer, nor the reported source). These predicate types open a set of buletic alternatives (based on wishes), a topic to which I return in section 5, wherein the theoretical assumptions of the dissertation are detailed. It should be noted that, in addition to the (set of) worlds in which a proposition is interpreted, the truth of an embedded proposition is also determined by the sentient being from whose point of view the proposition is interpreted. This is because if John believes that x, it is not necessarily the case that the speaker believes that x. Thus, Farkas (1992) restricts the notion of truth to individuals, or to an individual anchor. In other words, determining the truth value of a proposition can be achieved by assuming that propositions are evaluated with respect to possible worlds, and individual anchoring is attained by relating worlds to individuals. The notion that truth is relativized to a (sets of) world(s) and anchored to an individual are key factors involved in the conception of model theory, the assumptions of which are further elaborated in section 5. We will see that the intensional vs. extensional modal divide is not always a clear determiner of mood distribution, but is a crucial starting point in forming a semantic foundation and understanding the groundwork for previous analyses of mood distribution.

11 1.3. Intensional vs. Polarity Subjunctive In this section, I illustrate some differences and similarities between subjunctive clause types that have been observed in the literature and must be resolved by any approach to mood distribution. The first striking observation when attempting to characterize mood distribution in Spanish is that the subjunctive mood appears to be licensed in one of two ways, with the dual status of its licensing conditions often assumed in the literature. The first licensing condition refers to the triggering of the subjunctive mood by a matrix predicate, which Quer (1998) labels the (strongly) intensional class, as the propositional content of the complement is thought to be interpreted within a set of desire worlds. Volitional (e.g. querer ‘to want’) and directive (e.g. pedir ‘to request’) predicates belong to this class. The second licensing condition results in what is often referred to as the ‘polarity’ subjunctive (a term first coined by Stowell (1993)), in which the subjunctive mood is triggered by some other element, such as negation (illustrated in example (4)).4 The differing licensing conditions result in a variety of distinct syntactic and semantic properties. First, intensional (10), but not polarity (11), subjunctive complements give rise to a sequence of tense effects. This property refers to the fact that subjunctive clauses which are lexically-selected by a matrix verb are necessarily oriented to the event-time of the matrix predicate, resulting in a phenomenon of consecutio temporum. In other words, the sequence *PRESENT[PAST] is illegal in these contexts; the subjunctive clause tense specification may not be temporally oriented before the matrix clause temporal specification:

A major goal of this dissertation is to show that ‘polarity’ subjunctive clauses do not constitute one unified class, the main goal of chapters 4 and 5. Namely, I argue that the subjunctive complements to negated epistemic predicates share properties with emotives that are not exhibited by other negation-triggered subjunctive clauses, warranting a more fine-grained distinction. However, this binary classification is a sufficient starting point for the purposes of this introductory chapter. 4

12 (10)

Desea que (lleve/haya llevado/*llevara/*hubiera llevado) un libro. desire.PRES.3SG that bring.PRES/PERF/*PAST/*PLPERF.SUB.3SG a book ‘S/he desires that s/he brings/has brought/brought/had brought (SUB) a book.’

(11)

Yo no pienso que (llame/haya llamado/llamara/hubiera llamado). I NEG think.PRES.1SG that call.PRES/PERF/PAST/PLPERF.SUB.3SG ‘I don’t think that s/he calls/has called/will call/had called/called (SUB).’

This observation has led some researchers on the syntax of tense to propose that subjunctive clauses in the lexically-selected contexts of (2) are in some sense anaphoric or “untensed” events. Indicative clauses, on the other hand, are thought to carry independent tense (cf. Picallo 1984, 1985, Progovac, 1993, 1994, Manzini 1994, Santos 1997). This type of approach is discussed in section 4.2. Second, intensional (12), but not polarity (13), subjunctive clauses display subject obviation. This means that the subject of the subordinate clause subject cannot refer to the subject of the matrix clause: (12)

Maríai desea que (ella*i/j/pro*i/j) lleve un libro aburrido.5 Maríai desire.PRES.3SG that (she*i/j/pro*i/j) bring.SUB.3SG a book boring ‘Mary desires that s/he (someone else/*herself) bring ( SUB) a boring book.’

(13)

Maríai no piensa que (ellai/j/proi/j) perdiera un libro aburrido. Maríai NEG think.PRES.3SG that (shei/j/proi/j) lost.SUB.3SG a book boring ‘Mary doesn’t think that s/he (someone else/herself) lost ( SUB) a boring book.’

Third, under certain conditions, the polarity subjunctive can alternate with the indicative (15), while the intensional subjunctive cannot (14): (14)

María desea que Martín lleve/*lleva un libro aburrido. María desire.PRES.3SG that Martin bring.SUB/*IND.3SG a book boring ‘Mary desires that Martin bring (SUB/IND) a boring book.’

(15)

María no piensa que Martín lleve/lleva un libro aburrido. María NEG think.PRES.3SG that Martin bring.SUB/IND.3SG a book aburrido ‘Mary doesn’t think that Martin is bringing (SUB/IND) a boring book.’

I am not entering into the debate as to the nature/existence of the null pronoun [pro] in minimalism; I am using this label only to represent the phonologically null subject of tensed clauses.

13 Last, the intensional subjunctive (16) can only be licensed one clause down (i.e. it displays locality of triggering effects), while polarity subjunctive may be licensed in consecutive clauses, as long as the subjunctive chain is not broken (17): (16)

María desea que Martín crea que Juan lleve/*lleva un libro aburrido. María desire.PRES.3SG that Martin believe.SUB that John bring.IND/*SUB a book boring ‘Mary desires that Martin believes that John is bringing ( IND/SUB) a boring book.’

(17)

María no piensa que Martín crea que Juan lleva/lleve un libro aburrido. María NEG think.PRES.3SG that Martin believe.SUB that John bring.IND/SUB a book boring ‘Mary doesn’t think that Martin believes that John is bringing ( IND/SUB) a boring book.’ The subjunctive mood in complements to emotive predicates has proven difficult to

characterize, as these clauses exhibit overlapping properties with both intensional and negationtriggered subjunctive contexts. Like intensional predicates, emotives do not require negation to license the subjunctive mood (cf. example (3d)). Also, like intensional predicates, emotive contexts exhibit subject obviation (18a), may only be licensed one clause down (18b) and (typically) do not allow alternation with the indicative mood (18c): (18)

a. Maríai lamenta que (ella*i/j/pro*i/j) se vista mal. Maríai regret.3SG that (she*i/j/pro*i/j) CL.REFL.3SG dress.SUB badly ‘Mary regrets that s/he (someone else/*herself) dresses ( SUB) badly.’ b. María lamenta que su hermana crea que su hijo se viste/*vista mal. María regret.3SG that her sister believe.SUB that her son CL.REFL.3SG dress.IND/*SUB badly ‘Mary regrets that her sister believes (SUB) that her son dresses (IND/SUB) badly.’ c. Maríai lamenta que su hijo se vista/*viste mal. María regret.3SG that her son CL.REFL.3SG dress.SUB/IND badly ‘Mary regrets that her son dresses (SUB/IND) badly.’

However, like negation-triggered subjunctive contexts, complements to emotives do not exhibit sequence of tense effects (19): (19)

Maríai lamenta que su hijo se vista/haya vestido/vistiera/hubiera vestido mal. María regret.3SG that her son REFL.3SG dress.SUB.PRES/PERF/PAST/PLPERF.3SG badly ‘Mary regrets that her son dresses/has dressed/dressed/had dressed ( SUB) badly.’

14 Furthermore, unlike complements to intensional predicates (20a), complements to emotive predicates allow a veridical interpretation on the part of the matrix subject.6 The veridicality of subjunctive complements to emotives is illustrated by the felicity of the follow-up statement in (20b), in which the speaker is implying that the matrix subject believes the complement clause proposition to be true: (20)

a. María quiere que su hijo regrese temprano. #Y cree que ya ha regresado. Mary want.3SG that her son return.SUB early. And believe.3SG that already have.PERF.3SG return.PART ‘Mary wants her son to return (SUB) early. And she believes that he has already returned.’ b. María lamenta que su hijo regrese temprano. Y cree que ya ha regresado. Mary regret.3SG that her son return.SUB early. And believe.3SG that already have.PERF.3SG return.PART ‘Mary regrets that her son is returning (SUB) early. And she believes that he has already returned.’ Subjunctive complements to causative predicates have also proven difficult to

characterize because, like emotives, the complement carries a veridical interpretation on the part of the matrix subject. The implicative nature of the complement clause is illustrated by the infelicity of the follow-up statement, in which it is shown that the matrix subject believes that the complement clause proposition was realized: (21)

María hizo que su hijo se vistiera mal. #Pero cree que su hijo no lo hizo. Mary made.3SG that her son dress.SUB badly. But believes that her son NEG CL.ACC did.IND.3SG ‘Mary made her son dress (SUB) badly. But she believes that her son didn’t do it.’

I follow Giannakidou’s (2006) conception of (non-)veridicality, who defines non-veridicality and anti-veridicality as the following: (i) Definition 1: (Non)veridicality for propositional operators a. A propositional operator is veridical if Fp entails or presupposes that p is true in some individual’s model M(i). p is true in M(i) iff M(i) ⊆ p, i.e. if all worlds in M(i) are p-worlds. b. Otherwise, F is nonveridical (ii) Definition 2: Anti-veridicality for propositional operators A nonveridical operator F is antiveridical iff Fp entails not p: Fp → ¬ p 6

15 Thus, both causative and emotive predicates have proven difficult to characterize from a semantic standpoint, due to the extensional (real world) modal base from which they are interpreted, a property not shared with other subjunctive clauses. Though complements to causative predicates differ from those to intensional predicates in that they carry implicative semantics, the two types of complement clauses do share many properties. Causative contexts exhibit subject obviation (22a), allow only local triggering of the subjunctive mood (22b) and do not allow a subjunctive/indicative alternation in the complement clause (22c). (22)

a. Maríai hace que (ella*i/j/pro*i/j) se vista mal. Maríai make.3SG that (she*i/j/pro*i/j) CL.REFL.SG dress.SUB badly ‘Mary makes (someone else/*herself) dresses (SUB) badly.’ b. María hace que su hermana crea que su hijo se viste/*vista mal. María make.3SG that her sister believe.SUB that her son CL.REFL.SG dress.IND/*SUB badly ‘Mary makes her sister believe (SUB) that her son dresses (IND/SUB) badly.’ c. Maríai hace que su hijo se vista/*viste mal. María make.3SG that her son CL.REFL.SG dress.SUB/IND badly ‘Mary makes her son dress (SUB/IND) badly.’

Furthermore, like subjunctive complements to intensional predicates, those to causative predicates exhibit the sequence of tense effect *PRESENT[PAST]. This is a property not shared by complements to emotive predicates: (23)

María hace que su hijo (lleve/*haya llevado/*llevara/*hubiera llevado) un libro. Mary make.PRES.3SG that her son bring.PRES/*PERF/*PAST/*PLPERF.SUB.3SG a book ‘Mary makes that her son bring/has brought/brought/had brought (SUB) a book.’

The properties discussed in this section are outlined in the table below. As is readily apparent, subjunctive complement clauses do not form a uniform class. A more fine-grained distinction than the intensional vs. polarity distinction is needed:

Operator- Sequence of Tense Subject triggered *PRESENT[PAST] Obviation

Locality of Triggering

Intensional



Causatives



Emotives Polarity

Veridical interpretation by matrix subject



Table 1-1. Properties of Subjunctive Complement Clauses In this dissertation, I focus on all four types of subjunctive complement clauses illustrated in table 1. Now that we have seen some key properties of subjunctive complements, as well as the general issues surrounding the characterization of complement clauses, I detail the research questions of the dissertation: (24)

Research Questions 1) What are the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic factors that play a role in mood distribution? 2) What is the “core” (i.e. lexically-selected) class of subjunctive clauses (if there is one)? 3) Is the indicative or the subjunctive the “unmarked” (default) mood (if there is one)? 4) How can subject obviation in subjunctive complements to volitional, directive, causative and emotive predicates be accounted for? 5) In what ways do negation-triggered subjunctive clauses differ from clauses which do not require negation to license the subjunctive mood? How can the differing properties be accounted for? 6) Is all negation-triggered subjunctive the same? In other words, do the semantic and syntactic properties involved in negation-triggered contexts vary among predicate types? 7) What is the semantico-pragmatic contribution of mood? 8) Do subjunctive clausal complements exhibit variation in clausal structure? I will eventually argue for a tripartite division of subjunctive complement clauses. The

first are lexically-selected in complements to volitional, directive and causative predicates. The second includes those triggered by negation, including subjunctive complements to negated

17 perception verbs (e.g. ver ‘to see’), cognitive-factives (e.g. saber ‘to know’) and verbs of reported speech (e.g. decir ‘to say’). Finally, the third class constitutes contexts in which the subjunctive mood surfaces as the default mood, due to lack of illocutionary force in uninformative contexts. This context includes subjunctive complements to emotives and (some) negated epistemics. I provide evidence that this new characterization of subjunctive clauses accounts for the limitations of previous analyses. Earlier proposals have, however, provided invaluable insights and have formed the foundation for the current work; I review these proposals in the next section. 1.4. Previous Analyses I will first review semantic approaches to mood choice, shedding light on both the insights and empirical problems that each faces. Then, I examine syntactic analyses of mood distribution and identify the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. 1.4.1. Semantic Approaches: Realis vs. Irrealis According to the traditional ‘realis/irrealis’ approach to mood distribution, the ‘realis’ (indicative) mood indicates the truth of the proposition in the actual world, whereas the ‘irrealis’ (subjunctive) mood is not necessarily true in the real world. Palmer (1986) and Givón (1994) are proponents of this view. While this approach appears to work for languages like Greek, Romance poses an obvious problem. As shown in the last section, and illustrated in table 1, subjunctive complements to emotives and causatives present a challenge, as the complement clauses in these contexts are generally presupposed to be true. This observation has motivated a number of other analyses, discussed below.

18 1.4.2. Assertion vs. Non-Assertion The main proponents of the assertion vs. non-assertion approach are Bolinger (1968), Hooper (1975) and Terrell & Hooper (1974), who propose that predicates that select the indicative mood in Spanish are assertive predicates, while the predicates selecting the subjunctive mood are nonassertive predicates. However, a number of factive predicates select the indicative mood, such as saber ‘know’, acordarse ‘to remember’, olvidarse ‘to forget’. As factive clauses are considered presuppositional (i.e. non-assertive), they should not be compatible with the indicative mood. Contrary to the predictions of this approach, these predicate types invariably select indicative complements cross-linguistically. Furthermore, fiction predicates such as soñar (‘to dream’) and prometer (‘to promise’) select indicative complement clauses, while the truth of these embedded clauses is clearly not asserted in the real world. Under this type of approach, we would expect these clauses to surface with the subjunctive mood, contrary to fact. Finally, in the last section, we saw that subjunctive complement clauses exhibit a wide variety of distinctive properties. If all subjunctive complements belonged to a uniform “unassertive” class with identical licensing conditions, we would not expect such variation. 1.4.3. Strong vs. Weak Intensional Predicates (Farkas 1985, 1992) Farkas’s approach has been very influential in the analysis of the subjunctive in Romance. She argues for a world-based semantics, in which mood choice is seen as the specification of a set of possible worlds within which the truth of the proposition is judged. She proposes the notion that the truth of a proposition is relativized to individuals. Weakly intensional predicates, corresponding to predicates selecting the indicative mood, require only that the subject believe the embedded proposition to be true (in the real world or a fictional world, accounting for verbs like soñar ‘to dream’ which select indicative complements). Strongly

19 intensional predicates, on the other hand, don’t require that the subject believe the embedded proposition to be true, as discussed in section 2. The contrast between weakly and strongly intensional predicates captures the intuition that a subject might have desires that are incompatible with each other (desire predicates are strongly intensional) but not incompatible beliefs. Though her analysis provides very valuable insights when characterizing mood distribution, it is not without flaws. For instance, a predicate such as prometer (‘promise’) selects the indicative mood in Spanish, and in all other Romance languages, even though one may certainly make inconsistent or conflicting promises. Similarly, predicates such as adivinar ‘to guess’, sospechar ‘to suspect’, and concluir ‘to conclude’ are similar to desire predicates, in that one may guess, suspect or conclude contradictory propositions. According to Farkas’s proposal, then, we would expect these predicates to select subjunctive complements. Nevertheless, the indicative mood is selected in these contexts across the Romance languages. The indicative mood in these contexts presents a problem for her analysis, which predicts that mood distribution is determined by the (in)compatibility of propositional truth conditions within extensional vs. intensional modal bases. Furthermore, subjunctive complements to emotive and causative predicates present a problem for this approach, as their subjunctive complement clauses are believed true by the matrix subject. We would therefore expect these predicates to select indicative complements, as the subjunctive proposition encodes an extensional, rather than intensional, modal base, contrary to what is observed.

20 1.4.4. Veridical vs. Non-veridical Contexts (Giannakidou 1997, 1998, 1999) Giannakidou proposes to subsume Farkas’s (2002) notion of strong/weak intensionality under the more general notion of (non)veridicality. She hypothesizes that the subjunctive mood marks non-veridical contexts, defining non-veridicality in the following way:7 (25)

Definition 3: Veridicality and Non-veridicality a. A propositional operator is veridical if Fp entails or presupposes that p is true in some individual’s model M(i). p is true in M(i) iff M(i) ⊆ p, i.e. if all worlds in M(i) are pworlds. b. Otherwise, F is nonveridical

According to Giannakidou, a proposition is non-veridical if the embedded proposition is not necessarily true in all the worlds corresponding to the (intensional or extensional) model introduced by the predicate. Thus, weakly intensional predicates like soñar ‘to dream’ select indicative complements because the subordinate clause is true in the dream world model of the subject, while epistemics select the indicative because the subordinate clause is true in the epistemic model of the subject. Strongly intensional predicates, like volitionals and directives, select subjunctive complements because the truth of the subordinate clause proposition is not necessarily true in all of the (desire) worlds introduced by verb. Syntactically, Giannakidou (1994, 1995) and Manzini (1996) argue that the subjunctive is licensed by entering into a head-to-head dependency with an intensional operator, such as negation, or the operator if in counterfactual contexts. From this perspective, the subjunctive displays the same licensing restrictions as a negative polarity item; i.e. both can only appear in non-veridical contexts. However, while this analysis appears to work for Greek, negative polarity item licensing and subjunctive contexts do not completely overlap in Romance. The classic problem for this

For a more detailed analysis of (non)-veridicality relativized to a context, see Giannakidou (1997).

21 approach is the emotives class, in which matrix negation does not license long-distance NPIs in the subjunctive complement clause. Example (26a) shows the grammatical licensing of the NPI nada ‘anything’ by negation in the matrix clause of the volitional verb querer ‘to want’. Example (26b), on the other hand, illustrates that NPIs are not licensed by matrix clause negation in the subjunctive complement to emotives: (26)

a. No quiero que hagas nada/??algo. NEG want.1SG that do.SUB.2SG anything/??something ‘I don’t want you to do anything/something.’ b. No lamenté que hicieras *nada/algo. NEG regret.1SG that do.SUB.2SG *anything/something ‘I didn’t regret that you did *anything/something’. The fact that NPIs are not licensed in subjunctive complement clauses to emotives

indicates that the subjunctive mood in this context cannot be analyzed as non-veridical. Furthermore, we have seen that complements to causatives and emotives are believed true on the part of the matrix subject and, therefore, may not be classified as non-veridical. Thus, while a non-veridical approach to the subjunctive may be viable for Greek, it is problematic for Romance. 1.4.5. Subjunctive Selected by Focus Operator with Degree Argument (Villalta 2008) Villalta (2008) hypothesizes that the subjunctive mood signals the introduction of an ordering relation or scale which can compare a proposition p to its contextually relevant alternatives, much like focalized arguments. She hypothesizes that predicates which select subjunctive complements (i) carry a degree argument and (ii) are focus-sensitive. She motivates the hypothesis by using the adverb enormemente ‘enormously’ as a diagnostic for the gradability of predicates; predicates which select subjunctive complements are compatible with gradable adverbs, and therefore encode a degree argument. This is shown in

22 (27), as the volitional verb querer ‘to want’, which selects subjunctive complements, is compatible with the gradable adverb enormemente ‘enormously’: (27)

Quiero enormemente que llueva. want.PRES.1SG enormously that rain.SUB ‘I enormously want it to rain (SUB).’

Predicates which select indicative complements do not encode a degree argument and, therefore, are not compatible with gradable adverbs. This is illustrated below with the epistemic pensar ‘to think’: (28)

*Pienso enormemente que llueve. think.PRES.1SG enormously that rain.IND ‘I enormously think that it is raining (IND).’ Villalta also hypothesizes that subjunctive-selecting predicates are focus-sensitive

operators. To support her claim, she shows that focalizing a constituent in the subordinate clause changes the truth conditions of the utterance. For instance, let’s imagine a scenario in which María wants her husband Raúl to cook dinner on Monday because she has to work late. However, Raúl has to work late also. Since Raúl can’t do it, she asks her son Marco, even though Marco isn’t a good cook and she’d rather Raúl cook dinner. However, she still prefers that Marco cook dinner over herself. Given this scenario, consider the following utterances: (29)

María quiere que Marco prepare la cena EL LUNES. ‘Mary wants that Marco cook (SUB) dinner MONDAY.

(30)

María quiere que MARCO prepare la cena el lunes. ‘Mary wants MARCO to cook (SUB) dinner on Monday. Given the scenario laid out above, (29) is true and (30) is not true. We know that she

really wants her husband Raúl to cook dinner, but for Monday alone, she needs Marco to cook. Focalizing el lunes, then, results in a true statement. Example (30), on the other hand, is not true with the focalization of Marco because we know that she really wants Raúl to cook dinner. Thus,

23 the data appear to support her hypothesis that focus-sensitivity and gradability are the defining properties of subjunctive-selecting predicates. Admittedly, Villalta’s analysis does not account for cases of ‘polarity’ subjunctive. This becomes clear when applying the diagnostics above. Let’s imagine the same scenario described above, with Mary’s desire for Marco to cook dinner only if Raúl can’t. Unlike the volitional querer ‘to want’, focalization does not affect the truth conditions of the subjunctive complement clause with the matrix negated epistemic pensar ‘to think’: (31)

María no piensa que Marco prepare la cena EL LUNES. ‘Mary doesn’t think that Marco will cook (SUB) dinner MONDAY.

(32)

María no piensa que MARCO prepare la cena el lunes. ‘Mary doesn’t think MARCO to cook (SUB) dinner on Monday.

Regardless of which constituent is focalized, Mary’s doubt is still the same. The truth conditions of both subordinate clauses remains the same, unlike the embedded clauses that we saw under the volitional querer ‘to want’ in (29) and (30). Another challenge to Villalta’s (2008) analysis is the gradable nature and focus sensitivity of certain emotive verbs, like temer ‘to fear’, which select indicative complement clauses. Again, imagine the scenario described above, only this time Mary is scared that she won’t be home in time to cook dinner Monday, because she really enjoys cooking. She knows that her husband Raúl is a competent cook, however, and does trust him to cook a good dinner. Like the volitional querer ‘to want’, focalization affects the truth conditions of the statement, although the indicative mood is grammatical in the complement clause: (33)

María teme que Raúl tiene que preparar la cena EL LUNES. ‘Mary fears that Raúl has to (IND) cook dinner MONDAY.

(34)

María teme que RAÚL tiene que preparar la cena el lunes. ‘Mary fears that RAÚL has to (IND) cook dinner on Monday.

24 Given the scenario, (33) is true and (34) is not. Example (33) carries the interpretation that María is scared that, specifically on Monday, she will not arrive home in time to cook dinner. This is the true scenario. Example (34), on the other hand, implies that her fear specifically relates to Raúl’s cooking dinner, as opposed to the time frame in which the dinner would not be cooked by her (i.e. on Monday). This sentence is not true, because we know that Mary trusts Raúl to cook dinner; the fear does not lie with his cooking dinner, but rather with her unavailability to cook it herself. Thus, examples (33) and (34) indicate that the verb temer ‘to fear’ is focus-sensitive, like strongly intensional predicates. Furthermore, the verb temer ‘to fear’ is grammatical with a gradable adverb like enormemente ‘enormously’, indicating (according to Villalta’s hypothesis) that this predicate has a degree argument. We therefore expect the subjunctive mood in the complement clause, contrary to what is observed: (35)

María teme enormemente que Raúl tendrá que preparar la cena el lunes. ‘Mary fears enormously that Raúl will have to (IND) cook dinner on Monday.

Thus, the fact that a gradable, focus-sensitive verb like temer ‘to fear’ selects indicative complements indicates that these properties do not exhibit a one-to-one correspondence with predicates which select subjunctive complements, posing a problem for Villalta’s (2008) analysis. 1.4.6. Mood as Model Shift (Quer 1998, 2001) Quer (1998, 2001) follows Farkas (1985, 1992) and Giannakidou (1997, 1998, 1999) in classifying predicates into weakly and strongly intensional. The novelty of his approach is in attributing the subjunctive mood in languages such as Catalan and Spanish to ‘model shift’. Quer (1998, 2001) follows Giannakidou (1997, 1998, 1999) in proposing that propositional attitudes introduce sets of worlds which introduce a change in the context of evaluation (or ‘model shift’).

25 Subjunctive contexts mark a shift in the context of evaluation of the complement clause. In other words, the subjunctive mood indicates that the context of evaluation of the complement clause is different from the context of evaluation of the matrix clause. In volitional contexts, for instance, the model of evaluation has shifted from the real world model WR to a buletic model WBUL (based on wishes), and the subjunctive mood marks this shift. Crucially, models are relativized to an individual anchor, representing the being from whose perspective the truth of the proposition is judged (à la Farkas 1992). 8 The default world is the epistemic (real world) model of the speaker WR(speaker). The subjunctive mood in complements to strongly intensional predicates, then, introduces a shift from this model to the buletic model of the matrix subject WBUL(subject). Negation-triggered contexts, on the other hand, select subjunctive complements because they represent a shift in the individual anchor from the epistemic model of the speaker WR(speaker) to that of the matrix subject WR(subject). Thus, ‘polarity’ subjunctive contexts mark a shift in the individual anchor, rather than a shift in the (set of) world(s) from which the proposition is to be interpreted. The question that comes to mind is why weakly intensional predicates, such as epistemics like creer ‘to believe’ and verbs of reported speech like decir ‘to say’, select indicative complements (illustrated in (2)) when not negated. Like their negated counterparts, it is difficult to argue that these predicate types do not introduce a shift in individual anchor (i.e. a shift from the epistemic model of the speaker to that of the matrix subject). Furthermore, the propositional content of the clause may not form part of the epistemic model of the speaker; the truth of the indicative complement to a verb like pensar ‘to think’, for instance, may be disagreed with

I examine in more detail how ‘model shift’ works in section 1.7, as reference to this phenomenon will be relevant later in the dissertation. 8

26 (believed untrue) by the speaker. This is indicated by the felicity of the follow-up statement in (36), which indicates that the speaker is reporting information that does not form part of his/her own epistemic (real world) model (WR(speaker)). (36)

María piensa que va/*vaya a llover… ‘Mary thinks that it is going (IND/SUB) to rain…

pero no lo pienso yo. but I don’t think so.’

Moreover, in negated epistemic contexts with subjunctive complements, the speaker may believe the subjunctive clause proposition to be true, indicating that the subjunctive clause proposition can indeed form part of his/her epistemic model WR(speaker) in this context: (37)

María no piensa que vaya a llover… pero, pienso yo que sí, va a llover. ‘Mary doesn’t think that it is going (SUB) to rain… but I think that it is going to rain.’ Assuming that the default model is the epistemic model of the speaker WR(speaker), the

indicative mood in (36) appears to indicate a further shift from this model than the subjunctive mood in (37). The indicative complement clause represents a proposition that does not form part of the speaker’s epistemic model in (36), while the subjunctive clause proposition in (37) does. This is an unexpected result, given Quer’s prediction that the subjunctive mood indicates a shift in the model of evaluation from the default WR(speaker) model to a different model. It can also be noted that a predicate such as promise should introduce a model that is quite similar to the one introduced by the predicate want. For a predicate such as promise, we would expect that the embedded proposition be evaluated in all the worlds that are compatible with what the subject believes about the future realizations of the actual world; i.e. a model shift from the actual world to possible future worlds, which should trigger the subjunctive. Nevertheless, this predicate consistently selects the indicative mood across the Romance languages, posing a challenge to Quer’s (1998) analysis.

27 We will see, however, that Quer’s (1998) notion of models and model shift are very useful in describing and analyzing the interpretation of illocutionary force, and provide invaluable insights with respect to the interpretation of mood. I detail the theoretical assumptions regarding model theory in section 5. 1.4.7. Null vs. Non-null Ordering Sources (Giorgi and Pianesi 1997) Giorgi and Pianesi (1997) argue that mood choice represents possible contexts of evaluation, determined by a scale that ranges from non-realistic, weakly realistic, realistic to totally realistic contexts. The indicative vs. subjunctive alternation is determined by dividing this scale into two parts, with the indicative mood representing contexts at the realistic part of the scale, while the subjunctive mood represents contexts at the non-realistic end of the scale. Volitionals and directives, for instance, fall into the ‘non-realistic’ category, explaining why these complement clauses always appear in the subjunctive mood in languages that exhibit mood choice. Cross-linguistic variation is argued to derive from the fact that languages set this binary division at different points on the scale. Their analysis thus accounts for why non-negated belief verbs in Italian (38) can select subjunctive complements, while in Spanish, only negated belief verbs may select subjunctive clauses. This is illustrated in (39): (38)

Italian

(39)

Spanish

28 According to Giorgi and Pianesi, epistemics fall into the ‘realistic’ category. If this is correct, Spanish marks the binary divide of mood choice in the middle of the scale, prompting complements to non-negated epistemics to appear with the indicative mood. Italian, in contrast, would make the divide after the ‘realistic’ category; thus, complement clauses to epistemics appear in the subjunctive mood in Italian: Spanish divide (40)

Italian divide

non-realistic >> weakly realistic >> realistic >> totally realistic Furthermore, Giorgi and Pianesi (1997) argue that the semantics involved in subjunctive

contexts involves the interpretation of modals - the interaction between two conversational backgrounds - that is relevant for the interpretation of subjunctive clauses. They adopt key ideas from Kratzer’s (1981, 1991) proposal for modals (discussed more thoroughly in section 5). In this type of framework, modal verbs such as should, would, must and may require two contextual parameters (conversational backgrounds) for their evaluation: the modal base and the ordering source. The first conversational background is the modal base - a set of worlds that is provided by the epistemic conversational background, while the ordering source is a second set of background assumptions that orders those worlds with respect to an ideal. In this way, the ordering source determines from which model of evaluation the proposition is evaluated. To illustrate this concept, consider the following sentence with the modal must: (41)

John must be on vacation.

(42)

John must go to the doctor. The most natural reading of (41) is the ‘epistemic’ reading, in which the conversational

background is a contextually determined set of propositions provided by ‘the available evidence’; must is felicitously introduced only in a context in which one is evaluating possible

29 worlds based on ‘the available evidence’. For each world, the second conversational background induces an ordering on the sets of worlds accessible from that world. Interpreting the sentence in (41), then, requires one to evaluate the truth of the proposition ‘John is on vacation’ in all the worlds of the modal base (conversational background) that come closest to the ideal determined by the ordering source must. The sentence in (42) has a so called ‘deontic’ interpretation, which is interpreted as a desired outcome, based on the assessment of John’s health state. Thus, modals such as must can receive either the epistemic or the deontic reading, depending on the presence of an implicit (or explicit) specification. According to Kratzer, the conversational background involved in (41) is a contextually determined set of propositions provided by ‘the available evidence’. For the deontic reading in (42), on the other hand, it is a contextually determined set of propositions provided by what is ‘good for John’s health state’. For each world, the second conversational background induces an ordering on the sets of worlds accessible from that world. Giorgi and Pianesi build on Kratzer’s analysis, and claim that mood distribution can be explained by appealing to modality. They hypothesize that the subjunctive mood surfaces in contexts which involve a matrix predicate that introduces a modal base, and an ordering source which ranks the possible worlds introduced by the modal base. Specifically, in languages with the subjunctive/indicative alternation, the subjunctive mood is selected when the proposition is evaluated in a context that requires a non-null ordering source (i.e. a matrix predicate) which gives rise to non-realistic (intensional) contexts of evaluation. Then, depending upon where the language marks the binary divide in (40), those propositions which fall within the non-realistic end of the spectrum will result in the subjunctive mood.

30 Giorgi and Pianesi propose that for desire predicates and directives, it is the subject’s wishes and desires that provide the ordering source and establish a buletic conversational background. For emotive predicates, they assume that subjunctive complement clauses are selected because of their emotional/evaluative character. They claim that predicates such as sorprenderse ‘to be surprised’, lamentar ‘to regret’ and gustar ‘to like’ involve causation: “The event described by the complement clause (or the related fact) causes the subject to be in a state of astonishment, regret, worry, and so on.” (Giorgi and Pianesi 1997:219). However, under this approach, it is unclear why the subjunctive mood is required in the described contexts. Furthermore, the analysis seems to imply that all predicates which select the subjunctive mood denote the same modal value as the deontic uses of must or can, which seems unlikely in implicative (causative) contexts. 1.4.8. The Referential Approach (Schlenker 2005) Schlenker (2005) proposes an analysis to account for the indicative/subjunctive mood in French. He argues that the subjunctive mood cannot be given a common semantics in all contexts but, rather, that it functions as a default mood. His analysis captures the intuition that the indicative marks some notion of commitment on either the subject’s or the speaker’s part. The subjunctive, then, appears when there is no relevant presupposition of commitment to trigger the indicative. At first glance, complements to emotive predicates present a challenge to this approach because in French, like Spanish, a verb such as regret presupposes that the subject believes the embedded proposition to be true. However, to account for the subjunctive mood in these contexts, Schlenker proposes that emotives select the subjunctive mood because their lexical

31 semantics involve counterfactual reasoning. As a consequence, the subjunctive complement is not evaluated in worlds that are in any salient individual’s context set. While this approach accounts for the indicative mood in complements to epistemic predicates and predicates of communication, it is not immediately clear how it can account for the indicative mood in fiction predicates like soñar ‘to dream’ and prometer ‘to promise’. Clearly, the subject neither believes nor asserts the embedded proposition in complement clauses to predicates like dream or promise, yet these predicates select indicative complements, contrary to what is predicted by Schlenker. To conclude this section, while these semantic analyses of mood choice provide extremely valuable insights with respect to the indicative vs. subjunctive alternation, they do not quite captures the full spectrum of the interpretive properties involved in mood distribution. Most importantly, these types of approaches capture the fact that modality or, at least, the truth conditions of the proposition play a part in mood distribution, evidenced by the fact that strongly intensional predicates (i.e. volitionals and directives) invariably select the subjunctive mood in languages with a verbal mood paradigm. I will now turn now to syntactic approaches to mood distribution, which also provide valuable insights with respect to mood distribution, before outlining the theoretical assumptions of the dissertation. 1.4.9. Syntactic Analyses: Binding Theory Approaches Syntactic analyses of mood distribution often view the subjunctive mood through the lens of binding theory, in an attempt to reconcile the sequence of tense restrictions and subject obviation. The essential claim is that the subjunctive mood and, consequently, subject obviation, are due to Principle B of binding theory. There have been two prevalent ways of approaching this line of thought: (i) the idea that lexically-selected subjunctive complements are characterized

32 by a modal operator in Comp (Kempchinsky 1986, 1987, 1990, Avrutin & Babyonyshev 1997), or (ii) the idea that the binding domain of the complement clause is somehow extended due to deficient tense in subjunctive clauses (Picallo 1984, 1985, Progovac, 1993, 1994, Manzini 1994, Santos 1997). The latter type of approach involves searching for some principled way to extend the binding domain of verbs which lexically select subjunctive complements. In doing so, the sequence of tense restriction *PRESENT[PAST] and subject obviation are correlated, properties which are thought to be intrinsically connected. These researchers take the strict sequence of tenses as the primary ‘morphological’ evidence to argue that subjunctive is [-finite] and, because of this deficiency, subjunctive clauses may not constitute a separate syntactic or temporal identity. This ‘deficiency’ is argued to result in an extended binding domain, resulting in subject obviation. Picallo (1984, 1985) is a proponent of this view. His is one of the most influential approaches which attempts to unify subject obviation and sequence of tense restrictions by arguing that both are brought about by the establishment of a T(ense)-chain between the tense features of a subjunctive INFL node and those of its INFL antecedent, in a sense creating ‘anaphoric’ tense. Evidence for this approach is that these subordinate clauses do not have an independent temporal interpretation and, in this respect, are deficient. The analysis amounts to saying that Tense is the relevant feature for binding domains, and lack of tense therefore signifies a single binding domain. Hence, subject obviation is the result of a violation of Principle B, as illustrated in (43):

33 (43)

Maríai desea que (ella*i/j/pro*i/j) lleve un libro aburrido. Maríai desire.PRES.3SG that (she*i/j/pro*i/j) bring.SUB.3SG a book boring ‘Mary desires that s/he (someone else/*herself) bring ( SUB) a boring book.’ Maríai desea que (ella*i/j/pro*i/j) lleve un libro aburrido. X Principle B Violation

one binding domain

Because indicative complement clauses carry independent (non-deficient) tense, these clauses constitute their own binding domain. This is represented in (44); subject co-reference is allowed because no Principle B violation is incurred: (44)

Maríai piensa que (ellai/j/proi/j) perdió un libro aburrido. Maríai think.PRES.3SG that (shei/j/proi/j) lost.IND.3SG a book boring ‘Mary thinks that s/he (someone else/herself) lost (IND) a boring book.’ Maríai piensa que (ellai/j/proi/j) perdió un libro aburrido. 1 binding domain

1 binding domain

no Principle B violation Picallo also claims that this analysis accounts for the absence of the subjunctive mood in root clauses as, in these contexts, there is no tense specification available to value the deficient tense of the subordinate clause. Progovac (1993, 1994) later extends this idea, by proposing an LF deletion rule for an INFL with dependent tense and CPs without truth values. The most fundamental objection to tense-based approaches is that the past or present tense orientation of subjunctive complements to directives has real effects on the interpretation of the clause. As example (45a) illustrates, the past tense of the directive followed by the past subjunctive may receive an interpretation in which the subjunctive clause event was realized. In contrast, example (45b) illustrates that a past tense directive followed by a present tense subjunctive complement clause may not receive this interpretation; the subordinate proposition must be interpreted as an unrealized event. The potential interpretation (or lack thereof) of event

34 realization is indicated by the (in)felicity of the follow-up statements. Note that, regardless of the tense of the subordinate clause, these constructions still display subject obviation, illustrated by the ungrammaticality of subject co-reference: (45)

a. proi ordené a Pedroj que pro*i/j terminara el proyecto … y efectivamente lo hizo. … pero todavía no lo ha hecho. ‘(I) ordered Pedro that I/he finish (PAST.SUB) the prject … and in fact he did so.’ … but he still hasn’t done it.’ b. proi ordené a Pedroj que pro*i/j termine el proyecto #... y efectivamente lo hizo. …pero todavía no lo ha hecho. ‘(I) ordered Pedro that I/he finish (PRES.SUB) the project.’ #... and in fact he did so.’ … but he still hasn’t done it.’ (Kempchinsky 2009:1790)

Example (45) illustrates that the temporal orientation of the subjunctive clause event clearly affects the interpretation (i.e. the potential for a realized interpretation), providing compelling evidence that the semantic effects of temporal orientation in subjunctive clauses is not semantically vacuous and, therefore, not deficient. In a series of works, Suñer and Padilla-Rivera (Suñer and Padilla-Rivera 1985, 1987, 1990, Padilla-Rivera 1985, Suñer 1990) extensively argue against the claim that all subjunctive clauses lack tense in Spanish, showing that tense restrictions arise only in predicates that exclusively select subjunctive complements. When triggered by negation, or in relative and adverbial contexts, the subjunctive clause does not exhibit tense restrictions. They claim that what singles out predicates which show tense restrictions (volitional and directive predicates) is the lexical feature [-PRECEDENCE] which bars the sequence of tenses like [+past … - past]. Furthermore, they claim that verbs like prometer ‘to promise’ and planear ‘to plan’ also encode this feature, resulting in sequence of tense restrictions in their indicative

35 complement clauses, shown in (46). The evidence indicates that sequence of tense is not directly related to the subjunctive mood: (46)

Prometió que pro viene/venía/*había venido. promise.PAST.3SG that come.PRES/IMPERF/*PLPERF.IND ‘S/he promised that s/he is coming/would come/*had (IND) come.’ In sum, there are serious empirical problems in claiming that ‘deficient’ or ‘anaphoric’

tense is responsible for licensing the subjunctive. Nevertheless, tense restrictions require explanation in the characterization of subjunctive clauses, even though this property cannot be directly attributed to the subjunctive mood. 1.4.10. The Subjunctive Mood as an Imperative Operator (Kempchinsky 1986, 1987, 1990, 2009) Kempchinsky (1986, 1987, 1990) and Avrutin & Babyonyshev (1997) also rely on Principle B of binding theory to explain subject obviation; however, their claims do not rely on the idea that subjunctive clauses are somehow ‘deficient’. These types of analyses depend on the idea that subjunctive complements to desiderative and directive predicates are characterized by a modal operator in Comp. According to Kempchinsky, subjunctive clauses are essentially embedded imperatives, based on the fact that both lexically-selected subjunctive complements and imperatives share the impossibility to be assigned a truth value. The nature of the modal operator is not precisely characterized as an imperative operator, as volitional and directive contexts exhibit obviation with respect to the matrix subject, while imperatives show obviation with respect to the speaker (Quer 1998). Kempchinsky (2009) reconciles this difference by proposing that, in imperatives, the quasi-imperative operator in CP is an addressee-oriented logophoric element, while in desiderative constructions, the operator semantically binds a subject-oriented anti-logophoric element. This element prevents co-reference with the

36 subordinate clause subject, and is housed is FinP, the locus of speaker deixis.9 The analysis has the advantage of accounting for the fact that obviation effects extend only to the immediate superordinate clause: (47)

proi deseaba [que proj/*i quisiera [que proi/*j/k lo acompañara en el viaje]]] desire.PAST.3SG that pro want.PAST.SUB.3SG that pro CL.ACC accompany.IMPERF.SUB.3SG on the journey ‘S/He desired that she/he want (SUB) that she/he accompany (SUB) him on the journey.’ (Kempchinsky 2009:1789)

For approaches which analyze subjunctive clauses as carrying ‘deficient’ tense, on the other hand, this is an unexpected result. We would expect subject obviation to occur in consecutive embedded clauses, if the entire construction (being tense dependent) is one binding domain. The quasi-imperative operator, on the other hand, relies on no such tense-related stipulation, and thus accounts for the fact that obviation is local. Furthermore, because the quasi-imperative operator is not licensed in negated epistemic contexts, because epistemic predicates do not encode deontic/imperative modality, we have an explanation for the lack of obviation effects in these clauses. Moreover, the approach also accounts for the *PRESENT[PAST] tense restriction observed in lexically-selected contexts, as imperatives impose future orientation on the embedded eventuality. Thus, this type of analysis elegantly captures many properties of lexically-selected subjunctive complements: (i) the local nature of subject obviation, (ii) the lack of subject obviation in epistemic contexts and (iii) the *PRESENT[PAST] restriction. However, the principle empirical problem to binding-theory approaches in general is the failure to explain lack of obviation effects between subordinate clause subjects and matrix clause objects (accusative or

Kempchinsky’s (2009) analysis is discussed in more detail in chapter 2, wherein the syntactic analysis is detailed. For the current introductory purposes, this brief review will suffice. 9

37 dative) in complement clauses to volitional and directive predicates, exemplified below (data from Kempchinsky 2009:1791):10 (48)

a. Animé a Elisai a [que proi estudiara en el extranjero]. ‘I encouraged Elisa that she study (SUB) abroad.’ b. Lai animé a [que proi estudiara en el extranjero]. ‘I encouraged her (ACC) that she study (SUB) abroad.’ c. Lei aconsejé (a Pedroi) [que proi cambiara de carrera]. ‘I advised him (DAT)/Pedro that he change (SUB) his major.’ It is difficult to argue that the matrix clause subject c-commands the subordinate clause,

but that the matrix clause object does not; in other words, contexts which exhibit subject obviation should also exhibit object obviation (when one is present), contrary to what is observed. Thus, a Principle B approach to subject obviation is explanatorily inadequate in this context. Another challenge to this type of approach is that subjunctive complements to emotives also give rise to obviation effects in most dialects of Spanish, though the truth of these clauses is often presupposed by the speaker. It is unclear why a quasi-imperative operator would be present in these contexts, as the subjunctive clause can carry a positive truth-value and therefore does not encode deontic/imperative modality. Under this type of approach, then, we would not expect subject obviation to occur in these contexts, contrary to what is observed. 1.4.11. Subjunctive as a Dependent Nominal (Tsoulas 1994, 1995) Tsoulas (1994, 1995) proposes a theory of clausal indefiniteness to explain the correlation between the interpretation of indicative and subjunctive clauses, as well as definite

An exception to this generalization is obviation in subjunctive complements to factive-emotives with dative experience subjects: (i)

A Anai lei encanta que pro*i/j seà la ganadora. ‘Ana loves that s/he is the winner.

The obviation observed in these constructions can be accounted for on the assumption that dative experience subjects are syntactically (quirky) subjects (à la Belletti and Rizzi 1988).

38 and indefinite NPs. His key observation is that extraction may occur out of indefinite NPs as well as subjunctive clauses, whereas definite DPs and indicative subordinate clauses don’t allow extraction. Example (49) illustrates ungrammatical extraction from a volitional clause with a definite direct object (49a), but grammatical extraction from an indefinite object (49b): (49)

a.*De quién quieres ver las fotos <de quién>? of who want.2SG see.INF the photos ‘Who do you want to see the pictures of?’ b. De quién quieres ver una foto <de quién>? of who want.2SG see.INF a photo ‘Who do you want to see a picture of?’ Example (50), below, illustrates an interesting parallelism between extraction out of

complement clauses, and the data in (49) which illustrates extraction out of nominals. Example (50a) shows that, in indicative contexts, the non-availability of extraction renders the embedded clause an island, like the definite nominal of (49a). In contrast, extraction out of a deeply embedded infinitive (50b) and a deeply embedded subjunctive clause (50c) is grammatical, behaving like the indefinite nominal in (49b): (50)

a.*Qué te preguntas [quién dijo [que vio Alex <qué>]]? what REFL.2SG ask.2SG who said.3SG that saw.3SG Alex ‘What do you wonder who said that Alex saw?’ b. Qué te preguntas [quién decidió [ ver <qué>]]? what REFL.2SG ask.2SG who decided.3SG see.INF ‘What do you wonder who decided to see?’ c. Qué te preguntas [quién quería [que viera Sophie <qué>? what REFL.2SG ask.2GS who wanted.3SG that see.SUB.3SG Sophie ‘What do wonder who wanted Sophie to see?’ The data show that subjunctive contexts behave in the same way as indefinite DPs and

infinitival clauses. Based on this evidence, Tsoula claims that this distinction indicates that T is indefinite in subjunctive contexts (i.e. subjunctive contexts are temporally indefinite). However, while Tsoula’s analysis accounts for the extraction data, it fails to explain the island status of

39 subjunctive complements to emotive predicates which, being indefinite, should not exhibit island effects. On the contrary, these contexts do indeed exhibit island effects: (51)

*Quién lamentas que <quién> venga? Who regret.2SG that comes.SUB.3SG ‘Who do you regret is coming?’

The emotive data provide evidence that a more fine-grained analysis of subjunctive clauses is warranted. To conclude this section, I have outlined various semantic and syntactic approaches to mood distribution. The first sub-sections were concerned with semantic characterizations of mood, which attempt to formulate a unifying semantic property to account for mood distribution cross-linguistically. The triggering mechanism for the subjunctive mood has been framed in terms of intensionality (Farkas, 1985, 1992, 2003), modality (Giorgi & Pianesi 1997a), nonveridicality (Giannakidou 1994, 1997, 1998, 1999) and model shift (Quer 1998). The typical problem for these approaches are subjunctive complements to emotive predicates, whose truth tends to be presupposed by the speaker. Syntactic approaches to mood distribution traditionally focus on sequence of tense restrictions *[PRESENT[PAST]] and subject obviation in lexically-selected subjunctive contexts, relying in some way on Principle B to account for both properties. Many of these analyses assume that subjunctive clauses carry deficient tense (cf. Picallo 1984, 1985, Progovac, 1993, 1994, Manzini 1994, Santos 1997); the principle empirical problem for these approaches is that the tense specification in subjunctive complements to directive predicates entails interpretive differences. The main problems for the quasi-imperative operator analysis (Kempchinsky 1986, 1987, 1990, Avrutin & Babyonyshev 1997) lay with the fact that emotive contexts exhibit subject obviation, whose truth may be presupposed by the speaker.

40 Thus, the precise characterization of subjunctive clauses has remained elusive. It appears that neither a purely semantic nor purely syntactic approach can fully account for the data. In this work, I shed light on previously unobserved connections between the semantico-pragmatic (information-mapping) function of illocutionary force, modality, truth conditions and ‘point of view’ related phenomena, illustrating that semantic, pragmatic and syntactic components are involved in mood distribution. The analysis supports the idea that, as shown in this section, the representation and interpretation of mood choice involve various components of the grammar. 1.5. Theoretical Assumptions I will now briefly outline some critical assumptions with respect to the theoretical framework and terminology that are adopted in this dissertation. Specifically, I outline the groundwork with respect to the ways in which the terms modality and models are used, which will be particularly relevant in explaining the semantic denotation and syntactic properties of matrix clauses. I also outline assumptions regarding the semantico-pragmatic status of propositions in terms of illocutionary force, which relates to the ways in which propositions are situated in the discourse in terms of their information status, following Stalnaker’s (1978, 1999) approach to conversation semantics. Finally, the basic syntactic assumptions are outlined, establishing the framework for the syntactic analysis of complement clauses. 1.5.1. Modality Reference to modality in this dissertation is framed following Kratzer’s (1981, 1991) hypothesis that modality involves quantification over a set of worlds, a standard approach in the semantic literature. According to Kratzer, there are three separate parameters of modal operators in natural language which encode the modality of a predicate. The first is the modal force, which

41 differentiates modals such as may, which represents possibility, from a modal like must, which represents necessity. A second parameter is determined by the modal base, which is related to the accessibility relations from modal logic that for each world determine the set of worlds that are accessible from that world. Membership into a modal base is defined by a conversational background. Different kinds of modality are linked to different modal bases. In the case of epistemic modalities, for instance, the modal base is constituted of the propositions that an individual takes to be known. The set of worlds accessed by the epistemic modal base is composed of all the worlds in which the propositions in the modal base are true. Deontic modality, on the other hand, involves a modal base determined by a set of commandments or deontic conditions, and thus accesses worlds which satisfy that set of commandments. The third parameter that can determine the interpretation of a modal expression is the ordering source, which establishes an ordering among the possible worlds. A predicate like â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;wantâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;, for instance, requires a ranking of alternative desire worlds such that the output is an object or proposition that exists in the most highly ranked desire world in a given context. Kratzerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s analysis of modality resolves the issue that modals like must have two different readings. To illustrate this, I will reintroduce examples (52) and (53) from section 4.7: (52)

John must be on vacation.

Epistemic Reading

(53)

John must go to the doctor.

Deontic Reading

In (52) and (53), the modal force of must can be either one of possibility (52) or necessity (53). The two different readings are established via the two possible interactions between the modal base (conversational background) and the ordering source, which orders the set of accessible worlds.

42 In (52), must is behaving as an epistemic modal. The reading in (52), then, requires one to evaluate the truth of the proposition ‘John is on vacation’ in all the worlds of the modal base (i.e. the conversational background that determines ‘the available evidence’), that come closest to the ideal determined by the ordering source must. The sentence in (53) has the so-called ‘deontic’ interpretation, which is interpreted as a desired outcome, based on the assessment of John’s health state. In (53), the modal base is a contextually determined set of propositions provided by what is ‘good for John’s health state’, and the ordering source must determines all of the accessible worlds and orders them with respect to the propositional content ‘John goes to the doctor’. Thus, while the modal base is a contextually determined set of propositions, the ordering source orders the sets of worlds accessible from the world determined by the modal base. Reference to modality in this dissertation assumes, with Kratzer (1981, 1991), that modals are relative to two conversational backgrounds: the modal base b and the ordering source o. Nauze (2008), following Kratzer, defines these two conversational backgrounds as the following (2008:138): (54)

modal base b: W →P (P(W)) determines a set of propositions and thus the accessible worlds ∩b(w) from any w ∈ W

(55)

ordering source o: W →P (P(W)) determines the partial order < o(w) based on the propositions in o(w). In (54), the modal base b determines for a given proposition P the set of accessible

worlds W within the real world conversational background w. In (55), the ordering source o takes the set of accessible worlds W determined by b, and ranks them such that the resulting output of the modal value is P. The modal base and the ordering source of an expressive denotation determine the modal force of the proposition. Formal definitions of modality will be presented

43 when relevant, particularly in chapter 3, wherein I argue that subject obviation in subjunctive contexts is linked to the modality encoded on the matrix clause. As Quer (1998) notes, establishing a direct correlation of the subjunctive and indicative moods with modal and non-modal readings is insufficient in characterizing mood choice. There are cases in which modalized propositions are expressed in the indicative (i.e. in root declaratives with a modal verb like deber â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;must/may/shouldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;), and cases in which the subjunctive mood does not always yield a modalized interpretation. Notwithstanding, modality is a crucial factor in understanding intensionally-anchored propositions, and therefore has an important role to play in understanding mood distribution. 1.5.2. Conversation Semantics and Model Theory Analyses which attempt to explain mood distribution make predictions regarding the semantic and pragmatic import of illocutionary force. In this section, I take a little time to outline my assumptions with respect to the semantico-pragmatic import of propositions in terms of their information status; that is, I review the basic notion of conversational semantics that is adopted in this dissertation. The analysis developed here assumes an approach to conversation semantics of the kind first articulated by Stalnaker (1978, 1999), which has been pursued and implemented in many influential theories of dynamic semantics, such as File Change Semantics (Heim 1982) and Discourse Representation Theory. This type of approach assumes that sentences have semantic values which are functions from information states into information states; the utterance of a sentence conveying an assertion, for instance, modifies the common ground of a conversational exchange by updating the information state shared by the exchange.

44 Stalnaker has developed a theory of assertions and presuppositions that incorporates a dynamic view of conversational semantics, an approach which is still widely assumed today. On this view, utterances are interpreted against the background of specific contexts. At the point where an assertion is uttered, certain information is shared by the illocutionary agents which constitutes the common ground. The common ground is understood as the set of propositions corresponding to the background assumptions assumed to be true by the participants at a specific point in the context. The common ground then determines the context set. The context set is the set of worlds compatible with what is believed to be true by the interlocutors previously to each assertion. In this type of dynamic approach to conversation semantics, the illocutionary force of a sentence is determined on the basis of the effect that it has on a given body of information, what has been called an information state. Its truth-conditional content can then be determined on the basis of its informational updating function. Thus, meaning is an operation on information states; it can be construed as a function from information states to information states. If we take information states to be sets of possible worlds, then the meaning of a sentence will be specified in terms of update conditions on information states, determining a way for eliminating worlds from a given set of possible worlds. Giorgi and Pianesi (1997) define the context set as the following: Let P be the common ground (the set of propositions that the speaker takes for granted) of a conversation at a certain point C. Then the context set determined by P is as follows: (56)

C(P) = {w w â&#x2C6;&#x2C6; p, for every proposition p in P} In a conversation, utterances take propositions from one information state and map them

into information states. An assertion, for example, takes a proposition that does not yet form part

45 of the common ground, and assigns it a semantico-pragmatic function which maps it into the common ground. An assertion is a proposition p which does not yet belong to the common ground P, but whose positive truth value is compatible with the context set, defined in (56). Following Stalnaker’s notion of assertion as an update function, I assume that assertive illocutionary force is a function from the propositional content of p into the common ground P. Thus, I assume that assertions encode the function in (57): (57)

λp[P]

The entry for an assertion, then, entails a semantico-pragmatic function which introduces the proposition for entry into the common ground. Because modal expressions are interpreted within a set of worlds, on the other hand, modal expressions cannot belong to the common ground world P, which is only compatible with what is believed true by the discourse participants. The illocutionary function of modal propositions will be defined and illustrated in the schema as the analysis unfolds. For the moment, example (57) illustrates some preliminary assumptions regarding the information states to which a proposition may belong, illustrating also that the function of an assertion takes a proposition and maps it into the common ground information state:11

In Discourse Representation Theory, it is standardly assumed that propositions interpreted with epistemic modality belong to a separate model (layer of representation) within the common ground, but crucially anchored to an individual anchor’s epistemic state (Farkas 1992, 2003). Thus, the term ‘intensionally anchored’ in the sense of (58) makes reference to only strongly intensional (volitional) predicates, which are represented within a set of desire worlds which do not include the real world. In this sense, strongly intensional propositions belong to an information state outside the set of common ground propositions.

46 (58) Assertions λp[P]

Strongly Intensional (modal) propositions

Common Ground P Context Set: C(P) = {w w ∈ p, for every proposition p in P}

Example (58) illustrates that a major contribution of this type of approach to illocutionary force is the implementation of an update effect on context, which is standardly assumed to be a central aspect of meaning. A number of highly formalized theories were inspired by Stalnaker’s proposal for a dynamic view of context. Model theory, for instance, takes this basic idea one step further by connecting truth-conditions to a domain that was once thought to be purely pragmatic in nature (Quer 1998). Model theory is based on the idea that truth is relativized to individuals within a (set of) world(s) determined by the modal base. Thus, the meanings of propositions are determined by the possible ways in which interpretive functions map an individual anchor to a modal value, and a mapping from propositions to the truth values “true” and “false”. Thus, the truth-conditional semantics of the proposition are tied to its pragmatic update function, and not viewed as a separate function at logical form. That is, model theory revises the Stalnakerian notion of context by relativizing truth-conditions to a particular model of evaluation, which is determined by the context. Consequently, the semantic notion of truth-conditions is intrinsically connected to the pragmatic view of context. Reference to models in this dissertation follows Quer’s (1998, 2001) analysis. Models are based on the idea that propositional attitudes, or modal functions, introduce sets of worlds, or

47 models, resulting in a change in the context of evaluation (i.e. ‘model shift’). Furthermore, models of evaluation crucially require an individual anchor from whose perspective the truthvalue determination is relevant from within the (set of) world(s). Within the context set of a given context c within the world W, where the utterance takes place (that is, W(c)), Quer (1998), following Giannakidou (1997), defines a model of the form M(x) (constructed as a collection of worlds) in the following way: (59)

A model M(x) in a context c is a set of worlds W’ ⊆ W(c) associated with an individual x. x is said to be the individual anchor.

In the default case of a belief-report, embedded under an epistemic predicate, MR(x) stands for the (real) world view of x, and represents his or her epistemic state R. In the case of an unembedded assertion, the individual anchor is the speaker, whose worldview is represented as MR(speaker). Quer (1998) defines MR(x) in (60): (60)

A model MR(x) in a context c is a set of worlds W’ ⊆ W(c) associated with an individual x, representing worlds compatible with what x knows. The type of model varies according to the kind of worlds introduced by the matrix

predicate. For instance, the propositional complement of a fiction predicate like ‘dream’ will be evaluated against a model of the type MD(x), representing a set of worlds compatible with what the individual anchor x dreams. According to Quer (1998), strongly intensional predicates such as volitionals or directives (e.g. querer ‘to want’ and pedir ‘to request’) introduce a set of worlds that model alternative realizations of the actual world according to the preferences of the matrix anchor, and in this sense they contribute a model of buletic alternatives (based on wishes). A verb like querer ‘to want’, then, induces a model shift from the epistemic model of the speaker M E(speaker) to what Quer (1998) calls the buletic model of the subject MBUL(subject).

48 To define a buletic model of evaluation, I follow Villalta (2008), who proposes that this type of a model involves a scalar assignment by the matrix verb, establishing an ordered set between the embedded proposition p and an alternative proposition q, ranked on a scale of desirability (à la Villalta 2008). Her analysis crucially entails a ranking of propositions on a scale of desirability, and these propositions are determined by the modal base BUL(ETIC) (as defined in (61)). On this type of analysis, the context C represents a variable which is anaphoric to a contextually determined set of propositions (i.e. those propositions which form the common ground and the context set). The assignment g establishes the ordering source between the embedded proposition p, the subject’s buletic alternatives α (i.e. a set of desirable propositions) generated by the modal base BUL(ETIC), and the real world w. The formal definition is as follows: (61)

Semantics based on comparison of alternatives for MBUL MBUL Cg(p)(α)(w) = 1 iff q: q p & q g(C): p > DESα,w q The entry indicates that, in order for a matrix predicate like querer ‘to want’ to receive a

truth-value of 1, the propositions p & q cannot be equal in the rank established by the assignment g. Furthermore, the rank assigned by the ordering source g to the contextually relevant alternatives must favor p over the desirability (DES) of q, where DESα,w represents a relation between the subject’s desires α and the world w. The definition of >DESα,w thus determines how the relationship between two propositions p and q are ranked with respect to the various desirable propositions (buletic worlds) α of the subject.12

The proposal that Villalta develops can capture the truth conditions of a predicate such as want because it may express that p is not necessarily the best alternative, but, crucially, the highest ranked with respect to its contextually relevant alternatives. Thus, context is an important aspect of her definition, which is therefore nicely captured within a model theory of conversation semantics.

49 For Quer (1998) and Villalta (2008), strongly intensional predicates (volitionals and directives) encode a buletic model of evaluation, meaning that the complement to these predicates is ranked on a scale of desirability with respect to other (contextually relevant) alternative worlds. For other types of propositional attitude verbs, the ordering source g simply ranks the propositions on a scale of necessity or possibility (rather than desirability). So, expressions introduced by a verb like necesitar ‘to need’ will encode an ordering source g which ranks the propositions in C on a scale of necessity, rather than desirability. Therefore, the definition in (20) applies for all types of propositional attitudes (i.e. predicates which encode strongly intensional semantics). To conclude this section, I have reviewed some key assumptions with respect to the semantico-pragmatic representation of utterances and propositions. Modality was framed in terms of Kratzer’s (1977, 1981, 1991) hypothesis that propositional attitudes represent quantification over worlds, which are determined by a modal base and ordered with respect to an ordering source which determines the modal force of the proposition. The semantico-pragmatic function of propositions in the discourse was framed in terms of Stalnaker’s (1978) dynamic approach to conversation semantics. This view of conversation semantics was applied to modality through the lens of model theory, which is conceptualized following Quer’s (1998) analysis of models and Villalta’s (2008) definition of a buletic model of evaluation. With these tools available, we will be able to disentangle some of the intricacies involved in mood distribution, and the ways in which mood choice contributes to the interpretation of a proposition, as well as the contribution of mood to a discourse context.

50 1.5.3. Basic Clausal Architecture In line with current generativist analyses of the sentence, I assume that sentential structure comprises lexical and functional categories. The specifications of the lexical/grammatical features that head them are assumed to be the key to understanding the processes that lead to the final form of sentences and to their correct interpretation. Following standard assumptions in syntactic theory, I assume that clauses are organized in roughly three layers. The lowest one is the lexical projection normally headed by v. Next, there is the inflectional layer headed by T. On top of this there is a layer headed by C, which links the clause either to the immediately dominating clause or to the discourse: V-Projection

Verb plus its arguments

T-Projection

Tense, number, person, structural case

“Inwards oriented”

C-Projection

Link to a matrix sentence or to discourse

“Outwards oriented”

Table 1-2. Basic Clausal Architecture Each field of this tripartite organization has been shown to be organized into sub-units. Pollock (1989), for instance, has initiated research on a more fine-grained architecture for TP, with arguments in favor of splitting up TP into separate projections. Larson (1988), on the other hand, has initiated research on a more fine-grained architecture of VP as VP-shells, leading to the introduction of lexico-functional elements such as v. Rizzi (1997) has argued extensively that the C-system needs to be decomposed as well. He proposes ForceP for the syntactic representation of illocutionary force, TopP for topical material, FocP for focused material, and FinP, which encodes finiteness. His analysis is largely motivated by the fact that complementizers are sensitive to the finiteness or non-finiteness of the complement clause TP, as well as verb movement and other inflectional morphemes which may be spelled out at C.

51 The focus of this dissertation is primarily the C-system, as I assume that clause-typing, point of view phenomena (speaker deixis) and, consequently, mood distribution, are largely represented in this domain (cf. Bianchi 2001, Kempchinsky 2009, Cinque 1999, among many others). As we will see, however, the modal properties of vP and the temporal/aspectual properties on TP also carry implications for the analysis. 1.6. Road Map of the Dissertation The goal of the remainder of this dissertation is to formulate a novel characterization for mood distribution in complement clauses in Spanish. The analysis is informed by, and has consequences for, theories involving the components of the grammar that interface with syntax, namely, pragmatics and semantics. Thus, the proposal carries implications for the interpretive component of the grammar at the C-I interface. With respect to mood distribution, there are two overarching and intertwined questions: (i) is there a â&#x20AC;&#x153;coreâ&#x20AC;? case of subjunctive complements (i.e. a class of predicates which lexically select the subjunctive mood) and (ii) does the indicative or subjunctive mood represent the default (i.e. uninformative/unmarked) mood? The goal of chapter 2 is to answer these questions. I claim that the subjunctive, rather than the indicative, is the default mood in Romance. To support this claim, I illustrate that the indicative mood does not exhibit a one to one correspondence with assertive force in languages like Greek and Bulgarian, but does correspond to assertive propositions in Romance. Because the indicative mood does not cross-linguistically correspond to assertive force, I argue that indicative clauses in Romance are syntactically specified with an assertion feature. The analysis implies that the subjunctive is the default mood in Romance, while the indicative is the default mood in Greek and Bulgarian.

52 I then propose a novel tripartite classification of subjunctive clauses. The first class is lexically-selected by volitional, directive and causative predicates. These subjunctive propositions encode strongly intensional, buletic semantics. The second class is licensed by a non-veridical operator (i.e. negation), and the subjunctive proposition carries anti-veridical semantics. The third class of subjunctive clauses results from the absence of illocutionary force, with the subjunctive mood surfacing as the default (uninformative) mood in complements to emotives and negated epistemics. I appeal to Speas and Tenny’s (2003) proposal for a syntactic representation of pragmatic arguments, whose analysis elegantly captures the fact that complement clauses are anchored to particular points of view. In chapter 3, I illustrate how the framework in chapter 2 can account for subject obviation in lexically-selected subjunctive contexts. Modality is particularly relevant in this chapter. I hypothesize that subject obviation results in those contexts in which matrix v encodes deontic or causative modality. Support for the analysis comes from the novel observation that the addition of an evaluative/epistemic component renders subject obviation more violable in these contexts. I argue that subject obviation ultimately results from a semantico-pragmatic parameter setting in Spanish which disallows a de se (self-ascribed) interpretation in finite contexts. In chapter 4, the focus shifts to subjunctive complements in emotive and negationtriggered contexts. This chapter focuses primarily on interpretive differences between negationtriggered subjunctive clauses, specifically with respect to the scope of negation. I provide evidence for three novel claims. First, I show that the semantico-pragmatic properties of subjunctive complements to negated epistemic predicates overlap with those to both emotive predicates, which are evaluative, and those to evidential predicates (i.e. verbs of reported speech, like decir ‘to say’, verbs of perception like ver ‘to see’ and cognitive-factives like saber ‘to

53 know’). Second, in true negation-triggered subjunctive contexts (i.e. evidential contexts), the complement clause event carries anti-veridical semantics with respect to the speaker. Third, the subjunctive clause event in negated evidential contexts is unbounded. The novel observations merit a more fine-grained characterization of negation-triggered subjunctive clauses. I argue that Partee’s (1991, 1995) tripartite structure of the scope configuration of negation elegantly captures the interpretive facts. I propose that subjunctive complements to negated evidential predicates are interpreted in the scope of the negation operator, while those to evaluative (emotive) predicates are interpreted in the restrictor. I claim that the overlapping status of epistemic predicates as either evidential or evaluative results in a compatibility with both scope configurations, accounting for their overlapping syntactic and semantic properties. Chapter 5 is a continuation of chapter 4. First, I identify two different types of negation, following Horn’s (1989), Potts’ (2005, 2007) and Yoon’s (2011) analyses. I argue that the pragmatic classification of the predicate as either evidential or evaluative determines the type of negation with which it may surface. I claim that, because evauative predicates are gradable, they are compatible with metalinguistic negation. Metalinguistic negation behaves like a negative quantifier, rather than a sentential operator. This type of negation does not scope into the complement clause, resulting in the subjunctive mood as the default mood. I argue that subjunctive complements in negated evidential contexts carry anti-veridical semantics (following Giannakidou 1997), the interpretation of which results from the scope of (descriptive) negation into the complement clause. Following Klooster (2003) and Laka (1990), I assume that these clauses are syntactically specified with a negative clause-type feature. Furthermore, I show that these clauses constitute unbounded (topologically unclosed) events (following Giorgi and Pianesi’s (1997)), a novel observation. I propose that the anti-veridical

54 semantics of the clause result in an incompatibility with a bounded (change of state) interpretation. With respect to the syntax of tense and aspect, I assume with Bianchi (2001) and Demirdache & Uribe-Etxebarria (1997, 2000, 2003, 2005) that time spans are referential arguments projected in the syntax. I claim that the negative clause-type feature is responsible for re-ordering the matrix clause event time to WITHIN the complement clause reference time, resulting in an unbounded subjunctive clause event. The dissertation closes with some concluding remarks and directions for future research.

55 CHAPTER 2 ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE AND A SYNTAX FOR SENTIENCE IN COMPLEMENT CLAUSES 2.1. Introduction The primary goal of this chapter is to develop an analysis which more adequately characterizes mood distribution in Spanish from both a semantico-pragmatic and a syntactic standpoint. The analysis also carries implications regarding the extent to which semantico-pragmatic features are represented in the syntax, focusing on such domains as illocutionary force and (syntactically represented) pragmatic ‘point of view’ arguments. The starting point of the analysis hinges upon evidence that the indicative mood corresponds to assertive force in Romance, but does not exhibit this correspondence crosslinguistically (i.e. in Greek and Bulgarian). For this reason, I hypothesize that assertive illocutionary force and, consequently, the indicative mood, is syntactically represented in Romance. In Romance, then, the indicative is not the default mood; the subjunctive mood is the default mood, as it is exhibited in all non-assertive contexts. Clearly, however, this singular classification is not adequate in characterizing all subjunctive clauses, which display varying semantic and syntactic properties. To account for the various properties exhibited in subjunctive complements, I propose a novel tripartite characterization of subjunctive clauses: (i) those that are lexically-selected by volitional, directive and causative predicates, (ii) those that are triggered by negation (or some non-veridical operator) and (iii) those which surface as the default mood due to the absence of (intensional or assertive) illocutionary force. I provide evidence that the subjunctive mood in complements to emotive (e.g. lamentar ‘to regret’, gustar ‘to like’) and negated epistemic predicates (e.g. creer ‘to believe’, pensar ‘to think’) surfaces as the default mood, due to the absence of illocutionary force specification. I do

56 so by first presenting the novel observation that only subjunctive complements to negated epistemics and emotives allow a de dicto interpretation, which forces the presupposition of event realization. I take this as evidence that only these subjunctive propositions may be extensionally anchored (i.e. encode a real world modal base). However, they do not allow ‘point of view’ related phenomena, such as speech act and evaluative adverbs. Thus, it appears that subjunctive complements to emotives and negated epistemics are neither assertive nor intensional; based on this evidence, I suggest that the subjunctive mood surfaces as the default mood, due to the absence of illocutionary force, in these contexts. I propose that volitional (e.g. querer ‘to want’) directive (e.g. pedir ‘to request’) and causative (e.g. forzar ‘to force’) predicates lexically select subjunctive complements. Crosslinguistic licensing of the subjunctive mood in these contexts and studies on attrition support the hypothesis. I follow Kempchinsky (2009), who proposes that the subjunctive mood in these contexts results from feature assignment by the matrix predicate, which results in a shift from a real world model to a buletic model of evaluation (based on wishes). The chapter is organized as follows: in section 2, I review assumptions regarding the semantico-pragmatic contribution of utterances, following the Stalnakerian approach to conversation semantics. I then present data from Greek and Bulgarian which, I argue, indicate that the indicative mood is not correlated with assertive force in these languages. Based on this data, I claim that indicative clauses carry illocutionary specification in Romance. The goal of section 3 is to provide evidence that the subjunctive mood surfaces as the default mood in complements to emotives and negated epistemics, due to the absence of (intensional or assertive) illocutionary force. To analyze the syntax of complement clauses, I review Bianchi’s (2001), Kempchinsky’s (2009) and Speas and Tenny’s (2003) analyses in section 4. I eventually adopt

57 Speas and Tenny’s proposal, whose analysis is more articulated in structure and includes the syntactic representation of pragmatic arguments. In section 5, I argue that the subjunctive mood in complements to volitional, directive and causative predicates stems from lexical selection, following Kempchinsky (2009). I also propose a novel distribution for Speech Act Phrase (the locus of illocutionary force) in complement clauses, and discuss the implications of the proposal for cartographic approaches to the left periphery. Section 6 wraps up a few loose ends, such as the well-attested *PRESENT[PAST] sequence of tense restriction in lexically-selected subjunctive clauses, as well as the so-called “double-mood” selection in complements to verbs of reported speech. Section 7 synthesizes the findings and conclusions of the chapter. 2.2. The Indicative Mood as Denoting Assertive Propositions in Romance 2.2.1. Characterizing the Notion of “Assertion” Before distinguishing subjunctive complements, I will provide some background assumptions regarding the semantico-pragmatic status of utterances and illocutionary force, adopting the Stalnakerian approach to conversation semantics that was outlined in chapter 1, section 5. With this framework in mind, I will then argue that the indicative mood in Romance is syntactically specified and corresponds to the notion of assertion, an idea which goes back to Hooper and Terrell (1974), and provide evidence from Greek and Bulgarian that support the claim. The analysis implies that assertive force it is not the default interpretation of indicative verbal morphology and, therefore, the subjunctive is the default (uninformative) mood in Romance. The Stalnakerian approach to conversation semantics assumes that the interpretation of utterances involves an active conversational background. This conversational background, as first introduced by Stalnaker (1978), signifies the relevant notion of context, which refers to what

58 is common to all the participants in the communicative exchange (i.e. the common ground and the context set). When a speaker utters a sentence, s/he presupposes (takes for granted) various concepts about the conversation world, and his/her assertion is evaluated with respect to that set of presuppositions, or conversational background. The conversational background is also commonly referred to as the common ground, and all of the presupposed concepts together form the context set of the conversation; in other words, the context set is the intersection of all the propositions in the common ground. Under this type of dynamic approach, the illocutionary force of a sentence is determined on the basis of the effect that it has on a given body of information, what has been called an information state. Its truth-conditional content can then be determined on the basis of its informational updating function, meaning that utterances are operations on information states; utterances can be construed as functions from information states to information states. Illocutionary force encodes a pragmatic function which maps propositions from one information state to another (illustrated by the arrow). When an assertion is introduced, a proposition is mapped into the common ground. Strongly intensional predicates (i.e. volitional and directive predicates), on the other hand, map their complement propositions into information states which consist of (a set of) other possible worlds, which are then ranked on a scale of desire, necessity or possibility (as discussed in chapter 5, section 2). This is illustrated in (1):

59 (1) Other possible worlds

Assertions Common Ground

Context Set

Strongly Intensional (modal) propositions

Under this type of dynamic approach, illocutionary force encodes both a pragmatic and a semantic (a semantico-pragmatic) function, which determine the new information state of a proposition and, consequently, its meaning in the context. With these background assumptions in mind, we may now analyze illocutionary force, with respect to how it is interpreted and represented. In this section, I characterize indicative clauses, which a crucial first step in understanding subjunctive clauses. Recall that indicative complement clauses are selected by epistemic verbs (e.g. creer ‘to believe’, pensar ‘to think’) (2a), verbs of perception (e.g. ver ‘to see’, oír ‘to hear’) (2b), cognitive-factive verbs (e.g. saber ‘to know’, darse cuenta ‘to realize’) (2c), verbs of reported speech (e.g. decir ‘to say’, reportar ‘to report’) (2d), verbs of mental judgment (e.g. entender ‘to understand’, comprender ‘to understand’) (2e), comissive verbs (e.g. prometer ‘to promise’) (2f), and fiction verbs (e.g. soñar ‘to dream’, imaginar ‘to imagine’) (2g): (2)

60 c. Cognitive-factive Verb María sabe que su profesor está enfermo. ‘Mary knows that her professor is (IND) sick.’ d. Verb of Reported Speech María dice que su profesor está enfermo. ‘Mary says that her professor is (IND) sick.’ e. Verb of Mental Judgment María entiende que su profesor está enfermo. ‘Mary understands that her professor is (IND) sick.’ f. Comissive Verb María promote que viene a la reunión. ‘Mary promises that (she) is coming (IND) to the meeting.’ g. Fiction Verb María soñó con que su profesor estuvo enfermo. ‘Mary dreamt that her professor was (IND) sick.’ The indicative mood is also found in unembedded contexts (3a) and matrix clauses in clauseselecting environments (3b): (3)

a. María nadó por dos horas. ‘Mary swam (IND) for two hours.’ b. María supo que Fernando se casó. ‘Mary found out (IND) that Fernando got married.’

The fact that the indicative mood is exhibited in unembedded and matrix contexts has led many to hypothesize that the indicative represents the ‘default’ or ‘unmarked’ mood, and that assertive force is the default interpretation of the indicative mood. I hypothesize that, while the indicative mood corresponds to assertive force in Romance, the indicative mood does not cross-linguistically correspond to the notion of assertion and, therefore, is syntactically specified in Romance. In this way, I follow Bolinger (1968), Terrell and Hooper (1974), Hooper (1975), and Palmer (2001), who posit that the indicative mood requires additional assertive specification. We must first, however, define the term “assertion”. There are various conceptualizations of the term “assertion”. Lunn (1995), for instance, suggests that all clauses represent assertions, except those in which (i) the speaker has doubts about its veracity, (ii) the proposition is unrealized or (iii) the proposition is presupposed. I

61 follow Giorgi and Pianesi (1997a) and Mejías-Bikandi (1994) who, following the Stalnakerian view of conversation semantics (Stalnaker 1970, 1978, 1999), define the notion of assertion as a proposition which intends to express information regarding some individual’s view of reality, and does so by introducing the proposition into the common ground. 13 An assertion, then, is a proposition p which does not yet belong to the common ground P, and has a positive truth value as anchored to some discursively relevant being. We can thus formulate a preliminary definition of an assertion as (4): (4)

Definition 1: Assertive Force A proposition p encodes assertive force iff p updates the common ground.

The definition of a common ground update, then, is given in (5): (5)

Working Definition: Common Ground Update A proposition p carries a common ground update function iff the proposition (i) carries a positive truth value, anchored to some individual x (ii) in the real world WR and (iii) does not form part of the common ground information state at the moment of utterance.

Following the Stalnakerian notion of assertion as an update function, in the last chapter, I proposed that the (simplified) semantic entry of an assertion is a function from the propositional content of p into the common ground P, as in (6): (6)

λp[P]

The formula in (6) shows that assertive force has the effect of mapping a proposition p into the common ground P which, I propose, is the function of illocutionary force specification of all indicative clauses in Romance.

As Palmer (2001) notes, the notion of truth-value is very problematic when defining assertiveness. For instance, epistemic and evidential modality illustrate the speaker’s attitude toward the truth-value or factual status of a proposition, which often entails doubt and uncertainty. Clauses which encode such modality, however, may display the indicative mood. I follow Stalnaker (1970, 1978, 1999), Giorgi and Pianesi (1997), Palmer (2001) and Lunn (1995), who do not relate the notion of assertion to a positive truth-value judgment but, rather, are proponents of the view that assertions are propositions introduced into the context with the intention to be added to the common ground.

62 2.2.2. Potential Problems for “Assertion” as Corresponding to the Indicative Mood The first potential challenge for the notion that the indicative mood in Spanish corresponds to assertion as defined in (4) and (5) is the fact that fiction verbs like soñar ‘to dream’ (7a) and comissive verbs like prometer ‘to promise’ (7b) select indicative complement clauses in the Romance languages: (7)

a. Comissive Verb María promete que viene/*venga a la reunión. ‘Mary promises that (she) is coming (IND/SUB) to the meeting.’ b. Fiction Verb María soñó con que su profesor estuvo/*estuviera enfermo. ‘Mary dreamt that her professor was (IND/SUB) sick.’

These verbs clearly do not introduce propositions which correspond to a real world model WR which, according to our current definition of assertion, should not be compatible with the indicative mood in the complement clause. I appeal to Farkas’s (1992) distinction between intensional vs. extensional semantics to account for the assertive status of complements to fiction and comissive verbs.14 She hypothesizes that the notion of assertion is not restricted to those propositions which carry a veridical interpretation in the actual world WR but, rather, that they constitute veridical propositions within some extensionally anchored world (i.e. a modal base which constitutes only one world). So, complement clauses to fiction verbs like soñar ‘to dream’ select indicative complements because the propositional content represents an information update (assertion), evaluated against an (extensional) dream world WD. Furthermore, because the truth value of the proposition within the dream world is anchored to the matrix subject, it is evaluated against a model of the type MD(Subject), representing the dream world of the matrix subject (Quer 1998). Similarly, comissives like prometer ‘to promise’ are evaluated with respect

See chapter 1, section 2, for formal definitions of intensional and extensional modal bases, following Farkas (1992).

63 to an extensional modal base consisting of an (extensional) promise world WP, representing the world consisting of the matrix subject’ promises. Because the truth value of the proposition is anchored to the matrix subject, it is evaluated against a model of the type M P(Subject). The key to the notion of common ground, then, is that the propositions which belong within this information state crucially encode two semantic ingredients: (i) a veridical interpretation on the part of some sentient being and (ii) an extensional modal base (a modal base which consists of only one world). The analysis straightforwardly accounts for selection of the indicative mood by comissive and fiction verbs. The second challenge for this view of assertion comes from certain verbs like acordarse ‘to remember’, saber ‘to know’ and darse cuenta ‘to realize’. These are considered semi-factive verbs, in the sense that they often re-introduce propositions which may already form part of the common ground. According to our current definition of assertive propositions, these predicate types should be incompatible with assertive force and, therefore, incompatible with the indicative mood, as they do not introduce common ground updates. Yet, these predicates invariably select indicative complement clauses. The following grammatical discourse shows that the discursively presupposed proposition that ‘Sarah is visiting us next week’ can be re-introduced under the cognitive-factive predicate saber ‘to know’. The re-introduced embedded clause may only appear in the indicative mood, contrary to the predictions of our current hypothesis: (8)

Common Ground Information: Sarah is visiting Pedro and Ana next week. Ana: No sé si alguien más sabe que Sarah nos visita la semana que viene. ‘I don’t know if anyone else knows that Sarah is visiting (IND) us next week.’ Pedro: Pues, Laura sabe que Sarah nos visita/*visite la semana que viene. ‘Well, Laura knows that Sarah is visiting (IND/SUB) us next week.’

64 By appealing to a model theory of semantics (following Quer (1998) and Giannakidou (1998)), which relies on the notion that information is relativized to individuals, this discrepancy is explained. The complement clause proposition in semi-factive contexts receives an assertive interpretation because, crucially, the individual anchor responsible for the truth evaluation of the proposition has been altered from the speaker to the matrix subject, resulting in the re-assertive status of the proposition. Put differently, while root clauses represent assertions with respect to the real world model of the speaker MR(speaker), semi-factives, though re-introducing common ground information, encode an assertive (update) function because the proposition is newly anchored (asserted from) a different model of evaluation, that of the matrix subject MR(subject). Consequently, although indicative complements to semi-factive verbs can re-introduce propositions which already form part of the common ground information state, this incongruity is explained by appealing to the crucial tenet of model theory that information is relativized to individuals. In sum, I have attributed the indicative mood in complements to fiction/comissive verbs to the fact that assertions need only be anchored to an extensional world, rather than only the real world WR. Furthermore, accounting for the indicative mood in complements to semi-factives like saber â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;to knowâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; relies on the notion that assertions are relativized to individuals. Thus, these complements are assertive because they are re-introduced into the common ground from a point of view which crucially differs from the point of view of the original assertion. We may now update our definition of assertion to include these generalizations: (9)

Definition 1: Assertive Force A proposition p encodes assertive force iff p updates the common ground.

The revised definition of a common ground update, then, is given in (10):

65 (10)

Definition 2: Common Ground Update A proposition p updates the common ground if (i) the proposition is extensionally anchored, (ii) carries a positive truth value, anchored to some individual x, and (iii) does not form part of the common ground information state at the moment of utterance. Stipulation (iii) may be violated iff the individual anchor was different from x in prior mappings of p into the common ground.

This dynamic approach to illocutionary force accounts for the ways in which the indicative mood corresponds to assertive force in Spanish. Next, I present some cross-linguistic data which constitute evidence for an independently specified, syntactically represented [assertion] feature in assertive contexts. 2.2.3. The Indicative Mood in Cross-linguistic Contexts In this section, I present some data from Italian, Greek and Bulgarian which indicate that our current conception of assertive force does not capture the cross-linguistic distribution of indicative clauses. First, I hypothesize that assertions are crucially anchored to the speaker in Italian, differing in this way from other Romance languages. Then I provide data which illustrate that the indicative mood does not consistently mark assertive force in Greek and Bulgarian. The data provide evidence for my hypothesis that assertive force is specified independently of indicative verbal morphology, as well as evidence for a key component of my proposal that langauges contain clauses which are not informative (i.e. lack illocutionary force). While our current definition of assertion accounts for the indicative mood in Spanish and most other Romance languages (e.g. French, Catalan and Portuguese), Italian poses a challenge. In Italian, non-negated epistemic predicates can select subjunctive complement clauses (11a). The indicative mood in these contexts is unexpected, as non-negated epistemics introduce true propositions in the real world model of the matrix subject, and should therefore be assertive. Furthermore, other Romance languages, such as Spanish (11b), allow only the indicative mood in non-negated epistemic contexts:

66 (11)

a. Italian Credono che Gianni é/sia molto stanco. ‘They believe that John is (IND/SUB) very tired.’ (Quer 2001: 92) b. Spanish Creen que Juan está/*esté muy cansado. ‘They believe that John is (IND/SUB) very tird.

According to Quer (1998) and Kempchinsky (2009), the difference between Italian and the other Romance languages is that, in Italian, the relevant model of evaluation in assertive contexts is the speaker. The indicative mood surfaces only when the speaker is the individual anchor from whom truth evaluation of the proposition is judged; truth evaluation from any other individual anchor is irrelevant with respect to the assertive status of a clause. The fact that the speaker is the relevant individual anchor in Italian is indicated in (12), in which a first person subject with a non-negated epistemic requires the indicative mood, as a first person subject entails that the speaker believes the complement clause proposition to be true. The fact that only the indicative mood is grammatical constitutes evidence that only the speaker’s model of evaluation is the relevant anchor for an assertive interpretation in Italian: (12)

Italian Credo che io sono/*sia stanco. ‘I believe that I am (IND/SUB) tired.’

An assertive status in Italian, then, requires that the individual anchor be the speaker, as only the speaker must be committed to the truth of the proposition. We may thus refine our definition of a common ground update in Italian in the following way: (13)

Definition 3: Common Ground Update in Italian A proposition p updates the common ground if (i) p is extensionally anchored, (ii) p carries a positive truth value anchored to the speaker x, and (iii) has not been asserted previously by the speaker x. A proposition whose propositional content already forms part of the common ground can be assertive iff the speaker was not x in the prior mapping of p into the common ground.

67 The revised definition of assertion in Italian accounts for the fact that non-negated epistemics can select the subjunctive mood, while the indicative (assertive) mood is required in the presence of a first person subject. Cross-linguistic variation in mood selection is also attested in another well-known domain: emotive predicates (e.g. lamentar ‘to regret’, gustar ‘to like’). The rough generalization states that in languages like French, Portuguese, Catalan, Italian and Spanish, emotive predicates select subjunctive complements: (14)

Spanish María lamenta que su hijo robara/*robó el dinero. Mary regret.3SG that her son steal.PAST.SUB/IND the money ‘Mary regrets that her son stole (SUB/IND) the money.’

Our definition of assertion captures the fact that the subjunctive mood surfaces in these contexts. Assertions map propositions into the common ground, and complements to emotives are typically discursively presupposed; their propositional content already forms part of the common ground (cf. Quer 1998, Kempchinsky 2009, among many others).15 Therefore, complements to emotives are not assertive, and should not exhibit the indicative mood, which is exactly what we see in Romance. In Greek (15) and Bulgarian (16), on the other hand, the indicative mood does surface in complements to emotives (Quer 1998) (note that the mood of the complement clause in these languages is indicated by morphology on the complementizer): (15)

Modern Greek O Pavlos lipate pu efije i Roxani. the Paul is-sad.3SG that.IND left.PAST the Roxanne ‘Paul regrets that Roxanne left (IND).’ (Giannakidou 1998)

This is a simplification. I discuss the pragmatic status of matrix predicates at length in chapter 4, in which I argue that the evaluative, rather than evidential, status of emotive predicates is responsible for the unassertive (uninformative) status of the complement clause. This simplified explanation for the incompatibility of the indicative mood in complements to emotives will serve for our current purposes, however.

(16)

Bulgarian Ivan suzhaljava che otkradna parite. Ivan regret.3SG that.IND steal.PAST money ‘Ivan regrets that he stole (IND) the money.’ Siegel (2009: 1872)

According to our definition of assertive force, the indicative mood should not be possible in these complement clauses, which are typically presupposed in the conversation context and, therefore, already form part of the common ground information state.16 The data indicate that the indicative mood does not correspond to assertive force in Greek and Bulgarian. Following Giannakidou (1994, 1997, 1998, 1999), I assume that the subjunctive mood is triggered in non-veridical contexts in Greek and Bulgarian, with the indicative mood surfacing in all contexts which are not non-veridical; in other words, the indicative surfaces in contexts which are veridical, rather than assertive, differing from Romance in this way. I follow Giannakidou’s (2006) definition of (non-)veridicality, which is as follows: (17)

Definition 4: (Non-)Veridicality A propositional operator is veridical if Fp entails or presupposes that p is true in some individual’s model M(i). p is true in M(i) iff M(i) ⊆ p, i.e. if all worlds in M(i) are pworlds. Otherwise p is non-veridical. In addition to the mood distribution divide in emotive contexts, compelling evidence for

the hypothesis also comes from epistemic contexts. Now, because the subjunctive mood signals doubt (non-veridicality) in Greek and Bulgarian, it is ungrammatical in complement clauses to non-negated epistemic predicates, which is a predicate type that encodes some degree of certainty. Like Romance, examples (18) and (19) illustrate a non-negated epistemic predicate 16

According to Siegel (2009), emotives select subjunctive complements in Romance because of the semanticopragmatic requirement that discursively presupposed propositions not receive assertive status, in keeping with the current hypothesis. This observation immediately accounts for the fact that emotive predicates in Spanish (and other Romance languages) do not select indicative complements: their propositional content already forms part of the common ground. There is no such restriction in Greek and Bulgarian, resulting in the grammatical manifestation of the indicative mood in these contexts.

69 with a first person subject, which can embed only an indicative complement in Modern Greek and Bulgarian: (18)

a. Modern Greek Nomizo (oti/*na) efige. Think.1SG (that.IND/*SUB) left ‘I think that he left.’ (Philippaki-Warburton, 1993) b. Bulgarian Mislja (če /*da) Paulina e izjala tortata. think.1SG {that.IND/ *SUB} Paulina be.3SG eaten cake.DEF ‘I think that Paulina ate (IND/SUB) the cake.’ (Siegel 2009: 1871) c. Spanish Pienso que llovió/*lloviera. think.1SG that rain.IND/SUB ‘I think that it rained (IND/SUB).’ Interestingly, however, with the addition of negation, both the indicative and subjunctive

moods are allowed in Greek (19) and Bulgarian (20), even with a first person matrix subject. This situation is different from Romance languages, in which the subjunctive mood is required with a first person subject (21): (19)

Modern Greek Dhen nomizo (oti/na) efige. Not think.1SG (that.IND/SUB) left ‘I don’t think that he left (IND/SUB).’ (Philippaki-Warburton, 1993)

(20)

Bulgarian Ne mislja (če Paulina/Paulina da) e izjala tortata. not think.1SG (that.IND Paulina/Paulina SUB) be.3SG eaten cake.DEF ‘I don’t think that Paulina ate (IND/SUB) the cake.’ (Siegel 2009: 1871)

(21)

Spanish No creo que llueva/*llueve. neg believe.1SG that rain.SUB ‘I don’t believe it is raining (SUB/IND).’

70 According to our definition of assertion in (10), the complement clauses in examples (19) – (21) express non-assertive propositions. This is because the speaker and matrix subject represent the same individual anchor and, with respect to this individual anchor, the complement clause is not believed true and, therefore, is non-assertive. For this reason, we expect the subjunctive mood to be required in this context; this is what we see in Romance (21), but not in Modern Greek (19) or Bulgarian (20). I propose that the grammaticality of the indicative mood in (19) and (20) can, in fact, be attributed the fact that the subjunctive mood surfaces only in non-veridical contexts in Greek and Bulgarian, even though this may seem difficult to argue at first glance. I hypothesize that the indicative mood in examples (19) – (21) is grammatical because negation in epistemic contexts does not always result in a non-veridical interpretation of the complement clause. To illustrate this proposal, I follow Klooster’s (1994, 2003) observation that negation of matrix epistemic predicates (e.g. creer ‘to believe’) does not necessarily result in a “negation lowering” (i.e. nonveridical) interpretation of the complement clause, and it is the absence of this interpretation which results in an indicative complement in the Greek and Bulgarian examples. “Negation-lowering” refers to the fact that some clause-selecting predicates, such as epistemics, allow an interpretation in which matrix negation may be interpreted as if it were in the lower clause: (22)

Sarah doesn’t think that her students are lazy. = Sarah thinks that her students aren’t lazy.

The “negation-lowering” interpretation yields the interpretation: (23)

x ⌐ believes that p

→

x believes that ⌐ p

Klooster notes, however, that the “negation-lowering” interpretation is not required in negated epistemic contexts. The denotation x ⌐ believes that p may simply refer to the fact that x wishes

71 to reserve judgment on p. In these instances, the non-veridical interpretation of the complement clause p is not entailed: (24)

x â&#x152;? believe that p

â&#x2020;&#x2019;

x believes that â&#x152;? p

This interpretive difference between (23) and (24) in negated epistemic contexts has so far gone unexamined in relation to mood choice, which is a key component of the novel analysis put forth in this dissertation. Based on this interpretive difference, I attribute the indicative mood in Greek (19) and Bulgarian (20) to the interpretation in (24); the speaker is simply reserving judgment on p, without implying the non-veridical, negation lowering (doubtful) interpretation of (23). In the indicative contexts in (19) and (20), then, the speaker is simply reserving judgment with respect to the truth of the embedded proposition, rather than expressing doubt; thus, the proposition is neither assertive, nor non-veridical, but simply uninformative. In Greek and Bulgarian, then, the indicative mood surfaces in both assertive and uninformative contexts. In Romance, on the other hand, the indicative mood corresponds only to assertive force, with the subjunctive mood surfacing as the default (uninformative) mood in contexts corresponding to the interpretation of (24). In terms of conversation semantics, propositions corresponding to the interpretation denoted in (24) are not mapped into an information state, as they are uninformative. This is indicated by the absence of an arrow in (25) in this context, representing the absence of an information mapping function. I propose that it is this context in which we see a cross-linguistic divide with respect to mood distribution in Greek/Bulgarian and Romance. Schematically, this is represented below:

72 (25)

Assertions Greek/Bulgarian = Indicative Romance = Indicative

Common Ground

Other possible worlds

Context Set Uninformative propositions

Strongly Intensional Propositions

Greek/Bulgarian = Indicative Romance = Subjunctive

Greek/Bulgarian = Subjunctive Romance = Subjunctive

The schema above illustrates that uninformative contexts corresponding to the interpretation in (24) are not mapped into an information state (i.e. they lack illocutionary force). Furthermore, while Romance languages exhibit the subjunctive mood in these contexts, Greek and Bulgarian exhibit the indicative mood. In the next section, I provide more evidence that the clauses which belong to this uninformative information state are complements to emotives and negated epistemics which, not coincidentally, are the complement clauses which exhibit a mood choice division between Greek/Bulgarian and Romance. Because the indicative mood surfaces in both assertive and uninformative contexts in Bulgarian and Greek, with the subjunctive appearing in non-veridical contexts, I posit a different hypothesis for mood distribution in these languages: (26)

Hypothesis for the Subjunctive Mood in Bulgarian and Greek The subjunctive mood is triggered in a proposition p iff the propositional content of p is non-veridical. Otherwise, p exhibits indicative verbal morphology.

This hypothesis implies that, in Greek and Bulgarian, the indicative mood surfaces in the absence of a non-veridical trigger. In Romance, on the other hand, only an assertive semantico-pragmatic environment triggers the indicative mood, with the subjunctive mood surfacing in all other environments.

73 Importantly, the evidence from Greek and Bulgarian suggests that the indicative mood does not cross-linguistically entail an assertive interpretation, as the indicative mood also surfaces in uninformative contexts in these languages. Because assertive force is not the default interpretation of indicative verbal morphology cross-linguistically, I conclude that assertive force is independently specified. If assertive force were the default interpretation of indicative verbal morphology, we would expect a cross-linguistic one-to-one correspondence between the assertive status of a clause and indicative verbal morphology, contrary to fact. Thus, I conclude that an assertive interpretation must be independently specified, apart from indicative verbal morphology. To summarize, in this section I have formed some preliminary hypotheses for the distribution of mood in Romance, and cross-linguistically. The observations from Greek and Bulgarian support my hypothesis that, in Romance, some type of assertive specification is independently represented in clauses which exhibit the indicative mood, as indicative clauses are not interpreted as assertions cross-linguistically. This was evidenced by the fact that the indicative mood may surface in complement clauses to negated epistemics with first person subjects (i.e. unassertive/uninformative contexts) in Greek and Bulgarian, while the subjunctive is required in this context in Romance. The observations also support my hypothesis that the subjunctive mood surfaces as the uninformative mood in Romance, for which I provide more evidence in the next section. 2.3. Truth Conditions and Intensionality in Subjunctive Complements The remainder of the dissertation primarily focuses on the characterization of subjunctive clauses in Spanish. In this section, I first review the contexts in which we find subjunctive complement clauses. I then provide evidence that subjunctive complements to negated

74 epistemics and emotives differ from those to other predicates, in that only these subjunctive clause types can be anchored to an extensional (real world) modal base, yet do not allow ‘point of view’ phenomena. I argue that these two properties constitute evidence that these clauses are neither intensionally anchored, nor assertive, with the subjunctive mood surfacing as the default mood in these uninformative contexts. 2.3.1. Subjunctive-Selecting Predicate Types Recall from chapter 1 that, in Spanish, the subjunctive mood appears in complements to volitional verbs (e.g. querer ‘to want’, desear ‘to desire’) (27a), directive verbs (e.g. pedir ‘to request’, ordenar ‘to order’) (27b), causative verbs (e.g. forzar ‘to force’, hacer ‘to make’) (27c), and emotive verbs (e.g. lamentar ‘to regret’, gustar ‘to like’) (27d): (27)

Subjunctive Contexts a. Volitional verb María quiere que sus estudiantes lleguen temprano. ‘Mary wants that her students arrive (SUB) early.’ b. Directive verb María pide que sus estudiantes lleguen temprano. ‘Mary requests that her students arrive (SUB) early.’ c. Causative verb María hace que sus estudiantes lleguen temprano. ‘Mary makes that her students arrive (SUB) early.’ d. Emotive verb María lamenta que sus estudiantes siempre lleguen tarde. ‘Mary regrets that her students always arrive (SUB) late.’

Whether one or more of these predicate types forms the “core” class (i.e. lexically-selecting class) of subjunctive predicates continues to be a topic of debate. As discussed in chapter 1, subjunctive complement clauses have proven difficult to characterize due to their varying semantic, syntactic and pragmatic properties. All four predicate types share some overlapping properties, initially suggesting that all four constitute the “core” class. For instance, all of the constructions in (27) (i) exhibit subject obviation (disallowance of matrix and complement clause

75 subject co-reference), (ii) allow only local triggering of the subjunctive mood and (iii) do not require some other element to trigger the subjunctive mood (i.e. negation) (cf. Chapter 1, section 3). However, the potential veridical interpretation of complement clauses to emotives and the implicative nature of those to causatives (cf. chapter 1, examples (20) and (21)) have posed challenges in a uniform semantic characterization. Furthermore, while volitional, directive and causative predicates exhibit the sequence of tense *PRESENT[PAST] restriction, emotives do not, also posing a challenge for the characterization of these predicates. The other (standardly assumed) category of subjunctive clauses are those triggered by matrix negation. This type of subjunctive context is often referred to as ‘polarity’ or ‘operatortriggered’ subjunctive (Stowell 1993). Negation-triggered subjunctive contexts are illustrated below with a negated epistemic (28a), perception verb (28b), cognitive-factive (28c) and verb of reported speech (28d). (28)

Negation-triggered Subjunctive Contexts a. Negated Epistemic María no cree que su profesor esté enfermo. ‘Mary doesn’t believe that her professor is (SUB) sick.’ b. Negated Perception Verb María no ve que su profesor esté enfermo. ‘Mary doesn’t see that her professor is (SUB) sick. c. Negated Cognitive-factive María no supo que su profesor esté enfermo. ‘Mary didn’t know/find out that her professor is (SUB) sick.’ d. Negated Verb of Reported Speech María no dijo que su profesor esté enfermo. ‘Mary didn’t say that her professor is (SUB) sick.’ Unlike the four predicate types in example (27), the subjunctive mood is not required in

these contexts. Furthermore, these subjunctive complements do not exhibit subject obviation, sequence of tense restrictions, nor locality of triggering (cf. Chapter 1, section 3).

76 In this section, I provide evidence that even the uniform characterization of negationtriggered subjunctive clauses in (28) is not sufficient. I show that subjunctive complements to negated epistemics and emotives share many properties, a connection which has so far gone unnoticed. I argue that these predicate types form their own class, and select uninformative complement clauses which lack illocutionary force. 2.3.2. Negation-triggered Subjunctive does not form a uniform class Negated epistemic predicates, when selecting subjunctive complements, are generally thought to belong to the ‘polarity’ or ‘operator-triggered’ class of subjunctive-selecting predicates (Stowell 1993), due to the dependence between the appearance of the subjunctive mood and negation. In this section, I claim that a more fine-grained distinction is needed. Subjunctive complements to negated epistemic predicates do not pattern with other negationtriggered subjunctive clauses with respect to several syntactic and semantic properties, many of which are discussed at length in chapters 4. For our current purposes, I illustrate only two differences. First, subjunctive complements to negated epistemics allow a veridical interpretation on the part of the speaker in the real world WR, while those to other negated predicates do not. Negated epistemic contexts allow a follow-up statement implying that the speaker believes the subjunctive complement clause has been realized (29a). Other negation-triggered subjunctive clauses do not allow this type of follow-up (29b-d): (29)

Negation-triggered Subjunctive Contexts a. Negated Epistemic María no cree que su profesor esté enfermo. Pero yo, sí, lo creo. ‘Mary doesn’t believe that her professor is (SUB) sick. But I do believe it.’ b. Negated Perception Verb María no ve que su profesor esté enfermo. #Pero yo, si, lo veo. ‘Mary doesn’t see that her professor is (SUB) sick. But I see it.’ c. Negated Cognitive-factive María no supo que su profesor esté enfermo. #Pero yo, sí, lo supe. ‘Mary didn’t know/find out that her professor is (SUB) sick. But I did find it out.’

77 d. Negated Verb of Reported Speech María no dijo que su profesor esté enfermo. #Pero yo ya dije que está enfermo. ‘Mary didn’t say that her professor is (SUB) sick. But I already said that (he) is sick.’ Now, as (29) illustrates, while the propositional complement to a negated epistemic may be believed true by the speaker in WR, it need not be, as the follow-up in example (30) shows: (30)

Adan no piensa que vaya a llover… ‘Adam doesn’t think that it’s going (SUB) to rain...

y yo no lo pienso tampoco. and I don’t think so either.’

The felicity of both follow-up statements in (29a) and (30) indicates that the speaker may or may not believe true the subjunctive complement proposition to a negated epistemic. Examples (29bd) show that subjunctive complements to other negated predicates, on the other hand, may not be believed true by the speaker. The interpretive difference with respect to the truth value of these subjunctive propositions can be framed in terms of a split in the veridicality conditions of the two predicate types. Subjunctive complement clauses to negated epistemics introduce non-veridical propositions, in which a positive truth value is possible, but not entailed. Those to other negated predicates introduce anti-veridical propositions, in which the speaker may not believe the complement clause to be true. I follow Giannakidou (2006), whose definition of non-veridicality was given in (17) and repeated below as (31), with the definition of anti-veridicality following in (32): (31)

Definition 4: (Non)veridicality for propositional operators a. A propositional operator is veridical if Fp entails or presupposes that p is true in some individual’s model M(i). p is true in M(i) iff M(i) ⊆ p, i.e. if all worlds in M(i) are pworlds. b. Otherwise, F is non-veridical

(32)

Definition 5: Anti-veridicality for propositional operators A non-veridical operator F is anti-veridical iff Fp entails not p: Fp → ¬ p

78 This novel distinction in truth conditions between the two types of negation-triggered subjunctive clauses warrants a more fine-grained characterization. Emotive predicates have long been known to introduce veridical propositions from the point of view of the speaker, as illustrated by the felicity of the follow-up in (33): (33)

María lamenta que su hijo sea irresponsable. Y su hijo es muy irresponsable. Mary regret.3SG that her son be.SUB irresponsible. And her son is very irresponsible. ‘Mary regrets that her son is (SUB) irresponsible. And her son is very irresponsible.’

Like complements to negated epistemic predicates, however, the speaker is not required to believe the subjunctive complement clause to an emotive to be true in the real world. This is illustrated in (34), in which the speaker may felicitously follow-up with a statement implying that s/he does not believe the subjunctive complement clause to be true: (34)

María lamenta que su hijo sea irresponsable. Pero yo no creo que sea irresponsable. Mary regret.3SG that her son be.SUB irresponsible. But I NEG believe.1SG that pro be.SUB irresponsible. ‘Mary regrets that her son is (SUB) irresponsible. But I don’t believe that he is (SUB) irresponsible.’ The evidence suggests that, while other negation-triggered subjunctive complement

clauses carry anti-veridical semantics (as defined in (32)), those to both negated epistemic predicates and emotives carry non-veridical semantics (as defined in (31)), which do not require a negative truth value on the part of the speaker. As has long been observed, subjunctive complement clauses to volitional and directive predicates encode non-veridical semantics with respect to the speaker, indicated again by the felicity of the follow-up statement implying speaker belief in the real world. 17

The exception to this generalization is the class of causative predicates, whose complement clauses are generally implicative. I discuss causative predicates in section 3.5., in which I follow Quer (1998) in claiming that causative predicates, though encoding implicative (extensional/veridical) semantics as a result of their causative nature, do lexically select subjunctive complements.

79 These clauses behave like subjunctive complement clauses to emotives and negated epistemics in this way: (35)

Adan quiere/le ordena que vuelva su esposa. Adam wants/CL.DAT orders.3SG that returns.SUB.3SG his wife ‘Adam wants/orders his wife to return (SUB).’ … pro no sabe que ya volvió ayer! … pro NEG knows.3SG that already pro returned.IND.3SG yesterday ‘… he doesn’t know that she already returned (IND) yesterday!’

While a veridical interpretation of the subjunctive event in the real world is possible on the part of the speaker, it is not a requirement, as the felicitous follow-up in (36) shows. Therefore, volitional and directive predicates introduce non-veridical semantics (with respect to the speaker): (36)

Adan quiere/le ordena que vuelva su esposa. Adam wants/CL.DAT orders.3SG that returns.SUB.3SG his wife ‘Adam wants his wife to return (SUB).’ … pero no creo que vaya a volver. … but NEG pro believe.1SG that go.SUG.3SG return.INF ‘… but I don’t believe that she is going (SUB) to return.’

In terms of veridicality on the part of the speaker in the real world (i.e. potential interpretation of event realization), then, volitional and directive predicates pattern with emotive and negated epistemics, in that they encode a non-veridical interpretation. The truth-conditions of subjunctive complement clauses are summarized in table 1:

Anti-veridical Interpretation

Non-veridical Interpretation

Emotive Complements



Negated Epistemic Complements



Volitional and Directive Complements



Complements to Other Negated Predicates



Table 2-1. Speaker Truth Conditions of Subjunctive Complements in Real World (W R) Most importantly, the different truth conditions between subjunctive complements to negated epistemic predicates and those to other negation-triggered subjunctive clauses warrants a more fine-grained distinction, as these contexts are generally thought to constitute a uniform class. In the next section, I build on the veridicality conditions illustrated in this section to provide evidence for a uniform analysis of subjunctive complements to emotives and negated epistemics, in terms of the extensional nature of their subjunctive complements. 2.3.3. The de re vs. de dicto Distinction and the Intensionality of Subjunctive Complements The next property that I examine is the potential for a de dicto interpretation. Interestingly, we find that only subjunctive complements to negated epistemics and emotives allow a de dicto interpretation, a novel observation. The de dicto vs. de re distinction refers to whether or not a DP (or a CP) has reference in the discourse outside of the context in which it is presented. We can test this by using a resultative verb like romper ‘to break’ and a DP modified by an adjective denoting the result of the verb, such as dañado/a ‘damaged’, in the same clause. For a de dicto interpretation, the state of the window as dañada ‘damaged’ is interpreted as a direct result of the verb romper ‘to break’, which is presented in the same clause (the same discourse context). A de re interpretation requires that the ventana dañada ‘damaged window’ does not obtain its reference from the current discourse; it is interpreted as having been damaged

81 prior to the introduction of the verb romper ‘to break’ by some discursively presupposed or unspecified cause. Importantly, the de dicto interpretation necessarily entails veridical semantics in the real world; the resulting state of the predicate romper ‘to break’ by the adjective dañada ‘damaged’ forces a presupposition on the part of the speaker that the breaking event was realized. Example (37) shows that subjunctive complement clauses to emotives (37a) and negated epistemics (37b) allow a semantically de dicto interpretation. Subjunctive complements to other negated predicates (37c) and those to volitional (37d) and directive predicates (37e) do not. The only possible interpretation of the modified DP in (37c,d,e) requires that the window is interpreted as having been damaged prior to the complement clause breaking event; i.e. they allow only a de re interpretation. (37)

82 d. Volitional Juan quería que la ventana dañada hubiera sido rota. John want.3SG that the window damaged have.PAST.PERF.SUB be.PART break.PART ‘John wanted that the damaged window had (SUB) been broken.’ >*The window is damaged as a result of the complement clause breaking event *de dicto > The window is damaged due to some unspecified cause de re e. Directive Juan pidió que María rompiera la ventana dañada. John request.3SG that Mary break.PAST.SUB.3SG the window damaged ‘John requested that Mary break (SUB) the damaged window.’ >*The window is damaged as a result of the complement clause breaking event *de dicto > The window is damaged due to some unspecified cause de re The ungrammaticality of a de dicto interpretation in negation-triggered contexts in (37c) falls out straightforwardly from the fact that these complement clauses require an anti-veridical interpretation. It follows, then, that they are ungrammatical with an interpretation which implies event realization. However, the ungrammaticality of a de dicto interpretation in volitional and directive contexts is unexpected because, as shown in the last section, these complement clauses have the potential for a veridical interpretation on the part of the speaker. Therefore, we would expect them to be compatible with the entailment of event realization. This interpretation, however, is only possible in subjunctive complement clauses to negated epistemic predicates and emotives. I argue that volitional and directive predicates cannot embed de dicto complements because they encode an intensional modal base. In chapter 1, section 5.2, I followed Quer (1998), Villalta (2008), Farkas (1992) and many others, in assuming that volitional and directive predicates open a buletic model of evaluation (based on wishes). To define a buletic model of evaluation, in chapter 1, section 5.2, I followed Villalta (2008), who proposes that a buletic model involves a scalar assignment by the matrix verb, establishing an ordered set between the embedded proposition p and an alternative proposition q, ranked on a scale of desirability. Her analysis crucially entails a ranking of propositions on a scale of desirability, and these

83 propositions are determined by the modal base BUL(ETIC), and the real world w. The formal definition is as follows: (38)

Semantics based on comparison of alternatives for MBUL MBUL Cg(p)(α)(w) = 1 iff q: q p & q g(C): p > DESα,w q On this type of analysis, the context C represents a variable which is anaphoric to a

contextually determined set of propositions (i.e. those propositions which form the common ground and the context set). The assignment g establishes the ordering source between the embedded proposition p and the subject’s buletic alternatives α (i.e. a set of desirable alternatives). In order for a matrix predicate like querer ‘to want’ to receive a truth-value of 1, the propositions p & q cannot be equal in the rank established by the assignment g. Furthermore, the rank assigned by the ordering source g to the contextually relevant alternatives α must favor p over the desirability (DES) of q, where DESα,w represents a relation between the subject’s desires α and the world w. The definition of >DESα,w thus lays out in detail how the relationship between two propositions p and q are ranked with respect to the various buletic worlds of the subject. I follow Quer (1998) and Villalta (2008), who suggest that strongly intensional predicates (volitionals and directives) introduce a buletic model of evaluation. Because volitional and directive predicates introduce a set of alternative desire worlds, they introduce intensional propositions. The distinction between intensional vs. extensional semantics was originally outlined by Farkas (1992), who defines extensional environments in and intensional environments as in (39): (39)

a. Definition 6: Extensional Environments A proposition is extensionally anchored iff the modal anchor is a single world, i.e. the proposition is interpreted with respect to one particular world, the one introduced by the extensional predicate.

84 b. Definition 7: Intensional Environments A proposition is intensionally anchored iff the modal anchor constitutes a set of worlds. According to von Fintel and Heim (2011), who follow Farkas’s (1992) definitions, extensional modality signifies that, for any expression α, we have ⟦α⟧w,g, which stands for the semantic value of α in w, also known as the EXTENSION of α in w. The function λw.⟦α⟧w,g, denotes the INTENSION of α, which assigns to any world w the extension of α in that world. Since the denotation of INTENSION abstracts over evaluation worlds, intensions are not worlddependent. It now becomes intuitively clear why the truth of the complement clause proposition cannot be entailed in volitional and directive contexts. The intensional nature of these clause types necessarily involves multiple worlds. Thus, a positive truth value in the actual world cannot be presupposed (forced) in the propositional content, due to the fact that the real world is (real) world-dependent and, therefore, extensional. It also falls out straightforwardly, then, that the negation-triggered subjunctive clauses in (37c) are also intensional, at least insofar as the propositional cannot be interpreted with respect to the real world. The hypothesis, of course, implies that subjunctive complement clauses to emotives and negated epistemic predicates are extensional; the grammaticality of a de dicto interpretation shows that they may introduce propositions which are interpreted with respect to the (single) real world. On the other hand, other subjunctive complements are intensional, because they may not be real-world dependent. Table 2 illustrates the split in terms of intensionality between subjunctive complements:

Intensional

Extensional 

Emotives and Negated Epistemics Volitionals and Directives



Other Negated Predicates



Table 2-2. Intensional vs. Extensional Nature of Subjunctive Complements In sum, the data provided in this section warrant a more fine-grained distinction of subjunctive complement clauses than has been previously proposed. I have shown that subjunctive complements to emotive and negated epistemic predicates share the properties of non-veridicality and extensionality, which is a combination of semantic properties not shared with any other subjunctive clause type. In the next section, I show that, though subjunctive complements to negated epistemics and emotives can be extensionally anchored, they are incompatible with ‘point of view’ related phenomena. I take both facts together as evidence that the subjunctive mood surfaces as the default mood in these contexts, due to the absence of (intensional or assertive) illocutionary force. 2.3.4. ‘Point of View’ Anchoring in Complement Clauses Rooryck (2001) identifies speech act, evaluative, and epistemological adverbs as the combination of the notions `source of information' and `evidence/evaluation type'. Because assertions encode extensional propositions with a positive truth-value (relativized to an individual), assertive clauses should be compatible with ‘point of view’ modification, which expresses a source or evaluation of the propositional content. Indeed, we see that indicative (assertive) complement clauses are compatible with evidential adverbs like evidentemente ‘evidently’, evaluative adverbs like afortunadamente ‘unfortunately’ and speech act adverbs like aparentemente ‘apparently’. This is shown in example (40) in the indicative complement to a

86 cognitive factive (40a), verb of perception (40b), verb of reported speech (40c), and verb of mental judgment (40d). (40)

a. Cognitive-factive Juan supo que evidentemente/afortunadamente/aparentemente María lavó los platos. ‘John found out that evidently/fortunately/apparently Mary washed (IND) the dishes.’ b. Verb of Perception Juan vio que evidentemente/afortunadamente/aparentemente María lavó los platos. ‘John saw that evidently/fortunately/apparently Mary washed ( IND) the dishes.’ c. Verb of Reported Speech Juan dijo que evidentemente/afortunadamente/aparentemente María lavó los platos. ‘John said that evidently/fortunately/apparently Mary washed ( IND) the dishes.’ d. Verb of Mental Judgment Juan comprendió que evidentemente/afortunadamente/aparentemente María lavó los platos. ‘John understood that evidently/fortunately/apparently Mary washed ( IND) the dishes.’ Such adverbs are not, however, possible in subjunctive complement clauses. The

ungrammaticality of ‘point of view’ related adverbs in lexically-selected and negation-triggered contexts falls out straightforwardly from the fact that, as Rooryck (2001) and Schenner (2010) note, evidentials indicate a source for the truth of the embedded proposition, never for its falsity. In the last section, I illustrated the ungrammaticality of a de dicto interpretation in these contexts, and claimed that the incompatibility is due to the fact that these clauses are intensionally anchored. Due to the intensional nature of these clauses, then, we do not expect to find ‘point of view’ adverbs, as these type of phenomena are compatible only in veridical (extensional) contexts (Rooryck 2001, Schenner 2010). This is indeed what we find; subjunctive complements to volitional (41a), directive (41b), and negated verbs of perception/cognitive-factives (41c), are not grammatical with ‘point of view’ adverbs: (41)

a. Volitional Verb Juan quería que *evidentemente/*afortunadamente/*probablemente lavara los platos. ‘John wanted that evidently/fortunately/probably (he/she) washed (SUB) the dishes.’

87 b. Directive Verb Juan le ordenó que *evidentemente/*afortunadamente/*probablemente lavara los platos. ‘John ordered him/her that evidently/fortunately/probably (he/she) washed (SUB) the dishes.’ c. Negated verb of perception/cognitive-factive Juan no vio/supo que *evidentemente/*afortunadamente/*probablemente lavara los platos. ‘John didn’t see/find out that evidently/fortunately/probably (he/she) washed (SUB) the dishes.’ We saw in the last section that subjunctive complements to emotive (41a) and negated epistemic (41b) predicates, on the other hand, may carry a veridical interpretation and the presupposition of event realization (i.e. a de dicto interpretation), indicating extensional modal anchoring. Nonetheless, ‘point of view’ adverbs in these complement clauses are ungrammatical: (42)

a. Emotive Juan lamentó que *evidentemente/*afortunadamente/*probablemente lavara los platos. ‘John regretted that evidently/fortunately/probably (he/she) washed (SUB) the dishes.’ b. Negated Epistemic Juan no pensó que *evidentemente/*afortunadamente/*probablemente lavara los platos. ‘John didn’t think that evidently/fortunately/probably (he/she) washed (SUB) the dishes.’ The ungrammaticality of ‘point of view’ adverbs in these subjunctive complement

clauses is not readily explained, as these clauses may be interpreted within an extensional modal base and carry a veridical interpretation on the part of the speaker.18 There is no obvious reason, then, why these clause-types may not be evaluated, a previously unobserved phenomenon.

It should be noted that Quer (1998) distinguishes between a factive (episodic) reading and a generic (nonepisodic) reading of subjunctive clauses to emotives, implying that veridicality on the part of the speaker is not a priori a property of these clauses. The factive reading is that of (i), while the generic reading in (ii) requires a (nonveridical) counterfactual reading, and may be paraphrased as an if-clause, as the gloss illustrates: (i)

No me gustó que los estudiantes me hicieran algo/*nada. No DAT.1SG appeal.IND that the students to-me make.SUB something/anything. ‘I didn’t like it that the students made (SUB) me something/anything.’ → episodic

88 To explain this phenomenon, I hypothesize that ‘point of view’ adverbs are only compatible with assertive propositions (following Rooryck (2001) and Schenner (2010)). Though subjunctive complements to emotives and negated epistemics can be extensional in nature, they are not assertive (i.e. they do not inform). Because they are non-assertive, they are non-evaluative, and therefore incompatible with evaluative adverbs. Before this claim can be verified, however, it must be shown that the impossibility of ‘point of view’ adverbs is due to the appearance of the subjunctive mood, and is not due to an idiosyncratic property of these particular predicates. The complement clauses to emotives (43a) and negated epistemics (43b), then, should be compatible with evaluative adverbs when the subordinate clause verb appears in the indicative mood. This prediction is borne out, although subject to dialectal variation:19 (43)

a. %A Juan le agradó/lamentó que evidentemente/afortunadamente/probablemente va a llover. ‘John liked/regretted that evidently/fortunately/probably it is going (IND) to rain.’ b.%Juan no piensa/cree que evidentemente/afortunadamente/probablemente va a llover. ‘John doesn’t think/believe that evidently/fortunately/probably it is going (IND) to rain.’

The higher degree of acceptability of ‘point of view’ adverbs with the indicative mood is strong evidence that ‘point of view’ anchoring is intrinsically connected to assertive force, rather than simply to an extensional interpretation.

(ii)

No me gustaba que los estudiantes me hicieran algo/nada. No to-me appeal.IND.IMPERF that the students to-me made.SUB something/anything. ‘I didn’t like it if the students made me something/anything.’ → generic

Importantly, however, the clausal complement may carry a veridical interpretation on the part of the speaker, as in (i). 19 The diacritic % indicates inter/intra speaker variability. Of the five subjects consulted on the acceptability of peripheral adverbs in indicative contexts with negated epistemic verbs, they were found much more acceptable (average 3.5, on a scale of 1 – 5) than the same context with subjunctive forms (average 1, on a scale of 1 – 5). Still, the acceptability was not as high as those to emotives with indicative complements, but could also reflect a preference for the subjunctive in the negated epistemic contexts. More research is needed for a precise analysis of acceptability of peripheral adverbs in these contexts. Regardless, the important observation is the ungrammaticality of ‘point of view’ related phenomena in subjunctive contexts, which have been shown to be extensional.

89 The shared properties between subjunctive complements to emotives and negated epistemic predicates are presented in table 2. Both types of subjunctive complement clauses are the only which allow a veridical interpretation, the possibility for a de dicto interpretation, and are incompatible with ‘point of view’ modification, illustrated in the table below:

Potential veridical Allow a de dicto interpretation by (extensional) speaker in real world interpretation

Allow ‘point of view’ adverbs

Other negated predicates Volitionals and Directives



Emotives and Negated Epistemics



Table 2-3. Truth Conditions, Intensionality & ‘Point of View’ in Subjunctive Complements The intensional nature of subjunctive complements to volitionals, directives and other negated predicates accounts for their incompatibility with both a de dicto reading and ‘point of view’ adverbs. Because subjunctive complements to negated epistemics and emotives are the only subjunctive complements which may be extensionally anchored and carry a veridical interpretation on the part of the speaker, I hypothesize that the incompatibility of ‘point of view’ adverbs results from their non-assertive status. Thus, because they are neither intensional nor assertive, I propose that the subjunctive mood surfaces as the default mood, due to the absence of illocutionary force in these contexts. Furthermore, recall that these are the same clause-types which appear in the indicative mood in Greek and Bulgarian, which I proposed is the default mood in these languages, providing cross-linguistic support for my hypothesis that they form a

90 unified class. Within our Stalnakerian contextual schema, then, these propositions are not mapped into another information state, as they are unevaluative/uninformative: (44)

Assertions Îťp[P] Subjunctive complements to emotives and negated epistemics

Negationtriggered, anti-veridical subjunctive propositions

Common Ground P

Complements to volitional and directive predicates

Context Set: C(P) = {w w â&#x2C6;&#x2C6; p, for every proposition p in P} Other possible worlds (Intensional propositions)

The semantico-pragmatic schema in (44) represents the informational status of complement clauses in Spanish. Indicative clauses carry an assertive function, and map their propositional content into the common ground. I have argued for a tripartite classification of subjunctive complement clauses. The first class is those to strongly intensional predicates (i.e. volitional and directive verbs), which open a buletic model of evaluation (related to wishes). These propositions map information into a strongly intensional information state. The second class are subjunctive clauses triggered by negation, whose complement clauses are interpreted with anti-veridical semantics. These clauses are mapped into an anti-veridical model, which is strongly intensional in the sense that no world in which the proposition is true can constitute the actual world. Finally, complement clauses to emotives and negated epistemics constitute their own class, which carry a non-assertive, uninformative, status; the complement clause is not

91 mapped into an information state. The information status of these clauses accounts straightforwardly for the fact that they can be interpreted from an extensional modal base, yet may not be informative/evaluated, resulting in the incompatibility with ‘point of view’ related phenomena. 2.3.5. The Intensionality of Causative Predicates To this point, I have avoided discussing the status of causative predicates like forzar ‘to force’, obligar ‘to obligate’ and hacer ‘to make’. These predicates invariably select subjunctive complement clauses (when tensed). As Quer (1998) points out, causative predicates do not obviously group with these predicates, because they don’t seem to be intensional: in most cases, these predicates are implicative, entailing that the complement clause is true. This is shown by the infelicity of the follow-up in (45), in which the speaker cannot assert that the complement clause to the causative was not realized: (45)

María hizo que su hijo se vistiera mal. #Pero su hijo no lo hizo. Mary made.3SG that her son dress.SUB badly. But her son NEG CL.ACC did.IND.3SG ‘Mary made her son dress (SUB) badly. But he didn’t do it.’

Due to the extensional modal base of complement clauses to causatives, Quer (1998:49) states that they are “non-intensional and non-modal, and in this sense do not involve an (intensional) modal base”. However, subjunctive complement clauses to causative predicates exhibit many of the same properties as those to strongly intensional predicates (e.g. querer ‘to want’, desear ‘to desire’, pedir ‘to request’). For instance, both types of constructions display the sequence of tense restriction *PRESENT[PAST], which Kempchinsky (2009) attributes to the forwardshifting modal base involved in strongly intensional contexts: (46)

Maria desea/hace que su hijo (lleve/haya llevado/*llevara/*hubiera llevado) un libro. Mary desire/make.PRS.3SG that her son bring.PRS/PERF/*PAST/*PLPERF.SUB.3SG a book ‘Mary desires/makes that her son brings/has brought/brought/had brought (SUB) a book.’

92 Second, both display subject obviation. This means that the subject of the subordinate clause subject cannot refer to the subject of the matrix clause: (47)

Maríai desea/hace que (ella*i/j/pro*i/j) lleve un libro emocionante. Maríai desire/make.PRS.3SG that (she*i/j/pro*i/j) bring.SUB.3SG a book exciting ‘Mary desires/makes that s/he (someone else/*herself) bring ( SUB) an exciting book.’

Third, neither type of complement clause can alternate with the indicative mood (14): (48)

María desea/hace que Martín lleve/*lleva un libro emocionante. María desire/make.PRS.3SG that Martin bring.SUB/*IND.3SG a book exciting ‘Mary desires/makes that Martin bring (SUB/IND) an exciting book.’

Fourth, the subjunctive mood in complements to both strongly intensional predicates and causatives can only be licensed one clause down (i.e. both display locality of triggering effects): (49)

María desea/hace que Martín crea que Juan lleve/*lleva un libro aburrido. María desire/make.PRS.3SG that Martin believe.SUB that John bring.IND/*SUB a book boring ‘Mary desires/makes that Martin believes that John is bringing ( IND/SUB) a boring book.’

Finally, neither clause type allows ‘point of view’ related adverbs, even though complements to causatives are implicative (and, therefore, extensionally anchored): (50)

Juan hizo/quería que *evidentemente/*afortunadamente/*probablemente María lavara los platos. ‘John made/wanted that evidently/fortunately/probably Mary washed (SUB) the dishes.’ Thus, causative predicates share many properties with strongly intensional subjunctive

complements. This is unexpected, given the implicative interpretation of the complement clause. Causatives, however, are amenable to an intensional semantics if we assume, with Quer (1998), that the causer introduces a set of future alternatives right before the point of causation. As Quer puts it:

93 “…the main clause subject (the causer) introduces a set of future alternatives right before the point of causation: at a time t0 the causer acts in such a way that the actual future is in the set of future alternatives where the (caused) eventuality is realized (Quer 1998:49)” If Quer is on the right track, causatives, volitionals and directives have the common property of semantically introducing a set of alternate desire worlds right before the moment of causation (i.e. immediately prior to the realization of the subjunctive clause event). Thus, these predicates do encode strongly intensional semantics, in the sense that a buletic model of evaluation is introduced by the causative. So, while strongly intensional predicates encode the comparison of a proposition p to a set of contextually relevant alternatives on a scale of desirability, causative predicates do so as well. However, the buletic alternatives in which p is evaluated are introduced immediately prior to a moment in which p was caused/realized, a semantic element that volitional and directive predicates lack. The difference, then, is that causatives also encode the moment in which p is realized. Quer’s (1998) proposal elegantly accounts for the fact that causatives display the sequence of tense effect *PRESENT[PAST] which indicates the forward-shifting modality encoded by buletic (desire) semantics (Kempchinsky 2009). We have now identified the key semantico-pragmatic properties of complement clauses in Spanish: (i) those selected by volitional, directive and causative predicates and encode a strongly intensional (buletic) model of evaluation, (ii) those which are triggered by negation and encode anti-veridical semantics, (iii) uninformative complements to emotives and negated epistemics and (iv) assertive (indicative) complements. These properties are summarized in the table below:

94 Illocutionary status of complement clause Strongly intensional  Buletic complement

Mood of Complement Clause Subjunctive

Strongly intensional  Negationtriggered, antiveridical complement

Subjunctive

No illocutionary force  Uninformative complement

Subjunctive

Clause-selecting predicate types Volitionals, directives, causatives Negated verbs of perception, reported speech, cognitivefactives, verbs of mental judgment, fiction verbs, comissives Emotives and negated epistemics

Verbs of perception, reported speech, Indicative cognitive-factives, verbs of mental judgment, fiction verbs, comissives Table 2-4. Illocutionary Status of Complement Clauses in Spanish

Common Ground update  Assertive complement

Now that we have defined the semantico-pragmatic status of complement clauses, we will turn to the way in which these properties are syntactically represented. In the next section, I review some syntactic proposals for the complement clause left periphery. I eventually adopt Speas and Tenny’s (2003) analysis, which elegantly accounts for the syntax of subjunctive complements and the way in which models of evaluation are represented in the syntax. 2.4. Previous Accounts: The Syntax of ‘Point of View’ and the Left Periphery A long-standing issue in generative syntax is to what extent the semantic interpretation of illocutionary force and, therefore, mood choice are to be read off the syntactic representation. Such features are often thought to be represented in the left periphery, as this is the syntactic domain thought to be responsible for speaker deixis (e.g. modality, evidentiality and ‘point of view’ anchoring of the proposition). The left periphery is also assumed to be the domain in

95 which a clause is linked to a selecting-predicate and/or the discursive/pragmatic component of the grammar. Since Rizziâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (1997) seminal work, much research has focused on characterizing the structure of the left periphery. Such works often attempt to identify domains such as illocutionary force and evidentiality, and to what extent pragmatic and discourse features are represented on the syntactic level of representation. This recognition has inspired a number of cartographic-based analyses of the left periphery (Uriagereka 1995, Ambar 1999, Cinque 1999, Haegeman 2012, Villa-GarcĂa 2012a,b,c, Demonte and FernĂĄndez-Soriano 2009, among many others). The nature and representation of such properties continue to be topics of much debate. From the perspective of the syntax-semantics interface, the fundamental question is to what degree semantic properties are represented on the syntactic side of that interface. I assume with Rizzi (1997), Kempchinsky (2009), Bianchi (2001), and many others that, at least to some extent, semantic features are present in the syntactic derivation. Specifically, I predict that semantic features related to illocutionary force, like other features, are in the Numeration as features on the Force head, as an (abstract) lexical item. I limit myself here to two types of evidence in favor of this hypothesis. One piece of evidence in favor of analyzing illocutionary force as a syntactically represented feature is the data from Greek and Balkan presented in section 2.3 which indicate that assertive force is not cross-linguistically encoded by the indicative mood. Because the indicative mood does not entail assertive force cross-linguistically, assertive force cannot be the default (unspecified) illocutionary force in indicative contexts. It follows, then, that indicative clauses in Romance carry an additional clause-typing (illocutionary force) feature which encodes the assertive semantico-pragmatic function of indicative clauses.

96 Another piece of evidence comes from Kempchinsky (2009), who observes that many pragmatic studies note the relationship between simple imperatives and the subjunctive mood in directive contexts; exchanges such as (51) are extremely frequent. While the semantic import of the imperative (Person A, first utterance) and subjunctive verb forms (Person A, second utterance) are identical, mood choice is wholly dependent upon the position of the verb within the sentence: (51)

Person A: Sal! leave.IMP.2SG ‘Leave (IMP)!’ Person B: Qué dices? ‘What are you saying?’ Person A: Digo que salgas! say.1SG that leave.SUB.2SG ‘I’m saying leave (SUB)!’

In a matrix clause, the imperative mood is required, while in a subordinate clause, the subjunctive mood is required. The data provide evidence for a semantic feature whose morphological realization depends upon its syntactic position. The remainder of this chapter concentrates primarily on the syntax-semantics interface, attempting to tease apart to what extent the semantico-pragmatic properties of modality and illocutionary force are represented in the syntactic representation, and how to characterize the locus and nature of such features.20 Of course, the first step in doing so is to establish the most adequate syntactic framework from which to generate the analysis. I first review Bianchi’s (2001) and Kempchinsky’s (2009) analyses, both of which rely on the idea of some type of logophoric element in the subjunctive clause CP which, they argue, results in the subject

For the remainder of this chapter, I leave aside negation-triggered subjunctive clauses to perception verbs, verbs of reported speech, verbs of mental judgment and cognitive-factives. The interpretation and syntax of these clauses are the focuses of chapters 4 and 5, respectively.

97 obviation observed in lexically-selected subjunctive complement clauses. Then, I review Speas and Tennyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (2003) account. I show that, with a few modifications, Speas and Tennyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s framework can best account for mood distribution, as well as subject obviation in subjunctive contexts, the latter of which is the focus of chapter 3. 2.4.1. Bianchi (2001) Bianchi (2001) develops an analysis for the complement clause CP in subjunctive contexts. Her main goal is to account for mood distribution and subject obviation in Italian subordinate clauses. Bianchi begins with an analysis for indicative and infinitival complements, and then builds on the framework developed to analyze subjunctive clauses. She claims that, in subordinate contexts, nominative case and finiteness are necessary for the licensing of referentially independent DPs and pronouns with the feature [+R], a syntactically represented semantic feature encoding referentiality. In other words, in finite (tensed) clauses, a referentially independent [+R] subject with nominative case is licensed. She proposes that the [+R] person feature is selected by the head of FinP, where it is linked to the speech point S. Linking to S establishes a center of deixis, or external logophoric center. The logophoric center refers to the perspective point, or individual anchor, from whose perspective the truth value of the proposition is evaluated. The propositional events interpreted from an external logophoric center are referential, in the sense that they carry referential spatio-temporal coordinates. The propositional events interpreted from an internal logophoric center (infinitive complements) do not carry referential spatio-temporal coordinates and, consequently, encode an intensional modal base. According to Bianchi, in indicative clausal complements, the +Fin head links to S (the external logophoric center), which is the default option (52a). In infinitival contexts (52b), the

98 head of Fin is specified negatively ([-Fin]). In this case, it links to an internal logophoric center, which is anaphoric to the matrix clause event. In infinitival contexts, the internal logophoric center licenses a [-R] person feature on the subject of the complement clause (Spec, TP), which must be anaphoric to some [+R] DP, where this DP is a participant in the matrix clause event. She argues that this is essentially what happens in Control. Bianchi hypothesizes that there is a parameter in UG which allows for the [+R] person feature to be selected by an internal logophoric center, and it is this parameter setting that allows for the existence of logophoric languages, illustrated in (52c). There are, then, at least three different scenarios for complement clauses (excluding subjunctive clauses for the moment): (52)

a. Tensed complement clauses … V [CP [FinP + Fin [TP DP+R [T +/- Pst] … ]]] E

S (=Ext LC) referential DP

b. Infinitival complement clauses … V [CP [FinP - Fin [TP DP-R [T - T] … ]]] Ei

Int LCi

controlled PRO

c. Tensed complement clauses, logophoric languages … V [CP [FinP +Fin [TP DP+R [T +/- Pst] … ]]] Ei

Int LCi

logophoric pronoun

Bianchi then uses these assumptions to account for subject obviation in subjunctive clauses. Recall that strongly intensional (53), but not negation-triggered (54), subjunctive clauses display subject obviation between the embedded and matrix clause subjects: (53)

Maríai desea que (ella*i/j/pro*i/j) tenga un buen día. María desire.PRES.3SG that (she/pro) has.PRES.SUB a good day ‘Mary desires that s/he (someone else/*herself) has ( SUB) a good day.’

(54)

Maríai no pensó/no vio que (ellai/j/proi/j) hubiera perdido un libro. María NEG think.PAST.3SG/NEG see.PAST.3SG that (she/pro) had.PAST.SUB lost a book ‘Mary didn’t think/didn’t see that s/he (someone else/herself) had lost (SUB) a book.’

Bianchi assumes that subjunctive clauses are tensed, and that the +Fin head links to an external logophoric center, i.e. the speech point S. To account for the subject obviation in (53), she suggests that subjunctive clauses which are lexically-selected by the matrix predicate (i.e. volitional and directive predicates) also encode an internal logophoric center, linked to a Mood head situated between FinP and TP: (55)

(Lexically-selected) Subjunctive complement clauses … V [CP [FinP +Fin [MoodP Mood [TP [T +/- Pst] … ]]] Ext LC

Int LC

Subject obviation arises from the clash between the referential requirements of the external logophoric center and those of the internal logophoric center. Participants in an anaphoric internal logophoric center, with the feature [-R], must be anaphoric to arguments of the matrix clause, which is seen as incompatible with the [+R] person feature licensed by the external logophoric center linked to the Fin head. Therefore, the [+R] person agreement on the subjunctive subject “cannot take as a value the referential indices of the participants of the internal LC (logophoric center), i.e. the matrix arguments” (Bianchi 2001:38). The main problem for this approach is that it fails to capture the subject orientation of the obviation observed in subjunctive complements. In contexts such as direct object control causatives with predicates such as forzar ‘to force’ and obligar ‘to oblige’, the direct object must be present and is, therefore, an obligatory participant in the event. Yet, the subject of the subjunctive clause experiences obligatory co-reference with this object, despite what Bianchi predicts to be the case: (56)

Sui profesorj loi forzó a [que proi/*j llegara a tiempo]. his professor CL.ACC.3SG.MASC force.PAST.3SG to that pro arrive.PAST.SUB.3SG on time ‘Hisi professorj forced himi that (hei/*j) arrive (SUB) on time.’

100

Furthermore, as Kempchinsky (2009) points out, subject obviation is viewed by Bianchi as a consequence of blocking: if the [-R] person agreement licensed by the internal logophoric center is identified in turn by the [+R] person agreement licensed by the external logophoric center linked to Fin in the embedded CP, there should be nothing preventing “accidental” coreference with some participant in the higher clause. This is presumably what happens in the case of embedded indicative clauses. Thus, the notions of ‘participants in the matrix clause event’ and ‘blocking’ do not suffice in accounting for subject obviation in lexically-selected contexts. 2.4.2. Kempchinsky (2009) Kempchinsky (1986, 1990) proposes that complements to volitional and directive predicates are characterized by the presence of a modal operator in the head of the clause. Under this analysis, these subjunctive clauses are embedded imperatives, as the modal operator that triggers the subjunctive mood is akin to an imperative operator in simple imperatives. 21 Kempchinsky (2009) takes as its point of departure Portner’s (2005) proposal that the subject of a simple imperative is interpreted as an addressee-oriented logophoric pronoun which must be bound abstractly: (57)

a. (You) be quiet! [λwλx: x = addressee(c). x is quiet] b. Everyone sit down! [λwλx: x = addressee(c). [∀y: y ∈ x. y sits down]] Portner posits that imperatives are found in all languages because UG provides an

operator with the capacity to bind an addressee-oriented logophoric element. With this in mind, Kempchinsky proposes that the semantic parallelism between imperatives and complements to strongly intensional predicates is that both denote events or states of affairs which do not obtain

Steniu (1967), for example, proposes three types of modal operators: declarative, imperative, and interrogative. For later work assuming a type of imperative modal operator, see Rivero and Terzi (1995).

101 in the actual world WR at the moment of the event time, and that these matrix verbs license a quasi-imperative operator in the subjunctive complement clause Fin head.22 The crucial difference between the subjunctive operator and the imperative operator is that the latter semantically binds an addressee-oriented logophoric element, while the former binds a subjectoriented anti-logophoric element, preventing co-reference with the subordinate clause subject. In this way, the subjunctive operator excludes only the matrix subject alone, accounting for object co-reference in contexts such as (56), repeated below as (58), with direct object control causatives: (58)

Sui profesorj loi forzó a [que proi/*j llegara a tiempo]. his professor CL.ACC.3SG.MASC force.PAST to that pro arrive.PAST.SUB.3SG on time ‘Hisi professorj forced himi that (hei) arrive (SUB) on time.’ Kempchinsky recasts Bianchi’s “external” and “internal” logophoric centers in terms of

world arguments and their individual anchors. The external logophoric center corresponds to W R (=W(speaker)), corresponding to a real world model whose individual anchor (the perspective point from which the truth value is judged) is the speaker. The internal logophoric center corresponds to W(SU) (=W(matrix subject)), corresponding to the real world model of the matrix subject. Thus, the subjunctive mood results from a shift in the modal base from the model of the speaker W(SP) to the model of the subject W(SU). She hypothesizes that this feature is syntactically represented in Force Phrase, proposed to be the locus of illocutionary force specification (i.e. the shift in the modal base).23 The structure and feature composition of lexically-selected subjunctive complement clauses is as follows:

Differing from Bianchi (2001), Kempchinsky proposes that Fin head, and not Mood head, is the locus of the external/internal logophoric center. 23 Kempchinsky’s World feature is similar to Speas’ (2004) proposal that there is a syntactically represented semantico-pragmatic world argument which denotes the set of possible worlds within which the proposition

102 (59)

… [CP [ForceP W(SU) [FinP +Fin [Fin’ OP[+ anti-logophoric] [IP (DP) [MoodP [TP …]]]]]] Kempchinsky claims that the difference between negated epistemics and strongly

intensional predicates is the interpretability of the World feature in ForceP. In lexically-selected contexts, it is the selection relationship which triggers the feature, and the feature is thus hypothesized to be uninterpretable. The uWorld feature must enter into an Agree relation with the head of MoodP for feature valuation. The derivation of a lexically-selected subjunctive complement clause proceeds as follows: (60)

… VW [CP [ForceP Force[uW]] [FinP [Fin Op] [IP (DP) [MoodP [V+T+MW] [TP …]]]]] selection

checking (Agree)

In negation-triggered contexts, however, the shift in the modal base from W(SP) to W(SU) is not the result of lexical selection but, rather, is marked solely by the subjunctive morphology on the verb. For this reason, Kempchinsky proposes that the feature involved in these contexts is interpretable, and involves only an identification relationship between this feature and MoodP, illustrated below: (61)

… VW [CP [ForceP Force[W]] [FinP +Fin]] [TP (DP) [MoodP [V+T+MW] [TP ... ]]]] identification However, as Kempchinsky notes, subjunctive complements to emotive predicates give

rise to obviation effects in most dialects of Spanish, though the truth of these clauses is often believed true by the speaker in the real world WR. Thus, a shift in the model of evaluation from the speaker’s belief world WR to the subject’s belief/desire world W(SU) is not obligatory in these

expressed by a sentence is evaluated. She argues that evidential adverbs and morphemes (in languages such as Quechua), then, express a relation between the discourse and the world(s) in which the sentence is to be interpreted.

103 contexts; nonetheless, the subjunctive mood and subject obviation are exhibited in emotive contexts, contrary to what is predicted. Secondly, it appears that the model of evaluation of indicative clauses to non-negated epistemics and verbs of reported speech may represent the model of evaluation of the matrix subject (W(SU)), a result which should not be possible under Kempchinsky’s analysis. Recall that the indicative mood is hypothesized to represent the epistemic model of the speaker W (SP) and, therefore, the speaker should not be able to felicitously disagree with an indicative clause. However, the speaker need not believe an indicative complement clause to an epistemic or verb of reported speech to be true, as illustrated by the follow-up statement in (10b): (62)

María piensa/dice que va a llover. ‘Mary thinks/says that it is going (IND) to rain.’ a. …y estoy de acuerdo. ‘…and I agree.’ b. …pero no lo creo. ‘…but I don’t believe it.’ The felicity of the follow-up in (62b) signifies that the speaker does not believe the

indicative complement clause of (62) to be true. The model of evaluation of the complement clause in (62), then, appears to have shifted from WR to W(SU), which should trigger the subjunctive mood, contrary to fact. We have now seen two proposals which attempt to syntactically account for mood choice and subject obviation. Bianchi’s (2001) proposal cannot account for co-reference between the direct object and the subjunctive clause subject in direct object control causative contexts, nor can it account for the inability of “accidental” co-reference to occur in complement clauses to desiderative predicates. Kempchinsky’s (2009) proposal doesn’t adequately account for subject

104 obviation in complements to emotives or for the apparent shift in model of evaluation in certain indicative complement clauses.24 In the next section, I review Speas and Tenny’s (2003) proposal for the left periphery. Their analysis elegantly captures the idea that truth is relativized to a (syntactically represented) pragmatic argument, and explains the role of illocutionary force (or lack thereof) in complement clauses. In chapter 3, I build on the framework here to account for the subject obviation observed in strongly intensional and emotive contexts. 2.4.3. Speas and Tenny’s (2003) Proposal for Syntactic Sentience Speas & Tenny (2003) (henceforth S&T) put forward an argument that the relation between syntax and pragmatics (i.e. properties attributed to the C-I interface) is modeled more insightfully if syntax takes over a larger share of the burden. In particular, they suggest that wellestablished tools from formal syntax provide the correct constraints for grammatical encodings of illocutionary force and ‘point of view’ related phenomena, and their empirical consequences. In this section, I review and adopt S&T’s analysis. I will show that a few modifications must be made, however. Namely, I will argue for an embedded sentience domain (i.e. illocutionary force and ‘point of view’ phenomena in the subordinate CP) and, furthermore, that subjunctive clauses carry a positive specification for finiteness. I claim that, with the addition of these modifications, their analysis accounts for the ways in which models of evaluation are relativized to individuals in complement clauses. The primary evidence that S&T provide in favor of a more articulated syntactic structure, with loci for pragmatic arguments, is the existence of systematic restrictions we wouldn’t expect

This is a problem inherited from Quer’s (1998) analysis of the subjunctive mood as representing a shift in the model of evaluation from the real world model of the speaker to that of a different model (or individual anchor), as reviewed in chapter 1, section 4.6. 24

105 if these properties were purely pragmatic. First, no language has pronouns for more than 1 st, 2nd, 3rd and logophoric pronouns. This is strikingly different from the situation with other deictic features, such as honorific rank, where there are languages (like Thai) with pronouns for as many as nine different levels of politeness (see Hoonchamlong 1991). Second, many, if not all, of these phenomena show locality effects. For instance, in languages with overt logophoric pronouns, logophoric reflexives are blocked by intervening first or second person subjects. Again, we wouldn’t expect systematic locality restrictions if such properties were purely pragmatic. Third, logophoric phenomena have hierarchical properties. For instance, Sells (1987) shows that logophoric roles fall into a hierarchy. Some languages allow logophoric pronouns which may refer only to ‘the person making the report’ (Sells calls this the SOURCE role). In other languages, logophors may carry either the SOURCE role, or a logophoric role referring to the ‘one who makes the report’ (Sells calls this the SELF role). No language, however, allows only reference to the SELF role without also reference to the SOURCE role, displaying a distinct hierarchy in this respect: (63)

SOURCE >> SELF

I am aware that there is no uniform view on the nature of logophoricity. For the moment, it is necessary only to illustrate that logophoric phenomena display systematic restrictions that we would not expect if they were purely pragmatic in nature.25 S&T’s analysis applies to grammaticalized illocutionary force, i.e. sentence mood and point of view related phenomena. Combining recent work on functional projections in the Cdomain (Cinque 1999; Rizzi 1997) and on the mapping between lexicon and argument structure

The relevant hierarchies are generally treated in the literature as distinct pragmatic hierarchies, which are matters of degree, not reflecting any constituent structure. However, Speas (2004) has shown that several distinct “pragmatic” hierarchies can be unified into a single hierarchy, and this hierarchy turns out to reflect the structure that Cinque (1999) has shown to be necessary to account for morpheme and adverb order.

106 (Hale and Keyser 2002), S&T hypothesize that grammatically relevant properties for the mentioned domains are encoded at the top of the CP domain, in projections which they label Speech Act Phrase (similar to Rizzi’s “ForceP”), as in (64), and Sentience Phrase. (64)

SaP Sa’

XPSpeaker Sa

Sa*P

YPUtterance-Content

Sa*’

Sa*

ZPHearer

The configuration in (64) represents the formal encoding of sentence mood in terms of a layered "Speech Act Phrase" (SaP) configurationally defining the "P(ragmatic)-roles" Speaker, Utterance Content, and Hearer.26 The configuration of Sentience Phrase in (65) is the proposed locus of ‘point of view’ phenomena. This projection encodes the Seat of Knowledge pragmatic argument and Evidence:27 (65)

SenP XPSeat of Knowledge

Sen’

Sen

Sen*P Sen*’

YP(Evidence) Sen*

S&T follow Tsoulas & Kural (1999) in taking indexical pronouns to be operator-bound variables. They further assume that binding relations are computed over structures involving the

There is an intentional analogy to the configurational definition of θ-roles AGENT (A- θ), THEME (TH- θ), and in approaches like Hale &Keyser (2002). With hesitancy, S&T take SenP to be a unification of the more familiar "Evaluation Phrase" (EvalP=SenP) and "Evidential Phrase" (EvidP=SenP), for which one may consult Cinque (1999). It is an open question to what extent S&T's approach is intended to capture Cinque's (1999) idea that the functional projections in question should host semantically compatible adverbs in their specifiers. GOAL ( G-θ) 27

107 (syntactically represented) pragmatic arguments Speaker, Hearer and Seat of Knowledge, all of which function as variable-binders. The schemas in (64) and (65) together define the maximal range of P-roles, guaranteeing that no more than three "sentient" P-roles (i.e. Speaker, Hearer, and Seat of Knowledge) can be grammatically active. The Seat of Knowledge argument is conceived of as a null logophoric pronoun, interpreted as the “sentient mind” from whose viewpoint one can “evaluate, process, or comment on the truth of a proposition” (2003:332). The reference of the Seat of Knowledge argument is determined via co-indexation between this argument and the Speaker and Hearer roles, as well as other potential antecedents for logophors (to be discussed in chapter 3). S&T then go on to provide empirical evidence for their system, which they formulate in terms of formal notions like c-command, control via binding, and locality. S&T claim that their conception of the Sentience Domain (Speech Act Phrase and Sentience Phrase) forms the basis of why grammars usually encode no more than four basic sentence moods: declarative, interrogative, imperative, and subjunctive.28 They argue that the mood of the clause is determined by two factors: (i) the finiteness of the clause and (ii) the position of the Hearer argument.29 A declarative is defined as a [+finite] clause, while the subjunctive mood corresponds to [-finite]:

As discussed in chapter 1, I follow Palmer (1986), and conceptualize mood distinction only by that which is realized in the inflectional verbal morphology, consisting of indicative, subjunctive and imperative moods. As interrogatives in (most dialects of) Spanish display the indicative mood, they are not relevant to the dissertation, as they do not display a distinct modal category in terms of inflectional morphology. 29 According to S&T, SenP is the specifier of Sa*P which acquires and encodes the ‘Utterance Content’. Sen*P further embeds CP, which stands as placeholder for the remainder of the sentence. They assume that finiteness in encoded on the Utterance Content, encoded in Sentience Phrase. I follow the standard assumption that finiteness is encoded on FinP (cf. Rizzi 1997, Bianchi 2001, Kempchinsky 2009).

108 (66)

SaP Sa’

XPSpeaker Sa*

[+Fin] = Declarative Sa*P

YPUC-P

[-Fin] = Subjunctive Sa*’

Sa*’

ZPHearer

Interrogatives (which are [+finite]) and imperatives (which are [-finite]) are transformationally derived via an application of a counterpart of dative shift (cf. Larson 1988), as shown in (66), in which the Hearer role is promoted above Sentience Phrase. In these contexts, the Hearer binds the Seat of Knowledge position, as the Hearer is now its closest c-commanding pragmatic argument. (67)

SaP XPSpeaker

Sa’

Sa*

[+Fin] = Interrogative Sa*P

ZPHearer

[-Fin] = Imperative Sa*’

YPUC-P

Sa*’ Sa*’

< ZPHearer>

The analysis accounts for what Tenny (2004) labels the “Interrogative Flip” phenomenon, a term coined to explain the apparent anchoring of adverbials to the Hearer point of view in interrogative speech acts: (68)

a. Mary evidently knew the victim. b. Who evidently knew the victim?

(must be evident to SPEAKER) (must be evident to HEARER)

(69)

a. Honestly, Mary knew the victim. b. Honestly, who knew the victim?

(SPEAKER claims to be honest) (request that HEARER be honest) (Tenny 2004:3)

109 S&T take the anchoring of adverbials to the Hearer argument in interrogatives as evidence for the structure in (67), in which the Hearer is co-indexed with the Seat of Knowledge, and is thus responsible for evaluating the proposition. 2.4.4. A Revision to S&T (2003): The Embedded Sentience Domain S&T argue that every sentence has one and only one SaP (S&T:338), explicitly opting against an embedded SaP in an attempt to stay clear of the infinite regression dilemma lurking behind Ross’s (1970) analysis.30 Ross claimed that syntactic representations contained specific predicates which express the relevant speech act, and he claims that sentences with overt speech act predicates (such as ‘say that’ or ‘report that’) have the same underlying structure as the equivalent sentence without an overt speech act predicate.31 For example, (70a) and (b) have the same syntactic representation, as do (71a) and (b), and (72a) and (b). (70)

a. I tell you that Mary is a bad student. b. Mary is a bad student.

(71)

a. I ask you whether Mary is a bad student. b. Is Mary a bad student?

(72)

a. I request that you bake a cake. b. Bake a cake. According to Ross (1970), the claim that the (b) examples in (70) – (72) have both a

matrix and subordinate clause SaP, while their counterparts in the (a) examples contain only a matrix SaP, is vulnerable to the objection that there is no way of ruling out the possibility that the syntactic structure of sentence (70a) is actually “I tell you that I tell you that Mary is a bad

In this respect S&T diverges from Speas (2004). For an early critique of the performative analysis, as developed by Ross (1970), see Grewendorf (1972). 31 Ross, of course, is working within a representational view of grammar, rather than a derivational view, such as minimalism. He modeled the speech act domain as a full-fledged superordinate clause, i.e. as a structure of category S (1970:224).

110 student.” To avoid this recursion problem, S&T propose that there is one and only one SaP per sentence. So, (73a) would have the structure of (74a), and (73b) has the structure of (74b). (73)

a. I tell you that Mary is the culprit. b. Mary is the culprit.

(74)

a. [SaP [Sa’ [CP I tell you that Mary is the culprit.]]] b. [SaP [Sa’ [CP Mary is the culprit.]]] There are, however, empirical reasons to believe that the so-called ‘recursion’ problem is

not a sufficient reason to rule out the possibility of an embedded SaP. In Spanish, for instance, there is a type of interrogative clause selected by verbs like preguntar ‘to ask’ and verbs of reported speech/manner of speaking like susurrar ‘to whisper’ and decir ‘to say’, whose interrogative complements are not interpreted as questions but, rather, statements which report a question.32 These have been called “indirect questions”, a construction possible in all of the Romance languages (cf. Suñer 1994). The functional structure of these sentences contains a complex sequence formed by the complementizer que, followed by a wh-phrase (75b). The complement without the doubled complementizer in (75a) is interpreted as an assertion. The addition of the complementizer in (75b), on the other hand, yields the interpretation of an embedded interrogative, shown by the (in)felicity of the follow-up statements: (75)

a. Me dijo qué había comprado mi mamá … zapatos negros. CL.1SG said.3SG what CL.1SG have.PAST.3SG bought my mother … shoes black. ‘S/He told me what my mother had bought … black shoes’ b. Me dijo que qué había comprado mi mamá # … zapatos negros. CL.1SG said that what CL.1SG have.PAST.3SG bought my mother … shoes black. ‘S/He told me what my mother had bought. … black shoes’

Plann (1982), Suñer (1991, 1993) and Lahiri (2002) have shown that only those verbs which may embed a direct quote may embed what Suñer (1991) refers to as indirect questions. These constructions were first studied by Plann (1982).

111 S&T’s analysis, allowing only one Speech Act Phrase, cannot account for the data in (75b), in which the matrix clause is interpreted assertively, while the subordinate clause carries an interrogative (unresolved) interpretation. As declaratives and interrogatives require different configurations (different c-command relations) between the pragmatic roles Speaker, Hearer and the Seat of Knowledge, it is unclear how this could be achieved if only one matrix SaP were projected. More evidence that indirect questions contain their own Speech Act Phrase comes from the “Interrogative Flip” phenomenon, discussed above. In indirect questions, the Interrogative Flip associated with the Hearer role is clearly present in the subordinate CP, but not the superordinate CP, indicating that two different P-roles (i.e. pragmatic arguments) are anchored to the two separate clauses. This is unexpected, under the hypothesis that there is no embedded SaP: (76)

a. Te pregunté que honestamente qué compraste? ‘I asked you (that) honestly what did you buy?’ b. Honestamente te pregunté que qué compraste? ‘Honestly I asked you (that) what did you buy?’

(request for HEARER to be honest) (SPEAKER is honest)

It is unclear how the variation in pragmatic anchors of the superordinate and subordinate adverbials could be achieved via only a superordinate SaP. More evidence in support of embedded SaPs is that Romance languages show a “doublemood” selection by verbs of reported speech, such as decir ‘to say’.33 These verbs are referred to as such because they may select either a subjunctive or indicative complement. The indicative complement (77a) has the interpretation of a reported assertion, while (77b) carries the interpretation of a reported imperative:

This property is discussed in more detail in section 6.

112 (77)

a. María dice que viene Adan a la fiesta. ‘Mary says that Adam is coming (IND) to the party.’ b. María dice que venga Adan a la fiesta. ‘Mary insists that Adam come (SUB) to the party.’ The subjunctive in (77b) has the effect of changing the interpretation of the sentence from

a reported assertion to a reported imperative. Again, the ‘anti-recursion’ analysis of Ross (1970) makes the wrong prediction; if every embedding speech act predicate contained one and only one superordinate SaP, we would not expect the possibility for mood change in the subordinate clause. Perhaps the most compelling evidence for an embedded sentience domain is that matrix and subordinate peripheral adverbs may show different preferences for point of view anchoring. When appearing in a matrix clause, a speech act adverb like evidentemente ‘evidently’ must be anchored to the speaker (78a). When in the subordinate clause, however, the adverb may be anchored to either the speaker or the superordinate subject (78b): (78)

a. Evidentemente, María supo que la fiesta fue terrible. ‘Evidently, Mary found out that the party was terrible’ b. María supo que evidentemente la fiesta fue terrible. ‘Mary found out that evidently the party was terrible.’

(evident to Speaker) (evident to Speaker or Mary)

Evidential adverbs show the same pattern. When appearing in a matrix clause, the evidential adverb evidentemente ‘evidently’ must be anchored to the speaker’s point of view (79a), indicating that the Seat of Knowledge argument obtains its reference from the Speaker. When in the subordinate clause, the adverb has a tendency to be anchored to the subordinate subject’s point of view/evaluation (79b), indicating that the Seat of Knowledge argument is different from that of the matrix clause. We would not expect this if we assumed only one sentience domain (i.e. one Seat of Knowledge argument) per sentence: (79)

a. Evidentemente, María supo que la fiesta fue terrible. ‘Evidently, Mary found out that the party was terrible.’

(evident to Speaker)

113 b. María supo que evidentemente la fiesta fue terrible. ‘Mary found out that evidently the party was terrible.’

(evident to Mary)

Thus, I assume the existence of an embedded sentience domain in Spanish, based on evidence from indirect questions and adverbial anchoring in multi-clausal sentences. In the next section, I argue for one more revision to S&T’s analysis; namely, I argue that subjunctive clauses are tensed [+Fin], contrary to S&T’s hypothesis. 2.4.5. S&T’s argument for [-Finite] Tense in Subjunctive Clauses S&T argue that the determination of grammatically realized speech acts (declarative, interrogative, subjunctive and imperative) depends upon two properties: (i) the configuration (ccommand relation) of the pragmatic arguments with respect to the Seat of Knowledge argument and (ii) the finiteness of the clause. According to S&T, in both subjunctive and declarative (indicative) clauses, the Speaker c-commands the utterance content; the difference between the two moods is that subjunctive clauses carry [-finite] tense while declaratives carry [+finite] tense. In chapter 1, section 4, I reviewed various syntactic analyses of mood which attribute the subjunctive mood to deficient tense in Spanish, based on the observation that subjunctive clauses exhibit the strict sequence of tense restriction *PRESENT[PAST]. The sequence of tense restriction constitutes the primary ‘morphological’ evidence used to argue that subjunctive clauses are [-finite]. Thus, because these subordinate clauses may not carry a separate morphological or temporal identity, many researchers have considered these clauses temporally deficient (cf. Picallo 1985, Manzini 1994, Santos 1997). However, in a series of works, Suñer and Padilla-Rivera (Suñer & Padilla-Rivera 1985, 1987, 1990, Padilla-Rivera 1985, 1990, Suñer 1990) extensively argue against the claim that subjunctive clauses lack tense in Spanish, showing that tense restrictions are exhibited only in predicates which exclusively select the subjunctive; negation-triggered subjunctive complements

114 do not exhibit tense restrictions.34 The lack of tense restrictions in negation-triggered contexts is unaccounted for under S&T’s approach, as we expect all subjunctive clauses to exhibit a tense dependency, due to [-Fin] tense. Furthermore, as Suñer and Padilla-Rivera point out, the sequence of tense restriction *PRESENT[PAST] is also exhibited in complements to comissive verbs like prometer ‘to promise’, which select indicative complements in Spanish. Under S&T’s approach, we would expect comissives to select subjunctive complements. Finally, researchers on the syntax of tense have provided fundamental reasons to reject the idea that subjunctive clauses are [-finite]. On the one hand, many scholars (Zagona 2005, Stowell, 1996, Demirdache and Uribe-Etxebarria, 1997, 2000, 2005) have shown that, regardless of the mood of the clause, all complement clauses have a particular temporal relation with respect to the matrix clause.35 Moreover, as Kempchinsky (2009) notes, the present vs. past tense distinction of subjunctive clauses carries real interpretive effects, which we wouldn’t expect if these clauses were untensed (i.e. [-Fin]). For instance, the past tense of a directive followed by the past subjunctive may receive an interpretation in which the subjunctive clause event was realized. When followed by a present tense subjunctive complement clause, on the other hand, the subordinate proposition must be interpreted as an unrealized event. This is indicated by the (in)felicity of the follow-up statements:

See chapter 1, section 2.4 for more evidence and arguments against deficient tense as a trigger for the subjunctive mood. 35 Demirdache and Uribe-Etxebarria’s (1997, 2005) analysis, for instance, is intended to explain re-setting in indicative subordinate contexts, in which the subordinate clause to a past tense matrix verb may not appear in the future tense, but the present tense, like the following example: (i)

John loved that his girlfriend is coming/*?will come.

The obligatory tense construal is argued to be due to the re-setting of the subordinate clause assertion time with respect to the matrix clause reference time. They claim that resetting is driven by the principle of economy, according to which every step in the temporal derivation must be maximally semantically contributive; i.e. temporal derivations must yield an unambiguous ordering. Thus, regardless of mood choice, or even the language, there is a temporal dependency in complement clauses, which the generalization [+/- Finite] cannot properly capture.

115 (80)

a. Ordené a Pedro que terminara el proyecto … y efectivamente lo hizo. … pero todavía no lo ha hecho. ‘I ordered Pedro that he finish.PAST.SUB the project … and in fact he did so.’ … but he still hasn’t done it.’ b. Ordené a Pedro que termine el proyecto #… y efectivamente lo hizo. … pero todavía no lo ha hecho. ‘I ordered Pedro that he finish.PRES.SUB the project #… and in fact he did so.’ … but he still hasn’t done it.’ (Kempchinsky 2009:1790)

Example (80) illustrates that the temporal orientation of the subjunctive clause event clearly affects the interpretation of the complement, providing compelling evidence that the semantic effects of temporal orientation in subjunctive clauses is not semantically vacuous (i.e. not [-Fin]). I thus hypothesize that subjunctive clauses are indeed finite, contrary to S&T’s proposal. In summary, while S&T provide compelling evidence for the role of syntax in determining point of view roles, some modifications must be made. Namely, the evidence presented in this section suggests that, at least in some contexts, embedded sentience domains exist, and that subjunctive clauses are not temporally deficient (i.e. subjunctive clauses are [+Fin]). Based on these observations, I assume that the structure in example (81) represents a fully specified CP:36 (81)

Fully Specified CP [Speech ActP] [SentienceP] (TopicP) (FocusP) [FinP [+Fin]]

I will develop the proposed selection relationships and feature composition of Speech Act and Sentience Phrases in complement clauses as more evidence is presented.

I remain agnostic with respect to the potential for the discourse-related projections [TopicP] and [FocusP].

116 2.5. On the Syntax of Complement Clauses In this section, I adapt Speas and Tennyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (2003) syntactic structure to account for the left periphery of indicative and lexically-selected complement clauses. I will then outline the preliminary syntactic analysis for complement clauses to emotive and negated epistemic predicates, though I continue to develop the analysis for these clauses in chapter 3. 2.5.1. The Syntax of Indicative and Lexically-Selected Subjunctive Clauses In this section, I detail the syntactic proposal for the complement clause CP to lexicallyselected subjunctive clauses and embedded assertions, based on S&Tâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s framework. I follow Kempchinsky (2009) in hypothesizing that the subjunctive mood is lexically-selected under those predicates which introduce a buletic model of evaluation (based on desires), and that the complement clause CP in these contexts is fully specified. Many researchers have suggested that volitional, directive and causative predicates lexically select subjunctive complement clauses, as a number of cross-linguistic evidence from attrition supports this claim. First, all languages which exhibit morphologically realized mood exhibit the subjunctive mood in these contexts (Quer 1998, Kempchinsky 1986, 2009, among many others). Moreover, strongly intensional contexts constitute the last context in which the subjunctive mood is lost due to attrition (Poplack 1992, Silva-CorvalĂĄn 1994, Montrul 2005). Furthermore, cross-linguistically, the subjunctive mood is triggered in only the immediately subordinate clause in these contexts, evidence of a (local) selection relationship. Thus, there is much compelling empirical evidence that the subjunctive mood in volitional, directive and causative complements is the result of lexical selection. In section 3, we saw that complement clauses to volitional and directive predicates are interpreted with non-veridical semantics on the part of the speaker. With respect to the matrix

117 subject, however, these complement clauses carry an anti-veridical interpretation. This is illustrated in example (82). It is infelicitous for the speaker to imply that the proposition expressed by the subordinate clause is believed true by the matrix subject in the actual world WR:37 (82)

Adan quiere/le ordena que vuelva su esposa. Adam wants/CL.DAT order.3SG that returns.PRES.SUB.3SG. his wife ‘Adam wants/orders his wife to return (SUB).’ # … y pro sabe que pro volvió ayer. # … and pro knows that pro return.PAST.IND.3SG yesterday # … and he knows that she returned (IND) yesterday.’

The truth of the proposition, then, is obligatorily anchored to the matrix subject’s perspective, as the truth value of the proposition is relevant only to this argument. I suggest that, in these contexts, the Seat of Knowledge argument (i.e. the pragmatic argument responsible for truth value evaluation of the proposition) is the matrix subject. How the Seat of Knowledge obtains this reference in lexically-selected contexts is the focus of chapter 3. For now, I concentrate only on the syntactic structure based on the interpretive facts. We may thus posit the following preliminary (relevant) structural hypothesis for the complement clause CP in lexically-selected contexts, where SoK represents the Seat of Knowledge argument:

It should be noted that the tense construal of the matrix and complement clauses makes a difference. When both clauses appear with past tense morphology, the speaker may imply that the matrix subject believes the complement clause to have been realized: (i)

Adan quería/le ordenó que vuelva su esposa. Adam want/CL.DAT order.PAST.3SG that returns.PAST.SUB.3SG his wife ‘Adam wanted/ordered his wife to return (PAST.SUB).’ … y pro sabe que volvió ayer. … and pro knows that pro returned.PAST.IND.3SG yesterday … and he knows that she returned (PAST.IND) yesterday.’

Thus, the anti-veridicality of the proposition appears to be linked to the event time of the matrix clause (cf. Kempchinsky 2009).

118 (83)

Strongly Intensional Subjunctive Complement CP SaP

(SPEAKER)

Sa’

SenP

SoK[matrix subject] SenP’ Sen

CP…

In section 2, I reviewed Kempchinsky’s (2009) proposal, which claims that the matrix verb in strongly intensional contexts introduces a buletic model of evaluation, and that this semantic interpretation is the result of syntactic selection (i.e. feature assignment) by the matrix verb to the subordinate CP. While Kempchinsky’s (2009) analysis cannot be successfully applied to subjunctive complements to negated epistemic and emotive predicates, the account elegantly captures the properties observed in volitional, directive and causative predicates. Kempchinsky calls the illocutionary feature assigned by strongly intensional predicates a WBUL (World) feature, which semantically introduces a buletic model of evaluation (cf. chapter 1, section 5, for the definition of buletic modality, following Villalta (2008)). WBUL is assigned to ForceP (S&T’s Speech Act Phrase), the locus of illocutionary force. Because this feature is the result of lexical selection, it is uninterpretable, and must therefore be checked and deleted by subordinate Mood Phrase, illustrated below: 38 (84)

… VW [CP [ForceP Force[uW]] [FinP [Fin Op] [IP (DP) [MoodP [V+T+MW] [TP …]]]]] selection

checking (Agree)

Kempchinsky proposes the presence of a quasi-imperative operator assigned by volitionals and directives. It has the effect of an anti-logophor, disallowing the subordinate clause subject to agree with the matrix subject, accounting for the subjunctive disjoint reference effect. My analysis differs from hers in this respect.

119 Recast in S&T’s terms, the following configuration arises, with Speech Act Phrase (SaP) replacing Rizzi’s (1997) ForceP:39 (85)

… VW [CP [SaP SaP[uW]] [SenP] [FinP +Fin] [IP (DP) [MoodP [V+T+MW] [TP …]]]]] selection

checking (Agree)

Recall from section 2 that, based on data from Greek and Bulgarian, I proposed that indicative clauses in Romance are specified with an assertion feature, as assertive force is not the default interpretation of indicative clauses. I call this feature a (syntactically represented) [assertion] feature (following Hegarty (1990)) which marks the mapping of the proposition into the common ground. I argue that this feature is interpretable, as the assertive status of the clause in Romance is marked only by the indicative morphology on the verb. As the feature is interpretable, it involves only an identification relationship between the assertion feature and MoodP, illustrated below (where [A] represents the feature [assertion]): (86)

… VW [CP [SaP SaP[A]] [FinP +Fin]] [TP (DP) [MoodP [V+T+M[A]] [TP ... ]]]] identification

Note that the analysis implies that this [assertion] feature, while interpretable in Romance, is uninterpretable in Greek and Bulgarian, as the assertive interpretation in these languages is not marked by verbal morphology but, rather, only by feature assignment by the matrix verb. Assertive clauses must contain a Sentience Phrase because, following the intuitions of Haegeman (2006) that ‘a proposition that is apparently true must be so to someone’; thus, it follows that a Seat of Knowledge argument, which indicates from whose point of view the proposition is asserted must be present in indicative clauses. The (relevant) proposed

Note also that the inflected verb in the subjunctive clause, like all verbs inflected for tense, will also enter into an Agree relation with the +Fin head, which is not represented in (85).

120 configurations for the subordinate Speech Act Phrase to indicative complements (87), and those to strongly intensional predicates (volitionals, directives and causative) (88), are illustrated below: (87)

Indicative Complement Clause 40 SaP

(SPEAKER)

Sa’

[assertion]

SenP SoKj/i Sen

SenP’ CP…

This is a simplification. Like subjunctive complements, indicative complement clauses appear to warrant a more fine-grained distinction. De Cuba (2007) has observed that indicative clausal complements to cognitive-factive predicates like saber ‘to know’ and darse cuenta ‘to realize’ constitute weak islands to extraction and disallow embedded fragment answers. Other indicative complements, like those to verbs of reported speech and perception verbs, on the other hand, are not islands to extraction and allow embedded fragment answers (cf. de Cuba 2007, de Cuba and Ürögdi 2009a,b, 2010, de Cuba and MacDonald 2011, Haegeman and Ürögdi 2010). CPs which subsume factive complements have been shown to have referential properties both distributionally and in terms of their semantics (de Cuba & Ürögdi 2009). Many syntactic and semantic proposals have been put forth to account for these apparently referential properties: for a movement derivation of such embedded clauses, see Haegeman (2009), who extends the proposal in Haegeman and Ürögdi (2010) to an event relativization analysis. For the referential approach, which relies on a truncated left periphery, see de Cuba (2007) de Cuba &Ürögdi (2009a,b) and de Cuba and MacDonald (2010). A detailed analysis of indicative complement clauses, however, is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

121 (88)

Strongly Intensional Subjunctive Complement SaP

(SPEAKER)

[uW]

Sa’

SenP

SoK[matrix subject] SenP’ Sen

CP…

From the perspective of model theory and conversation semantics, Speas and Tenny’s proposal elegantly accounts for how the syntactic configuration determines the model of evaluation from which a proposition is interpreted. Recall from chapter 1 that Quer (1998) defines a model of evaluation MR(x) in the following way in (89): (89)

A model MR(x) in a context c is a set of worlds W’ ⊆ W(c) associated with an individual x, representing worlds compatible with what x knows. The illocutionary force feature uW syntactically represents and semantically encodes the

fact that, in strongly intensional contexts, the complement clause proposition opens a set of buletic worlds W. These worlds are ranked with respect to their contextually relevant alternatives in the context C (defined in section 3.3, example (38)), with the highest ranked proposition mapped into a strongly intensional information state. The Seat of Knowledge argument, anchored to (co-indexed with) the matrix subject, then, syntactically represents and pragmatically encodes the ‘point of view’ of the individual x, to whom the truth of the propositional content is evaluated. The resulting model of evaluation is the buletic model of the matrix subject MBUL(subject). Assertive (indicative) clauses, on the other hand, do not require a particular referent for the Seat of Knowledge argument; in other words, the propositional content

122 of indicative clauses is not obligatorily anchored to a particular pragmatic argument. The assertion in example (87) illustrates that the Seat of Knowledge in the indicative complement is not co-indexed with a specific referent, giving us the assertive model of evaluation MEX(x), where EX signifies an extensional modal base, and the individual anchor (x) is not a specific individual. The ways in which the antecedent for the Seat of Knowledge argument is determined is a major focus of chapter 3; for the moment, it is only necessary to notice that S&T’s account elegantly captures how models of evaluation are syntactically represented, capturing the semantico-pragmatic status of these complement clauses. To summarize this section, I have argued (with Kempchinsky 2009) that the subjunctive mood in complement clauses to volitional, directive and causative predicates is due to a lexically assigned uWorld feature, encoding buletic semantics. This feature is assigned to Speech Act Phrase of the subordinating CP, which must be checked and deleted by the head of Mood Phrase. I have argued that the Seat of Knowledge argument is co-indexed with the matrix subject in strongly intensional contexts, evidenced by the fact that truth evaluation in these contexts is relevant only to this individual. Because the truth-value of assertions does not require judgment from a particular individual, the Seat of Knowledge has variable co-indexation in indicative contexts. The analysis thus elegantly captures the ways in which propositions are evaluated within models of evaluation. We are left with two types of subjunctive complement clauses: complements to emotives/negated epistemics and those to other negated predicates. For the moment, I refrain from a detailed analysis of negation-triggered subjunctive contexts (i.e. subjunctive complements to negated verbs of reported speech like decir ‘to say’, perception verbs like ver ‘to see’ and cognitive-factives like saber ‘to know’) because the subjunctive mood in these contexts relies on

123 the quantificational properties of the negation operator. Due to various intricacies which must be detailed for a proper characterization, I postpone the analysis of negation-triggered subjunctive clauses until chapters 4 and 5. In the next section, I posit a syntactic analysis for emotives and negated epistemics, but must first outline some assumptions regarding the status of the subordinate CP domain in contexts which lack illocutionary force specification. 2.5.2. The Nature of Speech Act Phrase and Subordinator Phrase In this section, I suggest that clause-selecting predicates which do not assign an illocutionary feature (negated epistemic and emotive predicates) do not select a subordinate Speech Act Phrase. Instead, these predicates select an underspecified Sub(ordinator) Phrase, which serves only to house the complementizer and subordinate the clause, and does not house an illocutionary force feature. Subordinate clauses have long been recognized to be more varied in structure than matrix clauses, a topic which has received much attention recently. Many scholars have advanced the idea of ‘deficient’ clause types or, in other words, truncated left peripheries in certain complement and adjunct clauses (de Cuba 2007, de Cuba and Ürögdi 2009a,b, 2010 de Cuba and MacDonald 2011). Other researchers (such as Haegeman (2010, 2012), Bhatt & Yoon (1992), Bennis (2000), Roussou (2000), and others) propose that the cartography of the subordinate left periphery is more complex than that of matrix clauses. For instance, a dedicated phrase for the position of subordinators has been proposed for Modern Greek (Roussou 2000) and Korean (Zanuttini et al. 2012), where overt particles occupy a position above the traditional C head. In this type of analysis, subordinating conjunctions are inserted in a position that Haegeman (2012) labels ‘Sub(ordinator)P’, which is a pure subordinator position, as opposed to a position encoding illocutionary force. SubP serves to subordinate the clause, making it ‘available for (categorical)

124 selection independently of its force’ (cf. Rizzi 1997: note 6). Haegeman (2012) motivates the existence for SubP on the grounds that there must be some projection which encodes the relationship between matrix and subordinate clauses. While SubP projects in every CP, Haegeman argues that Force Phrase (Speech Act Phrase) houses privative features responsible for clause-typing. According to Haegeman, Speech Act Phrase, when not assigned a clausetyping feature, does not project if there is no clause-type assigned.41 For reasons of economy, I assume that Sub(ordinator)P projects in complement clauses only when Speech Act Phrase is not selected (i.e. emotive and negated epistemic contexts). I hypothesize, with Haegeman, that SubP is present in these contexts because, in the absence of a Speech Act Phrase, there must be some projection selected to subordinate the clause and mark it as a complement. Unlike Speech Act Phrase, SubP does not carry p-roles or illocutionary force. I assume that, when an illocutionary force feature is assigned by matrix clauses to a subordinate clause Speech Act Phrase, this feature assignment encodes the subordinate relationship in the complement clause and, thus, SubP is not motivated in these contexts. The schema for Speech Act Phrase and Sub(ordinator) Phrase is illustrated in (90). Also included is the status of

Haegeman (2004) argues that ForceP, the projection she claims is the locus of deictic orientation and encodes illocutionary force, is projected in what she characterizes as peripheral adverbial clauses, as these clauses allow epistemic modals (c, d). Central adverbial clauses are those which do not allow epistemic modals (a, b), and, lacking ‘point of view’ phenomena, do not contain a illocutionary force (i.e. ForceP) (based on Verstraete 2002: 149): (i)

a. *Mary accepted the invitation without hesitation after John may have accepted it. b.??John works best while his children are probably/might be asleep. c. The ferry will be fairly cheap, while/whereas the plane may/ will probably be too expensive. d. If Le Pen will probably win, Jospin must be disappointed. (Haegeman 2004:163)

Haegeman concludes that “the CP-domain of central adverbial clauses lacks the functional projection that guarantees anchoring to the speaker and which is projected in root clauses (and clauses embedded under speech act verbs or propositional attitude verbs) (Haegeman 2004:167)”. According to Haegeman, both central adverbial clauses and peripheral adverbial clauses contain the position Sub, which hosts the subordinating conjunction, but central adverbial clauses are truncated, as they lack discourse projections and illocutionary force. For reasons of economy, my analysis differs from Haegeman, in that I assume that the SUB feature is privative, and only assigned in the absence of other illocutionary force specification.

125 Sentience Phrase in these clauses, though I remain purposefully agnostic as to its presence in complements to emotives and negated epistemics, which is a major topic of chapter 3: (90)

Complement Clause Typing in Spanish Indicative: Lexically-Selected Subjunctive: Subjunctive complements to Emotives and Negated Epistemics:

[SpeechActP[assertion]] [SentienceP] [SpeechActP[uW]] [SentienceP] [SubP[Sub]]

([SentienceP])

In summary, I have argued that the left peripheral configuration of subordinate clauses is determined by their selecting predicate, which in turn governs their semantico-pragmatic status. In the absence of a Speech Act Phrase, a Sub(ordinator) Phrase is selected, which does not carry a specification for illocutionary force, nor pragmatic arguments related to ‘point of view’. To briefly recap, this chapter has aimed at a semantico-pragmatic classification of complement clause propositions. I claimed that the indicative mood signals an assertion in Romance and, in embedded contexts, is the result of feature assignment by the matrix predicate. The subjunctive mood, then, is the “unmarked” mood for subordinate clauses, and surfaces as default mood in complements to emotive and negated epistemic predicates, resulting from the absence of illocutionary force. Volitional, directive and causative predicates, however, lexically select subjunctive complements with a strongly intensional modal base (i.e. denoting alternate desire worlds). Appealing to Speas and Tenny’s (2003) syntactic analysis, I argued that the Seat of Knowledge argument in strongly intensional complements is co-indexed with the matrix subject, while the Seat of Knowledge does not carry obligatory co-reference in assertive contexts. The remainder of this chapter discusses a few loose ends. 2.6. Some Loose Ends In this section, I explain how the analysis can account for the sequence of tense restriction *PRESENT[PAST] in lexically-selected contexts. I then make some brief

126 speculations with respect to the so-called “double-mood selecting” predicates, referring to the compatibility of verbs of reported speech with both subjunctive and indicative complements. 2.6.1. “Dependent” Tense in Lexically-Selected Subjunctive Clauses Recall from chapter 1 that subjunctive complements exhibit the sequence of tense restriction *PRESENT [PAST] under volitional (91), causative (92), and directive (93) predicates. Complement clauses to emotives (94) and negated epistemics (95) do not: (91)

Desea que Ana (lleve/haya llevado/*llevara/*hubiera llevado) una película emocionante. desire.PRS.3SG that Ana bring.SUB.PRS/PERF/*PAST/*PLPERF.3SG a movie exciting ‘S/he desires that Ana bring/has brought/brought/had brought (SUB) an exciting movie.’

(92)

María fuerza a Juan a que (tome/*haya tomado/*tomara/*hubiera tomado) la medicina. Mary force.PRES.3SG to John that (he) take.SUB.PRES/*PERF/*PAST/*PLPERF.3SG the medicine ‘Mary forces John that (he) take/has taken/took/had taken (SUB) a book.’

(93)

María le ordena a Juan que (tome/*haya tomado/*tomara/*hubiera tomado) la medicina. Mary order.PRES.3SG to John that (he) take.SUB.PRES/*PERF/*PAST/*PLPERF.3SG the medicine ‘Mary orders John that (he) take/has taken/took/had taken (SUB) a book.’

(94)

Lamento que Pedro nunca (llame/haya llamado/llamara/hubiera llamado). regret.PRES.1SG that Peter never call.SUB.PRES/PERF/PAST/PLPERF.3SG ‘I regret that Peter never calls/has called/will call/had called/called ( SUB).’

(95)

No pienso que Pedro (llame/haya llamado/llamara/hubiera llamado) a sus padres. NEG think.PRES.1SG that Peter call.SUB.PRES/PERF/PAST/PLPERF.3SG to his parents ‘I don’t think that Peter calls/has called/will call/had called/called ( IND) his parents.’ To account for the restriction observed under the lexically-selected predicate types in (91)

– (93), I refer to Kempchinsky (2009). Kempchinsky assumes a temporal syntax which takes Tense and Aspect to be dyadic spatio-temporal predicates, as in Zagona (1990), Stowell (1996), and Demirdache and Uribe-Etxebarria (1997, 2000, 2005). In matrix clauses, the external temporal argument of FinP’ is a reference time (the REF-T), while the external temporal

127 argument of VP is the time of the event (the EV-T). Likewise, the external argument of AspectP is a reference time (typically, the utterance time UT-T). The temporal and aspectual properties of a clause are determined via the co-indexation (binding) of these spatio-temporal arguments, as in (96): (96)

FinP

REF-T Finâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; Fin

TP (DP) T

Tâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; AspP UT-T Aspâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; ASP

VP EV-T VP

Demirdache and Uribe-Etxebarria (1997, 2005) analyze the syntax of tense construals between complement and matrix clauses according to which the Reference-time (REF-T) of the complement clause must, in most cases, be reset from its unmarked value to the Assertion-time (UT-T) of the matrix clause. Resetting is driven by a proposed principle that temporal derivations must yield an unambiguous ordering of the Assertion-time of the matrix clause and the Assertion-time of the subordinate clause (driven by a principle of economy according to which every step in the temporal derivation must be semantically contributive). Their analysis is developed to account for tense restrictions in sentences like the following, in which the subordinate clause to a past tense matrix verb may not appear in the future tense but, rather, only the present tense: (97)

John loved that his girlfriend is coming/*?will come.

128 The obligatory tense construal is due to the re-setting of the subordinate clause Reference-time, which must be ordered with respect to the Assertion-time of the matrix clause. Because the complement clause event is anchored to a past moment, and the present tense carries a future orientation from a past moment, the future tense is rendered infelicitous. This approach to temporal syntax assumes that Tense and Aspect are referential, syntactically represented arguments. Therefore, the re-ordering is one of linking (binding), whose corresponding spatiotemporal re-setting results from the interpretive output at the C-I interface. According to Kempchinsky (2009), FinP is the syntactic locus of speaker deixis, the locus of the Reference-time (REF-T) specification, which must link to the matrix clause Utterance-time (UT-T) in subordinate contexts. An indicative complement clause has the following temporal structure: (98)

[CP [FinP Ref-T [TP T [AspP UT-T [vP/VP V [CP [FinP Ref-T [TP … Ev-T ←default Resetting Kempchinsky (2009) proposes that the sequence of tense restriction *PRESENT[PAST]

in lexically-selected subjunctive contexts is the result of the future-oriented modality denoted by buletic modality (i.e. based on a set of desires for a future outcome). As Kempchinsky (2009:1801) puts it “as a modal element, the subjunctive mood is a forward-shifting operator. If the subjunctive verb is in the past, the past moment from which the modal operator shifts forward cannot be previous to the past moment of the event time of the matrix verb.” She argues that the restriction is due to a temporal linkage between the complement clause Reference-time (REF-T) in FinP and the matrix clause Event-time (EV-T), rather than the matrix clause Utterance-time (UT-T). When the subjunctive mood is lexically selected, intuitively it is the selection relation between V and the uW feature in Speech Act Phrase which

129 prevents the Reference-time of the subjunctive clause from accessing any temporal argument higher than the matrix Event-time. The following abstract structure illustrates the tense construal between volitional, directive and causative matrix predicates and their complement clause: selection (99)

[CP [FinP Ref-T [TP T [AspP As-T [vP/CP VW [CP [SaP SaP[uW] [FinP Ref-T [MP … Ev-T re-setting Because complement clauses to emotives and negated epistemics are not lexically-

selected, there is no link established between the REF-T in subordinate FinP with the matrix clause EV-T. These clauses obtain temporal orientation in the usual way: subordinate REF-T (reference time) links to the matrix UT-T (utterance time), in the same way as for indicative subordinate clauses. Thus, the restriction *PRESENT[PAST] is not observed in these clause types. 2.6.2. “Double Mood Selection” of Verbs of Reported Speech This section addresses the phenomenon known as “double-mood” selection by verbs of reported speech, such as decir ‘to say’. These verbs may select either a subjunctive or indicative complement clause. An indicative complement (100a) has the interpretation of a reported assertion, while a subjunctive complement (100b) carries the interpretation of a reported imperative: (100) a. María dice que viene Adan a la fiesta. ‘Mary says that Adam is coming (IND) to the party.’ b. María dice que venga Adan a la fiesta. ‘Mary insists that Adam come (SUB) to the party.’ The interpretation in (100b) is semantically identical to that of directive constructions. Directive predicates like pedir ‘to ask’ (101a) and sugerir ‘to suggest’, though also carrying a

130 ‘reported speech’ interpretation, invariably select subjunctive complement clauses with an imperative interpretation. For this reason, they are considered members of the strongly intensional (lexically-selecting) class: (101)

María pide que vengas/*vienes a la fiesta. ‘Mary requests that (you) come (SUB/IND) to the party.’ Verbs of reported speech with subjunctive complements, as in (100b), exhibit the

properties of directive predicates. Both display the sequence of tense restriction *PRESENT[PAST] (102) and subject obviation (103): (102)

Sus amigos dicen que *vinieran/vengan a la fiesta. Their friends say.PRES.3PL that come.PAST.SUB.3PL/come.PRES.SUB.3PL to the party ‘Their friends insist that they come (PAST/PRES.SUB) to the party.’

(103)

Sus amigos piden que *vinieran/vengan a la fiesta. Their friends request.PRES.3PL that come.PAST.SUB.3PL/*come.PRES.SUB.3PL to the party ‘Their friends request that they come (PAST/PRES.SUB) to the party.’ Quer (1998:58) has proposed that the semantic entry of reported speech verbs which

appear with subjunctive complements encode causation, and is therefore more complex than that of their indicative-selecting counterparts. He proposes that reported speech verbs do not directly select subjunctive complements. Rather, the subjunctive clause proposition is coordinated with another VP headed by CAUSE, a verb which selects the subjunctive. The verb of communication, then, expresses the manner of causing. In other words the ‘reported speech event’ is the element that caused the outcome expressed by the complement clause proposition. So, a sentence like (104) is roughly semantically equivalent to the sentence in (105): (104) The doctor said that the patient be given medication. (105) The doctor caused it that the patient be given medication by saying it.

131 Thus, the presence of the CAUSE component explains the extra meaning, as well as the lexical selection of a subjunctive complement, while the overt predicate decir ‘to say’ instantiates the manner in which the causation is brought about. Quer proposes the presence of a covert coordinated (represented by &P) causative predicate which accounts for the fact that, when verbs of reported speech select subjunctive complements, they exhibit the properties of strongly intensional predicates:42 (106)

&P &’

VP DPi

V’ dice

VP V’

PROi CAUSE

CP que vengas a la fiesta

Evidence to support the analysis is that both indicative and subjunctive CPs can be coordinated in the complement domain of a verb of saying, as in (107a), indicating that the causative meaning of the subjunctive clause is correlated with coordination. Causative predicates do not allow the indicative vs. subjunctive alternation in coordinated contexts, seen in (107b), suggesting that the causative semantics in these clause-types is not related to coordination: (107) a. Dice que te extraña y que le escribas. say.3SG that CL.DAT.2SG miss.IND.3SG and that CL.DAT.3SG write.SUB.2SG ‘S/he says that s/he misses you and tells you to write him/her.’ b. Lo fuerza a que tome/*toma la medicina y que duerma. CL.ACC.3SG force.3SG that take.SUB/*IND.3SG the medicine and that sleep.SUB.3SG ‘S/he forces him/her to take the medicine and sleep.’

It must be noted that the causative versions of verbs of saying are not equivalent to implicative predicates. He postulates that CAUSE has to be understood under the wider perspective of causative meaning adopted in Jackendoff (1990, 1993), in which an implicative interpretation is not always required but, rather, only the ‘intent to cause’.

132 I follow Quer in assuming that there is a covert causative predicate in constructions like (107a). In our terms, then, it is the covert causative predicate which assigns the World feature to the subordinate SaP. The rest of the derivation remains the same as it would for causative predicates. (108)

vP v’

Maríai v

&P &’

VP dice

VP PROi

V’ CAUSE

SaP Sa’

uW que SentienceP selection SoK Sentience’ There is one other difference between the two subjunctive clause-types, however. As Villa-Garía (2012a,b,c) shows, an extra complementizer, which he calls ‘jussive/optative que’, is obligatory after a dislocated constituent under verbs of reported speech in embedded imperative (subjunctive) clauses: (109) Dijo que a la fiesta, *(que) vengan. said.3SG that to the party *(that) come.SUB.3PL ‘He/she insisted that they come (SUB) to the party.’ Jussive/optative que is not, however, obligatory in directive contexts, which also carry an imperative interpretation, shown in (110) with the verb pedir ‘to request’:

133 (110)

Pidió que la sopa (que) la comieran. request.3SG that the soup (that) CL.ACC eat.SUB.3PL ‘He/she requested that they eat (SUB) the soup.’

Hence, it appears that jussive/optative que is only obligatory under predicates which do not lexically select the subjunctive mood on their own (i.e. verbs of reported speech). Villa-García (in press) attributes the optionality of jussive/optative que in directive contexts to the fact that predicates like pedir ‘to request’ and ordenar ‘to order’ lexically select subjunctive complements with an exhortative (desire) value, and therefore do not require the realization of a lower que to lexicalize the relevant mood. Because verbs of reported speech like decir ‘to say’ or repetir ‘to repeat’ do not inherently subcategorize an exhortative embedded clause, jussive/optative que is mandatory in FinP to lexicalize the relevant mood and mark the sentence as exhortative. I will make some brief speculations regarding the nature of jussive/optative que, as VillaGarcía’s analysis does not fit directly with the one put forth here. My analysis entails that the locus of illocutionary force specification is Speech ActP (Villa García’s ForceP) which, in lexically-selected subjunctive clauses, must be checked by MoodP, while FinP is connected to speaker deixis (i.e. the spatio-temporal orientation of the clause). Under my analysis, then, FinP is not directly connected to mood choice, as Villa-García hypothesizes. In the last section, I followed Kempchinsky (2009) and Bianchi (2001), who claim that the Reference-time of the clause is encoded in FinP, which is re-set to the matrix clause event time in lexically-selected contexts. This differs from subordinate indicative contexts, which is considered the default setting, in which the Reference-time is reset to the matrix clause Assertion-time. The temporal re-setting of a lexically-selected subjunctive complement is repeated below:

134 selection (111) [CP [FinP Ref-T [TP T [AspP As-T [vP/CP VW [CP [ForceP Force[uW] [FinP Ref-T [MP â&#x20AC;Ś Ev-T resetting I hypothesize that jussive/optative que overtly marks the new temporal shift from the default re-setting to this new re-setting. In other words, in indicative contexts, the complement clause reference time is re-set to the matrix clause assertion time but, in lexically-selected contexts, the complement clause reference time is re-set to the matrix clause event time, and jussive-optative que marks this new shift. The shift is obligatorily marked under verbs which do not lexically-select the subjunctive (i.e. verbs of reported speech), because the shift is not lexically marked. Directive predicates, then, do not require jussive/optative que in the presence of dislocated material because the lexical semantics of the matrix predicate lexically mark this shift. Clearly, this idea requires formalization. However, the precise nature and analysis of jussive/optative que is beyond the scope of this dissertation (see Villa-GarcĂa (2012a,b,c) for an extensive discussion of jussive/optative que). 2.7. Conclusion In this chapter, I have argued for a new characterization of mood distribution in Spanish. First, I defined the notion of assertion as an extensionally anchored clause which carries a positive truth value (as anchored to some individual) and a common ground update function. The indicative mood in Romance corresponds to assertive conversational force, although Italian carries the additional stipulation that truth relativization be anchored to the speaker. In Greek and Bulgarian, however, the indicative mood does not always correspond to assertive propositions. In these languages, the indicative mood is the default mood, surfacing in clauses which are not non-

135 veridical (i.e. both assertions and uninformative clauses). Because an assertive interpretation is not cross-linguistically correlated with the indicative mood, it follows that indicative clauses in Romance are syntactically specified. The cross-linguistic data support my claim that the subjunctive is the default mood in Spanish, as it surfaces in uninformative complement clauses to emotive and negated epistemic predicates.43 I have argued for a novel tripartite characterization of subjunctive clauses: (i) those that are lexically-selected by (strongly intensional) volitional, directive and causative predicates, (ii) those that are triggered by negation (or some non-veridical operator) and (iii) those which surface as the default mood due to the absence of illocutionary force. The third category constitutes subjunctive complements to emotive and negated epistemic predicates. To support this characterization, I first provided evidence that the ‘negation-triggered subjunctive’ category requires a more fine-grained distinction. Subjunctive complements to negated epistemic predicates encode non-veridical semantics with respect to the speaker, while subjunctive complements in other negation-triggered contexts encode anti-veridical semantics, a previously unobserved phenomenon. The observation promotes my proposal for a split in terms of characterizing ‘negation-triggered subjunctive clauses’, because a unitary category is not sufficient. I then showed that only subjunctive complements to emotives and negated epistemic predicates allow a de dicto interpretation, which forces a presupposition of event realization, a novel observation. I hypothesized that this interpretation results from the potential for these clauses to be extensionally anchored, a property not shared with other subjunctive clauses.

The informative vs. uninformative status of complement clauses is returned to at length in chapter 4, in which I claim that the pragmatic status of the matrix predicate determines the information status and, consequently, illocutionary feature assignment, to the complement clause.

136 Furthermore, because subjunctive complements to emotives and negated epistemics disallow ‘point of view’ phenomena, I predict that the subjunctive mood surfaces as the default mood, due to the absence of (intensional or assertive) illocutionary force. I hypothesized that subjunctive complements to volitional, directive and causative predicates are lexically-selected. Evidence comes from (i) the invariable licensing of the subjunctive mood cross-linguistically in these contexts, (ii) the sequence of tense restriction *PRESENT[PAST], which indicates forward-shifting modality (buletic/future desire worlds), (iii) only local triggering of the subjunctive mood, indicating a selection relationship and (iv) the fact that the subjunctive mood in these contexts is the last lost due to attrition (cf. Poplack 1992, Silva-Corvalán 1994, Montrul 2005). I followed Kempchinsky (2009) in assuming that these predicates introduce a buletic model of evaluation via syntactic assignment of an uWBUL feature to subordinate Speech Act Phrase, which must be checked and deleted by MoodP. I adopted Speas and Tenny’s (2003) proposal for a syntactically represented Sentience domain, and argued that complement clause CP to emotive and negated epistemic predicates lacks a Speech Act Phrase, resulting in the subjunctive mood as the default mood. The analysis also accounts for the fact that lexicallyselected subjunctive clauses require an anti-veridical interpretation only on the part of the matrix subject, due to the fact that the matrix subject is co-indexed with the complement clause Seat of Knowledge argument in these contexts. I also show how appealing to Speas and Tenny’s (2003) analysis can account for the syntactic representation of models. The illocutionary force specification determines the modal base of the proposition, while the Seat of Knowledge argument determines the individual anchor for the model of evaluation. Based on these

137 assumptions, I proposed the following complement clause sentience domains for indicative and strongly intensional subjunctive complement clauses: (112)

Indicative Complement Clause SaP

(SPEAKER)

Sa’

[assertion]

SenP SoKj/i

SenP’

Sen

CP…

(113) Strongly Intensional Subjunctive Complement SaP (SPEAKER)

Sa’

[uW]

SenP

SoK[matrix subject] SenP’ Sen

CP…

Example (112) illustrates that indicative complements carry an assertive illocutionary force feature, with truth evaluation anchored to some relevant sentient being. Example (113) illustrates that strongly intensional subjunctive complements carry an illocutionary feature which maps the proposition into a buletic model (based on desires), with the truth of the proposition anchored to the matrix subject.

138 In example (114), I schematically illustrate the proposed CP structure and illocutionary specification of complement clauses. Example (114a) illustrates that indicative complements carry an assertion feature, while (114b) shows that subjunctive complements to volitionals, directives and causatives carry an uW illocutionary feature in Speech Act Phrase. Negated epistemics and emotives select only a Sub(ordinator) phrase, encoding a [sub(ordinator)] feature (114c). I remain purposefully agnostic with respect to the status of SenP in the latter clause type, a topic returned to at length in chapter 3: (114) a. Indicative complements: b. Volitionals, directives, causatives: c. Emotives and negated epistemics:

[ SA[A] que [ SA[uW] que [Sub[Sub] que

SenP FinP] SenP FinP] (SenP) FinP]

In sum, I have developed a more fine-grained distinction of complement clauses which accounts for previously unobserved properties with respect to illocutionary force specification. The most important observation is that complements to emotive and negated epistemic predicates can be extensionally anchored, yet carry non-veridical, non-evaluative semantics, supporting a â&#x20AC;&#x153;subjunctive as defaultâ&#x20AC;? analysis of these clause types. While this chapter makes important contributions and forms the foundation for the complete analysis of mood distribution, there are clearly many questions remaining. Most obviously, I have not properly analyzed or characterized negation-triggered subjunctive clauses, including the obligatory presence of negation in epistemic contexts, for which I have argued that the subjunctive is the default mood. Moreover, although I have claimed that subjunctive complements to negated epistemics and emotives constitute a uniform class, there are wellattested differences which must be explained. It is well known that subject obviation and presupposition of truth on the part of the matrix subject are exhibited in complement clauses to emotives, but not negated epistemics. In the next chapter, I argue that both properties are due to

139 the causative modality encoded in the matrix clause in emotive constructions. The remainder of the dissertation is principally concerned with accounting for the subject obviation in subjunctive contexts (chapter 3), which carries implications for the CP structure of complement clauses, and the syntactic and semantico-pragmatic analysis of negation-triggered subjunctive clauses (chapters 4 and 5).

140 CHAPTER 3 MODALITY AND SUBJECT OBVIATION 3.1. Introduction The goal of this chapter is to account for the well-attested subject obviation exhibited in various classes of subjunctive clauses. To do so, I build upon the syntactic and semantico-pragmatic framework outlined in chapter 2, relying principally on the syntactic analysis of Speas and Tenny (2003), who propose sentience-related projections in the left periphery. In chapter 1 (section 1.3), I reviewed data which illustrate that Romance languages exhibit a phenomenon in the literature known as subject obviation, or the subjunctive disjoint reference effect, meaning that the matrix and subordinate clause subjects cannot co-refer. The disjoint reference effect is a property of subjunctive complements to volitional (1a), directive (1b), causative (1c) and emotive (1d) predicates, but not negated epistemic predicates (2a) or other negated predicates (2b): (1)

a. Volitional Context Maríai deseó que (ella*i/j/pro*i/j) tuviera un buen día. María desire.PAST.3SG that (she/pro) have.PAST.SUB.3SG a good day ‘Mary desired that she (*herself/someone else) had (SUB) a good day.’ b. Directive Context Maríai pidió que (ella*i/j/pro*i/j) tuviera un buen día. María request.PAST.3SG that (she/pro) have.PAST.SUB.3SG a good day ‘Mary requested that she (*herself/someone else) had (SUB) a good day.’ c. Causative Context Maríai hizo que (ella*i/j/pro*i/j) tuviera un buen día. María make.PAST.3SG that (she/pro) have.PAST.SUB.3SG a good day ‘Mary made that she (*herself/someone else) had (SUB) a good day.’ d. Emotive Context Maríai se alegró que (ella*i/j/pro*i/j) tuviera un buen día. María REFL.3SG make-happy.PAST.3SG that (she/pro) have.PAST.SUB.3SG a good day ‘Mary was happy that she (*herself/someone else) had (SUB) a good day.’

141 (2)

a. Negated Epistemic Context Maríai no pensó que (ellai/j/proi/j) tuviera gripe. María NEG think.PRES.3SG that (she/pro) have.PAST.SUB.3SG flu ‘Mary doesn’t think that s/he (herself/someone else) had (SUB) the flu.’ b. Other Negation-triggered Subjunctive Contexts Maríai no supo/entendió que (ellai/j/proi/j) tuviera gripe. María NEG know/understand.PAST.3SG that (she/pro) have.PAST.SUB.3SG flu ‘Mary didn’t know/understand that s/he (herself/someone else) had (SUB) the flu.’ In this chapter, I illustrate that the type of modality encoded on the matrix clause is

intimately connected to the subject obviation observed in (1), which I will call the subjunctive disjoint reference effect (henceforth SDR), following Kempchinsky (1987, 1990, 1998, 2009). I present evidence that matrix clauses which encode deontic or causative modality display SDR, a novel observation. I support the hypothesis by showing that the addition of an epistemic/evaluative component results in an environment in which SDR is more violable, indicating that only deontic and causative modality are the factors involved in SDR. I propose that, though the subjunctive mood and SDR appear to be intrinsically connected, it is actually the causative or deontic modal value of v which results in SDR. I argue that SDR occurs only in subjunctive contexts because deontic and causative modality are not compatible with assertive force (i.e. the indicative mood). Thus, the analysis hinges on abandoning the assumption that SDR and the subjunctive mood are intimately linked, a popular assumption which I believe is the source of many empirical issues that have haunted previous approaches to SDR. This chapter is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the relevant background assumptions related to illocutionary force and modality. I also detail the intricacies of the SDR effect and review previous analyses, as well as the empirical problems that each faces. In section 3, I provide evidence that SDR is connected to a matrix clause which encodes either deontic or causative modality, and detail the relevant semantic properties of modality. In section 4, I follow Miyagawa (1999) and Harley (1995) in claiming that little v is the syntactic locus of modality. I

142 review Speas and Tenny’s (2003) syntactic analysis in section 5, which details the syntactic representation of ‘point of view’ related phenomena adopted in this dissertation. I claim that the relevant ‘point of view’ argument in deontic and causative contexts is the matrix subject. This observation is relevant when analyzing data from Mandarin Chinese which constitutes crosslinguistic evidence that de se (self-ascribing) contexts are sensitive to pronominal reference. I argue that the Chinese data provide evidence for a parameter setting, connected to a positive value for finiteness, which reduces ambiguity with respect to pronominal reference in de se contexts, and that this parameter setting is responsible for SDR. In section 6, I outline the syntactic analysis of SDR. Finally, section 7 reviews some idiosyncratic properties related to emotive contexts, which I attribute to the compatibility of emotive predicates with various types of modality. I also concisely outline the proposed articulated structures of the complement clause CP domain. In section 8, I summarize the arguments and conclusions put forth in this chapter.  3.2. Background Assumptions, Previous Analyses and the Idiosyncratic Nature of SDR 3.2.1. Background Assumptions Before detailing the proposal for SDR, I will briefly review the analysis developed in Chapter 2, which serves as a crucial starting point. Chapter 2 was principally concerned with the definition and representation of illocutionary force in complement clauses. Illocutionary force is conceived following the Stalnakerian approach to conversation semantics (Stalnaker 1978, 1999). Under this approach, utterances are interpreted against a background of information, known as the common ground, which is understood as the set of propositions corresponding to the background assumptions assumed to be true by the participants at a specific point in the context. The common ground then determines the context set, which is the set of worlds compatible with what is believed to be true by the interlocutors previous to each assertion.

143 The illocutionary force of a clause is determined on the basis of the effect it has on a given body of information, representing the transference of propositional information into other information states. The truth-conditional content of a proposition can then be determined on the basis of its informational updating function. Thus, illocutionary force is an operation on information states; it can be construed as a function from information states to information states. In other words, in a conversation, illocutionary force takes propositions from one information state and maps them into another information state. An assertion, for example, takes a proposition which does not yet form part of the common ground, and assigns it a semantico-pragmatic function which maps it into the common ground (Stalnaker 1978). Volitional, directive and causative predicates, on the other hand, map their complement propositions into a buletic information state, which is made up of alternate (unrealized) desire worlds. Finally, I proposed that complements to emotive and negated epistemic predicates do not map the propositional content of the complement clause into an information state; i.e. these subjunctive propositions lack illocutionary force, and are therefore uninformative. Example (3) illustrates the ways in which illocutionary force maps complement clause propositions into information states, as proposed in chapter 2: (3) Buletic worlds (based on desires)

Assertions Common Ground Subjunctive complements to negated epistemics and emotives

Context Set

Strongly intensional propositions

144 The function of illocutionary force, then, is to implement an update on the context by mapping propositional information into new information states. I proposed that the indicative mood in Romance corresponds to the notion of assertion (an idea going back to Hooper and Terrell 1974). I presented data from Greek and Bulgarian which indicate that the indicative mood does not always correspond to assertive propositions in these languages, a novel observation. I argued that, because an assertive interpretation is not cross-linguistically correlated with the indicative mood, indicative clauses in Romance are syntactically specified by the illocutionary feature [assertion]. I argued for a novel tripartite characterization of subjunctive clauses. The first class is lexically-selected by volitional, directive and causative predicates. These predicates introduce a model of evaluation based on wishes, mapping the complement clause proposition into a buletic information state via syntactic assignment of a uWBUL feature to subordinate Speech Act Phrase. To define a buletic information state, I followed Villalta (2008), who proposes that a buletic model involves a scalar assignment by the matrix verb, establishing an ordered set between the embedded proposition and alternative propositions, ranked on a scale of desirability against a conversational background of contextual assumptions (common ground assumptions).44 The information state BUL(ETIC) thus consists of the set of worlds which is introduced and ranked on a scale of desirability (see chapter 1, section 5.2 for the formal definition of a buletic model). The second class of subjunctive clauses is triggered by negation, or some type of nonveridical operator, which is the focus of chapters 4 and 5. For this reason, and the fact that negation-triggered subjunctive clauses do not exhibit SDR, these clause types are not discussed

145 in depth in this chapter. Finally, the third class constitutes those clauses in which the subjunctive mood surfaces as the default the default mood, due to the absence of illocutionary force specification. Emotive and negated epistemic predicates constitute this class. I provided evidence that complements to emotives and negated epistemics are the only subjunctive clauses which may denote extensionally anchored propositions (i.e. anchored to the real world). However, they do not allow â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;point of viewâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; phenomena which, I argue, indicate the non-assertive status of these propositions. Based on this evidence, I proposed that the subjunctive mood is the default mood in these contexts, due to the absence of intensional or assertive illocutionary force. In chapter 2, I accounted for the syntax of illocutionary force by following Speas and Tenny (2003). Speas and Tenny propose a syntactically represented Sentience domain, consisting of a Speech Act Phrase (akin to Rizziâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (1997) Force Phrase) and a Sentience Phrase. I claim that, while indicative and lexically-selected subjunctive complements contain a fully specified CP, the complement clause CP to emotives and negated epistemic predicates lack a Speech Act Phrase, with the subjunctive mood surfacing as the default mood. I proposed that these clauses contain a Sub(ordinator) Phrase which houses a [sub(ordinate)] feature, responsible for subordinating the clause (following Haegeman 2012). SubP is deficient in the sense that it lacks pragmatic arguments and illocutionary force specification. To this point, I have remained agnostic with respect to the status of Sentience Phrase in subjunctive complements to emotives and negated epistemics, an issue that will be resolved in this chapter. In example (4), I illustrate the proposed CP structure for clausal complements in Spanish to this point: (4)

a. Indicative Complements b. Volitionals, directives, causatives: c. Emotives and negated epistemics:

[ SA [assertion] que SenP Fin] [ SA [uW] que SenP Fin] [Sub [sub]que (SenP) Fin]

146 In this chapter, I will build upon these assumptions to account for SDR. Specifically, I propose a distribution for Sentience Phrase in complements to negated epistemics and emotives. 3.2.2. Previous Analyses: SDR ruled out by Principle B In this section, I review previous accounts of SDR, and the empirical problems that each faces. Then I will present some data which reveals the idiosyncratic nature of SDR, detailing some of the variation and complexities involved which must be explained. In the Government and Binding tradition and in early minimalism, one prominent line of explanation for SDR was based on binding domain extension. These types of analyses amount to assuming that co-indexation of the subject pronoun in the subjunctive clause with the higher subject violates Principle B. These approaches adopt the view that the binding domain is extended from the subjunctive clause to the matrix clause because subjunctive clauses are “temporally deficient” (cf. Picallo for Romance and Progovac 1993a, 1993b for Slavic, among others). Picallo (1984, 1985), for instance, attempts to unify SDR and the sequence of tense restriction (*PRESENT[PAST]) by arguing that both are brought about by the establishment of a T(ense)-chain between the tense features of a subjunctive INFL node and those of its INFL antecedent, in a sense creating ‘anaphoric’ tense. The principal empirical problem that approaches which appeal to binding theory fail to explain is the lack of obviation effects between subordinate clause subjects and matrix clause objects (accusative or dative) in complement clauses to volitional and directive predicates. This is exemplified in (5) (data from Kempchinsky 2009:1791): 45

An exception to this generalization is obviation in subjunctive complements to factive-emotives with dative experiencer subjects: (i)

A Anai lei encanta que pro*i/j sea la ganadora. To Ana CL.DAT loves that pro is.SUB.3SG the winner ‘Ana loves that s/he (*herself) is (SUB) the winner.’

147 (5)

a. Animé a Elisai a [que proi estudiara en el extranjero]. ‘I encouraged Elisa that she study (SUB) abroad.’ b. Lai animé a [que proi estudiara en el extranjero]. ‘I encouraged her (ACC) that she study (SUB) abroad.’ c. Lei aconsejé (a Pedroi) [que proi cambiara de carrera]. ‘I advised him (DAT)/Pedro that he change (SUB) his major.’ The direct objects in (5a-b) and the indirect object in (5c) exhibit co-reference with the

complement clause subject. This is problematic for approaches which assume an extended binding domain; co-reference should be ungrammatical, as the matrix clause object c-commands the complement clause subject. Yet, co-reference is acceptable. Also problematic for binding approaches which rely on tense dependencies is that obviation effects occur in nominals (6), in which the subjunctive mood is not selected by a verb but, rather, by the volitional properties of the DP. Because volitional DPs do not contain event structure, they do not carry temporal specification. Consequently, there should be no syntactically motivated T-chain between the subjunctive nominal complement and the matrix INFL; thus, SDR should not be exhibited, contrary to what is observed: (6)

Nunca entendí [sui deseo de [que proj/*i se casara tan joven]] never understand.PAST.1SG his/her desire that pro CL.REFL marry.SUB.PAST.3SG so young ‘I never understood his/her desire that s/he marry (SUB) so young.’

Furthermore, the binding domain never extends higher than the immediately superordinate clause, which is unexpected if the entire construction (being tense dependent) is one binding domain (Kempchinsky 2009): (7)

proi deseaba [que proj/*i quisiera [que proi/*j/k lo acompañara en el viaje]]] pro desire.PAST.3SG that pro want.PAST.SUB.3SG that pro him.ACC accompany.IMPERF.SUB.3SG on the journey ‘S/He desired that she/he want (SUB) that she/he accompany (SUB) him on the journey.’ (Kempchinsky 2009:1789)

The obviation observed in these constructions can be accounted for on the assumption that dative experience subjects are syntactically (quirky) subjects. Evidence for this hypothesis is that dative experiencers can control PRO in adjunct clauses, which generally display subject control. This topic is returned to in section 6.

148 Finally, the most fundamental objection to tense-based approaches is that subjunctive complements to directives may appear in either present or past subjunctive, which indeed affects temporal interpretation. This is indicated by the (in)felicity of the follow-up statements. Note that, regardless of the tense of the subordinate clause, these constructions exhibit SDR, illustrated by the ungrammaticality of subject co-reference: (8)

As example (8a) illustrates, the past tense of the directive followed by the past subjunctive may receive an interpretation in which the subjunctive clause event was realized. In contrast, example (8b) illustrates that a past tense directive, followed by a present tense subjunctive complement clause, may not receive an interpretation in which the subordinate proposition event was realized. Thus, the data indicate that the temporal orientation in subjunctive clauses is not semantically vacuous (i.e. not deficient), constituting compelling evidence that the subjunctive mood and, consequently, SDR, are not the result of ‘deficient’ tense. Another approach to SDR is pursued by Kempchinsky (1986, 1987, 1990) and Avrutin & Babyonyshev (1997), and relies on the idea that subjunctive complements to desiderative and directive predicates are characterized by a modal operator in Comp. These types of approaches

149 view subjunctive clauses as embedded imperatives, as both lexically-selected subjunctive complements and imperatives share the impossibility to be assigned a truth value. The principle challenge to this type of approach is that subjunctive complements to emotives also give rise to obviation effects in most dialects of Spanish, though the truth of these clauses is generally presupposed by the speaker. This is illustrated by the felicity of the followup statement in (9), in which the speaker implies that the subjunctive proposition did indeed occur. Yet SDR is exhibited: (9)

Adani lamenta que pro*i saliera. ‘Adam regrets that (someone else/*he himself) left (SUB).’ … y salió temprano. ‘… and (s/he) left early.’

Obviation in emotive constructions remains unaccounted for under such approaches, which rely on the idea that SDR contexts do not carry a positive truth value. 3.2.2. Previous Analyses: SDR ruled out as a Principle of Economy Other approaches have hypothesized that subject obviation is not the result of a Principle B violation, but an additional principle which prevents the expression of a pronominal when an anaphor is possible (cf. Bouchard 1984; Suñer 1986; Everaert 1986). In other words, subject obviation is attributed to a principle of economy which prohibits the manifestation of an overt pronoun in contexts in which PRO is possible (i.e. contexts in which an infinitival complement is possible). These infinitival contexts are illustrated in (10) with a volitional (10a), directive (10b), causative (10c) and emotive (10d) predicate, the same contexts which were shown in (1) to exhibit SDR. Because verbs like creer ‘to believe’ (11a) and entender ‘to understand’ (11b)

150 typically do not have the option to embed an infinitival complement, co-reference between matrix and complement subjects is possible in tensed contexts:46 (10)

a. Maríaj quiere PROj/*i dormir. Mary want.3SG sleep.INF ‘Mary wants (herself/*someone else) to sleep.’ b. Maríaj insiste en PROj/*i dormir. Mary insist.3SG in PRO sleep.INF ‘Mary insists on (herself/*someone else) sleeping.’ c. Maríaj se fuerza a PROj/*i dormir. Mary REFL.3SG force.3SG sleep.INF ‘Mary is forcing (herself/*someone else) to sleep.’ d. A Maríaj le gusta PROj/*i dormir. to Mary please.3SG sleep.INF ‘Mary likes (herself/*someone else) to sleep.’

(11)

a.*Maríaj no cree PRO dormir. Mary NEG believe.3SG sleep.INF ‘Mary doesn’t believe (herself/*someone else) to sleep.’ b.*Maríaj no entiende PRO dormir. Mary NEG understand.3SG sleep.INF ‘Mary doesn’t understand (herself/*someone else) to sleep.’ The dilemma that these approaches face is that SDR may be violated in the tensed

counterparts to the predicate types illustrated in (10) in certain contexts, which is the focus of the next section. If such a principle of economy existed, variability should not be exhibited, contrary to fact. 3.2.3. On the Idiosyncratic Nature of SDR In this section, I detail the complexities involved in SDR which pose an empirical challenge to all analyses of the phenomenon, including contexts in which SDR appears to be

This is a simplification. The verb creer ‘to believe’ can have a control complement with statives and at least some activities: 46

(i)

Ann cree hablar bien el italiano. Ana believe.3SG speak.INF well the Italian ‘Ana believes that she speaks Italian well.’

Importantly for these types of approaches, however, infinitives are not acceptable complements to epistemics in every context.

151 violable. As has been noted in the literature, a variety of factors can induce acceptability of subject co-reference; the phenomenon is, as Landau (2004:855) observes, ‘‘notoriously intricate’’. Speakers show variability in their judgments of sentences with passive subjects in either the superordinate (12a) or the subordinate clause (12b), sentences with modal verbs in the subjunctive clause (12c), and sentences with an emphatic or focused pronominal subject in the subjunctive clause (12d): (12)

a. % [El niño]i fue forzado a que proi tomara la medicina. ‘The child was forced that he take (SUB) the medicine.’ b. % Anai espera que proi sea elegida para el puesto. ‘Ana hopes that she be (SUB) elected to the position.’ c. % Joséi espera que proi pueda terminar el proyecto a tiempo. ‘José hopes that he be able (SUB) to finish the project on time.’ d. % [La ministra]i insiste en que ELLA/[ella misma]i presida la sesión. ‘The minister insists that SHE/she herself chair (SUB) the session.’ (Kempchinsky 2009: 1792) Intra- and inter-speaker variability surface most remarkably as a function of the particular

matrix predicate, with volitional predicates querer ‘to want’ and desear ‘to desire’ being the most resistant to overriding SDR (Kempchinsky 2009). Consider the examples in (13), presented without judgments on co-reference: (13)

a. Ana quiere que sea elegida. ‘Ana wants that (she) be (SUB) chosen.’ b. Ana quiere que pueda acompañaros. ‘Ana wants that (she) be able (SUB) to accompany you.’ c. Ana quiere que ELLA os acompañe. ‘Ana wants that SHE accompany (SUB) you.’ d. Ana quiere que os acompañe. ‘Ana wants that (she) accompany (SUB) you.’ (Kempchinsky 2009:1792) According to Kempchinsky (2009), while some of the speakers consulted accept a co-

referential reading of the two subjects in (13a-d), the majority reject a co-referential reading for all four examples in (13), including speakers who accept co-reference in examples such as (12).

152 However, some speakers reject (13b窶電), but accept (13a). Thus, the intra- and inter-speaker variability with respect to co-reference in these contexts poses an additional challenge to those analyzing SDR. As opposed to viewing the data in (12) and (13) as an additional empirical burden, I propose that the apparent violability of SDR in these examples holds the key to understanding this phenomenon, by providing insight with respect to the nature of its source. A major claim of this chapter is that the the deontic or causative modal specification of a clause is directly connected to the manifestation of SDR. I claim that the apparent violability of SDR in (12) is due to the addition of an evaluative element, such as a modal verb (12c) or discourse operation (12a,b,d), which creates a semantic environment compatible with epistemic/evaluative modality, by providing the modal base with a real world component. The analysis implies that the modal specification of the clause, rather than the subjunctive mood, is the trigger for SDR, a novel proposal. Before detailing the analysis, I review some theoretical assumptions regarding modality which serve as the groundwork for the analysis. 3.3. Deontic, Epistemic and Causative Modality 3.3.1. Modality: Background Assumptions It is important to note that, while I take illocutionary force to be a syntactically represented semantico-pragmatic feature which maps propositions into information states, I assume that modality is a related, but independently specified, property. While illocutionary force encodes the semantico-pragmatic function of mapping propositions into information states, I assume (following Kratzer 1981, 1991) that modality is a semantic function involving quantification over worlds. While illocutionary force was the primary focus of chapter 2, I claim that modality is the relevant property with respect to SDR.

153 Kratzer identifies three separate parameters of modal operators in natural language. The first is the modal force, which differentiates modals such as may, which represent possibility, from a modal like must, which represents necessity. A second parameter is determined by the modal base, which is related to the accessibility relations from modal logic that each world determines the set of worlds that are accessible from that world. Membership in a modal base is defined by a conversational background. Different kinds of modality are linked to different modal bases. The third parameter that can determine the interpretation of a modal expression is the ordering source, which establishes an ordering/ranking among possible worlds. Kratzer’s analysis of modality explains the fact that modals like must have two different readings: (14)

John must be on vacation.

Epistemic Reading

(15)

John must go to the doctor.

Deontic Reading

In (14), must is behaving as an epistemic modal; the speaker is evaluating the truth of the proposition ‘John is on vacation’ in all of the worlds in the modal base that come closest to the ideal determined by the ordering source must. The sentence in (15) has the so-called ‘deontic’ interpretation, which is interpreted as a desired outcome, based on the speaker’s assessment of John’s health state. In (15), the modal base is a contextually determined set of propositions provided by what is ‘good for John’s health state’, and the ordering source must determines all of the accessible worlds and orders them with respect to the propositional content ‘John goes to the doctor’. Thus, while the modal base is a contextually determined set of propositions, the ordering source orders the sets of worlds that are accessible from the world determined by the modal base. Modality, then, is relative to the modal base b and the ordering source o, which Nauze (2008), following Kratzer, defines as the following (2008:138): (16)

modal base b: W →P (P(W)) determines a set of propositions and thus the accessible worlds ∩b(w) from any w ∈ W

154 (17)

ordering source o: W →P (P(W)) determines the partial order < o(w) based on the propositions in o(w).

In (16), the modal base b determines for a given proposition P the set of accessible worlds W within the real world conversational background w. In (17), the ordering source o takes the set of accessible worlds W determined by b, and ranks them such that the resulting output of the modal value is P. The modal base and ordering source determine the modal force of the proposition, which will be defined when relevant. 3.3.2. Epistemic vs. Deontic Modality in Volitionals With Kratzer’s (1981, 1991) theoretical background in mind, in this section, I show that volitional and directive predicates encode deontic modality (based on necessity/desire). Recall that volitional and directive predicates exhibit SDR, and are the most resistant predicate type with respect to overriding this effect (Kempchinsky 2009): (18)

a. Volitional Context Maríai deseó que (ella*i/j/pro*i/j) tuviera un buen día. María desire.PAST.3SG that (she/pro) have.PAST.SUB.3SG a good day ‘Mary desired that she (someone else/*herself) had (SUB) a good day.’ b. Directive Context Maríai pidió que (ella*i/j/pro*i/j) preparara la cena. María request.PAST.3SG that (she/pro) prepare.PAST.SUB.3SG the dinner ‘Mary requested that she (someone else/*herself) prepare (SUB) dinner.’ Volitional and directive predicates typically express a deontic interpretation, meaning

that these predicates are used to introduce a modal value related to necessity or desire. Thus, this type of modality entails a particular type of modal relation between a set of possible worlds and the lexical semantics of the matrix predicate. I follow Han (1999), who adopts Kratzer’s (1981, 1991) framework with respect to modality. Han assumes that the deontic modality denoted in volitional and directive contexts is restricted by means of a modal base ƒ(w), which represents

155 the set of all the facts known to the speaker in w. Furthermore, the ordering source s ranks the propositions in the accessible worlds on a scale of necessity or desire: (19)

a. Modal base = ƒ(w) = the set of accessible desire worlds w determined by all known facts f b. Ordering source = s The function ≤s takes the worlds in ƒ(w) and orders them with respect to the set of

propositions that are needed/desirable according to the subject, and returns the worlds that are as close to the ideal as determined by s. Crucially, the ordering source for the propositions embedded by volitionals and directives includes the corresponding proposition p. The set of worlds denoted by a deontic(p), then, is the intersection between the set of worlds denoted by ƒ(w), and the propositional content of the highest ranked world returned by ≤s. Deontic modal force is thus defined as: (20)

Deontic Modality: ||deontic(p)||w = {w’: w’∈||p|| ∩ ≤s(∩ƒ(w))}

Thus, the denotation in (20) crucially entails that the propositional content p to a deontic predicate is ordered within a set of possible worlds w, and is judged against (coincides with) the knowledge of the speaker f. Complements to the volitional predicate querer ‘to want’ and directive predicate pedir ‘to request’ generally express deontic situations. Example (21), for instance, is interpreted as the speaker bestowing permission/obligation to the subjunctive clause subject, and strict SDR occurs: (21)

Yoi quiero/pido que proj/*i vaya a la tienda. I want/request.1SG that pro go.SUB.SG to the store. ‘I want/request (someone else/*myself) to go (SUB) to the store.’

156 No epistemic reading is possible in this example; the construction cannot be taken to mean ‘according to the evidence it is possible that John will go to the store’ but, rather, that the subject wishes, imposes, or gives permission for John to go to the store. The deontic reading is the only possible reading in this context. Epistemic modality, on the other hand, encodes possibility, which is relativized with respect to different types of contextual assumptions (Kratzer 1991; Papafragou, 2000, 2006). I hypothesize that this type of modality is encoded in negated epistemic contexts, and denotes the logical assessment of probability with respect to the truth value of a proposition. Recall that SDR does not occur in negated epistemic contexts: (22)

Maríai no pensó que (ellai/j/proi/j) tuviera gripe. María NEG think.PRES.3SG that (she/pro) have.PAST.SUB.3SG flu ‘Mary doesn’t think that s/he (someone else/herself) had (SUB) the flu.’ Pagafragou (2006) follows Kratzer’s (1981, 1991) tenets of modal force. In her

denotation of epistemic modality, c is the modal base (i.e. the context of utterance) consisting of the real world w and an evaluation time t, and i is the ordering source (i.e. the index of evaluation): (23)

a. Modal base = c = the set of all facts known in the real world w at evaluation time ti b. Ordering source = i Epistemic modality encodes a function fc, supplied from the modal base c, and assigns a

set of accessible worlds to the evaluation world w’ and the evaluation time t. I adopt Papafragou’s (2006) definition of epistemic modal force, which is as follows: (24)

Epistemic Modality: ||epistemic || c, i = 1 iff

w’

fc (i): || ||c, <w’, t> = 1

The denotation in (24) entails that the context-supplied function fc determines for every index the set of worlds which are accessible from the evaluation world w’ at t. The function fc then

157 provides a set of accessible real-world situations, providing the context with a modal base from which to evaluate the probability of the current proposition. The proposition receives a positive truth value iff it is compatible with the set of real world situations generated by fc, as determined by the ordering source (index of evaluation) i.47 The most important aspect of epistemic modality is that it denotes the logical assessment of a proposition, as determined by an ordering source i against the modal base c. My analysis for clause-selecting predicates crucially distinguishes between evaluative propositional attitudes (epistemic modality) and dispositional attitudes (deontic modality). Because deontic modality deals with disposition and epistemic modality deals with logical assessment of probability, we can use the paraphrase ‘in view of’ as a diagnostic to determine if a given construction can be construed with a deontic or epistemic interpretation (Papafragou 2006). The introduction by “in view of’’ followed by ‘his/her disposition’ tests for a deontic context, while ‘in view of’ followed by his/her assessment of probability’ tests for an epistemic context. Example (25) shows that a typical volitional construction, with no additional semantic or discursive component, may only be construed with the deontic reading (25b), and strict SDR occurs. (25)

Maríai quiere que pro*i salga. ‘Mary wants that (someone else/*herself) leave (SUB).’ a. #In view of Mary’s assessment of probability, Mary prefers that s/he (someone else) leave. #Epistemic Reading b. In view of Mary’s disposition, Mary prefers that s/he leave. Deontic Reading

In section 8.1, I discuss the nature of the ordering source involved in epistemic modality, which is developed around the notion that epistemic modality involves comparative (scalar) possibility (Kratzer 1981, 1991). Because a detailed explanation of an epistemic ordering source is not necessary for our current purposes, I do not detail it here.

158 Now I will use the paraphrase test in the contexts in which SDR is more violable. Recall that, in section 3.2., we saw that contexts in which SDR is marginally violable include sentences with passive subjects (in either the superordinate or the subordinate clause), sentences with modal verbs in the subjunctive clause, and sentences with an emphatic or focused pronominal subject in the subjunctive clause (Kempchinsky 2009), repeated below: (26)

a. %Anai espera que proi sea escogida para venir al congreso con sus profesores. ‘Ana hopes that she is (SUB) chosen to come to the conference with her professors.’ b. %Anai espera que proi pueda venir al congreso con sus profesores. ‘Ana hopes that she can (SUB) come to the conference with her professors.’ c. %Anai insiste en que ELLAi/[ella misma]i venga al congreso con sus profesores. ‘Ana insists that SHE/she herself comes (SUB) to the conference with her professors.’ I propose that SDR is more violable in these contexts because of the addition of an

epistemic (evaluative) component, resulting in the epistemic reading of the volitional which includes an assessment of logical possibilities. In other words, these propositions include a component of meaning which encodes an assessment regarding the potential occurrence of the complement proposition, rather than expressing a purely deontic attitude. One such context is illustrated in example (27), with a modal verb in the subordinate clause. Example (27) shows that the addition of the modal verb renders both the epistemic/evaluative (27a) and deontic (27b) readings are possible: (27)

María espera que pro?i/j pueda salir temprano. Mary hope.3SG that pro?i/j can.SUB.3SG leave early. ‘Mary hopes that (%she herself/someone else) can (SUB) leave early.’ a. In view of Mary’s assessment of probability, Mary hopes that (she herself) is able to leave early. Epistemic Reading b. In view of Mary’s disposition, Mary hopes that (someone else) is able to leave early. Deontic Reading Because the epistemic reading is possible in (27), I suggest that the modal verb supplies

an epistemic conversational background by encoding an assessment, on the part of Mary, of the

159 current circumstances. This hypothesis is in keeping with the fact that epistemic modals, like poder ‘to be able to/may’ in (26b), have long been thought to encode epistemic modality (Kratzer 1981, 1991, Lewis 1986, Brennan 1993, Papafragou 2000). Because epistemic modals encode a modal base which includes the real world w, I propose that the epistemic modal creates an environment that is compatible with assessment/evaluation, by contributing a real world component to the modal base. In other words, the epistemic modal base shifts the modality of the construction by contributing a set of worlds which includes the real world, as opposed to a purely deontic context, which introduces only a set of desire worlds. Like epistemic modals (26b), passivization (26a) and focalization (26c) require some type of circumstantial presupposition (i.e. a real world component). Passivization (26a), for instance, requires that the passivized constituent be discourse-old (i.e. forms common ground/assumption of circumstances in the real world), while clauses containing a focalized constituent (26c) require that the rheme (the unfocalized portion of the clause) be discourse old (López 2009, Rizzi 1997, among many others).48 The discursively presupposed nature of passivized and focalized constructions, then, entails a conversational background which forms part of the common ground. Therefore, the modal base includes the real world w. Deontic constructions without an additional real world component, such as example (25), do not encode a real world modal base, and are therefore not compatible with an epistemic/evaluative reading. Consequently, SDR is not violable in example (25).

López (2009) proposes that at the end of each phase of the syntactic derivation, the pragmatics component assigns discourse features to constituents at the phase edges. It is possible that this is how passivized and focalized subjects are also assigned [+anaphor] (a contextual background) by the pragmatics component. I hypothesize that it is likely this feature, or some variation of it, which contributes the real world modal component necessary for an environment compatible with epistemic modality. I do not provide a syntactic analysis here, as the precise mechanism through which the discourse/pragmatic components interact with the syntactic component in passivized and focalized constructions is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

160 The final semantic output of the complement propositions in (26a-c) is not, of course, purely epistemic, as the complement propositions clearly still involve a model of evaluation based on desires. The lexical semantics of the volitional and directive predicates do not change; these predicates still assign an illocutionary force feature to the complement clause which introduces a buletic model of evaluation (i.e. set of desire worlds) in which the proposition is situated, as discussed in section 2.1. Thus, like all volitional and directive constructions, the complement proposition is evaluated and ranked within the buletic model of the speaker. The difference between examples (25) and (26), then, is not the illocutionary force specification of the complement clause but, I claim, the modality encoded on matrix v. To summarize, I have argued that the violability of SDR results from the addition of an evaluative/epistemic modal element, via a modal verb, or a passivized or focalized constituent. Like all volitional and directive contexts, the resulting interpretation involves a buletic model of evaluation, resulting from illocutionary assignment by the matrix volitional or directive predicate. The difference is only the addition of an evaluative component, which provides the modal base with a real world component from which to assess the outcome of the proposition and, thus, encodes epistemic modality. The novel observation that the violability of SDR is the direct result of an epistemic component is compelling evidence that deontic modality is the property responsible for SDR in volitional and directive contexts, rather than the manifestation of the subjunctive mood itself. The analysis carries the additional benefit of accounting for the fact that the appearance of a modal like poder â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;to be ableâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; can ameliorate SDR, a phenomenon which has not been previously explained. In section 4, I will give the structural analysis of SDR constructions. First, however, I discuss the other environment in which SDR occurs: causative contexts.

161 3.3.3. Causative Modality In addition to volitional and directive contexts, SDR is also observed in complements to causative (28a) and emotive (28b) predicates: (28)

a. Causative Context Maríai hizo que (ella*i/j/pro*i/j) tuviera un buen día. María make.PAST.3SG that (she/pro) have.PAST.SUB. a good day ‘Mary made that she (someone else/*herself) had (SUB) a good day.’ b. Emotive Context Maríai se alegró que (ella*i/j/pro*i/j) tuviera un buen día. María REFL.3SG make-happy.PAST.3SG that (she/pro) have.PAST.SUB. a good day ‘Mary was happy that she (someone else/*herself) had (SUB) a good day.’

There is little debate that causative predicates like forzar ‘to force’, obligar ‘to obligate’ and hacer ‘to make’ in (28a) express a relationship of causation between the matrix predicate and the complement clause event (Jackendoff 1993). To account for SDR in the emotive contexts of (28b), however, I follow Quer (1998), who analyzes emotive predicates like lamentar ‘to regret’, alegrarse de ‘to be happy’ and preocupar ‘to worry’ as causative in nature. As Quer notes, emotives can be shown to belong to what Jackendoff (1993) calls the ‘family of causative concepts’. That is, the conceptual structure of emotive predicates includes CAUSE as one of their basic ingredients, in that the event expressed by the subjunctive complement clause to emotives is responsible for causing the resulting emotion. For instance, in (29), the propositional complement that Adam left early had the effect of causing Isabel’s emotion of regret: (29)

Isabel lamenta que Adan saliera temprano. ‘Isabel regrets that Adam left (SUB) early.’

I follow Quer (1998) in viewing the causative entailment of emotive predicates as evidence that emotive constructions encode causation. Under this view, we can conclude that the classes of predicates which express causation exhibit SDR.

With respect to the modality of causative expressions, I assume that causative modality bears some resemblance to deontic modality, and adapt Han’s (2000) definition of deontic

162 modality to define causative modality. Both deontic and causative modality represent an intersection, or causal relationship, between the event expressed by the subordinate clause and the matrix clause event. However, while deontic modality introduces an intersection between a necessity/desire event and a proposition p, causative modality introduces an intersection between a causing event and a proposition p. I assume that the semantic representation for causation, then, can be represented by slightly modifying our previous analysis for deontic modality. While a deontic proposition p is ordered with respect to relevant alternate worlds w, causative modality takes the event denoted by the proposition p and orders it with respect to the resulting causation/emotion e. The output is a caused (realized in the real world) proposition p. The event denoted by causative(p) is therefore an intersection between the event denoted by p and the matrix clause causing event returned by ≤s (adapted from Han (2000)): (30)

Causative Modality: a. Modal base = ƒ(w) = the set of accessible worlds w determined by all known facts f b. Ordering source = s ||causative(p)||e = {e’: e’∈||p|| ∩ ≤s(∩ƒ(w))}

The denotation of (30) entails that the function ≤s takes the proposition p and orders it within f(w), resulting in a propositional event which is subsumed within the set of facts that the speaker knows. We have now seen a direct correlation between deontic and causative modality and SDR. In the next section, I propose that modality is encoded on little v, and I identify the four types of modality which may be encoded on clause-selecting matrix v: deontic, causative, epistemic and assertive. The first three result in subjunctive complement clauses, while only the first two exhibit SDR.

163 3.4. Little v and Modality To investigate the syntactic properties of clause-selecting constructions, I adopt the analysis of verbal predicates generally assumed in minimalist approaches to syntax. I assume that the architecture of transitive and unergative verbal predicates is composed of a higher functional layer or shell, a typically phonetically null v, and a lower lexical layer or shell V: (31)

Transitive ‘light verb’ vP v’

DP Mary v

VP V closed

DP the door

A number of linguists have proposed that the different nature of events (e.g. causative, stative) is not determined by lexico-semantic information contained in the lexical entries of the verbal roots but, rather, is dictated by the various types of v heads that contain specific eventsemantic content.49 The structures in (32) show this contrast for the sentences Mary closed the door (32a), The door closed (32b) and Mary danced (32c). (32)

Types of eventive v a. vCAUSE ‘Mary closed the door’ vP v’

DPagent vCAUSE

V closed

VP DP [DP the door]

Kratzer (1996, 2002), Hale & Keyser (2002), Folli & Harley (2005), Harley (1995), Chomsky (1995), among many others, propose that little v is composed of both lexical and functional properties, in keeping with my assumption that modality is encoded on v.

164 b. vBECOME ‘The door closed’ vP vBECOME

V closed

DP [DP the door]

c. vDO ‘Mary danced’ vP v’

DPagent Mary vDO

VP V danced

The argument structure and function of causative constructions, for instance, is elegantly explained under this type of approach. Many researchers, such as Miyagawa (1999) and Harley (1995), assume that Cause takes the form of a functional light verb which takes the syntactic material representing the caused event as its complement. In (33), the functional verb Cause gives the sentence its causative meaning, ‘somebody (Mary) caused the chocolate to melt’ by virtue of embedding the predicate VP melted the chocolate ‘i.e., the chocolate melted’. Thus, Cause is responsible for both introducing the causing event (e’) and relating it with the event involved in the embedded material (e), shown in (33) (adapted from Harley (1995)):

165 (33)

(Mary) melted the chocolate. vP λe. (∃e’) melting (e’) & theme (e’, the ice) & CAUSE (e, e’)

Cause λf.λe.(∃e’)f(e’) & CAUSE (e,e’)

VP λe. melting (e) & theme (e, the ice)

V melted

DP the chocolate

Following Harley’s (1995) framework, I assume that modality is part of the feature make-up of v, and that v then establishes the relationship between the modal entry of the clause and the argument structure of the predicate. For example, a construction containing a clause-selecting emotive like agradar ‘to be pleasing’, which exhibits SDR and encodes causative modality, is illustrated below. Clause-selecting emotives are two place predicates; accordingly, in a sentence like (34), the emotive agradar ‘to be pleasing’ selects an experiencer subject (“Mary”), and a proposition theme (“the team won”). The proposition the team won (e) is responsible for the caused eventuality between the propositional event e and the experiencer subject Mary (e’), resulting in the caused emotion of being pleased. The syntactic configuration is illustrated in example (35): (34)

A María le agrada que el equipo haya triunfado. to Mary CL.DAT.3SG please.3SG that the team has.SUB.3SG won ‘Mary is pleased that the team has (SUB) won.’

166 (35) v’

Exp (To) Mary

vP λe. (∃e’) p (the team won) (e) & experiencer (e’, Mary) & CAUSE (e, e’)

Cause λf. λe. (∃e’)f(e’) & CAUSE (e,e’)

VP λe. pleasing (e) & p (e, the team won)

V is pleasing

CP that the team has (SUB) won

Example (35) illustrates the causative modal function of an emotive predicate like agradar ‘to like’, based on the argument structure of causative matrix v. We have seen three types of modality which can be encoded on clause-selecting matrix v: deontic, causative and epistemic. I have hypothesized that volitional and directive predicates typically surface with deontic v, while causative and emotive predicates typically surface with causative v, with both types triggering SDR. I have also proposed that the addition of an evaluative component, like a modal verb or passivized or focalized constituent, contributes a real world modal base, rendering an environment compatible with epistemic v. Epistemic v does not trigger SDR and, for this reason, SDR is not exhibited in negated epistemic contexts. Finally, I propose a fourth type of matrix v, whose complement clauses are assertive. This type of v encodes an extensional modal function, which I call assertive modality. In chapter 2, I followed Farkas (1992), who proposes that assertive clauses are anchored to an extensional (single world) modal base; it follows, then, that the modality on assertive v encodes the extensional modal base from which assertive propositions must be interpreted. Recall from chapter 1, section 2, that I adopt Fintel and Heim’s (2011) conception of an intensional base as

167 an environment which introduces a set of possible worlds, while an extensional modal base introduces a set of things that a proposition denotes in a single world: (36)

Definition 1: Extensional Environments A proposition is extensionally anchored iff the modal anchor is a single world; i.e. the proposition is interpreted with respect to one particular world, the one introduced by the extensional predicate.

(37)

Definition 2: Intensional Environments A proposition is intensionally anchored iff the modal anchor constitutes a set of worlds. Von Fintel and Heim (2011) claim that extensional modality signifies that, for any

expression α, we have ⟦α⟧w,g, the semantic value of α in w, also known as the EXTENSION of α in a single world w. The ordering source g, then, determines the extensional base from which the proposition α is evaluated in the real world w. Following von Fintel and Heim’s definition of extensionality, I propose that assertive v encodes the extensional modality of indicative (assertive) propositions: (38)

Assertive (Extensional) Modality: a. Modal Base: The real world w b. Ordering Source: g ⟦α⟧w,g Assertive v surfaces with predicates that embed indicative complements, including

epistemic verbs (e.g. creer ‘to believe’, pensar ‘to think’) (39a), verbs of perception (e.g. ver ‘to see’, oír ‘to hear’) (39b), cognitive-factive verbs (e.g. saber ‘to know’, darse cuenta ‘to realize’) (39c), verbs of reported speech (e.g. decir ‘to say’, reportar ‘to report’) (39d), verbs of mental judgment (e.g. entender ‘to understand’) (39e), comissive verbs (e.g. prometer ‘to promise’) (39f), and fiction verbs (e.g. soñar ‘to dream’, imaginar ‘to imagine’) (39g): (39)

Indicative Contexts a. Epistemic Verb María cree que su profesor está enfermo. ‘Mary believes that her professor is (IND) sick.’

168 b. Verb of Perception María ve que su profesor está enfermo. ‘Mary sees that her professor is (IND) sick.’ c. Cognitive-factive Verb María sabe que su profesor está enfermo. ‘Mary knows that her professor is (IND) sick.’ d. Verb of Reported Speech María dice que su profesor está enfermo. ‘Mary says that her professor is (IND) sick.’ e. Verb of Mental Judgment María entiende que su profesor está enfermo. ‘Mary understands that her professor is (IND) sick.’ f. Comissive Verb María promote que viene a la reunión. ‘Mary promises that (she) is coming (IND) to the meeting.’ g. Fiction Verb María soñó con que su profesor estuvo enfermo. ‘Mary dreamt that her professor was (IND) sick.’ It should be noted that negated epistemic predicates are also compatible with assertive v. Example (40) illustrates a negated epistemic predicate with an indicative complement clause: (40)

Elena no cree que va a llover. Elena NEG believe.3SG that go.IND.3SG to rain.INF ‘Elena doesn’t believe that it is going (IND) to rain.’

The interpretation of (40) entails that the speaker asserts the proposition that it is going to rain, while also informing the addressee that Elena does not believe it. The semantico-pragmatic and syntactic analysis of mood in negated contexts is developed in chapters 4 and 5. For the moment, it is only relevant to note that negated epistemic predicates are compatible with assertive v. Finally, as Quer (1998) points out, acceptance of the indicative mood in complements to emotives is possible, though subject to dialectal variation and idiosyncratic factors. Quer (1998), Borrego et al. (1986) and Bosque (1990) view the possiblity of the indicative mood as a consequence of the potential assertive use of the emotive, which may be paraphrased as ‘happy/regret to report that…’. In these contexts, the emotive predicate embeds an indicative complement clause:

169 (41)

A María no le agradó que su profesor estuvo allí. to Mary NEG CL.DAT pleased that her professor was.IND there ‘Mary didn’t like that her professor (IND) was there.’

I return to the topic of mood alternation in emotive complements in section 7.1. We have now seen that the modal value of matrix clause-selecting v comes in (at least) four forms. Table 1 illustrates the classes of clause-selecting predicates and the type(s) of v with which they are compatible. Assertive v (no SDR) Indicative-selecting predicates



Negated epistemics



Volitionals/directives

(SDR)

50

Epistemic v (no SDR)

 

Causatives Emotives

Deontic v Causative v

() 

()



()

Table 3-1. Matrix Predicate Compatibility with Modal Value on v () = possible, but only with the addition of another discourse related syntactic configuration (passivization, focalization, etc.) or semantic element (modal verb) which provides the context with a real world modal base

In sum, I have proposed four types of v with which clause-selecting predicates are compatible. I have also claimed that the presence of deontic or causative v results in SDR. By attributing SDR to the modal value on v, the analysis has the benefit of explaining those contexts in which SDR is more violable, as analyses which rely on the lexical semantics of the matrix predicate fall short in explaining environments in which SDR is not consistently observed. I have attributed the violability of SDR to the epistemic nature of v in violable contexts, which is made

Acceptance of the indicative mood in complements to emotives is subject to dialectal variation, idiosyncratic factors, and only possible in an eventive (episodic) reading.

170 compatible with the addition of a real world modal base, contributed by some evaluative element. While I have shown that SDR occurs in deontic/causative contexts, I have not yet provided an explanation for why it occurs in these environments. This is the focus of the next section. 3.5. On ‘Point of View’ in Causative and Deontic Contexts While we have seen that deontic/causative modality is connected to SDR, we lack a principled reason for why this would be, which is the goal of this section. The proposal relies on Speas and Tenny’s (2003) syntactic analysis of the CP domain, which assumes phrasal projections related to the pragmatic notion of ‘point of view’. In accounting for SDR, we will see that the Seat of Knowledge argument, the pragmatic argument responsible for truth evaluation, is particularly relevant, as this argument encodes the perspective point from which the clause is evaluated. I will illustrate that, in contexts which exhibit SDR, the Seat of Knowledge argument is co-indexed with the matrix subject; it is the matrix subject’s point of view to whom the clause is anchored in deontic and causative contexts. I ultimately argue that SDR results from a semantico-pragmatic parameter setting in Romance which prevents a de se (self-ascribing/selfattributing attitude) reading of complement clauses, linked to a positive value for finiteness on FinP. I claim that the parameter serves to reduce ambiguity with respect to pronominal reference in de se contexts, thereby facilitating the processing of pronominal elements. I provide evidence for cross-linguistic sensitivity with respect to pronominal reference in environments which denote self-ascribing (de se) propositional attitudes, supporting the proposal for a parametric restriction.

171 3.5.1. The Logophoric Nature of the Seat of Knowledge In chapter 2, I followed S&T, who claim that pragmatic sentient roles are syntactically represented, on the basis that person features are manifested in a systematic way. They propose a syntactically represented Sentience domain, consisting of a Speech Act Phrase (akin to Rizzi’s (1997) Force Phrase), which further embeds Sentience Phrase. Most relevant for the current analysis is that Speech Act Phrase carries illocutionary force specification and encodes the pragmatic arguments Speaker and Hearer, while Sentience Phrase encodes the ‘Seat of Knowledge’ argument in its specifier position. These pragmatic arguments, or p-roles, are conceived as null indexical pronouns, which function as variable-binders, and determine the ‘point of view’ to whom evaluation of the proposition is anchored. The Speaker and Hearer roles are invariably co-indexed with the speaker and the addressee, while the Seat of Knowledge argument may be co-indexed with various referents. The Seat of Knowledge is conceived as a null logophoric pronoun, interpreted as the “sentient mind” from whose viewpoint one can “evaluate, process, or comment on the truth of a proposition” (2003:332). The reference of the Seat of Knowledge argument is determined via co-indexation between this argument and the Speaker and Hearer roles, as well as other potential logophoric antecedents, which will be discussed shortly. In chapter 2, section 5, I showed that subjunctive complement clauses to volitional and directive predicates (deontic contexts) are interpreted with anti-veridical semantics; these propositions may not be believed true in the actual world on the part of the matrix subject.51 This

I follow Giannakidou’s (2006) conception of (non-)veridicality, who defines non-veridicality and anti-veridicality as the following: 51

(i)

Definition 1: (Non)veridicality for propositional operators a. A propositional operator is veridical if Fp entails or presupposes that p is true in some individual’s model M(i). p is true in M(i) iff M(i) ⊆ p, i.e. if all worlds in M(i) are p-worlds. b. Otherwise, F is nonveridical

172 is illustrated in example (42) with a volitional predicate, and in (43) with a directive predicate. In a present tense context, it is infelicitous for the speaker to imply that the proposition expressed by the subordinate clause is believed true by the matrix subject in the actual world: (42)

Volitional (deontic) context: Adan quiere que vuelva su esposa. # … y pro sabe que pro volvió ayer. Adam want.3SG that return.PRES.SUB.3SG. his wife … and pro knows that pro return.PAST.IND.3SG yesterday ‘Adam wants his wife to return (SUB). # … and he knows that she returned yesterday.’

(43)

Directive (deontic) context: Adan pide que vuelva su esposa. # … y pro sabe que pro volvió ayer. Adam request.3SG that return.PRES.SUB.3SG. his wife … and pro knows that pro return.PAST.IND.3SG yesterday ‘Adam requests that his wife return (SUB). # … and he knows that she returned yesterday.’

Because the (negative) truth value of the proposition is anchored to the matrix subject’s perspective, I suggested that, in volitional and directive contexts, the Seat of Knowledge argument is co-indexed with the matrix subject. The data suggest that complement clauses in causative contexts (complements to causative and emotive predicates) are also anchored to the matrix subject. As opposed to deontic contexts, the complement proposition in these contexts must be believed true (i.e. carry a veridical interpretation) by the matrix subject. The veridical semantics of the complement clause in causative contexts falls out straightforwardly from the real world event encoded by causative modality. That the truth value of the propositional content is anchored to the matrix subject is evidenced by the infelicity of a follow-up statement which implies that the matrix subject does not believe the complement clause to be true:

(ii)

Definition 2: Anti-veridicality for propositional operators A nonveridical operator F is antiveridical iff Fp entails not p: Fp → ¬ p

173 (44)

Causative context María hizo que su hijo se vistiera mal. #... pero cree que no lo hizo. Mary made.3SG that her son dress.SUB badly…. but pro believe.3SG that NEG CL.ACC did.IND.3SG ‘Mary made her son dress (SUB) badly. #... but she believes he didn’t do it.’

(45)

Emotive (causative) context María lamenta que su hijo se vistiera mal. #... pero cree que no lo hizo. Mary regret.3SG that her son dress.SUB badly. …but pro believe.3SG that NEG CL.ACC did.IND.3SG ‘Mary regrets that her son dressed (SUB) badly. #... but she believes he didn’t do it.’

Thus, examples (42) – (45) illustrate that the model of evaluation of subjunctive complement clauses in deontic and causative contexts is anchored to the matrix subject, as the complement clause proposition requires a veridical interpretation on the part of the matrix subject. Following S&T’s syntactic analysis, this means that the Seat of Knowledge in deontic and causative contexts is anchored to (co-indexed with) the matrix subject. As a result, we have the following (relevant) preliminary sentience domain for complement clauses in deontic and causative contexts: (46)

Clausal Complement to Matrix Deontic/Causative v52 SaP

(SPEAKER)

SaP

Sa’

SenP

SoK[Matrix subject] SenP’ Sen

CP…

It should be noted that this configuration isn’t entirely accurate for emotive predicates, in which I assume that Speech Act Phrase is not selected. In these contexts, SubP is projected, which does not house illocutionary force or pragmatic arguments. Relevant for our current purposes is only that the Seat of Knowledge argument is co-indexed with the matrix subject. The precise CP structure for all complement clauses in SDR contexts is detailed at length in the next section. 52

174 The Seat of Knowledge is conceived as a logophoric pronoun, which are special pronouns used in languages to refer to a pragmatically relevant individual whose viewpoint, words or thoughts are being reported (S&T). S&T adopt Sells’ (1987) characterization for the potential referents of logophoric pronouns, which may bear one of three pragmatic roles, as shown in (47): (47)

SOURCE: SELF: PIVOT:

the one who makes the report the one whose “mind” is being reported the one from whose physical point of view the report is made

While English does not have overt logophoric pronouns, the relative point of view to which adjectives and adverbs are anchored corresponds to Sells’ characterization of logophoric roles. For example, in example (48), there are three different pragmatic roles, or sentient discourse participants, from whose point of view the adverb may be interpreted as modifying: (48)

a. Mary heard that evidently it’s going to rain. = It is evident to the speaker (SOURCE) b. Mary heard that evidently it’s going to rain. = It is evident to Mary (SELF) c. Mary heard that evidently it’s going to rain. = It is evident to the meteorologist (PIVOT) S&T propose that the ‘Seat of Knowledge’ (henceforth SoK) argument accounts for this

type of adjectival and adverbial anchoring. Furthermore, the SoK may be co-indexed with the Speaker, Hearer or one of Sells’ three pragmatic roles, ensuring that only these five arguments can serve as potential antecedents. Adopting Sells’ characterization, it follows that the SoK pronoun in Spec, Sentience Phrase in deontic and causative propositions is anchored to the SELF role, as it is the mind of the matrix subject that is reported in these contexts. The matrix subject, then, serves as the anchor for the co-indexation of the SoK position, shown below in a deontic volitional/directive context:

175 (49)

Adani quiere/pide que pro*i vuelva. Adam wants/request.3SG that pro returns.PRES.SUB.3SG ‘Adam wants/requests that s/he (someone else/*himself) returns (SUB).’ = It is Adam’s desire/mind being reported (SELF) TP

Adam(ANCHOR)i T’ wants

DP v’ <Adam(ANCHOR)> v’ VP < want + [deontic]> <want> SaP que + SentienceP [uWBUL] SoK[SELF]i Sentience’ Sen

FinP [+Fin]

pro*i

…

The representation in (49) illustrates that co-reference is banned between both the complement clause SoK argument and the matrix subject; this is because the SoK carries the SELF role, and is therefore co-indexed with the matrix subject, which may not co-refer with the complement clause subject. While the syntactic derivation illustrates the restriction of co-reference between the complement clause subject and the SELF argument(s), it is still unclear why it is banned. This is the topic of the next section. To summarize this section, I have reviewed S&T’s proposal that every clause comes equipped with 3 syntactically represented pragmatic arguments: the Speaker, Hearer and Seat of Knowledge. The SoK is conceived as a null logophoric pronoun and, adopting Sells’ (1987) characterization of logophoric pronouns, there are five potential antecedents from which it may

176 obtain reference: Speaker, Hearer, SOURCE, SELF or PIVOT. I have also proposed, based on truth conditions, that the Seat of Knowledge argument of the complement clause in deontic and causative contexts carries the SELF role. This co-indexation results from the fact that the truth of the proposition is anchored to the matrix subject, the one whose mind is being reported, in these contexts. The analysis implies that the complement clause subject cannot co-refer with the SELF argument. 3.5.2. Evidence from Mandarin Chinese: A Parametric Difference In this section, I suggest that Romance languages exhibit subject obviation in part because of a semantico-pragmatic parametric restriction which bars the de se (the self-ascription of a property/attitude) interpretation of finite embedded clauses. De se contexts are those which involve an (animate) argument who attributes beliefs or attitudes to him/herself (Lewis 1979). I propose that the parametric restriction responsible for SDR serves to eliminate ambiguity with respect to pronominal reference in de se contexts, which facilitates the processing of pronominals. I provide data from Mandarin Chinese which suggests cross-linguistic sensitivity to co-referring entities in de se contexts, providing evidence in favor of analyzing antecedent possibilities as the result of parametric variation in these contexts. It has long been noted that Mandarin Chinese exhibits long distance anaphora. Long distance anaphora has been observed in a large number of languages, and refers to the ability of certain elements, such as reflexives, to be bound across the subject of an intervening clause. Recently, Pan (2000) has proposed that the long distance reflexive element ziji in Mandarin Chinese must be bound to the self-ascribing (self-attributing) argument. From a logophoric perspective, this would mean that ziji must co-refer with the argument which carries the SELF role, representing the sentient mind to whom truth-evaluation of the proposition is anchored.

177 To illustrate the claim, Pan first shows that ziji can be bound by the matrix subject Zhangsan across the intervening subject Lisi. (50)

Zhangsani xīwàng Lisij hai-le zijii/j Zhangsan want Lisi hurt-PAST self 'Zhangsan wants that Lisi hurt himself.' (adapted from Harbert 1995:194, from Huang & Tang 1991)

Interestingly, however, the long distance reflexive ziji cannot establish reference across an intervening indexical pronoun. Consequently, in example (51) with an intervening first or second person pronoun, the reflexive ziji can no longer be bound by Zhangsan, but must be bound by the intervening pronoun. (51)

Zhangsani xīwàng woj/nik juede Lisi dui zijij/k/*i mei xinxin Zhangsan want I/you think Lisi toward self not confident 'Zhangsan wants I/you to think that Lisi has no confidence in himself.' (adapted from Harbert 1995: 209, from Tang 1985) Pan (2000) suggests that first and second person pronouns must bind a long-distance

anaphor because first and second person pronouns are obligatory self-ascribers (i.e. they induce a de se context). Pan argues that the data indicate that, in de se contexts, the obligatory antecedent for the anaphor is the self-ascriber (i.e. the argument whose mind is being reported) and therefore, following Sells (1987), carries the logophoric SELF role. According to Pan (2000), first and second person pronouns are always self-ascribers because they introduce referents which self-consciously attribute properties to themselves. Third person NPs, on the other hand, are optional self-ascribers. Consequently, when an intermediate third person subject (see example (50)) does not function as a self-ascriber, it is not a blocker, and the matrix subject can be the antecedent of ziji. According to Pan (2000), this is because the matrix subject can attribute a belief to a complement clause subject without his/her awareness, and it is the matrix subject whose mind is being reported (i.e. the matrix subject

178 carries the SELF role), and thus obtains co-reference with ziji. From the discussion above we can see that long distance bound ziji co-refers with the carrier of the desire, and it is thus constrained by self-ascription (de se attitudes). Huang et al. (1984) suggest that long-distance anaphoric binding in Chinese is the effect of a perceptual strategy, in order to avoid perspective conflicts when the sentences are put in a context relativized to a propositional attitude. In other words, binding of ziji is determined by a perspective strategy that aims to prevent confusion; if one reading of a sentence involves perspective conďŹ&#x201A;icts, that reading is blocked. In a language like Chinese, pronominal coreference is determined by a strategy to produce a de se interpretation of the proposition; i.e. long distance anaphora obligatorily binds to the antecedent carrying the SELF role. This obligatory co-reference reduces the number of potential antecedents, thereby avoiding confusion by reducing ambiguity with respect to pronominal reference mapping. I claim that a similar phenomenon is responsible for SDR in Spanish. In Romance, in contrast to Mandarin Chinese, I propose that subject co-reference is determined by a semanticopragmatic parametric setting which prevents, rather than requires, a de se interpretation in finite contexts. Banning a de se interpretation results in fewer antecedent possibilities for the complement clause subject, as the matrix clause subject is eliminated as a potential antecedent. In this way, the number of potential antecedents for the complement clause subject is reduced, thereby avoiding the potential for pronominal mapping errors and facilitating the determination of the antecedent of the complement clause subject pronoun. In other words, eliminating the SELF argument (i.e. the matrix subject/SoK position in deontic and causative contexts) as a potential antecedent for the complement clause subject pronoun narrows the amount of potential antecedents, rendering a lower processing load in the determination of co-reference possibilities.

179 In short, then, SDR is exhibited in contexts which would otherwise be interpreted as a selfascribed attitude (i.e. when the complement SoK argument carries the SELF role), due to a parametric restriction which prevents a finite de se context in Romance languages and facilitates the determination of pronominal reference. For example, in (52), the complement clause to the volitional predicate querer ‘to want’ would carry a de se interpretation if the matrix and complement clause subjects co-referred. This is because, as we saw in the last section, evaluation of the complement clause in deontic and causative contexts is anchored to the mind of the matrix subject (i.e. the SELF role). Therefore, if the complement clause subject were co-referential with the matrix clause subject, the construction would be interpreted as a self-ascribed belief/desire (i.e. a de se interpretation). Subject obviation (SDR) thus occurs, as the de se interpretation is banned: (52)

Maríai quiere que pro*i/j salga. Mary want.3SG that pro leave.SUB.3SG ‘Mary wants that s/he leave.’ It must be noted that co-reference of the long-distance anaphor ziji in Mandarin Chinese

is not a complementary parameter setting to the one I propose for Romance. This is because ziji typically appears as an accusative anaphor, while it is the subject position in Romance which is effected by the de se status of the clause. Importantly, however, the data from Chinese do show that there is indeed cross-linguistic sensitivity in de se contexts with respect to antecedent possibilities. The data provide support for my claim that universal grammar provides parameters which govern binding options in de se propositions. Furthermore, with Pan (2000) and Huang et. al. (1984), I assume that the parameter results in the reduction in antecedent possibilities, serving to eliminate ambiguity with respect to pronominal reference.

180 The locus of the parameter appears to be FinP, as the restriction on co-reference is linked to a positively valued finiteness feature [+Fin] on Finite Phrase. The proposal is based on evidence that, as has long been observed, infinitival clauses (which carry the negatively valued finiteness feature [-Fin]) require a de se interpretation of the complement clause. Example (53a) illustrates that co-reference is required between a matrix subject and PRO in infinitival constructions (i.e. control constructions), with the relevant structure illustrated:53 (53)

Adani quiere PROi/*j besar a Isabel. Adam want.3SG PRO kiss.INF to Isabel ‘Adam wants to kiss Isabel.’ [-Fin] = de se reading required co-reference required ...[TP DP(ANCHOR)[vP [v’ v [DEONTIC][VP V [SaP [∅] [SenP SoK[SELF] [FinP [-Fin][IP PRO …

co-reference required as a by-product of shared features between SoK and matrix subject in [-Fin] context

Because the restriction barring the de se interpretation is enforced only in finite contexts, like that of (52), I predict that the parameter setting is linked to a positively valued finiteness feature on FinP. It is a parametric setting on [+Fin], then, which prevents co-reference with the SoK argument co-indexed with the SELF role in Romance.54 The analysis implies that SDR should not obtain in embedded indicative (assertive) and negation-triggered subjunctive contexts, as these complement clauses are not necessarily relativized to the matrix subject. For this reason, these clauses do not require a de se

I assume with Radford (2004) that there is a null complementizer in the CP (Speech Act Phrase) of infinitival clauses which, similar to the illocutionary feature in finite deontic contexts, introduces an intensional modal base (i.e. a non-veridical forward-shifting modal context). The precise semantico-pragmatic analysis of the null complementizer in control constructions, however, is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 54 This parametric setting appears to carry a positive setting in English as well, which also exhibits SDR in finite contexts. Interestingly, as in Spanish, the addition of an epistemic component, such as a modal verb, renders subject co-reference acceptable: (i) (ii)

Maryi demands that she*i leave. Maryi demands that shei be able to leave.

181 interpretation in co-referring contexts and, therefore, co-reference is possible. For instance, in example (54), the indicative complement clause is relativized to the source of information (i.e. the Seat of Knowledge carries the SOURCE role). Therefore, as Mary is not self-ascribing the belief that she (herself) will lose the race but, rather, this belief is attributed to the person that she heard it from, the complement clause does not constitute a de se context. Therefore, co-reference is allowed: (54)

Maríai oyó que proi/j va a perder la carrera. → the proposition is true to the person who Mary heard it from (SOURCE) Mary heard.PAST.3SG that pro go.IND.3SG lose.INF the race ‘Mary heard that (someone else/herself) is going (IND) to lose the race.’

The analysis put forth here directly accounts for the fact that SDR does not occur in indicative complement clauses, as the subordinate Seat of Knowledge is not necessarily anchored to the matrix subject. Consequently, indicative contexts do not necessarily constitute de se contexts, and subject co-reference is allowed. In summary, evidence from Mandarin Chinese indicates cross-linguistic sensitivity to de se (self-ascribing) contexts. In Mandarin Chinese, co-reference between the long distance anaphor ziji and the holder of the belief in de se (self-ascribed) contexts is obligatory, while in Romance languages, co-reference is prohibited between subjects in finite de se contexts. While the parameter in Romance is not identical to that of Chinese, the data show that co-reference sensitivity in de se contexts is cross-linguistically attested, providing evidence for a parameter setting which either prevents or requires pronominal co-reference in finite de se (deontic and causative) contexts. With Pan (2000) and Huang et. al. (1984), I predict that the semanticopragmatic parameter setting responsible for SDR can be viewed as a strategy that aims to prevent confusion by reducing co-reference options in de se contexts.

182 To this point, it is still unclear how and why the Seat of Knowledge argument in deontic and causative contexts carries the SELF role. Nor have I examined the nature of the syntactic relationship between deontic/causative v and this argument. The goal of the next section is to clarify these issues by detailing the syntactic analysis. 3.6. The Syntax of SDR To briefly recap, I have provided evidence that a direct semantic correlation exists between deontic and causative modality and the occurrence of SDR, and I hypothesized that the locus of modality is v. Furthermore, I have claimed that the Seat of Knowledge argument in complement clauses in deontic and causative contexts carries the SELF role, and is anchored to the matrix subject, representing the sentient mind to whom the proposition is anchored. Finally, I hypothesized that co-reference is prohibited between the matrix and subordinate clause subjects because Spanish, like all Romance languages, employs a semantico-pragmatic parameter setting which prevents a de se interpretation which is connected to a positively valued finiteness feature. In this section, I claim that the Seat of Knowledge is anchored to the matrix subject due to a syntactic relationship between matrix deontic/causative v and the subordinate SoK position. I then detail the syntactic analysis for all subjunctive contexts which exhibit SDR. 3.6.1. The Logophoric Nature of Causative and Deontic v With respect to the syntax of SDR, I propose that deontic and causative v carry an uninterpretable logophoric feature which I call uSELF. I hypothesize that this feature forms part of the feature make-up of deontic and causative v, and must be valued by some argument in its ccommand domain carrying the matching interpretable feature. According to the analysis put forth here, the only projection available to house such an element is SentienceP, whose specifier position houses a null logophoric pronoun (the SoK). After entering the derivation, the uSELF

183 feature probes downward until checked by the matching iSELF feature on the SoK position, with which it enters into an Agree relation.55 Because the SoK in deontic and causative contexts carries the SELF feature, it follows that the matrix subject serves as its logophoric anchor, as the matrix subject represents the sentient being whose mind/attitude is reported. The matrix subject, then, acts as the anchor from which the subordinate SoK obtains reference. From this view, the obviation between the matrix and subordinate clause subjects is an incidental phenomenon; it is the logophoric pronoun in subordinate Spec, SentienceP, which carries the SELF role, and the subordinate clause subject which cannot co-refer. Obviation between the matrix and complement clause subjects, on the other hand, is derived from the fact that the matrix subject is co-indexed with the SoK. In other words, subject obviation results only from the fact that the subordinate SoK obtains its reference from the matrix subject, but it is the SoK which cannot co-refer with the complement subject. The proposed derivation for a typical volitional predicate which displays SDR is illustrated in (55):56

I assume the standard version of Agree, as proposed by Chomsky (2000, 2001): (i)

Agree (Assignment version; following Chomsky (2000, 2001)) a. An unvalued feature F (a probe) on a head H scans its c-command domain for another instance of F (a goal) with which to agree. b. If the goal has a value, its value is assigned as the value of the probe. 56 I acknowledge that there is no agreement with respect to the final position of the subject in Spanish, but I assume with Chomsky (1995) that at least nominative subjects externally merge in Spec, v.

184 [+Fin] = de se reading banned Agree

(55)

co-reference disallowed

..[TP DP(ANCHOR)i [vP [vâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; v[DEONTIC[uSELF]][VP V [SAP[uW]][SenP SOK[iSELF] [FinP [+Fin][IP (DP)*i

co-reference ungrammatical as by-product of co-indexation of SoK and matrix subject in [+Fin] context

Example (55) illustrates the Agree relation between the subordinate clause SoK and causative/deontic v, and the banning of co-reference between the complement clause subject and the SoK carrying the SELF role in a [+Fin] context. The [iSELF] feature on the SoK entails that the complement clause will be interpreted from the model of evaluation of the SELF role, with the matrix subject serving as its anchor. I illustrate the (relevant) CP field for a clause-selecting deontic context in (56):57

Recall that, in chapter 2, I hypothesized that volitional and directive predicates lexically-select subjunctive clauses by assigning an uninterpretable World feature, which I call uW (following Kempchinsky 2009), to subordinate Speech Act Phrase. This illocutionary feature has the effect of mapping the proposition into an information state consisting of desire worlds.

185 (56)

Maríai quiere que pro*i salga. Mary want.3SG that she leave.SUB.3SG ‘Mary wants (someone else/*herself) to leave (SUB).’ TP T’

Maríai quiere

vP v’

DP <María(ANCHOR)i> v’

SAP

[+Fin] = de se reading banned

[uW] + que SentienceP selection SoK [iSELF]i Sentience’ Agree Sen

FinP [+Fin]

TP pro*i

…

co-reference disallowed co-reference incidentally disallowed To summarize the syntactic analysis of SDR, I have proposed that deontic and causative v enter the derivation with an uSELF feature, and value this feature via Agree with the null logophoric pronoun in Spec, SentienceP. The matrix subject, from whose epistemic model the complement clause is interpreted, acts as the anchor for the logophoric pronoun. Due to a parameter setting in Romance which prevents a self-ascribing (de se) interpretation in finite contexts, co-reference between the subordinate SoK and the complement clause subject is prohibited. Incidentally, the subordinate clause subject may not co-refer with the matrix clause

186 subject, which is co-indexed with the subordinate Seat of Knowledge argument. The syntactic analysis captures the fact that SDR results via the feature composition of deontic and causative v, which requires a SoK argument anchored to the SELF role. The analysis implies that SDR is not due to a lexical property or feature of the matrix predicate but, rather, the feature composition of deontic/causative v, accounting for those contexts in which SDR is violable. In the next section, I extend the analysis to causative and emotive constructions. 3.6.2. The Syntax of Emotives Emotive constructions present a slightly more complex picture than volitional and directive contexts because the experiencer argument in these constructions is not always a nominative subject. Belletti and Rizzi (1988) identify three types of emotive predicates: those with (quirky) dative experiencer subjects (the gustar ‘to be pleasing’ class) (57a), those with accusative subjects (the preocupar ‘to scare’) (57b) and transitive emotives with nominative subjects (the lamentar ‘to regret’ class) (57c). All three types of experiencers exhibit obviation with the subordinate clause subject:58 (57)

a. A Maríai le gusta que pro*i salga. to Mary CL.DAT.3SG please.3SG that pro leave.SUB.3SG ‘It pleases Mary (DAT) that (someone else/*herself) is leaving (SUB).’ b. Lai preocupa que pro*i salga. CL.ACC.3SG worry.3SG that pro leave.SUB.3SG ‘It worries her (ACC) that (someone else/*herself) is leaving (SUB).’ c. Maríai lamenta que pro*i salga. Mary regret.3SG that pro leave.SUB.3SG ‘Mary (NOM) regrets (someone else/*herself) is leaving (SUB).’

According to Pesetsky (1995), a key semantic difference between dative, accusative and nominative experiencers in emotive contexts is the degree of affectedness, with accusative subjects being the most affected, and dative and nominative experiencers following, respectively. Though this gradience in affectedness (causation) may well be a property of emotive predicates, all emotive predicates exhibit SDR. Thus, I assume all three types of emotive constructions are compatible with (some variation of) causative matrix v.

187 In this section I propose that, though structurally varying, the current proposal can account for all three predicate types. 3.6.3. The gustar class With respect to the position of the experiencer argument in emotive contexts, Belletti & Rizzi (1988) provide many convincing theoretical arguments to analyze the dative subjects of emotives (the gustar class) as “quirky subject” structures (Belletti & Rizzi 1988), with the inflected verb agreeing with the Theme argument, regardless of which argument fills the subject position (i.e., Spec, TP). This is supported by the interpretive facts in the following discourse fragments: (58)

A Pabloi le gustaba Maríaj. Pero no proi/*j quería admitirlo. to Paul DAT.3SG pleased Mary. But NEG pro want.PAST.3SG admit.INF-CL.ACC ‘Paul liked Mary. But (he/*she) didn’t want to admit it.’ The null pronoun pro has long been known to pick out the “subject of predication” of the

previous sentence as its preferred antecedent (Calabrese 1986, Belletti, Bennati, Sorace 2007) and, in the emotive context of (58), pro necessarily picks out Pablo as its antecedent.59 It appears, then, that the dative experiencer Pablo is the subject of predication. Based on this evidence, Belletti and Rizzi (1988) propose that quirky experiencer subjects in dative experiencer constructions (i.e. the gustar class) merge in Spec, vP, like nominative subjects: (59)

vP v’

Exp vcause

VP V

Empirical syntactic evidence for analyzing the preverbal dative experiencer as a quirky subject is that it controls PRO in an adjunct clause: (i)

A Pedroi le gusta PROi nadar antes de PROi comer. to Peter CL.DAT.3SG please.3SG PRO swim.INF before of PRO eat.INF ‘Peter likes to swim before eating.’

188

I follow Belletti and Rizzi (1988) in assuming that, when predicates of the gustar class select clauses, as in (57a), the quirky dative subject merges in Spec, vP, like nominative subjects. The quirky subject, then, serves as the anchor for the SoK. Like deontic v, causative v enters the derivation with uSELF, which then probes and Agrees with the SoK position in its complement clause. In chapter 2, I hypothesized that complement clauses to emotives lack illocutionary force specification and, therefore, lack a Speech Act Phrase. I hypothesized that, in the absence of illcutionary force, the complement clause CP structure contains only a Sub(ordinator) phrase (à la Haegeman (2012)). SubP carries a [sub(ordinate)] feature, but lacks pragmatic arguments and illocutionary force. Consequently, I posit the following structure for a clause-selecting emotive of the gustar class:60 (60)

A Anai le gusta que pro*i salga. to Ana CL.DAT.3SG is-pleasing that pro leave.SUB.3SG ‘Ana likes that (someone else/*she herself) is leaving (SUB).’ vP [acc]

(A) Ana(ANCHOR)i v’ lei + gusta VP v [CAUSE[uSELF]] <gusta>

SubP

[sub] + que SentienceP SoK [iSELF]i

Agree pro*i

...

co-reference incidentally disallowed

I acknowledge that there is debate with respect to the external merge position of clitics in Spanish, the analysis of which is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

189 In the next section, I detail the syntactic analysis for the preocupar ‘to worry’ class, which may select either an accusative or dative experiencer. 3.6.4. The preocupar class The second class of emotives is the preocupar ‘to worry’ class, in which the affected (experiencer) argument may appear in either the dative or accusative form (61a). This is different from the gustar class, in which only a dative experiencer is grammatical (61b): (61)

a. Le/Lo preocupa que llueva. CL.DAT/CL.ACC worries that rain.SUB ‘It worries (to him/him) that it’s raining.’ b. Le/*lo gusta que llueva. CL.DAT/*CL.ACC pleases that rain.SUB ‘It pleases (to him/*him) that it’s raining.’

There is much debate regarding the properties of the dative/accusative alternation. Some believe the distinction is related to causation (Pesetsky 1995, Quer 1998, Zubizarreta 1985). Pesetsky (1995), for instance, proposes that the alternation is due to the interpretive status of the Theme in the gustar and preocupar classes. He proposes that the Theme of preocupar type verbs contains a higher degree of causation which is absent in the gustar class. Others claim that the determining factor is related to the aspectual properties of the predicate (Parodi and Luján 2000). Parodi and Luján, for instance, claim that the accusative alternation is associated with an eventive interpretation of the predicate, and accusative case is assigned to the experiencer. The dative alternation, on the other hand, carries a stative interpretation. In these contexts, dative case is assigned to the experiencer and nominative case to the theme. I will not attempt to resolve this debate here, but merely call attention to the complexity of the issue. I follow Belletti & Rizzi (1988), Pesetsky (1995) and Parodi and Luján (2000), who hypothesize that both dative and accusative experiencers merge in Spec, vP. The case marking on the experiencer, then, is the result of inherent (rather than structural) case:

190 (62)

Preocupa a Anai que pro*i salga. worry.3SG to Ana that pro leave.SUB.3SG ‘It worries Ana that (someone else/*she herself) is leaving.’ vP [acc]

A Anai

v’

preocupa VP v [CAUSE, uSELF] <preocupa>

SubP

[sub] + que

SentienceP

SoK [iSELF]i Sentience’ Agree Sen co-reference disallowed

FinP [+Fin]

TP pro*i

…

co-reference incidentally disallowed To summarize, the syntactic structures of the gustar ‘to please’ and preocupar ‘to worry’ predicate classes are similar; both select quirky Case-marked experiencer arguments which merge in Spec, vP and both display SDR. Furthermore, the fact that many researchers have proposed that emotive constructions are causative in nature (Pesetsky 1995, Quer 1998, Zubizarreta 1985 and Belletti and Rizzi 1988) is in keeping with my hypothesis that SDR is a result of the causative modality on v in emotive constructions. 3.6.5. Transitive Emotives The last class of emotive predicates are transitive emotive verbs like lamentar ‘to regret’, which select nominative subjects. These predicates have a typical transitive structure, like that of volitional predicates in (56), with a couple of differences. One difference between the two structures is that emotive predicates do not lexically select subjunctive complements and, therefore, lack a subordinate Speech Act Phrase (cf. chapter 2, section 5), selecting only a SubP.

191 The second difference, of course, is that the modal value of v in emotive contexts encodes causative, rather than deontic, modality. The relevant syntactic derivation for an emotive of the transitive class like lamentar ‘to regret’ is illustrated in (63). The uninterpretable logophoric SELF feature on v probes and agrees with the matching feature on the SoK position, which is checked and deleted. Co-reference between the SoK argument and the subordinate clause subject is disallowed, resulting in obviation between the subordinate and the matrix clause subjects (i.e. SDR) because the SoK corefers with the matrix subject. (63)

Maríai lamenta que pro*i tenga gripe. Mary regret.3SG that pro has.SUB.3SG flu ‘Mary regrets that she (someone else/*herself) has (SUB) the flu.’ TP

María(ANCHOR)i T’ lamenta DP

vP v’

<María(ANCHOR)> v’ VP < lamenta + [CAUSE] [uSELF]> <lamenta>

SUB

[sub] + que

SentienceP SoK [iSELF]i Sentience’

Agree Sen

FinP [+Fin]

TP pro*i

co-reference disallowed co-reference incidentally disallowed

….

192 In section 7, I discuss the idiosyncratic nature of emotive predicates; namely, certain predicate types are more compatible with the indicative mood than others, and the status of SDR is more variable in emotive contexts. First, however, I will analyze the syntax of SDR in causative and nominal constructions, the last two environments which exhibit SDR. 3.6.6. The Syntax of Causatives As we have seen, SDR obtains in subjunctive complements to causative predicates, like forzar ‘to force’, obligar ‘to obligate’ and hacer ‘to make’.61 This is shown in (64a), which illustrates that the matrix and complement clause subjects may not co-refer with a matrix subject and a reflexive object. Interestingly, unlike emotives, causatives like forzar ‘to force’ allow an infinitival complement in which the direct object obligatorily co-refers with the subordinate clause subject, shown in (64b). The only type of construction with forzar ‘to force’ as the matrix predicate that allows a co-referential interpretation is an infinitival construction with a reflexive direct object in the matrix clause (64c): (64)

a.*Maríai se forzó a que pro*i dijera la verdad. Mary CL.ACC.REFL force.3SG to that pro tell.3SG the truth ‘Mary forced herself that she tell (SUB) the truth.’ b. Maríai la forzó a PRO*i/j decir la verdad. Mary CL.ACC.3SG force.3SG to PRO tell.INF the truth ‘Mary forced (someone else/*herself) to tell (SUB) the truth.’ c. Maríai se forzó a PROi/*j decir la verdad. Mary CL.ACC.REFL force.3SG to PRO tell.INF the truth ‘Mary forced herself to tell (SUB) the truth.’

Treviño (1994) observes that causative constructions have much in common with emotive predicates of the preocupar ‘to worry’ class, because the complement clause is generally presupposed to be true in the actual world, and the affected argument may appear in the dative or accusative form (in some dialects): (i)

Juan le/la forzó (a) que pro saliera. John CL.DAT/CL.ACC forced (to) that pro left.PAST.SUB ‘John forced her to leave.’

The dative/accusative alternation is not possible in all dialects of Spanish. When the alternation is possible, it is likely due to the variable lexical semantics of the implicative predicate in these dialects which, like the preocupar class, may encode a lower degree of causation, and select a dative argument in these contexts.

193 The fact that subject co-reference is possible only in (64c) is directly in keeping with my hypothesis that control constructions, which are [-Fin], require the de se interpretation. Consequently, co-reference is required between the matrix subject (anchored to the subordinate SoK carrying the SELF role) and the complement clause subject. In contrast, examples (64a-b) are [+Fin], and SDR occurs because a de se interpretation is prohibited in [+Fin] contexts in Romance. In Chapter 2, section 3.5, I argued that the subjunctive mood in complements to causatives is the result of lexical selection. Evidence for this characterization is that, though implicative, the subjunctive mood displays the sequence of tense effect *PRESENT[PAST]. I follow Kempchinsky (2009), who proposes that sequence of tense effects in subjunctive complements is due to the forward-shifting nature of the buletic/desire model of evaluation introduced by the illocutionary force feature uW. I assume, with Quer (1998), that causative predicates introduce a set of worlds immediately before the moment of causation. Thus, complements to causative predicates do encode an intensional modal base and, therefore, lexically-select subjunctive complements. Thus, like volitional/directive predicates, but unlike emotives, causative predicates assign an illocutionary force feature (uW) to the complement clause Speech Act Phrase, responsible for mapping the proposition into an information state which encodes a set of desire worlds. However, like emotive contexts and unlike volitional/directive contexts, little v encodes causative modality, which encodes the moment of event realization. Thus, causative v enters the derivation with the uSELF feature, which must be valued by the subordinate SoK in Spec, SentienceP. Like emotive and volitional contexts, I assume that the nominative subject argument

194 merges in Spec, v. The relevant syntactic structure for the clause-selecting causative predicate forzar ‘to force’ is illustrated below: (65)

Maríai forzó a Juanj a que pro*i/j/*k tomara la medicina. Mary force.3SG to John to that pro take.SUB.3SG the medicine ‘Mary forced John to take (SUB) the medicine.’ vP

María(ANCHOR)i v’ v + [CAUSE[uSELF]] VP V’

SaP

forzó (a) Juan Sa

Sa’

[uW] + que SentienceP selection SoK[iSelf]i Sentience’ Agree Sen

FinP [+Fin]

TP pro*i/

…

co-reference disallowed co-reference incidentally disallowed Thus, like volitional, directive and emotive constructions, SDR is exhibited in causative constructions due to a [+Fin] value on the complement clause FinP and the nature of matrix v. Because the matrix subject serves as the logophoric anchor for the complement clause SoK, which carries the SELF role, the matrix subject is ruled out as a potential antecedent for the subordinate clause subject pronoun. To summarize the chapter to this point, I have shown that deontic and causative contexts result in SDR, and that the locus of modality is v. I argued that the addition of an epistemic component, such as a modal verb, or passivized or focalized constituent, provides the context set

195 with a real world modal base, creating an environment compatible with epistemic v. When clause-selecting predicates surface with epistemic v, SDR is not observed, accounting for the apparent violability of SDR in these contexts. Volitional and directive predicates typically surface with deontic v, while causative and emotive predicates surface with causative v. Although emotive predicates show a range of compatibility with dative, accusative or nominative experiencers, the experiencer argument serves as the logophoric anchor to the subordinate SoK, and is hypothesized to merge in Spec, v. I propose that SDR occurs because the SoK carries the SELF role, and de se (self-ascribing) propositions in finite contexts are disallowed in Romance. I claimed that the reduction of potential antecedents in de se contexts results from a semantico-pragmatic parameter setting linked to a positively specified finiteness feature which expedites the processing of the clause by facilitating pronominal reference mapping. The disallowance of co-reference between the SoK and the subordinate clause subject incidentally results in obviation between the matrix and subordinate clause subjects (i.e. SDR), because the matrix clause subject serves as the anchor for the SoK. 3.6.7. Sentience in Nominals The analysis also applies to SDR in nominals. It has long been observed that nominals which express volition select subjunctive clauses, and SDR is exhibited: (66)

Nunca entendí [sui deseo de [que pro*i/j se casara tan joven]] never understand.PAST.1SG his/her desire that pro CL.REFL marry.IMPERF.SUB.3SG so young ‘I never understood his/her desire that s/he (someone else/*himself) get married (SUB) so young.’ (Kempchinsky 2009: 1789)

By adopting S&T’s analysis, SDR in nominals is straightforwardly explained. According to S&T, nouns phrases come specified with their own sentience domain, which they claim accounts for binding violations in nominals. For instance, examples (67) – (69) illustrate that, when an

196 expression introduces a point of view different from the speaker, co-reference between the subject and another pronominal is permitted in the same clause (i.e. Principle B is violable). This phenomenon is observed in the presence of certain adjectives, like (67b), and prepositional phrases, like (68b) and (69b). Co-reference is permitted because these elements introduce the speakerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s, rather than the matrix subjectâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s, point of view. The introduction of a point of view different from the matrix subject renders co-reference acceptable: (67)

a. *Luciei took a picture of heri. b. Luciei took that damned picture of heri.

(68)

a. *Timothyi set the books on himi. b. Timothyi set the books behind himi.

(69)

a. *Pierrei saw nothing but failure for himi. b. Pierrei saw nothing but failure before himi. (Speas and Tenny 2003: 331)

S&T propose that the potential for co-reference in (a) examples is due to the fact that the coreferring pronoun introduces a point of view (Seat of Knowledge) that is different from the matrix subject in the nominal domain. Because the intervening SoK does not bear the same phi features as the matrix subject, co-reference is permitted between the subject and a c-commanded nominal (i.e. no Principle B violation is incurred). Much recent work on nominals assumes a more articulated left periphery for DPs (e.g. Szabolcsi 1994; Aboh 2002, 2004a, b, Ticio 2006, among others). Ticio (2006), following Grohmann (2000), for example, assumes that DPs contain a thematic domain which contains the predicate and its arguments. The thematic domain consists of an agreement domain and a discourse domain, where discourse information is encoded. Ticio (2006: 146) follows Grohmann (2000) in assuming that the structure in (70) represents the basic DP structure:

197 (70)

ω-domain

TopP Top’ Top

DP D’

φ-domain

AgrP Agr’

Agr

POSS nP

n’ n

AGENT θ-domain

NP N

OBJ

This type of approach assumes that the nominal structure is parallel to the clausal structure in that it involves a predicate layer (i.e. nP) which encodes thematic relations, a functional layer (i.e. AgrP and DP) that encodes inflectional specifications (e.g. agreement and definiteness), and a left periphery (i.e. TopP).62 Thus, nP constitutes the nominal predicative layer, parallel to vP, which constitutes the verbal predicative layer. Assuming this parallelism, I hypothesize that nP encodes the modality of the nominal. Like deontic v, deontic n enters the derivation with a logophoric uSELF feature which must probe and Agree with the logophoric SoK pronoun in the left periphery (SentienceP) of its complement clause, parallel to the verbal domain. Furthermore, I propose that the volitional

Ticio (2006) considers AgrP a functional category, and groups under AgrP the agreement-related functional categories proposed in earlier analyses (i.e. NumP, GenP, PossP). She assumes that AgrP is the locus of agreementbased relations. She also assumes (see Zamparelli 2000, among many others) that not all determiners are generated in D. Thus, following Milsark’s (1977) division of Ds, she assumes that only the presence of a strong determiner triggers the presence of DP, and that weak determiners appear generated in a lower projection, labeled here as AgrP.

198 nominal, like its verbal counterpart, assigns an uW feature to the Speech Act Phrase of its clausal complement. The DP in (66), repeated below, has the following structure:63 (71)

su(ANCHOR)i

Agr’

deseo

<deseo> + NP n + [CAUSE[uSELF]] <deseo>

Sa’

[uW] + SentienceP (de) que SoK[iSelf]i Sentience’ Agree Sen

pro*i co-reference disallowed

…

co-reference incidentally disallowed Thus, following S&T’s proposal that nominals contain a Sentience domain, combined with recent hypotheses that the nominal and verbal domains exhibit parallel lexico-functional properties, SDR in nominals is straightforwardly explained.64 This section concludes with an analysis of the sentience domain in complements to negated epistemic predicates.

Following Ticio (2006), I assume that DP is not present in a construction like (71), as there is no strong determiner to trigger its presence. 64 Just as in the verbal domain, the subjunctive mood in nominal complements may also be operator (polarity) triggered. In keeping with the analysis put forth here, SDR does not occur in these contexts:

199 3.6.8. The Sentience Domain of Negated Epistemics It has long been observed that SDR does not occur in complement clauses to negated epistemic predicates. The absence of SDR is illustrated in (72), in which it is shown that the matrix and complement clause subjects may co-refer: (72)

Maríai no piensa que proi/j vaya a tener un buen día. Mary NEG thinks that pro go.SUB.3SG to have a good day ‘Mary doesn’t think that s/he (herself/someone else) is going (SUB) to have a good day.’

I have proposed that SDR does not occur in negated epistemic contexts because matrix v encodes epistemic modality, while SDR occurs only in deontic and causative contexts. I argue that, in the absence of both (i) illocutionary force and (ii) a deontic or causative v, the two contexts which require a Seat of Knowledge argument, the presence of SentienceP is not motivated. For this reason, I suggest that Sentience Phrase is not present in complements to negated epistemic predicates. Consequently, complement clause CPs to negated epistemics are the most truncated in structure. The proposed structure of a subjunctive complement clause to a negated epistemic is outlined below:

(i)

No hay una mujeri que proi pueda ayudarme. NEG there-is a woman that pro can.SUB help.INF-CL.ACC.1SG ‘There isn’t a woman that can (SUB) help me.’

I return to this topic in chapter 4.

200 (73)

Maríai no piensa que proi/j vaya a perder. Mary NEG think.3SG that pro go.SUB.3SG to win.INF ‘Mary doesn’t think that she (herself/someone else) is going (SUB) to win.’ TP

Maríai

T’

no + piensa DP <Maríai>

vP v’

v’ VP <piensa> v + [epistemic] <piensa>

SubP

[sub] + que FinP selection [+Fin] TP proi/j

…

Example (73) illustrates that the predicate pensar ‘to think’, in subjunctive contexts assigns a [sub(ordinate)] feature to the complement clause SubP, rather than an illocutionary force feature. Moreover, in the absence of SentienceP, there is no intervening SoK. As the context does not entail a de se reading, as there is no syntactically specified SELF argument, co-reference is allowed between the matrix and subordinate clause subjects. While negated epistemics typically appear with subjunctive complements, these predicates may select indicative complements. In this case, like any other indicative complement, the epistemic predicate selects a fully specified sentience domain via assignment of an [assertion] feature to the complement clause, as in (74). Like all indicative complement clauses, subject obviation does not occur:

201 (74)

Maríai no piensa que proi/j va a tener un buen día. Mary NEG thinks that pro going.IND.3SG to have a good day ‘Mary doesn’t think that she (herself/someone else) is going (IND) to have a good day.’ TP

María

T’ no + piensa DP <María>

vP v’

v’ VP <piensa> v + [assertive] <piensa>

SaP

[assertion] + que SentienceP selection SoK FinP [+Fin]

TP…

Like all indicative-selecting predicates, the verb pensar ‘to think’ assigns an [assertion] feature to subordinate Speech Act Phrase, which maps the proposition into the common ground (cf. section 2.1), while assertive modality introduces an extensional modal base to which all assertions must be anchored (cf. chapter 2, section 2.1). The Seat of Knowledge need not carry a particular logophoric role because assertive v does not carry an uninterpretable logophoric feature; the complement clause Seat of Knowledge need not be anchored to a particular referent. Obviation effects are not exhibited because the Seat of Knowledge need not be anchored to the SELF role and, therefore, a de se interpretation is not entailed by co-referring subjects. The analysis implies that epistemic predicates may manifest as two homonymic predicate types; one assigns an [assertion] feature to the complement clause while, in subjunctive contexts, the epistemic selects SubP, which lacks illocutionary force. This proposal is a major focus of chapter 4, in which I suggest that the epistemic may surface as an evidential predicate, selecting

202 assertive complements, or an evaluative predicate which, like emotives, triggers subjunctive complements. For the moment, it is important only to note the dual status of epistemic predicates, which may select either indicative or subjunctive complements. As Quer (1998) notes, and was noted in section 2.3., the indicative mood is ungrammatical in complement clauses to negated epistemics when the matrix subject is the speaker (1st person): (75)

No pienso que vengan/*vienen. NEG think.1SG that come.SUB/IND.3PL ‘I don’t think that they are coming (SUB/IND).’

The current analysis accounts straightforwardly for this property. Recall that, according to Speas and Tenny (2003), the default antecedent for the Seat of Knowledge argument in a declarative sentence is the SPEAKER role. In a clause-selecting context, a first person matrix subject will invariably carry the default SPEAKER role, as the complement clause to a matrix clause first person subject is anchored to his/her own epistemic model. Now, as there is no subordinate sentience domain in (subjunctive) negated epistemic contexts, the ‘point of view’ anchoring for the both clauses, then, is the matrix clause subject, which is the SPEAKER in first person contexts. This is illustrated in (76), in which the matrix clause subject is co-indexed with the prole Speaker:

203 (76)

Yo no pienso que vengan/*vienen. I NEG think.1SG that come.SUB/IND.3PL ‘I don’t think that they are coming (SUB/IND).’ SaP

p-role[Speaker]i SaP Sa

SenP

[assertion]

SoKi

SenP

co-indexation Sen

TP Yo

T’ no + pienso DP <Yo>

vP v’ v’ VP <pienso> <pienso>

SubP que

FinP [+Fin]

…

The configuration in (76) shows that the Speaker argument is the relevant argument from whose perspective the truth value of the entire construction is evaluated, in the absence of a subordinate SoK. Because a negated epistemic predicate with a first person subject entails the denial of a positive truth value on the part of the Speaker, the clause is semantically incompatible with an embedded assertion, which would require a positive truth value on the part of the Speaker. In other words, a semantic clash arises between a complement clause assertion anchored to the Speaker, and a matrix clause which asserts that the complement proposition is not true from the point of view of the Speaker. Before summarizing the conclusions of this chapter, I discuss some idiosyncrasies exhibited by complements to emotive predicates.

204 3.7. On the Idiosyncratic Nature of Emotive Complements In this section, I discuss some idiosyncrasies exhibited in complements to emotive predicates. First, some emotive predicates, typically those which select dative experiencers, allow an indicative/subjunctive alternation in the complement clause. I attribute this possibility to a lower degree of causation encoded by these predicates, as opposed to their nominative and accusative counterparts, rendering them compatible with assertive complements. Then I discuss the fact that complement clauses to emotives, unlike causatives, are not implicative with respect to the speaker; i.e. the speaker is not required to believe the complement clause to be true. I also present data from Kempchinsky (2007), who shows that SDR is variable in emotive contexts. I claim that the latter two properties are intrinsically connected, resulting from the compatibility of emotive predicates with both causative and epistemic v. 3.7.1. Mood Variation in Emotive Complement Clauses While Spanish complement clauses to emotives generally exhibit the subjunctive mood, some predicates (generally predicates with dative experiencer subjects) allow the indicative as well, as the contrasts in (77), (78) and (79) show (Kempchinsky 2009, Quer 1998): (77)

María lamenta que venga/??viene su mamá. Mary regret that come.SUB/IND her mother ‘Mary regrets that her mother is coming (SUB/IND).’

(78)

Lo preocupa que llueva/??llueve. worries that rains.SUB/IND ‘It worries him that it’s raining (SUB/IND).’ CL.ACC

(79)

Le molesta que lleguen/llegan tarde. CL.DAT annoy that arrive.SUB.IND late. ‘It annoys him/her that they arrive (SUB/IND) late.’

Quer (1998), Borrego et al. (1986) and Bosque (1990) view the possiblity of the indicative mood in emotive contexts as a consequence of the potential assertive use of the emotive, which may be

205 paraphrased as ‘happy/annoyed to report that…’. 65 While this generalization captures a facet of the interpretation of indicative complements to emotive predicates, it does not explain why some emotive predicates may select indicative complements while others may not. I suggest that the higher acceptability of the indicative mood in subjunctive contexts correlates with a lower degree of causation encoded by the matrix clause. In other words, the lower the degree of causality expressed by the matrix clause, the more amenable the predicate is with an assertive complement. According to Pesetsky (1995), the dative, accusative or nominative form of the experiencer in emotive contexts depends upon the degree of affectedness denoted by the matrix predicate. Accusative experiencers are the most affected, with dative and nominative following, respectively. Example (80) illustrates the scale representing the degree of causation expressed by a matrix emotive or causative clause, from lowest to highest. Note that causative predicates like forzar ‘to force’ are presumed to encode the highest degree of causation, appearing highest on the scale, while emotives with dative experiencers encode the lowest degree of causation: (80)

Dative Experiencer>> Accusative Experiencer>> Nominative Experiencer Lowest Causation >

Highest Causation

Quer (1998) also distinguishes between a factive (episodic) reading (i) and a generic (non-episodic) reading (ii) of complements to emotive predicates. The indicative can be used to a greater or lesser extent in the former, while it is ungrammatical in the latter, illustrated below: (i)

Me gustó que los estudiantes me hicieran/?hicieron preguntas. DAT.1SG appeal.IND that the students to-me made.SUB/?IND questions. ‘I liked it that the students asked me questions.’

(ii)

Me gustó que los estudiantes me hicieran/*hicieron preguntas. DAT.1SG appeal.IND that the students to-me made.SUB/*IND questions. ‘I liked it if the students asked me questions.’

Quer associates the generic interpretation to counter-factual semantics, roughly yielding the interpretation of an ifclause. I follow Quer (1998) in analyzing the non-factive reading in (viii) as the intensional entry of an emotive, with syntactic and semantic properties similar to those of volitional predicates like querer ‘to want’. Like volitional predicates, a buletic model of evaluation is introduced such that the complement clause is compared to its contextually relevant alternatives (à la Villalta 2008).

206 Following Pesetskyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s analysis, I propose that predicates which express a lower degree of causation are more amenable with an assertive complement. Consequently, these predicate types retain a higher compatibility with both assertive v and causative v. The analysis predicts two homonymic predicate types which select dative experiencers: those that are causative, and those that are assertive. Like other subjunctive-selecting emotive predicates, those with subjunctive complements do not assign illocutionary force to their complement clause. When an indicative complement is selected, in contrast, a homonymic assertive predicate assigns an [assertion] feature to the complement clause Speech Act Phrase and manifests with assertive v. The structure below illustrates an emotive verb with an indicative complement clause. Like all indicative (assertive) clauses, both Speech Act Phrase and Sentience Phrase are selected. As matrix v is neither deontic nor causative, the subordinate SoK need not carry the SELF role, and SDR effects do not occur. The matrix clause thus introduces information for entry into the common ground information state, rather than denoting an event without illocutionary force, like its causative counterpart. (81)

Lei disgusta a Juan que proi va a perder. CL.DAT.3SG disgust to John that proi go.IND.3SG to lose â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;It disgusts John that he (himself) is going (IND) to lose.â&#x20AC;&#x2122;

207 vP Juani

v’ v + [assertive] VP < lei disgusta> <disgusta> Sa

SaP SaP’

[assertion] + que selection

SentienceP SoK

Sentience’ Sen

…

In sum, I have argued that emotive predicates with dative experiencers are more compatible with assertive complements because of the lower degree of causation encoded by the lexical semantics of the emotive. In indicative contexts, the predicate manifests as a homonymic operator which assigns an [assertion] feature to subordinate SaP. Next, we will see that complement clauses to emotives are not implicative in nature with respect to the speaker, a property which I attribute to the compatibility of emotive predicates with epistemic v. 3.7.2. On the Compatibility of Emotive Predicates with Epistemic v In this section I show that, while complements to causatives require an implicative interpretation on the part of the speaker and exhibit SDR, those to emotives do not consistently exhibit either property. I claim that both properties are due to the compatibility of emotive predicates with epistemic v, while causative predicates are compatible only with causative v. In section 5.2, I claimed that subjunctive complements to volitional and directive predicates introduce a strongly intensional, buletic model of evaluation anchored to the matrix subject MBUL(subject). Furthermore, I illustrated that complements to causative and emotive predicates require a veridical interpretation in the epistemic model of the matrix subject,

208 suggesting that the model of evaluation of these clauses is the real world model of the matrix subject WR(subject): (82)

Volitionals: Directives: Causatives: Emotives:

MBUL(subject) MBUL(subject) MR(subject) MR(subject)

Interestingly, however, the truth conditions of complements to causatives and emotives are not identical. While both require a veridical interpretation with respect to the matrix subject, the picture changes when examining truth conditions with respect to the speaker. Example (83) shows that, while complements to causative predicates like forzar ‘to force’ and hacer ‘to make’ are implicative with respect to the speaker (i.e. require a realized interpretation on the part of the speaker) (83a), those to emotive predicates like gustar ‘to please’ and lamentar ‘to regret’ are not (83b). This is illustrated by the infelicity of the follow-up statement in example (83a), which indicates that the speaker must believe the complement clause to predicate forzar ‘to force’ to be true. In contrast, the same follow-up is infelicitous in emotive contexts (83b), indicating that the speaker need not believe true the subjunctive complement to an emotive: (83)

a. Causative María hace que su novio vuelva hoy. #Pero no pienso que vuelva. Mary make.PRES.3SG that her boyfriend return.SUB.3SG today. But NEG think.PRES.1SG that return.SUB.3SG ‘Mary is making her boyfriend return (SUB) today. But I don’t think that he’s returning (SUB).’ b. Emotive A María le agrada/lamenta que su novio vuelva hoy. Pero no pienso que vuelva. to.Mary CL.DAT.3SG thrill/regret.PRES.3SG that her boyfriend return.SUB.3SG today. But NEG think.PRES.1SG that return.SUB.3SG ‘Mary is thrilled/regrets that her boyfriend returns (SUB) today. But I don’t think that he’s returning (SUB).’ The fact that complement clauses to causative predicates require a veridical interpretation

on the part of the speaker (84a) falls out straightforwardly from the causative modality on matrix

209 v. Recall from section 3.3 that causative modality encodes a function ≤s which takes the event denoted by the proposition p and orders it with respect to the resulting causation e, resulting in a caused (realized in the real world w) event (adapted from Han (2000)): (84)

Causative Modality a. Modal base = ƒ(w) = the set of accessible worlds w determined by all known facts f b. Ordering source = s ||causative(p)||e = {e’: e’∈||p|| ∩ ≤s(∩ƒ(w))}

Because the causative modality on v encodes a causing event in the real world as part of its semantic composition, it falls out straightforwardly that a veridical (realized) interpretation on the part of the speaker is required in causative contexts. Nevertheless, the fact that complements to the emotives in (84b) do not require a veridical interpretation on the part of the speaker is unexpected, as I have claimed that these predicates surface with causative v. I propose that, while causative predicates consistently surface with causative v, emotive predicates may surface with either causative or epistemic v. One piece of evidence in favor of this hypothesis is that, unlike complements to causative predicates, Kempchinsky (2007) has shown that complements to emotive predicates do not consistently exhibit SDR. The fact that SDR is more variable in emotive contexts constitutes evidence that emotive predicates are compatible with epistemic v which, lacking a logophoric feature, does not induce SDR. Kempchinsky (2007) conducted a Preference Judgment Task which elicited judgments regarding the acceptance of co-reference between matrix and subordinate subjects in subjunctive complement clauses to emotives with nominative, dative and accusative experiencers. Speakers were from Latin America (Puerto Rico) and Spain.66 The subjects were given a scale from which

The subjects were provided discourse-old and discourse-new contexts in which the emotive construction was presented, with neither type of context exhibiting significant differences in the acceptability rate of SDR. The casemarking of the experiencer did not effect acceptability rates either.

210 to judge the acceptability of subject co-reference (i.e. acceptability of an SDR violation), represented by the numbers 1-5. The results of her test are as follows: Avg. rate of acceptance of co-reference Group 1: Spain

2.82

Group 2: Puerto Rico

2.54

Table 3-2. Acceptance rates of SDR violations in emotive contexts (Kempchinsky 2007) Kempchinskyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s results indicate that subject obviation is extremely variable in emotive complements, regardless of the dialect, as subject co-reference was accepted (i.e. SDR was violated) in over 50% of the contexts given. The data suggest that, in contexts in which SDR is not enforced, neither causative nor deontic modality are encoded, as these are the two types of modality which result in SDR. I propose that the two properties discussed here are intimately connected; because complements to emotives are not implicative (with respect to the speaker) and exhibit variability with respect to SDR suggest that, in these contexts, the emotive predicate does not surface with causative v but, rather, epistemic v. Only the latter results in both SDR and an implicative interpretation, accounting for the variability in emotive contexts.67 Recall that epistemic modality encodes necessity or possibility and is relativized with respect to an individual anchor, as well as contextual assumptions (Kratzer 1991; Papafragou, 2000, 2006) (cf. section 3.2 for the definition of epistemic modality). Thus, the epistemic value of v entails that truth evaluation on the part of the speaker is simply not relevant, as the truth of the proposition is relativized only to the matrix subject. In fact, causative modality is the only

The analysis entails a one to one correspondence between (i) the violability of SDR and (ii) the absence of an implicative interpretation on the part of the speaker with epistemic v. The correlation between the two properties, however, is difficult to empirically test because, although an implicative interpretation is not required by the speaker, it is often the case that the speaker incidentally believes the complement clause to be true. Nonetheless, to verify the hypothesis, it would be necessary to empirically validate the correspondence of these properties.

211 type which entails the interpretation of event realization with respect to the speaker; in all other embedded contexts, the modal value of matrix v does not carry an implicative entailment. Consequently, clause-selecting emotives with matrix epistemic v are not implicative with respect to the speaker. The proposal accounts for the fact that complement clauses to both negated epistemics (85a) and emotives (85b) share this property; neither require a veridical interpretation on the part of the speaker, resulting from the fact that both are compatible with epistemic v. This is illustrated by the felicity of a follow-up statement which entails that the speaker does not believe the complement clause proposition to be true in the actual world: (85)

a. Negated Epistemic María no cree que su profesor esté enfermo. Y yo no lo creo tampoco. ‘Mary doesn’t believe that her professor is (SUB) sick. And I don’t believe it either.’ b. Emotive A María le agrada/lamenta que su novio vuelva hoy. Pero no creo que vuelva. ‘Mary is thrilled/regrets that her boyfriend returns ( SUB) today. But I don’t think that he’s returning (SUB).’ I attribute the compatibility of emotive predicates with epistemic v to the fact that

emotive predicates are gradable, while causative predicates are not. Consequently, because causatives are not gradable, they are incompatible with epistemic v. To support this claim, I turn to many researchers who have suggested that epistemic modality is associated with a scale of possibility (Yalcin 2007, Portner 2009), explaining the compatibility of epistemic modals like likely, probable and possible with intensifiers, as in (86): (86)

a. It is very likely that John will win. b. It is extremely probable that Adam will get married. In fact, the standard theory of modality is built around a notion of comparative possibility

(Kratzer 1981, 1991). These types of approaches typically view epistemic modals as involving a scale given by a triple ⟨D,≺,δ⟩, where D is a set of degrees, ≺ is a total ordering of D, and δ is

212 the dimension (necessity or possibility) denoted by the modal. We can look at this scale as the formal denotation of the index of evaluation denoted by epistemic modality (cf. example (24)). In other words, I hypothesize that epistemic modality encodes a degree function, encoded by the index of evaluation, which measures the degree of probability with respect to the truth value of the proposition. As a diagnostic for the gradability of predicates, I use the gradable adverb enormemente ‘enormously’. Example (87) shows that, while emotive predicates are compatible with enormemente ‘enormously’ (87a), causative predicates are not (87b), providing evidence that emotive predicates are gradable while causative predicates are not: (87)

a. A Pedro le gusta (enormemente) que su hijo hiciera su tarea. to Peter CL.DAT.3SG please.3SG (enormously) that his son did.SUB.3SG his homework ‘Peter is (enormously) pleased that his son did (SUB) his homework.’ b. Pedro hizo (*enormemente) que su hijo hiciera su tarea. Peter made (enormously) that his son did.SUB.3SG his homework ‘Peter (*enormously) made his son do (SUB) his homework.’

I take the fact that emotive predicates are gradable as evidence that they are compatible with a degree argument and, thus, a degree of judgment on the part of the matrix subject. Because causative predicates are not gradable, they are not compatible with epistemic v but, rather, only causative v, which does not encode gradability. The compatibility of emotive predicates with epistemic v accounts for both the fact that (i) subjunctive complements to emotives do not always exhibit SDR and that (ii) they are not implicative with respect to the speaker. This is because epistemic v does not carry the logophoric uSELF feature and, unlike causative v, epistemic v does not entail event realization (i.e. does not require an implicative interpretation). SDR does not occur, then, because the complement clause lacks a Sentience Phrase in epistemic contexts (cf. section 6.8) and, therefore, no SoK argument is present in the complement clause to prevent co-reference. Causative predicates, on the other

213 hand, are compatible only with causative v, resulting in (i) an implicative complement clause which (ii) carries a logophoric uSELF feature and, therefore, exhibits SDR. Example (88) illustrates the types of v with which emotive predicates are compatible, and the corresponding complement clause CP structures. Example (88a) illustrates the CP structure of complements to emotives which surface with causative v. Causative v requires the subordinate SoK to carry the SELF role, resulting in SDR. The emotive does not assign illocutionary force to the complement clause, and the subjunctive mood surfaces as the default mood. In (88b), the emotive surfaces with epistemic v, and the CP structure is therefore identical to negated epistemic constructions. The subjunctive mood surfaces as the default mood, and SentienceP is not present, as its presence is not motivated. Finally, we saw in the last section that, subject to dialectal and idiosyncratic variation, some emotive predicates (typically with dative experiencer subjects) assign assertive force to the complement clause. In these cases, the emotive assigns an [assertion] feature to subordinate Speech Act Phrase, resulting in a fully specified CP domain: (88)

Types of little v in Emotive Contexts and Corresponding Complement CP a. Causative: b. Epistemic/Evaluative: c. Assertive:

[Sub [sub]] [SentiencePSoK[iSELF]] [FinP] [Sub [sub]] [FinP] [Speech ActP [assertion] [SentiencePSoK] [FinP]

In summary, I have argued in this section that emotive predicates which select dative experiencers express a lower degree of causation than emotives with nominative and accusative experiencer arguments. I claimed that the lower degree of causation creates a more compatible environment for the selection of an assertive complement and that, when selecting indicative complements, the predicate manifests as a homonymic assertive predicate. I showed that emotive predicates are not implicative with respect to the speaker and, furthermore, SDR is variable in emotive contexts (Kempchinsky 2007). I propose that both

214 properties result from the fact that emotive predicates may surface with epistemic v. Because epistemic modality is gradable (cf. Yalcin 2007, Portner 2009, among others), I claimed that the gradability of emotive predicates constitutes evidence in favor of this hypothesis. Because causative predicates are not gradable, they are compatible with only causative v, which results in SDR and entails an implicative interpretation on the part of the speaker. 3.7.3. Characterizing the Sentience Domain In this section, I summarize and refine the proposed cartography of the subordinate left periphery, based on the evidence provided in this chapter. We may now extend the proposal detailed in chapter 2 to account for the distribution and feature composition of subordinate Sentience Phrase. In the last chapter, I proposed three types of specifications for subordinate Speech Act Phrase. First, I claimed that indicative complement clauses house an assertion feature in Speech Act Phrase, based on evidence from Greek and Bulgarian that the indicative mood does not represent assertive force cross-linguistically and, therefore, must be syntactically represented in Romance. Second, I proposed that lexically-selected subjunctive complements to volitionals, directives and causatives house an illocutionary feature which maps the proposition into a buletic model of evaluation (based on wishes; cf. section 2.1), which I labeled uW (following Kempchinsky 2009). Finally, I proposed that emotive and negated epistemic predicates do not encode illocutionary force, due to the fact that only these subjunctive complements may be extensionally anchored, but do not allow â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;point of viewâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; phenomena. Therefore, these complements lack a Speech Act Phrase, with the subjunctive mood surfacing as the default mood. I followed Haegeman (2012) in assuming that these complements contain a Sub(ordinator) Phrase which houses a [sub(ordinate)] feature, responsible for subordinating the

215 clause. A summary of the distribution and feature composition of subordinate Speech Act Phrase is outlined in (89): (89)

a. Indicative Complements (e.g. complements to ver ‘to see’, saber ‘to know’) Predicates assign [assertion] feature to SaP [SpeechActP[assertion]] b. Volitionals, Directives and Causatives (e.g. querer ‘to want’, pedir ‘to request’, forzar ‘to force’) Predicates assign uW to SaP [SpeechActP[uW]] c. Emotives and Negated Epistemics (e.g. lamentar ‘to regret’, creer ‘to believe’) No illocutionary force assignment: SaP not selected [Sub [sub]] We may now incorporate Sentience Phrase into the schema. I have proposed that

subordinate Sentience Phrase, like subordinate Speech Act Phrase, will not be present unless motivated. I hypothesize that the presence of Sentience Phrase is triggered in one of two ways: (i) it is selected by an [assertion] feature in Speech Act Phrase because, as Haegeman (2006) puts it, ‘a proposition that is apparently true or false must be so to someone’. Assertions require point of view and, therefore, encode a Seat of Knowledge argument. The presence of Sentience Phrase is also required in deontic and causative contexts, which encode an uninterpretable logophoric feature on matrix v which must be checked by the subordinate Seat of Knowledge argument. Without a Seat of Knowledge argument to check this feature, the derivation crashes. Finally, subjunctive clauses in negated epistemic contexts do not contain a Sentience Phrase, as its presence is not motivated. This is because epistemic v does not encode a logophoric feature, nor is an assertion feature present to select SentienceP. Example (90) illustrates the distribution of Sentience Phrase in complement clauses, as well as the type of v with which the matrix predicate surfaces:

216 (90)

a. Indicative Complements (e.g. complements to ver ‘to see’, saber ‘to know’) Assertive v: No logophoric feature SentienceP selected by [assertion] [SentiencePSoK] b. Volitionals and Directives (e.g. querer ‘to want’, pedir ‘to request’) Deontic v: requires iSELF feature on SoK position in SentienceP, resulting in SDR [SentiencePSoK[iSELF]] c. Causatives and Emotives (e.g. forzar ‘to force’, lamentar ‘to regret’) Causative v: requires iSELF feature on SoK position in SentienceP, resulting in SDR [SentiencePSoK[iSELF]] e. Negated Epistemics (e.g. creer ‘to believe’) Epistemic v: No logophoric feature Sentience Phrase not motivated

In example (91), I illustrate the combination of Speech Act and Sentience Phrases, and the relevant feature composition of the complement clause CPs (leaving aside the possibility for discourse related projections): (91)

a. Indicative Complements (e.g. complements to ver ‘to see’, saber ‘to know’) Lexically-select indicative complements: SaP selected Assertive v: No logophoric feature SentienceP selected by [assertion] [SpeechActP[assertion]] [SentiencePSoK] [FinP] b. Volitionals and Directives (e.g. querer ‘to want’, pedir ‘to request’) Predicates lexically select subjunctive complements: uW in Speech Act Phrase Deontic v: requires iSELF feature on SoK position in SentienceP, resulting in SDR [SpeechActP[uW]] [SentiencePSoK[iSELF]] [FinP] c. Causatives (e.g. forzar ‘to force’) Predicates lexically select subjunctive complements: uW in Speech Act Phrase Causative v: requires iSELF feature on SoK position in SentienceP, resulting in SDR [SpeechActP[uW]] [SentiencePSoK[iSELF]] [FinP] d. Emotives (e.g. lamentar ‘to regret’) No illocutionary force assignment: SaP not selected Causative v: requires iSELF feature on SoK position in SentienceP, resulting in SDR (Also compatible with epistemic v, shown in (e)) [Sub[sub]] [SentiencePSoK[iSELF]] [FinP]

217 e. Negated Epistemics (e.g. creer â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;to believeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;) No illocutionary force assignment: SaP not selected Epistemic v: No logophoric feature Sentience Phrase not motivated [Sub[sub]] [FinP] Schematically, I present the proposed complement clause CP structures in example (92) (again leaving aside the possibility for discourse-related projections): (92)

a. Indicative Complements:

[SpeechActP[assertion]] [SentiencePSoK]

b. Volitionals and Directives:

[SpeechActP[uW]]

[SentiencePSoK[iSELF]] [FinP]

c. Causatives:

[SpeechActP[uW]]

[SentiencePSoK[iSELF]] [FinP]

d. Emotives:

[FinP]

[Sub[sub]]

[SentiencePSoK[iSELF]] [FinP]

e. Negated Epistemics/Emotives: [Sub[sub]]

[FinP]

The schema in (92) represents the embedded CP domain of complement clauses in Spanish presented in this chapter. The schema, however, lacks negation-triggered subjunctive clauses, the analysis of which is the focus of chapters 4 and 5. 3.8. Conclusion In this chapter, I motivated an analysis for the notorious subjunctive disjoint reference effect and, in doing so, proposed a novel cartographic analysis for the subordinate left periphery. The analysis was launched with the novel observation that SDR occurs only in causative and deontic contexts, based on the fact that SDR is more violable in the presence of an evaluative (epistemic) component, such as a modal verb, passivization or focalization. I proposed that the addition of an evaluative component alters the modal value of v from deontic to epistemic via the contribution of a real world modal base. I argued that SDR is more violable with the addition of an evaluative component because it is not triggered in epistemic contexts.

218 I followed Miyagawa (1999) and Harley (1995), who propose that little v is the locus of modality. I identified four types of v with which clause-selecting predicates are compatible: deontic, causative, assertive or epistemic. Only deontic and causative v result in SDR. Table 3 illustrates the classes of clause-selecting predicates and the type(s) of v with which they are compatible: Assertive v (no SDR) Indicative-selecting predicates



Negated epistemics



Volitionals/directives

(SDR)

68

Epistemic v (no SDR)

 

Causatives Emotives

Deontic v Causative v

() 

()



Table 3-3. Matrix Predicate Compatibility with Modal Value on v () = possible, but only with the addition of another discourse related syntactic configuration (passivization, focalization, etc.) or semantic element (modal verb) which provides the context with a real world modal base

I provided evidence from truth conditions that contexts which exhibit SDR are anchored to the matrix subject. I take this ‘point of view’ anchoring as evidence that the subordinate Seat of Knowledge position is anchored to the matrix subject in deontic and causative contexts, representing the sentient mind to whom the complement proposition is anchored (i.e. the logophoric role SELF). I then presented evidence from Mandarin Chinese which indicates cross-linguistic sensitivity to de se (self-ascribing) contexts. In Chinese, co-reference between the long distance

Acceptance of the indicative mood in complements to emotives is subject to dialectal variation and idiosyncratic factors, and is generally more acceptable with dative experiencers (Quer 1998), as discussed in section 7.1.

219 anaphor ziji and the holder of the belief in de se (self-ascribed) contexts is obligatory, while in Romance languages, co-reference is prohibited between subjects in finite de se contexts. While the parameter in Romance is not identical to that of Chinese, the data show that co-reference sensitivity in de se contexts is cross-linguistically attested, providing evidence for the existence of a parameter setting which prevents or requires pronominal co-reference in self-ascribing (deontic and causative) contexts. With Pan (2000) and Huang et. al. (1984), I predict that the parameter setting responsible for SDR can be viewed as a strategy which aims to prevent confusion by reducing co-reference options in de se contexts, which I claimed is linked to a positive specification for finiteness. From a syntactic perspective, I argued that SDR is due to an uninterpretable logophoric feature (which I call uSELF) on deontic and causative v. The feature is checked by entering into an Agree relation with the logophoric Seat of Knowledge pronoun in Spec, SentienceP, which is anchored to (co-indexed with) the matrix subject. Because co-reference would result in a de se context, the Seat of Knowledge pronoun and the subordinate clause subject cannot co-refer. The disallowance of co-reference between the matrix and subordinate clause subjects is thus derived from the fact that the logophoric pronoun in subordinate SentienceP carries matching features with the matrix clause subject. Because assertive and epistemic v do not carry this logophoric feature, these contexts do not exhibit SDR. The analysis crucially implies that SDR and the subjunctive mood, though seemingly connected, do not stem from the same source; this facet of the analysis accounts for the contexts in which SDR is violable, a property which has not been adequately explained in previous analyses. I claim that the subjunctive mood and SDR seem to be intimately connected only because deontic and causative modality are not compatible with embedded assertions, as these

220 types of modality do not encode the extensional modal base required in assertive contexts. This incompatibility explains why SDR occurs only in subjunctive contexts; the subjunctive mood itself does not trigger SDR. Finally, I discussed three idiosyncratic properties of clausal complements to emotive predicates: (i) the indicative/subjunctive alternation observed in dative experiencer contexts, (ii) the lack of an implicative entailment on the part of the speaker, and (iii) the variable nature of SDR. I argued that, because emotives with dative experiencer subjects express a lower degree of causation than their nominative and accusative counterparts (Pesetsky 1995), their lexical semantics are rendered more compatible with assertive complements. Then, I showed that subjunctive complements to emotives are not implicative with respect to the speaker, differing in this way from causative predicates. I connected this property to the fact that SDR is violable in emotive contexts (Kempchinsky 2007). The two properties are correlated because emotive predicates may surface with epistemic v, evidenced by their gradability. Causative predicates are not gradable, are therefore only compatible with causative v, invariably resulting in SDR and an implicative interpretation on the part of the speaker. Finally, I detailed the distribution of Speech Act and Sentience Phrases in complement clauses, based on the evidence and proposal outlined in chapters 2 and 3. I argued that the presence of Sentience Phrase is motivated in one of two ways: (i) it is selected by an [assertion] feature or (ii) to house a Seat of Knowledge pronoun which values the uninterpretable feature on deontic or causative v. In conclusion, this chapter has shed light on the semantico-pragmatic and syntactic constraints regulating SDR in Spanish. I have abandoned the popular assumption that SDR and the subjunctive mood are intimately connected, which is the source of many empirical issues that

221 have haunted previous approaches to SDR. By severing this connection, the analysis accounts for contexts in which SDR is not consistently exhibited. I proposed a novel syntactic derivation for clausal complements in SDR contexts, which accounts for both SDR and the way in which propositional truth conditions are anchored to individuals. Finally, I have provided support for S&Tâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s analysis of the left periphery in Spanish.

222 CHAPTER 4 THE DUAL IDENTITY OF NEGATED EPISTEMICS 4.1. Introduction In chapter 2, I detailed an analysis for two classes of subjunctive clauses in Spanish: those that are lexically-selected by volitional, directive and causative predicates, and those that surface as the default mood due to the absence of illocutionary force in complements to negated epistemics and emotives. In this chapter, I expand the proposal by analyzing negation-triggered subjunctive clauses. In doing so, I provide evidence that the semantic and syntactic properties of subjunctive complements to negated epistemic predicates overlap with those to both emotive predicates and those in other negation-triggered contexts, which are novel observations. I argue that the overlapping properties are due to the dual pragmatic status of epistemic predicates, resulting in the potential for two different configurations with respect to the scope of negation. Subjunctive complements to negated epistemic predicates tend to be grouped into the class of “polarity” (or “operator-triggered”) subjunctive clauses (1), along with subjunctive complements to negated verbs of reported speech, verbs of perception, and cognitive-factives (2) (Quer 1998, Stowell 1993, Giannakidou 1995, et.seq., among many others). (1)

Negated epistemic Juan no pensó que su novia estuviera allí. ‘John didn’t think that his girlfriend was (SUB) there.’

(2)

Negated verb of reported speech/perception/cognitive-factive Juan no dijo/no vio/no supo que su novia estuviera allí. ‘John didn’t say/didn’t see/didn’t find out that his girlfriend was (SUB) there.’

223 The subjunctive mood in these contexts is often labeled “operator-triggered” because these predicate types require negation to license the subjunctive mood; without negation, the subjunctive mood is ungrammatical, as illustrated in (3) and (4):69 (3)

Non-negated epistemic Juan pensó que su novia estuvo/*estuviera allí. ‘John didn’t think that his girlfriend was (IND/SUB) there.’

(4)

Non-negated verb of reported speech/perception/cognitive-factive Juan vio/supo que su novia estuvo/*estuviera allí. ‘John saw/find out that his girlfriend was (IND/SUB) there.’

The subjunctive mood in negation-triggered contexts is typically attributed to the non-veridical semantics of the complement clause. In this chapter, I propose that true negation-triggered subjunctive contexts involve the scope of negation into the complement clause of evidential (indicative-selecting) predicates. I argue that negation does not, on the other hand, scope into the complement clause of evaluative (emotive) predicates. I provide novel empirical evidence which illustrates that the semantic and syntactic properties of subjunctive complements to negated epistemic predicates overlap with both those to both negated evidential (indicative-selecting) predicates and evaluative (emotive) predicates. I argue that the overlapping properties result from the dual pragmatic status of epistemic predicates as either evidential or evaluative, and attribute the interpretive properties and licensing conditions for polarity items in complement clauses to the different scope

‘Polarity’ subjunctive clauses also include those triggered by (i) an interrogative operator (although this type of subjunctive clause is relatively infrequent in Spanish) or (ii) a non-veridical (following Giannakidou’s 2002 conception of veridicality) relative clause (ii): (i) Cuándo crees que venga Juan? ‘When do you believe John is coming (SUB)?’ (ii) No conozco a nadie que pueda ayudarme. ‘I don’t know anyone who can (SUB) help me.’ I hypothesize that the subjunctive mood is licensed in these complements a similar way as the negation-triggered subjunctive complements in (2), as both contexts introduce anti-veridical propositions with respect to the speaker and require a non-veridical operator to license the subjunctive. However, a more thorough analysis of these subjunctive clauses is needed to verify this claim, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 69

224 configurations of negation in the two pragmatic contexts. The analysis elegantly captures the (previously unobserved) overlapping properties and variable syntactic and semantico-pragmatic nature of complements to negated epistemic predicates, as well as providing support for a â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;subjunctive as defaultâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; analysis in evaluative contexts. It should be noted that the primary goal of this chapter is to elaborate on the interpretive differences with respect to subjunctive complement clauses in the presence of matrix negation, rather than provide a detailed semantic or syntactic analysis for the determination of mood choice in these contexts. Chapter 5 serves as a continuation of this chapter, in which the semantic contribution of negation is discussed in more detail and the syntactic analysis is outlined. The objective here is to illustrate the need for a binary distinction between negation-triggered subjunctive clauses, and develop some preliminary hypotheses based on the previously unobserved interpretive and syntactic properties that are presented. This chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, I present various semantic and syntactic properties of negation-triggered subjunctive clauses which illustrate the need for a more fine-grained distinction between epistemic predicates and other matrix predicates in negationtriggered subjunctive contexts. In section 3, I follow Fallerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (2002, 2006a and 2006b) pragmatic classification of predicates as F (evidential) level, p (evaluative) level or strongly intensional operators. I present evidence from the evaluative vs. evidential use of predicate types to illustrate that epistemic predicates may manifest as either F (evidential) level or p (evaluative) level operators, while other embedding predicates may encode only one pragmatic function. In section 4, I illustrate the syntactic and semantic similarities between subjunctive complements to emotive predicates and those to negated epistemic predicates, attributing their similarities to the evaluative (p level) status of these matrix predicate types. I hypothesize that the subjunctive

225 mood manifests as the default (uninformative) mood in complements to p level predicates, due to the evaluative (main point) status of the matrix clause. In section 5, Parteeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (1991, 995) analysis of negation as a tripartite structure is illustrated. I claim that the scope of negation depends upon the status of the matrix predicate as an F level, p level, or intensional operator, accounting for the varying semantic and syntactic properties that are exhibited in subjunctive complements to negated predicates. 4.2. Characterizing Negation-Triggered Subjunctive Complements The intent of this section is to compare and contrast negation-triggered subjunctive complement clauses, identifying differences and similarities between clause-types. First, I illustrate that subjunctive complements to negated epistemics cannot be characterized in the same way as other negation-triggered subjunctive clauses; only the former allow the potential for a negation-lowering interpretation, durative modification of the complement clause and a veridical interpretation on the part of the speaker. I argue that these differences indicate the need for a more fine-grained characterization of negation-triggered subjunctive clauses. However, subjunctive complements to negated epistemics also share many properties with other negation-triggered subjunctive clauses, complicating their classification. Both types of clauses require matrix negation to trigger the subjunctive mood, allow long distance negative polarity item licensing and allow long-distance licensing of the subjunctive mood. The properties presented in this section form the preliminary evidence for my claim that, in certain contexts, the subjunctive mood in complements to negated epistemic predicates is triggered in the same way as the subjunctive mood in other negated contexts. In other contexts, however, the subjunctive mood surfaces as the default (uninformative) mood, due to the absence of illocutionary force.

226 4.2.1. Negation-triggered Subjunctive Clauses are Not Uniform In this section, I present three differences between subjunctive complement clauses to negated epistemics and those in other negation-triggered contexts. One difference is that the former allow the so-called neg(ation)-lowering interpretation, in which negation may be interpreted as if it were in the lower clause.70 Other negation-triggered subjunctive clauses, like negated verbs of perception in (5b), do not: (5)

a. Juan pensó que no llegó su profesor. = Juan no pensó que llegara su profesor. ‘John thought his professor didn’t arrive (IND).’ = ‘John didn’t think that his professor arrived (SUB)’ b. Juan vio que no llegó su profesor ≠ Juan no vio que llegara su profesor ‘John saw that his professor didn’t arrive (IND).’ ≠ ‘John didn’t see that his professor arrived (SUB).’ Another difference is that subjunctive complements to negated epistemics are compatible

with temporal modification which delimits the event time of the complement clause (cf. Landau 2004), while subjunctive complements to negated verbs of perception and cognitive-factives are not. For instance, the temporal adverbial por dos semanas ‘for two weeks’ can be interpreted as modifying the duration of the subjunctive complement to a negated epistemic in (6) (i.e. Mary had another boyfriend for two weeks). In contrast, the durative cannot be interpreted as modifying the duration of the subjunctive complement to a negated verb of perception or cognitive-factive but, rather, only the duration of the matrix clause. In (7), then, the only possible

I follow Bartsch (1973) and Heim (2000), Gajewski (2005) who propose that the Neg-lowering interpretation is a lexical presupposition: it is lexical, because only certain predicates may carry this interpretation. As Klooster (1994, 2003) points out, the so-called Neg-lowering interpretation is likely not due to the fact that negation has syntactically risen out of its subordinate clause, as a true dichotomy between matrix and subordinate clause negation doesn’t exist. A true dichotomous predicate would be be true: if it is not true that p, then it is true that ⌐p. But if the subject x does not believe that p, it does not necessarily follow that he believes that ⌐p; x may simply want to reserve his judgment on p. On the other hand, it will always be the case that if x believes that ⌐p, he does not believe that p. This indicates an asymmetry, which implies that covert raising of negation is not how the Neg-lowering interpretation is derived, as matrix and subordinate clause negation do not necessarily yield the same interpretation. Relevant for the current discussion is only that a negated epistemic may carry an interpretation in which the negated event occurred; i.e. rather than ⌐p(believe), there is a potential for a negatively-evaluated belief act (an act of disbelief). This issue is returned to in chapter 5, in which the two interpretations are attributed to two different functions of negation with which epistemic predicates are compatible.

227 reading for the durative is that ‘John did not see/understand x for two weeks’, and not that the complement clause event ‘Mary had another boyfriend’ lasted for two weeks:71 (6)

Juan no pensó que María tuviera otro novio por dos semanas. ‘John didn’t think that Mary had (SUB) another boyfriend for two weeks.’ a. > John didn’t think it for two weeks. (DUR>NEG) b. > Mary had another boyfriend for two weeks. (NEG>DUR)

(7)

Juan no vio/entendió que María tuviera otro novio por dos semanas. ‘John doesn’t see/understand that Mary had (SUB) another boyfriend for two weeks.’ a. > John didn’t see/understand it for two weeks. (DUR>NEG) b. >*Mary had another boyfriend for two weeks. (NEG>DUR) The interpretation of (6b) is often attributed to the fact that, with certain verb types (like

epistemics), negation may take scope over the durative at LF (MacDonald and Ürögdi 2009, Karttunen 1974, and Mittwoch 1977; 2001). MacDonald and Ürögdi (2009) call this scope configuration NEG(ation)>DUR(ative).72 I return to the temporal properties of subjunctive clauses in negated contexts in chapter 5, section 5; the relevance of this property for our current purposes is only to show that negated epistemic predicates and other negated predicates may not be classified in the same way. The final difference between negation-triggered subjunctive clauses is that complements to negated epistemics allow a veridical interpretation on the part of the speaker, while other negation-triggered subjunctive clauses do not. The felicity of the follow-up statement in (8)

The only way in which (7b) is a possible interpretation is if the entire subjunctive complement clause (including the durative) is discourse-old. I assume that this is because discursively presupposed material escapes the scope of negation (Partee 1995). The intended reading of (6) and (7) is that the speaker has uttered the durative modification in an out-of-the-blue context (i.e. without discursive presupposition). In this case, the adverbial may not be interpreted as modifying the duration of the complement clause. I return to the temporal properties of negationtriggered subjunctive clauses in chapter 5, section 5. 72 Macdonald and Ürögdi (2009) argue that perceived differences and ambiguities with respect to the possibility for the DUR>NEG interpretation arrive from ‘exhaustive reference time’. According to this type of analysis, when a predicate is specified with an exhaustive reference time, as in (6), the durative may out-scope negation. If the predicate does not, as in (7), the durative may not out-scope negation. I return to this issue in chapter 5, section 5, in which I argue that, in the negation-triggered subjunctive contexts in (7), the complement clause represents an unbounded (unclosed) complement clause event time. The unbounded status of the event, then, results in the impossibility for a delimiting durative adverbial in these contexts.

228 shows that the speaker may felicitously state that s/he believes that the complement clause event to a negated epistemic was realized. Other negation-triggered subjunctive clauses, such as a negated perception verb like ver ‘to see’, do not allow a follow-up which indicates a veridical interpretation by the speaker in (9), indicating that the complement is necessarily interpreted as untrue in the epistemic model of the speaker: (8)

Juan no pensó que su mamá llegara. Pero yo sí, lo vi. ‘John didn’t think that his mom arrived (SUB). But I saw it.’

(9)

Juan no vio que su mamá llegara. #Pero yo sí lo vi. ‘John didn’t see that his mother arrived (SUB). #But I did see it.’

The potential for a veridical interpretation on the part of the speaker is evidence that subjunctive complements to negated epistemics can take narrow scope with respect to negation (10), while those to negated verbs of perception like ver ‘to see’ cannot (11): (10)

John thought e: e = propositional event or state of affairs a. ¬ > e e has negative truth value in epistemic model of speaker b. e > ¬ e has positive truth value in epistemic model of speaker

(11)

John saw e: e = propositional event or state of affairs a. ¬ > e e has negative truth value in epistemic model of speaker b. *e > ¬ e has positive truth value in epistemic model of speaker In chapter 2, section 2, I claimed that subjunctive complements to negated epistemics and

those in other negation-triggered subjunctive contexts exhibit a split in terms of veridicality. The proposal was based on the fact that, while the veridicality of the propositional complement to a negated epistemic may be disagreed with by the speaker, as shown in example (8), it need not be: (12)

Adan no piensa que vaya a llover… y yo no lo pienso tampoco. Adam NEG thinks that is.going.SUB to rain and I NEG CL.ACC think.1SG.IND either ‘Adam doesn’t think that it’s going (SUB) to rain… and I don’t think so either.’

The felicity of both agreement and disagreement on the part of the speaker with respect to the veridicality of the complement indicates that negated epistemics introduce non-veridical

229 propositions, as the truth of the complement proposition is not entailed. I followed Giannakidou (2006), who defines non-veridicality as the following: (13)

semantics, as the speaker may not believe the subjunctive complement clause to be true, illustrated in example (9). I followed Giannakidou (2006), who defines anti-veridicality as the following: (14)

Definition 2: Anti-veridicality for propositional operators A nonveridical operator F is antiveridical iff Fp entails not p: Fp → ¬ p

The properties discussed in this section are illustrated below. The table illustrates that “negationtriggered” subjunctive clauses do not exhibit uniform properties. Negated Epistemics Negation-lowering Interpretation possible



NEG>DUR (delimited temporal modification of complement clause) possible



Veridical Interpretation by Speaker possible



Other negation-triggered subjunctive

Table 4-1. Differences Between Negation-triggered Subjunctive Clauses Table 1 illustrates that the properties of negation-triggered subjunctive clauses are not uniform, indicating the need for a more fine-grained characterization than is generally assumed. In the next section, however, I show that subjunctive complements to negated epistemic predicates

230 share properties with other negation-triggered subjunctive clauses that are not shared with other subjunctive clauses, further complicating the characterization of these clauses. 4.2.2. Properties Shared by All Negation-triggered Subjunctive Clauses In this section, I illustrate the shared properties between subjunctive complements to negated epistemics and those to other negated predicates that are not uniformly exhibited in other subjunctive contexts. The first property is well known and was illustrated in the introduction: both predicate types require matrix negation to license the subjunctive mood. I illustrate in this section that both predicate types also allow long-distance negative polarity item licensing, a property shared with lexically-selected subjunctive clauses, but not complements to emotives. Furthermore, the subjunctive mood may be licensed in consecutive clauses in all negationtriggered contexts, a property not shared with either lexically-selected subjunctive complements or those to emotives. Long-distance negative polarity items (henceforth NPIs) refers to the possibility of matrix negation to license NPIs in the complement clause. NPIs are elements which are licensed, or triggered, by a non-veridical operator, such as negation (Ladusaw 1980). These elements include items such as ever and any in English and ningún ‘any’ and nada ‘anything’ in Spanish.73 They have been defined in various ways; they have been called epistemically non-specific (Haspelmath 1997), extremely non-specific (Farkas 2002), referentially vague (Giannakidou and Quer 2010) and elements with “low” referentiality (Partee 2008). Licensing conditions normally require that the NPI be in the scope of negation. Scope often translates into overt c-command, as shown by the ungrammaticality of the NPI in (15a),

There is debate among semanticists as to whether to classify these items as NPIs or as instances of negative concord. I follow Bosque (1980) and Laka (1990), who classify such items as NPIs.

231 corresponding to the scope configuration illustrated in (16a), in which negation does not ccommand the NPI any. The (b) examples illustrate the grammatical licensing of an NPI, which is licensed via overt c-command by negation: (15)

a.*Any books Bill didn’t buy. b. Bill didn’t buy any books.

(16)

a. ∃x. book (x) ∧ ¬ bought (bill, x) b. ¬∃x. book (x) ∧ bought (bill, x) According to Giannakidou (1995), NPIs are ungrammatical in indicative clauses because

these clauses are veridical, and NPIs are grammatical only in non-veridical semantic environments. NPIs are grammatical in negation-triggered subjunctive clauses, then, because these clause-types carry a non-veridical interpretation. She proposes the following licensing condition for NPIs: (17)

Licensing Condition for NPIs NPIs are functors which are modal in the sense of non-veridical. To be licensed, it is required that they occur within the scope of non-veridical operators.

Long-distance NPI licensing is possible in subjunctive complements to negated epistemics (18a), and those to other negated predicates like verbs of perception (18b), a property that all negationtriggered subjunctive clauses share. This is a property also shared by complements to predicates which lexically select subjunctive clauses (i.e. volitional, directive and causative predicates), illustrated in (18c): (18)

a. La profesora no pensó que los estudiantes hicieran algo/nada. ‘The professor didn’t think that the students did (SUB) something/anything.’ b. La profesora no vio que los estudiantes hicieran algo/nada. ‘The professor didn’t see that the students did (SUB) something/anything.’ c. La profesora no quería/no pidió/no hizo que los estudiantes hicieran algo/nada. ‘The professor didn’t want/didn’t request/ didn’t make that the students did ( SUB) something/anything.’

232 In contrast, long distance NPI licensing is not grammatical in subjunctive complements to emotive predicates: (19)

La profesora no lamentó que los estudiantes hicieran algo/*nada. ‘The professor didn’t regret that the students did (SUB) something/anything.’ Furthermore, subjunctive clauses differ with respect to locality of triggering of the

subjunctive mood. It has long been observed that negation-triggered subjunctive may be licensed in consecutive clauses, as long as the subjunctive chain is not broken (Quer 1998). Negated epistemic predicates (20a) pattern with those to verbs of perception/cognitive-factives (20b); both allow long distance triggering of the subjunctive mood: (20)

a. María no piensa que Martín crea que Juan lleva/lleve el libro correcto. María NEG think.PRES.3SG that Martin believe.SUB that John bring.PRES.IND/SUB the book correct ‘Mary doesn’t think that Martin believes (SUB) that John is bringing (IND/SUB) the correct book.’ b. María no ve que Martín crea que Juan lleva/lleve el libro correcto. María NEG see.PRES.3SG that Martin believe.SUB that John bring.PRES.IND/SUB the book correct ‘Mary doesn’t see that Martin believes (SUB) that John is bringing (IND/SUB) the correct book.’

Predicates which lexically select the subjunctive mood (21a) and subjunctive complements to emotives (21b), on the other hand, allow only local triggering of the subjunctive; the subjunctive mood is exhibited only in the immediately subordinate clause: (21)

a. María (no) quiere/pide/hace que Martín crea que Juan lleva/*lleve el libro correcto. María (NEG) desire/request/made.PRES.3SG that Martin believe.PRES.SUB.3SG that John bring.PRES.3SG.IND/*SUB the book correct ‘Mary (didn’t) desire/request/make that Martin believes (SUB) that John is bringing (IND/*SUB) the correct book.’ b. María (no) lamenta que Martín crea que Juan lleva/*lleve el libro correcto. María (NEG) regret.PRES.3SG that Martin believe.SUB that John bring.IND/*SUB.PRES the book correct ‘Mary (didn’t) regret that Martin believes (SUB) that John is bringing (IND/*SUB) the correct book.’

233 Table 2 summarizes the properties of subjunctive complements discussed in this section: Volitionals Directives Causatives Emotives Negated Other Epistemics negated predicates Negation required to licence subjunctive Long-distance NPIs



Long-distance triggering



Table 4-2. Properties of Subjunctive Complement Clauses to Predicate Types As table 2 illustrates, negation-triggered subjunctive complements share many properties not exhibited in other subjunctive complement clauses. To summarize this section, subjunctive complements to negated epistemic predicates differ from those to other negation-triggered subjunctive clauses in that the former allow a negation-lowering interpretation, durative modification of the subjunctive complement and a veridical interpretation with respect to the speaker. The two complement clauses do, however, share many properties: both require negation to license the subjunctive mood, allow longdistance licensing of NPIs and long distance triggering of the subjunctive mood. The primary goal of the remainder of this chapter is to properly characterize epistemic predicates in negated contexts. The analysis carries implications for the semantico-pragmatic and syntactic status of all clause-selecting predicates.

234 4.3. The Pragmatic Classification of Predicates In this section, I present an analysis for the pragmatic characterization of predicate types, following Faller (2002, 2006a,b). I argue for a tripartite divide of clause-embedding predicate types as (i) evidential (F level), (ii) propositional (p level), or (iii) strongly intensional, depending upon their function in the discourse. I then provide evidence in favor of analyzing epistemic predicates as homonymic operators which may encode either an evidential or evaluative pragmatic function, while other predicate types may serve only one pragmatic function. The dual pragmatic status of epistemic predicates will prove essential in characterizing their complement clauses which, as we will see, exhibit overlapping semantic and syntactic properties with complement clauses to both evidential and evaluative predicates. I analyze the pragmatic status of predicates following Faller (2002, 2006a, 2006b). Faller, following the tradition of speech-act theory, assumes that a speech act consists of two levels: an illocutionary force F and the propositional content p. F is defined in terms of several components: evidentiality, illocutionary point, mode of achievement, preparatory and sincerity conditions and a degree of strength (Faller 2006a: 5). Thus, F takes p as its argument F(p), where the propositional content p is generally defined as affecting the truth-conditions of the proposition. Consider the following speech acts: (22)

Assertive propositions with truth-values (p level operators) (a) “You opened the door.” (b) “You didn’t open the door.” Non-assertive propositions (F level operators) (c) “Open the door!” (d) “Did you open the door?” (Gilmour, Gonzales & Louie 2010:80)

Example (22) illustrates that the addition of negation in (b) changes the truth-conditions of (a), indicating that negation is a p level (propositional level) operator. Because the truth of (c) and (d)

235 doesn’t entail the truth of either (a) or (b), imperative and interrogative illocutionary operators constitute part of the F level class, as they do not entail truth conditions. Gilmour, Gonzales & Louie claim that adverbs are also categorized as p or F level operators, functioning as evidential (23a) or propositional level operators (23b): (23)

a. “Frankly, you opened the door”. b. “Quietly, you opened the door.”

In (23a), frankly does not affect or modify the truth-conditions of the proposition expressed in (22a). The adverb instead modifies the illocutionary level, expressing an attitude or degree of commitment on the part of the speaker, and is therefore an F level operator. The adverb quietly in (21a), on the other hand, alters the propositional content of the predicate by modifying the way in which the predicate was performed, and is therefore a p level operator. Following Gilmour, Gonzales and Louie (2010), I will refer to illocutionary modifiers as F level operators and propositional modifiers as p level operators, taking evidentials and subjective epistemic modals as falling into the former class.74 The pragmatic classification developed by Faller lends itself well to clause-selecting predicates, which is not an entirely new idea. For instance, Bates & MacWhinney (1987) have proposed that multi-clausal sentences involve competition between the two clauses for discursive

Rett (2012), Papafragou (2006) and many others have noted an interpretive difference between a subjective and objective epistemic modal interpretation for modals like may, might and must. Subjectives are said to be indexical to the speaker and time of utterance; objectives are based on evidence from a more sustainable and reliable source. Objective epistemics have a higher scope than subjective ones and they affect truth-conditions. For instance, consider example (i), where the modal might is based on a meteorologist’s (and not the speaker’s) opinion. Now it is possible to embed the objective under the scope of a conditional (i-b) and under a factive (i-c), properties which Rett and Papafragou attribute to its propositional status. (i)

a. It might rain tomorrow. b. If it might rain tomorrow, you should bring an umbrella. c. It is surprising that it might rain tomorrow.

Objectives affect truth conditions, and are therefore situated in the propositional (semantic/truth-conditional) level of meaning while subjective are situated in the evidential level of meaning. Therefore, modals have the potential for either p or F level status.

236 prominence. Boye and Harder (2007) call this competition between clauses discourse centrality. They argue that, when processing involves two clauses, either the matrix clause or the complement clause is the stronger ‘attractor’ for ‘main point status’, with the other clause typically serving an evidential or discourse-related (F level) function. In Faller’s terms, the clause with the highest discourse prominence expresses the propositional (p level) content of the sentence.75 Following this intuition, Gilmour, Gonzales and Louie (2010) label evidential/epistemic morphemes and lexical items as encoding F level semantics, which do not express the prominent part of the utterance. Following this line of thought, main clause evidentials, like verbs of reported speech, perception, cognitive factives and epistemics express a source of information, and/or encode how reliable the embedded claim is (Simons 2007), forming part of the F level class. The p level class of operators, on the other hand, constitute part of the ‘main point’ of the sentence and encode propositional semantics. Emotive predicates belong to this class. In Boye and Harder’s (2007) terms, the complement clause to an F level predicate carries higher discourse centrality than the evidential matrix clause. In contexts involving a clause-embedding p level predicate, on the other hand, the evaluative matrix clause carries higher discourse centrality than the complement clause. Below, I provide a diagnostic to test for the F vs. p level status of matrix predicates. I test for the F level status of a predicate by eliciting information. If the clause-embedding predicate is licit in an information-providing (common-ground updating) context, the predicate is an

Another analysis which extends this idea to predicate types is that of Ambridge and Goldberg (2008), who claim that evidential predicates like say and think do not constitute islands to extraction because these predicate types are of ‘low’ discourse centrality. The situation is different with their ‘semantically heavy’ counterparts including factives (realize, notice, know) and manner of speaking verbs (stammer, murmur, whisper), whose complement clauses constitute islands to extraction due to the high discourse centrality of the ‘semantically heavy’ matrix verb.

237 evidential, F level operator, and embeds assertions. When eliciting an opinion or evaluation, on the other hand, only p level operators are licit. Example (24) illustrates an F level context, in which only matrix predicate types which encode a source or degree of reliability/certainty for the information provided by the subordinate clause proposition are felicitous. This is because only F level predicates are capable of expressing an evidential (parenthetical) interpretation. Evidential adverbs and indicativeselecting predicates are felicitous in this context. Intensional predicates (24g), emotive predicates (24h) and evaluative adverbs (24i), on the other hand, are not licit, indicating that these elements do not constitute part of the F level class: (24)

Discourse Context: Ana is not at the meeting. Q: ¿Por qué no viene Ana a la reunion? ‘Why isn’t Ana coming to the meeting?’ a. Evidential Adverb: Evidentemente, visita a sus padres. ‘Evidently, she is (IND) visiting her parents.’ b. Cognitive Factive: Yo supe que Ana visita a sus padres. ‘I found out that Ana is (IND) visiting her parents.’ c. Verb of Perception Caminando hacia aquí, yo vi que Ana subía al autobús para Chicago. ‘Walking here, I saw that Ana was boarding (IND) the bus for Chicago.’ d. Verb of mental judgment Yo entiendo que Ana visita a sus padres. ‘I understand that Ana is (IND) visiting her parents.’ e. Verb of Reported Speech Ya dije que Ana visita a sus padres. ‘I already said that Ana is (IND) visiting her parents.’ f. Epistemic Yo creo que Ana visita a sus padres. ‘I believe that Ana is (IND) visiting her parents.’ g. Intensional: #Yo quiero que Ana visite a sus padres. ‘I want that Ana is (SUB) visiting her parents.’ h. Emotive: #Me alegro de que Ana visite a sus padres. ‘It makes me happy that Ana is (SUB) visiting her parents.’

238 i. Evaluative adverb: #Afortunadamente, Ana visita a sus padres.76 ‘Fortunately, Ana is (IND) visiting her parents.’ To diagnose if a predicate may be classified as a p (propositional) level operator, qualifying as main-point status, the same predicates are used in a set of answers to a question that elicits a feeling or attitude (rather than information) toward a discursively presupposed concept. As the main clause encodes an evaluative function, only p level matrix predicates are felicitous. Only epistemic predicates (25f), emotive predicates (25g) and evaluative adverbs (25i) are licit in this context: (25)

Discourse Context: Q: ¿Cómo te parece el buen tiempo? ‘How does the good weather seem to you?’ a. Evidential Adverb: #Evidentemente, hace buen tiempo.77 ‘Evidently, it is (IND) nice weather.’ b. Cognitive Factive: #Yo supe que hace buen tiempo. ‘I found out that it is (IND) nice weather.’ c. Verb of Perception: #Caminando hacia aquí, yo vi que hace buen tiempo. ‘Walking here, I saw that it is (IND) nice weather.’ d. Verb of mental judgment #Yo entiendo que hace buen tiempo. ‘I understand that it is (IND) nice weather.’ e. Verb of Reported Speech #Ya dije que hace buen tiempo. ‘I already said that it is (IND) nice weather.’ f. Epistemic Yo creo que hace buen tiempo. ‘I believe that it is (IND) nice weather.’ g. Intensional: #Yo quiero que haga buen tiempo. ‘I want that it is (SUB) nice weather.’

This interpretation is licit only as a response to a presupposed discourse context in which Ana is not liked by the interlocutors. The interpretation of the adverb graciosamente ‘thankfully’, however, is not licit with an evidential, or parenthetical, meaning. 77 Intonation does affect the acceptability of these answers. However, these sentences are intended to be read with no special intonation, with no interpretation involving discourse presupposition of the speaker’s disposition.

239 h. Emotive: Me alegro de que haga buen tiempo. ‘It makes me happy that it is (SUB) nice weather.’ i. Evaluative adverb: Afortunadamente, hace buen tiempo. ‘Thankfully, it is (IND) nice weather.’ Example (25) shows that only emotive and epistemic predicates fall into the evaluative (p level) class of predicates, as they can be used to express an evaluation or opinion toward a proposition. Indicative-selecting predicates (with the exception of epistemics), on the other hand, may only give a source of information or a degree of certainty regarding the veridicality of the embedded proposition, and are therefore infelicitous in evaluative contexts. The adverbial data support this claim: evaluative adverbs like afortunadamente ‘fortunately’ function as p level operators, felicitous only with an evaluative (p level/main-point) interpretation. Evidential adverbs have an inverse role; adverbs like evidentemente ‘evidently’ may only be used to indicate the speaker’s source of information or degree of truth toward the truth of the proposition, and are therefore infelicitous in evaluative (p level) contexts. The volitional predicates, in the (g) examples, do not constitute either the p or F level classes of predicates, as they are infelicitous in both contexts. The infelicity follows straightforwardly from their buletic semantics (based on wishes), which entails that they may not be used to give evidence for the truth of a proposition (as in (24)), nor may they be used to express an opinion about a discursively presupposed proposition (as in (25)), as both contexts involve veridical semantics.78 These predicate types, then, constitute their own pragmatic class, which I label strongly intensional operators.

The exception to this generalization is, of course, causative predicates, whose complement clauses carry a factive interpretation. I followed Quer (1998) in chapter 2, section 3.5, who argues that, though the complement clause is implicative (factive), causative predicates are strongly intensional, in that they introduce buletic modality (based on desires). These predicates differ from volitional and directive predicates only in that they also encode event realization of the highest ranked proposition.

240 Interestingly, epistemic verbs are compatible with either an evidential or evaluative function, exhibiting variability in their discursive and pragmatic function. In (24f), the epistemic creer ‘to believe’ is felicitously used to provide a source of information/degree of certainty, while in (25f), the epistemic is felicitously used to evaluate, or express an opinion toward, a discursively presupposed proposition. Based on these observations, I propose the following classification for matrix predicates (leaving strongly intensional predicates aside), with epistemic predicates overlapping with both F and p level predicate types: F level predicates p level predicates Cognitive-factives



Verbs of perception



Predicates of mental judgment



Verbs of reported speech



Epistemic



Emotive

 

Table 4-3. Pragmatic Classification of Predicate Types Table 3 indicates a divide between those predicates which select indicative complement clauses (F level) and predicates which select subjunctive complement clauses (p level). The exception, of course, is epistemic predicates, which appear to be compatible with both pragmatic functions.79

The difficulty in characterizing epistemic predicates is not a new issue. Quer (2001), for instance, builds on Farkas’s (1992) analysis that epistemic predicates constitute their own class, being considered ‘weakly intensional’, because both ‘strong intensional predicates’ (volitionals and directives) and epistemic predicates pick out a set of worlds. Epistemic predicates, however, pick out a set of worlds which may include the real world, while volitional predicates do not. These types of analyses, however, do not explain the overlapping properties between negated epistemic predicates and other predicate types.

241 Next, I support the claim that epistemic predicates may surface as evaluative (p level) predicates, evidenced by the fact that their subjunctive complement clauses share many semantic and syntactic properties with those to emotive (p level) predicates, which are novel observations. As we saw in the last section, however, subjunctive complements to negated epistemic predicates also share properties with those to negated F level predicates which are not shared by complements to (p level) emotives. I attribute the overlapping properties between subjunctive complements to negated epistemic predicates with both those to emotive (p level) predicates and those to negated F level predicates to their overlapping pragmatic status as either p or F level predicates. Furthermore, I propose that negation does not scope into subjunctive complements to p level predicates, while negation does scope into subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates, accounting for the different interpretive properties and licensing conditions exhibited in p vs. F level contexts. 4.4. The p Level Status of Epistemic Predicates and the Scope of Negation In this section, I show that only subjunctive complements to emotives and negated epistemic predicates allow positive polarity items and a de dicto interpretation, which are novel observations. I argue that these properties constitute evidence that negated epistemic predicates form part of the p level class and, furthermore, that complement clauses to p level predicates escape the scope of matrix negation. Subjunctive complements to strongly intensional and negated F level predicates, on the other hand, disallow PPIs and a de dicto interpretation, providing evidence that these complement clauses must be interpreted within the scope of negation.

242 4.4.1. Evidence from Positive Polarity Items and the de re vs. de dicto Distinction Positive polarity items (henceforth PPIs) are first discussed in Baker (1970), and are discussed more recently in Szabolcsi (2004), Nilsen (2003) and Ernst (2008). They are expressions that are ‘repelled’ by negation and tend to escape its scope (Giannakidou 2008). Such items include expressions like some, already, would, rather, and (some) speaker oriented adverbs: (26)

a. Bill bought some books. b.#Bill didn’t buy some books.

(27)

a. Bill would rather be in Montpellier. b.#Bill wouldn’t rather be in Montpellier.

(28)

a. John is here already. b.#John isn’t here already.

(29)

a. Unfortunately, John died. b.#John didn’t unfortunately die. (Giannakidou 2008: 4) The only subjunctive complement clauses in which PPIs are possible are those to

emotives and negated epistemics. The following examples show that subjunctive complements to negated epistemics (30a) and emotives (30b) allow the PPI ya ‘already’, while those to other negated F level (30c) and strongly intensional predicates (30d) do not, a previously unobserved phenomenon:80 (30)

a. Juan no piensa que María ya esté aquí. John NEG think.PRES.3SG that Mary already is.SUB.3SG here ‘John doesn’t think that Mary is (SUB) already here.’ b. Juan no lamenta que María ya esté aquí. John NEG regret.PRES.3SG that Mary already is.SUB.3SG here ‘John doesn’t regret that Mary is (SUB) already here.’

Examples (30c) and (30d) are marginally acceptable with a presuppositional discourse context; in other words, if a discourse participant had previously claimed that ‘María is already here’, providing an anaphoric context for the PPI ya ‘already’, the PPI in the subjunctive complement clauses in (30c) and (30d) is marginally acceptable. Crucially, if the PPI is presented out-of-the-blue, as is the intended interpretation in (30), these sentences are ungrammatical. Following Partee’s (1995) analysis, I assume that presuppositional elements escape the scope of negation in discursively presupposed contexts because they appear in the focus frame (restrictor) of negation. The analysis of negation is detailed in the next section.

243 c. *Juan no ve que María ya esté aquí. John NEG see.PRES.3SG that Mary already is.SUB.3SG here ‘John doesn’t see that Mary is (SUB) already here.’ d. *Juan no quiere/no pide que María ya esté aquí. John NEG want/NEG request.PRES.3SG that Mary already is.SUB.3SG here ‘John doesn’t want/didn’t request that Mary already be (SUB) here.’ Because it is well-known that PPIs may not appear in the scope of negation (Szabolcsi 2004, Nilsen 2003, Ernst 2008), the PPI data support my hypothesis that negated epistemic predicates form part of the p level class of matrix predicates and, moreover, that clausal complements to p level predicates escape the scope of negation. Another parallelism between complements to emotives and negated epistemics relates to the potential for the complement clause to receive a de dicto interpretation, discussed in chapter 2, section 3.3. I showed that only subjunctive complements to emotive and negated epistemic predicates allow a de dicto interpretation, a novel observation. Recall that the difference between a de dicto and de re reading is whether or not a DP gets its reference from the current discourse context (de dicto) or outside of the context in which it is presented (de re). We can test this by using a resultative verb like romper ‘to break’ and a DP modified by an adjective denoting the result of the verb, such as dañado/a ‘damaged’, in the same clause. For a de dicto interpretation, the state of the window as dañada ‘damaged’ is interpreted as a direct result of the verb romper ‘to break’, which is mentioned in the same clause. A de re interpretation requires that the ventana dañada ‘damaged window’ does not get its reference from the current discourse; the window is interpreted as having been damaged prior to the introduction of the verb romper ‘to break’, by some presupposed or unspecified cause. Example (31) illustrates that complement clauses to emotives (31a) and negated epistemics (31b) allow a semantically de dicto interpretation, while no other type of subjunctive clause does. The only possible interpretation of the modified DP in the subjunctive complement

244 to a negated F level predicate (31c) or strongly intensional predicates (31d) is one in which the window is interpreted as having been damaged prior to the complement clause event involving its breaking; i.e. they allow only a de re interpretation. (31)

a. Emotive Juan lamentó que la ventana dañada hubiera sido rota. John regret.3SG that the window damaged have.PAST.PERF.SUB be.PART break.PART ‘John regretted that the damaged window had (SUB) been broken.’ > The window is damaged as a result of the complement clause breaking event de dicto > The window is damaged due to some unspecified cause de re b. Negated Epistemic Juan no pensó que la ventana dañada hubiera sido rota. John NEG think.3SG that the window damaged have.PAST.PERF.SUB be.PART break.PART ‘John didn’t think that the damaged window had (SUB) been broken.’ > The window is damaged as a result of the complement clause breaking event de dicto > The window is damaged due to some unspecified cause de re c. Other Negation-triggered Subjunctive Juan no vio/no supo que la ventana dañada hubiera sido rota. John NEG see.3SG/NEG know.3SG that the window damaged have.PAST.PERF.SUB be.PART break.PART ‘John didn’t see/didn’t find out that the damaged window had (SUB) been broken.’ >*The window is damaged as a result of the complement clause breaking event *de dicto > The window is damaged due to some unspecified cause de re d. Volitional/Directive/Causative (Subjunctive-selecting Predicates) Juan quería/pidió/hizo que la ventana dañada hubiera sido rota. John wanted/requested/made.3SG that the window damaged have.PAST.PERF.SUB be.PART break.PART ‘John wanted/requested/made that the damaged window had (SUB) been broken.’ >*The window is damaged as a result of the complement clause breaking event *de dicto > The window is damaged due to some unspecified cause de re In chapter 2, I claimed that subjunctive complements to emotives and negated epistemics

allow a de dicto interpretation because they may be extensionally (real world) anchored. Furthermore, a de dicto interpretation necessarily entails a veridical interpretation, because the resulting state of the predicate romper ‘to break’ forces a presupposition on the part of the speaker that the subjunctive proposition was realized. Therefore, I hypothesize that negation does not scope into a complement clause with a de dicto interpretation, as a veridical interpretation

245 should not be possible. The potential for a de dicto interpretation, then, constitutes more evidence that negation does not scope into subjunctive complement clauses to p level predicates, and that negated epistemic predicates belong to this class. Furthermore, the fact that strongly intensional and negated F level predicates do not allow a de dicto interpretation constitutes evidence that matrix negation scopes into the complement clause in these subjunctive contexts. In sum, I have shown that strongly intensional and negated F level predicates are not compatible with a de dicto interpretation or PPIs in the subjunctive complement, indicating that negation scopes into the complement clause in these contexts. Subjunctive complements to emotive and negated epistemic predicates, on the other hand, allow PPIs and a de dicto interpretation. The novel observations support my hypotheses that negated epistemic predicates form part of the p level class, and that negation does not scope into subjunctive complements to p level predicates. The overlapping properties between subjunctive complements to negated epistemic predicates, negated F level predicates and emotives are summarized in table 4. The table neatly illustrates that complements to negated epistemic predicates exhibit all of the properties under investigation, indicating both the dual pragmatic status of epistemic predicates and the fact that the scope of negation differs in p and F level subjunctive contexts. The properties exhibited under negated emotive (p level) predicates indicate that negation does not scope into the subjunctive complement clause. In contrast, negation does scope into the subjunctive complement clause to negated F level predicates, with subjunctive complements to negated epistemic predicates allowing both options.

246

Table 4-4. Properties Shared by Negated Epistemics and Other Predicates Based on the novel observations summarized in table 4, I hypothesize that negated epistemic predicates manifest as F level predicates when exhibiting the first three properties, with negation scoping into the complement clause. On the other hand, the epistemic manifests as a p level predicate when exhibiting the bottom three properties, behaving like emotive predicates, and negation does not scope into the complement clause. In the next section, I further support my hypothesis that, in de dicto and PPI contexts, negated epistemic predicates surface as p level predicates, as they lose the possibility to license long distance NPIs. The data indicate that negated epistemic predicates display complementary distribution with respect to the scope of negation, indicating their dual status as either p or F level predicates. 4.4.2. The Scope of Negation and Subjunctive Complements to Negated Epistemic Predicates Interestingly, in the presence of a PPI, or if the complement clause is interpreted with a de dicto reading, the negated epistemic loses the potential for long distance NPI licensing. In

247 these contexts, the complement clause does not exhibit the properties of other negation-triggered subjunctive clauses. I hypothesize that, in these contexts, the epistemic manifests as a p level predicate and, like other p level predicates (i.e. emotives), negation does not scope into the complement. The ungrammaticality of long distance NPIs, then, falls out straightforwardly from the fact that negation does not scope into the complement clause to negated p level predicates. Example (32) shows that, in the presence of the PPI ya ‘already’, the NPI nada ‘anything’ is ungrammatical in the complement:81 (32)

*Juan no piensa que María ya hiciera nada. ‘John doesn’t think that Mary already did (SUB) anything.’ Like PPI contexts, complements to negated epistemic and emotive predicates interpreted

with a de dicto reading do not allow NPIs. This is shown by the ungrammaticality of the NPI todavía ‘yet’ in the subjunctive complement to a negated epistemic with a de dicto reading (33). Once more, the reader must assume that the state of the window as dañada ‘damaged’ is interpreted as a direct result of the verb romper ‘to break’ in the same clause for the de dicto reading to obtain: (33)

Juan no pensó que la ventana dañada hubiera sido rota *todavía. ‘John didn’t think that the broken window had (SUB) been broken *yet.’

The impossibility of long distance NPI licensing in these contexts constitutes more evidence that negation does not scope into subjunctive complement clauses to p level predicates and, when the complement clause carries a de dicto reading, the negated epistemic predicate surfaces as a p level predicate.

Discursive presupposition of the PPI ya ‘already’ makes the construction marginally acceptable. We will see, however, that presupposed elements appear within the restrictor (i.e. outside of the scope) of negation, accounting for the marginal grammaticality of both a PPI and NPI in the same clause in a presupposed discourse context. The intended reading is one in which the PPI is not discursively presupposed (i.e. newly introduced in this sentence). 81

248 The evidence suggests that negation is not the licensor of the subjunctive mood in neither complements to emotive predicates nor complements to (all) negated epistemic predicates. Importantly, the data are in keeping with a major claim of this dissertation that the subjunctive mood surfaces in complements to emotives and (some) negated epistemics as the default (uninformative) mood. Because the subjunctive complement in p level contexts is neither triggered by negation nor lexically-selected, it follows straightforwardly that the subjunctive surfaces as the default mood, due to the absence of (assertive or intensional) illocutionary force. These clauses are simply uninformative in terms of their contextual status; they are not mapped into any information state (cf. chapter 1, section 5.2 for assumptions regarding the information mapping/update function of illocutionary force). In sum, I have shown that only subjunctive complements to emotive and negated epistemic predicates allow PPIs and a de dicto interpretation, novel observations which I claim are evidence that negation does not scope into subjunctive complement clauses to p level predicates. Conversely, subjunctive complements to strongly intensional predicates and other F level predicates do not allow PPIs or a de dicto interpretation and consistently license longdistance NPIs, constituting evidence that negation scopes into subjunctive complement clauses to F level predicates. The data support my major claim in chapter 2 that the subjunctive mood is the default mood in p level (emotive and some negated epistemic) contexts, resulting from the absence of illocutionary force, rather than via licensing by a non-veridical operator or lexical selection. In the next section, I review Parteeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (1991, 1995) analysis for a tripartite quantificational configuration for focus-sensitive operators. I show that her analysis can account for the scope

249 configurations of matrix negation in p and F level contexts, based on the novel observations presented in this chapter. 4.5. Negation and the Subjunctive Mood In this section, I develop an analysis to account for the interpretive properties and scope configuration of matrix negation in clause-selecting contexts, following Partee (1991, 1995). The analysis accounts for the novel observations that subjunctive complements to negated p level predicates allow PPIs, a de dicto interpretation and a veridical interpretation on the part of the speaker, while F level predicates do not. The observations support my claim that subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates are interpreted within the scope of negation, while those to negated p level predicates are not. 4.5.1. Parteeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (1991, 1995) Analysis of Negation Partee claims that discourse-related phenomena like topic and focus can play a quantificational role in focus-sensitive constructions by creating a focus frame. A focus frame is a tripartite structure which consists of an operator, restrictor and scope, and provides a set of alternative scope configurations which determine the specification of the domain to be quantified over. Her analysis accounts for phenomena like presupposition which, she claims, falls within the restrictor of the operator. Consider the following example: (34)

a. The destruction of the city was caused by HERCULES. b. Hercules caused our DESTRUCTION.

In (34a), the cause of the destruction (Hercules), is the assertive part of the sentence and falls within the scope of the focus operator, denoting contextual contrast, and the fact that the city was destroyed is presupposed. Partee claims that the presupposition of non-focalized content in focus contexts results from the fact that this material is in the restrictor of the focus frame. In (34b), on

250 the other hand, the NP destruction is focalized, with the rest of the proposition in the restrictor of the focus operator, resulting in the discursive presupposition that Hercules caused something. The focus operator, then, creates a context which would not be entailed in the same sentence in the absence of a focalized constituent. Example (34a), above, would have the following structure, with the focalized material in the scope of the focus-sensitive operator, and the unfocalized material falling outside of its scope (in the restrictor): (35)

FOCUS [Restrictor The destruction of the city]

[Nuclear Scope caused by Hercules]

Presupposition: x: x = the destruction of the city Nuclear Scope: Hercules caused x Example (34b) has the inverse structure, with the opposite restrictor-scope configuration: (36)

FOCUS

[Restrictor caused by Hercules]

[Nuclear Scope The destruction of the city]

Presupposition: Hercules caused x Nuclear Scope: x: x = the destruction of the city Partee argues for a tripartite structure for all focus-sensitive operators, like adverbs of quantification, only, modals and negation.82

Partee’s analysis also accounts for ambiguity invoked by adjunct clauses, like the following sentence: (i)

The city wasn’t destroyed by Hercules.

This sentence has two interpretations, one in which the city wasn’t destroyed and therefore wasn’t destroyed by Hercules and one in which the city was destroyed, but not by Hercules. The two interpretations correspond to the following structures, respectively: (ii)

a. NEGx [Restrictor] [∃x] b. NEGx [Restrictor… x… ] [Scope Main Predication] x: x = The destruction of the city

251 Based on Partee’s proposal, a tripartite scope configuration for negation has also been strongly defended in Giannakidou (1997), Quer (1998) and Giannakidou & Quer (1995, 1997), who argue for quantificational vs. non-quantificational negation. They use data from the licensing of negative indefinites to support their claim, and argue that strong and weak licensing correlate with the quantificational vs. non-quantificational use of negation, respectively. Specifically, they argue that a negative indefinite is strongly licensed if it appears in the restrictor of the tripartite structure headed by negation, whereas weak licensing takes place in the scope of negation.83 When a negative indefinite is licensed strongly, its variable is bound in the restrictor, and it is interpreted as a universal negative (∀ x ¬). When the negative indefinite is licensed weakly, it is existentially closed in the scope of the negative operator, yielding an existential interpretation (¬∃x), as illustrated in (37):84 (37)

a. NEGx [Restrictor … X … ] [Scope Main Predication] b. NEGx [Scope … ∃x …]

Strong Weak

Quer (1998) takes a similar approach, and compares Partee’s analysis to the characterization of negative statements suggested in Giannakidou (1997: 174). He assumes that negative statements can be either thetic or categorical (Ladusaw 1994; see also Kuroda 1992). Categorical statements are comparable to non-presupposed (non-referential) events in which the event is in the scope of negation and the subject corresponds to the ‘topic’. Thetic statements

An example can be illustrated with negated relative clauses. The subjunctive mood corresponds to weak licensing, in which negation takes scope over the relative clause. The indicative mood corresponds to strong licensing, in which the relative clause falls outside the scope of negation, giving the relative clause an existential interpretation (i)

a. No hay una mujer aquí que hable español. NEGx [Restrictor… ∃x… ] ‘There isn’t a woman here who speaks (SUB) Spanish.’ b. No hay una mujer aquí que habla español. NEGx [Restrictor… x… ] [Scope Main Predication] ‘There isn’t a woman here who speaks (IND) Spanish.’ x: x= specific woman who speaks Spanish

See Giannakidou (1997) for an analysis of emphatic negative indefinites in Greek, which can be licensed strongly, and are analyzed as topics.

252 lack such a structure and are simply statements about events. For instance, a sentence like (38) has two possible structures, like those in (39): (38)

Sarah didn’t arrive last night.

(39)

a. ¬ arrived-last-night’ (Sarah) Categorical >With respect to Sarah, it is not the case that she arrived last night. b. ¬∃ e (arriving-of-Sarah’ (e) ∧ last night’ (e)) Thetic >There was no such event that Sarah arrived such that the arriving event was last night.

Under this type of approach, the two interpretations are correlated with the quantificational and non-quantificational properties of negation, in which non-quantificational negation gives rise to the thetic interpretation and the categorical interpretation results from quantificational negation. In light of these proposals, which provide evidence in favor of analyzing negation as a tripartite structure, I adopt Partee’s (1991, 1995) configuration for negation to analyze the interpretive properties and licensing conditions for polarity items in complement clauses. I therefore assume that negation yields a scope configuration like that of (40):85 (40)

NOT

[Restrictor ]

[Nuclear Scope ]

In the next section, I outline my proposal for the configuration of matrix negation in clauseselecting contexts, adopting Partee’s tripartite model. 4.5.2. The Scope of Negation in Clause-selecting Contexts In this section, I suggest that the subjunctive mood in complements to negated F level predicates, including verbs of perception, reported speech, cognitive-factives, and verbs of

Quer (1998) also adopts Partee’s tripartite structure, and claims that the indicative mood manifests as a result of the proposition falling within the restrictor of negation, yielding a reported presupposition on the part of the speaker that the proposition is true. According to Quer, negation-triggered subjunctive manifests when the subordinate proposition is in the nuclear scope of negation, yielding no such presupposition of truth on the part of the speaker. While the current proposal does not directly challenge Quer’s analysis, I claim that the situation is a bit more complex in subjunctive contexts. 85

253 mental judgment, give rise to the categorical interpretation of negation, in which both the matrix and subordinate clauses carry an unrealized (anti-veridical) interpretation.86 In these contexts, the complement clause is interpreted within the scope of negation. Negation of p level predicates, like emotives and epistemics, on the other hand, is interpreted as thetic negation, with the complement clause proposition interpreted within the restrictor of negation. I propose that subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates are interpreted within the scope of negation because the complement carries an anti-veridical interpretation, allows NPIs and disallows a de dicto interpretation. The configuration for a negated F level predicate with a subjunctive complement is given in (41): (41)

María no vio que su profesor estuviera allí. Mary NEG see that her professor was.SUB there ‘Mary didn’t see that her professor (SUB) was there.’ Neg (F level: to see that x) NOT

[RESTRICTOR]

anti-veridical complement clause

[SCOPE Mary saw that x & x is true]

In contrast, indicative complements to negated F level predicates are interpreted as assertions, and the subordinate clause is interpreted within the restrictor of negation.87 Only the matrix clause event is interpreted within the scope of negation, and an [assertion] feature is assigned to the complement clause by the matrix predicate (cf. chapter 2, section 2, for assumptions regarding the selection and interpretation of assertive complements):

Borgonovo (2003) attributes the subjunctive vs. indicative alternation in complements to negated predicates also as a scope configuration with respect to negation. According to her, the indicative marks the matrix predicate as the focus (in Partee’s terms, in the restrictor) of negation, while the subjunctive signals that the focus of negation is the embedded clause. My analysis, however, necessitates a distinction also between subjunctive clauses. 87 See chapter 2, section 2.1, for the definition of assertion and its proposed relation to veridicality and common ground update function, based on a Stalnakerian approach to illocutionary force.

254 (42)

María no vio que su profesor estuvo allí. Mary NEG see that her professor was.3SG there ‘Mary didn’t see that her professor (IND) was there.’ Neg (F level: to see that x) NOT

assertive (indicative/veridical) complement clause [RESTRICTOR x is true] [SCOPE Mary saw that x]

Next, I give the structure for p level (emotive) predicates, whose complement clauses are interpreted within the restrictor of matrix negation. Their subjunctive complement clauses may carry a veridical interpretation, allow both PPIs and a de dicto interpretation, constituting evidence in favor of this proposal. The proposed structure is given in (43): (43)

María no lamentó que su profesor estuviera allí. Mary NEG regret that her professor was (SUB) there ‘Mary didn’t regret that her professor (SUB) was there.’ Neg (p level: to regret that x)

non-asserted (uninformative) complement clause NOT [RESTRICTOR x is true] [SCOPE Mary regrets that x] In chapter 3, section 7.3, I discussed the fact that emotives with dative experiencer subjects like agradar ‘to please’ are compatible with indicative complements (though subject to dialectal and idiosyncratic variation). I attributed this compatibility to the lower degree of causation encoded by emotive predicates with dative experiencers. As Quer (1998), Borrego et al. (1986) and Bosque (1980) note, the possibility of the indicative mood can be viewed as a consequence of the potential assertive use of the emotive, which may be paraphrased as ‘happy/regret to report that…’. In these instances, then, the emotive predicate acts like an assertive (F level) predicate, with its complement in the restrictor of negation:

255 (44)

A María no le agradó que su profesor estuvo allí. To Mary NEG CL.DAT pleased that her professor was.IND there ‘Mary didn’t like that her professor (IND) was there.’ Neg (F level: to not like that x)

assertive (indicative/veridical) complement clause NOT [RESTRICTOR x is true] [SCOPE Mary didn’t like that x] I propose that subjunctive complements to strongly intensional predicates, including volitional, directive and causative predicates, are interpreted within the scope of negation, like subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates. This is because these complement clauses license long distance NPIs, disallow PPIs and disallow a de dicto interpretation. Although the subjunctive mood is lexically-selected in these contexts, the data presented in this chapter illustrate that the complement clause is a transparent domain for negation, with the complement clause interpreted within its scope. Therefore, the following structure emerges: (45)

María no quería que su profesor estuviera allí. Mary NEG want that her professor was (SUB) there ‘Mary didn’t want her professor to be (SUB) there.’ Neg (intensional level: to want that x) NOT

buletic complement clause (based on wishes) [RESTRICTOR] [SCOPEMary wants that x and [WBUL(SU) x is true]]

Finally, I propose that complements to epistemic predicates like pensar ‘to think’ are interpreted within the scope of negation in contexts in which long-distance NPIs are licensed and/or long-distance triggering of the subjunctive mood is possible. In these contexts, the predicate manifests as an F level operator, like other matrix predicates in negation-triggered subjunctive contexts. (46)

María no piensa que sus estudiantes hicieran nada. ‘Mary doesn’t think that her students did (SUB) anything.’ Neg (F level: to not think that x) NOT

non-veridical complement clause

[RESTRICTOR] [SCOPE Mary thinks that x & x is true]

256

However, we have seen that the subjunctive complement clause may also license PPIs and carry a de dicto interpretation; in these contexts, the subjunctive complement behaves like those to p level (emotive) predicates. In this case, the epistemic manifests as a p level operator, with the subjunctive complement in the restrictor of negation. Like emotive predicates, the subjunctive mood surfaces as the default mood in these contexts, due to the absence of (intensional or assertive) illocutionary force specification (cf. chapter 2, section 3). (47)

María no piensa que Ana ya llegara. ‘Mary doesn’t think that Ana already arrived (SUB).’ Neg (p level: to negatively evaluate x)

non-asserted (uninformative) complement clause NOT [RESTRICTOR x is true] [SCOPE Mary thinks that x] Thus, negated epistemic predicates are compatible with both the F level configuration in (46) and the p level configuration in (47), with the subjunctive complement appearing within either the scope or restrictor of negation, respectively. All other matrix predicate types, in contrast, are compatible with only one scope configuration. The proposal elegantly captures the novel observation that subjunctive complements to negated epistemic predicates exhibit overlapping discourse functions, interpretive properties and licensing conditions for polarity items with those to both F level and p level predicates. Finally, negated epistemic predicates may also select indicative complement clauses, manifesting in this context as an F level predicate. The assertive complement clause is interpreted within the restrictor of negation: (48)

María no piensa que sus estudiantes hicieron algo de valor. ‘Mary doesn’t think that her students did (IND) something of value.’ Neg (F level: to not think that x)

assertive (indicative/veridical) complement clause NOT [RESTRICTOR x is true] [SCOPE Mary thinks that x]

257 In sum, appealing to Parteeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (1991, 995) tripartite analysis for negation accounts for the interpretive properties and licensing conditions for polarity items in subjunctive complement clauses. I hypothesized that subjunctive complements to negated F level and strongly intensional predicates are interpreted within the scope of matrix negation, while those to negated p level predicates are interpreted within the restrictor. Subjunctive complements to negated epistemic predicates allow both options, accounting for the overlapping properties exhibited in the subjunctive complement clause. 4.6. Conclusion In this chapter, I first illustrated a number of properties which provide support for a more fine-grained anlaysis of negation-triggered subjunctive clauses. I showed that only subjunctive complements to negated epistemic predicates allow a negation-lowering interpretation, durative modification of the subjunctive complement and the potential for a veridical interpretation on the part of the speaker, properties not shrared with other negation-triggered subjunctive clauses. The data provide evidence for a dual characterization of negation-triggered subjunctive clauses. However, both types of subjunctive complements also share many properties, including the requirement of matrix negation to trigger the subjunctive mood, long distance negative polarity item licensing and long distance triggering of the subjunctive mood. I adopted a tripartite pragmatic classification of matrix predicates, following Faller (2002, 2006a and 2006b), and suggested that matrix predicates may manifest with one of three pragmatic functions: (i) illocutionary operators F, which embed assertions, (ii) propositional operators p, which encode evaluative semantics and do not embed assertions and (iii) intensional operators which embed buletic complement clauses (based on wishes). I argued that subjunctive

258 complements to negated epistemics have posed a challenge to characterize because they may manifest as either an F or p level predicate, resulting in overlapping properties. To support the claim, I showed that subjunctive complements to negated epistemic predicates share many semantic and syntactic properties with those to p level (emotive) predicates, including PPI licensing and the potential for a de dicto interpretation, which are novel observations. Furthermore, in these contexts, negated epistemics lose the possibility for longdistance NPI licensing, behaving like subjunctive complements to emotive (p level) predicates in these contexts. I argued that the overlapping properties exhibited between subjunctive complements to negated epistemics and those to both p level and F level predicates are due to the dual pragmatic status of epistemics as either F level (evidential) or p level (evaluative) predicates. I adopted Parteeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (1991, 1995) analysis for a tripartite structure of negation, and hypothesized that subjunctive complement clauses to negated p level (emotive) predicates are interpreted within the restrictor of negation. The analysis is based on the fact that these complement clauses may license PPIs, allow a de dicto interpretation and allow a veridical interpretation on the part of the speaker. Subjunctive complements to F level predicates (e.g. verbs of reported speech, perception verbs, cognitive-factives), on the other hand, may be interpreted only within the scope of negation, resulting in an anti-veridical complement clause and long distance NPI licensing. Though the subjunctive mood is lexically-selected in complements to strongly intensional predicates (volitionals, directives and causatives), these clauses are also interpreted within the scope of negation; they disallow PPIs, disallow a de dicto interpretation and license long distance NPIs. I have proposed that subjunctive complements to negated epistemic predicates may be interpreted within either the scope or restrictor of negation,

259 depending upon whether the predicate manifests as an F or p level operator, respectively, accounting for their overlapping properties. Thus, the analysis accounts for the interpretive properties and licensing conditions for polarity items in complement clauses to both F and p level predicates in the presence of matrix negation. We are still left with three major questions, which are the focus of chapter 5: (i) what determines the scope configuration of negation in F vs. p level contexts, (ii) why is negation needed to license the subjunctive mood in (p level) epistemic contexts and (iii) what triggers the subjunctive mood in negated contexts? That is to say, in what way is the verbal inflectional morphology in negation-triggered contexts connected to the syntactic and interpretive components of the grammar? In the next chapter, I analyze the semantic status of negation in clause-selecting contexts, and detail the syntactic analysis for negation-triggered subjunctive clauses.

260 CHAPTER 5 NEGATION, ASPECT AND THE SYNTAX OF NEGATION-TRIGGERED SUBJUNCTIVE 5.1. Introduction In this chapter, I build upon the assumptions and theoretical framework developed in chapter 4 to construct a more detailed proposal for the linguistic representation of complement clauses in the presence of matrix negation. In chapter 4, I focused primarily on the LF interpretation of complement clauses with respect to matrix negation, and the ways in which the mood of the complement clause and pragmatic class of the matrix predicate are indicators of the quantificational properties of negation. However, I have not yet provided a detailed semantic or syntactic analysis to account for the interpretation of negation-triggered subjunctive complement clauses, nor how the subjunctive mood is triggered in these contexts. Thus, the goal of this chapter is to answer four remaining questions: (i) what governs the scope possibilities of matrix negation, (ii) what determines the variable pragmatic status of epistemic predicates, (iii) what is the precise semantic and syntactic nature of negation-triggered subjunctive contexts and (iv) how does the analysis account for long-distance licensing of the subjunctive mood? To answer these questions, I first expand upon the interpretive observations detailed in chapter 4 to form an analysis for the semantic entry of negation which accounts for its scope possibilities, effect on truth conditions and the subjunctive mood in negation-triggered contexts. I argue for a dual status of negation: one whose semantic entry is similar to that of a negative quantifier, compatible only with gradable predicates, and one which acts upon the sentential properties of the clause. I propose that the two types of matrix negation result in different scope configurations, affecting the truth conditions and mood of the complement clause in different

261 ways. Moreover, I claim that the type of negation with which a predicate may surface is determined by the pragmatic status of the predicate as either evaluative or evidential. The second part of the chapter details the proposal for the syntactic representation of negation-triggered subjunctive complement clauses, based on cross-linguistic evidence, truth conditions and the aspectual properties of the clause. I show that the complement clause constitutes an unbounded event in true negation-triggered subjunctive contexts, a novel observation. I attribute the unboundedness of the event to the anti-veridical semantics of the complement clause, which are incompatible with the “change of state” interpretation entailed by boundedness. Thus, the chapter concentrates primarily on the syntax-semantics interface, attempting to tease apart to what extent modal semantics are represented in the syntactic representation, and how to characterize the locus and nature of such features. In this way, the analysis entails the interaction of properties at the conceptual-intentional interface of linguistic representation. This chapter is organized as follows: section 2 reviews background assumptions, as well as Horn’s (1989) and Yoon’s (2011) analyses of the metalinguistic vs. descriptive function of negation. In section 3, I claim that epistemics (e.g. creer ‘to believe’, pensar ‘to think’) are the only predicates which may surface with both types of negation, accounting for their dual pragmatic status. Furthermore, I argue that the pragmatic status and modal value of v in epistemic contexts depend upon the type of negation with which the epistemic surfaces. In section 4, I provide evidence from Klooster (2003) and Laka (1990) that negation-triggered subjunctive clauses are syntactically specified. I follow (and modify) Speas’ (2004) and Kempchinsky’s (2009) analysis of this feature. In section 5, I provide evidence that negationtriggered subjunctive clauses lack topological closure (i.e. are unbounded), using Giorgi and

262 Pianesi’s (1997) formal axioms for boundedness as diagnostics. I attribute the unboundedness of the event to a semantic incompatibility with a bounded interpretation, similar to habitual and progressive contexts. I also posit a syntactic analysis to account for the temporal orientation of subjunctive clauses in negation-triggered contexts, following Demirdache & Uribe-Etxebarria’s (1997, 2000, 2002, 2005) model of temporal representation. Section 6 summarizes the proposals and arguments developed in this chapter, and concludes the dissertation. 5.2. The Dual Function of Negation 5.2.1. Background Assumptions In this section, I briefly summarize the working assumptions that are relevant for the analysis developed in this chapter. In chapter 4 (section 3), I built upon Faller’s (2002, 2006a and 2006b) classification of predicate types as serving an evidential (F level), evaluative (p level) or strongly intensional pragmatic function. Matrix F level predicates are considered illocutionary operators which serve an evidential or discourse-related function and select assertive, indicative complements. Predicates belonging to the F level class are verbs of reported speech (ex. decir ‘to say’), perception (ex. ver ‘to see’), mental judgment (ex. entender ‘to understand’) and cognitive-factives (ex. saber ‘to know/find out’). In matrix clauses, these verbs express a source of information, and/or encode how reliable the embedded claim is (Simons 2007). The p level class of predicates, on the other hand, are propositional operators which encode propositional semantics. These predicates are evaluative and are considered the ‘main point’ of an utterance. In matrix clauses, p level predicates are used to express an opinion or evaluation with respect to an embedded proposition. Emotive predicates (ex. lamentar ‘to regret’, gustar ‘to like’) are considered p level pragmatic operators. I proposed that negated epistemic predicates (ex. pensar ‘to think’, creer ‘to believe’) may manifest as either evidential

263 (F level) or evaluative (p level) operators, as they are the only predicate type which may serve either pragmatic function. The third pragmatic class is the strongly intensional class, and includes verbs which lexically select subjunctive complements (i.e. volitionals like querer ‘to want’, directives like pedir ‘to request’ and causatives like forzar ‘to force’).88 These verbs introduce a buletic model of evaluation (based on wishes), and are strongly intensional in that their modal base includes a set of alternate worlds (von Fintel and Heim 2011). These predicates are not the primary focus of this chapter, but will be compared and contrasted to other predicate types for a thorough analysis of subjunctive clauses. In chapter 4, I provided evidence that the pragmatic class of the predicate determines the scope of negation with respect to its subjunctive complement clause. I hypothesized that subjunctive complements to p level (emotive) predicates are not interpreted within the scope of negation, based on novel observations that these are the only subjunctive complement clauses which are compatible with PPIs, a de dicto interpretation and a veridical interpretation on the part of the speaker, while those to negated F level predicates are not. Subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates, on the other hand, are compatible with long-distance NPIs and carry an anti-veridical interpretation, evidence that these complements are interpreted within the scope of negation. I showed that subjunctive complements to negated epistemic predicates (e.g. pensar ‘to think’, creer ‘to believe’) exhibit overlapping pragmatic and semantic properties with those to both negated F and p level predicates, novel observations which I attributed to their dual homonymic status as either F or p level operators. I appealed to Partee’s (1991, 1995) analysis

In chapter 2 (section 3.5) I argued with Quer (1998) that, although causative predicates like forzar ‘to force’ embed implicative (veridical) clauses, they encode strongly intensional semantics in that their semantic entry introduces a set of alternate desire worlds immediately prior to the moment of causation. Thus, these predicates do encode strongly intensional semantics, in the sense that a buletic model of evaluation is introduced by the causative. 88

264 for a tripartite structure of negation, and proposed that subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates are interpreted within the scope of negation, while those to negated p level predicates (emotives and some negated epistemics) are interpreted in the restrictor. In this chapter, I develop a syntactic analysis which accounts for the LF interpretation of negation in these contexts, as well as the variable p vs. F level status of epistemic predicates. I now briefly review assumptions regarding the illocutionary force specification and CP structure of complement clauses. In chapter 2, I hypothesized that F level predicates select indicative clauses, which are specified with an [A(ssertion)] feature in Speech Act Phrase, which maps the proposition into the common ground information state (cf. chapter 1, section 5.2 for assumptions on the information mapping function of illocutionary force). The proposal was based on evidence from Greek and Bulgarian which indicate that the indicative mood does not correspond assertive force cross-linguistically, and is therefore syntactically specified in Romance. I provided evidence that the subjunctive mood in complements to p level predicates surfaces as the default (uninformative) mood, due to the absence of intensional or assertive illocutionary force. These predicates select a Sub(ordinator) phrase which houses a [sub(ordinator)] feature which serves to subordinate the clause and house the complementizer (Haegeman 2012). Finally, complements to strongly intensional predicates are assigned a World feature to subordinate Speech Act Phrase by the matrix predicate, which maps the proposition into a buletic information state (based on wishes) (Ă la Kempchinsky 2009). Finally, I proposed in chapter 3 that subject obviation in subjunctive complements to intensional and emotive predicates is due to an uninterpretable feature on deontic and causative little v which must be checked by the Seat of Knowledge (SoK) argument in subordinate Sentience Phrase. Obviation itself is due to a parametric setting which bans a de se (self-

265 ascribing) interpretation in finite contexts in Romance. The following is the working hypothesis for the left peripheral structure and feature composition of complement clauses (leaving aside the possibility for discourse-related projections): (1)

Indicative Complements to: F level predicates:

[SpeechActP[A]]

Subjunctive Complements to: a. Strongly Intensional Predicates: [SpeechActP[uW]] b. p level Emotive Predicates: [SubP [sub]] c. p level Negated Epistemics: [SubP [sub]] d. Negated F level predicates: ?

[SentiencePSoK]

[FinP]

[SentiencePSoK[SELF]] [FinP] [SentiencePSoK[SELF]] [FinP] [FinP]

In this chapter, I build upon the hypotheses developed in this dissertation by proposing a semantic and syntactic analysis for subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates. I begin by arguing for a dual function of negation. 5.2.2. Metalinguistic vs. Descriptive Negation Horn (1989) identifies two kinds of negation: metalinguistic negation, which carries an identity function, and descriptive negation, which carries negative (¬) semantics.89 According to Horn, metalinguistic negation carries the interpretation of an ‘indirect assertion’, meaning an expression that is interpreted as a negatively valued emotive or evaluative stance. Descriptive negation, on the other hand, may only carry the interpretation of a negated event (i.e. a proposition with a negative truth value). It appears that in English, for instance, only sentential negation not allows the metalinguistic interpretation, while other negative elements allow only what Horn (1989) calls

To describe the binary divide in the quantificational interpretation of negation, the two versions have been given many labels. In Partee’s (1991, 1995) terms, metalinguistic negation corresponds to non-quantificational negation, and descriptive negation corresponds to quantificational negation. In Giannakidou (1997), Quer (1998) and Giannakidou & Quer’s (1995, 1997) terms, metalinguistic negation is related to the thetic interpretation of negation, while descriptive negation referred to as the categorical interpretation (also see Ladusaw 1994; Kuroda 1992 for the categorical vs. thetic functions of negation).

266 the descriptive function of negation. For example, (2a) is a case of metalinguistic negation, which entails that the adjectives escape the scope of negation; in Partee’s (1991, 1995) terms, they are interpreted in the restrictor of negation at LF. Example (2b), on the other hand, is a case of descriptive negation, as the negative element neither requires narrow scope, forcing the adjectives to be interpreted within the scope of negation: (2)

a. Maggie isn’t either patriotic or quixotic – she’s both! b. #Maggie is neither patriotic nor quixotic – she’s both!

Metalinguistic Descriptive

I suggest, with Potts (2005, 2007) and Yoon (2011), that negation of emotive and epistemic predicates is the result of metalinguistic negation, in which negation assigns a degree, or expressive indices, to the predicate, rather than negating the event itself. Evidence for this claim is that, when emotive and epistemic (p level) predicates are negated, an interpretation of matrix clause event realization is still allowed. For instance, a negated emotive predicate like gustar ‘to like’ may be interpreted as an act of ‘disliking’, rather than simply a non-liking event. Negation of the epistemic verb creer ‘to believe’ may be interpreted as an act of disbelief, rather than a non-belief act. In these contexts, negation takes on a metalinguistic function, assigning a negative degree value to the predicate, rather than (descriptive) negation of the event: (3)

a. p level emotive predicate = Metalinguistic Negation John didn’t like that his professor was there. John experienced lack of (negatively valued index of) liking (i.e. an act of dislike) b. p level epistemic predicate = Metalinguistic Negation John didn’t believe that his professor was there. John experienced lack of (negatively valued index of) belief (i.e. an act of disbelief) Negation of F level predicates, on the other hand, may only result in a non-eventive

interpretation of the matrix event. Negation of ver ‘to see’ or decir ‘to say’ cannot receive the interpretation of a negatively valued degree of seeing or saying but, rather, only the absence of a seeing or speaking event altogether; i.e. a case of ‘descriptive’ negation (Horn 1989). In other

267 words, negated F level predicates, like ver ‘to see’, are not possible with an entailment in which a ‘less than fully seeing’ experience occurred. (4)

F level predicate = Descriptive Negation John didn’t see that his professor was there valued index of) seeing

John experienced lack of (negatively

Potts (2002) claims that metalinguistic negation is an identity function on propositions: [λp[p]]. Descriptive negation, on the other hand, has the effect only of negating the matrix clause event entailment [¬ p]: (5)

The Semantics of Sentential Negation a. Descriptive Negation (F level predicates) = ¬ p b. Metalinguistic Negation (p level predicates) = λp[p]

I hypothesize that, because metalinguistic negation assigns a degree function, F level predicates are incompatible with metalinguistic negation because they are not evaluative and, therefore, not gradable. By hypothesis, then, only gradable (p level) predicates are compatible with the metalinguistic function of negation. To better define the functions depicted in (5), I turn to Yoon (2011) and Potts (2005, 2007) who refer to Horn’s ‘metalinguistic’ negation as evaluative negation. Evaluative negation is triggered in the environment to reflect the speaker’s emotive stance, adding the speaker’s heightened emotional perspective — a property typical of the class of expressive expressions such as damn and bastard, studied in Potts (2005, 2007). Their hallmark property is that, when uttered, they have “an immediate and powerful impact on the context” (Potts 2007: 1). Almost invariably, “a speaker’s expressives indicate that she is in a heightened emotional state. They can tell us if she is angry or elated, frustrated or at ease, powerful or subordinated (Potts 2007: 8).” Evaluative (or metalinguistic) negation, then, is amenable to a paraphrase which carries propositional implications, which Yoon (2011) refers to as expressive indices, as they manipulate

268 the degree of emotional evaluation or certainty encoded by an expressive denotation. Expressive indices are the main objects manipulated by expressive denotations which Potts (2007: 37) defines as the following: (6)

An expressive index is a triple <a I b>, where a, b ∈ De and I ∈ [-1, 1]. According to Yoon (2011:132) “expressive indices are the foundation for expressive

domains, which encode the degree of expressivity as well as the orientation of the expressive”. They are defined via numerical intervals I ⊆ [-1, 1]. We can read <a I b> as conveying that individual a is at expressive level I for an individual b. Mapping emotional stance onto expressive intervals has the advantage of allowing flexibility from very neutral (if I = [-1, 1]) to, in Potts’s (2007) words, “a has no feelings toward b”, to very negative. Emotive relations emerge as we narrow down I to proper subintervals of [-1, 1]; the more positive the numbers, the more positive the expressive relationship, and conversely. For example: (7)

a. <[[tom]] [-.5, 0] [[jerry]] >: Tom feels negatively toward Jerry b. <[[ali]] [-.8, 1] [[ jerry]] >: Ali feels essentially indifferent to Jerry c. <[[kevin]] [0, 1] [[ jerry]] >: Kevin is wild about Jerry (Yoon 2011: 131) According to Giannakidou and Yoon (2009) and Yoon (2011), evaluative

(metalinguistic) negation contains expressive relations between an individual and a proposition, and the expressive indices of evaluative negation range from -1 to 0.90 Furthermore, the expressive interval ‘I’ may be an epistemic state where the individual expresses either an attitude concerning the epistemic state in terms of likelihood or an attitude concerning preference:

For the remainder of the dissertation, I will refer to what Giannakidou and Yoon (2009), Potts (2005) and Yoon (2011) label evaluative negation as metalinguistic negation, as originally dubbed by Horn (1989), for consistency in terminology.

269 (8)

Expressive indices of evaluative negation i. Evaluative negation contains expressive indices <a I q>, where a is the individual anchor, q the proposition it embeds, and I ⊆ [-1, 1]. ii. I is an attitude towards q that may be either (a) an epistemic state or (b) a preference. The dual function of negation as proposed by Horn (1989), Potts (2002, 2005, 2007) and

Yoon’s (2011) analyses is directly in keeping with the proposal put forth in chapter 4. I claimed that negation is interpreted at LF as a tripartite structure which scopes into subjunctive complement clauses to negated F level predicates, but not into those of negated p level predicates, following Partee’s (1991, 1995) structure. The difference in scope possibilities may now be attributed to the type of negation with which a predicate surfaces.91 Following Horn’s (1989) terminology, negation of F level predicates is descriptive negation. I hypothesize that descriptive negation takes wide scope with respect to the subjunctive complement clause in F level contexts. The data presented in chapter 4 (section 4) support this claim: subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates license long distance NPIs, do not allow PPIs or a de dicto interpretation, and require an anti-veridical interpretation on the part of the speaker.92 Using Partee’s (1991, 1995) framework, we have the following preliminary scope

Appealing to a dual function for negation to describe the indicative/subjunctive alternation is not entirely novel. Borgonovo (2003) proposes that the subjunctive in negative contexts marks the focus of negation. In other words, when negation triggers the subjunctive mood, the subjunctive manifests as the result of appearing in the focus frame of negation. Evidence in support of Borgonovo’s analysis is that, in negation-triggered subjunctive complements to F level predicates, negation must scope over both matrix and complement clauses and requires an anti-veridical interpretation. The analysis does not, however, account for subjunctive complements to negated epistemic and emotive predicates, whose complements are not in the scope of negation. 92 Recall from chapter 4, section 2.1, that subjunctive complement clauses to emotives and negated epistemics (p level predicates) carry a non-veridical interpretation on the part of the speaker, while subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates carry an anti-veridical interpretation. I follow Giannakidou (2006), who defines nonveridicality and anti-veridicality as the following: (i)

Definition: (Non)veridicality for propositional operators a. A propositional operator is veridical if Fp entails or presupposes that p is true in some individual’s model M(i). p is true in M(i) iff M(i) ⊆ p, i.e. if all worlds in M(i) are p-worlds. b. Otherwise, F is nonveridical

(ii)

Definition: Anti-veridicality for propositional operators A nonveridical operator F is antiveridical iff Fp entails not p: Fp → ¬ p

270 configuration for subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates, which surface with descriptive negation: (9)

María no supo que su mamá estuviera enferma. ‘Mary didn’t find out that her mom was (SUB) sick.’ Descriptive Negation Subjunctive Complements to negated F level predicates Neg (F level: to see that x)

NOT

[Restrictor]

[Nuclear Scope Mary found out that x & x is true]

Negation of p level predicates, on the other hand, is metalinguistic (or evaluative) negation. Because metalinguistic negation does not scope into the complement clause, the analysis accounts for the fact that subjunctive complements to negated emotives (generally) constitute an opaque domain; matrix negation may not license long-distance NPIs, while a de dicto interpretation, PPIs, and a veridical interpretation on the part of the speaker are possible (cf. chapter 4, section 4.2). Furthermore, these are properties which Horn (1989) claims are diagnostics for the metalinguistic use of negation. In this case, negation is a degree function of (scopes into only) the matrix predicate, leaving the complement clause in its restrictor: (10)

María no lamentó que su mamá estuviera enferma. ‘Mary didn’t regret that her mom was (SUB) sick.’ Metalinguistic Negation Subjunctive Complements to negated p level predicates Neg (p level: to regret that x)

NOT

[Restrictor x is true]

[Nuclear Scope Mary regretted that x]

It is important to keep in mind that, in chapter 2, I argued that the subjunctive mood in p level contexts does not result from non-veridical semantics or feature assignment; rather, it

271 results from the absence of (assertive or intensional) illocutionary force specification. Therefore, unlike complements to negated F level predicates, complements to negated p level predicates are not interpreted within the scope of negation, in keeping with my hypothesis that the subjunctive mood is not triggered by a non-veridical operator in these contexts. However, it should be noted that p level predicates (emotives and some epistemics), though compatible with metalinguistic negation, are also compatible with descriptive negation. Negation of an evaluative predicate does not necessarily entail an evaluation by the subject x of the complement proposition p. In other words, it is not always the case that ‘x ⌐like p’ entails that ‘x dislikes p’. There indeed exists the potential that ‘x ⌐like p’ entails only a negated liking event, lacking an evaluative reading and, consequently, the descriptive function of negation. In fact, there are contexts in which negation of an emotive predicate may license longdistance NPIs, indicating that descriptive negation is possible with p level predicates. These contexts are what Quer (1998) calls the ‘generic’ reading of emotives, which carry non-veridical (generic) semantics. Quer distinguishes between a factive (episodic) reading (11) and a generic (non-episodic) reading (12) for emotive predicates. The generic reading requires a non-veridical, counterfactual reading, and may be paraphrased as an if-clause, as the gloss illustrates: (11)

No me gustó que los estudiantes me hicieran algo/*nada. No to-me appeal.PERF.IND that the students to-me make.SUB something/anything. ‘I didn’t like it that the students made ( SUB) me something/anything.’ → episodic

(12)

No me gustaba que los estudiantes me hicieran algo/nada. No to-me appeal.IMPERF.IND that the students to-me made.SUB something/anything. ‘I didn’t like it if the students made (SUB) me something/anything.’ → generic Given the non-veridical semantics and long-distance NPI licensing in (12), I hypothesize

that negation carries a descriptive function in this context. The complement clause is thus interpreted within the scope of negation, behaving in this way like negated F level predicates

272 with subjunctive complements. In the next section, I extend the insights regarding the dual function of negation to account for the dual status of negated epistemic predicates as either p or F level predicates. 5.3. On the Variable Pragmatic Status of Negated Epistemics In chapter 4, I claimed that subjunctive complement clauses to negated epistemics exhibit overlapping properties with those to both negated F and p level predicates, providing evidence for the claim with a number of novel observations. Subjunctive complement clauses to negated epistemics allow NPIs and long-distance triggering of the subjunctive mood, like those to negated F level predicates. However, they also allow PPIs, a de dicto interpretation, and do not require an anti-veridical interpretation on the part of the speaker, like those to p level predicates. The overlapping properties were summarized in table 4-4, repeated below:

Table 5-1. Overlapping Properties of Negated Epistemics with F and p level Predicates In this section I account for two properties: (i) the dual pragmatic status of negated epistemic predicates and (ii) the requirement of negation in epistemic contexts for a p level (evaluative)

273 status to obtain. I suggest that the metalinguistic function of negation is required to endow the predicate with the index of evaluation necessary to achieve the evaluative (p level) reading. Without metalinguistic negation, the epistemic surfaces as an F level (indicative-selecting) predicate. In the absence of the degree function provided by metalinguistic negation, like all F level predicates, the epistemic selects either an assertive, indicative, complement clause, or results in the descriptive function of negation, which scopes into the (subjunctive) complement clause. I assume that epistemic predicates in Spanish manifest as F level predicates in nonnegated contexts, as they obligatorily embed assertions (i.e. indicative complement clauses). In chapter 1, I defined the notion of assertion, following the framework of Stalnaker (1978) and Giorgi and Pianesi (1997), who assume that assertive force involves a common ground update. Following Stalnaker’s notion of assertion as an update function, I propose that assertive illocutionary force is a function from the propositional content of p into the common ground P, as in (13): (13)

λp[P]

Thus, an assertion encodes the entry of a new proposition p into the common ground P, and the indicative mood corresponds to assertion in the sense that this mood informs the hearer of this intersection between the proposition and the discourse. In keeping with this idea, Panzeri (2003) claims that epistemics are assertive because they involve a revision of the context set, understood as the set of worlds accessible to the participants in a conversation. The revision process is needed to account for the meaning of a sentence like (14), in which the speaker is inserting the embedded proposition into the common ground for

274 evaluation, with the embedding epistemic predicate serving an evidential function, providing a source/reliability for the truth of the embedded clause: (14)

María piensa que llueve. Mary think.3SG that rain.IND.3SG ‘Mary thinks that it is raining.’

Because non-negated epistemics select indicative complements and provide a source of evidence for the truth of a proposition, I hypothesize that, when not negated, epistemics serve an F level (evidential) pragmatic function. In non-negated contexts, then, epistemics behave like verbs of perception, reported speech, mental judgment and cognitive-factives. The obvious question, then, is how and why epistemic predicates acquire a p level (evaluative) status only in the presence of negation, and why these predicates require negation to achieve this status when other p level (emotive) predicates do not. In chapter 3 (section 3.3) I proposed that the modal value of matrix v in clause-selecting contexts encodes modality, and that there are four types of modality matrix v can encode: assertive, epistemic, deontic and causative. Assertive v is compatible only with embedded assertions, whereas the latter three are compatible only with subjunctive complements. Furthermore, I proposed that the modal base encoded on v in negated epistemic contexts encodes an epistemic/evaluative, rather than assertive, modal function in environments in which the subjunctive mood surfaces as the uninformative, default mood. I followed Papafragou’s (2006) definition of epistemic (evaluative) modality, repeated below. In Papafragou’s definition, c is the context of utterance (the modal base), and i is an index of evaluation (the ordering source), consisting of an evaluation world w’ and an evaluation time t. The function fc is supplied from the context (c), and assigns a set of accessible worlds to the evaluation world w’ and the evaluation time t, as expressed in (15):

275 (15)

Semantic Entry of Epistemic Modality a. Modal base = c = the set of all facts known in the real world w at evaluation time ti b. Ordering source = i ||epistemic || c, i = 1 iff

w’

fc (i): || ||c, <w’, t> = 1

According to (15), in epistemic modal contexts, the context-supplied function fc, or conversational background, determines for every index the set of worlds which are accessible from the evaluation world w’ at t. In this way, fc provides the context with a set of accessible realworld situations (i.e. a base from which to evaluate) the probability of the proposition. The proposition receives a positive truth value iff it is compatible with the set of real world situations generated by fc, as determined by the index of evaluation i. I argue that an epistemic predicate attains a p level reading only in the presence of (metalinguistic) negation because metalinguistic negation provides the index of evaluation i from which the accessible worlds assigned by the contextual function fc can be evaluated, resulting in an evaluative expression. In the absence of metalinguistic negation, the epistemic lacks the degree function (i.e. the index of evaluation) necessary for compatibility with epistemic/evaluative v and, in these contexts, is compatible only with an assertive modal base (i.e. assertive v), which embeds assertive complements. Recall that, according to Potts (2007), metalinguistic negation encodes the indices <a I q>, where a is the individual anchor, q the proposition it embeds, and I represents the indices of evaluation (ranging from [-1, 0]) mapped onto the predicate in metalinguistic contexts. Thus, the indices of evaluation encoded on metalinguistic negation I correspond to the index of evaluation necessary for an epistemic/evaluative (p level) status, following Papafragou’s definition of epistemic modality in (15).

276 In non-negated contexts, the epistemic lacks this degree index, and matrix v can encode only assertive modality (i.e. the extensional, or single world, modal base from which assertions are interpreted).93 As such, the epistemic may select only an assertive, indicative complement clause, anchored to an extensional, real world modal base. It is now clear why negation is required in epistemic contexts to achieve an evaluative (p level) status; metalinguistic negation endows the proposition with the degree indices necessary to achieve an evaluative, in place of an assertive, modal base. Without this index of evaluation, the predicate is compatible only with assertive v, resulting in the selection of an assertive, indicative complement clause, like other F level predicates. However, as discussed in the last section, other F level predicates are incompatible with metalinguistic negation because they are not gradable; thus, the pragmatic status (and modal base) of other F level predicates may not be altered. I hypothesize that emotive predicates (e.g. gustar ‘to like’, lamentar ‘to regret’) do not require metalinguistic negation to attain a p level reading because these predicate types do not involve a revision to the context set (Panzeri 2003). Evidence for the non-assertive status of emotive predicates was given in chapter 4, section 3, in which I showed that emotive predicates may not be used to embed assertions; they may not felicitously embed elicited information in a discourse. Thus, unlike epistemic predicates, emotive predicates do not involve a revision to the context set (i.e. they are non-assertive). Because emotive predicates are incompatible with

In chapter 3, section 4, I claimed that assertive v encodes the extensional (single world) modal base to which assertions must be anchored. I followed von Fintel and Heim (2011), who claim that extensional modality signifies that, for any expression α, we have ⟦α⟧w,g, the semantic value of α in w, also known as the EXTENSION of α in a single world w. The ordering source g, then, determines the extensional base from which the proposition α is evaluated in the real world w. Following this definition of extensionality, I proposed that assertive v encodes the extensional modality of indicative (assertive) propositions: (i)

Assertive (Extensional) Modality: a. Modal Base: The real world w b. Ordering Source: g ⟦α⟧w,g

277 assertive v, they do not require an additional index of evaluation to alter the modal base encoded on v from assertive to evaluative. In summary, I have appealed to two different types of sentential negation, following Yoon’s (2011) and Horn’s (1989) analyses of sentential negation. One is a descriptive negative operator that takes p  ¬ p. The other is metalinguistic negation, which maps a negative degree function onto a gradable (evaluative/p level) predicate. I have argued that subjunctive complements to negated epistemics often behave like those to p level (emotive) predicates because they are gradable, and are therefore compatible with the metalinguistic function of negation, capable of assigning the predicate the necessary expressive indices for an evaluative (p level) modal base. Descriptive negation, on the other hand, has the effect of negating the event realization of the matrix predicate. Because F level (indicative-selecting) predicates may not carry an evaluative interpretation, as they are not gradable, their pragmatic status may not be altered, and negation may only carry a descriptive function. Because embedding epistemic predicates involve a revision to the context set, they are assertive, and serve an F level function. However, they differ from other F level predicates in that they are gradable, and are therefore compatible with metalinguistic negation, endowing them with the index of evaluation necessary for a p level status. Thus, the dual status of negated epistemic predicates is explained by appealing to the fact that, though they are assertive, they are also gradable, and may therefore serve both an F and p level pragmatic function; no other predicate type is both assertive and gradable and, therefore, no other predicate type may serve a dual pragmatic status. In the remainder of this chapter, I detail the syntactic analysis for subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates.

278 5.4. The Syntax and Semantics of Negation-triggered Subjunctive In this section, I analyze the syntax of subjunctive clauses in negation-triggered contexts. I do so by first outlining the proposal for the left periphery and illocutionary force specification of the subjunctive complement clause, based on Klooster’s (1994) and Laka’s (1990) analysis of negative clause-types, and Speas’ (2004) and Kempchinsky’s (2009) proposals for the illocutionary force specification of negation-triggered subjunctive clauses. 5.4.1. Evidence for Negative Clause-typing In this section, I detail the syntactic analysis for the representation of subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates. I have already claimed that these complements are interpreted within the scope of (descriptive) negation, resulting in anti-veridical semantics, as well as various properties related to the wide scope of negation. Now I present data in favor of analyzing these clauses as syntactically triggered via licensing of a negative clause-type feature in the left periphery. In example (16), I repeat the working hypothesis for the left peripheral configuration of complement clauses, for ease of exposition. In this section, I expand the analysis to include negation-triggered subjunctive complements to F level predicates. (16)

F level (indicative complement): [SpeechActP[A]] Strongly Intensional Predicates: [SpeechActP[uW]] p level (emotives): [SubP [sub]] Negated Epistemics: [SubP [sub]] Negated F level (subjunctive complement): ?

[SentiencePSoK][FinP] [SentiencePSoK][FinP] [SentiencePSoK][FinP] [FinP]

To develop an analysis for the syntactic representation of the CP domain of subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates, I appeal to Laka (1990) and Klooster (2003). They claim that, when the subjunctive mood is triggered by negation, the subordinate clause Force Phrase (our Speech Act Phrase) requires (negatively valued) syntactic specification. Evidence in

279 favor of their analyses comes from long-distance NPI licensing in Basque, which requires overt negative specification in the subordinate clause complementizer domain. Laka (1990) shows that, in Basque, the possibility of NPIs in the subordinate clause depends upon the presence of a negative complementizer. Basque has the declarative complementizer ela, whose distribution is more or less like that of English that. It also has an interrogative complementizer en. The negative complementizer is enik (in which the initial vowel may assimilate to a preceding vowel), as in (17a,b), with the inherently negative predicate ukatu ‘to deny’: (17)

a. Amaiak [inork gorrotoa dionik] ukatu du Amaia anyone hatred has-that denied has ‘Amaia denied that anybody hated her.’ b. Lekukoek [gau hartan inor jauregira hurbildu zenik] ukatu dute witnesses night that anyone castle-to near was-that denied have ‘The witnesses denied that anyone got near the castle that night.’ (Klooster 2003: 11)

Example (18) illustrates the selection of the negative complementizer by an epistemic verb: (18)

Iñigok ez du sinisten [lurrak eztanda egingo duenik] Iñigo no has believed earth explode do will-that ‘Iñigo does not believe that the earth will explode’ (Klooster 2003: 11)

In example (18), the speaker doubts the proposition that ‘the earth will explode’, while also indicating that Iñigo does not believe it. Like Spanish, these predicates can select the indicative mood, and the declarative complementizer ela, for cases in which the truth of the content of the embedded clause is asserted by the speaker. This is illustrated in (19). (19)

Galileok ez zuen sinisten [eguzkia lurrari inguruka zebilela] Galileo no had believed sun-the earth-to turns-in went-that ‘Galileo did not believe that the earth sun revolved around the earth’ (Klooster 2003: 11)

280 In (19), the speaker is implying that s/he believes that the sun turns around the earth, while also indicating that Galileo did not believe it. Klooster (2003) also shows that the choice of complementizer in Basque is connected to the possibility of NPIs occurring in the embedded clause. For instance, a sentence such as (20), with the declarative complementizer ela combined with an NPI, is not grammatical: (20)

*Galileok ez zuen sinisten [ezerk lurrari inguruka zebilela] Galileo no had believed anything earth-to turns-in went-that ‘Galileo had not believed that anything revolves around the earth.’ (Klooster, 2003: 11) According to Klooster, the dependency between long-distance NPI licensing and the

[NEG] complementizer suggests that the CP of negative subordinate clauses contains an (abstract) negative operator in Spec, CP, reflected by the presence of the complementizer. 94 Based on the Basque data, he proposes that, in Spanish, negated predicates and adversative predicates like dudar ‘to doubt’, when selecting CPs in which long distance NPIs are licensed, always select CPs containing a [NEG] operator in Spec, CP, whether or not (depending on the language) this is reflected in a phonological form distinct from other types of complementizers, as seen in Basque.95

Klooster (2003) uses the Basque data as evidence that the Neg-raising interpretation of negated epistemics is not a case of covert movement of negation, as it depends upon the presence of a [+neg] complementizer. Klooster argues that the dependency indicates a selectional relationship, rather than the result of movement, which implies that (i) Neg-raising is a lexical phenomenon and (ii) the negative complementizer encodes negative semantics. 95 Interestingly, adversative (inherently negative) predicates like dudar ‘to doubt’, in Spanish, cannot license local NPIs (i-a), but only long-distance NPIs in subjunctive complement clauses (i-b). Progovac (1988) and Laka (1990) take this as evidence that C[neg] is the trigger for the licensing of NPIs, which adversative predicates cannot trigger unless in a selectional relationship with a subordinate CP. (i)

a. *La administración duda nada. The administration doubts nothing ‘The administration doubts anything.’ b. La administración duda que el presidente apruebe ninguno de estos proyectos. The administration doubts that the president approves.SUB.3SG none of these projects ‘The administration doubts that the president will approve (SUB) any of these projects.’

281 Following Klooster (2003) and Laka (1990), I assume that subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates carry a negatively valued feature in their subordinate CP, as these clause types are compatible with long-distance NPIs. Also, as was shown in chapter 4 (section 4), these clauses are incompatible with PPIs, a de dicto reading, and require an anti-veridical interpretation on the part of the speaker, constituting evidence that these complement clauses are negatively valued. Following Kempchinsky (2009), I claim that this negative feature is similar in nature to the feature proposed in chapter 2, for lexically subjunctive clauses. According to Kempchinsky (2009), lexically-selected subjunctive complements to volitional, directive and causative predicates result from feature assignment by the matrix predicate. The feature has the semantic effect of marking a shift in the modal base from the real world (WR) to a buletic model of evaluation, based on wishes (WBUL). Because the selection relation itself triggers the presence of the feature uW in lexically-selected contexts, Kempchinsky hypothesizes that W is uninterpretable in these contexts. This feature was referred to as uW, which must be checked and deleted by the head of MoodP within the lower clause: (21)

… VW [CP [SAP SAP[uW]] [SenP] [FinP +Fin] [IP (DP) [MoodP [V+T+MW] [TP …]]]]] selection

checking (Agree)

In the case of ‘polarity’ or ‘negation-triggered’ subjunctive clauses, I continue to follow Kempchinsky’s (2009) syntactic analysis. She assumes an interpretable version of the W feature in ForceP (our Speech Act Phrase) of these subjunctive clauses. Because the feature is not

Relating this to the current hypothesis and the proposed dual function of negation, it appears that dudar ‘to doubt’ is compatible only with metalinguistic negation (p level function) when not selecting a clausal complement, as metalinguistic negation does not license NPIs. However, the inherent negation expressed by the lexical semantics of the predicate appears to be compatible with the descriptive function (F level function) when selecting a clausal complement. Clearly this discrepancy merits further research.

282 triggered by lexical selection, but is licensed by negation, Kempchinsky claims that the shift in the modal base is only made visible by the subjunctive mood itself. For this reason, W is assumed to be interpretable in these contexts. Instead of being checked and deleted, then, we can look at this W argument as a feature which must be identified by MoodP. Thus, the relationship between W in Force Phrase (our Speech Act Phrase) and the verbal complex is not checking, but identiďŹ cation. (22)

...[Neg NEG] [TP...] [VP...][CP [SaP SaP [W]] [FinP +Fin]] [TP (DP) [MoodP [V+T+MW] [TP ... ]]]] identification Thus, I have followed Klooster (2003), Laka (1990) and Kempchinsky (2009), who

propose that negation-triggered subjunctive clauses are syntactically represented via a negative clause-typing feature. I have not yet, however, discussed the semantic import of this clause-type specification, which is the focus of the next section. 5.4.2. On the Semantic Import of W Throughout this dissertation, I have hypothesized that semantico-pragmatic features related to illocutionary force, like other features, are in the Numeration as features on the Force head, as an (abstract) lexical item. For instance, I presented data in chapter 2 (section 4) in favor of analyzing assertive force as a syntactically represented feature in Romance. With this in mind, I will now turn to the proposed semantico-pragmatic import of the negative clause-type feature W. In chapter 4, section 2.1., I showed that these clauses require an anti-veridical interpretation on the part of the speaker, based on the fact that the speaker may not believe the complement clause to be true. This is indicated by the infelicity of the follow-up when a negated F level predicate selects a subjunctive complement clause:

283 (23)

María no vio que su abuela hiciera un pastel. Mary NEG see.PAST.3SG that her grandma made.PAST.SUB.1SG a cake ‘Mary didn’t see that her grandma made (SUB) a cake.’ # …¡pero sí que lo hizo! … but yes that CL.ACC make.PAST.IND.3SG …‘but she did!’

Given the anti-veridical semantics of the complement clause, I hypothesized that these clausetypes carry anti-veridical semantics, with anti-veridicality defined by Giannakidou (2006) as the following: (24)

Definition 2: Anti-veridicality for propositional operators A non-veridical operator F is anti-veridical iff Fp entails not p: Fp → ¬ p

As the illocutionary feature in this context marks a shift in the modal base from the real world WR to an anti-veridical model, I will call it Wanti-veridical. This feature, then, maps the propositional content into a strongly intensional information state, in the sense that the set of worlds in which the proposition is true cannot include the real world. Thus, there is an interpretive difference between the model introduced by lexicallyselected subjunctive clauses, and that which is introduced by a negated F level predicate. The former marks a shift in the modal base from a real world model (WR) to a buletic (desire) model (WBUL) (à la Kempchinsky 2009, Quer 1998), shown in (25): (25)

Lexically-selected subjunctive:

WR → WBUL

The clause-type feature involved in subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates, on the other hand, marks a shift in the modal base from a real world model (WR) to an anti-veridical model (Wanti-veridical), shown in (26): (26)

Negation-triggered subjunctive:

WR → Wanti-veridical

As Quer (1998) points out, however, there is another component to illocutionary force. The model of evaluation of a proposition must include an individual anchor from whose

284 perspective the truth-value of the proposition is judged. Throughout this dissertation, I have adopted Speas and Tennyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (2003) analysis of syntactic sentience, which includes a Seat of Knowledge argument, interpreted as the individual anchor from whose perspective the truth value of a proposition is evaluated. The Seat of Knowledge argument is conceived as a null logophoric pronoun in Spec, Sentience Phrase, the phrase embedded by Speech Act Phrase. In chapter 3, I proposed that subordinate Sentience Phrase is motivated in one of two contexts: (i) selection by an assertion feature or (ii) to check an uninterpretable SELF feature on a matrix v which encodes deontic or causative modality. The subordinate CP domain to negated F level predicates in anti-veridical (subjunctive) contexts, then, cannot contain a Sentience Phrase, as the matrix clause does not embed an assertion, nor does matrix v encode deontic or causative modality. Empirical support for the claim comes from the fact that, as shown in (23) the antiveridical interpretation of these complement clauses is anchored to the speaker; it is the speaker who cannot believe the complement clause to be true. It follows straightforwardly that truth evaluation of the complement clause would be anchored to the Speaker role in the absence of a subordinate Seat of Knowledge, as the Speaker is co-indexed with the Seat of Knowledge position in matrix clauses. In the absence of a complement clause Seat of Knowledge, then, the Speaker is responsible for truth evaluation of entire construction, which is the closest ccommanding Seat of Knowledge argument to whom the anti-veridical interpretation of the complement clause is anchored. The (relevant) derivation is as follows: (27)

[SaP Speakeri [SenP SoKi [ [VP...][CP [SaP [W]] [FinP +Fin]] [IP (DP) [MoodP [V+T+MW] [TP ... co-indexation

identification

285 The representation in (27) shows that the complement clause is interpreted with anti-veridical semantics, via the feature composition of the W feature. Furthermore, the anti-veridical interpretation is anchored to the point of view of the Speaker, because the Speaker is co-indexed with the closest c-commanding Seat of Knowledge argument in matrix SentienceP. The syntactic analysis in (27), then, properly accounts for the interpretation of subjunctive propositions in negated F level contexts from the perspective of model theory as well. Recall from chapter 1 that Quer (1998) defines a real world model of evaluation MR(x) in the following way in (28): (28)

A model MR(x) in a context c is a set of worlds W’ ⊆ W(c) associated with an individual x, representing worlds compatible with what x knows.

The matrix clause Seat of Knowledge argument syntactically represents and pragmatically encodes the ‘point of view’ of the individual x (i.e. the speaker), to whom the truth of the propositional content is evaluated, while the illocutionary force specification represents the modal base. The result in negation-triggered subjunctive clauses is an anti-veridical proposition anchored to the model of evaluation of the speaker Manti-veridical(Speaker). The inclusion of negation-triggered subjunctive clauses completes the proposed schema for the illocutionary force (information mapping status) of complement clause propositions. The schema in (29) illustrates that strongly intensional predicates (i.e. volitionals, directives and causatives) map their propositional complements into a buletic information state, while negationtriggered subjunctive complements to F level predicates are mapped into an anti-veridical information state. Assertions map propositions into the common ground, while p level predicates (emotive and negated epistemic predicates), which lack illocutionary force, do not map their propositional complements into any information state.

286 (29) Assertions [assertion] Common Ground Subjunctive complements to negated epistemics and emotives

Context Set

Buletic worlds (based on desires) uW

Strongly intensional propositions

Anti-veridical (unrealized) worlds W

The complete schema for the CP structure of subjunctive complement clauses is illustrated below (leaving aside the possibility for discourse-related projections): (30)

F level (indicative) complements: [SpeechActP [A]] [SentiencePSoK][FinP] Intensional complements: [SpeechActP [uW]] [SentiencePSoK][FinP] p level (emotive) complements: a [Sub [sub]] [SentiencePSoK][FinP] p level (negated epistemic) complements: [Sub [sub]] [FinP] Negated F level (subjunctive) complement: [SpeechActP [W]] [FinP]

The schema illustrates that, while clause-typing features identify the information state in which a clause is to be interpreted (i.e. assertive, anti-veridical or buletic), it is the Seat of Knowledge argument which determines from whose point of view the proposition is evaluated. In this way, the proposal captures the interaction between the syntactic representation and the semantic/pragmatic components of the grammar with respect to the illocutionary force of complement clauses; i.e. the representation and interpretation of clause-typing at the C-I interface. In sum, I have proposed that descriptive negation licenses an interpretable Wanti-veridical feature in the complement clause Speech Act Phrase in subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates (Ă la Kempchinsky 2009). Evidence in favor of a negative clause-typing feature

287 was provided by Klooster (2003) and Laka (1990), who show that negative clauses are syntactically specified. By appealing to Speas and Tenny’s (2003) syntactic representation of ‘point of view’ arguments, I have accounted for the fact that the anti-veridical interpretation of the clause is relativized to the Speaker. Because a subordinate Sentience Phrase is not selected, the matrix clause Seat of Knowledge argument, which is co-indexed with the Speaker argument in matrix contexts, is responsible for truth evaluation of both clauses. The proposal completes the schema for the complement clause CP domain in subjunctive contexts (leaving aside the possibility for discourse-related projections). The rest of the chapter focuses on the aspectual properties of subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates. I provide evidence that their complement clause events are unbounded, a novel observation. I argue that the anti-veridical semantics of the complement clause are incompatible with boundedness, as boundedness requires a “change of state” interpretation of the event. Finally, I formulate a syntactic proposal which accounts for the temporal orientation of these clauses. 5.5. On the Unboundedness of Negation-Triggered Subjunctive Events In this section, I present evidence in favor of analyzing negation as a sentential (rather than lexical) operator, which interacts with the event structure of a predicate, a necessary first step in establishing the groundwork for analyzing the aspectual properties of subjunctive clauses. I then show that subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates are interpreted as unbounded events, a previously unobserved phenomenon. I do so by adopting Giorgi and Pianesi’s (1997) formal axioms for topologically closed events as diagnostics for boundedness. I also show that other subjunctive complement clauses may be bounded, providing evidence that unboundedness is not a priori a property of subjunctive clauses but, rather, only subjunctive

288 clauses in negated F level contexts (i.e. clauses containing an anti-veridical clause-typing feature). I claim that, temporally, these contexts are similar to habitual and progressive contexts, which also lack topological closure. The evidence indicates that the matrix and complement clause events are spatio-temporally linked, leading to the hypothesis that the negative clausetyping feature requires resetting of the matrix clause event time. 5.5.1. Background Assumptions: “Stativizing” Negation and Topological Closure In this section, I first briefly review evidence in favor of analyzing the effect of negation on temporal orientation as an interaction with the sentential properties of the clause, rather than as affecting the lexical event structure of a predicate. The evidence serves as an introduction to the debate surrounding the effect of negation on event structure, which is an essential first step in establishing the theoretical framework which I adopt to analyze the effect of matrix negation in subjunctive contexts. Much research has investigated the interaction between negation and the aspectual properties of predicates. Many argue that negation operates on the event structure of a predicate, creating a ‘stativizing’ effect (Dowty 1979, Verkuyl 1993). The notion of ‘state’ is conceived as a subcategory of lexical aspect, following the typology of lexical classes originally proposed by Vendler (1957), which assumes that verbal predicates manifest as either states, activities, achievements or accomplishments. Under these approaches, negation is proposed to alter punctual event structures to stative (durational) event structures. Typical evidence is given below in (31), in which the durational modification for/until is grammatical with an achievement predicate like arrive only in the presence of negation: (31)

a. John arrived #for an hour/#until noon. b. John didn’t arrive for an hour/until noon.

289 As (31a) illustrates, without negation, achievement predicates encode punctual events with no process component, resulting in the ungrammaticality of durational adverbials. However, as (31b) shows, the presence of negation renders the construction acceptable. Because states are considered atelic, and therefore donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t encode an inherent endpoint, the durational modification is taken as evidence that negation has altered the event structure of an achievement predicate to that of a stative predicate. However, many have argued against the idea that negation alters the event structure of a predicate. For instance, Giannakidou (2002) shows that, in Greek, the durative mexri â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;untilâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; cannot be used with a negated achievement that appears with perfective aspect, shown in (32a). Negation, therefore, seems unable to 'stativize' an unambiguously eventive verb form. With such forms, a scalar NPI para monon 'but only' is used instead of mexri. However, statives with progressive aspect (in either the perfective or imperfective form) allow mexri (32b): (32)

a. *I prigipisa dhen eftase mexri ta mesanixta. the princess not arrived.PERF.3SG until the midnight 'The princess did not arrive until midnight.' b. I prigipisa dhen kimotane mexri ta mesanixta. the princess not slept.PROG.IMPERF.3SG until the midnight 'The princess was in a state of not-sleeping until midnight. ' > non-stative reading 'It is not true that the princess slept until midnight.' (She woke up earlier than that.) > stative reading Giannakidou (2002:94) While mexri is possible in both perfective and imperfective progressive contexts, the

stative reading, which implies no event actualization, is only possible with negation of a stative verb with imperfective aspect. Thus, the evidence from Greek indicates that negation does not alter the lexical properties of the predicate. I follow Giannakidou (2002), who assumes that negation does not alter the event structure of a predicate but, rather, interacts with the temporal/aspectual properties of a clause only at the sentential level.

290 With this in mind, I turn to Giorgi and Pianesi (1997) (henceforth G&P), who formally distinguish the semantic interpretation of a closed vs. unclosed event. They propose the semantic primitive of topological closure, claiming that the formal counterpart of the notion of perfectivity is that of a topologically closed event. I will then use their diagnostics to show that subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates are topologically unclosed events. 5.5.2. A Formal Notion of Boundedness: Giorgi and Pianesi (1997) G&P argue that predicates which denote bounded events may denote only topologically closed events and, therefore, the temporal variable associated with the sentence must be existentially bound. Events which are not existentially bound denote topologically unclosed events. Their notion of topological closure is based on the idea that, given a set x of objects and a function cl from x into x, cl is an operator of topological closure iff the following axioms hold (1997:156): (33)

a. P(x,cl(x)) b. cl(cl(x)) = cl(x) c. cl(x) + cl(y) = cl(x + y)

G&P define the perfectivizing function of cl as the following (1997:156): assume that cl is a perfectivizing function. In this case, (33a) holds of cl. According to G&P, x is the imperfective event contained in a sentence such as ‘John is eating an apple’, and cl(x) is the perfective event appearing in the sentence ‘John has eaten an apple’. Then, the event x is part of the event cl(x). Considering now (33b), if x is a perfective event, that is, if cl(x) = x, then there is no smaller perfective event containing x but itself. Therefore (33b) holds of perfective events. Finally, it is intuitively clear that if x and y are imperfective events and z is their sum, then the perfective event corresponding to z is the sum of the perfective events corresponding to x and y. In other words, (33c) also holds of cl. In sum, the axioms (33a) and (33b) hold of the function cl and,

291 thus, cl can be regarded as an operator of topological closure. Therefore, the values of this operator, namely, perfective events, can be regarded as topologically closed (bounded) entities. With this formal definition of topological closure in mind, I now turn to a diagnostic which can test for topological closure. I assume, with many researchers, that temporal adverbs are predicates of spatiotemporal ordering (Demirdache and Uribe-Etxebarria, 2005, Stowell 1993, Zagona 2003), and that by using a durative adverbial which denotes a delimited period of time, like por una semana ‘for a week’ or por una hora ‘for an hour’, we can test whether or not an event is bounded/topologically closed. Namely, if an event may be delimited in its entirety by a durative, the event is a topologically closed (bounded) event. If not, the event is a topologically unclosed (unbounded) event. This particular diagnostic works best with stative and activity predicates, because neither predicate encodes telicity in their lexical meaning; states are static while activity predicates denote iterated changes (Dowty 1979, Kearns 1991, McClure 1994). These predicate types lend themselves best to testing for topological closure because, as both event types lexically entail duration, the potential for event delimitation is more clearly illustrated than with achievement or accomplishment predicates, whose event structures do not entail duration. In Spanish, the inflectional system overtly marks imperfective and perfective past tense in indicative contexts. The former marks unbounded events, while the latter marks bounded events. So, a delimiting durative such as por una semana ‘for a week’ is grammatical with (stative and activity) predicates that appear in the perfective preterit, such as with the perfective form of the stative verb tener ‘to have’ in (34a). They are not grammatical with the imperfective preterit form of the verb (34b), however, as this form denotes a topologically unclosed (unbounded) event:

292 (34)

a. Andrés tuvo una novia (por una semana). Andrew have.PAST.PERF.3SG a girlfriend for a week ‘Andrew had (PERF) a girlfriend (for a week).’ b. Andrés tenía una novia (*por una semana). Andrew have.PAST.IMPERF.3SG a girlfriend for a week ‘Andrew had (IMPERF) a girlfriend (*for a week).’ The compatibility of the durative with only the perfective form of the stative verb shows

that only the perfective past tense form marks topologically closed events. Testing the boundedness of the events in (34a,b) against G&P’s axioms for topologically closed events, we see this is the case. If cl(x) is the perfective event appearing in (34a), Andrés tuvo una novia ‘Andrew had (PERF) a girlfriend’, then the event x is part of the event cl(x). Considering now (33b), if x is a perfective event, that is, if cl(x) = x, then there is no smaller perfective event containing x but itself. As the event is delimited in its entirety by the delimiting durative por una semana ‘for a week’, axiom (33b) holds. Finally, it is intuitively clear that, during the week denoted by the adverbial, the entire event z is equal to its imperfective subparts x and y. Thus, the event denoted by (34a) is a perfective event. The same is not true of the event denoted by (34b) which, appearing in the imperfective past tense, denotes a topologically unclosed event. It is immediately clear that (33b) of G&P’s axioms does not hold, as there must be at least one subpart of the event which is not expressed with imperfective aspect, as the event cannot be delimited by the durative. Unlike past tense indicative contexts, however, the perfectivity distinction is not exhibited in the verbal morphology of subjunctive verb forms. Thus, past subjunctive contexts constitute a morphologically ambiguous environment with respect to the boundedness of the event. 5.5.2. On the (Un)boundedness of Subjunctive Complements to Negated F level Predicates In this section, I apply G&P’s axioms to clausal complements. Because Spanish does not display the perfective vs. imperfective distinction in the subjunctive mood, the boundedness

293 distinction is often ambiguous.96 The goal of this section is to tease apart the boundedness divide with respect to subjunctive complements. In doing so, I show that subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates denote unbounded events, while other subjunctive complements and indicative complements can be bounded. For a basis of comparison, I test for the boundedness of the indicative complement counterparts to negated F level predicates first. Example (35) shows that indicative complements to negated F level predicates can denote topologically closed events, as the perfective form of the verb allows the low construal reading of the delimiting durative. With a stative verb like tener ‘to have’ in the perfective past, the durative por una semana ‘for a week’ may be interpreted as delimiting the duration of the (perfective) matrix clause event time (high construal reading) or the complement clause event time (low construal reading), as indicated by the grammaticality of the paraphrases. The low construal reading is the most relevant, as the potential for this reading illustrates the boundedness of the indicative complement clause. This is shown with a perception verb (35a), a cognitive-factive (35b), verb of mental judgment (35c), and a verb of reported speech (35d): (35)

Discourse Context: Speaker believes that their friend Mary has had a boyfriend, but wants to inform listener that their friend John didn’t see/find out/understand/say this information. a. Perception Verb Juan no vio que María tuvo un novio por dos semanas. ‘John didn’t see that Mary had (IND.PERF) a boyfriend for two weeks.’ > John didn’t see that x for two weeks. x: Mary had a boyfriend > John didn’t see that x. x:Mary had a boyfriend for two weeks

High construal Low construal

In traditional grammars, the past subjunctive morphological forms are termed ‘imperfect’, but this terminology obscures the possible interpretations of these forms. The diagnostics used here from G&P provide a formal way to test for imperfectivity in the sense of boundedness. 96

294 b. Cognitive Factive Juan no supo que María tuvo un novio por dos semanas. ‘John didn’t find out that Mary had (IND.PERF) a boyfriend for two weeks.’ > John didn’t find out that x for two weeks. x: Mary had a boyfriend High construal > John didn’t find out that x. x:Mary had a boyfriend for two weeks Low construal c. Verb of Mental Judgment Juan no entendió que María tuvo un novio por dos semanas. ‘John didn’t understand that Mary had (IND.PERF) a boyfriend for two weeks.’ > John didn’t understand that x for two weeks. x: Mary had a boyfriend High construal > John didn’t understand that x. x:Mary had a boyfriend for two weeks Low construal d. Verb of reported speech Juan no dijo que María tuvo un novio por dos semanas. ‘John didn’t say that Mary had (IND.PERF) a boyfriend for two weeks.’ > John didn’t say that x for two weeks. x: Mary had a boyfriend High construal > John didn’t say that x. x:Mary had a boyfriend for two weeks Low construal As the delimiting durative is compatible with the low construal reading, the indicative complement clause events in these contexts constitute topologically closed (bounded) events. In contrast, when the indicative complement clause appears with imperfective aspect, the durative may only be interpreted as modifying the perfective matrix clause event. The impossibility for the low construal reading provides evidence that these imperfective complement clauses represent topologically unclosed (unbounded) events: (36)

Discourse Context: Speaker believes that their friend Mary had a boyfriend, but wants to inform listener that their friend John didn’t see/find out/understand/say this information. a. Perception Verb Juan no vio que María tenía un novio por dos semanas. ‘John didn’t see that Mary had (IND.IMPERF) a boyfriend for two weeks.’ > John didn’t see that x for two weeks. x: Mary had a boyfriend High construal >*John didn’t see that x. x:Mary had a boyfriend for two weeks *Low construal b. Cognitive Factive Juan no supo que María tenía un novio por dos semanas. ‘John didn’t find out that Mary had (IND.IMPERF) a boyfriend for two weeks.’ > John didn’t find out that x for two weeks. x: Mary had a boyfriend High construal >*John didn’t find out that x. x:Mary had a boyfriend for two weeks *Low construal c. Verb of Mental Judgment Juan no entendió que María tenía un novio por dos semanas. ‘John didn’t understand that Mary had (IND.IMPERF) a boyfriend for two weeks.’ > John didn’t understand that x for two weeks. x: Mary had a boyfriend High construal >*John didn’t understand that x. x:Mary had a boyfriend for two weeks *Low construal

295 d. Verb of Reported Speech Juan no dijo que María tenía un novio por dos semanas. ‘John didn’t say that Mary had (IND.IMPERF) a boyfriend for two weeks.’ > John didn’t say that x for two weeks. x: Mary had a boyfriend High construal >*John didn’t say that x. x:Mary had a boyfriend for two weeks *Low construal Before turning to the subjunctive counterparts of these negated F level predicates, I will first use the durative diagnostic to test whether the other subjunctive complement clause events investigated in this dissertation can be topologically closed. The importance of this data is to show that lack of topological closure (unboundedness) is not a priori a property of subjunctive complements. The example below shows that subjunctive complements to volitional (37a), directive (37b), causative (37c), emotive (37d), and negated epistemic (37e) predicates may be bounded, as a durative which delimits the event time can be interpreted with a low construal reading, which entails that the subjunctive clause event time is topologically closed (bounded). The high construal reading, which entails the delimintation of the matrix clause event, though not important for our purposes, is also possible: (37)

a. Volitional Predicate Juan no quiso que María lavara los platos por una hora. ‘John didn’t want (PERF) Mary to wash (PAST.SUB) the dishes for an hour.’ > John didn’t want that x for an hour. x: Mary wash the dishes High construal > John didn’t want that x. x:Mary wash the dishes for an hour Low construal b. Directive Predicate Juan no pidió que María lavara los platos por una hora. ‘John didn’t request (PERF) that Mary wash (PAST.SUB) the dishes for an hour.’ > John didn’t request that x for a year. x: Mary wash the dishes High construal > John didn’t request that x. x:Mary wash the dishes for an hour Low construal c. Causative Predicate Juan no hizo que María lavara los platos por una hora. ‘John didn’t make (PERF) that Mary wash (PAST.SUB) the dishes for an hour.’ > John didn’t make that x for an hour. x: Mary wash the dishes High construal > John didn’t make that x. x:Mary wash the dishes for an hour Low construal d. Emotive A Juan no le gustó que María lavara los platos por una hora. ‘John didn’t like (PERF) that Mary washed (PAST.SUB) the dishes for an hour.’ > John didn’t like that x for an hour. x: Mary washed the dishes High construal > John didn’t like that x. x:Mary washed the dishes for an hour Low construal

296 e. Negated Epistemic Juan no pensó que María lavara los platos por una hora. ‘John didn’t think (PERF) that Mary washed (SUB) the dishes for an hour.’ > John didn’t think that x for an hour. x: Mary washed the dishes High construal > John didn’t think that x. x:Mary washed the dishes for an hour Low construal The data in (37) show that subjunctive complements can denote topologically closed events, illustrated by the grammaticality of the low construal reading of the durative. We now have a basis for comparison. Perfective indicative complements, as well as the other types of subjunctive complements can denote topologically closed (bounded) events, while imperfective indicative verbs cannot. In (38), on the other hand, I show that subjunctive complement clauses to negated F level predicates cannot denote topologically closed (bounded) events. In the presence of a delimiting durative, only the matrix clause may be delimited (i.e. only a high construal reading is possible). The low construal reading is not possible. Consequently, these subjunctive complement clauses behave like their imperfective indicative counterparts; neither type of event can denote a bounded event. (38)

Discourse Context: Two friends are debating if their friend Mary has had a boyfriend Pablo: Andrés me dijo que María ha tenido un novio. ‘Andrew told me that Mary has had a boyfriend.’ (Speaker doubts Mary has had a boyfriend, and presents counter-evidence provided from his friend John): a. Perception Verb Pues, Juan no vio que María tuviera un novio por un año. ‘Well, John didn’t see that Mary had (SUB) a boyfriend for a year.’ > John didn’t see that x for a year. x: Mary had a boyfriend High construal >*John didn’t see that x. x:Mary had a boyfriend for a year *Low construal b. Cognitive Factive Pues, Juan no supo que María tuviera un novio por un año. ‘Well, John didn’t find out that Mary had (SUB) a boyfriend for a year.’ > John didn’t find out that x for a year. x: Mary had a boyfriend High construal >*John didn’t find out that x. x:Mary had a boyfriend for a year *Low construal

297 c. Verb of Mental Judgment Pues, Juan no entendió que María tuviera un novio por un año. ‘Well, John didn’t understand that Mary had (SUB) a boyfriend for a year.’ > John didn’t understand that x for a year. x: Mary had a boyfriend High construal >*John didn’t understand that x. x:Mary had a boyfriend for a year *Low construal d. Verb of Reported Speech Juan no dijo que María tuviera un novio por un año. ‘John didn’t say that Mary had (SUB) a boyfriend for a year.’ > John didn’t say that x for a year. x: Mary had a boyfriend High construal >*John didn’t say that x. x:Mary had a boyfriend for a year *Low construal The availability of only the high construal reading constitutes evidence that subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates are temporally unbounded (topologically unclosed) events. When applied to G&P’s axioms, we see that this is indeed the case. Assume that x is the event appearing in the complement clause María tuviera un novio ‘Mary had (SUB) a boyfriend’. Considering now (33b), if x is a perfective event, that is, if cl(x) = x, then there is no smaller perfective event containing x but itself. As the event may not be delimited in its entirety by the durative por una semana ‘for a week’, (33b) does not hold. Finally, the entire event z is not equal to its imperfective subparts x and y, because its subparts cannot be delimited and therefore cannot be measured. Thus, the axiom denoted by (33c) does not hold, and x is not a perfective event. Because the subjunctive events in (38) fail G&P’s axioms for topological closure, I conclude that subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates constitute unbounded events. In the next section, I provide an explanation for the obligatory unbounded interpretation of subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates. The account relies on the idea that anti-veridicality and boundedness are semantically incompatible. 5.5.3. On Anti-Veridicality and Boundedness In this section, I briefly illustrate the semantic incompatibility between anti-veridical semantics and boundedness. Recall from section 4.2 that I adopt Giannakidou’s (2006) definition of anti-veridicality, which is the following:

298 (39)

Definition 2: Anti-veridicality for propositional operators A nonveridical operator F is antiveridical iff Fp entails not p: Fp → ¬ p Upon closer inspection, it becomes clear why the event expressed by the subjunctive

complement cannot be bounded. I have used the verb tener ‘to have’ to test for boundedness because stative predicates refer to durational situations, whose event structure does not entail change. In contrast, the event structures of other predicates, such as achievement and accomplishment predicates, necessarily involve change. Stative predicates are, however, dynamic when encoded by perfective verb forms, in the sense that the perfective (bounded) form indicates that the state has ceased, thus resulting in a change of state to a condition where the state no longer holds (cf. Smith 1997). Thus, the (relevant) semantic entry for a bounded stative verb form is that of (40): (40)

Bounded State: State → ¬ State Now, the anti-veridical semantics encoded by the Wanti-veridical feature requires a constant,

non-dynamic (negative) truth value with respect to the complement clause situation. The following, then, is the (relevant) semantic entailment for the anti-veridical semantics of the complement clause: (41)

Anti-veridicality: Fp → ¬ p

Given the semantic entry for anti-veridicality, it follows straightforwardly that the complement clause event cannot express a change of state (i.e. boundedness). This is because the antiveridical operator requires a constant (negative) truth value, while a bounded event results in a change of state (from the original event p to the inverse of the event ¬ p), illustrated in example (40). Thus, the obligatory unboundedness of the subjunctive event in negated F level contexts results from the requirements of the anti-veridical operator that the constituents within its scope

299 have a constant (negative) truth value, and a bounded interpretation which alters the truth value of the event. In other words, if the anti-veridical operator scopes over p, the truth value of p is ¬ p. However, if the event is bounded, the boundedness of the event entails that ¬ p is converted to its positive truth value p. This conversion of truth value is semantically incompatible with the antiveridical operator, which requires that the proposition carry a constant negative truth value ¬ p. This is illustrated in (42), in which it is shown that a bounded interpretation results in a change of state from p to ¬ p. However, because the anti-veridical operator also values the proposition as ¬ p, the double negation results in the semantic entry ¬ ¬ p. However, because the negation of negation cancels the negative value, the result of the anti-veridical operator and the bounded event together result in a positive version of the event (¬ ¬ p = p), which is not compatible with an anti-veridical interpretation: (42)

Anti-veridicality: Fp → ¬ p

→

* ¬ pbounded → ¬ ¬ p = p (i.e. * ¬ ¬ p = p)

Thus, example (42) illustrates the incompatibility between anti-veridical semantics and a bounded interpretation. In the next section, we will see an apparent counter-example to the claim developed so far in this section. There appears to be one context in which the low construal reading of the delimiting durative is possible with a subjunctive complement to a negated F level predicate. The data at first glance indicate that, in this context, the subjunctive complement clause may be bounded. We will see, however, that the low construal reading is only possible in a context in which the durative is presupposed in the discourse. To account for the data, I argue that, in these contexts, the subjunctive clause does indeed constitute an unbounded event; the durative in these

300 contexts does not delimit the complement clause event time but, rather, picks out only a sub-part of the entire event time, similar to the function of habituality and progressive aspect. 5.5.3. Durative Modification in Presupposed Contexts Contrary to the picture that has been developed so far, it appears that, if a delimiting durative is discursively presupposed, it may receive a low construal reading in negated F level contexts. Specifically, a delimiting durative may be interpreted as modifying the subjunctive complement clause event time if the entire clause, with identical durative modification, has discursive presupposition (i.e. prior mention in the discourse context). This is unexpected, given the impossibility of this interpretation in an out-of-the-blue context. Furthermore, at first glance, the data is not in keeping with my claim that anti-veridical semantics are incompatible with a bounded interpretation. Example (43) shows that the low construal reading of the durative (subjunctive clause event delimitation) is possible if the speaker is responding doubtfully to the discursively presupposed assertion that ‘Mary had (IND) a boyfriend for two weeks’. Only in this context can the delimiting durative ‘for two weeks’ be repeated in a subjunctive follow-up with a low construal reading (the high construal reading is possible as well, but is not shown, as it is not relevant for the current distinction): (43)

Discourse Context: Pablo: Sabías que María tuvo un novio por dos semanas? ‘Did you know that Mary had (IND) a boyfriend for two weeks?’ (Speaker doubts that ‘Mary had a boyfriend for two weeks’, and follows up with counterevidence provided by his friend John): a. Perception Verb Pues, Juan no vio que María tuviera un novio por dos semanas. ‘Well, John didn’t see that Mary had (SUB) a boyfriend for two weeks.’ > John didn’t see that x. x:Mary had a boyfriend for two weeks Low construal

301 b. Cognitive Factive Pues, Juan no supo que María tuviera un novio por dos semanas. ‘Well, John didn’t find out that Mary had (SUB) a boyfriend for two weeks.’ > John didn’t find out that x. x:Mary had a boyfriend for two weeks Low construal c. Verb of Mental Judgment Pues, Juan no entendió que María tuviera un novio por dos semanas. ‘Well, John didn’t understand that had (SUB) a boyfriend for two weeks.’ > John didn’t understand that x. x:Mary had a boyfriend for two weeks Low construal d. Verb of Reported Speech Pues, Juan no dijo que María tuviera un novio por dos semanas. ‘Well, John didn’t say that Mary had (SUB) a boyfriend for two weeks.’ > John didn’t say that x. x:Mary had a boyfriend for two weeks Low construal As the discourse context in (43) shows, in a discursively presupposed context, a low construal reading of the delimiting durative in a subjunctive complement to a negated F level predicate is possible; thus, a bounded interpretation appears to be possible. Naturally, the question arises as to what makes discursive presupposition an acceptable context for the low construal reading of the durative. I propose that the low construal reading in example (43) does not result from a bounded interpretation of the event but, rather, the delimitation of only a reference time, or sub-interval, of the subjunctive clause event. In other words, the delimiting durative por dos semanas ‘for two weeks’ is behaving similarly to progressive aspect, in that neither denote a bounded event time but, rather, pick out only a defined period in which the event time holds. In presupposed contexts, then, the subjunctive clause event remains unbounded and, therefore, compatible with anti-veridical semantics. I illustrate the proposal by appealing to Demirdache & Uribe-Etxebarria (1997, 2000, 2002, 2005), who propose a semantic configuration for the sentential properties of events. They claim that a sentence with progressive aspect, like (44) below, is interpreted with the aspectual and temporal schema illustrated in (44b) and (44c), respectively:

302 (44)

a. María no estaba haciendo su tarea. Mary NEG is.IMPERF do.PROG her work ‘Mary wasn’t doing her work.’

[

EV-T [ ] Ref-T

UT-T ]

[

] Ref-T

I claim that the abstract aspectual (44b) and temporal (44c) representation of progressive aspect is similar to that of the subjunctive complement clause events to the negated F level predicates in (43). Example (44b) illustrates that progressive aspect and, I claim, the durative delimitation of the subjunctive events of (43), pick out only a sub-interval of the entire Event-time (EV-T). When the delimiting durative has a low construal reading, then, it delimits only a Reference-time (Ref-T) of the event, which constitutes only a sub-interval of the complement clause Event-time, rather than the Event-time (EV-T) itself.97 Because the Reference-time is contained within the Event-time in (44b), the Event-time remains unbounded (topologically unclosed).98 The way in which this temporal schema applies to a subjunctive complement to a negated F level predicate is illustrated below:

According to Demirdache & Uribe-Etxebarria (2005), delimiting durative adverbials typically restrict the event time to that of the reference time denoted by the durative, resulting in the following schema: (i)

Paco miró la televisión por dos horas. REF-T=EV-T UT-T ‘Paco watched (IND) television for two hours.’ ----[-----------------]----------------|--------->

I claim that the crucial difference between the delimiting durative in an out-of-the-blue context, as in (i), and the function of the durative in (45), then, is that the durative in (45) does not delimit the event time but, rather, picks out only a sub-part of the event time. I will claim that the new interpretation results from the fact that, when presupposed, the durative is interpreted within the restrictor of negation, and is therefore not intrinsically linked to the complement clause event time. This property is discussed in more detail below. 98 In a past subjunctive context, the temporal schema of (44c) holds as well, although the tense construal of subjunctive complements is not relevant for our purposes. The utterance time (UT-T) is ordered after the reference time (Ref-T), but remains unordered with respect to the final bound of the event. Thus, the temporal schema in (44c) illustrates that the events denoted by the negated F level predicates in (43) have not culminated before the utterance time (UT-T).

303 (45)

Perception Verb Pues, Juan no vio que María tuviera un novio por dos semanas. ‘Well, John didn’t see that Mary had (SUB) a boyfriend for two weeks.’ > John didn’t see that x. x:Mary had a boyfriend for two weeks

Low construal

EV-T: Mary had a boyfriend Ref-T: Two weeks UT-T: The moment in which the sentence was uttered EV-T b. [ [ ] Ref-T

UT-T ]

[

] Ref-T

The schema in (45) shows that the durative por dos semanas ‘for two weeks’ represents the Reference-time, which constitutes only a sub-interval of the Event-time. The Event-time, then, remains unbounded because it is not contained within the Reference-time, which is a requirement for topological closure. In other words, this temporal schema does not obey the axiom for topological closure which states that all sub-intervals of the event be contained within the temporal denotation of the event (i.e. the reference time), and the temporal schema in (45b) show that this is clearly not the case; the Reference-time (denoted by the durative) does not equal the Event-time, and the subjunctive clause event, therefore, is unbounded (cf. example (38)). This proposal implies that the possibility for a delimiting durative to denote a reference time of a subjunctive complement event to a negated F level predicate depends on discursive presupposition. We are still left with the question of why discursive presupposition is a requirement for reference time delimitation by a durative, as duratives cannot modify the reference time for the subjunctive event when presented out-of-the-blue, as shown in (38). I suggest that the interpretation of the durative, namely, its potential for Reference-time delimitation only in presupposed contexts, can be illustrated by once again appealing to Partee’s (1991, 1995) tripartite scope configuration for negation. The structure, which was adopted in

304 chapter 4 to explain the relationship between negation and clause-embedding contexts, includes a restrictor and a nuclear scope: (46)

NOT

[Restrictor ]

[Nuclear Scope ]

Typically, the low construal reading of a durative adverbial is not possible in these contexts because this interpretation involves boundedness, which is semantically incompatible with antiveridicality, ruling out the following ungrammatical LF scope configuration: (47)

Juan no vio que María tuviera un novio por un año. ‘John didn’t see that Mary had (SUB) a boyfriend for a year.’ >*John didn’t see that x. x:Mary had a boyfriend for a year

*Low construal

Neg (F level: to see that x) NOT

[RESTRICTOR] [SCOPE John saw that x & x was true. x: Mary had a boyfriend (*for a year)]

As (47) shows, when the durative is in the scope of negation, the event time is bounded, resulting in an ungrammatical scope configuration. This is because, as we saw in the last section, the change of state entailed by a bounded event is incompatible with the anti-veridical semantics of these clauses. However, we have seen that, when the delimiting durative is presupposed in the discourse, it may be interpreted with the low construal reading which, according to the configuration in (47), should not be possible. According to Partee (1995), however, presupposed constituents appear in the restrictor of focus-sensitive operators (i.e. negation). So, when a durative like por dos semanas ‘for two weeks’ is presupposed in the discourse context, as in (48), I hypothesize that the durative is interpreted within the restrictor of negation. It thus has the following structure:

305 (48)

Juan no vio que María tuviera un novio por dos semanas. ‘John didn’t see that Mary had (SUB) a boyfriend for two weeks.’ > John didn’t see that x. x:Mary had a boyfriend for two weeks

Low construal

Neg (F level: to see that x) NOT [RESTRICTOR y: for a year] [SCOPE John saw that x & x was true. x: Mary had a boyfriend (y)] As example (48) illustrates, because the durative is in the restrictor of negation, it is not intrinsically linked to the subjunctive clause event. Thus, when presupposed, the durative is not linked directly with the subjunctive clause event, and therefore retains the possibility to modify a sub-part (a reference time) of the subjunctive clause event. Consequently, unlike its nonpresupposed counterpart, the durative does not result in a semantic incompatibility with antiveridical semantics. In other words, because the durative is interpreted within the restrictor of negation, the truth-value of the event itself does not undergo a change of state (i.e. the event itself remains unbounded). Only a sub-interval of the event is bounded. The negative truth-vale of the Eventtime, which is required for an anti-veridical interpretation of the event, still holds, as shown in (49). The following interpretation results, which is compatible with the requirement of antiveridical semantics that the event time retain a negative truth-value: (49)

Event-time:

¬p→¬p

While Partee’s (1991, 1995) analysis descriptively illustrates a potential reason why the durative is grammatical as a modifier of the subjunctive clause reference time in (48), we still lack a formal explanation for why this reading is only possible in presupposed contexts. I propose that this can be explained via the quantificational vs. non-quantificational functions of negation. Recall from chapter 4 (section 5.1) that descriptive negation (leaving aside metalinguistic negation) can have two interpretations. It may carry either a categorical

306 (quantificational) or a thetic (non-quantificational negation) interpretation (Ladusaw 1994, Giannakidou 1997). Categorical statements are comparable to non-presupposed (non-referential) events, in which all non-presupposed constituents must appear in the scope of negation. Thetic statements lack such a structure and, therefore, the spatio-temporal coordinates of the event are not interpreted in the scope of negation. Crucially, one way in which an element may escape the scope of negation (i.e. is compatible with the thetic function of negation) is if the element is presupposed (Partee 1991, 1995). Example (50) illustrates the two possible structures: (50)

Mary didn’t have a boyfriend for two weeks. a. ¬ have-a-boyfriend-for-two-weeks’ (Mary) Categorical >With respect to Mary, it is not the case that she had a boyfriend for two weeks. b. ¬∃ e (Mary-had-a-boyfriend’ (e) ∧ two weeks’ (e)) Thetic >There was no such event that Mary had a boyfriend such that the ‘have a boyfriend’ event lasted two weeks. The two different readings of negation entail two different follow-up possibilities. The

categorical interpretation of negation in (50a) may be felicitously followed up only by (51a), which entails that the event that the ‘Mary had a boyfriend’ event was never realized. It may not be felicitously followed up by (51b), which entails event realization. This is because both the event entailment and the durative are in the scope of (quantificational) negation, entailing that they constitute one unit; i.e. the durative binds the event time. Thetic, or non-quantificational, negation, on the other hand, may be followed up by either (51a) or (51b), as the durative is not obligatorily bound to the event time in this structure. The thetic function of negation entails only that Mary did not have a boyfriend during a period of two weeks. She may have had one for another length of time, as the felicity of the follow-up in (51b) illustrates.

307 (51)

Mary didn’t have a boyfriend for two weeks. a. She has never had a boyfriend. b. She had one for three weeks.

Thetic/Categorical Thetic/#Categorical

I hypothesize that the durative is ungrammatical with the low construal reading in the out-of-theblue context presented in example (38), then, because both the subjunctive complement clause and the durative are interpreted in the scope of negation, which corresponds to the categorical, or quantificational, reading of negation. As the durative constitutes a non-presupposed context, it may not be interpreted within the restrictor of negation but, rather, the durative must bind the complement clause event time. The low construal reading is ungrammatical, then, because the categorical function of negation forces a bounded interpretation of the event when scoping over a delimiting durative, an interpretation which is incompatible with anti-veridical semantics. Only the thetic (non-quantificational) interpretation is grammatical, in which the durative is interpreted in the restrictor of negation and, therefore, denotes only a subpart of the event. Evidence for analyzing the presupposed durative in the restrictor of (thetic) negation in the low construal readings of (43) is that the construction may be followed up with a statement which implies that the subjunctive event did indeed occur, but that it lasted longer than the time denoted by the durative. The durative in this context, then, is interpreted within the restrictor of (thetic) negation, and denotes only a sub-part of the subjunctive clause event: (52)

Discourse Context: Pablo: Sabías que María había tenido un novio por dos semanas? ‘Did you know that Mary had had a boyfriend for two weeks?’ (Speaker doubts that ‘Mary had a boyfriend for two weeks’, and follows up with counterevidence provided by his friend John):

308 Pues, Juan no supo que María tuviera un novio por dos semanas. ‘Well, John didn’t find out that Mary had (SUB) a boyfriend for two weeks.’ > John didn’t find out that x. x:Mary had a boyfriend for two weeks Low construal … Y creo que tuvo uno por a lo menos un mes. … and believe.1SG I that had.IND.PERF.3SG one for a month. …‘And I believe that she had (IND) one for at least a month.’ The felicity of the follow-up constitutes evidence for my hypothesis that, when the low construal reading of the durative obtains, the durative is interpreted within the restrictor of (thetic) negation, and denotes only a sub-part of the subjunctive clause event. When non-presupposed, the durative is compatible only with the categorical function of negation, taking scope over the durative, which is then linked to the subjunctive clause event time. The durative in these contexts is ungrammatical, as in example (38), due to the incompatibility between antiveridicality and a bounded event time. In sum, I have shown that indicative complements, lexically-selected subjunctive complements and subjunctive complements to p level predicates can denote topologically closed (bounded) events, as these clauses allow the low construal reading of delimiting duratives. The data indicate that unboundedness is not a priori a property of subjunctive complements. I claimed that subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates, however, denote topologically unclosed (unbounded) events, as the event cannot be delimited by a durative, indicated by the ungrammaticality of a low construal reading. I argued that the unboundedness of the subjunctive complement event is due an incompatibility with anti-veridical semantics, as the former requires a change in truth-conditions while the latter requires constant (negatively valued) truth-conditions. I showed that a delimiting durative modifier is only acceptable with the low construal reading if the durative is presupposed in the discourse context. I argued that, when this is the

309 case, the durative is interpreted within the restrictor of (thetic) negation, and denotes only the reference time of a sub-part of the event. In the next section, I claim that the temporal and aspectual properties of subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates are similar in nature to the habitual operator proposed by Giannakidou (1995), and I detail a semantic analysis which captures their temporal/aspectual function. The analysis implies that, in addition to antiveridical semantics, Wanti-veridical also encodes an imperfectivizing function, affecting the temporal/aspectual properties of the matrix and complement clause event specifications. 5.5.4. Imperfectivity and the Subjunctive Mood in Negation-triggered Contexts In this section, I claim that subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates and habitual contexts share many properties; both involve temporally intersecting events and lack topological closure of the complement clause event. I will review some key ideas from Giannakidouâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (1995) analysis of habitual contexts, and then build upon the fundamental semantic components of her proposal to posit a similar spatio-temporal semantic entry for the operator involved in negation-triggered subjunctive contexts. Giannakidou (1995) claims that habituals describe a situation which is characteristic of an extended period of time and, therefore, lack topological closure. She suggests that habituality is semantically expressed (and syntactically represented) via a habitual operator HAB which functions at the sentential level. The habitual operator, like any other adverbial quantifier, performs restricted quantification in much the same fashion that nominal quantifiers do. Hence, for the interpretation of habitual quantification, she proposes a tripartite structure consisting of the operator and its two arguments as in (53): (53)

Op [Restrictor] [Matrix]

310 The first argument (the restrictor) provides the relevant set of cases/situations the quantifier ranges over. The second argument (the matrix) supplies the main predication. This is illustrated below: (54)

John usually flips through a magazine when he goes to bed.

The semantic structure of (54) is articulated in (55): (55)

USUALLYpres [John goes to bed] [John flips through a magazine] In (55), HAB (denoted by usually) quantifies over the set of situations in which John goes

to bed and relates them to the set of situations in which John flips through a magazine. Due to the lexical meaning of USUALLY as a habitual operator, the relation between the two sets is such that the number of situations in which John goes to bed and flips through a magazine is greater than the number of situations in which John goes to bed and does not flip through a magazine. Thus, there is an intersection between the context expressed by the main predication and the complement. This relation is represented in (56) (where A stands for the set denoted by the restrictor and B stands for the set denoted by the matrix): (56)

HAB(itual)

(A, B) = 1:

A∩B > A-B

The entry for HAB entails that (i) the two events A and B simultaneously occur, and that (ii) they simultaneously occur more often than they occur as separate events. I propose that, like habitual contexts, negated F level contexts with subjunctive complements are temporally linked. The difference is that, in this context, the matrix clause event is bounded and fully contained within the event time of the complement clause event. In other words, the lexical meaning of W as an anti-veridical operator (and therefore an imperfectivizing operator – see section 5.5.4) entails that the relation between the matrix and complement clause events is such that the situation (or set of situations) in which John didn’t

311 find out x is contained (marks an interval) within the unbounded situation of Mary had a boyfriend. This follows straightforwardly from the fact that the matrix clause can be delimited (bounded), as the high construal reading of a delimiting durative is grammatical, but the complement clause event cannot be. With respect to our temporal schema, we have the following aspectual configuration, with EV-T1 representing the matrix clause event time and EV-T2 representing the complement clause event time: (57)

Perception Verb Pues, Juan no vio que María tuviera un novio por dos semanas. ‘Well, John didn’t see that Mary had (SUB) a boyfriend for two weeks.’ >*John didn’t see that x. x:Mary had a boyfriend for two weeks *Low construal > John didn’t see that x for two weeks. x:Mary had a boyfriend High construal

EV-T1: John didn’t see that x for two weeks EV-T2: x: Mary had a boyfriend EV-T2

[

EV-T1 [

]

The aspectual schema in (57) shows that the matrix clause Event-time (EV-T1) is temporally ordered within the complement clause Event-time (EV-T2). The complement clause Event-time (EV-T2) remains unbounded, as it is not contained within the matrix clause event Reference-time (por dos semanas ‘for two weeks’). This semantic relation is represented in (58), where A stands for the matrix clause event(s) and B stands for the imperfect set denoted by the complement clause. The imperfectivizing function of W thus forces a temporal intersection (simultaneous occurrence) between the matrix event A and complement clause event B, while also resulting in the containment of the event time of matrix clause event A within the complement clause event B: (58)

Wanti-veridical

A, B = 1:

A∩B & A⊂B

312 In addition to anti-veridical semantics, then, Wanti-veridical carries a temporal/aspectual entailment which requires that (i) the two events A and B simultaneously occur, and that (ii) the event time of the matrix clause event A is ordered within the event time of the complement clause event B. Thus, a temporal intersection is formed between the matrix and complement clause events, and their spatio-temporal coordinates are linked. We now have a fuller picture with respect to the interpretation of negation-triggered subjunctive contexts. In chapter 4, I hypothesized that, when negation licenses the W feature in subordinate Speech Act Phrase, the anti-veridical operator is interpreted as scoping into the complement clause. The following configuration arises with respect to Partee’s (1995) analysis of negation: (59)

Juan no vio que María tuviera un novio por una semana. ‘John didn’t see that Mary had (SUB) a boyfriend for a week.’ Subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates Neg (F level: to see that x)

NOT

[RESTRICTOR]

[Nuclear Scope Mary saw that [W] x ∩ x is true]

When negation scopes over an F level predicate with an indicative complement clause, it is simply a case of coordination. No temporal link is established between the matrix and subordinate event time specifications, as no Wanti-veridical operator is present in the derivation. The complement clause appears in the restrictor of negation, with distinct temporal specification and assertive semantics.

313 (60)

Juan no vio que María tuvo un novio por una semana. ‘John didn’t see that Mary had (IND) a boyfriend for a week.’ Indicative complements to negated F level predicates Neg (F level: to see that x)

NOT

[RESTRICTOR x is true]

[Nuclear Scope Mary saw that x]

The analysis also accounts for long-distance triggering of the subjunctive mood. Recall that this property refers to the fact that, in lexically-selected contexts (61), the subjunctive can only be licensed one clause down, while negation-triggered subjunctive may be licensed in consecutive clauses, as long as the subjunctive chain is not broken (62), repeated below: (61)

María (no) quería/pidió/le forzó a que Martín creyera que Juan llevó/*llevara el libro correcto. María (NEG) desire/request/CL.DAT force.PRES.3SG that Martin believe.PAST.SUB.3SG that John bring.PAST.IND/*SUB.3SG the book correct ‘Mary (didn’t) desire/request/force that Martin believe ( SUB) that John is bringing (IND/*SUB) the correct book.’

(62)

María no piensa/no ve que Martín crea que Juan lleva/lleve el libro correcto. María NEG think.PRES.3SG/NEG see.PRES.3SG that Martin believe.SUB that John bring.IND/SUB.3SG the book correct ‘Mary doesn’t think/doesn’t see that Martin believes ( SUB) that John is bringing (IND/SUB) the correct book.’ I have claimed that Wanti-veridical carries negative semantics which quantify over the clause

that they specify. Carrying negative semantics, Wanti-veridical continues to be licensed in consecutive embedded clauses, triggering deeply embedded subjunctive complements, as long as no other illocutionary operator is assigned. For instance, if a predicate assigns an assertion feature to its complement clause Speech Act Phrase, Wanti-veridical cannot be licensed in the complement clause because (i) anti-veridical semantics are incompatible with assertive semantics, as assertive semantics entail a contextual update function within the real world W R and (ii) Speech Act Phrase is occupied by another feature, leaving no projection in which the

314 feature could merge. Thus, Wanti-veridical is only possible in the presence of a local c-commanding negative feature (either negation or a c-commanding Wanti-veridical feature), and if the F level predicate does not assign illocutionary force specification to its complement clause Speech Act Phrase. Deeply embedded indicative clauses, then, carry independent, referential temporal/aspectual specification, and an assertive interpretation. This type of construction is shown in (63), with consecutive clauses indexed for clarity. The LF scope configuration is illustrated in (64): (63)

[María no piensa/no ve que [xMartín crea que [yJuan lleva el libro correcto.]]] [María NEG think/NEG see PRES.3SG that [xMartin believe.SUB that [yJohn bring.IND.PRES the book correct] ‘Mary doesn’t think/see that Martin believes (SUB) that John is bringing (IND) the correct book.’

(64)

Indicative complement to deeply embedded negated F level predicate Neg (F level: to see/think that x)

NOT

[RESTRICTOR y is true]

[Nuclear Scope Mary saw that [W] x ∩ x is true that y]

A sentence with the subjunctive mood in the most deeply embedded clause is depicted in (65), and would have the LF scope configuration illustrated in (66): (65)

[María no piensa/ve que [xMartín crea que [yJuan lleve el libro correcto.]]] [María NEG think/see.PRES.3SG that [xMartin believe.SUB that [zJohn bring.PRES.SUB the book correct] ‘Mary doesn’t think/see that Martin believes (SUB) that John is bringing (SUB) the correct book.’

(66)

Subjunctive complement to deeply embedded negated F level predicate Neg (F level: to see/think that x)

NOT

[RESTRICTOR] [Nuclear Scope Mary saw that [W] x ∩ x is true that [W] y ∩ y is true]

315 Subjunctive complements to volitional, directive and causative predicates exhibit locality of triggering (the subjunctive mood may only be licensed one clause down) because, as argued in chapter 2, these predicates select subjunctive complements via feature assignment. As feature assignment requires a local (head-head) relationship, the subjunctive mood is licensed only in the immediately embedded clause. In this section, I have attributed the fact that subjunctive complement clause events in negated F level contexts are unbounded to the Wanti-veridical operator in subordinate Speech Act Phrase. I argued that the temporal properties of this operator are semantically similar to Giannakidouâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (1995) HAB(itual) operator, in that both create a temporal link between the matrix and subordinate clause temporal coordinates, and involve (at least one) topologically unclosed event(s). I then illustrated how the analysis accounts for the long-distance licensing of the subjunctive mood. Finally, I use the evidence presented in this section to detail the syntactic analysis for the temporal/aspectual properties of negation-triggered subjunctive clauses. 5.5.5. A Syntax for the Spatio-Temporal Properties of Negation-triggered Subjunctive With respect to the temporal syntax of subjunctive complements in negated F level contexts, I hypothesize that the Wanti-veridical feature results in the resetting of the complement clause event time to the reference time of the matrix clause event. The analysis is similar to what was proposed in chapter 2 to explain sequence of tense effects in lexically-selected subjunctive contexts. In chapter 2, section 5, I followed Kempchinsky (2009), who adopted Demirdache & Uribe-Etxebarriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (1997, 2000, 2002, 2005) model of temporal representation to explain tense

316 dependencies in lexically-selected subjunctive clauses.99 Her proposal accounts for the fact that strongly intensional subjunctive clauses give rise to the illegal sequence of tense construal (*PRESENT [PAST]) under volitional (67), causative (68) and directive predicates (69): (67)

María desea que lleve/*llevara un libro. Mary desire.PRES.3SG that bring.PRES/*PAST.SUB a book ‘Mary desires that s/he brings/brought (SUB) a book.’

(68)

María fuerza a Juan a que tome/*tomara la medicina. Mary forces.PRES.3SG to John that (he) take.PRES/*PAST.SUB the medicine ‘Mary forces John that (he) take/took (SUB) a book.’

(69)

María le ordena a Juan a que tome/*tomara la medicina. Mary CL.DAT forces.PRES.3SG to John that (he) take.SUB.PRES/*PAST the medicine ‘Mary forces John that (he) take/took (SUB) a book.’ Kempchinsky (2009), with Bianchi (2001) and Demirdache & Uribe-Etxebarria (1997,

2000, 2002, 2005), views Tense and Aspect as a tripartite set of semantic and syntactic primitives in which time spans are discourse referents projected in the syntax as temporal DPs/arguments. (1997, 2000, 2002, 2005). These arguments consist of a reference time (Ref-T), an event time (EV-T) and an utterance time (UT-T). Temporal and aspectual relations are thus semantically and syntactically determined via the specification of these arguments, and how they are ordered with respect to each other. For instance, example (70b,c) illustrates the semantic interpretation for the aspectual and temporal schema of progressive aspect, respectively. The aspectual schema in (70b) picks out a Reference-time (Ref-T) within the interval defined by the Event-time (EV-T). The Reference-

Demirdache and Uribe-Etxebarria’s (1997, 2005) analysis was originally intended to explain re-setting in indicative subordinate contexts, in which the subordinate clause to a past tense matrix verb may not appear in the future tense, but the present tense, like the following example: 99

(i)

John loved that his girlfriend is coming/*?will come.

They argue that the obligatory tense construal is due to the re-setting of the subordinate clause assertion time with respect to the matrix clause reference time. They claim that resetting is driven by the principle of economy, according to which every step in the temporal derivation must be maximally semantically contributive; i.e. temporal derivations must yield an unambiguous ordering.

317 time for progressive aspect picks out only a sub-interval of the entire event. Example (70c) illustrates the tense construal. Because (70a) denotes a past event, past tense orders the Utterance-time (UT-T) after the Reference-time (Ref-T). Thus, the temporal (70a) and aspectual (70b) schema for progressive aspect is represented below: (70)

a. María no estaba haciendo su tarea. Mary NEG is.IMPERF do.PROG her work ‘Mary wasn’t doing her work.’

[

EV-T [ ] Ref-T

UT-T ]

[

] Ref-T

According to Bianchi (2001) and Kempchinsky (2009), FinP encodes the specification for the subordinate clause Reference-time, which represents the external temporal argument of Tense. Because lexically-selected subjunctive clauses require forward-shifting modality, the matrix clause event time (EV-T), which is linked to the verb, is ordered BEFORE the complement clause reference time (Ref-T).100 The resetting results in the appropriate forwardshifting modality shift as well as the sequence of tense phenomenon *PRESENT[PAST]: selection (71)

[CP [FinP Ref-T [TP T [AspP UT-T [vP/CP VW [CP [SaP SaP[uW] [FinP Ref-T [MP … EV-T Resetting: BEFORE Now, because negation-triggered subjunctive clauses denote a subpart of the complement

clause event time, similar in this way to progressive aspect and habitual contexts, this resetting differs from lexically-selected subjunctive complements. I claim that, in the case of negation-

100

Because this type of approach to temporal syntax assumes that Tense and Aspect are referential, syntactically represented arguments, the re-ordering is presumably one of linking (binding), whose corresponding spatio-temporal re-setting thus results from the interpretive output at the C-I interface.

318 triggered subjunctive clauses, the Event-time of the matrix clause is reset to a spatio-temporal coordination that is ordered WITHIN the Reference-time of the complement clause. This ordering ensures that the matrix clause Event-time denotes only a subpart of the complement clause event, resulting in the unbounded interpretation of the complement clause, which is a necessary requirement for its anti-veridical semantics.101 licensing (72)

[CP [FinP Ref-T [NegP NEG [TP T [AspP UT-T [vP [VPV [CP [SaP SaP[W] [FinP Ref-T [MoodP â&#x20AC;Ś EV-T Resetting: WITHIN

It is, then, the anti-veridical W feature licensed by negation which is responsible for both negatively valuing the clause and forcing the resetting of the matrix clause event time to WITHIN the complement clause reference time, resulting in an unbounded complement clause event. I assume that this resetting is the result of the temporal/aspectual properties of the operator, as illustrated in (58). The entire picture leads us to the following representation for negation-triggered subjunctive in complements to F level predicates. Negation licenses the Wanti-veridical feature in subordinate Speech Act Phrase, which must be identified by MoodP, and resets the matrix clause Event-time to WITHIN the complement clause Reference-time:

101

I adopt the standard syntactic assumption of the existence of a functional category NegP which houses sentential negation and that, for languages like Spanish, the locus of this projection is above TP (cf. Pollock 1989, Zanuttini 1997, for the split IP hypothesis, and the position of NegP).

319 (73)

María no supo que su novio viniera a la fiesta. Mary NEG know.PERF that her boyfriend came.SUB.3SG to the party ‘Mary didn’t find out that her boyfriend came (SUB) to the party.’ [CP [NegP NEG [TP[ASP UT-T [vP[VP V [CP [SaP SaP[W]] [FinP Ref-T] [TP [MoodP [V+T+MW]… licensing

EV-T re-setting: WITHIN

Example (73) illustrates the derivation for negation-triggered subjunctive complement clauses, as proposed in this chapter. In the next section, I summarize the hypotheses and analysis developed in this chapter and conclude the dissertation. 5.6. Conclusion This chapter has focused on the status of negation-triggered subjunctive complements. I analyzed the effect of negation on both mood choice and the spatio-temporal coordinates of complement clauses, and how its quantificational properties affect linguistic interpretation and representation. I have accounted for two previously unobserved properties with respect to negation-triggered subjunctive clauses: (i) subjunctive complement clauses to negated epistemic predicates overlap with those to emotives and those to negated F level predicates and (ii) in true negation-triggered subjunctive contexts, the complement clause event is unbounded. I argued that these observations merit a more fine-grained distinction and analysis of subjunctive clauses in negated contexts, the development of which was the goal of this chapter. I followed Horn’s (1989), Potts’ (2005, 2007) and Yoon’s (2011) analyses of a dual function for negation, and claimed that the pragmatic classification of the predicate determines the type of negation with which it may surface. Metalinguistic negation assigns expressive indices to p level (emotive and epistemic) predicates, manipulating the degree of evaluation encoded by the predicate. I hypothesized that this type of negation does not scope into the

320 complement clause, and is only compatible with predicates which encode gradable, evaluative semantics (i.e. p level predicates). Evidence that metalinguistic negation does not scope into subjunctive complements to negated emotive and epistemic predicates is that both complement types allow PPIs, a de dicto interpretation and a veridical interpretation on the part of the speaker. Descriptive negation, on the other hand, interacts with the event specification of a clause, rather than assigning (negative) expressive indices. F level predicates are not gradable, and are therefore compatible only with descriptive negation, which scopes into the subjunctive complement clause in subjunctive contexts. Evidence is that these subjunctive complements invariably license long distance NPIs, do not permit PPIs and require an anti-veridical interpretation on the part of the speaker. I proposed that negated epistemic predicate can surface as either F or p level operators, resulting in their overlapping properties with both predicate types. I claimed that metalinguistic negation provides the epistemic predicate with the index of evaluation needed to alter its semantics from assertive (indicative-selecting; F level) to evaluative (p level). The analysis explains why non-negated epistemics surface invariably as F level predicates, which select indicative complements. I proposed that, in the absence of an assertion feature, descriptive negation licenses an interpretable Wanti-veridical feature in the complement clause Speech Act Phrase to F level predicates, following evidence provided by Klooster (2003) and Laka (1990) that negative clauses are syntactically specified. This feature is responsible for the anti-veridical interpretation of the clause. As it is interpretable, it must be identified (rather than checked) by Mood Phrase (Kempchinsky 2009). I argued that the semantic entry of Wanti-veridical results in an anti-veridical interpretation on the part of the speaker because, lacking a complement clause sentience domain,

321 the Speaker is co-indexed with the closest c-commanding Seat of Knowledge argument in matrix Spec, SentienceP. I showed that subjunctive complements to negated F level predicates constitute unbounded (topologically unclosed) events, adopting Giorgi and Pianesiâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (1997) formal axioms for topological closure as diagnostics. In addition to encoding anti-veridical semantics, I claimed that the Wanti-veridical feature re-orders the matrix clause Event-time to WITHIN the complement clause Reference-time. The resetting results in an unbounded event and a temporal link between the matrix and complement clause events, similar to progressive aspect and habituality. I posited a syntactic analysis for temporal relations in negation-triggered subjunctive contexts, based on Demirdache & Uribe-Etxebarriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (1997, 2000, 2002, 2005) proposal that time spans are referential arguments projected in the syntax. I also showed how the analysis can account for long-distance triggering of the subjunctive mood in complement clauses to negated F level predicates. In the absence of illocutionary force specification, Wanti-veridical is licensed in consecutive Speech Act Phrases via the quantificational semantics of negation. The presence of an assertion operator breaks the chain, as assertive semantics are incompatible with anti-veridical semantics. In these cases, the complement clause is interpreted as a coordinated assertion, with independent, referential spatiotemporal coordinates. Schematically, I have proposed the following articulated structures for the CP domain of subjunctive complement clauses (leaving aside the possibility for discourse projections). Included is the type of matrix negation with which the predicate type is compatible, the locus of the complementizer que and feature assignment to subordinate Speech Act Phrase (SaP):

322 (74)

Negated epistemics a. Metalinguistic Negation; evaluative semantics [CP [Sub’ [sub(ordinator)][SubP que

[FinP]]

b. Descriptive Negation; Neg licenses Wanti-veridical in SaP; anti-veridical complement [CP [SaP [W]

[SaP’ que

[SenP [FinP]]]]]

c. Descriptive Negation; assertive, indicative complement clause [CP [SaP [assertion] (75)

[SaP’ que

[SenP [FinP]]]]

(Negated) emotives a. Metalinguistic Negation; evaluative semantics [CP [Sub’ [sub(ordinator)][SubP que

[SenP [FinP]102

b. Descriptive Negation; Neg licenses Wanti-veridical in SaP; anti-veridical complement (generic, if-clause interpretation) [CP [SaP [W]

[SaP’ que

[SenP [FinP]]]]

c. Descriptive Negation; assertive, indicative complement clause 103 [CP [SaP [assertion] [SaP’ que [SenP [FinP]]]] (76)

Negated F level predicates a. Descriptive Negation; Neg licenses Wanti-veridical in SaP ; anti-veridical complement [CP [SaP [W]

[SaP’ que

[SenP [FinP]]]]

b. Descriptive Negation; assertive, indicative complement clause [CP [SaP [assertion] (77)

[SaP’ que

[SenP FinP]]]]

(Negated) Intensional Predicates Descriptive Negation; uWBUL assigned to SaP; non-veridical complement [CP [SaP [uW]

[SaP’ que

[SenP [FinP]]]]

In conclusion, this dissertation has aimed to develop a more fine-grained characterization of mood distribution in complement clauses in Spanish than has been previously achieved. The analysis has crucially relied on the idea that the left peripheral domain of complement clauses

102

Recall from chapter 3 that, although emotive predicates typically do not select a Speech Act Phrase, subordinate Sentience Phrase must merge. In causative clause-selecting constructions, a subordinate Seat of Knowledge argument is required for checking the uninterpretable logophoric feature on causative matrix v. 103 Indicative complements to emotives are subject to dialectal and idiosyncratic variation. See Kempchinsky (2007) for more on the idiosyncratic behavior of mood distribution in complements to emotives. Although more research is needed to determine the precise characterization of emotive complements cross-linguistically, the current hypothesis predicts some variation, discussed in chapter 3, section 7.

323 exhibits variation in structure and illocutionary specification. I proposed a tripartite divide for subjunctive clauses in Spanish which crucially depends on two factors: (i) the illocutionary force specification of the complement clause and (ii) the scope of negation. I have proposed a tripartite classification of subjunctive clauses, with respect to the illocutionary force specification (or lack thereof) of the complement clause CP. Volitional, directive and causative predicates lexically select subjunctive complements and assign an uninterpretable W feature to subordinate Speech Act Phrase; this feature maps the subjunctive proposition into a strongly intensional, buletic information state (based on wishes). In negation-triggered, evidential (F level) contexts, an interpretable version of the W feature is licensed by negation. This illocutionary feature maps the proposition into a strongly intensional, anti-veridical information state. Finally, the subjunctive mood manifests as the default mood in complements to evaluative (p level) predicates. In the absence of (assertive or intensional) illocutionary force, the complement clause is uninformative and, therefore, is not mapped into an information state. Because negated epistemic predicates may manifest as either an F or p level operator, the subjunctive mood may be triggered by either descriptive negation, or as the default (uninformative) mood, respectively. Table 2 illustrates the proposed illocutionary specification of subjunctive clauses in Spanish:104

104

It should be noted that the subjunctive mood be licensed by (descriptive) negation in emotive contexts in what Quer (1998) calls the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;genericâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; (i.e. non-veridical) reading of emotives, discussed in section 6.5. Generally, however, emotives carry a factive interpretation, with the subjunctive mood manifesting as the default (uninformative) mood in the absence of illocutionary force.

324 uWBul in SaP

Intensional Predicates

Wanti-veridical in SaP

No SaP (no illocutionary force)



Negated F level Predicates



Emotive (p level) predicates Negated Epistemics

 



Table 5-2. Illocutionary Specification of Subjunctive Complement Clauses The novel observations presented in the dissertation have contributed to a more complete corpus from which to draw and analyze clausal subordination. The analysis accounts for the idiosyncratic nature of subjunctive complements, as well as subject obviation, and sheds light on the complex interaction between the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic components which dictate mood choice. Of course, many questions are left unanswered, such as a more detailed account of the manner(s) in which the semantic and pragmatic components of the grammar are effected by, or read off, the syntax, and precisely how such features are represented. Furthermore, the analysis should be extended to account for mood distribution in purpose clauses, relative clauses and impersonal expressions, which did not receive a detailed treatment in this work. Finally, a more fine-grained analysis of indicative complements is needed which, like subjunctive complements, exhibit variation.

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