The imperative of good local governance. Challenges for the next decade of decentralization.

United Nations University Press is the publishing arm of the United Nations University. UNU Press publishes scholarly and policy-oriented books and periodicals on the issues facing the United Nations and its peoples and member states, with particular emphasis upon international, regional and transboundary policies.

The United Nations University was established as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations by General Assembly resolution 2951 (XXVII) of 11 December 1972. The United Nations University undertakes a wide range of activities focused on knowledge generation (basic and applied research, and foresight and policy studies), education and capacity development (developing human and organizational capabilities), and knowledge transfer and sharing (communications, dissemination and outreach).

The University operates through its institutes and programmes located throughout the world, and its planning and coordinating centre in Tokyo.

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The imperative of good local governance

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This publication has been partly prepared within the ICLD. ICLD acknowledges the financial contribution to its research programme made by the Government of Sweden (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency – Sida).

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The imperative of good local governance: Challenges for the next decade of decentralization Edited by Joakim Öjendal and Anki Dellnäs

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© United Nations University, 2013 The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations University.

United Nations University Press United Nations University, 53–70, Jingumae 5-chome, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 150-8925, Japan Tel: +81-3-5467-1212 Fax: +81-3-3406-7345 E-mail: sales@unu.edu General enquiries: press@unu.edu http://www.unu.edu United Nations University Office at the United Nations, New York 2 United Nations Plaza, Room DC2-2062, New York, NY 10017, USA Tel: +1-212-963-6387 Fax: +1-212-371-9454 E-mail: unuony@unu.edu United Nations University Press is the publishing division of the United Nations University.

Cover design by Ian Youngs Printed in the United States of America for the Americas and Asia Printed in the United Kingdom for Europe, Africa and the Middle East ISBN 978-92-808-1229-9 e-ISBN 978-92-808-7198-2 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The imperative of good local governance : challenges for the next decade of decentralization / edited by Joakim Öjendal and Anki Dellnäs. pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-9280812299 (pbk.)

1. Local government. 2. Decentralization in government. I. Öjendal, Joakim.

JS78.I5 2013 320.8—dc23 2013024656

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Endorsements

“This book provides an outstanding overview of the current challenges associated with making decentralization work in challenging development settings. Many volumes on the topic focus on individual case studies, or on generic principles cut loose from the messy politics of implementation. This volume in contrast elaborates on these real-world settings while extracting valuable lessons for policymakers and analysts of public sector reforms in developing countries. A must read.”

Scott A. Fritzen, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, New York University “This book gives a refreshingly comprehensive analysis of key issues on local governance and decentralization, and offers invaluable insights for researchers and policymakers alike.”

Khwima Nthara, Senior Economist, The World Bank “This publication comes at a critical time when the world is accelerating the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals by 2015, and developing ideas for people-centred development in the post-2015 era.

Vibrant local governance and decentralization are key elements for such people-centred development and understanding key issues for successful design of decentralization as discussed in this publication is the first step in this regard. Challenges for the next decade and emerging challenges on decentralization as a path to democratic governance and state building are particularly relevant in shaping the 2015 development agenda.

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The discussion on the developmental potential of local autonomy and the limits of politics-driven decentralization reforms bring an element of reality to the discussion. The regional dimensions of where local government is going in Latin America contain lessons also for other developing countries in Africa and Asia. As fiscal decentralization is a challenge faced by many developing countries, the discussion on participatory budgeting and local governance is of particular relevance. It is also necessary to balance the problems and consequences of recentralization with increasing local governance demands for local democracy with the engagement of civil society and popular aspirations. In this regard, the case of local CSOs in Indonesia is particularly interesting. There is an ongoing debate on whether decentralization also has the effect of decentralizing corruption. In this regard, the chapter on sanctions, benefits and rights provides some useful insights.

In the Asia-Pacific region, UNDP is supporting post-conflict state building and post-conflict recovery in several countries. In this context, the role of local governance as state building seen through the Cambodia experience is particularly interesting. Post-conflict strategies for local politics, civil society and state formation in Uganda are similarly of interest to practitioners of this area.

I congratulate the writers and the publishers on a timely, interesting and extremely useful publication which is of particular interest and relevance to practitioners in the field.”

Thusitha Pilapitiya, Policy Advisor, Decentralization and Local Governance, Asia-Pacific Regional Centre, United Nations Development Programme “Whether decentralization serves as a tool for development or a barrier to it depends on how it is designed and implemented. The contributors to this volume have done a tremendous job of discussing the context and content of successful decentralization and highlighting the key challenges.

All policymakers trying to decentralize their governments or make decentralization work effectively will find this book useful.”

M. Ramesh, Professor, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore “The book provides a rich collection of well-informed contributions to the debate about decentralization reforms, governance and development.

The contributions are based on a combination of research and practical reform experiences in Africa, Asia and Latin America and a variety of social science disciplines. Several of the contributors have worked on the decentralization and local governance research agenda for more than a decade and several of the contributions provide interesting insights into the authors’ intellectual journeys. The book eloquently discusses elements

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of both ‘politics of reform’ and technical reform issues. The individual contributions are written without editorial straightjackets, but the editors provide useful synthesizes of writings with tentative policy recommendations that will stimulate further debate. The book is highly recommended reading for anyone interested in local development and governance.”

Per Tidemand, PhD in International Development Studies from Roskilde University, and Founder, Senior Partner and Managing Director of DEGE Consult, a Copenhagen-based consultancy firm specializing in public sector reform and local governance

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Contents

List of figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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List of tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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List of contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Jan Pronk

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Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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List of abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Part I: Introduction and theoretical overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Joakim Öjendal and Anki Dellnäs

3

2 Understanding decentralization: Key issues for successful design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

James Manor 3 Decentralizing for development: The developmental potential of local autonomy and the limits of politics-driven decentralization reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Leonardo G. Romeo

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29

60

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CONTENTS

Part II: Local governance by designing decentralization . . . . . . . . .

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4 Representation, citizenship and the public domain: Choice and recognition in democratic decentralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Jesse Ribot

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5 Where is local government going in Latin America? . . . . . . . . .

Andrew Nickson

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6 Participatory budgeting and local governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Harry Blair

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7 Recentralization in developing countries: Forms, motivations and consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Paul Smoke

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Part III: Local governance demands for local democracy . . . . . . . .

205

8 Sanctions, benefits and rights: Three faces of accountability . . .

Merilee S. Grindle

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9 Engaging civil society to promote local governance: Emerging trends in local democracy in Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

G. Shabbir Cheema 10 Popular aspirations, decentralization and local democracy . . . .

Olle Törnquist 11 Citizen engagement, deliberative spaces and the consolidation of a post-authoritarian democracy: The case of local CSOs in Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Hans Antlov and Anna Wetterberg

233

255

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Part IV: Local governance as state-building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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12 Reconciliation in Cambodia? Decentralization as a post-conflict strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Joakim Öjendal and Kim Sedara

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13 Local politics, civil society and state formation in Uganda . . . .

Anders Sjögren

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CONTENTS

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14 Who won and who lost? The role of local governments in post-conflict recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

David Jackson

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Part V: Taking stock: Challenges for the next decade . . . . . . . . . . .

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15 Decentralization as a path to democratic governance and state-building? Conclusions on emerging challenges . . . . . . . . . .

Anki Dellnäs and Joakim Öjendal

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Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

395

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Figures

6.1 6.2 8.1 8.2 8.3 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5

Direct and indirect citizen participation level in budget allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Technical assistance given to participatory budgeting systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Percentage of municipalities and states governed by parties other than the PRI, 1985–2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Percentage of the municipal population governed by parties other than the PRI, 1990 –2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Federal transfers to all municipal governments, 1990 –2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Forms of CSO engagement, 2005–2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CSO involvement in public consultation, 2005–2009 . . . . . .

Changes perceived by CSOs in local government commitment to citizen participation, 2005–2009 . . . . . . . . . .

Local government perceptions of changes in openness and CSO capacity, 2005–2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Villagers’ perceptions of atmosphere and attitudes in village . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Villagers’ proactive interaction with the commune council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Signs of backlash at commune councils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Perceptions of commune councils’ democratic qualities . . .

Perceptions on elections making a difference in leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

160 164 212 213 214 283 284 284 285 311 312 312 314 314

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LIST OF FIGURES

12.6 12.7 12.8 12.9 12.10 12.11 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4

Perceptions of commune councils’ development knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Perceptions of commune councils’ development capacity . .

Commune councillors’ views of reconciliation qualities in decentralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Commune councillors’ views on democratic decentralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Commune councillors’ views on local development issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Measurements of quality of local development work . . . . .

Breakdown of Mozambique provincial budgets, 2000 and 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Breakdown of Huambo province expenditure, 2002 . . . . . .

Intervention logic of the local government approach to the reintegration of IDPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Evolution of Aceh’s local revenue, 1999–2006 . . . . . . . . . . .

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315 316 318 319 320 321 359 363 365 372

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Tables

5.1 6.1 8.1 8.2

Features of local government systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Participatory budgeting in eight settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total funding of municipal governments, 1990 –2002 . . . . . . . .

The threat of electoral loss: Increasing competition for the PRI in municipal elections, 1980 –2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

130 162 214 216

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Contributors

Hans Antlov, PhD, has over 25 years of experience in research and development projects in the fields of public sector governance, decentralization, civil society and legislative strengthening in Indonesia, working for the Ford Foundation, RTI International and presently at the World Bank.

Harry Blair is Associate Department Chair, Senior Research Scholar and Lecturer in Political Science at Yale University, USA. Since the early 1990s, he has worked mainly in democracy and governance, concentrating on civil society and decentralization. His fieldwork and writing include Eastern Europe, Latin America, North Africa and both South and Southeast Asia.

G. Shabbir Cheema is Senior Fellow, East-West Center, Honolulu.

Previously, he was the Director of the Governance Division of the United Nations Development

Programme. He is a contributor to and co-editor of the three-volume series Trends and Innovations in Governance (UNU Press, 2010) and author of Building Democratic Institutions (Kumarian Press, 2005).

Anki Dellnäs has a PhD in History of Ideas and Theory of Science from the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. She is a local governance expert and has worked on capacity development for local governments and as a policy consultant with governments and the United Nations. She is currently working in Myanmar and Cambodia.

Merilee S. Grindle is Edward S. Mason Professor of International Development and Director of the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies at Harvard University, USA. She is a specialist in the comparative analysis of policy-making, implementation and public management in developing

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

countries, with particular reference to Latin America.

David Jackson is Director of Local Development Finance at the United Nations Capital Development Fund in New York. He has 30 years’ experience in local public financial management and post-conflict states.

David has taught at London University (SOAS), UK, Duke University, USA, and The Hague Academy for Local Governance, the Netherlands.

Kim Sedara is a senior research fellow at the Cambodia Development Resource Institute in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. He holds a PhD from the University of Gothenburg in Sweden entitled “Democracy in Action: Decentralization in PostConflict Cambodia”. He is the author and co-author of several articles on Cambodian democratic governance.

James Manor is Emeka Anyaoku Professor Emeritus of Commonwealth Studies in the School of Advanced Study, University of London, UK. Andrew Nickson is Honorary Reader in Public Management and Latin American Studies at the University of Birmingham, UK. He carries out worldwide research and consultancy on public administration reform, decentralization and reform of the urban water supply sector, with long-term experience in Nepal, Paraguay, Peru and Sierra Leone.

Joakim Öjendal is professor in Peace and Development Research, University of Gothenburg, Sweden.

He has previously worked on, inter alia, democratization, peace-building,

decentralization and local governance, and has published in leading journals. Among his recent works are Beyond Democracy in Cambodia: Political Reconstruction in a Post-Conflict Society (with Mona Lilja, NIAS Press, 2009) and The Security–Development Nexus (co-edited with Ramses Amer and Ashok Swain, Anthem Press, 2012).

Jesse Ribot is Professor of Geography, Women and Gender in Global Perspectives, and Natural Resources and Environmental Studies at the University of Illinois, USA, and has been director of the campus-wide Social Dimensions of Environmental Policy Initiative since 2008. He worked at the World Resources Institute 1999–2008 and taught at MIT 1991–1994.

Leonardo G. Romeo is President of Local Development International LLC and Adjunct Professor of Planning at the Wagner Graduate School of New York University, USA. Formerly Principal Adviser at the United Nations Capital Development Fund, his consulting, teaching and research cover decentralized development planning and project appraisal in developing countries.

Anders Sjögren, PhD, is a researcher in the Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, Sweden, and with the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden.

Paul Smoke is Professor of Public Finance and Planning and Director of International Programs at New York University’s Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, USA. He works and publishes extensively on decentralization and

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS local government, with a focus on East Africa and Southeast Asia.

He previously taught at MIT and works with many international agencies.

Olle Törnquist, Professor of Political Science and Development Research, University of Oslo, Norway, has published extensively on politics in developing countries and on problems of democratization in theoretical and comparative perspective. His most recent book (with K. Stokke) is Democratisation

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in the Global South: The Importance of Transformative Politics (Palgrave, 2013).

Anna Wetterberg is a social scientist at the Research Triangle Institute in North Carolina, USA. In Indonesia, she managed an agricultural research and training programme, led a longitudinal study of locallevel institutions, and worked on the Kecamatan Development Program.

Dr Wetterberg received her PhD in sociology from the University of California, Berkeley, USA.

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Foreword Jan Pronk

Three questions stand out in development policy-making. First, in a particular country, what is the content of development; what is its direction; what are the objectives aimed at, with what instruments? Second, at what levels are decisions being taken, in which domain and with what range – centrally or more decentralized; by governmental institutions or by market partners? What type of decentralization has been chosen: geographical-territorial or ethnic-cultural? Are different types of decisions – regarding production, finance, investment, trade, employment, education, health care, social services and the environment – taken at different levels? How are they harmonized? Third, given the level of decision, how are decisions being made, and by whom? Are they made democratically or in an authoritarian manner, on the basis of market motives or the public interest, induced by tradition or by a preference for modernity, made mainly by men or by women, by elders or by younger generations, in a bureaucratic fashion, grounded in law, customs, a plan, or carried out flexibly? Who is responsible for coordination, for implementation and for feedback?

These questions can be phrased in descriptive terms or in the form of recommendations, based on theoretical analysis or on practical experience. They concern the development of a society, the economic order of a country and the political system of a nation-state. They were addressed extensively in classical literature, but received renewed attention owing to developments after the Second World War: the emerging ideological conflict between East and West and the decolonization of countries in the xviii

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FOREWORD

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South. Both developments had an impact on national decisions concerning “the design of development”: what, where, how and by whom?

Two challenges dominated the debate during the first decades after 1945: building up new sovereign nation-states, and achieving sustained national economic growth for all. In most countries in the so-called third world, some form of a “developmental state” was introduced. There were variations, owing to historical differences, arbitrary frontiers, cultural diversities, proneness to conflict and vulnerability to threats from outside.

The position of a country in the sphere of influence of East or West played a role as well. The choices were also influenced by aid and advice in the framework of development cooperation, by donors, Bretton Woods organizations and United Nations Agencies. Despite all this, a fair degree of centralism has characterized nearly all developing countries, which share a need to survive independently, to establish a state, to build a nation and to grow stronger.

This changed after 1989. Questions concerning the content and direction of development were approached from a different angle: sustainable development, human development, human security and poverty reduction became the chief objectives after economic growth. Questions regarding the level and domain of decision-making received new answers following the victory of capitalism over communism. Liberalization, privatization, deregulation and good governance became dominant themes.

Finally, questions about the way in which decisions should be made were influenced by ideas regarding people’s participation and ownership, grassroots development, democracy and human rights.

The new philosophies had one viewpoint in common: a preference for “bottom up” rather than “top down”. Fostering human development, guaranteeing human security and maintaining human rights would require “development from below”, and this could be achieved through economic, political and administrative decentralization.

Decentralization is the theme of this book. It is state of the art. The authors sketch an outline of decentralization theory; discuss context and conditions; and present case studies and lessons learned. I have dealt with decentralization questions as an academic, as a policy-maker, as a politician, in my country and in international development cooperation. At first, my ideas were mainly macro oriented. However, I learned that implementation is more important than planning, and that models are not applicable equably. Everything is country specific, even situation specific.

I gradually became an advocate of the decentralization of powers and the delegation of authority. However, I also learned that decentralization is not a panacea.

Any suggestion to decentralize should start with the question: why?

What is the purpose? It is far from certain that decentralization will offer

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a greater chance of meeting macro objectives, such as higher economic growth or national cohesion. The primary objective of decentralization should be to enhance the well-being of the people of the region or the population group to whom authority is delegated.

This logically leads to a second question: delegation of what, and to whom? Decentralization of legal authority, administrative command and control of resources implies the transfer of power to local leaders. This could result in the opposite of what had been aimed at. Local elites may abuse those powers, and cannot easily be restrained by others. Building up countervailing power, keeping a balance of powers, may, after decentralization, become more difficult than before. Conflicts may arise between traditional local elites and newly established local institutions of the modern nation-state. The national pattern of majority and minority relations – for instance between tribes, indigenous peoples, ethnic groups or religious communities – may become more complicated following regional decentralization of powers. This may lead to conflict escalation, affecting other regions as well.

So, a third question has to be raised: will the nation-state remain viable despite decentralization? In some cases, the viability of the state will be enhanced through decentralization, but there are risks, not only for people at the grassroots but also for the state.

Decentralization is a fascinating subject. It may enchant and confuse.

The chapters in this book provide the thoughtfulness required in order to strike a balance between nation-building and human development.

Jan Pronk Emeritus Professor of Theory and Practice of International Development at the International Institute of Social Studies in The Hague

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Acknowledgements

This volume is the result of a workshop held in Visby, Sweden, in late April 2010. The workshop was organized by the newly established International Centre for Local Democracy (ICLD) funded by Swedish Sida as an attempt to bring together leading scholars and practitioners in the field of local democracy and local governance. This volume is to a certain extent a first major intellectual signature of the ICLD, and could be seen as a starting point for further research and publication endeavours.

The editors are grateful to the ICLD for its support and to all who participated in the workshop with constructive comments and intellectual engagement. Two anonymous reviewers for UNU Press provided extensive comments on the manuscript, and the insight provided by these reviewers significantly improved the content of the volume. We acknowledge the contribution of Hanna Leonardsson for her work getting all the chapters together, Alexandra Kent for the first language editing, and Alex Read both for his insightful comments and for his excellent language editing on the final draft. We are most grateful to Gerhard Van’t Land for valuable discussions and suggestions on the introduction and concluding chapter. Finally, we are grateful to the Sida/Sarec project for partly funding Joakim Öjendal during the finalization of this work.

UNU Press and its staff have our gratitude for the highly professional guidance they provided throughout the process of publication. Finally, we thank the authors for their persistence and patience in responding to requests for changes to the chapters and their willingness and supportive attitude.

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xxii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

All remaining errors in this volume are ours and the conclusions are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the UNU Press.

Joakim Öjendal Anki Dellnäs

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Abbreviations

Bappeda Bappenas BRR BUCADEF BVC CDP CMC CNRT COP CPD CPP CRC CRDA CSF CSO CV DCC DPRD DS

Badan perencanaan pembangunan daerah [Regional Development Planning Agency] (Indonesia) Badan perencanaan pembangunan nasional [National Development Planning Agency] (Indonesia) Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi [Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency] Buganda Cultural and Development Foundation beach village committee Commune Development Plan (Cambodia) Citizen Monitoring Committee (Cambodia) Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorense [National Council of Timorese Resistance] Conselho do Orçamento Participativo [Participatory Budget Council] (Brazil) Centre for Policy Dialogue (Bangladesh) Cambodian People’s Party Citizen Report Card Community Revitalization through Democratic Action (Serbia) Commune Sangkat Fund (Cambodia) civil society organization Comité de Vigilancia [Vigilance Committee] (Bolivia) District Consultative Council (Mozambique) Dewan perwakilan rakyat daerah [district legislative council] (Indonesia) Decentralization Secretariat (Uganda)

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

FRELIMO FRETILIN FVPP GAM GDP GOLD HDI IDEA IDP IGFT KDP LAAR LC LDLG LGC LGSP MEA MEF MFPED MLG MOI MPLA Musrenbang NCPC NGO NRA NRM NU OTBs PAN PFM PPL PRD PRI RENAMO SWAp

Frente de Libertação de Moçambique [Mozambique Liberation Front] Frente Revolucionária do Timor Leste Independente [Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor] Fundação Viver, Produzir e Preservar (Brazil) Gerakan Aceh Merdeka [Free Aceh Movement] (Indonesia) gross domestic product Governance and Local Democracy (Philippines) Human Development Indicator Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance internally displaced person intergovernmental fiscal transfers Kecamatan Development Program (Indonesia) Local Administration and Reform Program (Cambodia) local council local development through local governments Local Government Code (Philippines) Local Governance Support Program (Indonesia) Municipalidades en Acción [Municipalities in Action] (El Salvador) Ministry of Economy and Finance (Cambodia) Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (Uganda) Ministry of Local Government (Uganda) Ministry of Interior (Cambodia) Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola [People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola] Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan [public forum for development planning] (Indonesia) Naga City People’s Council (Philippines) non-governmental organization National Resistance Army (Uganda) National Resistance Movement (Uganda) Nahdlatul Ulama (Indonesia) Organizaciones Territoriales de Base [territorially based community organizations] (Bolivia) Partido Acción Nacional [National Action Party] (Mexico) public financial management (Cambodia, Uganda) Popular Participation Law (Bolivia) Partido de la Revolución Democrática [Party of the Democratic Revolution] (Mexico) Partido Revolucionario Institucional [Institutional Revolutionary Party] (Mexico) Resistência Nacional Moçambicana [Mozambican National Resistance] Sector-Wide Approach

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS UNDP UNITA UPC USAID

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United Nations Development Programme União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] Uganda Peoples Congress United States Agency for International Development

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Part I Introduction and theoretical overview

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1 Introduction Joakim Öjendal and Anki Dellnäs

1.1 Introduction The wave of democratization seen in various countries, notably in the global south, that followed the deep-cutting political changes in the late 1980s and the early 1990s was somewhat predictable. However, few foresaw the equally powerful wave of decentralization reforms that would follow, in particular in political or democratic decentralization. Although researchers and practitioners realized the significance of the structural changes of the time (Campbell, 2005; Grindle, 2007; see also Manor, 1999; Prum, 2005), the strength, longevity and impact of local democracy and decentralization – and their influence on the distribution of political power – are rarely highlighted in the broader literature on local governance, democratization and state-building (Brinkerhoff, 2010; Englebert and Tull, 2008; Romeo, 2002). Decentralization processes are instead often restricted to minor development debates, or exclusively referred to when dealing with technical aspects, administrative reforms and capacity development.

Only recently have the overt political economy of these processes and the political consequences started to become fully valued (see Eaton et al., 2010). The authors and editors of this volume welcome this as a critical addition to the analysis and debate. They do not subscribe to the idea that decentralization is a small issue or a minor political idea. On the contrary, in various respects they see the political economy of decentralization reforms – entailing the rearrangement of power structures, The imperative of good local governance: Challenges for the next decade of decentralization, Öjendal and Dellnäs (eds), United Nations University Press, 2013, ISBN 978-92-808-1229-9

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improved democratic space and development potential – as contributing to sustainable state-building in general but more specifically in postconflict situations. However, none of these outcomes can be taken as given because they are strongly political and subject to different interests, ideologies and ways that power is organized.

This volume has two major objectives. The first is to compile a stateof-the-art overview of the most significant research efforts in the current debate on decentralization. Prominent agenda-setting local governance researchers and practitioners have contributed their knowledge and helped to consolidate two decades of experiences, change and development in the field. As such, this volume aims to cover the key debates and highlight the major arguments for and against decentralization and the emerging emphasis on local governance, local democracy and local development, especially in post-conflict areas. The second and possibly more significant objective is to discuss how and to what extent this change of focus towards local governance, local democracy and local development actually delivers, or can deliver, the enhanced efficiency, improved accountability and strengthened democracy that is widely believed to be within reach (see Manor, 2011; see also Eaton et al., 2010). In general, the pattern in the literature is that decentralization reforms rarely perform to their potential. As expressed by Grindle (2007: 8): Not surprisingly, these high expectations for the decentralization revolution were likely to be disappointed when policies were put in practice to restructure the locus of government decision-making and operational responsibility – practice rarely lives up to theory.

This naturally raises the question of whether the theory is faulty or the practice is to blame. It also leads to the question of whether the same applies for decentralization in post-conflict contexts, where, apart from arguments on efficiency and effectiveness, issues of power-sharing and state-building play a much more prominent role. Could it be that decentralization reforms represent a special opportunity in post-conflict areas, and, if so, what are the challenges and necessary preconditions for their effectiveness? These questions represent the focus of this volume.

In order to find answers, this introductory chapter will first provide a general background to the emergence of decentralization and examine how it fits into the larger picture of the evolution of democratic governance worldwide. Secondly, the theoretical underpinnings for the structure of and contributions to this volume will be detailed. Finally, we will present a brief overview of those contributions.

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1.1.1 Decentralization as an emerging paradigm Historical observations show that centrally held positions and opinions are crucial to any process of decentralization, and hence are of key significance when examining the concept. In original ideas about state-building (Hobsbawm, 1992; Tilly, 1975), centralism was at the core of efforts to formulate a standardized education system, a joint military structure and a common language and to pursue ambitions to establish and stabilize a unitary and legitimate power. In the first decades after the Second World War – the heyday of the centralized nation-state – the industrialized world harboured a deep optimism about economic growth and political stability, and the post-colonial world was undergoing the aforementioned stages of state-building. The idea of a centralized state fitted with the structures of international organizations, because development strategies, fiscal and defence policies and general information-sharing were primarily based on a national agenda. In other words, the pre-globalization integrity/ homogeneity of the nation-state initially needed, and later could still cope with, centralism. The early post-colonial state also saw centralism as a strategy for homogenization and a way to create national integrity.

However, decentralization is not a new concept. Treissman (2007: 9) traces the origin of the idea of political decentralization to early phases of the modern nation-state,1 referring to “thinkers such as Montesquieu, Rousseau, Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill” (2007: 4). Ideas of enhancing the quality of local political leadership through the decentralization of power can be linked to democratization efforts in nineteenth-century Britain. For example, John Stuart Mill led the debate on how to establish representative government, advocating the need for increased local participation and the utility of the local knowledge assumed to be held by local governments (Stoker, 1996: 5). Cohen and Peterson (1999: 1–2), being slightly more contemporary, examined north–south relations and identified three distinct dynamics that served to promote decentralization: the first related to state-building and the transition from indirect rule to self-rule in the former colonies; the second was seen as invented and promoted to achieve aid efficiency; and the third was tightly interwoven with global norms of democracy, participation, inclusion and conflict resolution.

The promotion of a participation agenda from the 1970s onwards constitutes a first key driving force behind the current popularity of decentralization as a form of governance (see Chambers, 1995). This was influenced both by failed developmental experiences and over-centralist large-scale endeavours rooted in reductionist world views, but was also

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part of a much longer and ongoing historical evolution involving the worldwide rise of middle classes, increased levels of education and public awareness, deepening perception of human rights and a broadly felt discontent with democratic deficits and elite capture (see Huntington, 1991).

This “third wave of democratization” saw bottom-up perspectives, grassroots engagement, public participation and people power growing in prominence. These ideas are popularly labelled “alternative development” and over time they have been integrated into mainstream ideas of development (for example, the World Bank has acted as the contemporary champion of participation), providing a counterpoint to mainstream liberal and modernizing growth orientation (Hettne, 2009). As a result, popular demands from below for state accountability have gradually increased in prominence, and in terms of policy have found their form in the institutionalized local state, helping to firmly establish concepts such as decentralization and local governance (World Bank, 1997; see also Yusuf, 2000).

Forces of globalization are the second key driver of decentralization.

The words of Cheema and Rondinelli (2007: 3) demonstrate the sources of this change: During the 1970s and 1980s, globalization forced some governments to recognize the limitations and constraints of central economic planning and management. A shift during the same period in development theories and strategies in international aid agencies away from central economic planning and trickledown theories of economic growth toward meeting basic human needs, growthwith-equity objectives, and participatory development also led to increasing calls for decentralization.

Globalization pressure, alongside deepened demands for democratization and the participatory revolution in development policy (Chambers, 1995), meant that important forces, inside but more notably outside, different countries began to push ideas of decentralization and local democracy. At this time, development dogma was beginning to assert that the “central state’s supremacy was more or less displaced . . . by international economic trends and the perceived failure of the previous policy paradigm” (Oxhorn et al., 2004: 11).

The promotion of local governments and local governance structures that can respond to increasingly engaged citizens has been part of the broad process of democratization observed globally during the last three decades (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006). It also results from the “crisis of government” (Rosanvallon, 2011), in which the legitimacy of central government has been questioned and the role of local government in pursuing a credible good governance agenda promoted (see Yusuf et al.,

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2000: 5; Brinkerhoff, 2010). A variation of the same theme is that the central government needs someone to manage local crises of various sorts (see International IDEA, 2001) or to take the blame for failures. Decentralization reforms thus represent a shift away from autonomous, nonresponsive central governments, which were seen as one-dimensional, lacking the flexibility, dynamism and resilience required in the modern age, and prone to power-grabbing and dominance by elites. In other cases, however, local elites saw the moves towards decentralization as a way of establishing and consolidating power, sometimes on a “divide and rule” basis.

In the early 1990s, continued globalization and the concept of the “end of the nation-state” (Ohmae, 1996; see also Beck, 1999; Falck, 1997) moved the debate to focus on multi-level systems of governance (World Bank, 1997; Keohane and Nye, 2000). Despite this, instead of weakening the state, globalization may instead have served to strengthen it, with states adapting, albeit in a different form. In its new, multi-layered shape the state system has been revitalized. Debates on the “end of the nationstate” have vanished, and calls for “bringing the state back in”, as advocated as early as 1985, have become stronger (see Evans et al., 1985).

Some even assert that “state-building is the new development paradigm” (Marquette and Beswick, 2011), in which the construction of accountable local government units is a key feature.

Political ideologies and development strategies come in trends, peaking then fading away, and this is witnessed in the rise and fall in popularity of decentralization over the decades (see Manor, 1999: 2). However, despite this it appears that the large-scale move towards decentralization as a way of political restructuring transcends fashions and trends, including globalization, the participation agenda and “waves” of democratization.

By now, the importance of the sub-national government and the local level is seemingly well established as a natural part of any governmental system. This has grown into a global phenomenon, a “structural revolution” (Grindle, 2007: 4; see also Campbell, 2005) challenging centralism and pertaining to state administrations and their power relations as well as broader political dynamics (see Rondinelli et al., 1983; Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007; see also Turner and Hulme, 1997).

The current understanding of the utility of decentralization can therefore be seen as stemming from bottom-up demand from citizens for accountable government closer to the people as well as from efforts to design from the top-down an agenda aimed at improved governance at the local level (see Craig and Porter, 2006; see also Grindle, 2004; and see below), in cooperation with, or on behalf of, central government. It is when this bottom-up demand is met by top-down plans that decentralization works; when this does not happen its efficiency diminishes and

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reforms can even turn destructive (see Prud’homme, 1995; see also Treissman, 2007). However, if and when such demand is indeed met by strong design, decentralization serves to support processes of state-building (Brinkerhoff, 2010), which is especially pertinent in the case of postconflict contexts. This point forms the central theme of this book and the dynamics of these processes will be further detailed below.

1.1.2 The change of perspectives and its empirical evidence In the post–Cold War era, despite the democratic and developmental crises faced by centralized states, the decentralized solution was not always self-evident, and the recurring risks were often used as an excuse for not implementing decentralization policies (Prud’homme, 1995; see also Rondinelli et al., 1983). Political fragmentation, fiscal imbalances, corruption and capacity deficits were often cited as evils of decentralization (see Treissman, 2007: 11–15) and these arguments are not without grounds. Decentralization is clearly neither a panacea nor applicable in all situations and countries. The successful creation of local governments depends strongly on factors such as balanced policies, strong legal frameworks, political will and available resources. In fact, managing decentralization requires a very strong central government and cannot on its own act as an alternative for a weak central government. Applied in the wrong situation or applied recklessly, decentralization can be harmful and produce negative consequences (see Manor, 1999).

Nevertheless, in the late 1990s a number of influential empirical studies came up with credible results concerning the potential of decentralization and local governance, answering questions about the ways in which and the extent to which it can respond to the crises of government.

Tendler (1997) showed in her classic study how the dynamics and potential of revitalized local governments in Brazil resulted in a distinct change to the quality of governance. This was followed by Crook and Manor’s (1998) broad and meticulously designed four-country study detailing the promising but unfulfilled potential of decentralization, a most thorough examination of decentralization dynamics whose themes recur in subsequent studies.

Shah et al. (2004) reviewed the empirical literature on the impact of decentralization and summarized its effects on service delivery, corruption, fiscal management and growth. In another broadly designed study, Blair (2000) found substantial political progress and signs of enhanced responsiveness and deepened accountability, as well as detailing problematic aspects of decentralization reforms. An influential paper by Crook and Sverrisson (2001) highlighted emerging views on the generic qualities of decentralization reforms, emphasizing the elusiveness of its benefits

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and the significance of continued central–local ties. Agrawal and Ribot (1999) presented a much-quoted four-country case study that powerfully argued that decentralization is likely to be efficient, but only on the condition that representation and downward accountability are solid and that there are sufficient countervailing powers to keep devolved powers in check.

Finally, a new equilibrium has to be found. This is put simply yet powerfully by Turner and Hulme (1997: 152) in their observation that all states have to consider and reconsider their balance of decentralized and centralized powers: Total centralization . . . is infeasible even for the most efficient autocrat in a micro-state. The needs of the modern state to provide some services to at least part of its citizenry, to exercise political control over its territory and to bolster its legitimacy require that a degree of authority is delegated and some decisions made outside of the political and administrative centre. In consequence, all systems of government involve a combination of central control and decentralized authority.

Turner and Hulme conclude by arguing that alterations to the central– local balance of power are an ongoing and continual process in statemaking, development and democratization. This reflects the focus of this volume, in which such processes are analysed in post-conflict contexts.

1.2 Theoretical underpinnings of this volume In assessing the above arguments – and taking as a point of departure that “decentralization matters” – it is clear that the political economy of decentralization reforms is complex and multidimensional (Eaton et al., 2010; see also World Bank, 2008). A complicating factor is that decentralization and local governance are generic terms that are habitually undefined (Manor, 1999: 8; Shah, 2006: 1ff; Turner and Hulme, 1997: 159ff). The different interpretations of these terms can potentially be endorsed by both conservative and neo-liberal forces, by politically radical and grassroots approaches to local development. They can favour national politicians, development partners and international financial institutions, because local governments could be attractive recipients and efficient users of funds. As so often in the social sciences, the harbouring of “essentially contested concepts” (Gallie, 1956) means that there is an ongoing debate on the content and meaning of terms and words used to prescribe and describe the various processes and manifestations of decentralization and its surrounding reforms. This can serve as a rallying point for different views and approaches.

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Since this is not the place to engage in conceptual innovations, we largely follow the established literature: • Decentralization refers generally to the transfer of powers and resources from the central government to lower levels in the state hierarchy.

• Political or democratic decentralization (devolution) is a deeper variant, in which local authorities that are democratically elected and primarily accountable downwards to their constituents are given distinct powers and discretionary resources.

• Administrative decentralization (delegation or deconcentration) refers to an assignment of functions to sub-national governments by the central government, making local governments primarily accountable upwards.

• Finally, fiscal decentralization refers to the degree of transfer of financial responsibility to sub-national governments (Turner and Hulme, 1997; see also Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Crook and Manor, 1998; Manor, 1999; Ribot and Larson, 2004; Smith, 1985).

Federalization and privatization are occasionally seen as aspects of decentralization, but are not explicitly covered in this volume. Governance here corresponds to the World Bank’s early definition of the term as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development” (1991: i), stressing that this is not solely pursued by the state and its agencies. “Local governance” is this process as pursued at the sub-national level. The emphasis in this book is mainly on devolution, because this is the political form of decentralization that guarantees the elected representation of subnational government to its constituents.

A simplistic critique of decentralization is that strengthened local government undermines the authority of central government. However, this is true only in a limited, bipolar understanding of the world. On the contrary – and as argued by most contributors to this volume – welldesigned decentralization reform gives the central government more legitimacy, capacity and stability through the strengthening of the local government system (Crook and Sverrisson, 2001). As Turner and Hulme (1997: 152) argue, “centralization and decentralization are not attributes that can be dichotomized: rather they represent hypothetical poles on a continuum that can be calibrated by many different indices”. Hence, central and local interests and institutions need to be mutually supportive for decentralization reforms to achieve their potential. As mentioned above, demand for democracy, rights, participation and inclusion must meet well-designed reforms that establish politically sustainable government structures that are receptive to these demands in a benevolent way. This potentially produces a win–win process that promotes stronger

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democracy and increases the potential of government (Brinkerhoff, 2011; Romeo, Chapter 3 in this volume). However, it is also argued that public demand – voiced directly through elected representatives or through mechanisms of social accountability – is rarely reflected in the design of reforms, creating a gap that prevents decentralization from living up to its potential (Yilmaz et al., 2010: 259).

The need to avoid such a gap between the design of reforms and local demand for accountable government becomes particularly prominent when we consider conflict- and violence-ridden contexts. In weak and/or post-conflict states, reconstructing government to meet public demand is an urgent endeavour and often seen as a prerequisite for establishing critical regime/governmental legitimacy, but there is a limit to how much contact and exposure a central government can establish with its citizens (Turner and Hulme, 1997: 152; Rondinelli, 2007). In these circumstances, and particularly after state failure, decentralization and the establishment of a legitimate local government may be part of a focused and intentional process of state-building (see Brinkerhoff, 2010). In a more general sense, state-building and regime legitimization are then supported by the creation of a politically meaningful local government structure.

1.2.1 Designing decentralization – simple, yet so hard Perhaps the most significant amount of literature on decentralization deals with so-called technical aspects and the design of decentralization reforms, answering questions such as who is given which powers, which mandate and with what resources? The centrality of technical aspects is highlighted by Litvack et al. (1998: 26), who assert that “to debate whether decentralization is good or bad is unproductive and misleading since the impact of decentralization depends on design”. As well as taking a more comprehensive approach (Crook and Manor, 1998; Manor, 2011; Sharma, 2005), the wide-ranging body of literature discussing design issues deals with topics such as decentralization based on natural resources (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Andersson and Ostrom, 2008; Ribot, 2011); fiscal decentralization (Prud’homme, 2003; Smoke, 2007; Yilmaz et al., 2010); and development perspectives (Manor, 1999, 2008; Turner and Hulme, 1997). These writings show how rapidly problems can emerge if the design is poor. Manor (Chapter 2 in this volume), arguing from broad experience, is clear in stressing three key design factors: substantial powers, matched by substantial resources, and kept in check by solid accountability mechanisms. These are “essential if democratic decentralization is to work well . . . If any of these three essentials is absent, the system will fail.” These guidelines would appear to be simple, yet can prove fairly difficult to achieve.

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Manor’s observations are built upon by authors such as Treissman (2007) and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006: 12–13), who dig deeper into the details of the critical preconditions for democratic decentralization such as the legal dimension, ranging from the constitution to electoral law; fiscal issues in combination with resource devolution; and the capacity of local officials and the information they have access to. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) takes this a step further in developing a comprehensive handbook on how to design systems for local democracy (International IDEA, 2001). The handbook explores local democracy in challenging contemporary settings by looking at what it sees as the three most important components of democracy: (i) conflict management, or specifically designed efforts and initiatives to prevent, manage, settle and resolve conflicts among diverse groups in today’s complex urban arenas; (ii) representation, through elections in which candidates stand for office, votes are cast, winners are made, and elected officials are chosen; and (iii) participation, in which citizen involvement in policy-making is more direct, with the active input of all elements of the population through consultative processes.

All the technical approaches, however, appear to be undervaluing the crucial importance of the context of decentralization and its inherited political nature, including power relations (Eaton et al., 2010; Grindle, 2007; see also Manor, 1999). In fact, the bottom line is that designing decentralization reforms constitutes a political and policy-oriented process, drawing on theoretical baselines, insights from previous research and a general understanding of not only the political context but also the views of those in power. It is therefore important that technicians designing reforms are very familiar with both the often-unexpressed demand and the political realities.

1.2.2 Demanding decentralization – omnipotent, but impotent Decentralization is often justified by claims that moving government closer to the people will improve representation of local needs. It is thereby commonly assumed that, with decentralization, the capacity for participation and wider inclusion is enhanced and that this deepens democracy. Democracy researchers such as Diamond (1999) subscribe to this theory. He argues that decentralized systems are inherently more democratic than centralized ones, and that (with certain qualifications) local democracy is the embodiment of democratic consolidation. Others are more cautious, seeing the process from “participation to deepening democracy” as a long-term objective that may not instantly materialize (Goldfrank, 2007: 148). The reality is that these aspects, being political,

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often receive little attention, even though the push for decentralization is partly grounded on the wish for more participatory approaches, as argued above.

But popular demand is also not a simple given, and local democracy is sometimes difficult to achieve. Manor poses the question: “Has pressure from ordinary people at the grass roots persuaded central authorities in some countries to decentralize? The answer must be: hardly at all” (1999: 31). Moreover, in her research on the establishment of accountable local governments in Mexico, Grindle (2007: 178) concludes that, despite a broadly successful process, the weakest link may have been frail, imprecise and uneven popular demand for quality services.

“Citizens had good ideas for how to get problems solved, but they were limited in terms of what seemed appropriate for demanding performance from government. . . . A civic culture of accountability remained weak.”

Similarly, Öjendal (2005) cautioned that, although decentralization in Cambodia was tentatively successful, it may face future difficulties because the capacity to make use of the newly provided democratic space is low amongst both civil servants and the public. This runs the risk, sooner or later, of the re-emergence of elite capture. Ribot (2011) notes that lines of accountability are often obscured and that demand therefore appears fragmented and ineffective, eventually jeopardizing the success of many decentralization reforms.

In other contexts, however, there is evidence of popular mobilization from below both to push decentralization and to have a voice in its design (see Harriss et al., 2005). Indonesia may be one of the most dramatic cases of how demands from below, in this case from provincial and/or district interests, forced a rapid, or “big bang”, decentralization (Hidayat and Antlov, 2004; Hofman and Kaiser, 2006). Similarly, governing sizeable countries such as India would hardly be feasible without deep federalization/decentralization. The same could increasingly be said about Viet Nam and China (Kennedy, 2010; Painter, 2008), even though in these cases there may be more deconcentration than enhanced democracy through devolution. Demand is intrinsically different depending on the context, and in none of these examples does it come in the form of explicit civil society engagement or popular uprisings; rather it comes as a response to pressure inside the state system.

Once systems are in place, it is noticeably more common that there are demands for influence and accountability. Lents (2006) argues that decentralization reforms set off a natural solidarity between various interest groups such as trade unions and traditional rulers, initiating a renegotiation process with the central state that is made possible through the political space created by democratic decentralization reform. Dauda

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(2006) highlights how, despite often limited democratic space, marginalized groups may use this to counter their lack of influence. Once systems are in place, the capacity to demand democratic decentralization (devolution) may be a bottleneck, rather than the system itself, but in the main as soon as opportunities are offered they are taken. For example, Kim and Öjendal (2012) analyse how democratic decentralization has opened up political space for women’s engagement in local politics, breaking a longstanding stigma. The empirical chapters of this volume offer ample examples of these points.

Finally, assessing demand for decentralized governance requires thorough local knowledge, and typically draws on empirical research into particular contexts. This incorporates the degree to which local problems are actually met by decentralization reforms, and what could be done in terms of policy to improve governance efficiency. As such, to a large extent this draws on agendas of inclusion and participation. The conclusion seems to be that there is a need in design processes to identify underlying demands, given the local context, even if these are not explicit at the time the design is undertaken. This shows that the design and demand sides of decentralization are closely interrelated. As stated by Oxhorn et al. (2004: 10): While it is obvious that democratic decentralization can be realized only by maximizing direct participation once the prerequisite institutions are in place, it may be less obvious that such participation is also dependent on how those institutions are designed.

1.2.3 Decentralization design meets demand for state-building In cases where, prior to decentralization, the state had failed, such as Cambodia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Somalia or Iraq, or where it is/was about to fail, such as Mozambique, Indonesia, South Africa or Uganda, decentralization and the (re)construction of local government constitute part of the state-building effort. In some cases, the design must be redrawn and a local state must be established to communicate demand (Brinkerhoff and Johnson, 2009). This task is both technical and administrative, political and contested (Brinkerhoff, 2011).

However, when design corresponds to demand, democratic decentral ization (devolution) is at the core of state–society relations. The state is positioned locally and as such it is made more available and increasingly exposed to demands made by broad segments of its population. Moreover, if successful, it establishes mechanisms for enhancing interactions from which a “social contract” may emerge, an occurrence that is considerably more difficult in an overly centralized state. This demonstrates the

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centrality of state–society relations, which must be balanced, benevolent and stable in order to conform to a process of state-building (Brinkerhoff, 2011; Jackson, 2005; Öjendal and Kim, 2011; see also Migdal, 2001).

As Oxhorn et al. write, “decentralization should be viewed as part of a larger process of the social construction of citizenship, in which who participates and who does not matter” (2004: 9; italics in original). As such, the state – including institutions at the central level as well as at the sub-national/local level – is being built and legitimized on the basis of the interaction between citizens and the state (see Turner and Hulme, 1997).

Local governments are essential parts of the overall public sector. In certain contexts this may be one of the more significant, yet most underrated, tasks undertaken in the process of democratic decentralization (see Romeo, 2002).

Furthermore, decentralization reforms, although in principle inclusive, if designed poorly can systematically exclude certain groups such as ethnic minorities or the poor (Jørgensen, 2006), or result in exclusion along territorial lines (McCulloch, 2011). Such cases of exclusion are naturally a “driver of conflict” (Brinkerhoff, 2011). In contrast, when processes of decentralization and the establishment of local government serve to be inclusive, they may work to consolidate and stabilize states, as in the cases of Indonesia (Brinkerhoff, 2011), Rwanda (Sentama, 2009) and Cambodia (Öjendal and Kim, 2011).

In post-conflict reconstruction, there is significant evidence that decentralization allows local authorities to play an important role because peace-building and state-building typically require deeper legitimization and a stronger bottom-up approach than is commonly attempted (Lederach, 1997). The slogan for early post–Cold War interventions by the United Nations was “interventions–early elections–exit”, and this has been shown to rarely work in complex peace-building and state-building operations (Paris, 2004). In cases of state failure, widespread violence and deep-seated conflict, regime legitimacy and trust in the state need to be built from below through long-term processes. These must include broad segments of the population, promote governance capacity and work to resume delivery of basic services (Rondinelli, 2007). Somalia demonstrates a case where centralized approaches have failed repeatedly, but where local reconstruction attempts have succeeded to the extent that there is “governance without government” (Menkhaus, 2006; see also Morrison and Rusten, 2012).

Decentralization and the rebuilding of a local governance system in post-conflict reconstruction processes constitute comprehensive statebuilding attempts where top-down reforms must meet demand from below. Although this may always be the ambition for decentralization reform, in this context it is imperative. It is this vastly underemphasized

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factor in post-conflict rebuilding processes that is the focus of this volume, which attempts to answer the question: To what extent can decentralization be a key component in state-building?

1.3 A brief overview of the volume 1.3.1 Structure of the volume The structure of the volume follows the three themes of design, demand and state-building as developed above. The contributors do not always adhere to one or more specific approach, but typically any analysis, and for that matter any reform, has a point of departure based around what is seen and understood as most important. The volume is structured as follows: • Part I introduces a general discussion of decentralization reform.

• Part II has contributions where the point of departure is design of reforms, considering primarily how reforms are planned and carried out.

In general, these contributions are at a higher level of abstraction and/ or more oriented to central policy, and typically are based on previous research.

• Part III has contributions focusing on demand, tracing local dynamics and their significance for issues of design. These can be seen as more field oriented, assessing the impact of various reforms and their design.

• Part IV has contributions that highlight, in the context of post-conflict reconstruction, the relationship between decentralization and statebuilding, emphasizing the importance of congruence between local demand and central design.

• Part V compares the contributions, analysing both similarities and differences.

1.3.2 Introducing the contributors One of the most critical issues in the current debate on decentralization is the importance of how decentralization reforms within the public sphere are designed. In Chapter 2, James Manor explores “Understanding decentralization: Key issues for successful design” by addressing two key concerns related to design: what happens within decentralized systems and how do different actors interact with one another? Elaborating on these two questions allows Manor to highlight a range of key concerns such as the need for strong, centralized leadership from the apex of the political system; comparatively simple and straightforward processes of implementation; and clear explanations of cornerstones of reforms for those who are to implement them. Furthermore, the division of responsi-

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bilities between the national level and elected bodies at sub-national levels must be spelled out clearly and in detail to ensure that elected local bodies have the autonomy and discretionary powers they need to function effectively. Manor points out that the most important factors for the success of reform are the transfer of substantial powers and resources from the national level to the elected councils at the sub-national level, and the establishment and development of robust accountability mechanisms, both horizontal accountability of bureaucrats to elected representatives and downwards accountability of elected representatives to ordinary people.

Manor leaves no doubt as to the centrality of getting the design right.

In Chapter 3, “Decentralizing for development: The developmental potential of local autonomy and the limits of politics-driven decentralization reforms”, Leonardo Romeo takes a somewhat different approach, concentrating on local demand and arguing that efforts at building a solid local state should always start with a “local needs” perspective. Romeo asserts that decentralization reforms in developing countries could be better designed, sustained and externally supported if they were seen as domestic efforts to build what he refers to as developmental states, rather than attempts to implement an international good governance agenda.

Decentralization must be based on development at the local level, and local autonomy is key to this endeavour. The chapter also posits that successful development-driven decentralization reforms require both a wider national policy for local development and the emergence of social demand and responsible local leadership, proactively encouraged where necessary. This theory stresses both that politically driven decentralization reforms – so common in the contemporary debate – remain incomplete and will be easily reversible, and that actors who are committed to promote “local development through local governments” may still remain engaged in such reforms and can take advantage of their contradictions. Manor and Romeo pursue complementary arguments, and agree to a large extent on the importance of autonomy and downward accountability in the functioning of local governance systems.

Following chapters focus on design and then demand from a universal and generalized perspective. Part II presents four authors who look at the significance of design through the use of more empirical evidence. In Chapter 4, “Representation, citizenship and the public domain: Choice and recognition in democratic decentralization”, Jesse Ribot uses the choice and recognition framework to analyse how democratic decentralization projects and policies affect democracy. Although thoroughly theoretical in its presentation, the chapter draws on a wide range of case studies to explore the effects of institutional choice and recognition on three dimensions of democracy: (i) representation; (ii) citizenship; and (iii) the public domain. He then examines the logic behind local institutional choice and its effects on local democracy, where “institutional

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choice” refers to the choice of the locus of authority (actors or institutions). Ribot observes that, in the design and implementation of decentralization activities, governments, international development agencies and large non-governmental organizations (NGOs) work with a wide range of other local interlocutors, including deconcentrated agents, private entities, customary authorities and smaller NGOs. Because actors designing reforms mistrust local authorities and recognize these other parallel local institutions, fledgling local governments receive fewer public powers and face competition for legitimacy. Bypassing local government institutions may even undermine the strength and legitimacy of central governments and instead strengthen local elites and promote reactionary policies. Ribot clearly shows how small differences in design risk resulting in significant negative outcomes, hence the necessity of careful design from the outset.

In Chapter 5, “Where is local government going in Latin America?”, Andrew Nickson empirically analyses the progress of local democracy and local governance in a broad setting. By using two ideal types of local democracy – the managerial and the governmental – Nickson captures the tension between the different roles and responsibilities of local governments in Latin America and beyond. The managerial type derives from English utilitarianism philosophy and is primarily aimed at more effective service delivery. It also stresses the importance of clearly defined local government competencies, regulated by statute and circumscribed by the application of the ultra vires principle. Under the governmental type, service delivery is one important aspect of local government, but equally important is local government’s role in acting on shared community interests through its policy choices. The essential function of local government derives from strong citizen identification with the local community. The governmental type sees local government exercising considerable discretion over rates of local taxation. National tax revenues are often shared between the central and local governments, and local and national levels work through negotiation and consensus in the governmental system rather than there being a confrontational relationship in which central government is in the ascendancy. Rather than supervising, central government plays a supportive role, often at the request of local government, and accountability of local government is mainly downwards to citizens rather than upwards to central government. Nickson observes the movement towards the governmental type of local democracy in Latin America, although, in cases where decentralization is less deep, key features of the managerial type are still prevalent.

In Chapter 6, “Participatory budgeting and local governance”, Harry Blair examines a consistent theme in development cooperation – citizendetermined budget priorities. Participatory budgeting is a process of

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democratic deliberation and decision-making in which citizens decide directly or indirectly through specially selected representatives how to allocate parts of municipal or public budgets, with the aim of empowering citizens and increasing their involvement in local governance. However, as also suggested by Ribot, evidence shows major weaknesses when local government institutions are bypassed by efforts, often donor instigated, that try to build sustainable and representative democratic institutions.

The use of eight different cases helps illuminate common patterns that can determine if and how citizen involvement in the budget process leads to better governance performance. Blair concludes that, although the time-span of experimentation with participatory budgeting has been too short to fully determine real signs of improvement, there is some evidence of positive effects on citizen empowerment and poverty alleviation, but no real evidence of a visible impact on citizen well-being.

Concluding Part II, Chapter 7 by Paul Smoke, “Recentralization in developing countries: Forms, motivations and consequences”, reviews various efforts to slow down or undo decentralization processes, using the cases of Uganda and Cambodia. Both countries are still emerging from extended periods of conflict and have similar design issues, being poor and aid dependent with weakly diversified economies and lacking capacity in government. However, they have taken different approaches to decentralization. Cambodia’s reform has been gradual but characterized by centralizing features, whereas Uganda started with an unusually ambitious reform and then dramatically scaled back. Smoke recognizes two main paths of recentralization: through the adoption of additional laws, regulations and decrees that clarify, modify or dilute the formal provisions of the original legislation; and through actions of politicians and bureaucrats at higher levels of government who face incentives to limit the functions of sub-national government (Uganda) or that constrain the behaviour and discretion of local politicians and officials (Cambodia).

The motives for this can include a lack of political consensus behind reforms in the first place, especially when decentralization is a response to donor pressure; a later awakening by central agencies to the realities of reform and the implications for them; or a reaction to weak performance at the sub-national level, which might be due to overly rapid implementation of reforms. Although recentralization could help correct mistakes of poorly conceived decentralization design and empower sub-national governments to carry out their remaining responsibilities more effectively, it could also negatively affect the ability of local governments to undertake meaningful functions and further undermine their credibility with their local constituencies. This is clearly the case in Cambodia, where the central level, despite implementing decentralization reform for over a decade, has strengthened its power.

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Part III concentrates on more field-oriented research findings that examine the demand side. In Chapter 8, “Sanctions, benefits and rights: Three faces of accountability”, Merilee S. Grindle argues that government accountability vis-à-vis its citizens is a multifaceted relationship that can be assessed in three ways. Grindle looks at whether citizens can reward or punish the performance of local public officials and the parties they represent (sanctions); whether citizens can generate a response to their collective needs from local governments (benefits); and whether citizens can be assured of fair and equitable treatment from public agencies at local levels (rights). By looking at a large-scale study of 30 randomly selected municipalities in Mexico, Grindle explores the evolution of sanctions, benefits and rights at the local level and how they are affected by decentralization and democratization reforms. She finds that voters have been able to enforce changes in local power structures, including in local elites, but that they are not necessarily able to transmit unambiguous messages to public officials or parties about governance performance.

Moreover, citizens have been able to build successfully on prior political experiences to extract benefits from local governments, but the ability to demand strong local government performance as a right of citizenship has lagged behind other forms of accountability. An important contribution of the chapter to this volume is the potential use of the research framework – owing to its simplicity and replicability in comparative studies – for assessing what Grindle refers to as government “by the people”.

Chapter 9, “Engaging civil society to promote democratic local governance: Emerging trends in local democracy in Asia” by G. Shabbir Cheema, advances the argument that deepening decentralization and democratic local governance requires a two-pronged strategy: a proactive civil society that demands decentralization and serves as the vanguard of accountability at national and local levels; and a conducive national context characterized by political pluralism that allows sufficient capacity and resources for local governments. Cheema argues that civil society organizations (CSOs) play vital roles at local, national, regional and global levels in the promotion of decentralization and inclusive governance, which is characterized by principles of participation, access, equity, subsidiarity and the rule of law. Using experiences from nine countries, Cheema describes how major democratic transitions in Asia have emanated from pressures from CSOs, stressing their important role in shaping policy by challenging the traditional ways that the state and the market have allocated societal resources. Cheema shows that space for CSOs has expanded and that their relationships with government have taken on new forms. More problematic situations where civil society is weak are not explicitly dealt with in the chapter.

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In Chapter 10, “Popular aspirations, decentralization and local democracy”, Olle Törnquist examines secondary data from various longitudinal studies since the 1980s that show how political civil rights organizations in India, Indonesia and the Philippines have tried to foster decentralization and local democracy. Törnquist uses three lenses: (i) a social perspective, stressing the importance of independent CSOs and movements working from below; (ii) a new party perspective, emphasizing the need for engaged citizens and CSOs to interact with local political parties during elections; and (iii) a supplementary perspective, giving priority to additional forms of democratic participation that can engage with established popular organizations as well as liberal-democratic institutions of governance. Törnquist emphasizes that the failure to achieve democratization lies mainly in the failure (of governments, agencies and organizations, including donor organizations) to recognize local institutions and partners that represent the citizenry, and which can create or help to create and nurture reforms if properly recognized and supported. The politics of recognition is decisive for either strengthening parallel structures that compete with local legitimate authorities, or strengthening government structures and thereby achieving more sustainable, legitimate and, importantly, accountable state institutions (see also Chapter 4). In his conclusion, Törnquist argues that democratic development has taken place in spite of the lack of political support from ruling parties, and that comparative historical and political analyses are critical in understanding what undermines attempts to establish local democracy.

Rounding off the demand section, Chapter 11 on “Citizen engagement, deliberative spaces and the consolidation of a post-authoritarian democracy: The case of local CSOs in Indonesia”, by Hans Antlov and Anna Wetterberg, focuses on the capacity and role of civil society and citizen participation to both deepen democracy and improve the performance of local governments. In analysing developments at the local level in Indonesia, Antlov and Wetterberg argue that CSOs should play a greater role to complement what progressive local leaders and democratic institutions can provide. More effort must go into community and political organizing and into building the capacity of civil society to engage government and re-politicize communities and thereby enhance democracy. The authors use data from the Local Governance Support Program (LGSP) – an effort funded by the United States Agency for International Development to support the expansion of participatory, effective and accountable governance – to highlight where cases of local-level innovation and mobilization have increased trust between local government officials and CSOs, raised standards of accountability and improved service delivery. Experiences from the LGSP seem to suggest that a focus on citizen

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participation can produce positive developmental outcomes. However, the authors state that power relations are integral to political systems and that local governance reforms must target changing these relations.

Power relations can influence the support for and impact of state–citizen interactions, whether in public consultations, Citizen Report Cards or citizen engagement in development planning.

Part IV moves to arguments concerning local government’s role in post-conflict environments and state-building processes. In Chapter 12, “Reconciliation in Cambodia? Decentralization as a post-conflict strategy”, Joakim Öjendal and Kim Sedara investigate popular perceptions of the evolving decentralization reform in Cambodia and the views of elected representatives at commune levels, with the aim of analysing how decentralization reform has influenced post-conflict reconstruction, local democracy and local development. The chapter draws mainly on two large surveys conducted in 2005 and 2008/9, before and after the important elections of 2007 and the national election in 2008, respectively, and on extensive qualitative fieldwork from several locations. The authors tentatively conclude that decentralization appears to have successfully addressed Cambodia’s legacy of war and violence. It has aided political reconstruction with its re-establishment “from below” of a benevolent state presence, its consolidation of peace and its easing of endemic fear.

The reform has opened up the local political space in a relatively benevolent and democratic way and reconnected local government with the central state apparatus. Equally, state legitimacy has benefited from the reform, but it has in no way secured an overall democratization of the country.

In Chapter 13, Anders Sjögren explores “Local politics, civil society and state formation in Uganda”, analysing how state–society relations have played out in one region of the country through looking at two different forms of CSO operating in the health sector. Sjögren outlines the historical development of local politics in the study area, concluding with a discussion of contemporary local politics and state formation. The combination of a decentralized state, civil society and market forces has frequently been claimed to constitute a framework through which ordinary citizens have a political voice. It can improve service delivery and increase political and administrative accountability, especially when contrasted with the perceived failure of centralized states. The case study also shows how an ad hoc regulation of welfare functions and the simultaneous, systematic creation of new institutional linkages deepen the political presence of the central state in local arenas (and lead to situations of potential de facto recentralization, as noted in Chapter 7). Although fragmentation of state authority is visible, in particular in relation to the

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welfare functions of the state, in general a fairly coercive apparatus often characterizes the heavy central-level presence at the local level. Analysis of local-level complexity needs to be complemented by analysis of the patterns of central–local relations, including the way central power holders have developed specific strategies in order to deal with regional power configurations, in combination with the capacity of these regional forces to respond to intervention. This requires an analytical frame that disaggregates both state and civil society (central/local) and ensures that the “presence” or “absence” of the state is discussed in relation to the balance of forces in society at these levels.

The final chapter of the state-building section, “Who won and who lost? The role of local governments in post-conflict recovery” by David Jackson, analyses processes of state-building in Mozambique, Angola, Timor-Leste and Indonesia. For all these four post-conflict countries, local government reforms were mandated as part of the peace settlement.

Jackson starts by outlining a theoretical framework based on different notions of the state idea and the roots of nationalism, a deeper notion than contemporary government policy that serves as a vehicle to keep a country together. Hence, the exclusion of segments of the population from such an idea can lead to conflict. He distinguishes this from what he calls the state system – the collection of state institutions, including at the local level. By using these two analytical categories, Jackson elaborates on the role of local government in the peace process and explores the linkages between local government and the effect of conflict on the state idea. The state system is related to what are often materially based conflicts through its fiscal arrangements and public finance structure, and in his analysis Jackson highlights how the reformulation of a state idea can be an important aspect of the peace process and how strategies vary in different contexts depending on levels of development and their specific history.

Conclusion Through the contributions noted above, this volume is committed to illuminating a broad variety of perspectives on decentralization and local governance. We believe that it will provide wide exposure to cutting edge research on the topic, as well as contribute to the ongoing theoretical debate in the field. In the concluding chapter (Chapter 15), we summarize the chapters in a comparative manner, analysing both similarities and differences. Key themes and findings are then highlighted and translated into a policy-relevant format.

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Note 1. There are different forms of decentralization, including delegation and deconcentration, the latter also sometimes called administrative decentralization. This volume, however, mainly focuses on the more extreme or more pure form of decentralization, called devolution or political/democratic decentralization, which includes a locally elected representative government with decision-making powers, and which thus has a potential direct link with democratization processes. See also section 1.2.

REFERENCES Agrawal, A. and J. Ribot (1999) “Accountability in Decentralization”, Journal of Developing Areas 33: 473–502.

Andersson, K. and E. Ostrom (2008) “Analyzing Decentralized Resource Regimes from a Polycentric Perspective”, Policy Sciences 41(1): 71–93.

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Crook, R. and J. Manor (1998) “Democracy and Decentralization in South Asia and West Africa: Participation, Accountability, and Performance”, Development Dialogue 26(2): 114 –120.

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Grindle, M. S. (2007) Going Local: Decentralization, Democratization, and the Promise of Good Governance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Harriss, J., K. Stokke and O. Törnquist (eds) (2005) Politicising Democracy: The New Local Politics of Democratisation. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Hidayat, S. and H. Antlov (2004) “Decentralization and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia”, in P. Oxhorn, J. S. Tulchin and A. D. Selee (eds) Decentralization, Democratic Governance, and Civil Society in Comparative Perspective. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 266 –294.

Hobsbawm, E. (1992) Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hofman, B. and K. Kaiser (2006) “Decentralization, Democratic Transition and Local Governance in Indonesia”, in P. Bardhan and D. Mookherjee (eds) Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing Countries: A Comparative Perspective. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 81–124.

Huntington, S. P. (1991) The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. New York: University of Oklahoma Press.

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Jørgensen, B. (2006) “Development and ‘The Other Within’: The Culturalisation of the Political Economy of Poverty in the Northern Uplands of Viet Nam”.

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Kim S. and J. Öjendal (2012) “Gender in Local Politics: The Case of Decentralisation Reform in Cambodia”, in Annual Development Review 2011–12. Phnom Penh: CDRI. Lederach, J. P. (1997) Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

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Manor, J. (1999) The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization. Washington, DC: World Bank.

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Manor, J. (2011) “Perspectives on Decentralization”. Working Paper No. 3, International Centre for Local Democracy, Visby, Sweden.

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Ohmae, K. (1996) The End of the Nation-State – The Rise of Regional Economies.

London: HarperCollins. Öjendal, J. (2005) “A New Local State in Cambodia: Decentralization as Political Commodity”, in F. Loh and J. Öjendal (eds) Southeast Asian Responses to Globalization – Restructuring Governance and Deepening Democracy. Copenhagen: NIAS Press. Öjendal, J. and Kim S. (2011) “Real Democratization in Cambodia? An Empirical Review of the Potential of a Decentralization Reform”. Working Paper No. 9, International Centre for Local Democracy, Visby, Sweden.

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Prud’homme, R. (1995) “The Dangers of Decentralization”, The World Bank Research Observer (August): 210 –226.

Prud’homme, R. (2003) “Fiscal Decentralization in Africa: A Framework for Considering Reform”, Public Administration and Development 23.

Prum, S. (2005) “Decentralization and Poverty Reduction in Cambodia: Regional Reformulations”, Modern Asian Studies 38(2): 1–21.

Ribot, J. C. (2011) Choice, Recognition and the Democracy Effects of Decentralization. Working Paper No. 5, International Center for Local Democracy, Visby, Sweden.

Ribot, J. and A. M. Larson (eds) (2004) Democratic Decentralization through a Natural Resource Lens. London and New York: Routledge.

Romeo, L. (2002) “Local Governance Approach to Social Integration and Economic Recovery in Post-Conflict Countries”. Paper presented at the conference “A Local Governance Approach to Post-Conflict Recovery”, New York, 8 October.

Rondinelli, D. A. (2007) “Parallel and Partnership Approaches to Decentralized Governance: Experience in Weak States”, in G. S. Cheema and D. A. Rondinelli (eds) Decentralizing Governance: Emerging Concepts and Practices. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Rondinelli, D. A., J. R. Nellis and G. S. Cheema (1983) “Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience”. World Bank Staff Working Papers No. 581, Washington, DC. Rosanvallon, P. (2011) Democratic Legitimacy: Impartiality, Reflexivity, Proximity.

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Sentama, E. (2009) “Peacebuilding in Post-Genocide Rwanda: The Role of Cooperatives in the Restoration of Interpersonal Relationships”. PhD dissertation, University of Gothenburg.

Shah, A. (ed.) (2006) Local Governance in Developing Countries. Public Sector Governance and Accountability Series. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Shah, A., T. Thompson and H.-F. Zou (2004) “The Impact of Decentralization on Service Delivery, Corruption, Fiscal Management and Growth in Developing and Emerging Market Economies: A Synthesis of Empirical Evidence”. CESifo DICE Report, Washington, DC. Sharma, C. K. (2005) “When Does Decentralization Deliver? The Dilemma of Design”, South Asian Journal of Socio-Political Studies 6(1): 38– 45.

Smith, B. C. (1985) Decentralization: The Territorial Dimension of the State.

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Smoke, P. (2007) “Fiscal Decentralization and Intergovernmental Relations in Developing Countries: Navigating a Viable Path to Reform”, in G. S. Cheema

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and D. Rondinelli (eds) Decentralized Governance: Emerging Concepts and Practices. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Stoker, G. (1996) “Introduction: Normative Theories of Local Government and Democracy”, in D. King and G. Stoker (eds) Rethinking Local Democracy.

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Tilly, C. (1975) The Formation of National States. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Treissman, D. (2007) The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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World Bank (1997) The State in a Changing World. Washington, DC: The World Bank; Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Yilmaz, S., Y. Beris and R. Serrano-Berthet (2010) “Linking Local Government Discretion and Accountability in Decentralization”, Development Policy Review 28(3).

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2 Understanding decentralization: Key issues for successful design James Manor

2.1 Introducing a wide range of issues This chapter mainly considers issues related to decentralization within the public sphere – issues that can be dealt with through design, reform or adaptation within the state structures, both political and administrative. It provides introductory comments on a great many issues, to prepare the ground for the more tightly focused, detailed chapters that follow. It examines what happens within elected bodies at or near the local level in less developed countries, the interactions of elected representatives and bureaucrats at both local and higher levels, how the design of decentralized systems shapes events within them, the roles played by political parties, citizens, user committees, traditional leaders/elites, and much else – and how all of these things influence the performance of decentralized bodies.

This is an exceedingly broad canvas. As a result, some readers will feel frustrated that issues of interest to them have been examined in too little depth. But, in a chapter of this modest length, such problems are inevitable. Deeper analyses of many of these topics appear in later chapters.

Some points in this chapter may also seem painfully familiar to readers who study decentralization.

There is one other potential source of frustration. Many of the issues discussed here are not (or not particularly) susceptible to quantitative analysis. They tend to emerge from qualitative studies, which rely heavily on interviews with knowledgeable informants. But, just because certain The imperative of good local governance: Challenges for the next decade of decentralization, Öjendal and Dellnäs (eds), United Nations University Press, 2013, ISBN 978-92-808-1229-9

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gains or disappointments associated with decentralization cannot be rigorously measured, we should not conclude that they have not occurred.

2.2 Two types of variations 2.2.1 Variations in political and socioeconomic contexts Any general discussion such as this has clear limitations because political and socioeconomic contexts vary enormously across Africa, Asia and Latin America (not to mention central/eastern Europe, which is sometimes included in analyses of the topic).

Consider first the political dimension. Decentralization has occurred within democracies, autocracies and so-called “transitional” cases that stand in between – although the “transitions” may never be completed in many of them (Carothers, 2002). Decentralization has been undertaken both to deepen democratic systems and, within some less open systems, as a substitute for democracy at higher levels. It has been attempted by ruling elites who are confident of their grip on power and by those who feel acutely insecure. It has occurred in countries with both strong and frail political institutions – and it has been undertaken by governments with both formidable and limited capacity to leave an imprint on society, deliver services or promote development. It has happened in polities that are conflict torn and those that are peaceable. Governments that are market oriented have decentralized, but so have those that maintain substantial economic controls. Governments that are enthusiastic about devolving power and those that are hesitant have undertaken it.1 Some governments have decentralized under pressure from international development agencies, but most did so of their own volition, before donors woke up belatedly to a trend that leaders in developing countries had established.

Given all of these variations, it follows that a full understanding of what happens when decentralization occurs in any specific country will require careful study of the distinctive political context. The other chapters in this volume offer rich empirical analyses of the varied contexts that they examine.

Socioeconomic contexts also vary greatly. Decentralization has happened in countries with high, middling and low indices of inequality, and in countries with and without a strong middle class. (Contrary to some arguments from the right, decentralization does not require a middle class in order to work well.) It has occurred in countries where prior land reforms and other redistributive measures have and have not taken place.

(Contrary to some arguments from the left, it does not require such prior

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initiatives in order to work well.) It has been pursued in countries with high, middling and low Human Development Indicators (HDIs). (It can work fairly well in countries where HDIs are low; high scores are not essential.) It has taken place in countries in which civil society is strong or weak (such strength is not a prerequisite for its success). It has occurred in countries that are ethnically diverse or homogeneous, strife torn or quiescent – and in countries where social hierarchies and patriarchies are strong or weak. This list of variations could be longer but, again, studies of specific cases need to consider the distinctive socioeconomic context as well.

2.2.2 Variations in the design of decentralized systems We also encounter significant differences in the ways in which various decentralized systems are structured. Most designs entail a mixture of the three familiar types of decentralization: administrative decentralization (or deconcentration), fiscal decentralization and democratic (political) decentralization (or devolution). But the emphases given to these various elements, the ways in which they interrelate, and the details of how systems are intended to work vary considerably. So do the actions taken by higher-level authorities to implement their plans.

One further comment is in order here. When deconcentration is pursued without the introduction of democratic content into a system, the result tends in practice to be centralization – because this enables highlevel actors to make their influence, and their control, penetrate more effectively downward into arenas at lower levels. Because democratic content is so important and (for the most part) constructive in decentralized systems, this chapter focuses much of its attention on democratic decentralization.

2.3 Making democratic decentralization work well: Requirements and consequences 2.3.1 How to make it work well – the essentials The comments above have identified several things that are not essential prerequisites for the effective functioning of democratic decentralization.

Most of them are helpful but not essential (and a strong middle class may be an advantage or a problem). There are, however, a few things that are essential if it is to work well.

In places where the social order is inequitable in the extreme and where severe exploitation and injustices are widespread – for example, in

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rural areas of Sind province in Pakistan – democratic decentralization is likely to further empower groups that already exercise overweening influence in a brutish manner. There are, however, few areas of the developing world in which inequalities are so extreme that decentralization is a dangerous option.

Second, democratic decentralization cannot work in a small number of extreme cases in which the state lacks even the most minimal capacity to govern or to make its writ run beyond a few urban centres – although, as a recent set of World Bank studies has shown, it can make a constructive impact within fragile states that are less extreme cases than that (Manor, 2007). Decentralization, like capitalism and civil society, needs the state – or a certain kind of state. All three of these things – decentralization, capitalism and civil society – have been seized upon by analysts because they are alternatives to the widely discredited centralized state. But we should not allow this to blind us to their need for the state.

Finally, and crucially, three further things are essential if democratic decentralization is to work well: 1. Substantial powers must be devolved to elected bodies at lower levels.

2. Substantial resources must be devolved to them.

3. Accountability mechanisms must be developed to ensure two kinds of accountability: the horizontal accountability of bureaucrats to elected representatives, and the downward accountability of elected representatives to ordinary people.

If any of these three essentials is absent, the system will fail. If any is present but weak, the system will work less than well. I know of no exception to this set of principles.

2.3.2 When it works well: The promise of democratic decentralization When the essentials are provided in sufficient measure to enable democratic decentralization to work well, it has considerable promise on several fronts. It tends strongly to enhance government responsiveness – in three senses. The speed of responses increases because elected bodies at or near the local level are empowered to make decisions and to act swiftly without waiting for approval from higher authority. The quantity of responses increases because local councils right across the world are more interested in many small projects (basic schools, minor irrigation works, small health dispensaries, etc.) than in a few grand undertakings, which actors at higher levels prefer (universities, large dams, hospitals, etc.). And, most crucially, the quality of responses improves – if we measure “quality” by the degree to which outputs from government conform to local preferences.2

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When it works well, democratic decentralization also enhances information flows between government and ordinary people – mightily, and in both directions. Elected members of local bodies pass much more information up through the system to bureaucrats. Civil servants in Indian states with strong decentralized systems routinely speak of a 10-fold increase. Some of that information is critically important, as when early warnings reach bureaucrats of problems in remote areas that might mushroom into disasters if they were not tackled quickly – droughts, floods, outbreaks of disease, etc. Downward information flows from government to ordinary folk also get better, sometimes with important implications. It is common to find an increase in the uptake of vital health services such as ante- and post-natal care, because elected local councillors are far better able than are health professionals to explain, in terms that ordinary people (their neighbours) can understand, the reasons for attending health clinics where doctors and nurses wear strange clothes and wield intimidating needles. This prevents illnesses and saves lives.

Democratic decentralization also tends strongly to enhance transparency. Even where elites dominate, information about local council proceedings usually reaches many more people than in the days when decisions were taken at higher levels. This sometimes reduces the overall amount of corruption.3 Decentralization always increases the number of people involved in corrupt acts, because it provides so many more with a little power to peddle. But, since processes are more transparent, it is far more difficult for small groups to skim off huge portions of project funds behind closed doors – so that the overall amount of money stolen may decline.

Thanks to greater transparency, at least moderate inroads can be made into absenteeism by local employees of line ministries, a problem that cripples some government health and education programmes across Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. That improves government services at no extra cost to the exchequer.

Democratic decentralization, when it works well, also strongly tends to stimulate civil society. When powers and resources are injected into local arenas, old voluntary associations tend to revive in order to influence decisions over their use, and people form new associations. Popular participation also increases, often substantially, for the same reason. This enhances the “political capacity” of ordinary (and poor) people – a topic that is discussed further in section 2.6.

Democratic decentralization also tends to erode winner-take-all attitudes, which have often wrought havoc across the developing world.

When open processes are introduced, in which a diversity of local groups possess the political leverage to achieve some of their ends, people gain experience of political accommodations that do not allow any winner to

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take all. A recent study of three governments in Brazil, Uganda and central India found that, when powerful leaders strengthened decentralization and took firm action to ensure conformity with democratic rules, local residents first became acquainted with the need for political accommodation and then developed an appreciation for its salutary impact both on development outcomes and on social relations. That occurred even in Uganda, which for decades had been ravaged by conflicts among people who ferociously pursued winner-take-all approaches (Melo et al., 2011).

This list of virtues is not exhaustive,4 but it should be apparent by now that democratic decentralization has promise. But it also has limitations.

The more important of these are examined in later sections of this chapter (see especially sections 2.6 and 2.9.2).

2.4 The importance of “politics” in decentralized systems 2.4.1 “Politics” is inescapable – and desirable The tasks set for this chapter are all linked to two key questions: what happens within decentralized systems, and how do different actors interact with one another? These are helpful because they ask us to focus on politics – if by “politics” we mean the interplay of actors, interests and ideas in the pursuit of power.

Nothing is more fundamental to the working of decentralized systems than politics. When powers and resources are injected into arenas at or near the local level, people there will pursue them. The processes that lead to outcomes are thus saturated with and strongly shaped by politics.

Some political economy approaches to the study of decentralization are narrowly technocratic and regard politics as merely an oddity, a constraint or something to be overcome, contained or even excluded. They are missing the main point, the role played by politics. They are also seeking to achieve goals that are infeasible and perverse. The aim of analysts and designers of decentralized systems should be not to marginalize politics but to embrace it. They should seek to create structures, processes and rules that enable politics to flourish and that channel it into constructive avenues.

It is encouraging to see that important international institutions have come to recognize this. That is apparent from a new initiative at the World Bank to acquaint practitioners there with the importance of politics to decentralization. The opening section of a draft concept paper from that exercise is entitled “The Centrality of Politics”. The opening paragraph includes the following comment, which sets the tone for everything

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that follows: “No matter what the official justification, decentralization is largely driven and continually shaped by politics . . . it is hard to imagine a more intensely political process than decentralization” (Eaton et al., 2009).

2.4.2 Political parties and decentralized systems Consider, by way of illustration, an example of a wrongheaded, futile attempt to exclude politics from decentralized systems. In many countries, the designers of such systems have sought to exclude political parties from elected bodies at lower levels. In some, parties have been formally banned from intruding into these institutions. Such taboos are pointless.

Parties exist to pursue power and, when even limited power is devolved to lower levels, parties naturally attempt to capture some of it. They almost always find ways to get round attempts to exclude them from elected councils at lower levels. I once witnessed a local council election campaign in a town in Bangladesh. Parties were forbidden to take part and the pictorial symbols for national parties printed for illiterates on ballot papers were unavailable. But the two main parties campaigned vigorously nonetheless. One of them, whose usual election symbol is a sailboat, adopted a chair as its symbol and staged a rally in which dozens of people hoisted chairs above their heads to acquaint voters with the surrogate symbol.5 People voted along party lines, and national newspapers reported aggregate figures on the main parties’ performances across the country. This sort of thing is so ubiquitous that it makes no practical sense to try to exclude parties.

Is that bad news, because parties have an undesirable impact on decentralization? Not entirely. Their record is ambiguous rather than discouraging. One charge against parties is that they magnify divisions within elected bodies at lower levels. This sometimes happens, but we need to understand and accept that, even if parties play no role, democratic decentralization (and democracy more generally) almost always intensifies divisions. Indeed, it is supposed to do so. To democratize any political arena is to invite conflict since that is the way that popular preferences come to determine decisions. And democratization also moderates conflict, which occurs according to comparatively polite rules.

Parties sometimes play a role in this process, but they seldom make it much more bitter and destructive than it would otherwise have been – for two main reasons. First, it is unusual for parties to possess the organizational strength to penetrate so effectively into local arenas, especially but not only rural arenas. So they seldom have enough influence there to polarize local communities. There are exceptions to this statement, especially in Latin America, but in most cases parties are seeking to plug into

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local factional or other conflicts in the hope that they may acquire a modest presence in those arenas. They seldom exert transformative influence of any kind. The second point follows from the first. Local residents sometimes have strong attachments to parties, so that abrasive conflict between parties at higher levels inspires the same thing at the local level, but this too is unusual. More often, ordinary people identify only tenuously (or not at all) with parties.

There are also advantages to parties’ involvement in local bodies. A major problem facing elected local representatives in many countries is their inability to get powerful people at higher levels to pay attention and to offer help. If local councillors have party colleagues higher up, they are more likely to get a hearing and some assistance. So parties can enable (or compel) those at higher levels to become more responsive to elected representatives at lower levels – and this often compensates greatly for any polarization that they inspire. These processes tend to be untidy, and this irritates people with a fastidiously technocratic outlook.

But democracy is an inherently untidy affair, and we must learn to live with that. Some of those who want to keep parties out of local bodies actually want to keep politics out too. As we have noted, democratic decentralization (a deeply political process) is actually about bringing politics in. (See also section 2.8.1 on the dangers of technocratic overload.)

2.5 Key themes: Accountability and transparency 2.5.1 Accountability counts for more than transparency, but is more difficult to achieve An extensive recent study of India’s largest poverty programme, much of which is implemented through elected village councils, has concentrated on the transparency mechanisms that have been built into it. These mechanisms are more formidable than those found in any other poverty initiative worldwide, but it has become clear that they have significant limitations. They tend to work well only when they are linked to reliable mechanisms to ensure downward accountability – which is unusual. Accountability plainly matters more than transparency, even though the latter is very important.6 But how might accountability be ensured? In many countries, policymakers have included in systems of democratic decentralization a requirement that elected leaders and members of councils at lower level organize regular and frequent mass meetings of ordinary people at the local level. In some systems, these meetings are empowered to make

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decisions, whereas in others participants merely discuss local issues, question elected representatives and perhaps select beneficiaries of government programmes.

These mechanisms seldom do much to ensure downward accountability, except in a few quite rare cases in which progressive political parties have strong influence over the working of decentralized systems. Elected councillors find it inconvenient and irritating to be questioned by their constituents, so they either report mass meetings that did not take place or they inform only pliable people of such meetings – in order to avoid being held accountable.

There is no easy solution to this problem. In some cases, governments have sought to promote accountability either by organizing social audits themselves or by contracting out the responsibility for holding social audits to civil society organizations. The first approach tends not to work well because government employees are unenthusiastic and ill suited to the task. The second holds more promise, but it is sometimes difficult to find civil society organizations that have the skills and the “reach” (see section 2.9.3) to operate effectively, and governments sometimes contract this job out to people who only purport to have the requisite skills.

Social audits and other similar devices are well worth pursuing,7 but in most places downward accountability will gain substance only when ordinary (and poor) people develop significant “political capacity” (see section 2.6). That may sound like a pious hope but it is clear that, when democratic decentralization works at least tolerably well, non-trivial gains in people’s political capacity are indeed achievable.

2.5.2 Beyond accountability and transparency – positive incentives This discussion should not be confined to transparency and accountability – even though they are immensely important. Certain changes in political systems that do little to enhance transparency and accountability can also help to make democratic decentralization work constructively.

Readers may be familiar with a study of the Brazilian state of Ceará

by Judith Tendler (1997). It has little connection to democratic decentralization, but it is still relevant here. She explained how the government in that underdeveloped state recruited a new corps of employees who worked at and very close to the local level, and whose main task was to facilitate the delivery of important services. Their recruitment was publicized energetically by the government, in a campaign that stressed the importance of their work in human and moral terms. The publicity was intended to generate enthusiasm and expectations among ordinary people. That brought popular pressure on the new employees to perform

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enthusiastically, which is to say that one of its effects was to whet the popular appetite for downward accountability. But Tendler stresses its impact in building high morale and a strong commitment to their tasks among the new recruits. Awards were given to individual recruits who performed especially well – and these were again publicized. The results were quite impressive.

This emphasis on the positive side of government employees’ work differs from the negative sanctions that are usually implied by efforts to encourage downward accountability, but they do not contradict them.

The approach that Tendler describes might be used to supplement other efforts to make democratic decentralization work well.

2.6 A crucial, complex issue: Democratic decentralization and poverty reduction Does democratic decentralization help to reduce poverty? To respond to this question, we must first determine how we define “poverty”. Let us consider two different definitions – one narrowly economistic, and the other broader, which also embraces poor people’s opportunities and capabilities to exercise influence in the public sphere.

The narrower definition sees poverty as a severe shortage of funds, incomes and material assets. There is widespread agreement that, if this definition is used, the record of democratic decentralization is ambiguous at best. Interesting disagreements arise when we consider the degree to which the news is positive or negative – these are questions of degree, not of either/or.

Early studies of the question, including some by me, reached rather pessimistic conclusions. These were in substantial measure justified, as some subsequent studies have shown,8 but, as we shall see presently, the picture is more complicated than it then appeared. I argued in 1999 that democratic decentralization had considerable promise for reducing poverty that arises from inequalities between regions or localities, because many decentralized systems include provisions to redistribute resources from prosperous to poorer areas, and because those systems knitted poor, remote areas into regional or national networks that enabled them to gain greater assistance from higher levels. But decentralization had far less promise in reducing poverty that arises from inequalities within regions or localities – and that is usually the main problem. The principal reason for its lack of promise on the latter front is “elite capture”, the tendency for prosperous groups to gain control of elected bodies at lower levels and thus the resources that they possess (Manor, 1999: 104 – 6).

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Even greater emphasis on the problem of elite capture (which is a far more important factor than the capacity constraints faced by local councils) was given by Richard Crook and A. S. Sverrisson in an influential paper (Crook and Sverrisson, 2001). Much of their evidence was taken from African cases where patron–client networks – a key element in their argument – loom larger than they do in many (though not all) Asian and Latin American systems. A solid recent review of decentralization and poverty in Africa noted that “[i]t is in Africa that the negative impact of decentralization is most evident” (Crawford and Hartmann, 2008: 19). Crook and Sverrisson concluded that democratic decentralization tends to reinforce inequalities unless (as in the Indian state of West Bengal) a progressive political party administers the system from on high. This pessimistic view is echoed in several other impressive analyses, some of which focus mainly on themes other than decentralization.9 In more recent times, it has become apparent (to me at least) that these studies, including my own and some others,10 overstated the problem somewhat – but only somewhat. There are three main points to stress here.

First, in arenas in which a large proportion of the voters are poor (and there are many such arenas), members of elites who need the votes of poor people in order to win control of decentralized bodies have to compete with one another for their support. As poor people gain experience of elections to such bodies, they tend increasingly to insist that elite leaders offer them real substance and not mere promises before they agree to vote for them. If those leaders do not deliver, they often suffer a backlash from poor voters at the next election. This has eased somewhat the danger and the damaging impact of elite capture.11 Second, it is possible for governments to link demand-driven programmes that elicit only demands from poor people to systems of democratic decentralization, to good effect. One telling example of this is the Education Guarantee Scheme in the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh. It gave villages that lacked schools nearby the right to demand and receive schools and teachers drawn from the village. The teachers would be accountable to and paid by the elected village council, and that greatly eased the main problem that afflicts more conventional government schools in India – absenteeism. As a result, examination results from the new basic schools were slightly better than those from older conventional schools. Fully half of the villages in the state (26,000) demanded and got schools and 1.16 million pupils – many of whom would otherwise have received no education – enrolled in them. Only very poor villages demanded schools (Melo et al., 2011: Ch. 3). That programme and others

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like it would not have been possible without elected councils at the local level. Democratic decentralization enabled the poverty reduction that followed from the programme – a role that has seldom been acknowledged in studies of this issue.

Third, governments can make abundant funds for certain programmes available to elected bodies at lower levels on the condition that they ensure that large numbers of poor people benefit from them. A good example occurred under the Cardoso government in Brazil, when funds for schools were released only when large proportions of potential pupils were enrolled (Melo et al., 2011: Ch. 4). These trends justify somewhat more optimism about the impact of democratic decentralization on poverty, narrowly defined. But it is certainly not a panacea, or even a mighty force in the struggle against poverty.

If we adopt a broader definition of “poverty” (as I have partly done already in the discussion above), the picture brightens. Let us view poverty not just as a severe shortage of funds, incomes and assets, but also as a severe shortage of opportunities and of the capacity to operate effectively and to exercise influence in the public sphere – which is to say, political capacity. The term “political capacity” here implies four things: poor people’s political awareness, confidence, skills and connections (to people like themselves and to allies among the non-poor). It is surely appropriate to see a severe shortage of these things as one important dimension of their poverty.

Democratic decentralization provides poor people with opportunities to play at least a minimal and often a not-so-minimal role in the public sphere. Since decisions taken in elected bodies at lower levels affect everyone’s material well-being, popular awareness of politics increases, even among the most disadvantaged. As people who are poor and were previously excluded become actors, often for the first time (even at the margins), they acquire some confidence and political skills. Democratic decentralization tends strongly to inspire collective consultation and group formation and action – because people can see that decisions that occur at or near the grassroots will affect them – so poor people (like everyone else) tend to forge or strengthen connections with one another.

And since decentralization often persuades enlightened civil society organizations to reach into local arenas to assist poor groups, connections with new allies also often develop. These processes enhance the political capacity of the poor and ease the severe shortages of it that have long been one dimension of their poverty. Ambiguities always attend these processes, and the degree to which they occur varies greatly from place to place. But we need to recognize that these things happen, and to give them the attention that they deserve.

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2.7 Key sets of actors in decentralized systems – and interactions between them 2.7.1 Bureaucrats and democratic decentralization: No zero-sum game Bureaucrats (and politicians) at higher levels in political systems often, and understandably, see democratic decentralization as a zero-sum game in which they part with powers and resources and get nothing in return.

They are mistaken, and many eventually come to see this. But it takes time.

This is especially important in ministries that provide important services, and it is there that the greatest gains by bureaucrats occur. To reiterate a point made in section 2.3.2 above, consider the health sector in Cambodia. Civil servants and health professionals had long felt frustrated that doctors and nurses seeking to deliver services in rural areas could not break down suspicions that local residents harboured towards middleclass, urbanized people in white coats with alarming needles and other strange apparatus. Then a field worker from a United Nations agency who worked with both health professionals and elected local councillors persuaded the councillors to explain to local residents the benefits that would occur if they took advantage of things such as ante- and post-natal care. They – unlike the health professionals – could get this message across in language that ordinary folk could grasp. As a result, the uptake of health services increased markedly. Health Ministry officials saw that working through the local councils greatly enhanced their impact, and they became enthusiasts for democratic decentralization.12 Similar things have happened in service delivery agencies in India, Mozambique and other countries (Crook and Manor, 1998: Ch. 2; Kulipossa and Manor, 2007).

And to reiterate once again: where absenteeism among service providers – for example, teachers and health professionals – is a serious problem, service delivery can be enhanced by making providers accountable to elected members of decentralized bodies. The Education Guarantee Scheme in Madhya Pradesh, India, noted above, is a solid example.

By getting the politics right, that initiative produced a substantial improvement in the delivery of education services, which was very welcome within that state’s Education Ministry.

This evidence – and there is more – illustrates that democratic decentralization should not be seen by people high up in government ministries, and by ministry employees working at the local level, as a zero-sum game. They also make compensatory gains.

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2.7.2 Interactions between elected representatives and bureaucrats in decentralized systems This is a difficult topic to discuss because conditions vary so greatly from country to country, but I shall attempt here to cover most of the main points. It will become apparent that much of what happens inside the “black box” of local government is influenced by what happens outside the box, especially at higher levels in political systems.

Levels in political systems The first question to ask is: “At which level(s) do we find elected bodies?”

The answers vary. Most decentralized systems entail elected bodies at or very near the local level. There are some exceptions. In Ghana, for example, elected district assemblies have been created a little higher up, at an intermediate level between the national and the local levels. But that is somewhat unusual.13 More than a few systems entail the creation or empowerment of elected bodies at several levels. When that happens, elected local bodies have elected bodies at higher levels to reach up to for technical and political assistance that is needed (a) to implement complicated projects, (b) to deliver services resources and (c) to enhance their leverage in dealing with bureaucrats at various levels and with elected leaders at the national level.

In other cases, however, no elected bodies exist at intermediate levels.

(In Bangladesh, for example, elected councils at the local level that could once seek assistance from similar bodies at the sub-district level have been on their own since 1992. Successive national governments have promised to create such intermediate bodies, but in 19 years they have not delivered.) When elected local bodies have no elected counterparts at intermediate levels, they face serious problems because they must grapple with bureaucrats at higher levels who are usually unsympathetic or worse. The only elected representatives to whom they can turn are national legislators – and legislators tend strongly to be hostile to elected bodies at any lower level because they perceive them (often mistakenly) as enemies who have been given powers that rightfully belong to legislators. The disadvantages experienced by elected local bodies that cannot reach up to elected bodies at intermediate levels are evident from a study that examines the benefits experienced by local councils in Mozambique when the intermediate (district) level was pried open (Kulipossa and Manor, 2007).

Multiple accountabilities and the need for “balance” The second (and central) question to ask here is: “How do elected members of decentralized bodies interact with bureaucrats in these diverse

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systems?” The answer is complex in the extreme, because systems vary so much. But here I shall attempt to identify the more important elements of an answer (a certain amount of oversimplification is unavoidable).

Elected representatives at or near the local level usually predominate over bureaucrats who work at that level. In some cases, local bureaucrats are manipulated by political actors at higher levels in order to check the power of elected local leaders. For the most part, however, elected local councillors have the upper hand within local arenas. Their problems arise when they must interact with bureaucrats at higher levels, or when the employees of line ministries operate – intermittently or constantly – within local arenas.

Let us consider the second of these issues first. The key question to ask is: “To whom are these line ministry employees accountable?” All too often, they are accountable only upward, to their bureaucratic superiors within their ministries. When that is true, then one of the “essentials” for democratic decentralization to work well – appropriate accountability mechanisms – is absent. When line ministry employees are partly accountable (horizontally) to elected members of local bodies, but mainly accountable (upward) to bureaucratic overseers, that essential element is present but weak. When it is absent, decentralized systems fail. When it is weak, they limp along, working less than well.

In other words, decentralized systems must be designed in ways that create a balance between these two types of accountability – horizontal and upward. After the design phase, the implementation of the policy must be undertaken seriously, lest informal political machinations enable line ministry employees to ignore the requirement that they answer to elected representatives. So there are two dimensions to this problem: one technocratic (the design of decentralized systems) and the other political (implementation).

The need for “balance” here deserves emphasis. If elected members/ leaders of local bodies are given overweening power over the line ministry employees whom they encounter (school teachers, health professionals, agricultural extension workers, etc.), they tend to abuse them. If, however, elected representatives have little leverage over these people – to consider the more common problem – then line ministry employees tend to do as they like. Absenteeism by teachers and health professionals – a massive problem across much of South Asia – is the sort of abuse that ensues.

How might balance be achieved? The best answer is to give significant powers over line ministry employees’ future prospects both to leaders of elected local bodies and to their bureaucratic superiors. This needs to be done in different ways, depending on the diverse processes that exist in various countries, but an example will illustrate the point. In many less

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developed countries – especially but not only in the Commonwealth – an annual report on the performance of every public employee is placed in his or her personnel file. These reports are extremely important in determining their career prospects. One way to foster balanced accountability is to allow both the leader of an elected body at a lower level and an employee’s bureaucratic superior to insert comments on his or her performance during the previous year. This will make the employee feel beholden to both.14 Informal political interventions that strengthen decentralization and promote compliance by bureaucrats Other, more informal political actions may also be undertaken at higher levels to combat the main abuse that arises in these systems: a refusal by line ministry personnel to respond to elected bodies at lower levels. Highlevel leaders may often intervene in the workings of a decentralized system to support elected bodies at lower levels, perhaps because they see them as part of their political base and/or because members of elected bodies lower down serve as their eyes and ears in far-flung arenas, and as agents who can help leaders at the apex of the system tackle problems that arise there. Or leaders of elected bodies at intermediate levels, when they have been given enough power to become formidable figures, may lend support to their counterparts at lower levels because they see them as allies.

Politicians at higher levels may also be persuaded to back elected bodies lower down because they welcome one gain that often occurs when such bodies are empowered: enhanced coordination across development sectors. Consider, for example, elected leaders of councils at the intermediate (and sometimes at the local) level who have been given significant influence over bureaucrats, when work is being planned for (say) a chain of small irrigation channels and ponds. Such leaders often convene meetings that include not just an irrigation official and an engineer but also bureaucrats from the sanitation, fisheries and agriculture departments to contribute to the plan. This is in part an act of vanity, to boost the leaders’ sense of self-importance, but it also tends to produce better development results because the project will benefit from coordinated input from different perspectives. This is attractive to politicians at higher levels who understand that improved development outcomes boost their popularity.

Politicians and even line ministry personnel at higher levels may also conclude that decentralization can help them to deliver services more effectively when they see that elected members of local bodies can explain the rationale for things such as health services to ordinary people at the

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grassroots in language that the latter can understand. If this increases the uptake of vital services – as it often does – then that also has an appeal at higher levels.

Leaders at higher levels sometimes also recognize that elected bodies at lower levels can serve as crucially important instruments in implementing development and/or poverty-reducing initiatives. Consider one enormous example. India’s largest anti-poverty programme, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, mandates that at least 50 per cent of its substantial funds be channelled through elected local councils in the hope that this will promote transparency and accountability.15 Informal political interventions that weaken decentralization and undermine compliance On the other hand, we must recognize that informal political dynamics can undermine the autonomy, power and constructive capacity of elected bodies at lower levels. This can happen in a variety of ways. A few examples are worth noting.

On paper, Ghana’s district assemblies have significant powers to act autonomously and responsively to ordinary people. However, many members of these assemblies are intensely preoccupied with their longterm political prospects, which are largely determined by national leaders at the head of quite centralized parties. So assembly members often do the bidding of their political superiors, even when this undercuts their autonomy and their capacity to respond to constituents.16 On paper, Cambodia’s emerging system of decentralization to provincial, district and local levels again appears to provide autonomy to elected councils at those levels. But candidates for election to them are placed on party lists over which national leaders exercise huge influence, and the ruling party (which currently dominates nearly all councils) is extremely centralized. So, although the means may differ somewhat from those in Ghana, the result is similar.17 Powerful senior leaders who face legal or even constitutional provisions urging or requiring them to devolve powers and resources to elected bodies at low levels may prefer to exercise strong centralized control. They may informally subvert decentralization. In the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu (in power 1995– 2004) refused to devolve the full set of functions to elected councils at lower levels until council leaders threatened self-immolation in front of his residence. He then agreed to devolution but subsequently refused to deliver. He also illegally diverted massive funds from those councils to a pet programme that he controlled, and then tried (illegally again) to postpone fresh council elections until the courts forced him to proceed.

Such “control freakery” is not uncommon.

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When senior politicians wish to undermine democratic decentralization, they can almost always rely on support from legislators, who in almost all countries see it as a threat to their power. That is why the clawing back of powers and resources from decentralized bodies is a widespread problem across the developing world.

One further point is worth stressing. There are certain spheres in which high-level leaders are especially reluctant to decentralize – and especially likely to use informal devices to subvert decentralization when it has been introduced – and in which low-level government employees are especially reluctant to share power with elected members of councils at or near the grassroots. This is common (a) in spheres from which governments extract substantial revenues (logging is a prime example), (b) in spheres from which the private interests and/or government actors extract substantial profits (logging again), and (c) in spheres that are technocratically and/or technologically complex.

2.8 Three issues for designers of decentralized systems 2.8.1 The dangers of technocratic overload Experiments with decentralization are often designed by technocrats, and their insights may be very constructive. But it is important that they not approach their task with excessive zeal, since this can do damage. An example will illustrate the point. When in the late 1990s the South African government set about devising a new set of elected councils at the local level, it gave the task to people who had no knowledge of democratic decentralization in less developed countries. Those designers wanted the best for their country so, instead of considering processes in the Philippines, India or Brazil, they modelled their new system on processes in places such as New Zealand and Scandinavia where the very latest, technocratically advanced approaches were used. The result was a system of daunting complexity. Civil servants in places such as Durban and Cape Town, who were armed with a master’s degree in business administration and state-of-the-art computer facilities, expressed grave doubts about whether they could make the new processes work adequately. And they were certain that their counterparts in more underdeveloped rural areas across South Africa would be defeated by the huge technocratic overload.18 Their fears have been realized. The South Africans have allowed the best to become the enemy of the good.

It is important that designers of decentralized systems understand the need to devise comparatively simple, straightforward processes and that they explain them with great clarity to those who must operationalize

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them. It is especially necessary to ensure that the division of responsibilities between central government and elected bodies at lower levels is spelled out clearly and in detail, lest elected bodies lack the autonomy and discretionary powers that they badly need to function effectively.19 Often (in countries in which rules are actually taken seriously and in which high-level elites do not subvert the devolution of power20) that has a powerful impact on the informal manoeuvring that occurs once a new system is established. The extent to which such systems succeed will be determined by the degree to which the three essentials noted in section 2.3.1 are provided, and not by administrative instruments that delight technocrats but often cripple elected bodies at lower levels. It is necessary to trust elected members of such bodies, even though they do not possess much (or any) technocratic sophistication. That trust is justified by the gains that have ensued from those bodies that have been generously funded and empowered.

2.8.2 Parallel agencies/ bodies and mainstream government institutions We need to consider two kinds of “parallel” structures here. The first consists of special administrative agencies that extend from the national level down to lower levels. Such structures were often created in the 1990s in response to emergencies (conflicts, droughts, etc.), in order to deliver vital goods and services to people on the ground when mainstream government agencies were too ineffective or corrupt to achieve this. Once they were in place, however, these parallel agencies (which contained highquality, well-paid practitioners, many of whom were recruited and thus taken away from mainstream government ministries) tended to live on after the emergencies had passed. The World Bank’s social programmes were a classic example.

In time – especially as anxiety about fragile states took hold – people began to recognize that it was important to strengthen mainstream government institutions in order to make states less fragile. This has caused the earlier enthusiasm for these special administrative agencies to wane, since they diverted funds and talent from mainstream ministries and undermined their capabilities, morale and legitimacy.

Enthusiasm has also waned somewhat for a second type of parallel institution, this time at or near the local level: user committees or stakeholder committees. User committees are usually created to address a single sector, for example water users’ committees, joint forest management committees, health committees. They are thus different from elected councils at lower levels, which are multi-purpose bodies. They usually differ from elected councils in two other ways: they tend strongly to be

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better funded (by line ministries, which usually create them, and/or by donors) and they are often unelected or less reliably elected than are local councils. Line ministries often prefer to work with their own user committees – whose composition and decisions they can more easily control – than with local councils. So we may find well-funded (or even excessively funded) single-sector user committees sitting cheek by jowl with impoverished multi-purpose local councils. Local residents naturally look more to these well-resourced parallel bodies than to cashstarved local councils. As a result, user committees frequently undermine the legitimacy of local councils – which are mainstream government institutions – and damage democratic decentralization.21 As donors and many governments in less developed countries have come to recognize the importance of strengthening mainstream government institutions at all levels, the enthusiasm for user committees has diminished. But they remain a problem, especially but not only in Africa.

2.8.3 Modalities for resourcing elected bodies at lower levels Debate sometimes occurs over the best means of ensuring that elected bodies at lower levels possess sufficient funds. There are two main alternatives, although the two are often mixed. On the one hand, elected bodies may be given revenue-raising powers. On the other, they may receive funds that are devolved from higher levels of government. (The first method is widely used in Africa, and the second is regularly found in Asia.) The debate over these approaches is less important than it may seem, but let us consider the main theme that tends to arise.

It is common to hear that it is better to provide elected bodies with revenue-raising powers because citizens will be more likely to seek to hold elected representatives accountable if they must pay fees and taxes levied by local bodies; and, if funds are devolved, local bodies will be dependent upon a higher authority and thus lack autonomy. These are not trivial issues, but in practice they have less substance than those with a taste for political theory believe.

In the real world, risks and drawbacks attend the first method. Elected members of decentralized bodies tend to be reluctant to impose new or heavy taxes on voters partly because it will make them unpopular, but also (and more admirably) because the ensuing popular discontent may undermine the legitimacy of the elected bodies – especially when they are relatively new and thus fragile institutions, struggling to gain acceptance. The promise of democratic decentralization has limits, but it is great enough to warrant caution about compelling elected bodies to raise most or all of their resources through taxation.

Again in the real world, the devolution of resources to these elected bodies has been shown to work quite well – provided that higher au-

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thorities transfer plentiful or at least adequate funds downward, and that the process is firmly institutionalized and rule bound so that those bodies are not dependent upon the whims of high-level leaders. Some of the strongest decentralized systems in the world rely mainly on this method – for example, the state of Kerala in India. A senior civil servant in another Indian state who headed the Education Ministry once complained to me about seeing a sizeable percentage of aggregate funds automatically lopped off the state government’s budget and passed down to elected councils at lower levels, depriving his ministry of resources it coveted. But then he added that state law required this, and that he knew that democratic decentralization had its uses, even in enabling his ministry to do its job more effectively (see sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2).22 Note also that the devolution of funds can facilitate greater downward accountability to citizens. Consider one telling example. India’s largest anti-poverty programme, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, allows state governments in that federal system to decide how much of the programme’s money should be transferred down to elected local councils – as long as at least 50 per cent of it goes to them. In the state of Madhya Pradesh, senior officials decided to devolve not 50 per cent but 90 per cent of the programme’s very substantial funds. They did so because they believed that the alternative – channelling the money through line ministries – would entail far less accountability in the use of the funds than if local councils managed them. Extensive field research on the working of this scheme in that state indicated that they were correct – there was no downward accountability at all for the funds used by line ministries.23 Finally, it is worth stressing that these debates may themselves cause harm by distracting us from the key point in all of this. To reiterate: the crucial concern here is not the method by which elected bodies acquire financial resources but the quantity of resources that they receive. Either method will enable them to work well if they are generously resourced.

And either method will damage them if, as often happens, they cannot obtain adequate resources. Adequate resources represent one of the three essentials, without which democratic decentralization will struggle or fail. We must not lose sight of that.

2.9 Links between decentralization and other major themes 2.9.1 Decentralization and fiscal indiscipline Some distinguished analysts have expressed anxiety that decentralization may lead to fiscal indiscipline (Prud’homme, 1995; Tanzi, 1996). There

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may be a genuine risk of this when power is decentralized to the regional (provincial or state) level in federal systems. But our concern here is local government, not federalism.

I have seen next to no evidence that decentralization to elected bodies at or near the local level poses a threat to fiscal discipline at the macro level. Nearly all experiments with decentralization to lower levels include quite strict controls over the capacity of elected bodies to borrow and spend. The most common problem that we encounter when we consider the budgets of local bodies is not excessive spending but underfunding – and sometimes excessive controls from higher levels.

So, before opponents of decentralization argue that elected councils at lower levels will threaten fiscal discipline, they should provide evidence that this actually happens. A little possible support for their case emerged in India’s financial press some years ago: suggestions that elected councils in two huge metropolises (Hyderabad and Mumbai) had overspent so much that they had contributed to the yawning fiscal deficit. But that problem, if it was one, has since been addressed by the national leadership. In any case, most of the decentralizing that we are considering here is focused on smaller cities, towns and villages – none of which are in a position to cause much (or any) damage.

2.9.2 Decentralization and economic growth The literature on decentralization has more than its share of bizarre “studies”, but one that stood out was presented by a major international development agency in draft form a decade or so ago. It contained statistics on economic growth in numerous countries and concluded that, because China’s growth was highest, its rather insubstantial exercise in decentralization must be the best.

The main point to stress here is that decentralization tends to have little or no impact – for better or for worse – on a country’s economic growth. We have some evidence from places such as Mozambique that it can help to promote growth within small arenas at or near the grassroots – which is welcome but has no significant impact on macro-systemic growth rates. Decentralization’s virtues (see sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 of this chapter) lie elsewhere.

2.9.3 Civil society and decentralization Before we consider the topic of civil society and decentralization, we need to agree on a neutral definition of “civil society”. Let us view it as a domain that stands between the state and the household that is populated by voluntary associations with a significant degree of autonomy

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from the state. If we define it thus, “civil society” includes not just large, elaborately institutionalized non-governmental organizations reaching down towards the local level from high levels, but also small, rather informal associations that local residents form among themselves. It also includes not just enlightened, progressive organizations but also uncivil organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan and al-Qaeda – plus apolitical organizations such as the Bangalore Music Society. This neutral definition will prevent us from defining out inconvenient associations – a common practice among evangelists for civil society whose analyses are damaged by this trickery.

Democratic decentralization almost always causes civil society at and near the local level to quicken and gain substance. It injects powers and resources into lower-level arenas, where local residents naturally make common cause in efforts to influence decisions about these new powers and resources. Older associations become more active, and new organizations are formed. These local civil society organizations tend to help democratic decentralization to work well – although, in some cases, prosperous people band together in order to achieve “elite capture”. Enlightened organizations from outside local arenas often reach into those arenas in efforts to enhance the capacity of ordinary (and/or socially excluded and poor) people to make the systems work in a genuinely democratic manner. This latter point should not be overstated, since in most less developed countries such civil society organizations have only limited reach – they penetrate only a small minority of localities. For the most part, democratic decentralization and civil society have a mutually enabling and reinforcing impact upon one another.

This is not to say, however, that a strong civil society is essential if democratic decentralization is to work well. It is helpful but not essential.

We have clear evidence from countries where civil society is not remarkable to indicate that decentralized systems can work reasonably well nonetheless.

It is worth adding in passing that some advocates of decentralization are deeply sceptical about civil society. This is surprising because many people who doubt the virtues of centralized states look to both decentralization and civil society as constructive alternatives, since both can promote participation, bottom-up development, and so on. Yet in two large Asian nations – India and Bangladesh – I found that each country’s leading official champion of decentralization had sharp criticisms of civil society organizations. They regarded them as unaccountable, selfrighteous and self-appointed associations that lacked the democratic mandate possessed by elected bodies at lower levels, so that they had no legitimacy. Thus, it is sometimes difficult to construct alliances that include enthusiasts for both decentralization and civil society.

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2.9.4 Traditional rulers, traditionally dominant elites and the problem of “elite capture” I am no authority on the roles played by traditional rulers (that is, chiefs) in decentralized systems in Africa.24 But three points from (mostly unpublished) studies are worth noting.

First, when governments empower local chiefs who are accountable upward to officials and not downward to ordinary people, this is not democratic decentralization.25 Second, the political influence of traditional rulers varies from place to place as we move across Africa. Some parts of Africa have experienced severe turmoil in recent decades whereas others have not, and these different histories carry different implications for traditional rulers (and everyone else).

Third, traditional rulers vary in their attitudes towards democratic decentralization. Some are hostile because elected bodies at lower levels pose a threat to their influence. At least some cooperate constructively with such bodies. A great many more appear to be perplexed by the debates and contestation that occur within elected councils. Those in the majority within these councils are questioned and challenged by the minority. Votes are seldom unanimous. These things pose problems for traditional rulers, who tend to preside over discussions of local issues, remain silent until various ideas have been advanced, and then announce decisions that are expected to be accepted by all. Traditional rulers prefer not to participate in debates, since this exposes them to challenges that they find distasteful and beneath their dignity. The result is often a reluctance to engage with elected councils. And traditional rulers sometimes seek to undercut councils’ influence. Given all of this, it is difficult to design systems that will resonate with the institution of chieftancy.

In India, recent changes have eroded the influence of traditionally dominant elites and eased the problem of “elite capture” (discussed above).26 In villages, where most Indians still live, landowning castes traditionally dominated the public sphere. However, two sets of changes have undermined their power.

First, popular acceptance of the old caste hierarchies has declined markedly in most rural areas. Caste is increasingly coming to denote not hierarchy but difference.27 This makes it difficult or impossible for the traditionally dominant elites to get their way or to remain pre-eminent.

Second, the empowerment of elected local councils since 1993 – which varies in degree from state to state in India’s federal system – has created new power centres that those once-dominant elites find hard to control.

Lower-status groups usually have superior numerical strength, and they are sufficiently sophisticated politically and sufficiently sceptical of the

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old caste hierarchies to refuse to defer to the once-dominant castes. Competition between members of those elite castes for the support of lowerstatus groups also undercuts the former patterns of dominance. (This trend is less strong in other countries, but it has begun to happen there too.) Members of elite castes who enter local politics in an effort to dominate elected councils find themselves challenged, criticized, questioned and sometimes voted out of office. Like traditional leaders in Africa, they find all of this distasteful. In some of the more developed areas of rural India, members of these once-dominant castes are, as a result, opting out of local councils. This leaves the way open for members of lower-status groups to take power in their place.28 One respected scholar has argued that official, elected local councils possess less influence over local decision-making than do informal, unelected, traditional panchayats, which are dominated by landowning castes (Kripa, 2007). This is clearly true in some places, but my field research in two quite different states suggests that it is rather unusual. Most of the evidence from India indicates that the pre-eminence of traditionally dominant elites there has been seriously eroded, not so much because of democratic decentralization but as a result of a prior change in the social sphere: the declining power of caste hierarchies. But that eases the problem of elite capture.

One last comment is essential here. Elected bodies at lower levels are in a position to rival traditional rulers and elites only when they have been given significant powers. In many countries, that has not happened.

So the discussion above has limited relevance.29

2.10 Three words of warning 2.10.1 Beware of extreme arguments One point is worth repeating: we are discussing questions of degree. Arguments that democratic decentralization will solve everything, or nothing, fly in the face of the ambiguities that attend this topic. (The same can be said of arguments about civil society and social capital.) It may seem unnecessary to state this, but there are still some who adopt extreme views, especially on the positive side. One former United Nations official made a habit of offering toasts to democratic decentralization as a force that would sweep away poverty and injustice. Such people believe that they are decentralization’s truest friends, but in reality they imperil it.

They encourage wildly unrealistic expectations that are bound to be dashed when ambiguities arise. That can inspire unjust dismissals of decentralization, which has genuine (but far from overwhelming) promise.

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2.10.2 Do not expect popular pressure from below to trigger or to rescue decentralization We sometimes hear enthusiasts for democratic decentralization say that popular demands from below have triggered, or may in the future trigger, decisions by senior leaders to devolve power to elected bodies at lower levels. Some of them also argue that, once democratic decentralization becomes a reality, popular pressure will prevent actors at higher levels from disempowering those elected bodies. Both arguments are baseless.

In over 60 countries that have experimented with democratic decentralization, evidence has emerged from only one to indicate that pressure from below played any part in triggering decentralization – South Korea – and the argument even there is open to doubt. Nor have highlevel leaders been inhibited by fears of popular resentment from clawing back powers granted to elected bodies at lower levels. Clawbacks are very common, and nowhere have popular protests of any substance arisen.

Decisions to decentralize, and to sustain decentralized systems once they are in place, require – ironically – strong centralized leadership from the apex of political systems. The beneficiaries of decentralization are too widely dispersed to muster much pressure.

2.10.3 Avoid blaming the victim – decentralization We must take great care to avoid a serious and, sadly, quite common error in analyses of democratic decentralization. Decentralization is often blamed for things that are actually the result of governments’ refusal to devolve powers and resources generously to elected bodies at lower levels, which are, let us recall, essential if such systems are to work well.

We often read that such elected local bodies are less effective at service delivery and less responsive than expected but, when we examine the details, it becomes apparent that high-level leaders did not provide them with the powers and the resources to achieve those things.

That is not the fault of those bodies. We must avoid blaming the victim – decentralization – when the real culprit is the opposite: a refusal to decentralize.

2.11 Summing up, with special attention to the design of decentralized systems This chapter ranges so widely that it is impossible to provide a tidy summation, but several key points are worth stressing, especially those that

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may be helpful to people involved in designing systems of democratic decentralization.

Designers of such systems, who need to pay attention to political and socioeconomic contexts, must – above all – ensure that decentralized systems have strong democratic content. This may seem obvious but, in many countries, designers have been far too reluctant to trust elected members of councils at lower levels with significant powers and resources.

If they provide them with too few powers and resources, decentralized systems will not work well and will not provide the benefits that emerge when systems work well.

Decentralized systems that work badly threaten the political interests of politicians and bureaucrats at higher levels because they cause discontent among ordinary people at the grassroots. When such systems work well, they make leaders at higher levels (and their governments) more popular and legitimate in the eyes of ordinary folk. So paradoxically, although democratic decentralization requires senior leaders to give up some powers, the leaders also make valuable political gains.

Some readers may find this reference to the “politics” of decentralization surprising, since technocrats have important roles to play in the design phase of such systems. But we need to recognize that democratic decentralization is all about empowering and creating space for “politics” – democratic, representative politics – to flourish and to influence events at lower levels in political systems. That is why so much of this chapter focuses on political dynamics and not on bureaucratic rules and regulations.

Bureaucrats who are involved in designing decentralized systems must curb their natural tendency to impose complex rules, regulations and controls on elected councils. They must limit these, keep systems and rules clear and simple, and avoid overloading elected councils with onerous technocratic tasks of the kind that have severely damaged South Africa’s local councils. The designers must find ways of creating a balance between lower-level bureaucrats and elected councillors, so that bureaucrats are protected from abusive treatment but elected representatives possess substantial powers to make decisions. They must also restrain themselves from empowering parallel bodies at or near the local level, which bureaucrats tend to control, because this undermines the legitimacy, strength and promise of elected local councils.

In other words, the designers must (to reiterate) trust ordinary people at the grassroots (and their elected representatives, who are also ordinary people) to bring their extensive local knowledge and their constructive energies into play, and to make sensible decisions. The evidence from a great many countries clearly indicates that ordinary people are worth trusting, and that, when elected local leaders perform badly, democratic

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“politics” will tackle the problem because such leaders will be voted out of office. The main solution to poor performance lies in bottom-up “politics”, not in top-down interventions or controls.

Designers of decentralized systems must also avoid unrealistic fears and expectations. They should not worry that democratic decentralization will undermine fiscal discipline. They should not expect it to promote a nation’s economic growth rate, to sweep away poverty and inequality, or to provide more than a modest boost to civil society. Its very considerable virtues, which are discussed in detail in this chapter, lie elsewhere.

Notes 1. We should thus beware of statements that decentralizing initiatives “are invariably aimed at retaining (and even consolidating) their own powers and control over resources” (emphasis added). This comment was made by Gordon Crawford (Crawford and Hartmann, 2008: 107).

2. This can be measured quantitatively through careful surveys. Responsiveness is addressed in great detail in Crook and Manor (1998).

3. See, for example, the chapter on the Indian state of Karnataka in Crook and Manor (1998).

4. For more on this topic, see Chapter 6 of Manor (1999).

5. This occurred in Sherpur, in Bogra District, in 1993.

6. This has emerged from a study by myself and Rob Jenkins of India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, funded by the British Economic and Social Research Council. A book setting out the findings by Rob Jenkins and James Manor entitled Politics and the Right to Work will be published in early 2014 by Hurst and Co. in London, with US and Indian editions appearing simultaneously.

7. For a valuable review of these, see Goetz and Gaventa (2001).

8. See, for example, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000), Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson (2001) and Abraham and Platteau (2004).

9. See, for example, Harriss (2002), especially Chapter 5 and pp. 68–73; and Tendler (1997).

10. See, for example, Vedeld (2003), Jutting et al. (2004), Bossuyt and Gould (2000) and Crawford and Hartmann (2008). Slightly more optimistic arguments are offered in von Braun and Grote (2002).

11. See, in this connection, Rao and Ibanez (2003).

12. Interviews with the United Nations employee in question and Health Ministry officials, Phnom Penh, 12 October 2009.

13. Malawi is similar, but the government there got cold feet after beginning to decentralize and scuttled what might have been an effective system (Chinsinga, 2008).

14. Such arrangements work best when the elected leader who makes entries in the report on annual performance is located at an intermediate (rather than the local) level. Leaders at intermediate levels are more formidable figures than their elected counterparts at the grassroots, and they tend strongly to consult the latter before entering comments in annual reports.

15. The results are mixed, but it is harder to steal money from this Scheme than from any other government programme. These comments are based on extensive field studies by myself and a colleague in two Indian states during 2008 and 2009.

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16. These comments are based on my field research in Ghana in 2007 and 2008.

17. These comments are based on my field research in Cambodia in 2008 and 2009.

18. Interviews with these officials, Durban and Cape Town, August 2000.

19. For more detail, see Agranoff (2004) and Crawford and Hartmann (2008: 14 –15).

20. For more on this, see Blair (2000).

21. For more detail on this, see Manor (2004).

22. Interview with me, Bangalore, 12 August 1998.

23. This is based on my research there in November–December 2008.

24. The literature on this topic is limited, but for useful ideas on Malawi see Chinsinga (2008: 89–90) and Chiweza (2005).

25. This is clear, for example, from a sound study of forestry in the Sahel (Ribot, 1999).

26. Another case that cries out for study is the Philippines, where a serious exercise in democratic decentralization has encountered local bossism. On the latter topic, see Sidel (1999).

27. See, for example, Mayer (1997) and Sheth (1999).

28. This comment is mainly based on unpublished research findings, but the trend is examined in several papers in the May 2012 issue of the New Delhi journal Seminar.

29. It does not, for example, refer to Thailand, where we find bossism akin to that seen in Sidel (1999) on the Philippines because, as Sidel himself has explained, insufficient powers have been devolved there.

REFERENCES Abraham, A. and J. P. Platteau (2004) “Participatory Development: When Culture Creeps”, in V. Rao and M. Walton (eds) Culture and Public Action: A CrossDisciplinary Dialogue on Development Policy. Paolo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

Agranoff, R. (2004) “Autonomy, Devolution and Intergovernmental Relations”, Regional and Federal Studies 1: 26 – 65.

Bardhan, P. and J. Dayton-Johnson (2001) “Unequal Irrigators: Heterogeneity and Commons Management in Large-Scale Multivariate Research”. Working Paper, University of California, Berkeley.

Bardhan, P. and D. Mookherjee (2000) “Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels”, American Economic Review 90(2): 135–139.

Blair, H. (2000) “Participation and Accountability at the Periphery: Democratic Governance in Six Countries”, World Development 28(1): 21–39.

Bossuyt, J. and J. Gould (2000) “Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction: Elaborating the Linkages”. Policy Management Brief No. 12, ECDPM, Maastricht.

Carothers, T. (2002) “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, Journal of Democracy 13(1): 5–21.

Chinsinga, B. (2008) “Decentralization and Poverty Reduction in Malawi – A Critical Reappraisal”, in G. Crawford and C. Hartmann (eds) Decentralization in Africa: A Pathway out of Poverty and Conflict? Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp. 73–106.

Chiweza, A. L. (2005) “The Ambivalent Role of Chiefs in Malawi’s Rural Decentralization Initiatives”. Paper presented at the AEGIS Conference, School of Oriental and African Studies, London.

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Crawford, G. and C. Hartmann (eds) (2008) Decentralization in Africa: A Pathway out of Poverty and Conflict? Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Crook, R. and J. Manor (1998) Democracy and Decentralization in South Asia and West Africa: Participation, Accountability and Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Crook, R. and A. S. Sverrisson (2001) “Decentralisation and Poverty-Alleviation in Developing Countries: A Comparative Analysis or, Is West Bengal Unique?”

IDS Working Paper 130, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton.

Eaton, K., K. Kaiser and P. Smoke (2009) “The Political Economy of Decentralization Reforms in Developing Countries: A Development Partner Perspective”. Draft, 24 September.

Goetz, A. M. and J. Gaventa (2001) “Bringing Citizen Voice and Client Focus into Service Delivery”. IDS Working Paper 138, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton.

Harriss, J. (2002) Depoliticizing Development: The World Bank and Social Capital.

London: Anthem Press.

Jutting, J., E. Corsi and A. Stockmayer (2004) Decentralization and Poverty Reduction in Developing Countries. OECD Development Centre Working Paper No. 236. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Kripa, A. P. (2007) “Rivalry or Synergy? Formal and Informal Local Governance in Rural India”, Development and Change 38(3): 401– 421.

Kulipossa, F. and J. Manor (2007) “Decentralized District Planning and Finance in Mozambique”, in J. Manor (ed.) Aid That Works: Successful Development in Fragile States. Washington, DC: The World Bank, pp. 173–198.

Manor, J. (1999) The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Manor, J. (2004) “ ‘User Committees’: A Potentially Damaging New Wave of Decentralisation?”, European Journal of Development Research 16(1).

Manor, J. (ed.) (2007) Aid That Works: Successful Development in Fragile States.

Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Mayer, A. (1997) “Caste in an Indian Village: Change and Continuity, 1954 –1992”, in C. J. Fuller (ed.) Caste Today. Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 32– 64.

Melo, M., N. Ng’ethe and J. Manor (2011) Against the Odds: Politicians, Institutions and the Struggle against Poverty. London/New York: Hurst/Columbia University Press.

Prud’homme, R. (1995) “The Dangers of Decentralization”, World Bank Research Observer (August): 210 –226.

Rao, V. and A. M. Ibanez (2003) “The Social Impact of Social Funds in Jamaica: A Mixed-Methods Analysis of Participation, Targeting and Collective Action in Community Driven Development”. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2970, Washington, DC. Ribot, J. (1999) “Decentralization, Participation and Accountability in Sahelian Forestry: Legal Instruments of Political-Administrative Control”, Africa 69(1): 23– 65.

Sheth, D. L. (1999) “Secularisation of Caste and Making of New Middle Class”, Economic & Political Weekly 34: 2502–2510.

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Sidel, J. (1999) Capital, Coercion and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Tanzi, V. (1996) “Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization: A Review of Some Efficiency and Macroeconomic Aspects”, in Proceedings of the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Tendler, J. (1997) Good Government in the Tropics. Baltimore, MD, and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Vedeld, T. (2003) “Democratic Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction: Exploring the Linkages”, Forum for Development Studies, No. 2: 159–204.

Von Braun, J. and U. Grote (2002) “Does Decentralization Serve the Poor?”, in E. Ahman and V. Tanzi (eds) Managing Fiscal Decentralization. London: Routledge, pp. 68–95.

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3 Decentralizing for development: The developmental potential of local autonomy and the limits of politics-driven decentralization reforms Leonardo G. Romeo

3.1 Decentralization, good-enough governance and the developmental state Over the last two decades, democratic decentralization has been a key component of the “good governance” agenda and a common presence in the long list of reforms and related guiding principles that shape such agendas of the international community (Commission of the European Communities, 2001; UNDP, 1997, 2002; World Bank and International Monetary Fund, 2006; see also Graham et al., 2003; Hyden et al., 2004).

Relatively less emphasis has been put on decentralization as part of the simultaneously re-emerging “developmental state” agenda.

Yet decentralization is very much about state reform. It is ultimately about rethinking the scope and modalities of state action to promote development. As Weimer (2009: 47) puts it, the discourse on decentralization of political and administrative and developmental functions has substituted the former discourse on building the nation state. Decentralization is viewed . . . as part of building a more viable, balanced etc. state which can deliver goods and services and contribute to wealth creation (or “poverty reduction”). This reality is difficult to undo.

Hence, I argue, a discussion of decentralization reforms should start with the recognition of the instrumentality of decentralization with respect to development. This may also help us understand better the possible scope and modalities for external aid to decentralization reforms.

The imperative of good local governance: Challenges for the next decade of decentralization, Öjendal and Dellnäs (eds), United Nations University Press, 2013, ISBN 978-92-808-1229-9

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Actually, a sharper focus on the instrumentality of decentralization for development and the emergence of a developmental state is akin to adopting the “good-enough governance” approach suggested by Grindle (2004), as opposed to a more comprehensive and normative “good governance” agenda, when discussing decentralization reforms and related external aid. Reform champions and their development partners could design, assess and support decentralization reforms with reference not to the prescriptions of political, administrative and fiscal decentralization theory as regards content and sequencing, but to the criterion of the contribution that specific features of country-specific decentralization efforts may, or may not, make to the country’s social and economic development.

By adopting an instrumental view of decentralization reforms we can move the discussion from within the box of the “pure” good governance agenda to a more open examination of their contribution to building developmental states. As Fritz and Rocha Menocal (2006: 6 –7) note, “the good enough governance agenda is more readily reconcilable with the developmental state idea than the pure good governance agenda. This is so because both the developmental states concept and the good enough governance agenda share a more instrumental and selective understanding of governance as a tool to achieve development.”

If, following a good-enough governance approach, we must come to a “more instrumental and selective” understanding of decentralization with respect to development, the next question is obviously: what exactly is this understanding? How can the good-enough governance agenda be operationalized when it comes to decentralization? More explicitly: what features of the decentralization process, in terms of both substance and sequence, are more critically and directly supportive of the developmental state project? And how should external aid be deployed to support the design and implementation of development-driven decentralization reforms?

Answers to these questions can only be country specific but, as I argue below, they might have to be based on three key premises: (i) a better understanding of the political drivers of the reforms, (ii) a focus on local development and an appreciation of the role of local autonomy to promote it and (iii) a greater attention to the demand side of the reform process and the role of local leadership.

Recently, the importance of understanding the political economy of the decentralization reforms in any given country has been highlighted as critical to identify the actual political drivers and scope of the reforms. Indeed, understanding the politics of decentralization is critical because real-world decentralization reforms are driven by politics, not by development policy. But the task cannot be limited to illuminating how

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political objectives and power relations may either lead to successful reforms that build developmental local government systems or generate incomplete, unsustainable and easily reversible reform processes.

To be utilizable for policy dialogue and aid programming within a good-enough governance framework, insights into why politically driven decentralization reforms result in a particular sub-national system of governance and public administration must be accompanied by an assessment of how such a system actually may contribute to open or closed spaces for state–society interaction and to promote or impede local development, and what potentially effective engagement strategies might be devised by aid agencies under such conditions. Assessing and supporting decentralization reforms by adopting a good-enough governance approach means focusing on how reforms may support social and economic development, even if they do not necessarily conform to the content and sequencing prescribed by normative (political, administrative and fiscal) decentralization theory. By keeping an eye on the development prize, domestic reformers and their external supporters may devise paths to reform that accept intermediary, less than optimal, sub-national arrangements but still support a cycle in which good-enough governance leads to development and this in turn opens space to further improve governance systems and practices.

As already hinted, to engage in a viable and sustainable path to reform that leads to actual development, not just governance improvements, domestic reform champions and their external partners may require three basic ingredients: first, a deeper understanding of the political drivers of the reforms; second, a substantive focus on creating space for autonomous action by sub-national governments to promote local development; and, third, support for the emergence of a stronger social demand for the reforms. Much attention has been given recently to the first ingredient by a growing strand of the literature (Eaton et al., 2010; Fritz et al., 2009), which stresses how important it is to understand both the political rationales that shape the design of the reforms and the bureaucratic politics that affect the extent and modalities of their implementation. Here I attempt to complement this welcome new emphasis on understanding the political economy of decentralization with a proper appreciation of the remaining two ingredients required for effective engagement with developmental decentralization reforms.

With respect to the first – the developmental orientation of the reforms – I argue that this requires a better understanding of the two pillars on which the relationship between decentralization and development stands: a proper conceptualization of the “local” in local development, and an appreciation of the centrality, scope and limitations of local autonomy.

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Such understanding is critical for developing a “local development through local governments” perspective that could guide reform champions and their external partners and help them advocate developmentdriven decentralization reforms, while they “muddle through” the actual reform process, inevitably driven by politics.

With respect to the second – the strengthening of social demand for the reforms – I suggest that more attention (and external support) should be given to turning local governments from “objects” into “subjects” of the reform process, ensuring that reforms inevitably led “from above” are also shaped by a push “from below” and subject to related social pressure and control mechanisms. This brings under sharper focus the role of leadership in local governments and raises the critical issue of the political autonomy of their associations and their ability to both lobby for genuine decentralization and build capacity among their members.

3.2 The “local” in local development The starting point is to understand “local” development. Clearly, it is not just development that happens locally (as all development ultimately does), but rather development that leverages the comparative and competitive advantages of localities and mobilizes their specific physical, economic, cultural, social and political resources. Put differently, in the expression “local development”, the adjective “local” refers not to the “where” but to the “who” and the “how” of development promotion. It refers to the actors who promote it and the resources they bring to bear on it. Development is local if it is endogenous, open and incremental, that is, if it makes use of locality-specific resources, combines them with national/global resources and brings them to bear on the national development effort as an additional benefit in a positive-sum game.

The promotion of local development is gaining a broader appeal as a development strategy for both developed and developing countries as they compete in the global economy. In the last decade, an important body of literature, mostly European, has highlighted how, in a global economic environment, territorial contexts, with the specificity of their material and non-material resources and the quality of their governance, may become essential factors for global competition. Importantly, most of these contributions de-emphasize geographical and historical determinisms, and stress the role of autonomous political initiative in both mobilizing local resources and producing collective goods that generate local external economies for endogenous development. This has led, among other initiatives, to experimentation with “territorial development pacts”

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(ECOTEC, 2002) in member countries of the European Union (EU) and, importantly, to the emergence of an area of practice (still in its infancy) dedicated to “territorial development” in EU development aid.

In developing countries, understanding the promotion of local development as an endogenous yet open process, for which the local government takes primary responsibility and mobilizes local resources, and which is both complementary and supplementary to national development efforts, is critical from both an analytical and programmatic point of view for both domestic reform champions and their external partners. To reform champions, such understanding may provide stronger arguments in their dialogue with national finance and planning authorities, because they can point to the incremental character of genuinely local development that relies on the mobilization of additional private and community resources, and to its potential for economic diversification and reduction of regional disparities. These benefits would be over and above those conventionally expected from decentralization reforms as efficiency gains in the management of national public sector resources.

To development partners, the concept of local development provides an analytical perspective for a better understanding of the actual drivers and impacts of decentralization reforms. In fact it provides a standpoint from which to assess whether the reforms (i) open or close space for the emergence of a development-minded local political leadership, (ii) create or destroy opportunities for local social capital and other local resources mobilization and leverage and (iii) actually do or do not empower local authorities to make an additional contribution to national development and poverty reduction efforts.

But, for all its promises, the promotion of local development is far from being a priority for most decentralizing states. The very concept is also often missing in much of the policy debate and externally funded programmes supporting decentralization reforms. Instead, generic views of local development as development that happens locally have continued to prevail, missing the difference that it could make and neglecting the comparative advantages of local authorities to promote it. This has led to all sorts of domestic initiatives and externally supported programmes that, under the label of decentralization reforms and local development promotion, actually aim at extending the central administration action in the periphery and not at empowering democratic and developmental local authorities. This state of affairs is rooted in the difficulty of defining (and reluctance to promote) local autonomy as a critical feature of genuine decentralization. The result has been the multiple cases of “decentralization without autonomy”, observable worldwide and particularly in Asia and Africa, that, in spite of the developmental rhetoric associated with them, are bound to have little impact on local development.

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Before moving to a discussion of local autonomy, however, the definition of local development as the incremental impact on national development that autonomous local governments may generate through the mobilization and open combination of a wide range of local and non-local resources must be complemented with a quick reminder that such a definition has long been associated in the literature with the valuation of local social capital and local political institutions as the two localityspecific resources of greatest importance. Indeed, their presence, their quality and the way in which they interact may well determine the way in which all other local and non-local resources (human, physical and financial) may be developed, mobilized and combined to pursue specific local development strategies.

3.2.1 Local development and social capital There is a considerable body of literature on the often-abused concept of social capital and its importance for local development. Of particular relevance are those contributions that adopt a structural (as opposed to cultural) definition of social capital and see it more as the product of effective social networks – that is, networks of social relations that facilitate economic exchanges – than as a generic endowment of common cultural norms of trust and cooperation, important as those may be (Trigilia, 2001).

Equally relevant and important are those contributions that stress the dynamic nature of social capital and its constructability through interaction with the political institutions of national and especially local governments (Evans, 1996; Fox, 1996; Warner, 2001). Recognizing that the relation of social capital to local development is not always unambiguously positive, a focus on the interaction between local political institutions and social capital is critical to understanding under what conditions social capital can be a powerful factor in local development or lead to elite capture, collusion, corruption and even criminal economies (Trigilia, 2001).

Finally, necessary as it might be for the prospects of genuinely local development, local social capital is certainly not sufficient, and the tendency to overload the concept should be resisted. As just mentioned, the activation and build-up of social capital depend on local politics and political leadership but it obviously cannot replace the human, physical and financial resources (of local and non-local origin) required by a local development project. What needs to be stressed, however, is that social capital can provide the key for mobilizing and combining those other resources, and the potential of social networks to facilitate local development should be recognized and enabled by national

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policy and activated and expanded by development-minded local political leaders.

Understanding the importance of social capital for endogenous local development and adopting a decentralized national development strategy centred on the promotion of local development are therefore critical to building developmental states through modernization approaches that do not negate, but positively engage with traditional local socio-political formations (Romeo and El Mensi, 2011). In countries confronted with the basic challenge of state-building, putting local development at the centre of national development strategies and making it the driver of decentralization reforms might actually go a long way to capture the potential for trust and cooperation of traditional socio-political formations and turn them into effective social networks that facilitate local development.

Eventually, this will trigger simultaneous processes of social transformation and political development and contribute to the extension and consolidation of the state at the periphery.

3.2.2 Local development and local political institutions Local authorities are not the only actors in the local space, and often they are not even the most important or powerful ones. But, when it comes to promoting local development, they are increasingly recognized as “the principal legitimate agent of the local development process” (ACPLGP, n.d.: 1). The potential for local governments, among many agents operating in the local space, to take centre stage, assume primary responsibility for the promotion of local development and become an important channel of international aid has long been recognized, if not much realized (UCLG, 2008).

Brugmann (1994) summarizes local governments’ comparative advantages with respect to other public, non-governmental and private agents.

They include: (i) a very broad mandate, enabling the comprehensive multi-sector planning and action often required by local development challenges, (ii) a unique legitimacy to play a facilitative role and achieve consensus among different institutional actors and interest groups, (iii) unique regulatory powers, allowing them to enforce local action, (iv) a unique ability to be sensitive to local conditions and local social pressures and (v) a greater degree of institutional stability, which allows them to survive and continue to face local development challenges, in the midst of ongoing and broader political, economic and social changes.

To these potential comparative advantages of local governments in promoting local development, one should add those posited by much of the economic literature on decentralization. They include the potential to realize, through participatory planning and budgeting practices, signifi-

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cant allocative and productive efficiency gains in the use of public resources and implementation of both national and local programmes, and, just as importantly, the potential to leverage additional resources for local development through improved state–society interactions and strategic alliances with local community and private sector organizations.

With respect to the latter argument, the critical role that local governments may play in the production of collective goods that generate external economies for local productive or service delivery activities undertaken by private and collective actors is also often highlighted.

Whether or not these comparative advantages are actually realized or are negated by political factors (lack of effective leadership, corruption, elite capture and the local extension of neo-patrimonial regimes) and/or institutional weaknesses (dysfunctional organization, low levels of administrative capacity, inadequate planning procedures) remains an open and empirical question. The answers depend on the context, on the countryspecific and even locality-specific conditions (see, further, the empirical chapters of this volume).

3.3 Decentralization and local autonomy Having characterized local development and its relation to the mobilization of local social capital, as well as the key role of democratic local authorities in promoting it, we can return to the issue of how decentralization reforms can be instrumental in promoting it. Here one needs to understand how, in any particular country context, the key issue of balancing autonomy and accountability in local government is addressed and resolved both de jure and de facto in legal frameworks and the actual practice of intergovernmental relations.

Genuine local governments are bound to operate in a dual mode. On the one hand, they act as agents of the central state in their jurisdictions and, in the process, they may bring their comparative advantages to bear on the efficient design and implementation of central policies and programmes in the localities. On the other hand, they act as agents of a local political constituency and should be able to develop and implement their own policies and programmes in direct response to the needs and priorities of the local polity. In both cases, the developmental difference that local governments can make is directly related to the degree of autonomy they enjoy. Whether the task is to “localize” national goals and programmes or to develop and implement complementary local development strategies, what makes it possible to realize any locally “added value” with respect to centrally managed national development efforts is ultimately the real extent of local governments’ autonomy.

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Using a definition of local autonomy as a combination of powers of initiative and immunity from higher-level controls (Clark, 1984),1 we can look deeper into the conditions for local development and assess the extent to which decentralization reforms are driven by, or conducive to, local development. Reforms can then be evaluated in terms of the extent to which they grant to local governments (i) powers to initiate actions and regulate in the interests of their own constituencies, as well as (ii) a degree of immunity from the authority of higher tiers of the state with respect to opportunity choices and implementation modalities. The former defines what local governments can do, the latter defines how they can do it. The narrower the scope of what local governments can do, and the stricter the definition and control by higher-level authorities of how they should do it, the less the potential of decentralization reforms to promote genuinely local development and the closer they get to a zerosum game. Increasing both the powers of initiative and the level of immunity of local governments is therefore central to any decentralization reform, if this must be driven by a local development goal.

The “powers of initiative” dimension of local autonomy refers to local governments’ discretion in terms of service delivery and development promotion functions and related regulatory powers. Here a critical distinction is between (i) the “general mandate” of local authorities, that is, their responsibility to do whatever is in their power to improve the welfare of their communities, as long they operate within the national law and the only limitation being the resources available to them, and (ii) the “specific functions and regulatory powers” for administrative and developmental services delivery assigned to local authorities by national legislation and regulations.

The problem with many decentralization reform processes in developing countries is that the general mandate is rarely recognized and supported as space open to autonomous local action. Even when it is inscribed in legislation, local authorities are not encouraged to translate it into service delivery and development promotion initiatives of their own choices, which they could implement by mobilizing local resources through a closer state–society interaction. As for specific functions, these may never actually be assigned or reassigned, because of either bureaucratic resistances or macro concerns about the fiscal neutrality of the reassignment or, most commonly, both.

In what appears to me a narrow understanding of fiscal decentralization, the scope of local governments’ action remains conceptually framed exclusively in terms of specific functions (permissive or mandatory) to be assigned by national legislation. As a consequence, local governments are actually discouraged from assuming functions that are not, or may not be, formally assigned, either because they simply cannot be defined before

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and outside of a more intense interaction between the local state and the local society (for example, new types of locally relevant and prioritized social or economic services) or because nobody could tell who in the central administration should reassign such functions and what that actually means (a case in point is the responsibility for promotion of local economic development).

Here the absence of a national local development policy to drive the reforms (see below) and the macro concerns about the fiscal neutrality of decentralization combine to create the common situation of local authorities paralysed both by a misunderstood and grossly unfunded general mandate and by the lack of specific functions and related resources. The results are much constrained powers of initiative and eventually the inability to promote endogenous, open and incremental local development.

Distinguishing the general mandate from specific functions and upholding the first, even in the absence of the second, is therefore a necessary condition for decentralization reforms to promote local development.

This condition is altogether missing in countries where local authorities are not understood as having a general developmental mandate for the welfare of their constituencies, but are rather strictly conceived as agencies specialized in the delivery of a closed set of services (commonly a more or less expanded set of traditional municipal infrastructure and services).2 On the other hand, essential as it is, the distinction between general mandate and specific functions carries a major risk. Local authorities enabled to exercise their general mandate but without assigned specific functions may end up being marginalized from the core state business of public services delivery. Their role may be limited to that of providers of small-scale capital projects, with no chance to influence, and contribute to, the larger reform of the state. This is precisely the result of most of the politics-driven, incomplete decentralization reform processes implemented in many countries in the last two decades.

But even when specific functions and related resources are assigned, and authority is given de jure to local governments to develop their own initiatives, the lack of any degree of immunity from central controls can dramatically constrain the de facto ability of local governments to promote local development. This is indeed what happens when the recognition of the powers of initiative dimension of local autonomy and the enlargement of the scope of local governments’ action end up being negated, often in the name of “capacity-building” imperatives, by strict and pervasive controls and the proliferation of centrally imposed procedural guidelines and manuals that regulate how local governments should behave and make every decision they take subject to review, modification or outright dismissal by higher tiers. This ultimately frustrates local

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initiative because, no matter how large the scope of their action (their powers of initiative), local governments are eventually forced to behave just as agents of the central administration.

Clearly, given the dual mode of local governments’ operation, a balance must be found between autonomy and agency. And the first and most general terrain where both the necessity and the difficulty of reconciling autonomy and agency come to light is that of sub-national (decentralized) planning.

The establishment and regulation of decentralized planning is a common feature of the early stages of the decentralization reform process in most decentralizing countries. As new sub-national authorities legally empowered with at least a degree of autonomy in policy-making are established, decentralized planning procedures are also introduced and regulated, often with simultaneous changes in sub-national financial arrangements, which make available a modicum of resources for local programming. A closer examination of these decentralized planning systems, however, often shows that they are mostly aimed at aligning regional or local authorities with national (and even international) goals, rather than stimulating their autonomous policy-making.

Regional and local planning are actually confused with “regionalization” and “localization” of national plans, goals and targets, and the scope for local authorities to take advantage of local opportunities and mobilize local resources remains restricted and unexplored, ultimately contradicting an important rationale of genuine decentralized planning.3 An uncomfortable thought in this respect is that mechanistic implementation of donor-supported efforts to localize the Millennium Development Goals (that is, localizing national objectives and targets derived from global commitments) might unintentionally contribute to undermine local autonomy and prevent the emergence of genuinely local planning systems.

Autonomy of local councils and the scope of their action to promote genuine local development therefore depend on both the extent of their mandate and the way in which their accountability to the state is structured. Unfortunately for so many local authorities throughout the developing world, accountability to the state (or rather to the “big men” who run the state) is the only accountability that matters and there is a total lack of immunity from central controls.

But two other types of accountability define the extent to which local governments may be able to deliver genuine local development. The first is the accountability of the local elected bodies to their own constituencies, which obviously shapes their responsiveness to local priorities and legitimizes their attempts to mobilize local resources. The second and critical one is the accountability of local executives and administrations

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to local councils, without which any autonomy of local authorities in policy-making ends up being neutered by lack of effective control over the policy implementation process. Again, in many countries this accountability is extremely weak and, no matter what the de jure powers of local authorities, the de facto implementation of their policies remains substantially constrained by a non-accountable local administration.

Therefore, besides rebalancing the upwards and downwards accountability arrangements towards the state and its citizens, perhaps the most important factor for the development of autonomous and developmental local governments remains the establishment of strong mechanisms of horizontal accountability of local administrations to democratically elected councils.

3.3.1 The potential developmental impact of local governments’ autonomy If local autonomy is a precondition, what is the actual scope for autonomous action by local governments with respect to local development?

The literature on local governments’ autonomy is extensive (see Pratchett, 2004, for an overview) but the potential developmental impact of autonomous local government action has received limited conceptual and empirical research attention. An exception is the early study of US and UK local government systems by Wolman and Goldsmith (1990).

The study explicitly aims at assessing whether, and in what way, the autonomy of local governments can make a developmental difference. It asks: “Do local governments . . . have autonomy in the sense that their presence and activities have independent impacts on anything important?” (1990: 3). The study concludes that the autonomy of local governments has varying but potentially significant impacts on the welfare of local people, because it can affect their economic status and their access to services as well as other dimensions of welfare, including a healthy environment, personal safety and social interaction. The size of this effect depends on both the amount of discretionary resources that local authorities can mobilize and the legal and regulatory environment within which they operate. Indeed, the potential impact of local autonomy on local development varies depending on whether local governments are concerned with the delivery of infrastructure and services or with the promotion of local economic development. An assessment of this potential requires a detailed unpacking of services delivery and local development promotion processes.

As regards infrastructure and services delivery, autonomy is critical to enable local governments to reach out to local society, including private sector and voluntary and community organizations, and increasingly to

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develop forms of co-provision and co-production and to mobilize local resources accordingly. Equally important is local autonomy to structure forms of intergovernmental cooperation, which more and more appears as the most appropriate arrangement for the delivery of a broad range of local infrastructure and services.

A focus on local autonomy provides a new perspective on the process of functional reassignments, which remains a critical component of the fiscal decentralization agenda. If local autonomy is adequately protected (and related accountability obligations defined), the debate on functional reassignments could productively shift from the elusive search for the optimum distribution of infrastructure and services delivery responsibilities across levels of government to the design of mechanisms for intergovernmental cooperation and enhanced state–society interaction that effectively deliver the local development objective of the reforms.

With respect to intergovernmental cooperation, particularly at the outset of the reform process, greater attention should be given to contractual delegation arrangements between the state and local authorities (as opposed to outright devolution), as long as these arrangements come with the margins of autonomy (in terms of both the power of initiative and freedom from controls) that local authorities may need to make a positive difference with respect to centralized delivery.

The scope and opportunities for contractual delegation, as entry-points in the functional reassignment process to help build local governments’ capacity for service delivery, might not have been sufficiently valued and explored in many decentralizing countries. One possible reason is that the greatest obstacle is often not, as one would expect, the initial low capacity of the local authorities to assume delegated responsibilities, but the low capacity of the delegating authorities (ministries and other central agencies) to properly structure, support and oversee the delegation contracts and to open the space for local autonomous decisions, which ultimately may produce the expected efficiency gains of functional delegations.

Besides allowing for more effective intergovernmental cooperation, a focus on local autonomy would enable greater interaction with local society, the promotion of active citizenship and the mobilization of local resources for local services delivery. An emerging concept, with potentially important applications in many local contexts in developing countries, is that of local service delivery partnerships: voluntary agreements between local authorities, other services providers (in the public, nongovernmental or private sector) and communities of service users (see Communities and Local Government, 2008). Local autonomy is vital to allow the negotiation of the respective rights and obligations and the structuring of these partnerships, which cannot be imposed unilaterally

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and cannot be reduced to just a technical contract between service providers, because they require that local people become actively involved in the service delivery process and hold other service providers to account.

However, it is with respect to the promotion of local economic development that the greatest potential, and in some cases the least resistance from central administrations, exists for action by autonomous local governments to mobilize and combine local resources, develop and implement innovative strategies and generate real additional support to national development efforts. Yet it is also in this area that the limitations of politically driven decentralization reforms become more apparent as states embarking on decentralization reforms fail to simultaneously adopt, fund and implement a national policy for local development that could provide the incentives and the support essential for unleashing local initiatives.

3.4 The importance of a national local development policy As stated by the United Nations Capital Development Fund, a UN agency that has been very active in supporting decentralization reforms and local development over the last two decades, “[d]ecentralization reforms are not a substitute for an explicit, deliberate strategy for local development” (UNCDF, 2011). Ideally, a local development policy should be the key driver of decentralization reforms and contribute to determining how the sub-national system of governance and public administration should actually change. Importantly, this policy should be recognized as an essential component of the national economic policy, as important as the macroeconomic stabilization or industrial relations policies (Trigilia, 2001). It is not a local choice but a national choice to allow local governments to use their potential and thereby contribute to development at the macro level. This cannot be left to localities; it must be promoted politically and sustained technically by committed central authorities (see Manor’s argument in Chapter 2 of this volume on the necessity of a strong centre for sound decentralization). Developing explicit national policies for local development and making them drive the design and implementation of decentralization reforms should therefore be seen as the central challenge for, and the terrain for intense policy dialogue between, the governments of decentralizing developing countries and their development partners.

The two basic principles on which a national local development policy would rest are the ones I have mentioned above: (i) recognizing local development as an endogenous, open and incremental process whose critical precondition is a substantial degree of local autonomy, and (ii) valuing

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local governments as indeed “the principal legitimate agent of the local development process” (ACPLGP, n.d.). Admittedly, adopting these principles requires a shift of perspective that has proved difficult for many central governments and their development partners. This complicates the prospects for development-driven decentralization reforms and legitimates practices that eventually work at cross-purposes with them. These are well known and range from the design of national local development programmes that actually bypass local governments’ policy-making and implementation processes, to difficulties in re-conceptualizing the state– society interaction at local level and mobilizing communities for a genuine local development process initiated by local authorities.4

3.5 Demand for decentralization and the role of leadership in local government If the adoption of a local development perspective by national governments is critical for the developmental effect of decentralization reforms, what is also becoming increasingly clear after over two decades of decentralization reforms is that the sustainability of the reforms, their resilience in the face of recentralization and their actual developmental impact ultimately depend on the initiative and leadership exercised by local authorities themselves (see Chapter 7 in this volume by Smoke).

A fundamental paradox of most decentralization reforms is that they are pushed from above rather than pulled from below (Bossuyt and Gould, 2000; Eriksen et al., 1999). They reflect a politically driven, and bureaucratically constrained, supply by the centre. The extent to which they are actually influenced by an organized demand for authority, responsibilities and resources by the intended beneficiaries (local governments or civil society organizations) remains extremely limited or absent, particularly where local authorities are in their infancy, as is the case in much of Africa and Asia.

Exceptions do exist and, not surprisingly, mostly come from Latin America, where municipal institutions have a longer tradition and the representation of local government interests is better organized and politically stronger, so that the scope of decentralization reforms can actually result from a bargaining process between local and national interests (Falleti, 2005). A review of the experience of selected countries in Latin America shows that the sustainability of the reforms and their resilience with respect to potential reversals is greater when they are initiated from below, by civil society and organized municipal movements (as, for example, in Colombia), rather than from above, by the central government (as, for example, in Argentina). It also shows that the sequence of polit-

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ical administrative and fiscal decentralization is different when the reforms are initiated from above rather than from below (Falleti, 2005).

Interestingly for our discussion, in both cases the reforms, as they unfold in practice, are at variance (in both substance and sequence) with what is recommended by normative theory, raising issues of development relevance and effectiveness in the first case and of fiscal imbalances in the second.

But even these exceptions cannot be presented as evidence that decentralization reforms are a response to a demand for popular participation in government. In fact, much evidence has accumulated in the last two decades suggesting that, when it comes to the demand for popular participation in local government, the issue for reformers is not how to respond to it but how to generate it (Mansuri and Rao, 2013). The idea that decentralization reforms are undertaken because of a demand for participatory governance must be turned on its head. If anything, decentralization could be a powerful tool for generating a demand for participation and eventually turning it into more evolved forms of “active citizenship”.

So Manor (Chapter 2 in this volume) is certainly right when he observes that decentralization reforms are hardly ever initiated in response to popular demand. And political economy analyses have begun to show that what drives the reforms is not a popular demand for participatory democracy but the immediate political motives of the parties in power.

Yet we must go beyond recognizing that a popular demand is missing and that narrow political self-interests drive the reforms. We need to realize the inherently contradictory nature of decentralization and focus on the emergence of another kind of “demand”, which has the potential to shift the boundaries of the reforms beyond their original and narrowly political goals. This demand is not the people’s demand for participation, which is more an effect than a cause of decentralization reforms, but the local politicians’ “demand for autonomy”, which may be brought to the fore and empowered by decentralization reforms.

From a political economy perspective, it is difficult to see how decentralization reforms may be sustained and deliver their potential developmental benefits if the initial (and easily reversible) push by central actors, who “supply” them in response to their own political legitimization and control imperatives, is not followed by the emergence of developmentminded local political actors who “demand” a space for discretionary local policy-making and base their demands on the strength of their own local accountability and local participatory practices.

The point I am trying to make is that the future of decentralization as an instrument of local democracy and local development will not be determined by presumed exogenous pressures for participatory governance

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that would exist (and could be leveraged) before and without decentralization itself. Similarly, it cannot be left to the political will of central elites, which is bound to vanish rapidly in the absence of new political actors challenging the country’s political system and requiring new relations between central and local elites. If this view is correct, efforts to “induce” demands for participation or to influence central political will in order to sustain decentralization reforms may be less effective than direct support for emerging local leaders and their collective organizations (local government associations), helping them to claim an increasingly visible role in national politics. It is these leaders’ demand for local autonomy as the key to promoting local development, rather than the demand for “popular participation” in local governance or the central political will to decentralize, that matters most in sustaining decentralization reforms and an open space for participatory development.

Ultimately, the impact that local autonomy could make on development, whether in the area of public services delivery or local revenue and employment creation, remains potential (Wolman and Goldsmith, 1990).

Its realization depends on the willingness and ability of local leaders to make use of autonomy. If an effective local leadership does not emerge to take advantage of the spaces opened by decentralization reforms, limited as they may be, the developmental promises of decentralization will continue to remain unfulfilled – a point to which I return below.

3.6 Politically driven vs. development-driven decentralization reforms How do real-world politically driven decentralization reforms compare with development-driven reforms that would create the conditions for autonomous local governments to promote local development? Again, answers can only be country specific, but some common features emerge from several country cases in Africa and Asia.

Typically, politically driven decentralization reforms, initiated from above by leaders in power in order to win national political battles and legitimize and entrench their political regimes, end up establishing local councils with neither fully accountable executive and administrative structures nor meaningful functions and related resources. These reforms introduce new political institutions in the sub-national system of governance but shy away from the administrative, functional and fiscal changes that would enable them to promote local development. The gap between the political and the other dimensions of the reforms is the clearest signal that the reforms are actually driven by politics rather than by a local development policy.

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Politically driven decentralization may follow different rationales and take different shapes depending on the country context. Most decentralization reforms appear to be rearranging powers within the central administration rather than producing autonomous local governments enabled to make and implement their own local development policies. A rather ubiquitous variant of politics-driven reforms is an unusual form of deconcentration that focuses on transferring powers from central ministries to sub-national territorial representatives of the state (governors and the like) rather than to local authorities and their councils.5 These reforms attempt to formally combine, and simultaneously strengthen, two different functions of the empowered governors: those of head of the local branches of the central administration and those of executive of a local authority and head of the local administration.

Again, this particular form of deconcentration is driven by political calculations. Sub-national governors are, or are perceived to be, easier to align with, and ultimately better instruments to serve, the president’s or the prime minister’s vision and partisan and personal interests, than national ministries and their bureaucratic apparatus. Because the prime motivation for the reforms is the search for a more direct and more effective mechanism to transmit and implement central directives and policies, rather than to enable localities to develop their own initiatives and resources in pursuit of local development, the election of local councils is not the first step towards the establishment of autonomous and capable local governments. Rather, it is the political price to pay to provide a semblance of democratic legitimacy to the enhanced powers transferred to sub-national governors. However, although the governors’ powers over deconcentrated ministry departments may be substantially enhanced, their accountability to the elected councils would tend to remain weak or nil. As a result, councils end up functioning as no more than advisory bodies to the newly empowered governors, often reproducing at subnational level the weak, and rubber-stamping, legislative structures that prevail at national level.

It must be noted how such reforms (shifting powers from ministries to governors and sub-governors, and creating sub-national councils to legitimize the shift) respond to the logic of neo-patrimonial regimes. Because the real objective, in spite of the rhetoric, is to serve the interests of parties and patronage networks, the effect is to further weaken, rather than build, the state by weakening its formal (ministerial/ bureaucratic) structures and related rules-based operation. This makes them increasingly easier to manipulate and functional to the interests of political networks operating outside the state’s formal rules. The key is to enhance the semiformal role that sub-national “big men” can play to serve the national “bigger man”.

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This kind of process, however, opens up a double order of contradictions. First, fights within the central administration, initiated by the country leaders, cannot be taken beyond a certain point. So, although the reform process may be inspired and initiated by the country’s political leadership, it may also soon be left to the care of a relevant single ministry (of the interior, local government, local administration, and the like).

This ministry may try to implement the reforms as a programme of its own rather than as the whole-of-government effort that they actually need to be – only quickly to discover that the system cannot be made to work if the question of its functions, resources and outcomes is not comprehensively addressed.

The point here is that many of the current “stalled” decentralization processes seem to follow a common pattern. Leaders who initiate them because of the expected political benefits are ultimately reluctant to assume primary responsibility for their comprehensive implementation, because this would imply fighting their own administrations beyond the point at which the political costs exceed the benefits. They are then happy to leave decentralization reforms “half way”, in the hands of particular ministries that cannot take the process beyond electing sub-national councils or, at most, establishing weak sub-national administrations, without the required mandate, capacities and resources.

In fact, these ministries cannot, on their own, infuse the new structures with the necessary developmental spirit because this requires protecting their autonomy and reallocating important regulatory powers and functions away from sector ministries and/or substantial changes in intergovernmental fiscal relations, which can be produced only by sustained high-level political support. Without such high-level backing, these ministries have neither the capacity nor the appetite for inter-ministerial fights.

And to continue pushing on their own, as a typical Ministry of Local Government or similar might be tempted to do, often with substantial external support, is not an institutionally sustainable option. Although situations may differ from country to country, there are limits to the extent to which these ministries could, or even should, set up and directly manage large programmes to support local government action for local development, financed only by external aid, without much chance of influencing broader state reform.

The second kind of contradiction raised by politically driven reform has more positive dimensions. The very election of the councils may end up putting in motion an irreversible dynamics. Sooner or later, councils may start demanding some real accountability of the local executive and administrations and their increasing functioning as implementers of councils’ policies. The election of councils opens a window that can hardly be entirely closed by the initiators of politically driven reforms. This offers a

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contested terrain in which reform champions (with support from development partners) can engage to ensure that democratically elected councils fight back against marginalization and start taking responsibilities and obtain powers to participate in the core regulatory and services delivery business of the state, through local administrations accountable to them.

3.7 Designing and implementing development-driven decentralization reforms Reform champions and their development partners, engaging with real, politically driven decentralization processes, must continue to advocate, and be guided by, the project of development-driven decentralization reforms. Then the important question is: how can this project be articulated, communicated and pursued?

The answer is again, obviously, country specific, but it may be useful to develop a general framework for both diagnostic and programming purposes, to help assess country conditions, identify key problems to be tackled and develop and communicate the vision of the developmentdriven decentralization reforms project. The development of such a diagnostic and programming framework is therefore an urgent and important task for the academic and policy communities. Here I can advance only its most basic outline. The starting point is a proper conceptualization of the linkages between (i) decentralization reforms, (ii) improved local self-governance, (iii) local development and (iv) poverty reduction (Romeo, 2003).

3.7.1 Linkages between decentralization reforms, improved local self-governance, local development and poverty reduction The relationship between decentralization and poverty reduction is evidently very complex, and eludes attempts at measurement based on a few key variables (see, for one, Jutting et al., 2004). In fact, such attempts have often left unexamined the real nature of the reforms whose impact on poverty was being tested. Although predictably concluding that the impact could not be ascertained, such attempts might have (i) contributed to confusing genuine, development-driven decentralization reforms with what were actually processes of extension of central control of the periphery and (ii) involuntarily lent support to the case for recentralization.

To begin with, the relation between decentralization and poverty reduction is mediated by two equally critical concepts: effective local self-

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governance and local development. Although certainly not the only factor, a key factor contributing to poverty reduction is indeed local development (via improved local-level infrastructure and services, a better-managed local environment and growth in local employment and revenue). This in turn depends on improvements in local governance (including effective local political representation, accountable and performing local administrations, popular participation in public decision-making and effective public–private–community partnerships) but also, and critically, requires a substantial increase in the flow of resources – public and private, domestic and external – for investments in local development.

Importantly, under the right conditions, the availability of resources for investment in local development can act as a powerful incentive to build capacity for good local governance. And, in turn, improvements in local governance depend critically on both an enabling decentralization policy and legal framework and a parallel effort of institutional development and local authorities’ capacity-building.

3.7.2 A national programme to implement a decentralization reform strategy A national programme to implement a decentralization reform strategy, driven by the goal of genuine local development, is therefore a complex multidimensional programme that must contain three generic categories of output: policy, institutional and sector outputs.

Policy and legal outputs Policy and legal outputs include the production of (i) general legislation such as constitutional amendments, local government Acts, organic laws of the sub-national administration, local electoral laws, etc., to define the architecture of the sub-national governance and public administration system and the accountability relations across it; (ii) sectoral decentralization policies, as well as legal and regulatory instruments to reassign (devolve, deconcentrate or delegate) functions across the sub-national system; (iii) fiscal decentralization policies and laws to reassign fiscal powers, develop transfer systems and regulate sub-national finances; and (iv) sub-national personnel policies and laws, to assign and regulate the development of the human resources of local authorities and administrations.

Institutional outputs Institutional outputs refer to changes in organizations and procedures to be introduced at both sub-national and national level and to drive related capacity development efforts. They include: (i) institutions of effective lo-

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cal political representation, participation and deliberation; (ii) institutions of transparent and effective management of local public expenditure, including strategic planning, capital programming, budgeting, implementation and procurement, assets management, accounting and financial reporting, internal controls and auditing; (iii) institutions of effective local administration, aligning internal local authorities’ structures and procedures with a programme-based performance-oriented management approach; (iv) institutions for local service delivery and development management, introducing appropriate provision and production arrangements and improving the local authorities’ performance in carrying out both their general mandate and their devolved and delegated responsibilities; and, finally, (v) institutions for state support and oversight of local authorities, for the provision of technical assistance and training services and effective legality controls and performance monitoring of subnational authorities.

Sector outputs Sector outputs refer to the actual investments in a broad range of local infrastructure and services to improve the basic conditions for growth of the local economy, as well as the coverage and quality of administrative and social services available to local communities; improved local environmental management, ensuring a sustainable use of local natural resources and an improvement in the environmental quality of the localities; and promotion of local economic development, generating employment and increasing local revenues through activities that leverage the competitive advantages of the localities.

Critical for the success of such a programme is a national policy to promote local development through local governments (LDLG). Such a policy should necessarily include the establishment of a range of mechanisms to finance local authorities and support the production of sector outputs, including budget financing mechanisms (both discretionary and conditional), project financing mechanisms to address local investment financing requirements, and contractual financing mechanisms associated with intergovernmental programme implementation agreements and functional delegation arrangements.

It is worth repeating that a national programme to implement decentralization reforms driven by local development must produce results in all the above three categories. Restricting attention to the policy and institutional development dimensions, at the expense of explicit action to set up appropriate local development financing mechanisms and produce concrete local-level sector outputs, would not only miss the local development objective but also impair the effort to develop good local

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governance practices, because it would deprive local actors of vital incentives. As indicated above, it is common for decentralization reforms not driven by explicit local development policy to focus exclusively on structural, as opposed to functional, changes in the sub-national system of governance and public administration. Damaging as this may be for the ultimate success of the reforms, this approach is consistent with the political/partisan interests of country leaders who initiate politically driven reforms but have little incentive to actually complete them because this would eventually strengthen the state’s formal systems and capacities at the expense of the patronage networks the leaders run. It is not surprising that all this eventually results in disillusionment with the developmental potential of decentralization reforms and a related push for recentralization (Smoke, Chapter 7 in this volume).

Designing and supporting decentralization reforms driven by local development requires therefore: • That the country’s decentralization strategy be derived from a political commitment to local development (a national local development policy with equal status to the macroeconomic and industrial relations policies) as a distinct and critical dimension of the country’s development effort.

• That a medium-term national programme be designed to implement the national decentralization strategy and (i) deliver the required changes in the policy and legal framework within which local authorities are called to operate, (ii) develop the required national and subnational institutions and capacities, and (iii) produce concrete sector outputs and develop appropriate and sustainable funding mechanisms through which increased domestic and external resources can be channelled to local authorities for the delivery of local development.

• That, through the implementation of the above programme, sustainable structural and functional changes be introduced in the sub-national system of local governance and administration, in all four dimensions of this system: (i) the architecture of the system and the accountability relations among its components, (ii) the functional assignments throughout the system, (iii) the related assignment of financial resources, and (iv) the deployment of human resources and administrative capacities.

3.8 Towards a more effective engagement of external aid with real-world decentralization processes Donors and international aid agencies have come to realize that decentralization reforms are essentially driven by politics and are increasingly

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committed to “think politically” when assessing the scope and modalities of external support to the reform processes. Political economy analysis is taking centre stage in analytical work supporting aid programming and is trying to address both the macro and the micro political dynamics that help move forward or stall the reform process.

Much more difficult for development partners, however, is to take the next step and also “act politically” (Cammack, 2007). This would require taking sides, advocating and taking risks, identifying and supporting reform champions and starting to think like them. That includes, where necessary, accepting the detours, the compromises, the inconsistencies and the tactical retreats that such champions face, and must take, to keep the reforms alive and build a social constituency for them. All this is very difficult for development partners to do, perhaps even more so for the big multilateral institutions. Besides all the corporate incentives working against it, there is also rarely the capacity in resident missions for such sophisticated analysis and behaviour, and “bringing politics squarely into the aid equation takes many development professionals outside their zones of comfort, and development agencies to the outer edges of what some of them are equipped, even mandated, to do” (Armon, 2007: 656).

So, analytical work may clearly show that the “political will” to reform is never unambiguous, and that, given the intense intra-governmental contestation of the process, there is no such thing as a single “government position” on decentralization. Yet, in country after country, development partners that support decentralization reforms, assessing them in the frame of a pure “good governance” agenda, are still too intent on teasing out upfront (and often perfunctory) policy clarity, rather than engaging strategically and with the required political sophistication in the messy process out of which such clarity could eventually emerge. They are still too intent on setting upfront conditionalities, rather than requesting and supporting space for policy experimentation and the building of reform constituencies. They may be “thinking politically” but they are still far from “acting politically”. No wonder then if national reform champions squeezed between internal resistance in their own government and unrealistic development partner demands for clear government policies as a condition for assistance end up asking if, with friends like these, they may ever need enemies.

Development partner positions may be even more puzzling to national reform champions when the same donors supporting decentralization and local governance reforms do not stress the linkage with the promotion of local development by local governments and, instead of advocating an LDLG approach, support different mechanisms that often work at cross-purposes with the objective of developmental local governments,

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including direct resourcing of community development initiatives and Sector-Wide Approaches that marginalize or exclude local governments from development management and services delivery processes. What makes this puzzling is that it is not necessary to conceive of these approaches as alternatives. Community development approaches and Sector-Wide Approaches could actually be combined quite effectively, and with potentially dramatic effects, within the LDLG approach, if only the local government perspective was indeed used as the privileged vantage point for their design.

Finally, a critical challenge, particularly for large donors and major aid agencies, remains how to match their understanding of decentralization reforms as “whole-of-government” reforms (something they rightly ask partner governments to adopt) with their own ability to provide “wholeof-agency” support for the reforms (something they rarely do, or for which they do not have particularly strong corporate incentives). It is a fact, for example, that major donors and aid agencies, although rhetorically supportive of sectoral decentralization, have been unable to make a positive contribution to system-wide functional reassignments by realigning their own sector support programmes. Because the same silo mentality that prevents inter-ministerial coordination affects the departments of major aid agencies, these have rarely supported sectoral strategies and programmes with the explicit aim of aligning them with system-wide decentralization reforms to bring about LDLG and fulfil the developmental promises of decentralization reforms.

However, if donors and international aid agencies are to remain consistent in supporting decentralization reforms driven by local development, they must engage with the reform process by explicitly committing to and advocating an LDLG approach. In practice this may require adopting, alternating and/or combining two main programming approaches in response to diverse and country-specific situations and opportunities: 1. The first is to take advantage of political openings, when they occur, and advocate decentralization reforms driven by local development, supporting the preparation of national decentralization strategies and programmes for their implementation (along the lines suggested above), and adopting them as frameworks for the alignment and harmonization of external aid.

2. The second is to engage in more direct partnerships with emerging local governments and their associations, where they have been established, and to support policy experiments for local-level institutional innovation in local governance and local development, with the aim of eventually building a constituency for national decentralization reforms driven by local development.

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These “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches can obviously be combined as necessary. In any case, what must be kept central is the focus on local development as the guiding light and rationale of decentralization reforms, with the understanding that its incremental contribution to national development efforts strictly depends on supporting local autonomy and more intensive and effective local-level interaction between state and society.

Moving beyond generic support for decentralization reforms to advocate and support their varieties driven by local development would actually amount to a fuller recognition that the reform of sub-national governance and administration systems is possibly even more critical to the project of building effective developmental states than it is for the promotion of good governance. It would therefore resonate with recent attempts to rethink the good governance agenda and to pay increasing attention to the developmental state agenda (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007) in a search for their appropriate combination.

3.9 Summary and conclusion Rounds of decentralization reforms have been in the making in the developing world for more than two decades. Initiated by central governments essentially for political reasons – to legitimize and consolidate regimes in power – they have often quickly hit a wall and remained incomplete because, after creating sub-national political authorities, administrative and fiscal reforms to empower them have not followed. The ability of organized civil society, including the associations of local authorities themselves, to move the reforms forwards by pressuring “from below” for institutions of sub-local governance that allow new forms of state–society interaction and promote genuine local development has been sorely inadequate if not missing altogether. Meanwhile, aid agencies, somehow misreading the trend, have made their support for decentralization part of an often unrealistic global good governance agenda, making decentralization a “good” in itself and underplaying its instrumentality for development and the need to engage decentralizing governments on the perhaps more promising terrain of developmental state promotion.

Both the primacy of the central government initiative in decentralization reforms and the importance of political rather than governance or developmental concerns as drivers of this initiative are facts that could hardly be expected to change. Domestic champions of developmentdriven decentralization reform, and their international backers, should learn to live with such facts. Yet they could arm themselves better as they

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continue to advocate developmental sub-national governance and public administration systems and take advantage of the openings provided by politics to actually build them. To this end, three things would help.

First, as a recent but growing literature is stressing, champions of development-driven decentralization reform need to build up a deeper understanding of the political economy of the reforms, to gain a more realistic view of opportunities and constraints for reformers and to hone their tactical skills.

Second, they should develop a clearer sense of the instrumentality of decentralization for development. This will require understanding local development as endogenous, open and incremental rather than as the localization of national (or global) development goals and programmes.

This, in turn, requires the recognition of local autonomy as the key to translating decentralization reforms into developmental gains. Indeed, most of the stalled decentralization processes alluded to above could effectively be described as “decentralization without autonomy”.

Third, they should pay greater attention to the development of social demand for the reforms as well as to the promotion of individual and collective leadership in local government. This would ensure that decentralization reforms, although inevitably led from above, also reflect emerging good practices of local governance and local development promotion and are supported by growing citizen awareness and political engagement.

More realistic and more effective national decentralization strategies and related implementation programmes could then be developed. And a new generation of externally supported programmes could be launched that explicitly use local governments and their associations, rather than ministries and/or communities, as entry-points for the promotion of local development. They would go beyond supporting decentralization reforms and good governance and would actually promote local development through local governments.

Notes 1. For Clark, autonomy defines the extent of local discretion in terms of local government functions, actions and legitimate behaviour. It is itself the product of two specific factors: (i) powers of initiative and (ii) immunity from the authority of higher tiers of the state.

2. For example, this is the prevailing understanding of local governments throughout the Arab region.

3. I have observed, in countries as diverse as Cambodia, Mozambique and Nicaragua, how attempts to introduce decentralized development planning procedures within the framework of decentralization reforms have often been compromised by the lack of understanding by the very authorities in charge of developing and extending such planning procedures to local authorities of the fundamental difference between localizing national

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plans and programmes (the main concern of central agencies such as ministries of planning and/or finance, or of special national agencies such as aid-supported social funds) and developing local plans that respond to local priorities, that are in line with local capacities and mandates and that are driven as much by opportunities as by needs.

4. In spite of much rhetoric in support of decentralization reforms and local development, in the last two decades most externally funded programmes have not used local governments as entry-points for aid delivery. Conspicuous in this respect have been programmes such as community-driven development and Social Investment Funds. Obviously, the programming of substantial resources for grassroots projects outside the formal institutions of local government planning and budgeting has neither built local governments’ democratic accountability nor stimulated active citizenship and civic engagement with local political institutions.

5. I have directly observed such patterns in Yemen, Egypt and Jordan, as well as (with different features) in Cambodia. Most recently, Kenya has also moved in this direction.

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Armon, J. (2007) “Aid, Politics and Development: A Donor Perspective”, Development Policy Review 25(5): 653– 656.

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Fritz, V., K. Kaiser and B. Levy (2009) Problem-driven Governance and Political Economy Analysis: Good Practice Framework. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Graham, J., B. Amos and T. Plumptre (2003) “Principles for Good Governance in the 21st Century”. Policy Brief No. 15, Institute on Governance, Ottawa. Available at <http://iog.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/2003_August_policybrief15. pdf> (accessed 8 April 2013).

Grindle, M. S. (2004) “Good Enough Governance: Poverty Reduction and Reform in Developing Countries”, Governance 17(4): 525–548.

Hyden, G., J. Court and K. Mease (2004) Making Sense of Governance: Empirical Evidence from 16 Developing Countries. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Jutting, J., et al. (2004) “Decentralization and Poverty Reduction in Developing Countries: Exploring the Impact”. Working Paper No. 236, OECD Development Centre, Paris.

Mansuri, G. and V. Rao (2013) Localizing Development: Does Participation Work?

Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Pratchett, L. (2004) “Local Autonomy, Local Democracy and the ‘New Localism’ ”, Political Studies 52: 358–375.

Romeo, L. (2003) “The Role of External Assistance in Supporting Decentralization Reforms”, Public Administration and Development 23(1): 89–96.

Romeo, L. and M. El Mensi (2011) “The Difficult Road to Local Autonomy in Yemen”, in J. Martinez-Vasquez and F. Vaillancourt (eds) Decentralization in Developing Countries: Global Perspectives on Obstacles to Fiscal Devolution.

Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 501–548.

Trigilia, C. (2001) “Social Capital and Local Development”, European Journal of Social Theory 4(4): 427– 442.

UCLG (United Cities and Local Government) (2008) “UCLG Draft Support Paper on Aid Effectiveness and Local Government”, UCLG Capacity and Institution Building Working Group, Istanbul, Turkey, 28 November,

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<http://www.cities-localgovernments.org/uclg/upload/newTempDoc/ EN_489 _documentation_istanbul_en.pdf> (accessed 8 April 2013).

UNCDF (United Nations Capital Development Fund) (2011) Local Development Outlook Cambodia. New York: UNCDF. UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (1997) Governance for Sustainable Human Development. New York: UNDP. Available at <http://mirror. undp.org/magnet/policy> (accessed 8 April 2013).

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (2002) Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World. New York: UNDP. Warner, M. (2001) “Building Social Capital: The Role of Local Government”, Journal of Socio-Economics 30: 187–192.

Weimer, B. (2009) Decentralization of the African State – or State Building Through Local Governance – A Paradox? Challenges to Governance and Decentralization in Mozambique. Report on the Conference “Bringing the State Back in: The New Roles and Responsibilities of the 21st Century State”, Association of Development Researchers in Denmark, Copenhagen, 12–13 May. Wolman, H. and M. Goldsmith (1990) “Local Autonomy as a Meaningful Analytic Concept: Comparing Local Government in the United States and the United Kingdom”, Urban Affairs Quarterly 26(1): 3–27.

World Bank and International Monetary Fund (2006) Global Monitoring Report 2006: Millennium Development Goals – Strengthening Mutual Accountability, Aid, Trade, and Governance. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

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Part II Local governance by designing decentralization

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4 Representation, citizenship and the public domain: Choice and recognition in democratic decentralization Jesse Ribot

4.1 Introduction Elected local governments have been legislated in many countries. In some countries, higher-scale intervening agents – central governments, international development agencies, large non-governmental organizations (NGOs) – chose to foster these elected local governments. In others they avoided them in favour of a plethora of parallel institutions. The result is a multiplication of local institutions and the cultivation of identityand interest-based forms of inclusion over residency-based citizenship.

Often the result is that local people cannot demand that their needs and aspirations be served by government. This choice of local institutions appears to be fragmenting the local arena into competing and conflicting identity and interest groups. Through many of these choices, the public domain – the material resources and decisions under public control – is being enclosed and de-secularized.1 Citizenship – the right and ability of people to shape the polities that govern them – is then being narrowed.

Substantively, democracy is the accountability of leaders to the people (see Moore, 1997). This requires having leaders with some discretionary powers that make holding them accountable worthwhile and citizens equipped with the means to hold them to account (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). One of the great challenges ahead for the building of effective local or decentralized democracy is to furnish elected local authorities with sufficient and meaningful discretionary powers to enable them to be responsive to their populations. Meaningful discretion in the hands of The imperative of good local governance: Challenges for the next decade of decentralization, Öjendal and Dellnäs (eds), United Nations University Press, 2013, ISBN 978-92-808-1229-9

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leaders will provide local populations with the motive to engage as citizens. This chapter provides some theoretical background along with case examples aimed at the eventual development of institutional choice guidelines to ensure government, development agency and large-NGO policy and project interventions support rather than hinder fledgling local democratic government (see Ribot, 2004, 2008).

The choice by higher-scale intervening agents of local institutions to partner with or to empower shapes three dimensions of local democracy: representation, citizenship and the public domain. This chapter explores the origins of the power transfers to an emerging mix of local institutions and their effects on local democracy. In particular, it focuses on transfers and non-transfers by sectoral bodies and the instrumental programmes of states and other intervening organizations. The cases cited in this chapter draw mostly on decentralization activities in the natural resource sectors.

I argue that (i) these sectoral powers are more important than the fiscal transfers on which analysts of decentralization tend to focus, (ii) the transfers being made rarely create discretionary spaces under representative authorities, and (iii) without discretionary power in the hands of representative local authorities there is no representation or citizenship, there is no local democracy, there is no reason for local people to engage as citizens.

The vast majority of studies of democratic decentralization focus on why it is promoted and legislated, or on its effects on service delivery efficiency or equity (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; Crook and Manor, 1998; Larson and Ribot, 2004; Oxhorn et al., 2004; Tulchin and Selee, 2004). Some scholars are beginning to focus on democracy outcomes of democratic decentralization. Yet there are still “few critical analyses of whether this localization actually generates the expected outcomes, especially in terms of democratization” (Harriss et al., 2004: 4). Nonetheless there is an emerging literature with observations on the effects of “democratic decentralization” on local democracy (Grindle, 2007; Harriss et al., 2004: 4; Ribot, 1999, 2003, 2004; Ribot et al., 2008) and some observations on its role in higher-scale democracy (Chhatre, 2008; Grindle, 2007).

Decentralization reforms have legislated the creation of elected local governments across the developing world. But these democratic decentralizations are rarely implemented in the manner that is expected to add up to local democracy. “Hence, the benefits predicted by economists, political scientists, and management specialists as consequences of decentralization provide a palette of possibilities, not of realities” (Grindle, 2007: 178). There are, of course, good reasons why it is difficult to establish local democratic authorities (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Grindle, 2007; Ribot et al., 2006). Although there are now many elected local govern-

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ments in place, they rarely hold the powers that would enable them to respond to local needs and aspirations, that would link local demand for infrastructure and services into a relationship that could be called democratic.

Harriss et al. (2004: 6) observe that “the test for democracy is not about the existence of formal democratic rights and institutions, but whether they have real meaning for people”. Such meaning in local democracy is contingent on whether democratic local institutions have anything to offer to local people. They usually do not, I argue. Mkandawire (1999, cited by Törnquist, 2004: 205) describes some African countries as “choiceless democracies”, owing to the ways in which their discretion is constrained in the global political economy. Local or sub-national democracies are all too often like these choiceless national democracies. Their meaningful discretion barely exists.

It is around meaningful discretionary powers that local democracy can crystallize or take form. For example, Grindle (2007: 17) found that, although constrained, local arena political competition in Mexico was growing and significant and that political competition grew around the new resources provided under decentralization. In her Mexico study, civil society was able to organize, make demands for investments and receive responses from local government (2007: 125–127). In general, however, local democracy is limited by the lack of resources and poor downward accountability. In natural resource sector decentralizations, Ribot (2004) found in a 15-country comparative study that either local actors hold significant powers but are not democratic or they are accountable to their population but hold no significant powers. Neither power without downward accountability nor accountability without powers can be labelled democratic.

Many battles take place over whether to decentralize, how to structure new decentralized local governments and what powers to transfer to them. A lot of attention is focused on fiscal transfers from central government – how much and with what stipulations. However, new fledgling local elected governments are imbued with or starved of powers through decisions made elsewhere. The allocation of significant powers is often exercised by sectoral ministries, donors and large international and national NGOs. These institutions allocate or withhold important powers, such as the power to decide who has access to resources and markets, who has labour opportunities, who receives training and who gets construction contracts. Transfers made by line ministries and other higherlevel intervening institutions are extremely important and largely ignored by analysts of decentralization owing to their focus on fiscal transfers.

Often they withhold powers from elected local governments, often they work with or allocate to parallel institutions.

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Transfers to non-government bodies, which often take place in the name of decentralization, are not decentralization. They should be labelled as privatization, participatory or empowerment approaches, NGO and civil society support, social funds or community-driven development (Pritchett and Woolcock, 2004; Ribot, 2003). Each approach empowers different kinds of local institutions or authorities, with potentially different democratic and distributional outcomes. Because of support for and proliferation of local institutional forms, fledgling democratic local governments often receive few public resources or powers and must compete with a plethora of new local institutions (Larson and Ribot, 2007; Manor, 2004; Namara and Nsabagasani, 2003; Poteete, 2007: 16; Ribot, 1999).

Democratic local government is rarely given the means – discretionary authority, technical support, equipment or finances – to represent or to engage local people in public affairs (Crook and Manor, 1998; Ribot, 2003). Numerous cases illustrate how local government has been fettered in this manner (see Bandiaky, 2008; Hara, 2008; Ribot, 2003; Ribot and Oyono, 2006; Spierenburg et al., 2008; Toni, 2007; Xiaoyi, 2007),2 whereas others show that central government or external actors have successfully – even if not wholeheartedly – promoted greater local representation (Chhatre, 2008; Grindle, 2007: 176; Ito, 2007; Lankina, 2008; Larson, 2008).

In this chapter I examine the logic behind local institutional choices and the effects on local democracy of choosing or “recognizing” different kinds of local authorities under what are called “decentralization reforms”. “Institutional choice” refers to the choice of the locus of authority (actors or institutions). I use the term “choice” to attribute agency and therefore responsibility to government and international organizations for their actions. Governments and international organizations manifest their choice of local authorities by transferring powers to them, conducting joint activities or soliciting their input. Through their choices, they are transforming the local institutional landscape.

The term “recognition” (from Taylor, 1994) evokes the literature on identity politics and multiculturalism (also see Fraser, 2000; Kymlicka, 2002). I use the concept of “recognition” (applying it to authorities rather than to individuals or their cultures and identity groups) to better understand the effects of the chosen mix of local authorities on representation, citizenship and the public domain. Different forms of local authority imply different development and equity outcomes. Knowing why particular choices are being made helps to relate their outcomes back to – to interrogate and influence – the project and policy design process. Understanding their effects helps to identify approaches most likely to strengthen local democracy while serving the needs of local people and broader developmental objectives.

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The “choice and recognition framework” (Ribot, 2006, 2007; Ribot et al., 2008) is outlined in this chapter. The next section explains the focus on recognition of authority. The following section develops the basic concepts of choice and recognition and criteria for examining their effects.

4.2 Recognizing authority Individuals and groups seek recognition (in the sense of acknowledgement); similarly, leaders and their institutions seek to be recognized in the numerous arenas in which they operate.3 Hagberg (2004: 200) shows how development NGOs in Burkina Faso seek recognition in multiple arenas – local, state and international.4 Sikor and Lund (2009: 1) show that “the process of recognition of claims as property simultaneously works to imbue the institution that provides such recognition with the recognition of its authority to do so” in what they call “the ‘contract’ that links property and authority”. Acknowledgement by other actors is part of the process of gaining and maintaining authority. This acknowledgement is partly predicated on the ability to recognize and uphold property claims.

The holding of power – such as the ability to make and enforce decisions, rules or adjudications – shapes the ability of an authority to attract claimants and to help enforce their claims. There is a dyadic relationship between property claimants and authorizing actors. But there is also a dyadic relationship between local authorizing actors or authorities and the higher-level intervening agents who empower them. Their ability to authorize property claims is, at least partly, predicated on backing by the state or other institutions, having the financial or technical resources needed to mobilize people or pay for services, or having the ability to allocate access to resources or to other authorities. These are some of the material underpinnings of local authority.

The “politics of recognition” literature (starting with Taylor, 1994) provides means for exploring moments where one actor recognizes another as consummated through transfers of some form of power to that authority or individual. The relationship does not just affect the binary relationship between the higher-level actors and sub-national authorities. The state, donors or international NGOs recognize and are recognized by the local actors they seek to partner with or empower – in a kind of “contract” that links authority and authority (Sikor and Lund, 2009: 1). That act of mutual recognition and the sharing or transfer of power – or even the harnessing of these actors as extensions of the state, donors or international agencies – subsequently reshapes the relationship between the empowered actors and the populations they interact with or whom they

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dominate and rule (for example, the “dual mandate” of Lugard, 1926; Chanock, 1991). There is a cascading recognition effect when higher-level institutions recognize more local bodies, transforming their relations with local actors. This is partly why I have called the structures being established in the name of decentralization in the natural resources sectors in Africa a “modern reproduction of indirect rule” (Ribot, 1999).

States and national and international institutions are constantly engaged in recognizing new and existing authorities around the world – creating, strengthening and weakening them. In the process, they are producing and destroying different forms of authority and those authorities’ reign over their constituent populations. Such recognition is at the heart of reforms called “decentralization”. The recognition literature provides some insights into the effects of choices on the authorities they recognize. To leverage these insights, in this chapter I shift the focus of the recognition debates in two ways: (i) from the recognition of culture and identities to the recognition of authority, and (ii) from Taylor’s view of recognition as enfranchisement to a more ambiguous view of recognition having positive and negative consequences for democracy.5 I find that critiques of Taylor’s concept of recognition by Fraser (2000), Markell (2000), Povinelli (2002) and Tully (2000) shed light on the enfranchising and disenfranchising effects of recognizing different kinds of authorities. As shown below, the recognition literature provides conceptual tools for analysing the production of democratic local authority under democracy “decentralization” reforms. Ultimately, in the vein of “design and demand”, the theme of this volume, choosing an authority that is able to respond and that can be held accountable to the population is a design choice that enables demand by local people – transforming them from subjects who are managed into citizens who make demands.

4.3 The politics of choice and recognition This section outlines an analytical framework for evaluating the enfranchising potential of forms of local authority, broken into discussions of the politics of choice and the effects of recognition.

4.3.1 The politics of choice In practice, designers of democratic decentralization are choosing (i) powers to transfer, (ii) means by which to make those transfers and (iii) local institutions (ostensibly democratic local government) to receive powers. Each choice has an effect on the relationship between higher and

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lower authorities and between those lower-scale recipient authorities and their constituents. It has an effect on whether needs and aspirations are heard and can be responded to. In very few reforms are appropriate and sufficient discretionary powers transferred to local institutions that are not private or dependent on and accountable to higher-scale authorities.

In most transfers to elected bodies, few powers of significance are transferred other than mandates – which are often underfunded. Although the choice of powers to transfer and the means (the security of the instruments used) of transfer affect local empowerment, I focus on the choice of local institutional interlocutors. Power transfers and the inclusion of local institutions in power-sharing or significant decisions are viewed as the material means of institutional choice and recognition.

Under democratic decentralization reforms, the public justifications for the choices of local institutions vary widely. They include efficiency and equity arguments, democracy arguments, pro-poor agendas, the virtues of civil society, the superiority of community-based and/or indigenous systems and the advantages of direct participation. Lurking beside the public justifications are other interests such as donor pressure, fear of loss of power and authority, fiscal crises, political crises, maintaining privilege or cultivating political constituencies. Understanding the rationale behind institutional choices can shed light on ways to influence decentralization policy processes. Understanding the effects of recognition helps to identify approaches most likely to foster dynamic and articulated local democracy.

There are multiple ways to explain institutional choice. Ostrom (1990) makes a public choice argument that the mix of institutions reflects the aggregate aspirations of individuals maximizing their own good. Bates (1981) shows that political actors select authorities and institutions to meet their own narrow economic and political interests (also see Frye, 1997). Törnquist (2004: 211) notes that local institutional arrangements can be chosen to circumvent party and political clientelism. Some authors show that local institutions have a role in choosing themselves and imposing themselves on emerging opportunities and decision-making processes (Benda-Beckmann and Benda-Beckmann, 2006; Boone, 2003; Eckert, 2006; Gaventa, 2002). Clearly, all of these processes are in play.

The “choices” made by these actors may be mere political calculation, as Bates would argue, but they reflect the relations in which they are embedded that generate the motives and intentions of actors.

Chhatre (2008), Hara (2008), Toni (2007) and Ito (2007) describe how, in India, Malawi, Brazil and Indonesia, the policies and decisions of higher-level authorities, with or without the influence of local citizens, result in the creation, selection or appointment of specific authorities

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and/or enable local actors to engage or capture new opportunities. In Himachal Pradesh, India, legislators chose to work with panchayats because local people had opted to use the panchayats as a channel to influence the state’s environment minister. Local people chose panchayats for their political connections and their emerging powers under decentralization reforms. Chhatre describes this political “virtuous circle” linking people to panchayats and panchayats to legislators as “political articulation” (Chhatre, 2008).

In Mangochi District, Malawi, headmen in the villages traditionally played a mediating role in fisheries decisions. The Fisheries Department, however, with donor support, created elected committees to represent the whole population of each fishing village in order to balance the interests of fishers. Subsequent to the creation of beach village committees (BVCs), Malawi’s decentralization laws created elected district assemblies with the power to manage fisheries. The new laws would require the transfer of supervision over BVCs from the Fisheries Department to the district assemblies. However, this transfer was prevented by opposition from members of parliament who were threatened by the creation of district assemblies. Further, the Fisheries Department did not trust the BVCs enough to give them significant powers – starving them of authority. Central government had no interest in empowering the district assemblies enough to allow sectoral committees – fisheries in this case – to be transferred out of the centrally controlled fisheries line ministry. Parliament had no interest in allowing district assemblies even to come into being. Donors did not trust district authorities enough to allow elected district representatives to control the BVCs. The result was a weak BVC functioning outside of the legal framework of decentralized but powerless democratic district institutions (Hara, 2008).

In Para, Brazil, donors and central government avoided local governments, arguing that they were dominated by elite interests (such as ranchers and loggers) and were not worth working with. Toni (2007) describes how mayors and councillors were sidelined by donors even in the exceptional localities where candidates from the pro-poor ruling party were elected. Donors’ mistrust of local authorities precludes their working through these bodies; NGOs were given preferential treatment and resources. Although FVPP (Fundação Viver, Produzir e Preservar), an NGO representing some 100 grassroots movements, cared about the interests of the poor, Toni questions the degree to which FVPP is a “grassroots” body. He points out that FVPP, which is allied to the ruling party, is used by the government as a “paid service sector” provider and is accountable primarily to bodies within the government (also see Resosudarmo, 2005). Donors choose NGOs, arguing that they want to cultivate civil society and social capital. Toni also shows that the view of the Minis-

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try of the Environment and donors that local governments lack capacity is not reflected in practice in agriculture and forest management.

In the Bandung district of Java, Indonesia, powers and resources were successfully transferred to popularly elected district governments, opening new opportunities to influence policy and its implementation at the district level (headed by the elected bupati). There has been a clear opening of space for political competition in which village heads have gained a significant influence in district electoral politics. Despite advances resulting from this decentralization, Ito (2007) shows that the civil society approach to local democracy chosen by the district heads is excluding poor and marginal populations from democratic decision-making (see also Chapter 11 by Antlov and Wetterberg in this volume). The result is investments that serve elites while ignoring the demands of the poor. The bupati and district bureaucrats justify working with elites on grounds of efficiency – getting the work done. Rather than a broad cross-section of civil society working with local government in a voluntaristic and broadbased manner, aligned participants are selected and cultivated. The chosen civil society organizations do not represent a broad cross-section of local society. The alignment of district government with elites reduced public participation, hemming in the public domain by reserving public decisions for a narrow elite. Ito (2007) argues that the stratifying effects of the choices of the bupati were obscured by the positive civil society discourse of international development institutions.

In these cases, local institutions, and the forms of representation, belonging and public space they produce, emerge through policy choices.

The dilemmas and choices faced by policy elites (decision-makers, policymakers, policy planners and other political and administrative officials with policy responsibilities) are critical to understanding policy change (Grindle, 2007: 3). Bates’ (1981) notion of “institutional choice” is useful for bringing attention to the motives and actions of the central authorities crafting decentralizations and, in the process, shaping the local institutional landscape. Bates (1981) argues that governments choose among policy options based on political utility. For example, they choose to create allocative and rent-seeking opportunities that will help them to consolidate their own political and economic power. Although motives and intentions are driven by relationships, researchers can still follow Bates’ approach. Researchers can unpack the explicitly expressed and implicit logics that actors within governments and international organizations use to “choose” their local interlocutors. Understanding the politics of choice – why decision-makers choose the institutions they choose – requires an understanding of both stated and unstated objectives, understanding the logic and beliefs informing decision-makers’ choices, and their awareness of the effects of these choices. Applying Bates’ analysis of policy logic

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with Taylor’s “politics of recognition” enables a thorough analysis of the motives (however generated) behind acts of recognition from above and their effects.

4.3.2 The effects of recognition Governments and international organizations usually emphasize development outcomes when promoting decentralization, and many also give high billing to participation and democracy outcomes. In addition, they often evoke improved environmental management or other sectoral efficiency. But the results of their institutional choices on development, the environment or the emergence and consolidation of local democracy usually differ from the stated objectives or expected outcomes.6 How can we analyse whether the mix of recognized institutions is helping to establish, strengthen or consolidate local democracy?

The “politics of choice and recognition” framework extends the discussion of recognition to institutions. Like the recognition of culture or individuals, the recognition of local institutions or authorities confers power and legitimacy and cultivates identities by providing forms of belonging.

The choice of local authorities or organizations by government or international agencies is a form of recognition. Following Markell (2000: 496), “recognition” is used to refer not to the successful cognition of an already existing thing but to the constructive act through which recognition’s very object is shaped or brought into being (also see Fabian, 1999).

This recognition takes place through the transfer of powers, partnering in projects, engagement through contracts or participation in dialogue and decision-making. Recognition strengthens the chosen authorities and organizations with resources and backing, reinforcing the forms of belonging these local institutions engender and the identities of their members.

In doing so, recognition shapes three key aspects of democracy discussed below: representation, citizenship and public domain.

Representation In recent decades, many institutions have been created or cultivated with the purpose of increasing popular participation and empowerment in planning and decision-making (Fung and Wright, 2003; Fung, 2003).7 While increased participation may have democratic characteristics by bringing a broader cross-section of the population into decision-making, participatory processes are often neither representative nor binding (Mosse, 2001). Following Manin et al. (1999), democratic representation occurs when leaders are both responsive and accountable to the people.

Accountability is achieved through positive and negative sanctions, and is a defining characteristic of democracy. Responsiveness requires leaders

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with powers – the discretionary power to translate needs and aspirations into policy and policy into practice (Pritchett and Woolcock, 2004; Ribot, 2003). So, to be democratic, institutions must be representative: accountable to the people and empowered to respond.

In decentralization and other local development interventions, outside authorities choose to work with, and therefore recognize, local authorities. In doing so, they cultivate these authorities, strengthening and legitimating them. But, how representative are the chosen institutions? In current decentralizations – even those called “democratic” – governments and international donors are largely choosing to avoid elected local government in favour of other institutions (see Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Bandiaky, 2008; Hara, 2008; Manor, 2004; Romeo, 1996; Toni, 2007; and, for exceptions, see Lankina, 2008; Lankina and Getachew, 2006). This choice is critical in that it deprives local elected authorities of the powers transferred to the local arena while empowering alternative or so-called “parallel” authorities. Empowering local line ministry offices, NGOs, customary chiefs and private corporations can de-legitimate elected local authorities while legitimating parallel bodies. Elected local government is forced to compete and struggle with other local institutions for the legitimacy that follows from control of public decisions and service delivery.

Representative local authorities can be strengthened through recognition (Lankina, 2008). They may be weakened, however, if (i) they receive too little power to be effective (Bandiaky, 2008; Hara, 2008; Larson, 2008; Spierenburg et al., 2008; Toni, 2007) or (ii) parallel institutions overshadow or pre-empt their ability to serve the public interest (Bandiaky, 2008; Hara, 2008; Toni, 2007). Manor (2004) describes the democracy effects of underfunded local governments with a mandate to manage natural resources operating in an arena with overfunded environment committees. Transferring public powers to parallel authorities in the local arena can take powers away from, and produce competition with, democratic local government. That competition can be divisive (Toni, 2007) or it may lead to more efficiency and better representation all around (Chhatre, 2008; Ito, 2007). It can undermine the legitimacy of local democratic authorities while producing conditions for elite capture, or it may produce a pluralism of competition and cooperation that helps establish and thicken civil society and articulation between society and government (Chhatre, 2008; Lankina, 2008).8 For an example where institutions are strengthened, Chhatre (2008) details the process of democratic consolidation in Himachal Pradesh, India. Here legislators chose panchayats as local interlocutors because local people opted to use them as a channel of influence. Local people chose panchayats owing to their political connections and their emerging

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powers under decentralization reforms. The key to Himachal Pradesh’s local government success was the “space and opportunity for community engagement” generated by the accountability of empowered leaders. In Chhatre’s dynamic multi-layered analysis of emerging local democracy, power and accountability are relational and not located in a single authority. Here higher-level competition explains how the choices by higherlevel political authorities helped make lower-level authorities locally accountable (for example, Schumpeter, 1943). Recognition of the panchayat by political parties and via decentralization explains their consolidation as a local political force and locus of engagement.

Analyses of the recognition of cultural authorities (those authorities based on cultural identities, such as customary chiefs, ethnic or religious leaders, etc.) provide insights for analysis of democracy outcomes. Fraser (2000) argues that Taylor’s recognition of specific “misrecognized” groups, “insofar as it reifies group identities, . . . risks sanctioning violations of human rights and freezing the very antagonisms it purports to mediate”. By reifying culture, Fraser (2000: 112) suggests, the politics of recognition places “moral pressure on individual members to conform to a given group culture. Cultural dissonance and experimentation are accordingly discouraged, when they are not simply equated with disloyalty. So too is cultural criticism, including efforts to explore intragroup divisions, such as those of gender, sexuality and class”. Fraser (2000: 108–111) argues that privileging culture and identity diverts attention from material and social bases of distribution, potentially reinforcing material injustices.

Recognizing identity- and interest-based authorities imposes their notions of culture and their interest on those under their rule – similarly suppressing intra-group difference (also see Mamdani, 1996). Indeed, by reifying group identity, recognition obscures internal cultural differences and subordinates the “struggles within the group for the authority – and the power – to represent it” (Fraser, 2000: 112; also see Povinelli, 2002: 6 –13).

These critiques are not limited to instances where culture-based injustices are redressed through the strengthening of cultural identities or the privileging of one cultural form over another. These critiques apply to any reforms where powers are transferred to local authorities – identity based, interest based or residency based. Recognition is not merely an act of acknowledging an existing identity or authority; recognition creates or enforces that authority (Markell, 2000: 496 – 497) and therefore must be analysed as a political act with profound consequences for democracy.

The transfer of material powers or backing to an authority is based on some “recognition” of the recipient authority – its consistency with or mutual visions of the giving authority’s world view or objectives. The transfer then reinforces or transforms that authority, enabling that

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authority to define the breadth of belonging and the forms of rule to which its constituents are subjected.

The empowering of customary or indigenous authorities illustrates these points. The desire to privilege “misrecognized” cultures often drives international development interventions. Across sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America, for example, “indigenous”, “customary” and “traditional” authorities are making a political comeback (Benda-Beckmann et al., 2003; Geschiere and Boone, 2003; Larson, 2008).

This re-emergence is at least partly cultivated from above – a result of government, donors and international NGOs recognizing the authority of chiefs and headmen. The re-emergence of customary authority is so widespread and takes so many forms that it must also be attributed to particular local histories reshaped by global changes that give new life to traditional forms of belonging and identity (Engelbert, 2002). Important blind spots, however, are evident in development approaches that favour indigenousness. First, political analysis and judgement of indigenous governance systems are rarely featured in the new approaches (a new kind of “anti-politics”, outlined by Ferguson, 1994). Second, custom and customary authority are conflated, such that customary authorities are favoured rather than custom itself (also see Chanock, 1991; Moore, 1986).

Of course, not everything indigenous is “good”. Many of the indigenous governance systems, when analysed as political systems rather than being viewed as cultural forms, would be labelled autocratic, despotic, oppressive, patriarchal, gender biased or gerontocratic. Some indigenous cultures condone and continue forms of servitude and slavery. But, when we call them “indigenous”, it is as if suddenly the nature of authority and governance is obscured behind a fog of cultural relativism. Those who favour cultural groups or indigenous people are unwilling to judge them.

The confusion is deepened since many cultural or indigenous authorities are substantively democratic and do indeed work on behalf of their people (Larson, 2008; Olowu et al., 2004; Spierenburg, 1995; Spierenburg et al., 2008), whereas elected local governments often marginalize the poor, women, indigenous peoples and lower castes (Agrawal and Gupta, 2005; Crook and Manor, 1998; Crook and Sverrisson, 2001). Where communities are already highly stratified along the lines of power, income, wealth and social status, recognizing local governments can have the effect of “obscuring internal differences” within the village, thereby further marginalizing lower castes (Agrawal and Gupta, 2005).

Clearly, authority should not be legitimized just because it is labelled “democratic”, “customary” or “indigenous”, nor should power over the public domain be transferred uncritically to NGOs or private bodies.

Whereas elected local governments are often scrutinized, the terms

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“culture”, “private” or “NGO” should not provide protection from political analysis – even if these authorities are locally “legitimate” or considered “authentic” (see Ntsebeza, 2005). To avoid double standards, cultural and political authorities as well as civil society, community and private leaders should be viewed in the same critical light. This critical equity provides a starting point for a dialogue among cultural and political stances. All local authorities need to be evaluated for how they represent people, encourage citizenship and produce an engaging public domain.

Citizenship Citizenship is the ability to make demands on government. Recognition of different kinds of authorities and organizations entails different forms of belonging (Bandiaky, 2008; Lankina, 2008; Larson, 2008; Toni, 2007).

Under democratic authorities, belonging is inclusive of those who reside in a jurisdiction – residency-based citizenship. In liberal democracies, citizenship is usually associated with entitlement to certain civil, social and political rights irrespective of one’s identity and interests (Sparke, 2004).

But, “rather than merely focusing on citizenship as legal rights”, Isin and Turner (2002: 4) argue that “there is now agreement that citizenship must also be defined as a social process through which individuals and social groups engage in claiming, expanding or losing rights”. Citizenship has come to be a process of being politically engaged and shaping the fate of the polity in which one is involved (Isin and Turner, 2002).

Sikor and Lund (2009: 8) bring together property rights and citizen rights (as two aspects – avoir and être – of social life) that exist “only to the extent that they are produced, endorsed and sanctioned by some form of legitimate authority”. Sikor and Lund argue that, “[a]s authority grants or denies legitimacy to property claims, such claims are intimately bound up with the scope and constitution of authority. The two form a contract of mutual recognition” (2009: 9). Authority is legitimized and sanctioned at least partly insofar as it can support such claims. Hagberg (2004: 205) describes how “[t]he president of a given association must ground his legitimacy not only in his leadership skills and access to funding but also in other powerful registers linked to origin, ethnicity and family. The success of the leader will depend upon the aptitude to combine such different registers of power and legitimacy.” The choice of local interlocutors is partly a choice of actors who appeal to these forms of legitimacy and therefore these forms of belonging.

Power transfers to local interlocutors both empower and legitimize them as authorities – providing a material basis for their ability to authorize. Hence there are also contracts between authorities of different scales such that one recognizes the other and, in the process, produces

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the other’s authority. In return there is some presumption that the acts of a lower-level authority will be recognized by the higher-scale authority and will promote its vision and agenda. Empowering a local authority gives it a role and resources, making it worth engaging, giving people a reason to belong and to exert influence – to act as citizens. Authorities that are open to influence foster citizenship, whereas those that impose their will and are less inviting of engagement may produce subjects.9 Different authorities authorize several different forms of belonging.

Residency-based citizenship is an inclusive form of belonging associated with democratic authorities that are ostensibly open to influence by the resident population. In private groups and NGOs, belonging is narrower, based on interest – often class or objective driven. Membership in these organizations can also be based on identity, such as profession or any other entry criteria the leaders or members (in the case of democratically run private institutions) establish. In customary and religious institutions, membership is often based on identity – such as ethnicity, place of origin, language or religion. Self-appointed or hereditary, private and customary leaders may be less systematically accountable to their members.

Bandiaky (2008) shows how institutional choices by donors and the Forest Service deepen existing gender, class, political and ethnic hierarchies in the Malidino Biodiversity Community-based Reserve project in Senegal (funded by the World Bank), while weakening elected local authorities. Decentralization and forestry laws in Senegal give elected local governments (rural councils) the right to manage natural resources. The project, however, circumvented the rural councils, creating “village committees” led by village chiefs, imams and village elite “wise men” to manage the reserve. This marginalized and weakened the elected rural council. The project addressed gender by assigning elite women to administrative committee positions, such as treasurer, and by giving fictitious “paper” positions to elite family women. In turn, these elite women allocated project positions and resources to women in their families and ethnic groups. Male committee leaders, mostly from the ruling Socialist Party, also excluded opposition party members from reserve benefits. The Forest Service appointed an elected Socialist Party rural councillor as the reserve president, who allocated project food assistance to his extended kin and Socialist Party members. The reserve presidency allowed a private individual to use public powers to further his political agenda (as in Bates, 1981). The project enclosed the reserve in the service of one identity group, a political party and associated families, excluding the larger citizenry and reproducing gender inequalities in the process.

Different kinds of authorities confer diverse rights and recourse, being accountable to the population to varying degrees. Under some authorities, people are citizens, with rights and recourse; under others, they are

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managed as subjects (Mamdani, 1996). Citizenship emerges where there are empowered and downwardly accountable authorities, which are worth engaging with and are open to engagement. Choosing the locus of authority establishes, strengthens or weakens citizenship. Where public resources are channelled into private bodies or autocratic authorities, the scope for citizen engagement is diminished. In short, the choice of authorities matters for the enabling or production of citizen demand.

The public domain Without powers, no authorities are worth influencing – even if they are accountable. A “domain” is something that is dominated by an authority.

The public domain consists of the powers (resources and decisions) held, or citizen rights defended by, a public authority. It is the set of political powers vis-à-vis which citizens are able and entitled to influence public authorities. Retaining powers in the public domain maintains and reinforces public belonging in, and citizen identification with, the public authorities and with other citizens in the polity. Conversely, privatizing public resources and powers to individuals, corporations, customary authorities or NGOs diminishes the public domain. Such enclosure shrinks the integrative space of democratic public interaction. Without public powers there is no space for democracy, there is no “public domain” for citizens to engage in.

In Senegal, for example, Hesseling (n.d.) observed in the 1970s that, although the local government was elected, the state had given it too little power to have a meaningful relationship with local populations, noting that they had nothing to offer. There was no public domain, no citizenship and no democracy. A 1996 decentralization law and 1998 forestry law gave elected rural councils considerable authority over forest exploitation and management. But, because the Forest Service never allowed the councils to exercise these powers, the elected authorities remain powerless and frustrated that they cannot respond to local needs.

The foresters (supported by forest management projects of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank) created committees – often headed by traditional authorities – to manage the forests rather than allowing the councils to exercise their legal rights (Bandiaky, 2008; Faye, 2006). There is still little they can offer their communities, and community members do not engage them on forestry matters (Larson and Ribot, 2007; Ribot, 2009).

In decentralizations, the choice to allocate public powers among multiple interest and identity groups may enclose the public domain and fragment society into interest- and identity-based forms of belonging by taking those powers from public authorities. The privatization of public

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powers to NGOs and other private bodies is a form of enclosure. When actors receiving these powers are customary or religious authorities, this enclosure constitutes a de-secularization of powers. These acts diminish the domain of integrative public action, undermining residency-based belonging and citizenship. A public domain is a necessary part of representation and of the production of citizenship. It is the space of integrative collective action that constitutes democracy. For decentralization to produce benefits in terms of equity, efficiency and democratization, it is essential to retain substantial public powers in the public domain.

In Mexico, citizens were able to organize and demand benefits when local government had new resources with which to offer services – this created new spaces of citizen engagement (Grindle, 2007: 175). This is the kind of space – one of meaningful and sufficient discretionary powers – that intervening agents must create if local democracy (the responsiveness of local authorities to the people) is to take root. Fox (1996) too shows that the development of “virtuous” state–society relations, in which citizens are engaged, follows from the very existence of enabled government (also see Chhatre, 2008).

4.4 Discussion and conclusion The institutional choice and recognition framework has been used for comparative multi-case research to interrogate the effects on democracy of the recognition of local institutions and authorities (elected local government, pluralism, privatization, NGOism, support for customary chiefs); the results are summarized in Ribot et al. (2008). By examining the effects of choosing these different institutions in decentralizations, researchers examined the propositions that (i) the support given to local authorities privileges and strengthens them – whether their constituencies are residency, identity or interest based, and (ii) when governments and international agencies empower local authorities, they are enforcing upon the members of the groups the particular forms of comportment, accountability relations, belonging and beliefs of the chosen authorities.

The cases from this comparative study have been cited in the above discussion and provide some preliminary data on the ways institutional choices are made within decentralization reforms and how they shape representation, citizenship and the public domain.

The governments of India, Brazil, Indonesia, Russia, Guatemala, Benin, Senegal, Malawi and South Africa have launched processes ostensibly designed to enable local people to govern their own affairs (Ribot et al., 2008). In all of these cases, central government, donors or development professionals proclaimed a belief in democratic local government. This

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belief seems to have at least partly driven choices in India, Indonesia, Russia and Guatemala. In Brazil, Guatemala and Malawi, however, mistrust of local government compelled politicians, government agencies and donors to choose alternative local authorities. Mobilization of a union social movement in Brazil and an indigenous social movement in Guatemala, instrumental management objectives in Malawi, Benin and Senegal, belief in civil society in Brazil, Indonesia and Senegal, and a line ministry’s support for group rights in South Africa drove the choice towards parallel local authorities. The outcomes of these choices were mixed.

Recognition of local government in India, Indonesia, Russia and Guatemala helped local governments to become relevant and more representative. In Brazil, Malawi, Benin and Senegal, the circumvention of elected local government channelled resources into deconcentrated project committees and other private civil society organizations. In South Africa, recognition of collective private rights produced a democratically chosen ethnic leader.10 The empowerment of local governments in India and Indonesia illustrates how democratic competition shapes the political articulation of citizens with the state (see Chhatre, 2008; Ito, 2007). Whereas in India citizen engagement is broad based, in Indonesia engagement is between the state and a narrow elite. This narrow engagement followed from a selective civil society approach to local democracy in which policy-makers choose or cultivate an elite state-allied civil society. Ito (2007) shows the limits of a civil society approach to local democracy and development in Indonesia; increasing competition to influence decentralized public office could, over time, generate incentives for the elite to expand social inclusion, providing opportunities to poor villagers to influence policy. As Chhatre (2008) argues, competitive elections at many levels over time and several electoral cycles are needed for articulation to trickle down to the most marginalized sections of society. Lankina (2008) also shows how the struggle for local power in Russia has engaged deputies with the population in a more articulated political struggle. The governor, aligned with the Kremlin, is at odds with municipal deputies, who are actively cultivating a local citizenry and appealing to European donors and governance standards as part of their struggle to consolidate their locality’s political power and autonomy.

The selective civil society approach was also used in project implementation by the forestry and fisheries departments in Senegal, Malawi and Benin, where projects produced civil society committees composed of hand-picked local actors aligned with project objectives. In these cases and the Indonesia case, civil society approaches are used to selectively empower class, party, ethnic and gendered allies, reproducing and entrenching existing social stratification. This civil society approach is not

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enabling all groups within society to influence governance on an equal basis. In Brazil, however, the state chose an arguably pro-poor local union movement as its institutional ally, and in Guatemala the self-selected indigenous leaders did effectively protect the interests of their marginalized population. Where civil society emerged from social movements, it appears that a civil society approach is effective at broad-based representation and serving interests of the poor. Similarly, in Chhatre’s (2008) Indian case, a locally constituted social movement against a forestry project articulated broad-based representation through local government – the panchayat.

Democratic deepening is shaped by the way “unequal social relations and uneven institutional environments impinge upon the exercise of citizenship” (Heller et al., 2007: 627). In most of the case studies, transferred powers – whether discretionary or merely the implementation of mandates – follow the contours of the existing divisions and inequalities shaping national and local politics. In Himachal Pradesh, India, the powers took on the contours of balanced political competition (Chhatre, 2008). In Para, Brazil, they divided along party lines. In Bandung, Indonesia, they articulated via class divisions (Ito, 2007). In Guatemala, they fractured along indigenous and settler-integrationist lines (Larson, 2008).

Where few discretionary powers are transferred, as in Benin and Senegal, project funds and interventions still flow along lines of traditional ethnic and gender hierarchies (Bandiaky, 2008; Mongbo, 2008). Agrawal and Gupta (2005) argue that decentralization can exacerbate existing socioeconomic inequalities unless decentralization programmes are specifically biased towards disadvantaged groups, rather than being formally neutral in their design and implementation. Bandiaky (2008) also shows that gender biases are not addressed by gender-neutral projects and argues in favour of skewing recognition towards women and other marginalized groups.

The cases reviewed for this chapter show that the distributive aspects of recognition are not solely local. Mechanisms are needed to ensure that marginal populations can engage in their own governance. Local and central governments play roles in ensuring both the inclusion and the empowerment of marginal groups. In Indonesia, the choice of elite civil society is biasing distribution by channelling investments towards elite interests (Ito, 2007). In Guatemala and South Africa, however, it appears that marginal populations are being served by their own local institutions, and in South Africa that success came with the support of the central government’s Commission on Restitution of Land Rights (Larson, 2008; Spierenburg et al., 2008). When does local authority or local democracy serve the poor? Are Crook and Sverrisson (2001) right that local democracy does not serve the poor unless there is a central mandate to do so?

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How significant is Foster and Rosenzweig’s (2004) research showing that democratic local governments in India are more pro-poor than autocratic local authorities, or Heller et al.’s (2007) findings that all categories of respondents – including farmers, unions, scheduled castes and women – found improved service delivery following democratic decentralization reforms? Clearly, democratic decentralization can serve the poor, but targeting women, low castes and underprivileged groups with focused attention on biased hierarchy is probably a necessary complement to any local authority if local democracy is to redress entrenched inequity (also see Crook and Sverrisson, 2001; Heller et al., 2007: 629; and Mansuri and Rao, 2003: 11–14).

Recognition of representative authorities can provide for representation of diverse interests. Recognition of non-representative authorities, in contrast, can subject individuals to the cultural or ideological vagaries of those authorities. Many struggles for recognition and many acts of acknowledgement uncritically recognize non-representative authorities.

Tully (2000: 477) points out that struggles over recognition and distribution must be subject to “democratic disagreement, dispute, negotiation, amendment, implementation, review and further disagreement”. To remain democratic, these struggles need to be subordinated to democratic authority. “A free and democratic society will be legitimate even though its rules of recognition harbour elements of injustice and non-consensus if the citizens are always free to enter into processes of contestation and negotiation of the rules of recognition” (Tully, 2000: 477). However, rules are not easily contestable when the chosen authorities are nondemocratic and the choice of those authorities is imposed by inaccessible higher authorities. The central irony of the common practice of recognizing cultural authorities – chiefs, indigenous or ethnic leaders – in the name of freedom or democracy is that this recognition can constrain the very contestation that makes a society free and democratic.

More is required than Tully’s (2000) “democratic disagreement, dispute, negotiation, amendment, implementation, review, and further disagreement” or the progressive targeting of the poor, of women and of marginalized castes and ethnicities. Criteria are needed to judge the likely human rights and material equity effects of choosing particular authorities. Fraser (2000: 115) proposes the ideal of “participatory parity”, by which all citizens and citizen groups, regardless of identity, must have equal opportunities to participate in democratic institutions. In the institutions chosen by governments and international organizations, inclusive parity is not always evident. The chosen authorities are enabled to recognize other actors as authentic, or to discipline those they consider inauthentic. They are able to determine who belongs and who does not. In the cases explored in this chapter, the chosen actors are shaping who belongs

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and benefits – they are choosing by gender, migrant status, indigenousness, ethnicity and interest. Recognition is enabling cultural and noncultural authorities, which can in turn shape the boundaries of inclusion and determine which decisions are made by a broad public and which are to serve individual and collective private ends. To produce and maintain the “opportunity” for equal inclusion will require the production of a meaningful public domain with a built-in bias in favour of poor and marginal groups.

Neither accountable authorities without powers nor the devolution of power without popular accountability constitute local democracy. Without powers there is no reason for local people to engage as citizens – no reason for them to make demands on local government. Without accountability there is no means for people to engage as citizens – no channels through which to make those demands. The production of citizenship is predicated on a meaningful mix of both. Simple guidelines for policy and project design and implementation, as well as for monitoring and evaluation, are necessary to ensure that interventions support representation, citizenship and the development of a public domain.

The common framework for the design and evaluation of decentralization, which characterizes it as a combination of administrative, political and fiscal transfers, has little analytical purchase. Administrative and political decentralization are about who receives powers (appointed or elected bodies) whereas fiscal decentralization is about the kind of power received (finance). Indeed, fiscal power is only one kind of power among many, including executive, legislative and judicial powers. It is misleading insofar as fiscal power is only one executive resource and is relatively minor compared with other executive functions such as the allocation of jobs and access to resources. By focusing on the fiscal element alone, the framing occludes other powers that are much more important. Furthermore, these categories tell us nothing about the elements that constitute decentralization. No analytical causal relations are evoked by these three not even related categories.

Analytically, decentralization can be defined by local actors, the powers they hold and their accountability relations. It is the accountability relations that help us explain different outcomes of the exercise of powers.11 Actors, their powers and their accountability relations are the basic analytical elements of all forms of decentralization. The core question of any decentralization analysis is whether the choices being made by legislators and other intervening agents are resulting in a configuration of actors and powers and accountability relations that can be expected to lead to improved outcomes.

Democratic decentralization is, in its most basic form, the process through which central actors choose to transfer meaningful discretionary

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powers to local actors and are accountable to a broad cross-section of the local population (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). Meaningful discretion in the hands of downwardly accountable local authorities creates a public domain, while making citizenship meaningful and possible. Training attention on the logic of institutional choice and its effects on the institutions that it recognizes can help us to understand why local democracy is created or hindered and how we can promote democracy outcomes – the creation of a public domain, representation and engaged citizens.

Acknowledgements I would like to extend sincere thanks to Daniel Brockington, Ashwini Chhatre, Anki Dellnäs, Jonathan Fox, Amanda Hammar, Fidelx Pious Kulipossa, Tomila Lankina, Joakim Öjendal, Amy Poteete, Thomas Sikor, Jacob Trane Ibsen, Keebet and Franz von Benda-Beckmann and Wang Xiaoyi for their constructive comments on earlier versions. Finance for the research behind this chapter was generously provided by the Royal Dutch Embassy in Senegal, the World Bank Program on Forestry (PROFOR) and USAID’s Economic Growth, Agriculture and Technology (EGAT) division. This chapter has developed in steps. Earlier versions have appeared as Ribot (2006, 2007, 2008) and Ribot, Chhatre and Lankina (2008). The present chapter is a re-edited version of Ribot (2011).

Notes 1. In contrast to Habermas’s (1991) focus on the discursive domain of public interaction, I emphasize the material basis of authority, that is, the powers (resources and domains of decision-making) over which citizens can interact and attempt to influence public decisions. This is why I call this space of democracy the “public domain”.

2. Cases discussed in this chapter are from Ribot et al. (2008).

3. I use the term “recognition” following Taylor (1994) and Fabian (1999). The term here is simplified to “acknowledgement”; however, I chose to use “recognition” owing to the useful critiques of Taylor to be addressed later in this chapter.

4. Hagberg (2004: 200), studying locally rooted voluntary development associations in Burkina Faso, observes that “[a]ssociations need to seek recognition in three different realms. First, they seek to be recognized in the home arena so as to enjoy legitimacy and grass roots support. Second, the associations need to be officially recognized by the Burkinabe state. Third, they must seek to be recognized internationally so as to obtain funding and support.”

5. Including instances where the authorities being recognized are created by those recognizing them.

6. Despite the extreme difficulty in establishing links between institutional arrangements and development or ecological outcomes, a body of data is emerging (Conyers, 2002;

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Foster and Rosenzweig, 2004; Heller et al., 2007; Mansuri and Rao, 2003; Phelps et al., 2010; Ribot et al., 2010; World Bank, 2009).

7. Fung (2003) writes on the participation of civil society and of people within civil society in processes of decision-making. He does not, however, seem to view representative forms of government as sufficient or even necessary to the democratic processes.

8. This is not to deny the importance of competition between public and private agencies or local governments for efficient provision of public services (see Lankina et al., 2008).

9. Engagement does not have to be invited. Resistance is also a form of engagement that is used to confront imposed authority. Resistance too is part of the production of citizenship – the ability to influence governing authorities.

10. In a conflict with central authorities over management of a wildlife reserve, the Makuleke used national laws to establish a Communal Property Association to manage their land collectively. The association included the entire Makuleke community and elected its leadership. They elected their traditional chief as chairperson (Spierenburg et al., 2008).

11. Indeed, all institutions are defined by the accountability relations in which they are embedded. I call an institution “democratic” if it is accountable to the population it serves. I call it “administrative” if it is accountable upwards to a higher authority. I call it “private” when an individual or institution is not accountable with respect to a certain domain of action.

REFERENCES Agrawal, A. and K. Gupta (2005) “Decentralization and Participation: The Governance of Common Pool Resources in Nepal’s Terai”, World Development 33(7): 1101–1114.

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Bandiaky, S. (2008) “Gender Inequality in Malidino Biodiversity Reserve, Senegal: Political Parties and the ‘Village Approach’ ”, Conservation and Society 6(1): 62–73.

Bardhan, P. and D. Mookherjee (eds) (2006) Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing Countries. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Bates, R. (1981) Markets and States in Tropical Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Benda-Beckmann, F. von and K. von Benda-Beckmann (2006) “Changing One Is Changing All: Dynamics in the Adat–Islam–State Triangle”, Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 53(4): 239–270.

Benda-Beckmann, F. von, K. von Benda-Beckmann, J. Eckert, F. Pirie and B. Turner (2003) “Vitality and Revitalisation of Tradition in Law: Going Back into the Past or Future-oriented Development?”, in G. Schlee and B. Mann (eds) Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Report 2002–2003. Halle: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, pp. 296 –306.

Boone, C. (2003) Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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5 Where is local government going in Latin America?

Andrew Nickson

5.1 Introduction A major process of decentralization has been under way in Latin America since the mid-1980s, the reasons for which have been extensively debated (Angell et al., 2001; Bland, 2004; Nickson, 1995; O’Neill, 2005; Willis et al., 1999). The main features of this process, including greater formal political autonomy for and financial strengthening of local government, as well as the transfer of competencies from central government, have also been widely discussed (Campbell, 2003; Fukasaku and Hausmann, 1998; Melo and Rezende, 2004; Montero and Samuels, 2003; Perry et al., 1999; Peterson, 1997). There is also a growing literature on the way in which formal and informal institutions constrain and mould the outcomes of these decentralization processes (Eaton, 2004; Grindle, 2009). By contrast, far less attention has been paid to the impact of decentralization on the changing role of local government within the overall political system of Latin America. This chapter seeks to address the question “Where is local government going in Latin America?” by attempting to situate the current decentralization process within the framework of two distinct “ideal types” of contemporary local government systems around the world. I start by examining how states have designed decentralization programmes in the region.

The imperative of good local governance: Challenges for the next decade of decentralization, Öjendal and Dellnäs (eds), United Nations University Press, 2013, ISBN 978-92-808-1229-9

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5.2 The design of decentralization Latin America is the most urbanized region of the developing world: around 80 per cent of citizens now live in cities.1 The region is marked by the most extreme inequality of income in the world (UNDP, 2010). Although the average per capita income is US$5,540 (World Bank, 2008), some 40 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line. As a result, Latin American societies are characterized by low levels of inclusiveness and weak citizenship. Despite the common heritage of Spanish and Portuguese colonialism, there is a surprisingly high degree of diversity with regard to administrative structures within the 18 nations, 350 states and regions and over 16,000 municipalities of the region. The four largest nations (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Venezuela) are federal, whereas the rest are unitary.

The region retains a deep-rooted centralist tradition that spans both federal and unitary nations and is epitomized by a presidential system with strong executive powers over sub-national tiers of government. This tradition can be traced back to the extremely limited powers of the fledgling local political body, known as the cabildo, during the colonial experience and its subsequent decline during the post-independence period (Nickson, 1995). More recently, it was reinforced by a period of authoritarian military rule during the 1970s and 1980s. Yet, after more than a century and a half since independence during which local government had played a minimal role in the development process, uneasy domestic coalitions in favour of decentralization emerged during a period of democratization from the late 1980s.

Three groups, with different agendas, saw decentralization as a means to advance their respective aims. Neo-liberals viewed it as part of a wider strategy for reducing the role of the state in the economy. Radical reformers saw it as a progressive measure designed to overcome the exclusionary and undemocratic social structures inherited from the period of military rule. Technocrats viewed it primarily as a means to improve the efficiency of service delivery through better citizen voice and local accountability. In all cases except Bolivia, these pressures for decentralization originated “from above” and not from sub-national bodies (see Manor, Chapter 2 in this volume). The active encouragement of the InterAmerican Development Bank and the World Bank provided an important external support for these domestic coalitions. As the influence of this powerful coalition in favour of decentralization was felt in the public policy-making sphere, a structural change began to emerge in central– local relations.

The strengthening of the political autonomy of local government became the central feature of the decentralization process. Prior to this

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there was a longstanding tradition of central government appointment of executive heads – a practice that was particularly enduring in the case of capital cities of the region.2 From the early 1980s these central appointments were increasingly replaced by democratically elected mayors. By 2008 all countries except Cuba had multi-party local government elections. In Colombia (1988), mayors were elected for the first time for over a century, and in Paraguay (1991) they were elected for the first time ever in the history of the country. In Peru (1981), Bolivia (1985) and Chile (1992), local government elections were held for the first time since 1968, 1950 and 1973, respectively.

Under this sequencing arrangement, political democratization at the municipal level led to a deepening of the overall decentralization process, by kick-starting subsequent fiscal and administrative strengthening of local government. In the few cases where service delivery responsibilities were devolved prior to financial and political reforms, as in Argentina, this enhanced the likelihood of “recentralization” (Falleti, 2005; see also Smoke, Chapter 7 in this volume). The decentralization process has had a major impact on strengthening local government finances in the region.

The unweighted average of decentralized expenditure rose from 11.6 per cent of total public spending in 1980 to 18.8 per cent in 2002–2005 (Rosales and Valencia Carmona, 2008: 178). However, the process has been uneven. Among the federal nations, in Mexico and Venezuela the main thrust has been to devolve responsibilities to historically weak state governments rather than to local governments, whereas in Argentina and Brazil historically weak local governments have been accorded priority over state-level structures. Among the unitary nations, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Nicaragua have experienced considerable transfer of service delivery responsibilities and accompanying fiscal transfers.

Progress has been more limited in Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay and Uruguay. Generally speaking, the pace of fiscal decentralization in the region has outstripped the much slower transfer of service delivery responsibilities. The sharing of national tax revenue and the limited earmarking of such fiscal transfers have – in the absence of major new responsibilities – exacerbated problems of financial mismanagement, especially in the majority of smaller municipalities.

Nevertheless, the centralist tradition still has an impact on the design and implementation of the decentralization programmes undertaken in the region since the 1980s. These centralist pressures continue to produce a mismatch between the stated policy objectives of decentralization and the actual extent of change in central–local relations, as evidenced in the political, administrative and financial aspects of decentralization. First, despite the introduction of electoral democracy, many features of electoral legislation have entrenched centralization. In almost all countries,

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the system of proportional representation operates through closed and blocked party lists, an arrangement that enables the national leadership of political parties to impose candidates on party branches for municipal elections. In several countries, independent candidates are still not allowed to stand for municipal office. Second, in almost all countries there has been minimal progress towards the establishment of a career system for municipal administrators. Instead, the ongoing prevalence of clientelism in human resource “management” has enabled central governments to continue to exert control over the machinery of local government. Third, despite the introduction of transparent mechanisms for revenue-sharing in many countries, central government often restricts financial autonomy by retaining strong controls over the administration of property taxation, which is by far the major source of own-revenue for local government. A major review of local government in the region concluded that, “[d]espite advances in decentralization, Latin America is still a continent with a high degree of political, territorial and economic centralization, exacerbated by concentration in the metropolises and immense social and territorial disparities” (Rosales and Valencia Carmona, 2008: 199).

5.3 Two visions of local government Several global classifications of local government systems have been proposed that categorize national systems according to the nature of central–local relations, in particular the degree of overt political control that central government exercises over local government (Hesse and Sharpe, 1991; Humes, 1991; Norton, 1994; Page and Goldsmith, 1987).

These “structural” typologies were particularly relevant to Latin America during the 1970s, at a time of widespread authoritarianism, when the degree of political autonomy of local government could be measured primarily by the existence or not of a directly elected municipal executive. But, in the current period of democratization, when mayors are now directly elected in all municipalities in the region, the basis for this classification has lost its explanatory power.3 A more relevant and policyrelated comparison of local government systems in the current era of market liberalization is proposed here, namely one that is based on the core question, “What is the core purpose of local government?” In answering this question, two extreme positions, or Weberian “ideal types”, of local government systems may be identified, which derive from fundamental differences around the world in citizen understanding of the purpose of local government.

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5.3.1 The “managerialist” type The first of these types is what we may call “managerialist”, according to which the primary purpose of local government is the efficient delivery of services. Under this type, local government’s competencies are clearly defined, regulated by statute and circumscribed by the application of the principle of ultra vires. To put it crudely, “local government” fulfils the role of “local administration”. This economic rationale for local government, which derives from English utilitarian thinking, is given to it by central government, which ultimately decides the overall allocation of responsibilities between different tiers of government. Central government support for the transfer of responsibility for service provision to local government is based on the assumption that productive efficiency can be improved through lower unit costs arising from the use of locally available resources in the construction, maintenance and administration of public services.

Hence, embedded within this “managerialist” function of local government is an implied political subordination to the dictates of central government. This subordination often engenders a conflictive relationship between local and central government in which the allocation of service delivery responsibilities, always in the gift of central government, is seen as a “zero-sum game”. This produces a marked prevalence of confrontation rather than consensus in central–local relations. The tendency towards confrontation is reinforced by the use of a majoritarian (“first past the post”) electoral system that, by polarizing party positions, leads central government to call into question local government when it is controlled by opposition parties, and, at the local level, discourages consensus governance by political coalitions.

In pursuit of its objective of efficiency in service delivery, central government frequently imposes the territorial reorganization of local government in order to achieve economies of scale through the amalgamation of municipalities into larger administrative units. This further reduces citizen identification with local government. Partly as a consequence of this, voter turnout at local government elections tends to be low, and local voter preferences are determined primarily by national political considerations.

Given the significant transfer of service delivery responsibilities, intergovernmental fiscal transfers (IGFTs) from central to local government are sizeable, are strongly earmarked for specific purposes and are allocated between municipalities on the basis of a transparent, needsbased formula designed to ensure minimum nationally decreed standards of provision for individual services. This has two major regulatory

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implications for central–local relations. First, it means that, because local government’s share of total public expenditure is high, central government needs to exert strong control over local government expenditure in order to maintain macroeconomic stability. Hence, there is strict regulation over local government powers of taxation, over the rates of these local taxes and over the local government’s ability to borrow. Second, central government, as the source of most local government revenue, is concerned to ensure “value for money” via external efficiency audits of local government expenditure carried out by the Comptroller General’s Office, a prestigious body steeped in the Luso-Hispanic tradition of administrative law.

The nature of local accountability and citizen participation under this “managerialist” type must be viewed in the context of the overriding objective of central government to ensure efficient service delivery. Local government is held accountable to local citizens primarily for its economic performance in the delivery of local services. Broader political accountability, by contrast, is reduced by the large average population size of municipalities, by the high number of citizens per municipal councillor and by the limited transparency of the local government administrative machinery. Citizen participation is perceived in an instrumental fashion as a mechanism that may contribute towards improved service delivery.

Great stress is placed on the development of competition in supply, which enables citizens to exercise the “exit” option through individual choice between alternative mechanisms of service delivery. By contrast, forms of participation that engage citizens collectively to exercise “voice” in policy formulation and resource allocation are limited because these run the risk of interfering with centrally defined national priorities for service provision.

Of relevance for Latin America is the fact that it is the preferred type of local government by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. After two decades during which these international financial institutions had sought to bypass local government in their lending programmes to the region, in the late 1980s both institutions became strong advocates of decentralization and the institutional strengthening of local government. This volte-face was motivated primarily by “managerialist” considerations. First, in support of the harsh exigencies of the structural adjustment policies of the International Monetary Fund, they recognized the benefits of decentralization in contributing to overcoming the fiscal crisis of the state by tapping the enormous fiscal potential of local government. Second, they viewed local government basically as an institutional arrangement for improved service delivery, recognizing the advantages of decentralization in terms of improved productive efficiency, effectiveness and equity. Third, local

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government was also intended to play an instrumental role as a more efficient administrator of poverty-alleviation programmes during structural adjustment. It would improve upon central government’s performance by identifying target households, by coordinating centrally funded welfare programmes and by mobilizing community participation in social investment projects.

5.3.2 The “governmental” type The second type of local government is what we may call “governmental”. Service delivery is important but there is a wider role for local government both as the mouthpiece of a locality’s shared community interests and also in making policy choices in its name within the wider body politic “as a natural part of an organic whole” (Norton, 1994: 22).

This essentially “governmental” function of local government derives from strong citizen identification with local communities (for example, the commune in France and the comuna in Italy) that “possess a social reality anterior to that of the state” (Norton, 1994: 23). This imbues local government with a sense of shared responsibility with central government for service delivery, in which “levels of government have complementary contributions to make to the general social good” (Norton, 1994: 22). Local government retains a high degree of political autonomy, often enshrined in a written constitution. This autonomy is reflected in the general competence usually granted to local government to select which services to provide. This is important “at least symbolically but also as a statement of local government’s wider community responsibility, if not always of wide spending functions. Potentially at least, this wide responsibility allows local government to adopt a strategic role, reinforcing its nature as government rather than only as provider of specific services” (Batley, 1991: 226).

Under this type, local government exercises considerable discretion over the power of local taxation and the rates at which these taxes and charges are applied. National tax revenues are often shared between central and local government as equal partners in a common system of government rather than as a manifestation of a conflictive relationship in which central government has a clear ascendancy. As a result, central– local relations are characterized by negotiation and consensus rather than confrontation. The overlapping of competencies for the provision of particular services is common and, where this occurs, the actual division of responsibilities between different tiers of government is determined on the basis of partnership in a common endeavour. The role of central government, rather than that of a supervisor, is one of an adviser whose support may be requested by local government.

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The main direction of accountability by local government under the “governmental” type is to its own citizens rather than to central government. Local government is held accountable to citizens primarily for its political role in reflecting the collective interests of the community. Emphasis is placed on mechanisms of citizen consultation through organizations of civil society that incorporate the views of local “actors” (such as business, women’s and neighbourhood groups) in the formal policymaking process. Mechanisms of citizen consultation such as local referendums and plebiscites are used over matters affecting the strategic direction of local government. Local accountability is strengthened by the smaller average population size of municipalities, by the low number of citizens per elected councillor and by a high level of transparency of the local government administration (for example, local government files are normally open to the public). The marked preference for consensus instead of confrontation at the local level is derived in part from the electoral system of proportional representation, which encourages government by coalition. Voter turnout at local government elections is high.

Local political leaders have considerable prestige, often comparable with that of national politicians. The municipal executive head plays a key role as “broker” within a network of public and private agencies, in which s/ he is expected to display an ability to lever funds for local public and private investment.

Of relevance here is the fact that the formative period of local government in the region during the period from 1880 to 1920 coincided with large-scale immigration of artisans drawn overwhelmingly from the Mediterranean countries. The political values that they brought with them strongly affected the popular perception of local government along the lines of the “governmental” type, especially in the larger cities of the region. More recently, the Catalan municipal expert, Jordi Borja, himself a leading exponent of the “governmental” type, has exerted a major influence on Latin American policy-makers engaged in decentralization and local government (Borja et al., 1987, 1989).

5.4 Evolution of the Latin American system: Alternative scenarios Given the consolidation of the above-mentioned decentralization process, I now attempt to “locate” Latin America within the characterization of local government systems based on the two ideal types – the “managerialist” type and the “governmental” type. First, I examine the alternative scenarios that one would expect to unfold as each type expressed itself through changes in the major features of the local government system.

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5.4.1 Evolution towards the “managerialist” type?

Under this scenario, a gradual transfer of service delivery responsibilities to local government would continue, especially in education, health, social housing and urban water supply. The allocation of these responsibilities would become more clearly defined and the phenomenon of “concurrent” (overlapping) responsibilities of different tiers of government would become less pronounced. The earmarking of fiscal transfers would be emphasized. The transfer of responsibilities would be accompanied by a tightening of central government control over the expanded service delivery role performed by local government. The respective central government agencies would exercise this control primarily through the monitoring of standards of performance (for example, exam results, immunization coverage and building standards). These central government agencies would increasingly adopt a regulatory role as they relinquished their direct operational involvement in service delivery. On the financial front, the audit function performed by the Comptroller General’s Office would shift from that of ensuring the legality of local government expenditure towards “value for money” audits that monitored the efficient use of earmarked fiscal transfers received from central government. In pursuit of greater productive efficiency in service delivery through the reaping of economies of scale, there would also be a move towards the territorial reorganization of local government. This would take the form of the amalgamation of rural municipalities with small populations and the establishment of metropolitan forms of government in large conurbations.

5.4.2 Evolution towards the “governmental” type?

Under this scenario, the transfer of delivery responsibilities to local government for specific, clearly defined services would be less pronounced.

Instead, a partnership approach would develop in service provision between local government and a number of other “actors”, including central government, the private sector and not-for-profit organizations. The IGFT system would be based increasingly on revenue-sharing agreements, and transfers would not be earmarked to the same extent as under the “managerialist” scenario. Less emphasis would be placed on central government monitoring of local government expenditure, and the function of the Comptroller General’s Office would remain limited to ensuring the legality and probity of expenditure and own-revenue generation by local government. There would be minimal reorganization of the territorial dimension of local government. Instead of amalgamation into larger units, economies of scale would be achieved through the pooling of

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resources on a case-by-case basis and the voluntary relinquishment of particular service delivery responsibilities to a higher authority only when it was considered appropriate by local government.

5.5 Local government in Latin America: Quo vadis?

I now examine 12 features of the Latin American system of local government in an attempt to “locate” it within the parameters of the alternative scenarios outlined above (see Table 5.1). The highly centralized political system and service delivery system that characterized Latin America until recently have meant that some of these features are still “latent”, given the overall weak development of local government as an institution in the region, in comparison with many areas of the world.

Table 5.1 Features of local government systems Structural feature

The “managerialist” type

The “governmental” type

Legal status

Creature of parliament

Average population size General powers Intergovernmental fiscal transfer system

Large Limited by statute Determined by central government and limited by earmarking Strict regulation and “value for money” auditing Strict

Protected by national constitution Small General competence Revenue-sharing and with considerable discretion

Financial control and audit function National monitoring of standards of service provision Number of citizens per elected councillor Electoral system Voter turnout Citizen participation

Weak regulation and legal/ probity auditing Weak

High

Low

First past the post Low Limited/restricted

Proportional representation High Extensive/encouraged

5.5.1 Legal status In this respect the Latin American system of local government would seem at first to conform more to the “governmental” type. A definition of the municipality as a primary and autonomous unit of government within the national political system is now enshrined in the constitution of virtually every country in the region. The opening articles of the new constitu-

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tions of Colombia (1991) and Paraguay (1992) even defined the nation itself as “decentralized”, and in Brazil a new 1988 constitution for the first time recognized municipalities as constitutional bodies. Major legislation reforming local government was introduced through articles in the national constitution in Mexico (1983), Guatemala (1986) and Paraguay (1992). New municipal codes have been promulgated in 10 countries: Peru (1984), Bolivia (1985), El Salvador (1986), Colombia (1986), Nicaragua (1988), Venezuela (1988), Guatemala (1988), Honduras (1990), Chile (1992) and Paraguay (2010). These constitutions and municipal codes typically define local government autonomy in three major ways: politically, so that it is able to elect its own authorities; administratively, so that it may operate without interference in areas under its jurisdiction; and financially, so that it has the power to levy and collect its own sources of income. In addition, several constitutions state that municipal decisions may be challenged only through the courts.

However, it is necessary to distinguish between the rhetoric and the reality of municipal autonomy in the region. Latin American political culture remains highly centralized and, with the limited exception of Brazil, local government relations with central government are still characterized more by subordination than by equality. Laws approved by the national congress and decrees issued by the national executive invariably have an enormous bearing on municipal activities. The municipal codes regulate the internal organization and functions of local government to a much higher degree than under the “governmental” type. With the exception of those in a few provincias (states) in Argentina, municipalities in the region have virtually no independent legislative function and can make regulations only within the framework of state and national laws.

Finally, in many countries the constitutional autonomy of local government is belied by the fact that locally elected municipal administrations (mayors and councillors) may be suspended by a majority vote of the national congress for failure to discharge their duties.

5.5.2 Average population size In this respect the Latin American system would seem at first to conform more to the “managerialist” type of local government. The national population size of municipalities ranges from 14,000 to 85,000, with a weighted average of 33,863 (Nickson, 2011).4 These figures are similar to those found in countries approximating the “managerialist” type (Australia, 29,415; Sweden, 31,300; New Zealand, 48,400; Japan, 69,800) but are considerably higher than those found in the countries approximating to the “governmental” type (France, 1,745; Greece, 3,500; Spain, 4,900; Italy, 7,100). However, such international comparisons are deceptive because,

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in every Latin American country except Costa Rica, these national averages mask enormous differences in population size between municipalities, which are extremely pronounced by international standards. Around 90 per cent of all municipalities have fewer than 15,000 inhabitants and are essentially rural in character, and around 100 municipalities, less than 0.1 per cent of the total, have over 500,000 inhabitants.5 Rapid migration since the 1950s has swelled the populations of urban centres while at the same time contributing to the stagnation, if not absolute population decline, of the vast majority of rural municipalities. Yet nowhere have municipalities been amalgamated to accommodate this rapidly changing pattern of human settlement. Nor have municipalities been divided into size categories according to their capacity to provide different levels of service provision. Any such move in this direction would be interpreted as a flagrant violation of local government autonomy. As a result, municipalities, large and small, are treated equally by the law in terms of the range of services for which they are responsible.

Municipal sub-division has been a common phenomenon in rural areas.

The historical pattern of the Latin American municipality has been based on an urban centre and surrounding rural territory. In areas of expanding colonization, new urban settlements emerged within the rural hinterland of existing municipalities. They usually lacked adequate political representation and were subordinated to those political interests based in the municipal headquarters. The prime motive for “breaking away” has invariably been in order to obtain better access to IGFTs.6 This rural fragmentation explains the significant 16 per cent rise in the total number of municipalities in the region between 1994 and 2010 (Nickson, 2011). It continues in violation of regulations in virtually all national municipal codes that specify a minimum population size as a precondition for official recognition of new municipalities. The effect is to keep most Latin American municipalities well below the critical size needed in order to reap the economies of both scale and scope that would justify the trained personnel and capital investment necessary to provide adequate service provision to their citizens.

5.5.3 Metropolitan governance Most large conurbations in Latin America have long been formally designated as “metropolitan” areas. Yet, because of the perceived threat posed to municipal autonomy, hardly any have a functioning metropolitan system of government enabling the integrated management of the urban territory. This absence of metropolitan government has been responsible for the lack of coordination in service provision between municipalities within large conurbations. This is especially noticeable in the case of solid

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waste disposal, transportation and urban planning (Rosenbaum and Rodriguez Acosta, 2008). The only exception is the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima, which has a functioning metropolitan structure of government comprising a provincial council and 42 district municipalities.7

5.5.4 Inter-municipal collaboration Rural municipalities in the region with low-density population often lack the financial and human resources to operate a comprehensive range of services. Amalgamation, by promoting economies of scale, would make available technically qualified municipal staff and enable the costeffective provision of basic services such as road maintenance. Given the strong commitment to municipal autonomy in the territorial sense and the ongoing process of municipal fragmentation, local governments in Bolivia, the southern states of Brazil and Ecuador have developed forms of inter-municipal cooperation, known as mancomunidades. These voluntary associations seek to achieve economies of scale in service delivery through the pooling of scarce resources, especially for road maintenance, tourism development and environmental protection. However, the impact of most of these inter-municipal associations suffered from the fact that they were limited to links between municipal authorities without the involvement of the business sector and civil society (Montecinos, 2003).

5.5.5 General powers In this respect the Latin American system would seem at first to conform to the “governmental” type of local government. Municipal codes usually grant local government a general competence to undertake any service in its jurisdiction that is not assigned to another level of government or that it is not expressly forbidden to undertake. This differs sharply from the restrictions of the principle of ultra vires under the “managerialist” type (of which Chile is a rare example in Latin America), which limit the municipal mandate to clearly specified activities.

However, behind this rhetoric of a general competence lies the allimportant legal distinction between so-called discretionary and nondiscretionary functions. The point at which the line is drawn between the two is ultimately determined by central government. Non-discretionary functions mandated to local government include few that central government has any interest in undertaking itself. 8 It is these services, and these alone, that the vast majority of municipalities in Latin America actually provide. But even these are obligatory in name only, because no mechanism exists to penalize local government for their non-delivery. By contrast, discretionary functions are those basic public services that interest

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central government.9 Many of these were, in practice, absorbed by central government during the period of de-municipalization in the 1950s and 1960s (Nickson, 1995). Under the current wave of decentralization, some of these very same services are now being transferred back to local government. Despite the rhetoric of a general competence, Latin American municipalities have rarely taken the initiative to expand their own mandate beyond the non-discretionary services outlined in the municipal code. Furthermore, virtually all the expansion of service delivery functions by local government during the current wave of decentralization resulted from the transfer of non-discretionary functions at the initiative of central government.

5.5.6 Intergovernmental fiscal transfer system In this respect the Latin American system would seem to conform increasingly to the “governmental” type of local government. Until the 1980s, IGFTs to local government were small scale, were on an ad hoc basis and hence subject to sudden variation, and were often allocated between municipalities on the arbitrary basis of clientelism. Since then, however, there has been a rapid increase in the level of fiscal transfers, which often take the form of general revenue-sharing agreements, under which local government receives a stipulated share of national fiscal revenue (for example, Bolivia, 20 per cent; Costa Rica, 10 per cent; Ecuador, 15 per cent; and Venezuela, 20 per cent) or of national public expenditure (for example, Dominican Republic, 10 per cent; El Salvador, 7 per cent; Guatemala, 10 per cent; Honduras, 5 per cent; and Nicaragua, 10 per cent).

The most far-reaching examples of this new approach occurred in Brazil and Colombia. In Brazil, a wide range of new revenue-sharing agreements with both federal and state government were embodied in the 1988 Constitution. Municipalities henceforth received guaranteed transfers that included stipulated shares of the proceeds from federal taxes on income, industrial production and rural property, as well as from a state value-added tax and state tax on vehicle ownership. In Colombia, the 1992 Constitution introduced a general agreement for the sharing of national fiscal revenue, with the proportion accruing to local government destined to rise, by stages, to 41 per cent by 2001.

Because these revenue-sharing agreements were linked to major sources of national taxation, they greatly increased the elasticity of municipal income in relation to overall economic growth. Their predictability and transparency, in sharp contrast to the volatility and obscurity of the previous transfer mechanism, also enabled municipalities to programme expenditure over the medium term. The increased level of IGFTs functioned like a central government “multi-purpose” or block grant and they were not usually earmarked for specific sectoral expendi-

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tures. Consequently, municipal discretion in the allocation of its financial resources in accordance with local priorities was significantly increased.

The only limitation on this discretion was the frequent requirement that a minimum share of the grant should be spent on particular services.

Although IGFTs from such tax-sharing have been allocated on needsbased criteria rather than the previous origin-based (that is, derivation) criteria, they have had a weak impact in reducing horizontal inequity between municipalities. This is because the transfer formulas have not incorporated an equalization mechanism designed to ensure a standard level of service provision across all municipalities by “topping up” local revenues in areas of below-average fiscal capacity. Instead, transfer formulas usually include equity considerations as just one among several factors in the overall weighting. As a result, despite the increase in their scale and their greater transparency in recent years, IGFTs have not diminished the enormous disparities in municipal expenditure per head.

5.5.7 Financial audit The Latin American system of local government audit also seems to conform strongly to the “governmental” type. In most countries, financial supervision of local government is entrusted to the Comptroller General’s Office, although in some of the smaller countries of the region this function is carried out by the Ministry of the Interior or by the Ministry of Finance. The overriding audit objective is to ensure the legality and probity of municipal revenue generation and expenditure. Hence municipal performance is evaluated in terms of budgetary conformity and financial propriety. This takes the form of a posteriori audits of municipal accounts, controlling the preparation and execution of budgets, as well as the purchase and sale of municipal assets. The Comptroller General’s Office can independently investigate the finances of a municipality without requiring the invitation of the municipal auditor. This form of financial supervision is essentially regulatory rather than supportive in nature, and the audit process rarely involves techniques of management accounting. Even in those countries that have seen a dramatic recent growth in IGFTs – notably Bolivia, Chile and Colombia – the Comptroller General’s Office provides little guidance on management practices, carries out no comparative analysis of municipal expenditure and thus offers little information on managerialist efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery by local government.

5.5.8 National monitoring of standards of service provision In this respect the Latin American system conforms strongly to the “governmental” type of local government. Despite the rapid growth in IGFTs,

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central government monitoring of standards of service provision by local government is still relatively rare in Latin America. During the 1990s, national systems of educational assessment were introduced in a few countries. The most notable case is Chile, where assessment findings have been used as a management tool by central government for targeting supplementary fiscal transfers to educationally disadvantaged municipalities.

Elsewhere, however, moves towards national monitoring in the “core” services provided by local government are still largely absent. This absence reflects the fact that central governments in Latin America are not yet committed to the goal of ensuring universal standards of service provision to all their citizens for specific public services such as education, public health, housing and water urban supply. As shown in section 5.5.6, the absence of a formal equalization mechanism means that, despite the increase in the scale and transparency of IGFTs in recent years, they have had little impact in reducing the enormous disparities in the level of service provision between municipalities.

5.5.9 Ratio of citizens to elected officers One of the most striking features of the Latin American electoral system that sets it apart from the rest of the world is the very small number of councillors, ranging from a minimum of 5 in most countries to a maximum of only 60 in the case of the Municipality of Buenos Aires. The limit placed on the number of councillors has led to a gross deficit in local representative democracy, especially in larger municipalities of the region where the number of citizens per councillor ranges from 100,000 to 500,000 (Nickson, 2011). These figures are extremely high by international standards. Both “managerialist” and “governmental” municipalities in other parts of the world have much lower numbers of citizens per councillor.

5.5.10 Electoral system In this respect the Latin American system conforms strongly to the “governmental” type of local government. Throughout the region, councillors are elected “at-large” (by the entire body of voters) under the d’Hondt system of proportional representation. The only exception is Panama, where the “first past the post” system based on sub-municipal electoral wards is practised, and in Venezuela, where a 1992 reform introduced a mixed system under which two-thirds of councillors are elected on a ward basis and the remaining one-third according to party lists. Despite a lively debate about the merits of the first past the post system, notably in Colombia, there have been no further moves in this direction in the region.10

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Furthermore, party lists are usually closed and blocked, greatly reducing political accountability to the electorate. This has served to entrench the power of elites within political parties and encourages intra-party bickering over position on the list to take precedence over the cultivation of a strong personal relationship between candidates and the electorate.

The “opening up” of the party list system has been noticeably absent from the decentralization reform process in recent years. In Brazil, councillors are elected by a variation of the party list system of proportional representation under which voters select a single candidate from a party list. Seats are distributed between parties in proportion to their candidates’ aggregate share of the overall vote and parties’ seats are then allocated in rank order to their highest-scoring candidates. Venezuela (from 1989) and Chile (from 1992) are also exceptions, where an open preference voting system was introduced with a “non-blocked” list ( panachage).

5.5.11 Voter turnout In this respect the Latin American system would seem at first to conform more to the “governmental” type of local government. However, although voter turnout is relatively high by international standards, there is evidence of a decline in recent years. In El Salvador, local government elections are still held at the same time as elections for national office, which understandably raises the voter turnout for local elections. In Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, where voting is obligatory, the turnout remains high. This is particularly the case in Chile, where the legal requirement to vote is strictly enforced.

In most other countries, where local elections are traditionally held on separate dates from national elections – usually at the mid-point of the period of presidential office – local turnout is typically well below that at national elections. In Venezuela and Colombia, the timing of local government elections was delinked from that of national elections during the 1980s, but this did not have the effect of raising the turnout. In both countries, local electoral turnout is now well below that of national elections. The turnout in the smaller Central American countries averages around 50 per cent, although in the first ever elections for local mayors in Costa Rica in 2002 the turnout was only 25 per cent. Voter turnout in Bolivia and Paraguay has displayed a declining trend since democratization began (Nickson, 2009).

5.5.12 Citizen participation In this respect the Latin American system would seem at first sight to conform to the “governmental” type of local government. The exclusionary

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style of development has been a major underlying cause of social conflict in Latin America, and opposition to authoritarian rule in the 1970s and 1980s was often expressed through the emergence of community organizations. The newly established democratic governments of the region regarded citizen participation as a means of containing social tensions and strengthening the long-term prospects of democracy through dialogue and consensus-building at the municipal level. Citizen participation was also seen as a way of improving performance in service delivery by introducing greater transparency into municipal resource allocation so as to better reflect the broad interests of the population (see Grindle, Chapter 8 in this volume).

Central government encouraged citizen participation through revisions to local government legislation, requiring municipalities to grant official recognition to community organizations, to undertake local referendums and plebiscites and to accept popular initiatives and recall of officeholders (Cunill, 1991). In most countries, mayors are now legally required to consult with citizens through periodic open meetings (cabildos abiertos). Although the use of such meetings remains strong in Central America (Costa Rica, Nicaragua and El Salvador), elsewhere in the region they are often a formality and little effort is made to publicize them. In Colombia, all candidates for the post of mayor are required to submit a “programme”. If they do not implement the programme, the electorate may call a vote to remove them from office. Legislation in Costa Rica, Ecuador, Paraguay and Venezuela also allows for referendums to revoke the mayoral mandate. In some cases, the allegations of poor management and corruption necessary to trigger a referendum are vaguely defined and the mechanism has become open to abuse. In almost all countries there is encouragement for municipal authorities to officially recognize and liaise with community organizations.

Participatory budgeting, first introduced in the Municipality of Porto Alegre in 1989, has achieved worldwide interest as a novel form of citizen participation in the formulation of the municipal budget (Abers, 1998; Baiocchi, 2001; De Sousa Santos, 1998; Gret and Sintomer, 2005; Schneider and Baquero, 2006; Souza, 2001; see also Blair, Chapter 6 in this volume). By 2010 this policy had spread to around 200 –250 Brazilian municipalities. It has also been transferred in a more simplified form to at least another 500 municipalities in most other countries in the region (Andersson and Van Laerhoven, 2007; Chavez and Goldfrank, 2004). Although participatory budgeting is now mandatory for all municipalities in some countries in the region (for example, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Peru and the Dominican Republic), the practice has more often become a topdown formality that does not encourage the independent mobilization of civil society (Sintomer et al., 2010). Nevertheless, a study of 14 experi-

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ences in Bolivia, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Peru concluded that, despite problems, participatory budgeting had succeeded in small, povertystricken, rural municipalities as well as in large cities (Goldfrank, 2007).

Legislative reforms in Colombia and Brazil have heavily promoted citizen participation. In Colombia, the 1986 municipal reform legislation introduced the most comprehensive range of mechanisms in Latin America for promoting citizen participation in local governance. These include local planning committees, local administrative boards to monitor municipal service delivery, citizen representation on the boards of municipal companies and out-sourcing of municipal investment projects to local communities. However, implementation has been greatly limited by the legal requirement that municipal councils must approve the associated enabling regulations. The 1988 Brazilian Constitution enshrines the plebiscite, the referendum, popular tribunes, popular councils and the right to popular initiatives, with the signatures of 5 per cent of those on the electoral register as a requirement to trigger such actions.

However, a considerable gulf has emerged between the rhetoric and the reality of citizen participation in Latin American local government, and the real level of participation is usually no higher than that found in other regions with comparable living standards. Lack of continuity has been a notable feature of community participation initiatives. Mobilization was often built around specific demands and, once these were realized, participation tended to diminish. Most examples of citizen participation appear to have taken place on the personal initiative of the mayor, whose role as facilitator had many drawbacks. It encouraged a network of individual relationships between neighbourhood leaders and the mayor, in the process marginalizing both councillors and the wider membership of community groups. These initiatives were rarely institutionalized, because existing administrative processes and forms of decision-making were not modified.

In the larger cities of the region, democratization also saw the introduction of new mechanisms for administrative deconcentration and citizen consultation at the sub-municipal level (Myers and Dietz, 2002).

Examples include the 31 sub-mayoralties within the Municipality of São Paulo from 1983, the 18 community centres within the Municipality of Montevideo from 1993, the 16 delegations within the Municipality of Mexico City and the 15 communes within the Municipality of Buenos Aires. As these new structures have become institutionalized, in some cases elected bodies have been introduced around these structures. In Mexico City, the delegation heads are directly elected and in Buenos Aires community councillors were elected for the first time in 2007.

Such mechanisms are often projected as political initiatives designed to strengthen citizen participation in local government. However, they are

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also motivated by managerialist considerations, seeking to ensure a more effective delivery of municipal services through new deconcentrated structures. Some Brazilian municipalities, notably Fortaleza in the State of Ceará, have attempted to link intra-municipal administrative deconcentration with the creation of a “holistic” multi-sector approach to service delivery, led by multi-professional teams (Prates, 1998). The new elected committees at the sub-municipal level are usually limited to an advisory role, without policy-making powers, and rarely operating with their own budget. The locally elected committees in Montevideo, which have decision-making powers over budget allocation, are a rare exception (Goldfrank, 2002).

5.6 Conclusion: Where is decentralization going in Latin America?

By 2011, local government in Latin America had been considerably strengthened in comparison with two decades earlier. Political democratization at the municipal level has been the lynchpin of the process and the direct election of local authorities has now become the norm rather than the exception. In the process, this is helping to slowly introduce programmatic politics into parties that were hitherto overwhelmingly clientelist in nature. It is also beginning to produce a new generation of national political leaders with experience of municipal management. Constitutional and other legal reforms have transferred new competencies and fiscal resources to sub-national governments. IGFTs have risen considerably and sub-national governments now typically account for around one-fifth of total public expenditure, twice the share in the mid-1980s. The new competencies of the local governments are encouraging an uneven process of institutional development where some municipalities stand out because of their capacity for initiatives and innovation whereas others still cling to their traditional structures and practices.

As we have seen, Latin American local government is strongly conditioned by its historical tradition of centralism. Nevertheless, after decades of relative stagnation, that system is currently undergoing rapid evolution, primarily as a result of pressures from powerful external actors – namely, central government and multilateral development agencies. For this reason, it is valid to ask where decentralization in Latin America is going. In order to seek an answer to this question, I consider which of the two above-mentioned “types” of local government is gaining ascendancy.

On the face of it, Latin American local government seems to display certain features that have more in common with the “governmental”

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type. These include strong legal protection for political autonomy, a general competence, an electoral system based on proportional representation and limited financial control by central government. But, as we have seen, in reality autonomy is severely limited and the actual mandate is strongly determined by central government, both of which are key features of the “managerialist” type. The extremely high ratio of citizens to elected officers, the low voter turnout, limited citizen participation and the emphasis on administrative deconcentration at the sub-municipal level are also features that have more in common with the “managerialist” type.

The recent reforms in central–local financial relations, with the emphasis on revenue-sharing, the high level of discretion in the use of transfers, the weak monitoring of standards of service provision and the legalitybased system of audit, might seem to be pushing Latin American local government in the direction of the “governmental” type. Nevertheless, the “managerialist” type of local government is already making powerful inroads in Latin America, as part of the wider move towards liberalization and market-led development within the region. The classic example is Chile, where the introduction of an “agency” role for local government under central government supervision, with strict earmarking of financial transfers and national monitoring of standards of service provision, is much more aligned with the “managerialist” type than any other national system in Latin America is with the “governmental” type. The “managerialist” type of local government, with its strong supervisory role for central government, would seem to be more congruent with the longstanding tradition of centralism in the region. Its overriding focus on the service delivery role of local government may prove to have a growing appeal in a region of the world with probably the greatest level of disparities in the provision of basic public services. The longstanding and noble dream of Latin American cognoscenti to emulate the classic European “governmental” type, even enhancing it with a participatory style of local democracy, could well be sidelined as an increasingly pragmatic and instrumental perception of local government takes hold. This may be a price worth paying, given the urgency of the task of providing decent basic public services to the citizens of Latin America.

Notes 1. For the purposes of this chapter, Latin America refers to the following 18 countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela and Uruguay. Cuba is excluded because of the absence of multi-party democracy at the municipal level.

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142 ANDREW NICKSON 2. In contrast to Africa and Asia, where appointed executive heads have usually been recruited from a central cadre of career-based public administrators, the criterion for the selection of appointed municipal executive heads was political patronage rather than professional competence.

3. Panama was the last country in Latin America to introduce the direct election of mayors (in 1995). The mayor of Buenos Aires was directly elected for the first time in June 1996 and the mayor of Mexico City was directly elected for the first time in July 1997.

4. The only exception is Peru, which had a much smaller average size because of its unique two-tier system of local government.

5. France provides the only comparable example: in 2010 more than half – some 19,428 – of the 36,682 municipalities had fewer than 500 inhabitants and 33,000 had fewer than 3,000 inhabitants.

6. Throughout the region, this process of municipal fragmentation has been unwittingly encouraged by the growing use of transparent formulas for the allocation of IGFTs, which often include provision of a minimum amount for every municipality, irrespective of population size.

7. Even here, the port of Callao, which is an integral part of the city of Lima, has separate provincial status.

8. These non-discretionary functions fall into four broad categories: (i) elementary powers of regulation carried out on behalf of central government, such as public order, justice of the peace, and civil registration, (ii) essential urban services, such as road maintenance, city lighting, street cleaning, solid waste management and basic land-use zoning, (iii) essential revenue-generating public services, such as slaughterhouses, cemeteries, public markets and bus terminals, and (iv) basic social services, such as public hygiene, granting of commercial and industrial licences, and weights and measures.

9. These discretionary functions fall into three broad categories: public utilities (water, sewerage and electricity supply), social services (primary health care and basic education) and planning (road transport, zoning).

10. In El Salvador, the party that wins most votes obtains all council seats and there is consequently no representation of other parties.

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Andersson, K. and F. Van Laerhoven (2007) “Participatory Municipal Governance in Latin America”, Comparative Political Studies 40: 1085–1111.

Angell, A., P. Lowden and R. Thorp (2001) Decentralizing Development: The Political Economy of Institutional Reform in Colombia and Chile. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Baiocchi, G. (2001) “Participation, Activism and Politics: The Porto Alegre Experiment and Deliberative Democratic Theory”, Politics and Society 29: 43–72.

Batley, R. (1991) “Comparisons and Lessons”, in R. Batley and G. Stoker (eds) Local Government in Europe: Trends and Developments. Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 210 –229.

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Bland, G. (2004) “Enclaves and Elections: The Decision to Decentralize in Chile”, in A. Montero and D. Samuels (eds) Decentralization and Democracy in Latin America. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 94 –121.

Borja, J., T. Valdes, H. Pozo and E. Morales (1987) Descentralización del Estado: Movimiento Social y Gestión Local. Santiago de Chile: CLACSO, FLACSO, ICI. Borja, J., F. Calderón Gutiérrez, M. Grossi and S. Peñalva (eds) (1989) Descentralización y Democracia: Gobiernos Locales en América Latina. Santiago de Chile: CLACSO. Campbell, T. (2003) The Quiet Revolution: Decentralization and the Rise of Political Participation in Latin American Cities. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Chavez, D. and B. Goldfrank (eds) (2004) The Left in the City: Participatory Local Governments in Latin America. London: Latin America Bureau.

Cunill, N. (1991) Participación Ciudadana. Caracas: Centro Latinoamericano de Administración Para el Desarrollo.

De Sousa Santos, B. (1998) “Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre: Toward a Redistributive Democracy”, Politics and Society 26(4): 416 –510.

Eaton, K. (2004) Politics Beyond the Capital: The Design of Subnational Institutions in South America. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Falleti, T. (2005) “A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective”, American Political Science Review 99(3): 327–346.

Fukasaku, K. and R. Hausmann (1998) Democracy, Decentralization and Deficits in Latin America. Paris: OECD and Inter-American Development Bank.

Goldfrank, B. (2002) “The Fragile Flower of Local Democracy: A Case Study of Decentralization/Participation in Montevideo”, Politics & Society 30(1): 51–83.

Goldfrank, B. (2007) “Lessons from Latin America’s Experience with Participatory Budgeting”, in A. Shah (ed.) Participatory Budgeting. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Gret, M. and Y. Sintomer (2005) The Porto Alegre Experiment: Learning Lessons for Better Democracy. London: Zed Press.

Grindle, M. (2009) Going Local: Decentralization, Democratization, and the Promise of Good Governance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hesse, J. J. and L. J. Sharpe (1991) “Local Government in International Perspective: Some Comparative Observations”, in J. J. Hesse (ed.) Local Government and Urban Affairs in International Perspective. Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.

Humes, S. (1991) Local Government and National Power. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Melo, M. and F. Rezende (2004) “Decentralization and Governance”, in J. Tulchin and A. Selee (eds) Democratization and Democratic Governance in Latin America. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, Reports on the Americas, No. 12.

Montecinos, E. (2003) De la Asociatividad Municipal a la Asociatividad Estratégica. Granada: Unión Iberoamericana de Municipalistas.

Montero, A. and D. Samuels (eds) (2003) Decentralization and Democracy in Latin America. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Myers, D. and H. Dietz (2002) Capital City Politics in Latin America: Democratization and Empowerment. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

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144 ANDREW NICKSON Nickson, R. A. (1995) Local Government in Latin America. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Nickson, R. A. (2009) “The Local Governance Reforms in Latin America”, in N. Kersting et al., Local Governance Reforms in Global Perspective. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 76 –126.

Nickson, R. A. (2011) “Where Is Local Government in Latin America Going? A Comparative Perspective”. Working Paper No. 6, International Centre for Local Democracy (ICLD), Visby, Sweden.

Norton, A. (1994) International Handbook of Local and Regional Government: A Comparative Analysis of Advanced Democracies. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.

O’Neill, K. (2005) Decentralizing the State: Elections, Parties and Local Power in the Andes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Page, E. and M. Goldsmith (eds) (1987) Central and Local Relations: A Comparative Analysis of West European Unitary States. London: Sage.

Perry, G., S. J. Burki and W. Dillinger (1999) Beyond the Center: Decentralizing the State. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Peterson, G. (1997) Decentralization in Latin America: Learning through Experience. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Prates, L. (1998) “Descentralización, Intersectorialidad y Red en la Gestión de la Ciudad”, Reforma y Democracia (Caracas) 18: 89–108.

Rosales, M. and S. Valencia Carmona (2008) “Latin America”, in Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World: First Global Report by United Cities and Local Governments. Barcelona: United Cities and Local Governments, pp. 166 –199.

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Sintomer, Y., C. Herzberg and G. Allegretti, with A. Röcke (2010) Learning from the South: Participatory Budgeting Worldwide – An Invitation to Global Cooperation. Bonn: InWEnt GmbH – Capacity Building International, Germany, and Service Agency Communities in One World.

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6 Participatory budgeting and local governance Harry Blair

6.1 Introduction Citizen-determined budget priorities have become a favourite theme in decentralization for international donors over the last couple of decades.

This is not surprising, because what could provide a better way to bring government closer to the governed than by having citizens decide how to spend public funds? And how better to give citizens the incentive to accept taxation than to give them a role in determining how their tax moneys are spent?

What has been the track record of participatory budgeting, and what lessons can be drawn from it for local governance? This will be the present chapter’s central theme.1 I shall begin by looking at the most ambitious, most studied and arguably most successful effort in participatory budgeting: the Porto Alegre initiative and its widespread replication in Brazil (although this was not a donor-sponsored endeavour but rather an entirely indigenous one, it nonetheless serves nicely as an exemplar of the high end in participatory budgeting, against which other efforts can be compared). I then go on to offer a number of examples that have been driven variously by donor funding (Cambodia, Serbia and Indonesia) or a combination of domestic reforms supplemented by donor efforts (Bolivia, El Salvador, the Philippines and a separate Indonesian effort). Two of these (El Salvador and Serbia) have been post-conflict initiatives seeking to repair societal divisions and build linkages to the state, a third (Indonesia) has tried to The imperative of good local governance: Challenges for the next decade of decentralization, Öjendal and Dellnäs (eds), United Nations University Press, 2013, ISBN 978-92-808-1229-9

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bolster an early-stage democracy after a long authoritarian period, and another one (Cambodia) has aimed at making an increasingly authoritarian regime more accountable to its citizenry. The donor in all cases has been the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), except for one of the Indonesian examples, where it has been the World Bank.2 Altogether these eight cases essentially cover the spectrum of the possible in participatory budgeting. Some of the cases (Brazil, the Indonesian Kecamatan Development Program) have been quite successful over time, whereas others have at best made only marginal progress (Cambodia, Serbia), with the remainder in between. My objective here, however, is not to assess project success as such but rather to explore a full range of participatory budgeting experiments and what can be learned from them.

Before beginning, I should define “participatory budgeting”. This relatively new term in the developmental lexicon dates from the experiment begun in Porto Alegre in 1989 and, in this Internet age, there is perhaps no better way to capture its most widely accepted meaning than to quote the Wikipedia entry:3 Participatory budgeting is a process of democratic deliberation and decisionmaking, . . . in which ordinary people decide [directly or indirectly through representatives] how to allocate part of a municipal or public budget. Participatory budgeting allows citizens to identify, discuss, and prioritize public spending projects. Participatory budgeting generally involves several basic steps: 1) Community members identify spending priorities and select budget delegates 2) Budget delegates develop specific spending proposals, with help from experts 3) Community members vote on which proposals to fund 4) The city or institution implements the top proposals.

By adding the phrase within square brackets I have widened the definition beyond its usual use, with the idea of including all local governance systems that aim to provide a process for serious citizen involvement of any kind in deciding budgetary allocations. I will thus be discussing participatory budgeting in its broadest sense.

6.2 Case studies 6.2.1 Porto Alegre: The participatory budgeting pioneer In 1989, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (or Workers’ Party, which was the party of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who was later to become Brazil’s president) led a Popular Alliance coalition to win municipal elections in Porto Alegre, a city of some 1.3 million in the country’s south-east. Led by

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Mayor Olívio Dutra, the coalition took advantage of the decentralization features of the country’s new 1988 Constitution to institute a participatory budgeting process (called “Orçamento Participativo” in Portuguese) the next year.4 The participatory budgeting process begins with open neighbourhood public meetings at the outset of the annual budget cycle. Citizens debate the previous year’s municipal efforts, determine priorities for the upcoming year, and elect delegates to a regional meeting, at which neighbourhood proposals are consolidated and prioritized. The delegates within each of the city’s 16 regions elect two higher-level delegates to the citywide Conselho do Orçamento Participativo (COP, or Participatory Budget Council) (Koonings, 2004: 85–91). The COP then further consolidates and prioritizes all the proposals from the regions, based on a weighting formula. Finally, the COP proposals go to the municipal council for deliberation and approval, which has generally been granted with few if any changes. The COP then monitors implementation of the year’s budget.

In the COP’s weighting system, citizen preferences, carried by the elected neighbourhood delegates and debated at regional meetings, are then combined with “statistically measured need” (the degree of previous access in relation to need – for example, proportion of streets unpaved, housing units lacking sanitary water) and population size. Each of these three factors is scored and added up for each region. The 16 sets of regional preferences are then put together at the COP meetings into a consolidated municipal budget (Wainwright, 2003: 48– 49; see also Avritzer, 1999: 11–12). As should be obvious, the whole system is quite complex and requires a good deal of technical support from the municipal executive office to function properly (De Sousa Santos, 1998).

Participatory budgeting can also claim a number of other achievements. First, it has brought in many new participants, particularly among the poor. One estimate (Koonings, 2004: 92) holds that something like one-third of the poor have taken part in the process, whereas another found that one-fifth of all citizens had participated at some point up to 2006 (World Bank, 2008: 23). More importantly, perhaps, the poor appear not just to have attended meetings but to have actively participated, for example speaking up just as often as the non-poor (Baiocchi, 1999: 9) and getting elected to both regional meetings and the COP itself (CIDADE, 2010).

There is some indication of elite influence through “creaming”, in that the more educated and wealthier tiers of participants get elected to successively higher offices (Fedozzi, 2007, cited in World Bank, 2008: I, 34 –35), but the relative proportions of those with less education and income also getting elected would have to be reckoned as extraordinary.

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Participatory budgeting does seem to have provided something of a Tocquevillean education in local-level schools of democracy (Tocqueville, [1835] 2000: Vol. I, Book 1, Ch. 5).

Second, it has replaced a patron–client political structure in which citizen loyalty went upward and political largesse came downward with a budget system based on neighbourhood wants and objective needs. Pork patronage (legislated budget allocations benefiting specific individuals or groups as a special favour), in fact, has been virtually eliminated as the scope for discretionary budgeting has decreased for the municipal council members (Koonings, 2004: 85–91).

In a third and related achievement, participatory budgeting shows that it is possible to overcome the disincentives to cooperate that characterize a patron–client system. More specifically, poor people had to see themselves as gaining sufficiently in public services and investments to outweigh the transaction costs, risk of embarrassment, time spent, etc., in the participatory budgeting process (see Abers, 1998, 2000).

As an impressively successful experiment, Porto Alegre’s participatory budgeting system has been widely copied. Within Brazil, over 100 municipalities have taken up participatory budgeting reforms, as have many states in the country’s federal structure (Selee, 2005). Moreover, participatory budgeting has survived loss of political power by the political party that started it; since 2004 Porto Alegre has been governed by another party but participatory budgeting remains in place. The system has spread into other Latin American countries and also some European ones (Bräutigam, 2004; Sintomer et al., 2008).

There are some constraints on replicating the model elsewhere. For one thing, money, as always, helps considerably. Porto Alegre is among the richer Brazilian cities in one of the richer states, enabling it to raise the revenues needed for participatory budgeting and furnish the technical advice needed to rationalize and consolidate participatory budgeting priorities. Second, the city possesses a bureaucratic infrastructure that can deliver the goods and services that the participatory budgeting process calls for. And third, it has largely been able to avoid the kind of capture by elites and vested interests that has stymied decentralization initiatives in other places.

After participatory budgeting had been in place for well over a decade, it became possible to undertake serious studies of its impact on poverty and well-being. Studies by Marquetti (2003, cited in Boulding and Wampler, 2009) and the World Bank (2008) found that participatory budgeting did reduce poverty rates, while increasing access to well-being measures such as piped water and sewage treatment. However, a later study based on 220 Brazilian cities showed no real participatory budgeting impact on broader well-being indices such as infant mortality, life

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expectancy or literacy, although it did decrease poverty (Boulding and Wampler, 2009).

6.2.2 Bolivia: Local checks and balances Bolivia’s Popular Participation Law (PPL), launched in 1994, constituted one of the boldest reforms anywhere in the history of local governance – an “audacious reform” indeed, in the words of Merilee Grindle’s 2000 book title. A country that had systematically excluded its large indigenous population from meaningful political participation for some five centuries suddenly embarked on a plan to devolve significant resources and responsibilities to its citizens at the local level, along with several avenues for citizens to participate in local governance and demand accountability from those they chose to exercise that governance.5 At one stroke, the PPL introduced a number of major reforms. It devolved responsibility for health, education, sanitation, irrigation and roads, inter alia, accompanied by a guaranteed transfer of 20 per cent of national tax revenues to the country’s 311 municipalities, specifying that at least 85 per cent of that allocation must be spent on investment, as opposed to recurring costs of administration. Second, in addition to elected councils, it established a parallel municipal structure called Comité de Vigilancia (CV, or Vigilance Committee) in each municipality, to be composed of representatives from territorially based community organizations (Organizaciones Territoriales de Base, OTBs), each representing his/ her canton and each selected according to the organization’s mores and customs (usos y costumbres) for two-year terms.

Participatory budgeting of an indirect nature came into the picture as the CVs were charged with preparing investment plans as well as oversight of the council’s implementation of investment. In other words, the CVs decided on investment priorities, the councils implemented the plans and the CVs monitored their performance. CVs also had some sanctioning power in that they were given authority to lodge actionable complaints (denuncias) of council malfeasance to the national senate, which at its discretion could withhold central funds from the municipality.

Collectively these reforms established two paths for direct citizen participation (choosing members for the council and the CV) and several more for indirect participation through their representatives (for the council its normal business and for the CVs their regular work and the denuncias).

The PPL brought a number of advantages to the municipal level. First, the two-fifths of the population who had been without any official governance structure at all now had elected and accountable councils, along with substantial budgets. Second, the new system provided a school for

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democracy, especially for the poor. Grootaert and Narayan (2001: 23–24, 57) found in their detailed study of four municipalities that people from the poorest quintile assumed leadership positions in the OTBs as often as those in the top quintile. Third, associational investment paid off, again especially for the poor. Joining and participating in associational life brought a greater return than other activity, even education (at least in the short run), and this was more so for the poor than for the rich (Grootaert and Narayan, 2001: 58–59).

Evidence on the PPL’s impact is mixed. Like Boulding and Wampler (2009) on Brazil, Cameron (2009: 65) found that the PPL had little effect on social and economic development but did bring a degree of empowerment to the rural poor, giving them a certain agency against the outside world. And in this observation he supports Grindle, who finds the CV structure giving grassroots OTB organizations some leverage vis-à-vis local elites, who tended to have more influence with the town councils (Grindle, 2000: 132).

There were other problems as well. For one thing, the territorial nature of the OTB/CV setup meant awarding monopoly representational rights to just one OTB in each canton, which almost always went to some longstanding (though not thitherto officially recognized) men’s organization, leaving the equally venerable rural women’s associations with even less power than they had before. In addition, the Bolivian state could not furnish anything like the bureaucratic infrastructure that municipalities such as Porto Alegre could provide to assist the participatory budgeting process there. Local expertise was thin to begin with, given that some 90 per cent of Bolivia’s municipalities have fewer than 50,000 inhabitants, and fully one-third have fewer than 5,000. Furthermore, help from the national level is less steady than it could be because, every time power changes hands at the national level, the entire bureaucracy is replaced throughout the country. Despite efforts by USAID and other donors using pilot projects to bring CV members up to speed on municipal planning, budget monitoring and the like, these new office holders tended to find themselves in over their heads with their new responsibilities. And the fact that they were expected to work pro bono while the council members held paid positions understandably grated considerably.

6.2.3 The Philippines: Civil society as an inside player in local governance The Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 launched an explosion in participatory governance in the Philippines – another “audacious reform” arguably approaching Bolivia’s PPL in its determination to devolve meaningful authority and resources to the citizenry.6 On the supply side

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of local governance, the LGC devolved service delivery functions in such areas as health, education and environment, while allocating an automatic 40 per cent of internal revenues to pay for them and transferring some 70,000 central government employees to implement them.

On the demand side, the LGC mandated full participation by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in all “local special bodies” (statutory committees) at the various levels – barangay (village or urban neighbourhood), municipality, city and province – to include membership in committees overseeing health, education and, most importantly, all Local Development Councils and the Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committees. The former deal with socioeconomic development efforts, including their evaluation, and the latter focus on all-important local construction and service delivery contracts. NGOs were to constitute fully 25 per cent of the voting members of Local Development Councils and to have two members on the Prequalification Committees at all levels. All certified NGOs in a jurisdiction would choose those to fill these slots.

The citizen role in the budgeting process is even more indirect than in Bolivia, for there the OTB members did choose all the members of the CV, which constituted the investment planning mechanism at local level.

In the Philippines, NGOs claiming with differing degrees of validity to represent various elements of the population decided among themselves who to delegate to the statutory local government committees charged with public investments, where they would constitute a quarter of the total members. Still, the process did inject into the planning and budgeting process a new set of players who represented the citizenry in a different way from elected council members. In effect, civil society – the so-called “third sector” of organized life in distinction from the state and private sectors – was to move partly in with the first sector.

Nationwide, the new local governance system has attracted much enthusiasm, and, as expected in a country so given to unfettered debate and self-criticism as the Philippines, it has been subjected to withering criticism.7 But for purposes of the present chapter, the reforms are best understood and analysed through an examination of the country’s best case. Individual sub-national governmental units were free to go further than the LGC required, and by all accounts the most daring experimenter has been Naga City, a municipality of about 140,000 inhabitants located some 450 kilometres south-east of Manila in southern Luzon. Here Mayor Jesse Robredo led the city to undertake an exceptionally bold effort to include civil society participation in urban management.

In 1995, a city ordinance invited all NGOs to join a new Naga City People’s Council (NCPC), which would then have the exclusive right to appoint representatives to all city government bodies (excluding the city council itself), not to exceed 25 per cent of their total membership. The

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NCPC representatives were entitled to participate, vote and introduce legislation in all committees. By 2004, its representatives sat with full rights on some 29 standing committees of the city legislature as well as 14 “special bodies”. Each of the city’s 27 barangays also has a people’s council, modelled on the NCPC (Naga City Government, 2004; ADB, 2004).

The NCPC has been intimately involved with budget planning and decisions. In the mayor’s words, the NCPC has been “co-governing” the city, an observation shared by the Philippines Centre for Investigative Journalism, which is internationally known and esteemed for its highly critical stories of official malfeasance (Pabico, 2007a, 2007b, 2008). The Naga model has been emulated in a few places such as Quezon City (CPE, 2009), but even after more than 15 years it remains the standout example of how indirect participatory budgeting can work in the Philippines.

However, the very success of the “co-governing” model in Naga City provides its own cause for concern. In its analysis of the Naga experience, the Asian Development Bank observed: The traditional inputs [from NGOs] in making the government listen to the voice of the people, such as mobilizations and rallies, take much of the time and resources of civil society organizations with uncertain [and] unsure results.

In contrast, the avenues offered for participation through direct involvement in government meetings and discussions produce the needed results with less resources and at the same time strengthen the capacities of the people to engage the government. (ADB, 2004: 13)

But can it become too easy for civil society organizations to deal with government? Can the civil society community become an inside player within the state structure without changing the nature of the political game itself? Can the “third sector” be autonomously representing the interests of its constituencies vis-à-vis the state if it becomes part of the state? Such questions arise in particular when one considers that the NGO representatives serving on all these bodies are most likely the best and more able leaders in the civil society community. If they are in danger of being captured by the state, what will happen to the rest of civil society? As Bill Cooke (2005) might put it, can NGOs work inside the state system without being co-opted?

6.2.4 El Salvador: Mass meetings to direct local investment In 1986, the government of El Salvador, then caught up in a brutal civil war, introduced a new municipal code, which among other things resuscitated an institution from the Spanish colonial era called the cabildo abierto, or open town meeting. The new regulations called for mayors in the

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country’s 200-plus municipalities to hold a cabildo every three months, to which all citizens, as well as NGOs and community groups, would be invited. Its function would be to ask citizens to specify and prioritize infrastructural needs so as to guide local government in its investment decision-making.8 Shortly afterward, USAID employed the cabildo institution as the mechanism for allotting municipal reconstruction grants during the then ongoing conflict, thinking that its efforts would thereby gain popular support and even (though the term had not yet come into use) build “social capital” in a war-torn country. Its Municipalities in Action programme (MEA, after the Spanish name of the programme, Municipalidades en Acción) stipulated that all local projects supported would have to be first proposed in cabildos abiertos. That the programme enjoyed popular support was attested to by the apparent fact that no MEA infrastructural project was attacked during the years between programme launch in 1986 and the end of the war six years later (Wilson et al., 1994: 2). As hostilities wound down and came to an end through the Peace Accords of 1992, the programme was extended to areas that had been controlled by the opposition side during the long war (1980 –1992).

By the time MEA had finished its work in 1994, it had completed more than 8,600 local projects, spending some US$135 million, mainly focusing on roads, schools, water and electricity, and operating in all 261 municipalities of the country (most of which were rural areas with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants).9 By the end of the MEA programme, about 80 per cent of the total required cabildos were being held and over 200,000 citizens were attending them. Altogether, it was a very substantial programme for a country of 5 million people.

In 1993, a survey of over 1,000 respondents revealed considerable citizen confidence in the programme. Of the sample total, 27 per cent had attended at least one cabildo abierto at some point. Among those who had attended, 96 per cent responded that those in attendance had asked for a project at the meeting and 61 per cent reported that the requested project had in fact been built. Some 77 per cent said their family had directly benefited from a project. Altogether, 58 per cent of all respondents thought the cabildos had either a high or a medium importance in identifying projects to be built.10 As with any development enterprise, the cabildo abierto approach had problems. First, its scope was strictly limited to identifying local infrastructure projects. Actual decisions on which projects were to be built were made by the municipal council, whose meetings were almost always closed, a practice fitting in well with the winner-take-all structure of municipal elections in El Salvador, whereby the party with a plurality of votes gets all the council seats plus the mayor’s office, leaving opposition

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parties entirely bereft of any official presence at all in municipal affairs (see Blair et al., 1995: 44ff; also Bland, 1994). The citizen role, then, comprised little more than making wish lists.

In sum, the cabildo abierto did open a useful channel for citizens to express their needs to local government (that is, reveal their preferences), and a fair number made use of this new avenue. Later on and with considerable donor prodding, some municipal council meetings became more open as well. But there is little indication that popular participation went beyond the level of submitting requests to local authorities.

6.2.5 Serbia: Community confidence-building through participation In the wake of Yugoslavia’s disintegration during the 1990s, international donors set up various post-conflict programmes designed to mitigate the effects of the serial upheavals that had taken place and to begin rebuilding both physical and social capital. USAID in Serbia sponsored such a programme, designed to bring forth significant citizen participation that would include ethnic minorities and women. Community Revitalization through Democratic Action (CRDA) was launched in July 2001 to spend US$200 million over the ensuing five years (Blair et al., 2004; Czajkowska et al., 2005).

Five implementing American NGOs were each assigned a region of the country in which their task was to set up citizen committees that were to include ethnic minorities and women, and to start at least one community-driven infrastructure-oriented project in each site. The basic approach was to begin with open community meetings in which a citizen committee would be elected. The citizen committees would choose smallscale projects (mostly infrastructure, but quite a few in the health sector and some for education and even fairs and festivals). With assistance from CRDA to assure technical soundness, proposals were drawn up, and projects selected would then be funded by CRDA, provided the mesna zajednica (local municipal government) contributed 25 per cent of the cost. Once the project had been agreed upon by the citizen committee and the mesna zajednica, the project would be contracted out for implementation. By early 2005, CRDA had completed over 3,000 projects at an average cost of about US$40,000 (Czajkowska et al., 2005: 10 –17).

A mid-term assessment of the programme found that CRDA had in fact stimulated citizen participation, which included women and minorities as required. Further, the programme had provided models and experience in inter-group consensus-building that encouraged new community leaders to emerge. But in general, the evaluators found, CRDA tended to emphasize physical infrastructure over the more subtle goals of building social capital, increasing tolerance and mobilizing demand for democratization. Physical product had become more important than social process.

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The CRDA approach did provide some experience in democratic practice, but there seemed little spillover into other local activities, nor was there much evidence of a citizenry becoming more politically active (Czajkowska et al., 2005; Sneed, 2006: 104 –105).

In the end, CRDA was successful in that it completed a large number of projects all around the country, generating considerable local income in the process. The Community Revitalization half of the programme’s title thus was realized in considerable measure, which evidently was the intention of the USAID director at the time, who had brought the quicklaunch model from a previous assignment in Lebanon. He was then able to turn the approach into a much larger template for what became the huge infrastructure programme that unfolded in Iraq in mid-decade (Merritt, 2006: 40).

The Democratic Action half of CRDA came up somewhat shorter, however. The citizen committees did incorporate some degree of community representation with their requirements for female and minority membership (the latter especially important in a country that had disintegrated through ethnic conflict), and these organizations provided useful experience in local governance to their members. But neither the Serbian government nor USAID evinced any interest in continuing the experiment, despite several contractors’ attempts to build in a sustainability component (Blair et al., 2004; Czajkowska et al., 2005: 32).

6.2.6 Indonesian Musrenbang: Injecting citizen input into top-down planning Indonesia offers two examples of participatory budgeting, both very large in scale. The bigger of the two in terms of coverage has been the Musrenbang programme,11 which, as in Bolivia and the Philippines, started as a “big bang” initiative taking in the entire country. The programme began with decentralization laws passed in 2003 and 2004, transferring significant authority and responsibility as well as resources to the local level, along with some three-quarters of all government servants. The Musrenbang’s main feature has been a bottom-up process of successive meetings designed to elicit and then consolidate local priorities for state investment over a yearly cycle.

Things begin in January with open meetings organized by the regional body for planning and development (Badan perencanaan pembangunan daerah, known as Bappeda) in each of its villages (average population around 2,700), which all citizens are urged to attend. The meeting determines investment priorities and selects attendees to represent the village choices at the next highest level, the sub-district or kecamatan, where civil servants and members of the district legislature (Dewan perwakilan rakyat daerah, or DPRD) join in. At this level, preferences expressed by

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the villages (there are roughly 20 villages per kecamatan) are consolidated amid a great deal of negotiating and horse-trading into a unified list of preferences. Delegates are again selected for Musrenbang meetings at the district level, where a third level of Musrenbang meets to consolidate the preferences expressed by the kecamatan. In the next step, the priorities established through the Musrenbang system are folded into the overall district development plan for the following year.

Criticisms were numerous. To begin with, Musrenbang meetings were in many cases either not held or essentially closed affairs. Much more important was the continued dominance of centralized planning. A national structure consisting of 33 provinces, roughly 450 districts, 5,400 sub-districts and 70,000 villages, in which a central planning ministry in Jakarta (the National Development Planning Agency, Badan perencanaan pembangunan nasional, known as Bappenas) operating through its agents at provincial and district level was charged with determining virtually all investments, was not going to surrender control overnight to a bottom-up scheme, especially one that was facilitated by the very same Bappeda office that had managed the earlier system. In effect, bureaucratic Bappeda could – and did – ignore bottom-up Musrenbang and elected DPRDs. Scope for citizen input, in sum, proved rather minimal. Still, the Musrenbang process did for the first time encourage some citizen participation in budgetary allocation in a system that since Dutch colonial times operated through a very centralized, top-down planning organization that essentially precluded any citizen input at all.

As an add-on to a larger programme aiming to strengthen DPRDs and civil society organizations, a USAID effort titled the Local Governance Support Program (LGSP) worked on strengthening the Musrenbang process with a Musrenbang Delegation Forum consisting of Musrenbang attendees who would “follow the budget development and approval process and then advocate for the inclusion of Musrenbang results in the [district level] budget” (LGSP, 2009a: 2–19). The LGSP reported that such forums had been set up in half its 62 districts by the end of 2008 (LGSP, 2009a: 9; 2009b). This initiative may well have enhanced citizen input into the district-level allocations, but it came along late in the project (which closed in September 2009) and it is not clear how much of it survived or whether the government had an interest in replicating it elsewhere in the country.

6.2.7 Indonesian Kecamatan Development Project: Locally determined investment Operating somewhat in parallel with the Musrenbang process was the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) sponsored by the World

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Bank.12 It has also been huge by any standard, encompassing almost three-quarters of Indonesia’s sub-districts by 2009 and spending well over US$1 billion in the process. KDP began in 1998, targeting the poorest sub-districts and thus choosing to “build on the rest” rather than “build on the best”, to use an old phrase from the rural development programmes of the 1970s. By 2012 it was reaching more than three-quarters of the country’s kecamatans.13 The KDP cycle begins with open village meetings at which proposals are offered and eventually up to three are decided upon (the first two must include a women’s component). The village selects a delegation to attend a series of kecamatan-level meetings, at which all the village proposals are vetted for technical feasibility and prioritized. Projects can consist of infrastructure, economic or social development activity (though most deal with infrastructure). KDP grants run between US$60,000 and US$110,000, including an average 17 per cent community contribution.

Government officials supervise the programme, but the actual implementation is handled by consultant teams of facilitators at all levels down to kecamatan and village, which allows the project to avoid using underperforming contractors (KDP claims 25–50 per cent savings over normal construction costs). The programme’s pro-poor aspect emerges in KDP surveys showing some 50 per cent of planning meeting participants in the poorest stratum, which also supplies around 70 per cent of the workforce on KDP projects. Elite capture is held in check partly in this way, but a potentially stronger bulwark comes in the form of a “blind contract” with a journalists’ association, which covers a set number of projects, at times of the association’s own choosing, and without any prior project review of what it publishes.14 An evaluation covering the 2002–2007 period and using a treatmentand-control-group methodology found significantly increased per capita consumption within the poorest quintile in KDP villages, as well as increased access to health care and employment, with fewer benefits flowing to upper-quintile groups (Voss, 2008).

At least a couple of serious problems have been reported, however.

First, like the Brazilian participatory budgeting programmes, KDP requires significant overhead in the form of the technical and social facilitators who provide the necessary expertise and close field supervision. Such people are in scarce supply, and management costs have run 15–20 per cent higher than in other World Bank initiatives. Second, as with many pro-poor efforts, even though the poor do benefit, it has proved difficult to reach the very poorest stratum, which as elsewhere tends to consist disproportionately of female-headed households. Finally, there is some worry that, after the project ends, there will not be funding to keep the facilitators in place, with the consequence that, although the bottom-up prioritizing process might have built up enough inertial momentum to

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keep going, it will no longer be able to keep shady contractors out of the game, and thus project construction will become both substandard in quality and more costly in price.

6.2.8 Cambodia: Intermediaries between local government and citizenry Cambodia is perhaps best characterized as a “one-party-plus” regime, in which the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) is overwhelmingly dominant but tolerates and even encourages a modest opposition to maintain some international legitimacy and to keep party functionaries at least minimally responsive to public demands (Blue et al., 2008). It is this last motivation that provided the opening for a modest USAID programme titled the Local Administration and Reform Program (LAAR), which ended its five-year run in September 2010.15 Cambodia’s lowest (and only) tier of sub-national government is the commune council, of which there are 1,621 in the country. Following the 2007 election, fully 1,590 of them had a CPP majority, with minor parties controlling the other 31 (although they have some 30 per cent of the total seats in all councils). LAAR worked with 356 (22 per cent) of these councils, all CPP controlled.

The local government system required that commune councils hold village meetings on an annual cycle to solicit citizen views on development investment priorities, but, given the country’s turbulent background (the Khmer Rouge oppression of the late 1970s, followed by a Vietnamese invasion and takeover, then an interregnum managed by the United Nations, a coup engineered by the CPP, and finally today’s authoritarian state), it makes sense that the commune councils were on the one hand unenthusiastic about seeking out citizen input and on the other hand lacked any real knowledge of how to go about doing it. LAAR’s approach was to set up and train Citizen Monitoring Committees (CMCs) to act as intermediaries between commune council and citizen.

In the programme’s first phase, CMC members were chosen by a show of hands among those attending an initial meeting, but the USAID office concluded that this approach looked too much like an election, possibly implying a competitor to the officially elected commune council, so in subsequent years CMC members were vetted and selected by the commune councils. The CMCs included members from each village within the commune council’s boundaries and along with commune council members received training on outreach, social development and monitoring. The CMC task was to recruit villagers to attend meetings with commune council members, where they could voice their thinking on development investment priorities. Afterwards, CMC members attended commune council

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meetings to monitor the latter’s work and report back to their villages about how local priorities fared in the commune council’s yearly allocations.

A mid-term evaluation found that the CMCs seemed to be only minimally engaged in monitoring and little given to reporting back to their constituents. But they did appear to do quite well at mobilizing citizens to participate in commune council outreach meetings at village level.

And commune council members at the meetings evidently did in fact solicit citizen views, using a simple matrix method to determine villagers’ priorities. The evaluation team was not able to determine the extent to which these priorities wound up in the final commune council investment plans, but the fact that commune council members felt it necessary to ask for and listen to citizen input must be regarded as a step forward against a backdrop of top-down authoritarian governance.

6.3 Analysis A number of interesting patterns emerge from comparing the eight cases summarized in the previous section. My analysis of these patterns will proceed in two phases. First will come a discussion of the dimensions of citizen involvement in participatory budgeting, which will employ Figure 6.1 for illustration. This will be followed by an examination of participatory budgeting’s salient features, in which the chart appearing as Table 6.1 should be helpful as the argument moves along.

6.3.1 Two dimensions for citizen involvement If the key aspect of participatory budgeting is the extent to which ordinary citizens decide how to allocate part of a local government budget, we can rank our eight case studies along two dimensions, as in Figure 6.1.

The first dimension is the citizen role in initiating budget priorities (the horizontal axis) and the second is the citizen role in determining local budget allocations (the vertical axis). In Porto Alegre (Brazil), citizen groups meet to set priorities, sort them out and consolidate them into an investment package, which the city council then implements; then, at the end of the cycle, citizen groups review the results. In short, they (and their elected representatives at successively higher levels) both initiate proposals and determine how those proposals fare in the budgeting process. In El Salvador’s cabildos abiertos, in contrast, citizens met to devise a wish list of priorities but had no role after that in determining or even influencing the actual allocation of local investment funds. Thus Porto Alegre ranks high on both dimensions in Figure 6.1, whereas El Salvador

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Figure 6.1 Direct and indirect citizen participation level in budget allocation

ranks modestly on the initiating (horizontal) axis but at the bottom on the determining (vertical) axis.

Other experiences fall mostly in between Porto Alegre and El Salvador. In Cambodia, the CMCs worked as outreach agents for the elected commune councils in organizing open local meetings to establish investment priorities, and then had the chance at council meetings to advocate for different projects (though there was not much indication that they exercised that opportunity), so Cambodia would rank about the same as El Salvador on the horizontal scale but a bit higher on the vertical scale in Figure 6.1. In the Indonesian Musrenbang process, those present at successive levels of village and sub-district chose representatives to take their priorities to the next tier, and could argue their case at that level, so the Musrenbang would rank somewhat higher than Cambodia or El Salvador on both dimensions. With Indonesia’s KDP, though, the citizen committees actually decide on investment allocations, so it ranks higher on both dimensions.

6.3.2 Direct and indirect participation All Philippine local government units are mandated to include NGO representatives as 25 per cent of sectoral committees and also the statutory

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bodies that deal with public investment programmes and select contractors to implement such programmes. To the extent (not universal by any means) that local governments complied with the mandate, NGOs came into a strong position to influence budgetary allocations. So there is some participation by citizens in budgeting matters, but only indirectly through NGOs claiming to represent them. In Serbia, there was somewhat more citizen involvement, in that attendees at an initial meeting chose members of a citizen committee, but then it was the citizen committee itself that actually decided on the projects to be proposed. On the project determining side (vertical axis), the citizen committee then negotiated with the elected local government to finalize allocations, so there was some input on the determining side as well. Accordingly, Serbia would rank higher on both axes, but again any citizen role came only indirectly through the citizen committee. Finally, the Bolivian CVs, selected by the officially designated OTBs, had the sole authority to decide on a municipality’s investment programme, to monitor the results and to lodge actionable complaints about the elected council’s implementation of its projects. If anything, that might even amount to more citizen power than the COPs have in Porto Alegre, but again that power is indirect, in this case by two removes, because CV members are chosen by the OTBs, which in turn represent only some of the citizens in their territory.

By now a second pattern has emerged, as appears in Figure 6.1’s ovals.

Citizens in Brazil, Indonesia, Cambodia and El Salvador had a direct participatory role in that they initiated the first round of budgetary allocation at an open public meeting. But citizens in the Bolivian, Serbian and Philippine cases had only an indirect role, in that they respectively selected, elected or were at best nominal members of groups that were involved in initiating budgetary allocations. In a general sense, the direct participation systems have more say in initiating budget allocations, but the two groups rank about the same on actually determining those decisions. Systems with indirect participation, in other words, can have as much impact on determining allocation as the direct ones.

For the remainder of this section, Table 6.1 should prove a useful guide to the discussion.

6.3.3 Innovation origins and motivations My examples show a mix of domestic and donor origins. Porto Alegre, the Bolivian PPL, the Philippine LGC and the Indonesian Musrenbang were all quite home grown, whereas the Cambodian CMCs, the Indonesian KDP and the Serbian citizen committees were donor creations, with the Salvadoran cabildos a mix. Motivations differed considerably.

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El Salvador – Cabildos abiertos Serbia – Community Revitalization through Democratic Action

Note: LG = local government.

Brazil – Porto Alegre Bolivia – Popular Participation Law Philippines – Local Government Code Indonesia – Musrenbang process Indonesia – Kecamatan Development Program Cambodia – Local Administration and Reform Program

Type

Country & programme

2000

1986

2005

1998

2004

1991

1994

1989

Year introduced

Non-government spending authority

Mass meetings

LG–citizen intermediary structure

Bottom-up project decisions

Participatory prioritization

Participatory LG budgeting Checks and balances in LG NGOs inside LG units

Key characteristic

Table 6.1 Participatory budgeting in eight settings

Decentralization

Post-conflict

Domestic and donor Donor

Donor

Donor

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Domestic

Source of innovation

Donor

Donor

Donor

Donor

Central government champions Central

Local champion National champion

Source of political will

Some

Some USAID

USAID pilot

High

Some USAID pilot None

USAID pilot

High

Technical assistance

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Parallel governance structure

Unclear

Medium to high

High

Medium

High

High

Medium

Low

Risk of elite capture

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Incoming mayor Olívio Dutra saw participatory budgeting as an instrument to build a constituent base for the Workers’ Party in Porto Alegre, and incoming Bolivian president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada likewise viewed the PPL as a way to build support for his political party.16 The Philippine LGC had its champion in Senator Aquilino Pimentel, who pushed its creation through the legislature, but it can be seen more as part of the overall reaction to the centralization of the Marcos regime deposed in 1986. Similarly, the Indonesian Musrenbang process can be interpreted as a part of the Reformasi drive to repudiate the highly centralized Suharto era that ended with his overthrow in 1998.

The donor-led programmes had their own motivations, of course. The USAID office in Cambodia was looking for some initiative to counter the increasing authoritarian trajectory and democratic decline afflicting the country under Prime Minister Hun Sen and his CPP, and LAAR seemed a way to increase accountability a bit at the governmental base.

In Indonesia, the World Bank, reeling from the heavy criticism then being levelled at its large-scale transmigration and dam-building programmes, was looking for something that would represent a change of direction to a more people-centred approach (Guggenheim, 2006: 119–121). Meanwhile, USAID saw a way to bolster its Local Governance Support Program by enhancing Musrenbang effectiveness. USAID’s CRDA project operated in all Serbia’s districts, seeking to fuel what it hoped was a post-Milosevic demand for democracy and to aid in bridging the ethnic tensions that lingered after his ousting in 2000. Finally, USAID’s MEA programme in El Salvador reinforced what had started as a government effort to generate allegiance to a reconciled political system after the Peace Accords of 1992.

6.3.4 The importance of a political champion Wherever it has been introduced and to the extent that it has been successful, participatory budgeting has meant a major change from the usual way of doing business in making budgetary decisions, which in turn has meant discomfiting and even displacing significant numbers of people from the positions of power and often rent-seeking that they had enjoyed. Such disruption needed a champion if it was to occur, particularly in the bolder examples we have seen. Mayor Dutra in Porto Alegre along with his successors Tarso Genro and Raul Pont, as well as President Sánchez de Lozada in Bolivia and Senator Pimentel in the Philippines, all played this role. Without these champions, it is doubtful that reforms would have taken place.

Political will can come from other directions also. The 2004 introduction of Indonesia’s Musrenbang process was overshadowed by the first

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direct presidential election held the same year, and its origins are somewhat obscure in the literature, but it was evidently part of the Reformasi wave of the early post-Suharto era, which saw many reforms seeking to reverse the dictator’s New Order structure. The authority and determination to move the other four examples along came from their donors – USAID in its Cambodian, Salvadoran and Serbian programmes, and the World Bank with the KDP.

6.3.5 Technical assistance and participatory budgeting Overall, to judge from Figure 6.1, participatory budgeting appears to do best in Porto Alegre and the Indonesian KDP. How is their pre-eminence to be explained? The most obvious answer is simply that they have better funding. Porto Alegre is a relatively wealthy city in a relatively wealthy Brazilian state, and the KDP has been one of the World Bank’s more generously supported programmes, with some US$1.2 billion spent thus far and growing. But the real answer lies in where the money has been spent, which is technical assistance, as shown in Figure 6.2.

Serious participatory budgeting is a great deal more complex than showing up for a meeting and expressing preferences for public investment. As should be clear from the case studies, the programmes where

Figure 6.2 Technical assistance given to participatory budgeting systems

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citizens really do have a strong voice in determining what gets done with public funds require more citizen time and energy than the wish-list efforts. The initial meetings take longer, the special delegates to a higher level need a real commitment, and the review of the previous year’s work that begins the next year’s cycle takes yet further resolve. And, as anyone who has been involved in voluntary work for a community enterprise knows (often all too well), it is difficult to keep up the enthusiasm needed to sustain such activity. Public virtue can be its own reward for only so long.

In addition to enthusiasm and commitment, there also has to be expertise in dealing with designing, planning, budgeting, supervising, monitoring, and so on – all skills not in plentiful supply anywhere, much less in developing countries. In short, a healthy quantum of technical assistance is needed to make participatory budgeting succeed. Porto Alegre’s various algorithms for weighting neighbourhood needs against poverty levels, past allocations, sectoral balances, coordinating services and the like all require much outside expertise, which fortunately the municipality can supply through its budget planning office, the Gabinete de Planejamento (De Sousa Santos, 1998). Likewise Indonesia’s KDP requires ample quantities of technical assistance to make the system function, appropriately supplied by the World Bank.17 In a seeming contradiction, Bolivia’s CVs are shown at roughly the same level on the vertical axis as the Porto Alegre and the KDP systems, although their management abilities lagged far behind the latter two, because the CVs’ monitoring role enabled them to interfere with initiatives implemented by the elected councils, even to the extent of calling for sanctions. Opportunity to exercise a role does not necessarily reflect capacity to do so.18 Six of our cases received some technical assistance in connection with a USAID assistance programme. For Serbia and El Salvador, the programmes were nationwide, covering a very large portion of Serbia’s communities and virtually all of El Salvador’s. In both cases there was some minimal technical assistance in the form of reviewing the projects selected for technical soundness, but virtually none was provided to guide the participatory process itself. In Bolivia, the Philippines and Indonesia’s Musrenbang process, the decentralization programmes themselves were nationwide with little or no technical assistance to the municipalities, but USAID supported pilot projects that did provide quite extensive technical assistance to selected locales (25 out of more than 300 in Bolivia, 60 out of 450 in Indonesia and 200 out of over 40,000 in the Philippines). In Cambodia, there was only the pilot – there was no national programme to create CMCs everywhere – but the USAID project footprint was intentionally large, covering over 20 per cent of the country’s commune councils.

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6.3.6 Parallel governance structures A number of our case-study programmes set up what amounted to parallel structures of governance, in effect displacing the local government system already in place. In Porto Alegre, the COP decided how the city would spend its development investment funds, a function usually exercised by local elected councils. True, the Porto Alegre council did have the prerogative of rejecting the COP’s plan, but invariably it approved whatever the participatory budgeting system came up with. In Serbia, the citizen committees decided on projects and, although an elected council could in effect veto a project by refusing to put up its 25 per cent matching share, the more common experience appears to have been that the council went along with projects of marginal value to the municipality in order to “leverage” the other 75 per cent of construction costs from the citizen committee. In Bolivia, the CV decided on the investment plan and then monitored it, while the elected council only implemented it, subject to sanctions from the CV. Finally, the Indonesian Musrenbang was also new, stapled onto the local governance structure set up several years earlier.19 This brings us to Deborah Bräutigam’s (2004) complaint that participatory budgeting tends to insert new mechanisms that in essence displace elected local government bodies that have been constitutionally charged with making decisions on local public investments. Her question is whether the energy and funding going into the new structures might have been better devoted to correcting the defects of the old ones, given that the old ones will still remain in place. This is, of course, an old question in public administration, but it is also an important one, which can easily get forgotten in the enthusiasm for new ideas.

The answer in the Brazilian case is that it would have been extremely difficult to convince the traditional decision-making machinery to adopt a new formula requiring them to direct new public investment in an order inverse to accumulated previous investment, that is, to direct public funds away from neighbourhoods that had previously contributed more taxes, more campaign support and more votes to areas that had provided less of each to the council members. It was more feasible to set up a new structure apart from all that encrusted tradition of mutual exchange.

In Serbia, the imperative for the USAID mission was to get things moving quickly on the ground to show that society could pick itself up again after the previous regime’s collapse and resuscitate the infrastructure. Here, too, it was just easier to start a new machinery than to revive and improve the old one based on the local councils that had been in place since Yugoslav times.

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Bolivia did not face the choice between working with the old structure and creating a new one because, before the PPL, only 38 municipalities existed; the rest of the country’s territory had no local government. So the PPL’s authors could have given the planning authority to the new elected councils, which would have more authentically represented the populace than the CVs with their base in the OTBs. Presumably the PPL’s authors wanted to devise a structure of checks and balances with their new local governance dispensation.

A fourth parallel system came with the Musrenbang structure in Indonesia. Local councils were created as elected bodies in 1999 as part of the post-Suharto reforms and so had been in place for only a few years when the Musrenbang system was introduced in 2004. Five years would seem too short a period for the councils to have developed such debilitation that a parallel system for soliciting citizen input was needed. But that may have been long enough for central government reformers to realize that elected local councils were not going to be enough to shake loose the power of the country’s premier planning agency, Bappenas, and its district-level counterpart the Bappeda, which had long held local governance in a centrally controlled straitjacket. So Musrenbang would be the therapy to loosen the hold of the planning apparatus. But, if this was the strategy, it did not succeed, as noted above.

6.3.7 The risk of elite capture Ever since Gunnar Myrdal’s (1968) devastating critique of India’s decentralization programme in the 1960s, it has been clear that elite capture has been one of the two principal hazards facing any devolution initiative.20 A risk assessment on this account would thus seem essential for our cases. Porto Alegre appears well insulated here, with its highly structured participatory budgeting process, reinforced during its first 16 years

by Workers’ Party mayors committed to it, a combination reported to have essentially eliminated pork patronage (Koonings, 2004: 85–91).

More recently, at least one analysis concludes that private sector elites have become dominant since the change of government in 2004 (Baierle, 2008), and another has found that the private sector has gained a foothold in allocating municipal development investments by sponsoring NGOs that have had influence on participatory budgeting processes, but this seems more a story of elite influence than of outright capture (Junge, 2012).

The Indonesian KDP has had significant grassroots protection through the large number of poor participants at the planning meetings, but a better safeguard could come through the programme’s “blind contract”

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with the journalists’ association, which gives the latter carte blanche to snoop into any project activity on its own initiative. To date, however, there appears little evidence that this media check has proved effective.

With its parallel structure of accountability involving both the CVs and the municipal councils, and the sanctioning authority given to both bodies, Bolivia should have some defence in depth against elite takeover, but a lack of expertise (and even literacy, especially in the CVs) is likely to constrain their watchdog capacities. The risk of elite takeover in these two cases would have to be rated medium.

One would hope that El Salvador’s maturing two-party system (the former insurrectionary force won the presidency in 2009 and already controlled most of the municipalities) would provide a buffer of competitive politics against elite takeover there, but the country’s winner-take-all local electoral system gives the winning party all the seats on municipal councils for its entire term, creating dangerous temptations. In these circumstances, elite capture at the local level would be somewhere between medium and easy.

In the remainder of our cases, the possibility would have to be rated fairly easy. Naga City and some others are surely exceptions, but the long history of local bosses and caciques (wealthy landowning oligarchs) in the Philippines is not going to be overturned through the Local Government Code.21 The Musrenbang system faces a different sort of elite takeover: it is not local oligarchs who are so much the danger as the local field offices of the central planning agency, Bappenas, which, along with the Ministry of Home Affairs, still has great influence. In Cambodia, it is the CPP as the dominant political party controlling 98 per cent of the commune councils that, although it is perhaps trying to solicit citizen input, exercises control over what budgetary allocations are made: local party elites are already in command.22 Finally, in Serbia there was surely some real danger of elite capture, but the experiment closed out in 2006, making the question moot.

6.3.8 Achievement and sustainability Some of the initiatives did reasonably well in their time. In the two postconflict programmes, a quickly constructed Serbian system of citizen committees did complete several thousand projects based on citizen input, and the Salvadoran programme eventually completed more than 8,000 projects. But the Serbian CRDA’s citizen committees were limited to the life of the project, for there was no reason for them to continue after the funding ran out. And, although the law on cabildos abiertos remained in place in El Salvador, specifying that they meet quarterly, it is unlikely that they did much work after the MEA’s end.

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As for the pilot projects, USAID’s Democratic Development and Citizen Participation project in Bolivia in the 1990s made good headway in “capacitating” (to use a forced translation of the Spanish verb commonly used, capacitar) the CVs. The Philippine Governance and Local Democracy (GOLD) project was significantly constrained from the start in participatory budgeting terms, in that citizen participation – coming as it did through NGO representatives serving on local government bodies – was even more indirect than in Bolivia or Serbia. However, where local political leadership was accommodating and encouraging, as in Naga City, one could see real input from below. The USAID Local Governance Support Program in Indonesia worked with the executive, elected councils and civil society organizations in its 62 pilot districts to promote more interaction with the Musrenbang process, and the project made some progress in strengthening the successive Musrenbang tiers and moving more citizen demands through its structure. The Cambodian LAAR project showed somewhat mixed results at first in its efforts to build CMCs to elicit community inputs for public investments, but it developed a learning curve as the project went into successive years.

Some of these pilots may have survived the lifetimes of their respective donor-supported projects. USAID’s Bolivian project produced an excellent manual to guide the CVs and elected councils (DDCP, 1999). The GOLD project generated a large number of practical publications23 and, more importantly, conscientiously created six Centres for Local Governance to provide technical assistance and training to local governments and NGOs on a fee-for-service basis after GOLD shut down in 2000.24 The LGSP effort in Indonesia25 worked to assist many of its implementers (mainly located in local universities) to become post-project service providers as well. And the Cambodian LAAR was hoping that at least some of the province-level NGOs it contracted to provide technical assistance would follow a similar path after it ended in 2010.

Unfortunately, there is no real way to ascertain whether any of these sustainability hopes have been realized, because USAID has thus far shown virtually no interest in post-project study. Once a project has closed out, so has USAID interest in the project or its legacy.26

6.3.9 Programme impact Typically in these programmes, a prominent goal is some kind of empowerment for the poor through political participation. A couple of them have been in place long enough to make some assessment on this front.

Boulding and Wampler (2009) find some evidence of this for participatory budgeting in Brazil, as do Cameron (2009), Grootaert and Narayan (2001) and Grindle (2000) for Bolivia. In both countries, at least some

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poor people have attained a degree of agency in the local political arena.

An additional goal – not always stated – has been poverty alleviation.

Boulding and Wampler (2009) do find a small reduction in the incidence of extreme poverty over participatory budgeting’s first decade.27 However, so far as more general well-being in terms of such indicators as life expectancy or literacy is concerned, there is as yet little indication that participatory budgeting has had any effect in Brazil or Bolivia. Boulding and Wampler find no statistically significant correlations, nor does Cameron in his more qualitative study.28 Likewise Indonesia’s KDP shows no improvement in school enrolments, though an evaluation did show increased access to health care and movement out of poverty for the lowest income quintile, as well as higher consumption for the lowest income quintile (Voss, 2008). As far as I know, the other programmes in my sample never undertook (or at least never released results of) any studies of this sort. This paucity of knowledge of programme impact can be traced in part to programme brevity (what, after all, can one show in terms of well-being improvement after five years?), but also to a lack of donor interest in longer-term programme impact.29 In sum, there is some evidence that participatory budgeting enhances empowerment through participation, less evidence, but still a real indication, of its efficacy in poverty alleviation, but no evidence so far for any impact in improving well-being. However, it can be argued that participatory budgeting’s time-span has been far too short to expect any real and enduring signs of well-being, and that, furthermore, given the Western countries’ own experience in improving well-being, citizen empowerment is the place to start on what has to be a long-term drive to achieve it.

6.4 Policy implications for participatory budgeting initiatives From this analysis of eight cases, a number of implications emerge that should be useful in considering future initiatives in participatory budgeting.

Direct and indirect participation. Participatory budgeting systems that directly involve citizens do give them a greater role in suggesting public investment activities than those using some kind of indirect representation, but this approach does not necessarily lead to more influence over what activities will actually be undertaken. Indirect participatory budgeting schemes can do as well on the latter score (Bolivia and Serbia vs. Porto Alegre and KDP).

Source of innovation. Domestically initiated participatory budgeting systems obviously have a better chance of lasting than those set up by

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donors, but they are not necessarily more effective on that account (the Philippines and Musrenbang vs. KDP and Serbia).

Political will. Where political will exists to forge a participatory budgeting system, it needs a champion to push the agenda along (Porto Alegre, Bolivia, the Philippines).

Importance of technical assistance. For citizen groups to have a real impact on budget decision-making, significant technical assistance will be needed (Porto Alegre, KDP). But effective participatory budgeting is not cheap.

Lessening democracy. Parallel structures can substitute for what are judged to be ineffective elected local councils (Porto Alegre, Bolivia, Musrenbang, Serbia), but they are inherently less democratic.

Elite capture risk. The greater the citizen role in initiating and determining budget allocation, the lower the risk of elite capture of the participatory budgeting process (Porto Alegre, KDP and Bolivia vs. the Philippines, Cambodia, Musrenbang and El Salvador).

Participatory budgeting’s impact. Even after two decades of experience, relatively little is known about participatory budgeting’s impact on empowerment, poverty alleviation and well-being, owing in significant part to donors’ lack of interest in following up impact over time.

Notes 1. This chapter is an extension of an earlier enquiry (Blair, 2008), in which I looked at participatory innovation more generally at the local level. Here I narrow the focus to participatory budgeting and widen the sample set to include Cambodia and Indonesia, in addition to the five countries considered earlier.

2. My analysis is based on fieldwork done in all the countries covered here except Brazil. I visited Bolivia, El Salvador and the Philippines twice each between 1994 and 2000, Cambodia in 2008 and 2009, and Indonesia in 2002 and 2008. Serbia I visited in 2004.

My fieldwork in all these countries focused on USAID programmes; for Indonesia’s KDP, I have drawn on interviews and secondary sources for my information about the World Bank programme there. I have not been to Brazil, but the literature on Porto Alegre has become so huge (and still growing) that there is no difficulty in looking into virtually all aspects of participatory budgeting.

3. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Participatory_budgeting> (accessed 10 April 2013).

4. There are many good accounts of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, from which the present overview is distilled. See, inter alia, Baiocchi (1999), Fung and Wright (2001), Goldfrank (2011), Koonings (2004), Wainwright (2003), World Bank (2008).

5. There are several excellent analyses of the PPL and its implementation (for example, Altman, 2003; O’Neill, 2005). See also Blair (2001b, 2001c).

6. Most of this account is derived from Blair (2001a). For another assessment, see Brillantes (2007). Again, the “audacious reform” phrase is from the title of Grindle’s (2000) book.

7. See, for example, Barns (2003), Capuno (2005), Legaspi (2001).

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8. For an analysis of the cabildo abierto and the USAID programme built upon it, see Blair et al. (1995: 31ff).

9. Data presented in this and the following paragraphs are from Wilson et al. (1994). In El Salvador, as in most of Latin America, the entire country is divided into municipalities.

10. Data in this paragraph are from Wilson et al. (1994). Córdova et al. (2004) provide similar data for more recent years.

11. Musrenbang is an acronym for Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan (public forum for development planning). This account of the Musrenbang programme is drawn largely from Ahmad and Thébault Weiser (2006), Kristiansen et al. (2008), LGSP (2008, 2009a, 2009b), McLaughlin et al. (2007) and Ngoedijo (2007), as well as Blair et al. (2008).

12. Later renamed PNPM (Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat – National Program for Community Empowerment) Mandiri.

13. My account of KDP draws mainly on Guggenheim et al. (2004), Guggenheim (2006) and McLaughlin et al. (2007). Data on coverage are from <http://www.pnpm-mandiri. org> (accessed 24 April 2013).

14. As the programme progressed, the “blind contract” did not actually result in any significant journalistic coverage of KDP, but the government’s embracing of the idea was an important commitment to transparency in a sector where risk of corruption has been high. Personal communication from Scott Guggenheim, April 2010.

15. Material on the USAID programme is largely drawn from Calavan et al. (2009).

16. To the extent this interpretation is true – the strategy did not succeed for President Sánchez. By 1999, his party in fact had lost about one-third of the municipalities it had held in 1995 (Altman, 2003: 87). More significantly for him and his party, the PPL system facilitated the rise of Evo Morales, whose movement ousted Sánchez de Lozada and his government altogether in 2005. See also Kohl and Farthing (2006: 149ff).

17. See Woodhouse (2005); Guggenheim et al. (2004: 15) mention 20 per cent of KDP project costs going to technical assistance at one point in the project.

18. Grootaert and Narayan (2001: 61) note the need for technical assistance to local governance in this connection. One estimate held that more than 85 per cent of the CV members were illiterate (Lee Van Cott, 2000a, 2000b, cited in Altman, 2003: 83). One unfortunate result of this feeble CV capacity is that a great many CVs farm out their planning responsibility to NGOs or consulting firms (Bartholdson et al., 2002: 28–29); this was also my own observation during field visits in the mid- and late 1990s.

19. The KDP did develop a parallel system, but it was funded by the World Bank’s programme, not by funds that would have otherwise been allocated by local government units. USAID’s Cambodian programme and the Salvadoran cabildos were not so much parallel structures as devices to solicit some public input. The Philippine NGO inclusion in local government committees was the opposite of a parallel device.

20. The other main danger has been reluctance from the centre to actually devolve any real power (among the many analyses of these two risks to decentralization, see Manor, 1999).

21. See, for example, Hutchcroft (1991).

22. There is significant evidence that commune council leaders have not manipulated decisions to favour themselves (World Bank, 2011). On the other hand, a 2008 survey of council members found that 66 per cent were serving in their second term and 32 per cent were in their third term (Meerkerk et al., 2008: 31 passim); when combined with the CPP’s control of 98 per cent of the communes, these data would indicate that local party elites had a firm grip on commune affairs.

23. The GOLD project, implemented by Associates in Rural Development as the contractor, was perhaps the best ever documented decentralization effort, at the end producing a CD with hundreds of project documents (ARD, 2001).

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24. In doing this, GOLD was following the path set in a number of East European countries when USAID and the Soros Foundation set up “intermediate service provider” organizations to continue offering expertise to civil society organizations and local governments after the post-Communist foreign aid programmes closed out.

25. LGSP also produced a trove of useful publications that will be of post-project value. For a list, see LGSP (2009b: Annex D).

26. USAID has a real interest in learning from current experience, because it does conduct mid-term and final evaluations of selected projects, but it has evinced no enthusiasm for learning from completed efforts, for instance sponsoring a study of the legacy of the GOLD project, say three (or five) years after it had closed out. Such analyses would be invaluable in learning what works over time and what does not. Other donors do not appear to be greatly different in this regard. Gary Bland (2011) provides an example of what could be learned from post-project research in his analysis of USAID’s support for participatory budgeting in El Salvador over the years 1994 –2006.

27. In their survey, they found a reduction in “indigent poverty” of just under 1 per cent that could be associated with participatory budgeting in 64 Brazilian municipalities. One could ask whether Porto Alegre as the pioneer had made more progress in this regard, but the authors report that the number of years a municipality had been using participatory budgeting made much less difference than whether or not it had adopted participatory budgeting (Boulding and Wampler, 2009: 128).

28. An exception here is Gonçalves (2009), who finds a positive correlation between Brazilian municipalities adopting participatory budgeting and a reduction in infant mortality.

29. There may be a change at USAID if the recommendations made by a recent study team are taken seriously. The authors urge that programmes in the democracy sector be evaluated with randomized sample populations of target and control groups taken on a before-and-after-project basis in order to assess impact (Goldstone et al., 2008).

REFERENCES Abers, R. (1998) “From Clientelism to Cooperation: Local Government, Participatory Policy, and Civil Organizing in Porto Alegre, Brazil”, Politics & Society 26(4): 511–537.

Abers, R. (2000) Inventing Local Democracy: Grassroots Politics in Brazil.

Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

ADB (Asian Development Bank) (2004) “People’s Participation in Governance: The Naga City People’s Council Experience”. Paper for regional seminar on Local Governance and Pro-Poor Service Delivery, Asian Development Bank, Manila.

Ahmad, R. and E. Thébault Weiser (2006) Fostering Public Participation in Budget-Making: Case Studies from Indonesia, Marshall Islands, and Pakistan.

Manila: Asian Development Bank and the Asia Foundation.

Altman, D. with R. Lalander (2003) “Bolivia’s Popular Participation Law: An Undemocratic Democratisation Process?”, in A. Hadenius (ed.) Decentralization and Democratic Governance Experiences from India, Bolivia and South Africa.

Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, pp. 63–103.

ARD (Associates in Rural Development) (2001) GOLD: USAID Support to Philippines Local Governance, Governance and Local Democracy Project

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1995–2001. CD available from Gerry Roxas Foundation, 18th floor, Aurora Tower, Araneta Center, Quezon City, Philippines.

Avritzer, L. (1999) “Public Deliberation at the Local Level: Participatory Budgeting in Brazil”. Paper presented at the Experiments for Deliberative Democracy Conference, University of Wisconsin, January 2000. Available at <http://www. ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/avritzer.pdf> (accessed 11 April 2013).

Baierle, S. (2008) “Shoot the Citizen, Save the Customer: Participatory Budgeting and Bare Citizenship”, Soberania Popular Sovereignty: Revista de Debates do Centro de Assessoria e Estudos Urbanos-Cidade 1(1). Available at <http:// www.ongcidade.org/site/php/Revista/arquivo/ baierleen.pdf> (accessed 11 April 2013).

Baiocchi, G. (1999) “Participation, Activism, and Politics: The Porto Alegre Experiment and Deliberative Democratic Theory”. Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA. Available at <http://www.ssc.wisc. edu/~wright/Baiocchi.pdf> (accessed 11 April 2013).

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7 Recentralization in developing countries: Forms, motivations and consequences Paul Smoke

7.1 Introduction Some form of decentralization has been a nearly ubiquitous element of public sector reform in developing countries for more than two decades, although with very different approaches and highly uneven results (see Ahmad and Tanzi, 2002; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007; Connerley et al., 2010; Eaton et al., 2011; Litvack et al., 1998; Smoke et al., 2006; UCLG, 2008, 2010; UNDESA, 2005; and World Bank, 1999, 2005). Throughout this period, particularly in more recent years, decentralization efforts have stalled or been reversed in various ways and to varying degrees. Some losses of momentum and recentralization efforts have been very high profile, while others have occurred almost without being noticed. Dedicated literature on the topic is relatively limited or not explicitly framed as being on the deceleration or reversal of decentralization.1 In this chapter I review various efforts – both more and less explicit – to slow or undo decentralization, primarily with a focus on two countries, Cambodia and Uganda. I first provide an overview of deceleration and recentralization efforts, their underlying causes and their possible consequences. I conclude with tentative comments on what might be learned from experiences to date and make recommendations for future work.

Throughout the chapter, “recentralization” is used to refer both to explicit steps to disempower local governments and to failure to advance officially mandated reforms.

The imperative of good local governance: Challenges for the next decade of decentralization, Öjendal and Dellnäs (eds), United Nations University Press, 2013, ISBN 978-92-808-1229-9

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7.2 What is recentralization?

The balance of authority between central and sub-national governments – even in industrialized democracies with robust sub-national systems such as the United States – often fluctuates over time. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, there was an unusually broad trend towards some form of decentralization in many countries – industrialized, in transition and developing. A number of efforts undertaken during this wave of reform have ended up stalling or even reversing course.

Recentralization can take multiple forms across countries and within individual countries. One extreme involves formal de jure retraction or alteration of robust/detailed decentralization policies and laws. This is often pursued partially, such as through new laws and regulations to constrain substantial sub-national government borrowing powers in Argentina and Brazil following financial crises in the 1990s, or the withdrawal of taxing powers, such as the discontinuation of Kenya’s Local Authority Service Charge in 2002 or Uganda’s graduated personal tax in 2006. I am not aware of any country in which the entire legal and constitutional framework that empowered local governments in a decentralization process has been completely and officially reversed.

In more typical cases, often where the decentralization framework is relatively general, recentralization can occur through new laws, regulations and decrees specifically intended to elaborate, modify or dilute the formal provisions of the original enabling legislation. In some countries, this may appear more like a slowing of what seemed to be a decisive reform rather than overt recentralization.

This type of phenomenon is quite common and has occurred in both focal cases covered here. Regulations that built on the original decentralization law in Cambodia constrained newly elected local governments at the commune level, and new legislation that appears to extend decentralization to other sub-national levels in some ways strengthens the central government’s reach into their management (see discussion below). In Uganda, the Fiscal Decentralization Strategy issued in 2002, which was framed as supporting decentralization, and some recent laws regarding local civil service and procurement procedures placed non-trivial restrictions on local governments that had been heavily empowered less than a decade earlier (see discussion below). Other examples of such behaviour are easy to find, for example in follow-up laws to Indonesia’s 1999 big bang decentralization that curtailed local government revenue generation powers and reinstated a monitoring and management role for provincial governments, which had been weakened by initial decentralization laws.2

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In some cases, a degree of recentralization is brought about indirectly by legal measures that increase the role of national politicians in local activities. In a number of countries with empowered local governments, for example, constituency development funds give non-trivial resources to elected national politicians to meet constituent demands, including for services that are legally local government functions.3 A constituency development fund may be part of initial decentralization negotiations to ensure that reforms will not severely weaken national politicians (as in the Philippines), or it can occur at a later stage to deal with a political crisis but not necessarily with the overt intention of curtailing local governments (as in Kenya). In either scenario, such sources of funding managed directly by elected national legislators complicate accountability relationships in situations where local governments already face credibility deficits.

An earlier Kenyan example of indirect weakening of local governments occurred after an unsuccessful coup against President Daniel arap Moi in the 1980s. This resulted in the adoption of a new national policy, District Focus for Rural Development. This did not explicitly take powers from elected local governments, but it undermined them by creating a powerful role for unelected District Development Committees that were heavily funded by resources from the national budget at a time when local governments had limited access to central government resources (Smoke, 1993, 2003, 2008a; Smoke and Whimp, 2011).

In still other cases, recentralization is more informally pursued – without explicit changes in laws or regulations – through either regularized or ad hoc actions of politicians and bureaucrats at higher levels of government who face incentives to limit the functions of local governments or to constrain the actions of officially empowered local politicians and officials. This can occur, for example, through the institution of review procedures for local government budgets by a Ministry of Finance.

It can also take the form of the introduction of sectoral service delivery programmes (through, for example, Sector-Wide Approaches) by a Ministry of Education or Health that constrain local government expenditure decisions; in some cases these ministries exert a centralizing influence simply by failing to develop legally mandated implementing regulations for decentralization in their sector.

Such behaviour occurs during the implementation of decentralization frameworks in many countries.4 Sometimes the ministry in charge of supporting local governments can also take steps to increase central monitoring and quality control, as has been the case with the Ministry of Local Government in Kenya, and intermediate levels can in some cases increase controls on or create incentives for local government behaviour,

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as in the case of the Ceará state government in Brazil following nationally mandated decentralization in the 1990s.5

7.3 What motivates recentralization?

The factors that motivate recentralization vary considerably in their nature and in their impact.6 Recentralization could simply be the result of a lack of political consensus to adopt or implement decentralization in the first place. In such cases, laws were passed for political reasons or in response to donor pressures. There may never have been an intention to fully implement the law and, once it was passed, any impetus for enforcing it quickly subsided. Such a situation might be more accurately described as stalled decentralization rather than recentralization.

Recentralization can also be motivated by awakening central agencies that did not pay much attention when the decentralization framework was being formulated, but later became concerned when they understood the implications for their own role. Examples would include the relatively common actions noted above – the Ministry of Finance increasing review processes because it realized it was dubious about local government fiscal autonomy, or a sectoral ministry instituting controls and guidelines when it finally understood how decentralization might affect its own power and access to resources.

In some countries, recentralization is a reaction to the weak performance of sub-national governments empowered under decentralization and the emergence of a sense that these reforms had gone too far too quickly, a position that appeals to centralists or actors whose power was curtailed by decentralization reforms. Clearly this has been the case in Uganda (discussed below), where decentralization occurred rapidly and deeply despite the limited technical, managerial and governance capacity of many of the locally elected councils. The recent recentralization has been powerful and sweeping. In some cases recentralization can occur less broadly. Some of the recentralizing moves in Indonesia and Kenya, as noted above, were targeted to specific aspects of decentralization, such as perceived abuse of local revenue-generating authority. In the Philippines, the apparent decline in the quality of services in hospitals run by local governments subsequent to decentralization led to their transfer back to national government control.

In other cases, recentralization results from shifts in underlying context – economic, political and bureaucratic dynamics – that create forces that undermine the original parameters of the decentralization framework.

The specific actions taken can be motivated by differing intentions on the part of higher-level officials, ranging from a desire to reassert con-

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trol over powers and resources they lost under decentralization (as in Uganda) to an (at least partially benevolent) aspiration to assist subnational governments to improve performance (as in the Ceará case noted above).

There are many examples of political motives for recentralization.7 Sometimes these are broad based and affect overall decentralization. In Argentina, the Peronists supported decentralization while in opposition, but then pushed the country in a more centralizing direction after they won control of both the legislature and the executive in the 1991 elections. In Peru, Alejandro Toledo announced an ambitious decentralization while campaigning for the presidency in 2000. When opposition candidates won the majority of regional governments in elections that he introduced, his enthusiasm waned. In the late 1990s, Colombia’s worsening internal security crisis reduced support for decentralization and led to cuts in intergovernmental transfers and a selective return to the appointment of mayors. When the Sandinistas were out of power in Nicaragua, they gained popularity for promising greater decentralization, only to ignore the reforms they vigorously promoted during their successful campaign in the 2006 elections.

7.4 What is the impact of recentralization?

The effects and consequences of recentralization can also be rather diverse. In some cases, recentralization can help correct the mistakes of poorly conceived reforms and/or help to empower local governments to carry out their remaining functions more effectively. Most analysts, for example, saw stricter control of sub-national government borrowing in Argentina and Brazil (noted above) as a positive move. The law to reduce local revenue-generating power in Indonesia mentioned above was seen as necessary to curtail the creation of inefficient taxes that generated negative impacts, for example on inter-jurisdictional trade.8 The above-noted controls on municipalities in Brazil’s Ceará State involved innovations that protected local government decisions from problematic politics and improved performance incentives.

At the other end of the spectrum, recentralization can negatively affect the ability of local governments to undertake basic functions and undermine their credibility with their local constituents. The extension of decentralization in Cambodia to districts and provinces, for example, depending on how the implementation proceeds, could threaten the fragile governance and performance gains made by the elected commune council system (Öjendal and Kim, Chapter 12 in this volume) even though in some respects service delivery might improve. In Uganda, the substantial

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retraction of local government powers in recent years, although again improving aspects of service delivery, has in the view of some analysts marginalized elected local government councillors and undermined their ability and incentives to think more holistically about local development than individual sectoral ministries would ever be inclined to do (see the discussion below and Sjögren, Chapter 13 in this volume).

In the final analysis, the impact of recentralization depends on how the system was organized, how it performed and its key underlying objectives. Thus, one cannot generalize about whether recentralization is inherently positive or negative – many such efforts probably create both desirable and undesirable effects. The ultimate concern should be the impact on the quality of service delivery and the level of democracy.

The overarching point is that deeper and more systematic effort, including broad-based debate, should ideally go into understanding how much decentralization or recentralization makes sense in a particular setting. The world is not so rational, of course, and decisions about decentralization are often made in periods of political and/or economic crisis when the time required for a deliberative and well-informed approach is simply not available. At the same time, much can be learned by looking more carefully at how and why intergovernmental systems and reforms start and move in a particular direction, as well as why and how the trajectory can quickly change.

7.5 Selected cases In this section I discuss two countries that have received considerable attention in the decentralization literature, Cambodia and Uganda. Although there are important differences – for example, Cambodia is fairly homogeneous in ethnic and religious terms, whereas Uganda is not – the countries share similarities. Both are poor and aid dependent, with weakly diversified economies and low-capacity governments, and both are still emerging from extended conflicts. The approaches they took to decentralization, however, could not be less similar. Cambodia started small and officially sought to expand reforms, but with some potentially centralizing features. Uganda, in contrast, started with unusually ambitious reform and then dramatically scaled back.

It is not possible to understand recentralization without understanding what motivated decentralization in the first place, how implementation proceeded and the forces that overtly or more subtly promoted a rethinking of the original approach. In each case, I present a brief (necessarily simplified) background to set the stage, discuss the formal decentralization policy and its underlying drivers, and review in what form and how

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(what I am calling) recentralization came about (or threatens to come about).

7.5.1 Cambodia: Embracing decentralization or stealth recentralization?

For the past decade Cambodia has pursued an unusual decentralization in an unlikely environment for such reform.9 The country is characterized by socioeconomic and fiscal conditions not conventionally seen as ideal for decentralization. It is small in size and population, and the economy is poorly diversified. Human resource development is limited and poverty is widespread, and the society is relatively homogeneous. The government has long been highly centralized and non-democratic, is small by international standards and has limited capacity.

The formal decentralization process began in 2002 with the election of governments in rural communes and their urban counterparts, sangkats, as per laws rapidly passed in 2001. Under 2008 legislation, reform is being expanded upward to districts, provinces and municipalities. Policy papers frame decentralization as a key element of the national reform agenda (see Royal Government of Cambodia, 2001, 2002, 2005, 2006).10 Yet, underlying this seemingly ambitious reform and the type of success documented in this volume (Öjendal and Kim, Chapter 12), some observers see an attempt to reassert central control and undermine the modest initial decentralization triggered by political dynamics. Before considering this possibility, it is useful to briefly outline some context that helps to explain the current intergovernmental realities.11 Some basic context Cambodia has endured an unstable modern political history that spanned a long period of centralized colonization, the post-independence installation of King Sihanouk’s Popular Socialist Community, and a subsequent series of struggles for political control. This culminated in Viet Nam’s 1979 overthrow of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge and the creation of the Republic of Kampuchea under the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party, which evolved into today’s Cambodian People’s Party (CPP).12 Hostilities endured, however, and efforts to restore Sihanouk emerged and led to the founding of the political party FUNCINPEC. The United Nations facilitated a peace agreement in Paris in 1991, leading to the establishment of a constitutional monarchy and elections in 1993 held under the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. The main contestants were the CPP under Hun Sen, who had served as a prime minister under the post-Pol Pot regime, and FUNCINPEC under Norodom Ranariddh, the son of King Sihanouk. FUNCINPEC

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won the election but Hun Sen retained control over the military and refused to yield power. Rather than risk new hostilities, a coalition was created in which Ranariddh and Hun Sen shared power as First and Second Prime Ministers, a pattern of paralysis-inducing dual responsibility replicated throughout the government.

The deadlock was broken by a 1997 coup d’état13 engineered by Hun Sen. Elections in 1998 were narrowly won by the CPP, and FUNCINPEC went into opposition. In the 2003 elections, CPP received the most votes but not the two-thirds majority required by the Constitution to form a government. It took CPP a full year to form a coalition, which amended the Constitution in 2006 to require only a simple majority in future elections. In 2008 elections, the CPP gained 58 per cent of the National Assembly seats and effectively marginalized the diminished FUNCINPEC. The increasing dominance of a single political party may seem to be at odds with the highly visible push for stronger sub-national government. In fact, this dominance in part allowed for the more stable and prosperous environment that facilitated the adoption of decentralization.

During the power-sharing period before the 1997 coup, the weak central government focused on promoting stability and security and it gave limited attention to development and service delivery. The donor community, initially led by the United Nations (which had gained credibility through its role in the 1993 elections), stepped in to fill the void. Donorfunded and largely donor-managed (through parallel systems) programmes helped to develop a planning, financing and implementation system for villages and communes that delivered many small but visible development projects.14 Initially this system was piloted in a few communes, but it was scaled up rapidly and spread countrywide.

Explaining decentralization: Political drivers Sensing the potential political importance of this donor initiative, the central government embraced the parallel commune system and adopted it as a government programme. Initially this system continued to operate largely separately from regular government operations, but, after the 1997 coup and narrow 1998 electoral victory, the CPP apparently wanted to broaden and consolidate its electoral power. With more stability, there was more pressure and space to increase attention to development. As 2003 national elections approached, the government formalized the system through the commune laws mentioned above.

A key consideration in shaping the initial decentralization reform seems to have been that elections at the commune level tapped into the CPP’s strong rural support and helped to sideline opposition in urban areas.15 The CPP hoped to dominate commune elections, as it did. In addition, by rapidly advancing decentralization laws so as to hold commune

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elections a year before national elections, the CPP was able to mobilize and expand its local institutional infrastructure. Central ministries and provincial governors may have seen opportunities for reducing the pressures they faced for local service delivery and/or for improving their influence, access to resources and capacity through involvement in donor programmes.

Equally important, the CPP was careful to enact reforms with an initial scale and structure that were modest and non-threatening to the ruling party and the central bureaucracy. There was a degree of genuine local discretion and accountability, as well as progress in developing credible systems and procedures and delivering projects that local people felt they benefited from, as documented by Öjendal and Kim (Chapter 12 in this volume). At the same time, structural controls constrained serious expressions of local autonomy, and the small size of the communes ensured that most could not be independently viable as sustainable providers of regularized services. The functions assigned to communes were limited and they were made dependent on transfers, with local revenue assignment relegated to future legislation. Although councils were elected, their only staff – the clerk and the treasurer – were respectively appointed and overseen by the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF). The weak capacity of commune councillors also left them very dependent on higher authorities for technical assistance and advice, even where they were trying to genuinely respond to their constituents.

Finally, the reform provided a strategic means to tap into the substantial development partner resources available for decentralization, a cornerstone of many of their public sector reform priorities. The strong role that donors played in the development and oversight of the system generated some lingering problems in the form of maintaining parallel mechanisms and reinforcing inter-ministerial conflicts. At the same time, it also generated non-trivial pro-decentralization dynamics at the local level, as documented by Öjendal and Kim (Chapter 12 in this volume) that were probably not recognized at the time by the CPP, which was focused on securing external resources for reforms and programmes that enhanced their credibility.

Political decisions meet the bureaucracy The success of the commune decentralization in delivering services depended on its operation as a semi-parallel system and associated donor support and subsidies. This arrangement worked for central government (because it needed the funds) and for donors (because they had more control). But, with no transition strategy, maintaining the substantially separate system simply put off dealing with larger reforms that would

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need to be pursued if the system were to be institutionalized. These necessarily involve a larger array of central agencies more substantially than the initial decentralization did, and this set the stage for potentially centralizing reforms.

Even from the beginning, bureaucratic politics played an important role in how decentralization unfolded. Various overarching central agencies were involved, but three – the MOI, the MEF and the Council on Administrative Reform – dominated, with a key role also played by the National Treasury. Because limited functions were assigned to communes and the provincial departments continued to dominate service delivery (to the extent it existed), national sectoral ministries were largely on the sidelines of initial reforms.

The MOI was assigned the lead on decentralization, developing laws and chairing various inter-ministerial bodies set up to manage decentralization (currently the National Committee for Sub-national Democratic Development). The decision to empower the MOI – driven by internal CPP politics and pragmatic concerns – created tensions with other ministries, particularly the MEF, whose cooperation was required for reform.

They felt that they were not properly consulted and saw the interministerial bodies largely as instruments of the MOI. Accordingly, they failed to participate fully and even avoided associated responsibilities to the extent this did not damage their interests and they could get away with it.

Some inter-agency tensions seem to have been related to power struggles within the CPP (and members based in particular ministries).

Others involved inter-ministerial competition, partly based on the culture of political patronage that dominates how ministries work with each other, conduct their internal business and deal with non-governmental actors.16 The commune system, by virtue of its parallel aspects, has been somewhat protected from such behaviour, but this may be increasingly difficult to maintain as reforms expand to include other government actors of greater fiscal significance.

Disagreements and inconsistencies within individual agencies and donor dynamics further complicated the development of the system. On a number of occasions, for example, the MEF seemed ready to advance the development of the commune financial system on the advice of one donor, only to be blocked by an MEF department and the National Treasury taking advice from another donor. It seems likely that this was able to occur for at least two reasons. First, the proposed reform threatened, even if in a very modest way, the ability of well-placed bureaucrats to continue to use prevailing non-transparent financial management systems for personal gain and political patronage. Second, the directors of the obstructionist department must have had links at higher

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levels that allowed them to undermine reforms that other MEF officials had agreed to.

Shifts in political and bureaucratic dynamics The bureaucratic tendencies to slow reform once it was adopted, as it turned out, were reinforced by shifts in political imperatives. Having met initial political objectives with the new commune system, the government and CPP impetus for further reform was somewhat diminished. As noted above, the formation of a coalition government after the 2003 elections took a full year to negotiate, and this also distracted even the pro-reform actors from focusing on substantive public sector reform efforts.

The challenges that the CPP faced in forming a government after the 2003 elections created incentives to expand the system in a very particular way. They decided to hold indirect elections for district and provincial councils, retaining direct elections only at the commune level. In effect, the CPP seems to be using indirect elections that depend on its strong base of support (rural communes) and its authority (through its control of the MOI) to appoint provincial governors in order to reinforce its overall power, even if maintaining commune control over the small amount of resources allocated to them.

Concerns regarding the purpose of extending the system were reinforced by the decision to base the first district and provincial elections in 2009 on party lists largely chosen by central authorities rather than on candidates nominated from the directly elected commune councillors, as originally planned. The sub-national accountability situation was further confused by the appointment of parallel district and provincial executive committees (boards of governors) with an unclear relationship to the elected councils. These structures are still new, so there is insufficient experience on which to evaluate how they will work on the ground.

Finally, the independent interests of other central government agencies have started to emerge more vigorously on the public sector reform scene. Although decentralization was one of the first reform initiatives to take root, various national agencies have begun in recent years to focus on their own reforms – often supported by particular donors. The MEF began an ambitious public financial management (PFM) reform, the Council on Administrative Reform reintroduced efforts at civil service reform, and many sectoral agencies began to pursue service delivery reforms. None of these efforts has explicitly and seriously engaged with core decentralization reforms, even if managed by national agencies with decentralization roles. Many of them, however, did or could eventually affect decentralization reforms, mostly in ways that could limit the nascent commune system as well as maintain or expand upwards the accountability incentives of districts and provinces.

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Summary and the current situation Cambodian decentralization has unusual origins and is unusually constructed owing to a particular set of contextual conditions and the political incentives they created and fuelled. Some genuine institutional and governance innovations and results have been realized in the commune system, but they are modest in the larger picture and they stalled for several years. Evolving political dynamics created new incentives to extend the system, but in ways that could reinforce central control and limit genuine democratic decentralization despite their official portrayal as a means to expand it.

As the government works on its 10-year national programme implementation plan, various central agencies (with ties to specific CPP factions and donors) are jockeying to position themselves to define the powers and functions of various levels and sectors and their linkages.

Some agencies will try to protect and expand to lower levels the nontransparent financial and civil service systems, even as they are undergoing formal reforms at the national level, as well as potentially centralizing service delivery reforms in sectors. Others will push to expand “better practice” commune systems upwards and protect the recognized governance gains realized locally, as well as to engage communes as service delivery is reformed. It remains to be seen how these forces will meet and whether those who desire a more centralized system will prevail over those who wish to preserve and build on the genuine local governance accomplishments – with their acknowledged limitations – of the commune decentralization.

7.5.2 Uganda: Undermining decentralization nirvana?

Uganda has received considerable attention in the decentralization literature as a developing country that embraced significant reform with unusual enthusiasm.17 Following extended internal post-independence conflict, the country began a greater period of stability with the rise to power of Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in 1986. Museveni quickly moved to establish a functioning state.

From the start, there was great emphasis on citizen engagement and local capacity as key drivers of economic development and political legitimacy.18 By the late 1990s, a strong constitutional and legal framework for decentralization was in place, and Ugandan local governments quickly became among the most empowered and best financed in Africa.

By the turn of the twenty-first century, multiple forces threatened decentralization and concerns were growing about the effectiveness of the local governments created with such fanfare in the 1990s. The 2002 Fiscal

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Decentralization Strategy, framed as an effort to improve local government performance, in fact represented recentralization, reinforcing other efforts that undermined local autonomy (see Ahmad et al., 2006; Muhumuza, 2008; Smoke, 2008a; and Steiner, 2007). This scenario could have been expected given the political and institutional dynamics that motivated and shaped the initial reforms. Before exploring what happened and why, it is useful to briefly outline some contextual factors that laid the foundation for the present situation.

Some basic context Uganda achieved independence in 1962 from the United Kingdom, which had held Uganda as a protectorate since the late nineteenth century.19 There were fierce debates between supporters of a unified central state (including the first prime minister, Milton Obote) and those favouring a federated system based on traditional Bantu kingdoms. Initially the kingdoms were accommodated as distinct entities in the formal system. Within a few years, however, Obote created a more centralized state under a new Constitution and abolished kingdoms. In 1971, the notorious Idi Amin Dada led a military coup to oust Obote. He presided over an eightyear reign of economic decline, state deterioration and human rights violations. Amin’s military incursion into Tanzania in 1978 led to a conflict that drove him from power in 1979.

The next year saw instability and infighting among key leaders, but Obote regained power through the 1980 elections. His oppressive regime fuelled the rise of Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) and a period of intense conflict. A military coup ousted Obote in 1985, and the new regime opened negotiations with the NRA, but the two sides fought until the NRA seized control in 1986. Museveni assumed the presidency as leader of the “non-party” NRM.20 A new Constitution in 1995 established Uganda as a democratic republic and provided for direct presidential elections every five years. Museveni was elected president as the NRM candidate in 1996. A successful (but controversial) referendum in March 2000 supported retention of the NRM and rejected multi-party elections. Museveni retained the presidency and the NRM gained control of parliament in the 2001 elections.

Under renewed pressure to consider reforms, the government formed a Constitutional Review Commission, which recommended constitutional changes in 2003, but the government did not support some of its recommendations. In 2005 a referendum resulted in the adoption of multi-party elections. One contentious aspect of the reform was the passage of an amendment to eliminate presidential term limits, allowing Museveni to run for a third term. The first multi-party elections held under the new system in 2006 again resulted in a (controversial) victory for Museveni.

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Explaining decentralization: Political drivers Sub-national government/administration primarily served a control function in the colonial period and for over two decades after independence.21 Elections began in the 1950s, but central control was exercised right up to independence. The kingdoms maintained a separate identity during the colonial period and until Obote abolished them in 1967. After independence, local governments were in flux, deteriorating under Amin but revived after his ousting. Local elections began again, but there was heavy central control and some local councillors were centrally appointed.

During the war against Obote in the 1980s, the NRA mobilized popular support by creating Resistance Councils anchored at the village level.

On coming to power in 1986, the NRM built on the NRA approach by creating a hierarchy of elected Resistance Councils in villages, parishes, sub-counties and districts throughout the country. The early multi-tiered NRM governance system formed the basis for the local government system that was developed in the 1990s. Local councils at the level of the district (LC5), sub-county (LC3) and village (LC1) were elected by universal adult suffrage, whereas at the level of the county (LC4) and the parish (LC2) they were elected indirectly or appointed ex officio and served more as administrative units than local governments.

Decentralization was a central part of the NRM strategy to develop Uganda. Museveni saw it as necessary to nurture governance and promote modernization and development in a historically fragmented country emerging from conflict. Although critics saw decentralization as a way for the NRM to consolidate power, supporters attributed it to a genuine desire to better the country. Decentralization was in any case a “homegrown” endeavour, as demonstrated by the government’s efforts to hold most of the international development agencies largely at bay as the new system was developed.

The creation of a modern local government system may also have been a way to sideline traditional kingdoms, which are influential but play no formal governance role in the modern state, and to preclude the resurgence of support for federalism. At the same time, Museveni reportedly seemed willing to restore the kingdoms, some of which supplied NRA soldiers. In 1993, the kingdoms were reconstituted as parallel institutions, but to serve only a cultural rather than a political function. Of course, the kingdoms by their nature have political meaning, but they received no power to tax and had limited funds, so they were clearly not seen as partners in governance and development.

Two factors about the emergence of the local government system in the 1990s are important. First, even if the NRM’s commitment to decentralization was genuine, it seemed based on a lack of a full appreciation

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of the repercussions. High governance and service delivery expectations were placed on the new local governments – very different from the political mobilization and conflict mediation roles of the Resistance Councils that inspired reform. Second, close government relationships with particular donors with limited experience in decentralization led to the design of an unusually ambitious local government system for a developing country in early stages of reform. The functions, resources and levels of autonomy rapidly given to local governments were in hindsight not commensurate with their capacity and accountability levels.

Political decisions meet the bureaucracy Although there was no overt strong bureaucratic opposition to decentralization reforms as laws and policies were being developed in the 1990s, this may not have signalled robust endorsement by national agencies. As reforms were being designed, the NRM was relatively unquestioned, the public sector was weak and many government agencies were preoccupied with building up their own policies, capacities and procedures. Some ministries likely to be negatively affected by decentralization were not involved in early discussions or perhaps did not understand the implications for them. Even powerful agencies, such as the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED), were busy with their own institutional development and probably did not focus on or fully understand decentralization.

Much of the responsibility and most resources for developing the local government system were concentrated at the Ministry of Local Government (MLG). The government also set up a Decentralization Secretariat (DS) linked to the MLG to coordinate decentralization reforms. The DS, however, paid better salaries than the MLG and performed many functions that the MLG should have managed, so that the DS itself became the driver of reform and limited MLG capacity was developed. The MLG and the DS developed local systems and procedures with minimal consultation with other agencies. Since the MLG was relatively weak and the DS was a parallel mechanism, the stage was set for future challenges from other powerful agencies.

The Local Government Finance Commission (mandated by the 1995 Constitution and the 1997 Local Government Act) also received external resources to conduct work (and to advise the president) on fiscal decentralization. In the early years, the Commission was relatively weak and not very influential, but even later, when it developed credibility and capacity, its association with the MLG and the DS weakened its ability to influence broader policy. In some cases, the MFPED all but ignored the Commission’s analytical work and advice, and the Commission was so focused on sub-national revenues that it had little interaction with

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sectoral ministries and was only minimally involved in public service standards and costing or anything else related to the expenditure side of public finance.

Shifts in political and bureaucratic dynamics Over time the government became more established and opened the door to greater donor involvement in reform. As key policies, such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, were articulated and other central agencies became stronger, many awakened to the roles that they could play in service delivery and local development and realized that resources and mandates for these purposes had been assigned to local governments by the Constitution and decentralization laws. Reform efforts at ministries other than the MLG began to move beyond developing basic systems and capacities, and, as more attention was given to performance on the ground, these other reforms increasingly began to conflict with decentralization. Donors reinforced these conflicts with their fragmented approach to support.

PFM reforms in the MFPED, for example, started to focus on local government budgeting, which had been under the MLG and the DS. Early on, the MLG developed a local PFM system with support from various donors, including the World Bank. A few years later, the MFPED decided that the system was not adequately linked to national systems and procedures. As a result, the system developed by the MLG was discarded and a new system was developed by the MFPED with support from a different World Bank programme, and local officials had to be retrained to use a new system for the second time. Several major sectoral ministries also began to develop new approaches to service delivery – again with support from various donors. These set the stage for later clashes with decentralization policy and the early local government systems and procedures developed by the MLG. Because other ministries were independently beginning to carve out a role for themselves in local development and management systems, emerging empirical evidence began to document serious problems with local expenditure management and service delivery. Specifically, the Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys conducted by the World Bank and other related research raised alarm bells (see, for example, Ablo and Reinikka, 1998; Jeppson, 2001; and Reinikka and Svensson, 2004). Education allocations, for example, often did not reach the intended schools, and health allocations were reduced considerably when districts received the authority to form their own budgets.

The emergence of these performance concerns reinforced decisions by government agencies (further buttressed by donors) to deepen PFM reforms and Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAps) that had a non-trivial re-

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centralizing effect (see, for example, Jeppson, 2002; Kasumba and Land, 2003; and Wunsch and Ottemoeller, 2004). The convergence of centralizing interests resulted in the development of a variety of policies, systems, procedures and programmes that have undermined the powers of local governments in ways that are inconsistent with the legal framework.

Beginning in about 2000, PFM and SWAp reforms inspired the adoption of a new local budgeting and financial management process that transformed the bulk of once flexible intergovernmental transfers into conditional grants and that dramatically reduced the budgeting discretion of local governments.22 In recent years, the central government has also taken steps to recentralize the power to recruit and control the top-tier local government civil servants, and it has returned control over district procurement to central agencies (Muhumuza, 2008).

Shifts in political dynamics have played an important role in this recentralization, including increased local government fiscal dependence on the centre. Some underlying factors are local and relate to the unwillingness of citizens to pay taxes to local governments with weak credibility.

Given increased conditional transfers and a lack of their own revenues, local governments have limited ability to respond to locally expressed needs. In the fragile governance environment of Uganda, the resources that are available not uncommonly get captured by local elites for patronage.23 There is, however, some evidence that local governments perform better when they have full responsibility for services rather than share it with the central government (Ahmad et al., 2006).

Other political dynamics involve more national calculations. For example, prior to the last national elections in which the NRM faced opposition from newly legalized political parties, Museveni abolished the graduated personal tax. Although this tax had long been criticized by reformers and was politically unpopular, it was a rich source of local revenue and it was inadequately replaced.24 The central government has also been reluctant to improve the property tax, which is selectively and poorly administered and raises much less revenue than, for example, it does in Kenya. The central government’s unwillingness to support property tax reform is probably owing to sensitive political economy issues surrounding land holding and use.

Second, the government has created many new local governments (districts) in recent years, and this trend had continued. This is officially justified as improving local citizen voice and service delivery, but critics see it primarily as a source of political patronage designed to help the NRM win increasingly tough electoral battles.25 Creating a new district brings resources to a location and is very visible to local residents, benefiting the ruling regime. In addition, because districts have little influence on national policy formation in Uganda, Museveni and the NRM seem to feel

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they can afford to create districts even in opposition areas with little real risk of negatively affecting national-level politics and policies.

Finally, after a period of relative absence from public discourse, the issue of federalism is re-emerging. Some traditional kingdoms have publicly clashed with the government. Ronald Mutebe – the high-profile kabaka (king) of Buganda (the largest ethnic group) – has been promoting a federal structure of self-governing states built around kingdoms.26 This concerns the government not only because of the obvious political threat but also because oil production is likely to begin soon in territory associated with kingdoms.27 The potential volatility of the situation is evident from riots sparked in February 2010 by the government’s refusal to allow Mutebe to travel around his kingdom, allegedly for his own safety.

How the situation with kingdoms will play out remains to be seen, but their influence could be important in the future.

Summary and current situation Ugandan decentralization, inspired by a major political realignment, was unusually home grown and (initially) substantial for a low-income, postconflict country. There was genuine progress, but the nature, pace and trajectory of reform were too ambitious for it to take root, and there was too much emphasis on formal system development and not enough on local accountability and governance development. Central agencies that supported decentralization became alarmed when they saw its implications for them and acted accordingly to protect their turf. In addition, documentation of local government performance problems and evolving political and bureaucratic dynamics (including donor behaviour) led to a number of recentralizing policies that have undermined the incentives and ability of local governments to improve performance.

Local governments have been diminished, and it is unclear if and when there will be action to re-empower them. There are no obvious incentives for the government, individual ministries or donors to step back from their over-reaction to the early poor performance of local governments burdened with unreasonable expectations. The situation is further complicated by the re-emergence of talk about federalism from the traditional kingdoms and the likely frame of mind of the NRM in a new era of multi-party government. In short, the future of local governments in Uganda is uncertain.

7.6 Concluding comments Although only two cases have been reviewed in detail here, the stalling and/or alteration of decentralization reforms, or even outright recentralization, have not been uncommon in developing countries. The logic

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behind such behaviour was reviewed above, and the specific factors underlying the multifaceted reassertion of central control in Cambodia and Uganda were outlined in the discussion of those two cases.

In looking forward, four major issues seem to merit further consideration.

• First, can we understand more about how and why reform stagnates and recentralization occurs and whether and in what circumstances these developments are likely to have positive or negative effects?

• Second, in cases where decentralization reforms seem to have gone too far, are there possible avenues to undertake some recentralization in a way that does not undermine the benefits that the original reforms generated or could still generate?

• Third, could better analysis as decentralization reforms are being contemplated, designed and implemented prevent some of the experiences of excessive or overly rapid decentralization, or is the process inherently too political for this type of rational, evidence-based effort to make a difference?

• Finally, in cases where excessive recentralization has already occurred, what options are available to begin to appropriately re-empower local governments?

The answers to these questions are likely to vary across countries, and the questions themselves will be challenging to frame in appropriate detail and to investigate in a specific case, much less comparatively.

However, given the likelihood that decentralization and recentralization will remain important phenomena in developing countries, there would clearly be considerable benefit to exploring these issues more fully and systematically.

Notes 1. Some literature on recentralization is reviewed in Dickovick (2011), Eaton et al. (2011) and Smoke et al. (2006).

2. See Alm et al. (2004) and Smoke (2007) for a discussion of the evolution of decentralization in Indonesia.

3. See, for example, Chua and Cruz (2004), Bagaka (2010) and Murray (2011) for information on constituency development funds.

4. See Connerley et al. (2010) and Eaton et al. (2011) for some examples.

5. See Smoke (2003, 2008a) for a discussion of the Kenya case and Tendler (1997) for an analysis of the Ceará (Brazil) case.

6. These factors are discussed with examples in Smoke (2008b) and Eaton et al. (2011).

7. These cases are discussed in more detail in Eaton et al. (2011).

8. More information on the Indonesian experience is provided in Lewis (2003, 2005) and Lewis and Suharnoko (2009).

9. See Smoke and Morrison (2011) for a discussion and review of the literature on this issue.

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10. Donor views are outlined in Asian Development Bank and World Bank (2003).

11. The next two sections are condensed and adapted from Smoke and Morrison (2011).

12. For more on Cambodia’s political history, see Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (2004), Chandler (1996), Curtis (1998), Hughes (2003), Öjendal and Lilja (2009), Pak (2010) and US Department of State (2012).

13. This is referred to in Cambodia as “the unusual events of 1997”.

14. Smoke and Morrison (2011) review this history up to the present and provide a more detailed bibliography.

15. Some additional reviews of decentralization in Cambodia from various perspectives can be found in Blunt and Turner (2005), Kim and Öjendal (2007), Pak (2010), Romeo (2000), Smoke (2006), Spyckerelle and Morrison (2007), Turner (2002) and World Bank (2003b).

16. See Smoke and Taliercio (2007) and Taliercio (2009) for a discussion of the role of patronage in public sector reform in Cambodia.

17. See Asiimwe and Musisi (2007), Okidi and Guloba (2006), Kauzya (2007), Onyach-Olaa (2003), Saito (2004), Smoke (2000), Smoke et al. (2011), UNCDF (2003), UNDP (2003), UN-HABITAT (2002), USAID (2004) and World Bank (2003a).

18. Decentralization is highlighted in key policy documents, including the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (Government of Uganda, 2000), the Fiscal Decentralization Strategy (Government of Uganda, 2002) and the National Development Plan (Government of Uganda, 2010).

19. Uganda’s political history is covered in Apter (1997), Byrnes (1990) and Sejjaaka (2004).

20. Francis and James (2003) provide a useful discussion of the National Resistance Movement.

21. See Asiimwe and Musisi (2007), Azfar et al. (2001), Byrnes (1990), Francis and James (2003), Government of Uganda (1994, 2001), Muhumuza (2008), Okidi and Guloba (2006), Onyach-Olaa (2003), Saito (2004), Smoke et al. (2011), Steffensen (2006), Villadsen and Lubanga (1996) and Wunsch and Ottemoeller (2004) for more information on decentralization in Uganda.

22. The details are outlined in the Fiscal Decentralization Strategy (Government of Uganda, 2002).

23. Francis and James (2003) provide a discussion of the dual-mode system of governance in Uganda driven by “technocracy” and “patronage”, and Smoke (2008b) discusses the politics of local revenue.

24. The government did create two new sources of revenue, a hotel tax and a local service levy, but these do not make up for the loss of the graduated personal tax and are important primarily in urban and tourist areas.

25. There is a detailed discussion of the history of district creation in Green (2008).

26. This was reported in a story put out by National Public Radio on 14 February 2010.

27. The government passed a Bill in 2009 to enable the creation of regional governments, but these are distinct from the kingdoms, which the government wants to remain neutral political actors.

REFERENCES Ablo, E. and R. Reinikka (1998) “Do Budgets Really Matter? Evidence from Public Spending on Education and Health in Uganda”. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1926, Washington, DC.

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Ahmad, E. and V. Tanzi (2002) Managing Fiscal Decentralization. Oxford: Routledge.

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Azfar, O., J. Livingston and P. Meagher (2001) “Decentralization in Uganda”.

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Reinikka, R. and J. Svensson (2004) “Local Capture: Evidence from a Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(2): 679–705.

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Saito, F. (2004) Decentralization and Development Partnership: Lessons from Uganda. Tokyo: Springer Publishers.

Sejjaaka, S. (2004) “A Political and Economic History of Uganda”, in F. Bird and S. Herman (eds) International Business and the Challenges of Poverty in Developing Areas. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 98–110.

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Smoke, P. (2000) “Fiscal Decentralization in East and Southern Africa: A Selective Review of Experience and Thoughts on Moving Forward”. Paper prepared for a Conference on Fiscal Decentralization, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, 20 –21 November. Available at <http://www.imf.org/external/ pubs/ft/seminar/2000/fiscal/smoke.pdf> (accessed 12 April 2013).

Smoke, P. (2003) “Erosion and Reform from the Center in Kenya”, in J. Wunsch and D. Olowu (eds) Local Governance in Africa: The Challenge of Decentralization. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 211–236.

Smoke, P. (2006) “Cambodia’s Nascent Decentralization: From Donor Experiment to Sustainable Government Reform”, in P. Smoke, E. Gomez and G.

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Smoke, P. (2007) “Fiscal Decentralization and Intergovernmental Relations in Developing Countries: Navigating a Viable Path to Reform”, in G. Shabbir Cheema and D. Rondinelli (eds) Decentralized Governance: Emerging Concepts and Practice. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, pp. 131–155.

Smoke, P. (2008a) “The Evolution of Subnational Development Planning under Decentralization Reforms in Kenya and Uganda”, in V. Beard, F. Miraftab and C. Silver (eds) Planning and Decentralization: Contested Spaces for Public Action in the Global South. London: Routledge, pp. 89–105.

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Smoke, P. and J. Morrison (2011) “Decentralization in Cambodia: Consolidating Central Power or Building Accountability from Below?”, in J. MartinezVazquez and F. Vaillancourt (eds) Decentralization in Difficult Environments.

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Smoke, P. and R. Taliercio (2007) “Aid, Public Finance and Accountability: Cambodian Dilemmas”, in J. Boyce and M. O’Donnell (eds) Peace and the Public Purse: Economic Policies for Postwar Statebuilding. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 55–84.

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Part III Local governance demands for local democracy

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8 Sanctions, benefits and rights: Three faces of accountability Merilee S. Grindle

8.1 Introduction As countries throughout the world democratize and decentralize, citizen participation in public life should increase. According to advocates of these trends, citizens in a decentralized and democratic system of government can expect enhanced opportunities to demand public attention for their needs, monitor government response to these demands, hold local officials responsible for their performance and punish electorally those who do not deliver on promises or programmes. Increased accountability of government to citizens, then, is a much-anticipated consequence of political, fiscal and administrative decentralization in countries that are also democratizing. Felicitously, these trends are widely expected to improve the potential for government “by the people”. Recognizing the importance of citizen demands for decentralization, this volume addresses an important expectation about the dynamics and consequences of decentralization.

In this chapter, and as a contribution to the volume’s focus on the demand side of decentralization, I suggest that local government “by the people” is enhanced when citizens have access to at least three mechanisms for holding local officials accountable for their actions: • Can citizens use the vote effectively to reward and punish the general or specific performance of local public officials and/or the parties they represent?

• Can citizens generate a response to their collective needs from local governments?

The imperative of good local governance: Challenges for the next decade of decentralization, Öjendal and Dellnäs (eds), United Nations University Press, 2013, ISBN 978-92-808-1229-9

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• Can citizens be ensured of fair and equitable treatment from public agencies at local levels?

In other words, to what extent do citizens have recourse to sanctions, benefits and rights when local governments assume more responsibilities and political systems become more competitive?

The findings of a study of 30 randomly selected municipalities in Mexico indicate that, over the course of a decade and a half, voters were able to enforce alternation in power and the circulation of elites, but not necessarily to transmit unambiguous messages to public officials or parties about performance concerns. More definitively, citizens were able to build successfully on prior political experiences to extract benefits from local governments. At the same time, the ability to demand good performance of local government as a right of citizenship lagged behind other forms of accountability. The experience of Mexico also suggests that mechanisms to enforce the accountability of government to citizens evolve differentially in specific contexts.1

8.2 Three faces of accountability in theory and practice Accountability refers to being answerable for actions. In democratic regimes, many accountability mechanisms work within government to set limits on the arbitrary exercise of power: constitutional guarantees enforced through courts, checks and balances in the separation of powers, independent auditing agencies and federalism, for example. Other mechanisms enable citizens to constrain the activities of politicians, public officials and public organizations. Three specific means through which citizens should be able to hold officials and agencies responsible are sanctions administered through elections, collective action to demand responsiveness to needs for public goods and claims for citizenship rights.2

8.2.1 Elections With political decentralization, advocates of democratic reform anticipate that elections for local officials will enforce accountability by sanctioning public officials and the parties they represent, holding out the prize of electoral victory to those who perform well and the threat of defeat to those who are unresponsive or corrupt. States are more effective, they argue, because citizens have more opportunities to reward and punish the behaviour of officials and parties. And, as a consequence of increased voter vigilance, rational politicians will have incentives to be responsive to local concerns. Political activists, non-governmental organizations and human rights groups are similarly vocal in arguing that political decen-

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tralization increases the ability of citizens to select responsive public officials and to hold them accountable for their performance.

8.2.2 Collective action The capacity to influence the allocative decisions of government through collective action is a second face of accountability, and also one that is expected to be enhanced through decentralization. Advocates of decentralization argue that it is easier for citizens to organize around common concerns locally than at other levels of government, where issues of collective action are more complex and common objectives more difficult to identify and act upon. Locally, citizens can readily define common interests in gaining access to public goods (in desiring to live in a community with potable water and drainage facilities, for example), and proximity and community ties encourage trust in undertaking collective actions to acquire such benefits. Further, citizens face relatively low transaction costs in organizing to influence local officials, certainly when compared with efforts to affect official behaviour in faraway capital cities and ministries.

8.2.3 Citizenship rights A third face of accountability is the ability to claim rights to certain standards of public performance. Disciples of public management anticipate that decentralization and democratization will produce more responsive decision-making, higher-quality services and public administrators motivated to perform well. When government administration is brought closer to those who receive services, they argue, the beneficiaries of these services will become active in demanding good quality. Because those responsible for the quality of services are local, citizens will have incentives to complain and demand improvements if services fail or decline in quality. Moreover, public servants will have incentives to orient their behaviour towards good service provision because of the potential for public disruption and complaints from dissatisfied “customers”. Corruption will also be more visible at local levels and thus easier to control.

8.2.4 How effective are these mechanisms?

These three mechanisms of accountability define expectations about relationships between state and society in decentralized and democratic settings. Yet simply altering the structural relationship between different levels of government and instituting democratic electoral procedures may

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not lead automatically or swiftly to greater accountability of government to its citizens. For example, the use of voting as a mechanism to reward and punish the behaviour of officials and parties may depend on the extent to which “messages” about performance can be effectively conveyed through electoral results. Moreover, even at local levels, collective action cannot be taken for granted. Organizations that mediate effectively between government and individual citizens must agree on common interests, select leadership that can be successful in organizational and advocacy tasks, acquire information and devise strategies to influence local officials and agencies. The third face of accountability, based on citizenship rights, may be dependent on the extent to which citizens have information about what they can and should expect in their encounters with government. In addition, citizens may or may not have a “culture” of accountability that sets their expectations about interactions with government or procedures through which to pursue equitable treatment when they believe they have not received it. In the following section, a comparative analysis of municipalities in Mexico suggests how citizens take advantage of new opportunities for holding government accountable for its performance and the extent to which their behaviour is shaped by current and prior institutions and political practices.

8.3 Decentralization and democratization in Mexico In the research reported here, a random sample of six states (one from each region of Mexico) was followed by a random sample of five medium-sized municipalities (25,000 –100,000 inhabitants) in each state, for a total of 30 municipalities in the sample.3 During the summer and fall of 2004, researchers interviewed past and present officials in the 30 municipalities; delved into relevant documents about local fiscal conditions; explored the dynamics of changes in administrative, service, development and participatory activities of local government; assessed the electoral history of each; generated insights into the relationship of local governments to state and federal ones; and came to know well the sites they were studying.4 In addition, data from national election archives and a 2002 Municipal Census are used to probe the relationship between accountability mechanisms and citizen capacity to regulate the performance of government.

Municipalities in Mexico are generally composed of a town that serves as a county seat and its surrounding communities, which are often rural.5 At the time of the research, local governments were responsible for basic municipal services such as water, sewerage, public lighting, garbage, urban transport, public markets, roads and highways, public security and slaugh-

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terhouses. They were expected to maintain social infrastructure, such as school buildings, playgrounds, health clinics and hospitals. They had responsibilities to regulate zoning and environmental issues. They had control over property taxes and could levy a series of local taxes and fees.

Annually, they were expected to prepare budgets for approval by state legislatures.6 Local governments are composed of a mayor and councillors, who are elected for three-year terms and who are legally barred from holding the same position again for three years. These officials are elected by party lists, with the first name on the ballot that of the candidate for mayor; proportional representation determines the make-up of the council.7 In all municipal governments, mayors have extensive discretion over appointments of local administrative officials. Among the most important are heads of various departments – treasury, public works, public safety, culture and youth, public health, urban development, rural development, and so on. Mayors also appoint a chief administrative officer and the secretary of the government, who usually serves as chief of staff to the mayor. Beyond these high-level positions, the mayor also usually can appoint sub-departmental officials, secretaries, office workers, labourers and others.

Throughout most of the twentieth century, municipal governments were poor and almost powerless in the Mexican political and administrative system. The country was highly centralized, boasting a powerful executive, a weak legislature and judiciary, and a dominant party – the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI, or Institutional Revolutionary Party) – that won all presidential elections between 1929 and 2000, as well as the vast majority of legislative, state and local elections.8 The system was held together by extensive clientelist networks that reached from the most remote locations to culminate in the presidential office.

Despite injustice and inequality, this system produced decades of relative political peace that was the envy of politicians in many less stable countries. Beginning in the early 1980s, however, dual processes of decentralization (from above) and democratization (from above and below) introduced significant changes in how this system worked.

In the days of PRI hegemony, “the exercise of municipal government followed the rationale and orthodoxy of its role as a cog in the Mexican political (that is, PRI) machine” (Ward, 1995: 141).9 In the late 1980s, this tradition of local subservience to the PRI began to change, as the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN – National Action Party) and the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD – Party of the Democratic Revolution) began to make electoral inroads at state and municipal levels.10 As is clear in Figures 8.1 and 8.2, opposition party victories became increasingly common in Mexico.

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Figure 8.1 Percentage of municipalities and states governed by parties other than the PRI, 1985–2003 Source: Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo A.C., <http://www.cidac.org>.

In addition, decentralization, initiated hesitantly in the early 1980s and evolving equally hesitantly over the next two and a half decades, gradually allowed local governments greater autonomy and more resources. In 1994, they began to receive significant increases in grants and transfers from the federal government, by far the most important source of their revenue.11 Figure 8.3 shows the growth in funds provided to local governments from all federal sources between 1990 and 2002. In constant 1993 pesos, municipalities received extremely little before 1994; by 2002, they were receiving almost 2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) (see Table 8.1). In per capita terms, there was an increase from 0.14 pesos per person in 1990 to 311.58 pesos in 2002 (see Table 8.1).

Gradually, then, municipal elections in Mexico became arenas for greater competition between political parties and, by the mid-1990s, local governments were beginning to receive extensive new resources for the management of public affairs. This set the stage for the potential to increase citizen participation through elections, collective action and expectations for government performance.

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Figure 8.2 Percentage of the municipal population governed by parties other than the PRI, 1990 –2003 Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, “Sistema Municipal de Base de Datos”, <http://www.inegi.org.mx/prod_serv/contenidos/espanol/simbad/ default.asp?c=73>.

8.3.1 Voting to reward and punish Over time, parties other than the PRI increased their capacity to win elections in the 30 research municipalities. Indeed, in these localities, the probability of an incumbent party losing control over the town hall had risen from 0.06 in 1990 to 0.50 by 2004, even though incumbents routinely benefited from municipal funds and logistical support for their campaigns.

Even where the PRI continued to reign supreme, its margin of victory was considerably reduced. Table 8.2 shows the increasing threat faced by the PRI at election time in the research municipalities, demonstrating that party’s losses and also a pattern of decreasing margins of victory. As indicated, in 18 of the 30 municipalities, the PRI had lost at least one election; in only 6 of them had opposition parties not come within a 10-point margin of the dominant party.

An interviewee in Santo Domingo Tehuantepec described the threat of electoral loss as important in “forcing the parties to modernize themselves”, a factor that was perhaps most true for the PRI.12 Although there continued to be complaints that the PRI had not changed its colours

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Figure 8.3 Federal transfers to all municipal governments, 1990 –2002 (millions of 1993 pesos) Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, “Sistema Municipal de Base de Datos”, <http://www.inegi.org.mx/prod_serv/contenidos/espanol/simbad/ default.asp?c=73>.

Table 8.1 Total funding of municipal governments, 1990 –2002 Year

Total (1993 pesos)

As per cent of GDP

Per capita (1993 pesos)

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

11,493,530 12,844,330 13,957,728 15,670,364 16,627,876,932 13,467,271,150 13,593,322,125 14,834,650,367 19,041,518,428 22,914,372,452 24,847,462,509 27,730,706,387 31,412,724,549

0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.27 1.10 1.05 1.08 1.31 1.53 1.55 1.73 1.98

0.14 0.15 0.16 0.18 185.69 147.76 146.84 157.94 199.91 237.25 253.63 279.05 311.58

Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, “Sistema Municipal de Base de Datos”, <http://www.inegi.org.mx/prod_serv/contenidos/espanol/simbad/ default.asp?c=73>; and data from the Banco de México.

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from the old days of its dominance, most informants referred to elections in which the PRI won with lower margins of victory as “a wakeup call” for the party. A PRIista administrator, for example, observed that, “suddenly, we didn’t have the power we had had for decades”, and in a staunch PRI municipality a local party president asserted that, in the previous election, it was clear that “the people have given a vote of confidence to the PRI for the last time”.13 Parties responded to increased competition by introducing important organizational and behavioural changes. In Tamaulipas, for example, the PRI state party council ceded more authority to its local organizations in selecting candidates, a change from the old days when the governor made such choices.14 Contending leadership candidates in many localities were presented and voted upon by the membership of the party. Frequently, losing pre-candidates were offered positions on the list of candidates for the council. A former PRI mayor commented that, since 1989, “the population has realized that it was possible to participate more actively. Now the PRI is more open, there’s more internal competition, and the credentials of its leaders are clearer.”15 The threat of losing elections encouraged another development in the parties: they began to pay more attention to selecting candidates they hoped would appeal to local voters. At times, the means for doing so contributed to internal democratic practices. After losing a municipal election in a traditional PRI stronghold in Tamaulipas, for example, that party organized a broad consultation with its voter base to select its next candidate for mayor.16 In Puebla, a municipal party began carrying out voter surveys to determine the popularity of potential candidates.17 A deeply divided PAN in a Oaxacan municipality sought to overcome its inability to win elections by selecting a candidate who was well respected in the community but not affiliated with any party.18 The PRI in some locations began to rejuvenate itself by drawing new and younger members into local party decision-making councils.

Modernizing the internal workings of the parties did not dramatically affect how campaigns were carried out, however. Instead, campaigning in a multi-party Mexico closely resembled campaigns in the old dominantparty Mexico. Continuing practices from the days of PRI hegemony, for example, promises of jobs were the most important way to recruit campaign workers. As a consequence, when campaigns were under way, town halls tended to resemble ghost towns, as elected and appointed officials absented themselves to work for their candidates.

As in traditional campaigns of the PRI, party platforms were not important means for generating votes for local offices. In the 30 municipalities, campaign slogans focused on vague promises of a better future – among them “Working Shoulder to Shoulder”, “A Government That Works for

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Tamaulipas

Sinaloa

Puebla

Oaxaca

Guanajuato

Abasolo Manuel Doblado San Luis de la Paz Santa Cruz de Juventino Rosas Yuriria Acatlán de Pérez Figueroa San Juan Guichicovi Santiago Pinotepa Nacional Santiago Juxtlahuaca Santo Domingo Tehuantepec Chignahuapan Coronango Ixtacamaxtitlán Libres San Pedro Cholula Escuinapa Mocorito Rosario Salvador Alvarado San Ignacio Aldama Gonzalez Miguel Aleman San Fernando Tula

Municipality 1982 1991 1988 1991 1991 1992 1992 1995 1995 1980 2001 1983 1995 1995 1992 1992 1995 1995 1992 1998 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995

First time PRI <60% 1991 2003 1991 1997 1997 1992 1995 1995 1995 1995 2001 1992 2001 1995 1995 1992 1995 1995 1992 – 1995 1995 1995 1995 –

First time PRI <50% 1991 2003 1988 2000 1997 1992 1995 1995 1995 1995 – 1995 2001 1995 1995 1992 1995 1998 1995 – – 1998 1995 – –

First time PRI <10% from its closest opponent 2 1 2 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0

No. of PRI losses

Table 8.2 The threat of electoral loss: Increasing competition for the PRI in municipal elections, 1980 –2004

PAN PAN PAN PVEM PAN PRI PRI PRI PRI PRI PAN PRI PRI PRI PRI PAN PRI PRD PRI PRI PRI PRI PAN PRI PRI

Party in office at time of research

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Oxkutzcab Progreso Ticul Uman Valladolid

1993 1993 1993 1990 1993

1995 – 1995 1995 2001

1995 – 1995 1995 1995

3 0 2 1 1

PRI (PAN) PRI (PRI) PRI (PAN) PRI (PRI) PRI (PRD)

Sources: Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo A.C. and local electoral institutes.

Notes: PAN = Partido Acción Nacional, PVEM = Partido Verde Ecologista de Mexicó, PRI = Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRD = Partido de la Revolución Democrática. In the case of Yucatan, the results of the 2004 elections, which were held in the middle of the research period, are shown in parentheses. These are accounted for in the number of PRI losses.

Yucatan

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You” and “Working Together for a Better Municipality”.19 Specific promises to pay attention to very specific public goods – a better access road to the community, potable water, electricity, drainage, a new bridge – were the stuff of daily campaigning. Equally important were individual promises of a job, a water hook-up, a new roof for a house. Thus, as in the past under the long reign of the PRI, community-level political rallies were complemented by a great deal of one-on-one campaigning and listening to the individual grievances of citizens. In the research municipalities, candidates visited as many homes and localities as possible during a campaign, listening to problems and promising to resolve them when the candidate won. Significant numbers of citizens helped organize rallies and marches, put up signs and worked to get out the vote for their candidates. Parties also sent their activists out to do surveys and to report back on what local communities were most concerned about. Campaigning in a more electorally competitive Mexico, then, mirrored a long tradition of labour-intensive personal offers of promises and candidates.

Beyond promises, candidates brought gifts to potential voters. To demonstrate their sincerity, for example, they might bring paint for the local school and set local party activists to work on painting it or distribute sports equipment to community clubs or schools. Again, individual benefits, such as those distributed in the days of PRI dominance, were important for attracting voters: a chit for medicine from a local pharmacy or food from a local store, cement blocks for housing, free seeds and gasoline, for example. In the case of highly competitive elections, the amount of patronage and clientelistic practice might even have increased.

These pre-election gifts led to widespread charges of electoral fraud and vote-buying. In one municipality, it was asserted that candidates could buy a vote for about MX$20; elsewhere votes were reputed to cost between MX$15 and MX$25.20 Frequently, also, incumbent parties were accused of using municipal funds for the campaigns of their candidates; similarly, incumbents were not above hoarding municipal funds so they could be spent on social services and public works just prior to elections.21 And charges of electoral fraud, common enough during the heyday of PRI ascendance, were also part of the more competitive electoral arena. On a more positive note, this form of campaigning did much to educate candidates about the needs and desires of their constituents. In addition, unconstrained by party platforms, parties could alter their priorities from one election to the next. Thus, for example, “in the last election, the candidates promised a university, more health clinics, school lunches, hand-outs and cement blocks. This year, the people are worried about roads, jobs and seeds for their crops.”22 The deep-seated tradition of political campaigning with a strong clientelist or personalist component meant that winning parties usually ar-

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rived in the town hall without a clear programme of government or even a mandate about the important issues they should tackle. Programmes were typically crafted once newcomers had arrived in municipal offices and, at times, no consistent programmes at all were developed. Universally, the bulk of decision-making revolved around the allocation of public works to different parts of the municipality and appointments for jobs in the town hall. Roads, drainage ditches, small bridges, potable water, electricity, a new clinic or hospital, parks, basketball courts, ring roads, a new school, tourist facilities, industrial parks – mayors focused great attention on the legacy of works they would leave behind when their administration was over. Moreover, when competitive campaigns left behind divided councils, incumbents often encountered significant conflict over the allocation of resources and jobs.

Also, because of limitations on the re-election of mayors and councillors, individual office holders could not be rewarded or penalized directly unless they were seeking other positions through elections. That is, if mayors wished to continue their career by running for office as a representative to the state or federal legislature, local citizens would have the capacity to penalize or reward their actions while they had been mayor.

However, if they decided to retire from public life or to seek an appointed position, there was no direct way to penalize or reward their behaviour publicly. Similarly, with only about one-third of municipal workers in unions, which prevented their dismissal when new administrations took over, with no civil service, and with no immediate re-election providing for some continuity of personnel, changes of administration were characterized by wholesale changes in who had jobs in the town hall. The skills and perspectives of those who were selected again depended on the preferences of the mayor.

Potentially, of course, this does not mean that elections could not be used to send a message about the performance of a political party, but, as we have seen, the tendency towards retail politics and the capacity to emphasize the personality of the candidate generally undermined the ability to send a clear message to parties about good and bad performance.

8.3.2 Organizing to acquire benefits Despite a lively history of revolution, insurrection and political mobilization, Mexico’s twentieth-century political system discouraged the emergence of a vibrant and independent civil society. For most of this period, the dominant theme in national politics and administration was centralization of authority and decision-making in a national government that was tightly held together by a dominant national political party. Citizen demands were routinely met with clientelistic responses channelled

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through the PRI – in the case of peasant, worker and middle-class concerns – and with accommodation and mutual interest between government and economic elites. Important decisions were made at national levels, usually by the powerful executive branch, in ways that increased the importance of the national leaders of organized interests and, in many cases, encouraged an alignment of their interests with the strength and persistence of a centralized and authoritarian government.

At local levels, where organization around common interests for civic purposes might be easier to accomplish, Mexican politics generally provided little incentive for such action. Local officials and governments controlled few resources and did not have significant decision-making power; local elites frequently used their ties to the PRI or organized interests to extract personal benefits from government and maintained control of local populations through clientelist networks that originated at the national level. There were not, in fact, many policies or actions that local citizens could influence locally.

Thus, the general pattern for state–society interaction in the twentieth century was one in which the state was dominant and civil society groups were dealt with in corporatist, clientelistic and non-democratic ways, and in which overt repression was always available as a last resort. As a result, civil society was neither strong nor very independent at the outset of the twenty-first century in Mexico. A generalized expectation of a weak and often disorganized civil society pervaded public discussion of state– society relations, even after the country’s politics had become more democratic.

These expectations did not, however, capture the full reality of citizen engagement in the research municipalities. In fact, many of the municipalities boasted local community groups such as Lions Clubs and Rotary Clubs, professional associations of lawyers and doctors, producers’ associations and a variety of cultural organizations. In many, groups of citizens had joined together to establish and maintain a local history museum. Local improvement committees were ubiquitous. These were organized at the neighbourhood or village level to increase the availability of public amenities such as roads, potable water, sewerage and electricity.

Indeed, in all of the 30 research municipalities, there were organizations formed explicitly for the purposes of proposing, assisting in and monitoring local investment projects. Among the most common patterns of local organization was that resulting from official requirements for benefits to be acquired from other levels of government.23 National and state laws required each municipality to have a municipal development committee (Comité de Desarrollo Municipal) whose purpose was to establish priorities for investments and to monitor their execution. In

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many places, the meetings of the municipal development committee were preceded by community-level meetings in which residents drew up petitions for public investments in their neighbourhood or village. Creating a municipal development plan was supposed to be a major requisite for acquiring various project funds from state- and national-level agencies.

Investments made in particular kinds of activities – a new health clinic, for example, or a school rehabilitation project – also required the formation of citizen groups if funds were to be released by public agencies.

In many cases, such committees were formed by municipal directors of various offices, such as public health or public works, and often served as participatory “window dressing” for decisions made elsewhere. In a municipality in Sinaloa, for example, an important local citizen remembered being asked to serve on a committee for public security: After the committee was composed, we did an extensive analysis of the needs of the municipality and I developed plans for constructing police kiosks, we figured out routes for patrol cars, and we laid out needs for capacity-building among the police officers. Well then, when we presented our report to the mayor, he told us it wouldn’t be possible to carry out any of them because there wasn’t any money. And that’s what he told all the groups. As a consequence, the people who make up the committees get discouraged because they see that the mayors already have their security plan . . . Many times, when these committees are formed, an official photograph is taken, and then they never meet again.24

There were, however, examples in which municipal development committees became more authentic drivers of collective action. In a municipality in Oaxaca, for example, the municipal development committee met one Sunday a month from 10 a.m. until 4 p.m. and reported average attendances of 200 –300 people.25 In a municipality in Tamaulipas, 60 –70 people met as the municipal development committee every six months; after the initial priority-setting meeting, subsequent gatherings were dedicated to follow-up and review of progress. In another Oaxacan municipality, the legally required formation of a social development council was credited with the democratization of information about the budget – how much money the government had and how it was being spent.26 In one community in Sinaloa, a committee regularly coordinated activities for local development with municipal authorities – dances, rodeos and raffles to raise money; materials to connect households with piped water; a police kiosk; and other such works.27 All of the research municipalities demonstrated some citizen activism at the sub-municipal or community level. Organized by local residents, community improvement committees of various kinds reflected an apt

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understanding of effective ways to influence decisions about public investment. These organizations functioned with remarkably similar dynamics. First, they organized around a specific common interest. This was almost always an investment project and represented a significant local need – a road, potable water or drainage ditches, for example. At times, the problem to be solved was one that had been identified by a community as a priority over a significant period of time. In one community, for example, the rainy season regularly brought flooding; in another, annual rains created an impassable stream that separated some residents from the main road to town; in yet another, residents had to travel long distances for emergency medical care and people had been known to die while being transported to the nearest hospital. In some cases, a very specific common interest brought a group together, as in the case of handicapped people in an Oaxacan municipality who organized to obtain a government-financed rehabilitation centre.28 At its initial meeting, the committee would elect a president, secretary and treasurer. Almost inevitably, those who emerged as leaders of an initiative were well recognized for their prior work on behalf of the community and were often those who had taken the initiative to mobilize the group at the outset. Those elected were also often those known to have a good reputation or good connections in the town hall – people who had acquired benefits for the community in the past or those who had stood firmly with a successful candidate during an election. It was the leadership’s responsibility to represent the community to the municipality and, at times, to higher levels of government.

Community-level committees selected similar strategies for approaching the municipality with their needs. The main focus of action was initially to draw up a petition that laid out the difficulties created by the problem and that asked the municipality for help in resolving it through a particular investment. The petition was signed by as many members of the community as possible. Very frequently, the committee would impose a small fee on each member – usually MX$1–5 – to be used for transportation costs to send the leaders to the municipal seat to present the petition and then to follow up on a weekly basis to see what had become of it. Usually, they would take the petition directly to the mayor’s office. Although often this involved waiting for long periods of time in the mayor’s anteroom before being granted an audience, this official would usually accept the petition, promise to give it priority and then refer the group to the appropriate department for follow-up.

Follow-up with the director of the department or the councillor who oversaw that department was an important part of the committee’s subsequent strategy. This often meant repeated visits by the committee leadership to check on whether action had been taken by this person or when

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action was scheduled. Such follow-up activities were often sustained for weeks, months and even years, and typically were financed by contributions from committee members. Persistence was essential, and met ruefully by some public officials. According to one, “it is impossible to escape from them. They always come to the town to investigate [what’s happening] and demand attention for their projects.”29 Although persistence often paid off, collective action strategies suggest the ways in which government priorities, promises and responsiveness changed as incumbents in office changed. There was little institutional infrastructure that could be relied upon over time to take responsibility for delivering a particular benefit; initiatives often had to be re-started as governments at state and local levels changed hands.

From a strategic perspective, it was well understood that local contributions might mean a positive response from the government. As the principal of a school noted: “If you have money in your hand, the municipality is more likely to help. It shows you are committed and willing to work with the municipality.”30 In the same municipality, the legal affairs officer noted that, if “you arrive with your petition – for a street, for example – and you have a good budget and 50,000 pesos, we see that you are willing to meet the municipality halfway. We can spend [the saved] money elsewhere.”31 At times, acquiring funds meant tapping into a variety of sources. In a municipality in Sinaloa, a group of migrants in the United States signed an agreement with the government to provide school scholarships for local children.32 Some projects came with explicit agreements that local residents would have to put up some of the money, as was the case with a health centre approved for a community in Tamaulipas that required MX$15,000 to be collected locally before construction could begin.33 A good example of the combination of local initiative and a facilitative municipality was the construction of a small bridge to join two parts of a community in Sinaloa. This community had long been divided by a gulch that could not be crossed by foot or motor traffic during the rainy season.

For many years, community members had petitioned the municipality to put up a bridge, but had never been successful in their quest. Then, in 2002, community members elected a new committee to take on the task of building the bridge.

Led by their president, the committee acted shortly after a new municipal government came into office. Having decided that the bridge could be made of the kind of drainage pipes that were currently being used to build a sewage plant in the municipality, the committee petitioned the local agency in charge of constructing this plant. The agency agreed to donate two pipes, and then later two additional pipes when it was determined that two were not enough. The municipality was then asked to

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provide equipment to do the heavy work of shifting soil and laying the pipes. The committee sponsored dances and horse races and collected a 5 per cent tax on beer sold in the community after certain hours to buy cement and other materials and to pay for labour. Committee members also helped out in the construction, and, reportedly, when others saw their leaders at this work, they joined in. Within a short time, the community was connected in good weather and bad. The municipal director of public works held up this community as an example of what could be accomplished when people worked together on local problems.34 Underpinning the strategic choices made by community improvement committees was the use of formal and informal networks to tap into the “right connection” for acquiring technical studies, approval, funding, equipment and labour for the actual implementation of an investment.

Thus, those who knew the mayor or who had been important in mobilizing people and votes for an election campaign or who were related in some way to influential public figures were often chosen to take the petition to the town hall and follow up on it. Talking, negotiating and invoking political support, the groups demonstrated good knowledge of how to find the right connections that would eventually result in their success.

They formed alliances with officials willing to commit themselves to solutions, they worked around obstructionist local officials and appealed directly to state-level officials, and they contributed from their own pockets to making something happen. Committees that were successful in gaining their objectives often did not stop at the municipal level but worked with contacts at the state level, at times even circumventing a local government that was distrusted or considered unresponsive.

8.3.3 Demanding citizenship rights Whereas local collective action built on strong traditions of petitioning and community organizing for benefits, there was scant evidence of citizens organizing around demands to improve the overall quality of government performance. Thus, although many communities mobilized around the need for potable water, a new road, a bridge or drainage, they did not identify the quality of education delivered by the local school, the helpfulness of nurses and doctors at the local clinic or the right to efficient service in civil registry institutions as issues around which to organize. How they were treated at the town hall was a matter for complaints, but not for organization. Waiting in line, having to pay bribes, being refused service were conditions to be endured, even while many citizens expected that organizing around investment petitions would eventually pay off. Groups were primarily concerned about particular benefits, not

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about the more abstract idea of “good governance” as a right that could be demanded by citizens.

This does not mean that there were no initiatives to improve the quality of governance through citizen participation in the research municipalities. There were. Interestingly, however, these initiatives almost always originated in the town hall, not in the demands, ideas or actions of citizen groups. In several municipalities, for example, officials placed suggestion boxes in the town hall and other localities so that citizens could complain about services; these were often used to denounce particular officials who were judged not to be doing their jobs correctly.35 In a municipality in Yucatán, the local government created an office of citizen response, where residents could report water leaks, broken or burned out streetlights, problems with the police and other such local concerns.36 In several municipalities, public departments carried out surveys to find out which services were working well, which ones were experiencing problems and how the municipal government’s activities were viewed by its citizens. In many, “Citizen Wednesdays”, “Citizen Mondays” or “Saturdays in Your Neighbourhood” took municipal officials outside of the town hall to meet directly with constituents who had problems or complaints. When these kinds of accountability measures worked well, they did so because there were mechanisms in place to follow up and ensure that problems had been dealt with. Open sessions of the municipal council provided opportunities for greater transparency in some localities. As with other such innovations, these emerged at the initiative of public officials and agencies.

Current histories in the research municipalities revealed some instances in which citizens sought to hold officials accountable for their actions in ad hoc and sometimes violent ways. Thus, for example, the Citizen Movement of Ixtacamaxtitlán was formed in order to sack several mayors for poor performance, one after only six months in office.37 In the 1980s and 1990s, political movements ousted authoritarian political bosses in some municipalities.38 In this way, some mayors and councillors felt under pressure from political society to improve the performance of local government. Nevertheless, a citizen’s right to good governance was not one that was clearly articulated or acted upon by citizens in the research sites.

Moreover, where non-electoral mechanisms of accountability did exist, they were much more likely to have been introduced by public officials than by citizen action. In contrast to the discussion of sanctions and benefits, then, there is much less to report in terms of activities related to demanding citizenship rights.

Of course, demanding rights as citizens is a more difficult task than demanding public investments in infrastructure. The performance of

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teachers and schools, for example, was responsive to state-level secretariats; nurses and doctors were hired and managed by state- or nationallevel institutions; road maintenance required expertise not always available to local citizens; garbage collection was a service that many were used to doing without. Moreover, demanding good performance as a right of citizenship entailed more ambiguous and ongoing scrutiny than did mobilizing around an interest in a particular infrastructure investment. It was clear when potable water was made newly available, but how could citizens identify “good governance”?

8.4 Conclusions Three forms of government accountability to citizens – the use of the vote to penalize or reward behaviour, organizing to gain responsiveness to collective needs and the capacity to demand rights of citizenship for fair and equitable treatment from government – are expected to improve through decentralization and democratization. Comparative research in municipalities in Mexico, however, suggests contextual factors that may limit the capacity of citizens to hold local governments accountable for their performance.

In the case of the municipalities in Mexico, more competitive elections and greater decentralization of responsibilities to local governments encouraged political parties to pay more attention to local contests and to democratize their internal procedures. Yet, a tradition of political campaigning with a strong clientelist or personalist component, along with a prohibition on immediate re-election and an extensive turnover of appointed positions after elections, weakened the ability of citizens to send a clear message to local governments and their officials about their expectations for improved performance. Common patterns in the research municipalities thus indicated the emergence of hotly contested local elections. The way in which campaigns were carried out, however, closely mimicked the kinds of political campaigns that were characteristic of Mexican politics in the past.

In contrast, citizen groups showed considerable sophistication and knowledge about how to extract benefits from government – especially how to get government to deliver on promises to provide public works.

Using a fairly universal set of tools to influence public decision-making, many were relatively successful in affecting the allocation of resources for particular projects and communities. The means they used were familiar ones: petitioning and invoking networks of influential people, often through time-tested forms of clientelism. Their objectives were to obtain tangible benefits that could be provided in the short term. Not surpris-

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ingly, they often found politicians ready to respond to their requests for these types of projects – these investments provided concrete evidence of actions that were bringing benefits to the communities.

In the municipalities studied, most citizens had an extractive relationship with government rather than one based on their rights as citizens to demand good performance. Parent groups were not active in demanding that schools perform effectively or that teachers show up for work regularly; committees formed to plan municipal investments or to oversee the construction of a clinic or a road did not subsequently oversee the management of the clinic or the maintenance of the road. When garbage collection services failed, there was little evidence that citizens organized to demand their improvement. Moreover, even with investment projects, when local officials were unresponsive, citizen groups went elsewhere rather than demand more accountability locally.

Thus, the effectiveness of civic action in Mexico was limited by the weakness of political and administrative institutions. In the case of extracting benefits, the response to petitions from local communities depended primarily on the decisions of mayors, councillors and public works officials rather than on enforceable institutional commitments over time. When administrations changed, community improvement committees often had to start all over again to gain support from the local government – a paper trail of commitments from the past was not an effective way to ensure that projects could be sustained across administrations. In the case of citizenship rights to effective government, mechanisms for ensuring it often depended on the willingness of public officials to create and maintain them. The looseness of local institutions was a significant constraint on citizen engagement in monitoring government performance.

Nevertheless, the extent to which civic organizations became mobilized and pressured government to deliver on promises for public works and social infrastructure undoubtedly contributed to the delivery of these services in all the municipalities. The ongoing petitioning, lobbying and reminders of commitments made to specific communities kept many public officials from ignoring their responsibilities and promises. These activities also kept municipal leaders from assuming full control of resource allocation decisions. Although there were few institutional constraints on decisions about the distribution of public investments, the mobilization of community groups acted to shape these allocations. Yet, as indicated, these actions of local groups mirrored those of decades past when there was much less decentralization and democracy.

Moreover, the increased importance of competitive elections in Mexico’s municipalities provided opportunities for new leadership groups to reach public office, some of whom had strong commitments to introducing

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more participatory and responsive forms of governance. As experience with more democratic local elections increases, it may well be that ideas about the right to good performance will become more prominent. Additionally, the accountability mechanisms introduced in a number of municipalities from the top down may become more institutionalized over time and thus provide more focus on good performance as an everyday expectation.

This distinction in terms of civil society activism in local government is an important one in the design of development policies, programmes and projects and in understanding the impact of decentralization. Currently popular forms of encouraging participation in local decision-making – such as organizing groups to help plan municipal investments – may in fact help to restrict citizen input to tasks of petitioning, making connections, lobbying and finding ad hoc methods to influence government, rather than encouraging the development of a culture of accountability, of a sense that citizens have a right to demand effective government.

There are many interesting examples of more participatory governance developing at local levels around the world. Yet these new models require a basis in a widespread assumption that citizens believe they have rights in democratic contexts. That culture can be generated with new participatory models, but it also needs to extend to attitudes towards voting as a means of holding individuals and parties accountable for their actions. This more traditional mechanism of democratic governance must be used, in addition to newer mechanisms of participation to deliver messages of approval or disapproval of performance and encouraging understanding of how democratic rights can be exercised.

Notes 1. This chapter draws extensively on Grindle (2007).

2. The literature on decentralization and accountability is extensive. Many scholars trace arguments about local government and the ability of citizens to hold government accountable to Alexis de Toqueville ([1848] 1988). For more recent discussions, see Abers (1998); Alatas, Pritchett and Wetterberg (2002); Baiocchi (2001); Beer (2003); Blair (2000); Campbell (2005); Crook and Manor (1998); Eaton (2004); Falleti (2003); Fung (2004); Heller (2001); Manor (1999); Montero and Samuels (2004); O’Neill (2003); Oxhorn, Tulchin and Selee (2004); Putnam (1993); Schönwälder (1997); Tendler (1997).

The discussion of three forms of accountability presented here draws on this literature.

See also Grindle (2007) for more discussion.

3. See Stoner-Weiss (1997) and Snyder (2001) on this methodology. The states were Guanajuato, Oaxaca, Puebla, Sinaloa, Tamaulipas and Yucatán. In 2000, municipalities of 25,000 –100,000 inhabitants comprised 23.6 per cent of all local governments in Mexico and 25.3 per cent of its population; their average population was 46,516 (INEGI, 2000).

These municipalities were large enough to have substantial responsibilities and signifi-

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cant resources for addressing them, yet small enough to facilitate understanding complex political, administrative and fiscal interactions.

4. Collectively, 569 individuals were interviewed: 51 current and former mayors, 113 councillors, 229 local public managers, 98 community leaders and important citizens, 26 local party officials, 48 state and federal-level officials, as well as a number of academic experts. Orazio Bellettini, Karla Breceda, Alexi Canaday-Jarrix, Elizabeth Coombs, Xochitl Leon and Alberto Saracho-Martínez, graduates of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, USA, and Sergio Cárdenas-Denham, of the Harvard Graduate School of Education, USA, carried out the research. Naomi Walcott, Elizabeth Gewurz Ramírez and Emanuel Garza Fishburn assisted in the research.

5. The Municipal Census of 2002 reported that Mexico contained 2,429 municipalities.

Their size and population varied greatly: the largest municipality is one that extends to almost 52,000 km2 in the state of Baja California; the smallest measures just 4.3 km2 in the state of Tlaxcala. Similarly, populations ranged from 1.65 million people in a municipality in the state of Jalisco to 109 people in an Oaxacan municipality.

6. On decentralization in Mexico, see Beer (2003); Bruhn (1999); Cabrero Mendoza (2003); Cornelius et al. (1999); Fox and Aranda (1996); García del Castillo (2003); Grindle (2007); Merino (2004); Mizrahi (2004); Rodríguez (1997); Santín del Río (2004); Ward et al. (1999).

7. The number of councillors is dependent on the population of the municipality and is determined by state law. In the 30 research municipalities, councils ranged from 6 to 22 elected officials, and had an average of 12 councillors. Depending on the municipality, the council met once a week, every two weeks, once a month or irregularly. In most municipalities, each councillor had oversight responsibility for one or more public departments. There are important exceptions to this general panorama of municipal government. In states in which there are significant indigenous populations, local governments can legally be governed by traditional rules, known as usos y costumbres (traditions and customs).

8. Opposition parties began winning elections at the local level in the 1980s. In 1989, the first governor from an opposition party won election (although, earlier in the decade, a number of other opposition candidates at this level may have fallen victim to electoral fraud).

9. Local politics were controlled by party bosses, or caciques, who used their power in the local economy to marshal or coerce votes for their PRI patrons at state and national levels. In the words of a journalist in one cacique-ridden state, one such local boss “used the municipality’s money as if it were his own” (interview, 22 June 2004, San Pedro Cholula, Puebla). Before 1980, explained a mayor, “there was a person who decided what needed to be done. This person belonged to the PRI and he was the person who communicated with the state and federal governments about who would be the next candidate, and consequently, the mayor. . . . At that time there were no [real] elections; he named [mayors] with the dedazo [literally, ‘the big finger’]” (interview, 7 July 2004, San Juan Guichicovi, Oaxaca).

10. The PAN was created in 1939 and had been successful in winning a number of state and local electoral contests in the 1980s and 1990s. The PRD was established in 1989 (from its predecessor, the Frente Nacional Democrático, established in 1988); its capacity to win local elections has been less than that of the PAN, but in 1997 it won control over the government of Mexico City, one of the world’s largest cities.

11. In the 30 research municipalities, locally generated resources accounted for an average of only 11 per cent of total funding.

12. Interview, 23 June 2004, Santo Domingo Tehuantepec, Oaxaca.

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13. Interviews, 18 June 2004, González, Tamaulipas; 24 June 2004, Santo Domingo Tehuantepec, Oaxaca.

14. Interview, 21 June 2004, González, Tamaulipas.

15. Interview, 27 July 2004, Acatlán de Pérez Figueroa, Oaxaca 16. Interview, 4 August 2004, Miguel Aleman, Tamaulipas.

17. Interview, 26 June 2004, San Pedro Cholula, Puebla.

18. Interview, 23 June 2004, Santo Domingo Tehuantepec, Oaxaca.

19. Interviews, 17 July 2004, Acatlán de Pérez Figueroa, Oaxaca; 6 August 2004, Santiago Pinotepa Nacional, Oaxaca; 5 July 2004, Manuel Doblado, Guanajuato.

20. Interviews, 15 July 2004, Tula, Tamaulipas; 19 August 2004, Uman, Yucatán.

21. Interviews, 8 July 2004, Manuel Doblado, Guanajuato; 22 June 2004, Abasolo, Guanajuato; 19 August 2004, Uman, Yucatán.

22. Interview, 21 June 2004, González, Tamaulipas.

23. Many individual programmes required local participatory mechanisms, a component of development projects that could be traced back to community development programmes in the 1960s and 1970s and that again grew popular in the 1990s and 2000s. In 2003, the Law of Social Development guaranteed that programmes focused on social development would be accompanied by “social participation forms in the formulation, implementation, evaluation, and control of social development programs” as a way of promoting the organizational capacity of Mexican society (quoted in Puga, 2004: 11).

24. Paraphrase of interview, 6 June 2004, Rosario, Sinaloa.

25. Interview, 11 August 2004, Santiago Pinotepa Nacional, Oaxaca.

26. Interview, 19 June 2004, Santo Domingo Tehuantepec, Oaxaca.

27. Interview, 8 July 2004, Salvador Alvarado, Sinaloa.

28. Interview, 20 June 2004, Acatlán de Pérez Figueroa, Oaxaca.

29. Interview, 21 June 2004, Santo Domingo Tehuantepec, Oaxaca.

30. Interview, 16 June 2004, González, Tamaulipas.

31. Interview, 17 June 2004, González, Tamaulipas.

32. Interview, 6 July 2004, Mocorito, Sinaloa. On the role of home town associations in local development, see Levitt (2001).

33. Interview, 26 August 2004, San Fernando, Tamaulipas.

34. Interview, 27 July 2004, Salvador Alvarado, Sinaloa.

35. Interview, 22 July 2004, Chignahuapan, Puebla.

36. Interview, 17 October 2004, Oxkutzcab, Yucatán.

37. Interview, 22 July 2004, Ixtacamaxtitlán, Puebla.

38. Interview, 7 July 2004, San Juan Guichicovi, Oaxaca.

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Beer, C. C. (2003) Electoral Competition and Institutional Change in Mexico.

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Blair, H. (2000) “Participation and Accountability at the Periphery: Democratic Local Governance in Six Countries”, World Development 28(1): 21–39.

Bruhn, K. (1999) “PRD Local Governments in Michoacán: Implications for Mexico’s Democratization Process”, in W. A. Cornelius, T. A. Eisenstadt and J. Hindley (eds) Subnational Politics and Democratization in Mexico. La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S.–Mexican Studies, University of California at San Diego.

Cabrero Mendoza, E. (ed.) (2003) Políticas públicas municipales: Una agenda en construcción. Mexico City: Miguel Angel Porrua.

Campbell, T. (2005) The Quiet Revolution: Decentralization and the Rise of Political Participation in Latin America’s Cities. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Cornelius, W. A., T. A. Eisenstadt and J. Hindley (eds) (1999) Subnational Politics and Democratization in Mexico. La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S.–Mexican Studies, University of California at San Diego.

Crook, R. C. and J. Manor (1998) Democracy and Decentralization in South Asia and West Africa: Participation, Accountability and Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Eaton, K. (2004) Politics beyond the Capital: The Design of Subnational Institutions in South America. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Falleti, T. G. (2003) “Of Presidents, Governors, and Mayors: The Politics of Decentralization in Latin America”. Paper prepared for the 2003 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Dallas, TX, 27–29 March.

Fox, J. and J. Aranda (1996) Decentralization and Rural Development in Mexico: Community Participation in Oaxaca’s Municipal Funds Program. Monograph Series No. 42, Center for U.S.–Mexican Studies, University of California at San Diego.

Fung, A. (2004) Empowered Participation: Reinventing Urban Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

García del Castillo, R. (2003) “La política de servicios municipales en México: Casos y tendencies recientes”, in E. Cabrero Mendoza (ed.) Políticas públicas municipales: Una agenda en construcción. Mexico City: Miguel Angel Porrua.

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Heller, P. (2001) “Moving the State: The Politics of Democratic Decentralization in Kerala, South Africa, and Porto Alegre”, Politics and Society 29(1): 131–163.

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Manor, J. (1999) The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

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Mizrahi, Y. (2004) “Twenty Years of Decentralization in Mexico: A Top-Down Process”, in P. Oxhorn, J. S. Tulchin and A. D. Selee (eds) Decentralization, Democratic Governance, and Civil Society in Comparative Perspective: Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

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Oxhorn, P., J. S. Tulchin and A. D. Selee (eds) (2004) Decentralization, Democratic Governance, and Civil Society in Comparative Perspective: Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Puga, C. (2004) “Associations and Governance in Mexico”. Paper prepared for the 25th International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Las Vegas, NV, 7–9 October.

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9 Engaging civil society to promote local governance: Emerging trends in local democracy in Asia G. Shabbir Cheema

9.1 Introduction Along with the state and the private sector, civil society is instrumental in promoting democratic local governance. As an agent of change, civil society can actively engage in policy analysis and advocacy, monitor state performance, including the actions and behaviour of local public officials, and build social capital and enable citizens to identify and articulate their values and civic norms. Civil society can also mobilize particular constituencies such as vulnerable and marginalized groups and minorities to participate more fully in politics and public policy. Another important role of civil society is to undertake local developmental activities, including the provision of shelter and basic social services to the poor in urban and rural areas.

Civil society organizations play vital roles at local, national, regional and global levels in the promotion of decentralization and inclusive governance; that is, governance characterized by the principles of participation, access, equity, subsidiarity and the rule of law. At the local level, civil society organizations are actively engaged in community development, skill improvements for sustainable livelihoods, and access to basic social services. Through local elections and local elected councils, they can hold local leaders accountable and influence the articulation of local needs and priorities. In urban areas, civil society organizations have played a major role over the years in urban shelter, services and protecting the interests of slum dwellers and squatters in government-initiated programmes. They The imperative of good local governance: Challenges for the next decade of decentralization, Öjendal and Dellnäs (eds), United Nations University Press, 2013, ISBN 978-92-808-1229-9

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organize poor urban communities to help them gain access to land titles and basic urban services, such as water, sanitation, primary health care and education. Active civil society engagement at the local level, however, requires open and transparent national political institutions. The rapid pace of globalization and the emergence of global institutions with mandates to promote and protect public goods such as human rights, democracy and access to basic services have had an influence on national democratic governance processes.

This chapter advances the argument that deepening decentralization and democratic local governance requires a two-pronged strategy: (1) a proactive civil society that utilizes the institutional structures created through decentralization and serves as the vanguard of accountability at national and local levels; and (2) a conducive national context characterized by political pluralism and the capacity and resources for local governments. The first section examines the evolution of the concepts, from deconcentration to devolution and political decentralization. The second section introduces the implementation issues that are critical to an understanding of decentralization. This is followed by an assessment of Asian civil society’s patterns of growth, legal and regulatory frameworks, capacity and accountability, advocacy roles and impact on democratic change. Examples from Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Japan, China, the Republic of Korea and the Philippines are included. Finally, the chapter identifies emerging trends in the region.

9.2 From deconcentration to democratic local governance With the evolution in thinking about development and governance and the rapid pace of democratization around the world, the concepts and practices of decentralization too have changed over the past few decades.

Decentralization was defined as the transfer of authority, responsibility and resources – through deconcentration, delegation or devolution – from the centre to lower levels of administration (Rondinelli, 1981; Rondinelli et al., 1983). Until the late 1970s, government was seen as the institutional embodiment of state sovereignty and as the dominant source of political and legal decision-making. In developing countries, debates over the structure, roles and functions of government focused on the effectiveness of central power and authority in promoting economic and social progress and on the potential advantages and disadvantages of decentralizing authority to sub-national units of administration, local governments or other agents of the state. Decentralization efforts focused on deconcentration of government functions from central to local levels and

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delegation of some of the functions to semi-autonomous development authorities and enterprises.

With the shift from government to inclusive governance involving three sets of actors – those from the state, civil society and the private sector – decentralization took on new meanings and new forms and objectives (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007). The second wave of decentralization beginning in the mid-1980s broadened the concept to include political power-sharing, democratization and market liberalization, expanding the scope for private sector decision-making. During the 1990s, decentralization was seen as a way of opening governance to wider public participation through the organizations of civil society. Globalization led to the recognition by governments of the limitations of central economic planning and management. Shifts in development thinking from the trickle-down theories of economic growth to growth with equity and participatory development also led to increasing calls for decentralization (Korten and Alfonso, 1981). International development partners promoted decentralization as an essential part of a “process approach” to development that depended primarily on self-help by local communities and local governments (Rondinelli, 1993).

9.3 Issues in implementation Over the past few decades, many countries have adopted decentralization policies and programmes. However, the results of these efforts have been mixed. Successful experiments in decentralization have yielded many benefits, such as improved access to services, citizen participation and mobilization of local resources, and the institutionalization of democratic political processes at the local level. Decentralization’s limitations have also been highlighted by the sceptics – including the “elite capture” of local governments, weak financial and administrative capacity of local governments, widening economic and social disparities between regions, and increased levels of local corruption and nepotism.

There are wide gaps between the objectives and scope of decentralization and local governance policies in developing countries and their implementation. Four recent studies highlight key issues in decentralization practice around the world: the first global report on Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World by United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG, 2007); UN-HABITAT’s International Guidelines on Decentralisation and the Strengthening of Local Authorities (UN-HABITAT, 2007); “A Guide to Local Governance and Decentralization: Programme Experiences and Strategies from a UNDP E-Discussion” (UNDP, 2007); and the United Nations Capital Development Fund’s Delivering the Goods:

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Building Local Government Capacity to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals (UNCDF, 2005). These and other documents identify a set of implementation issues that are critical to enhance our understanding of decentralization and local governance practice. The issues include the following: • the scope of policy and strategy • political and administrative organization of the state • the scope of local government responsibilities • financing local governments • mechanisms for local participation • mechanisms for local government accountability

9.3.1 The scope of policy and strategy In most developing countries, policy statements concerning decentralization encompass comprehensive objectives. But in most cases the policies in practice are much less than comprehensive in scope because they do not blend political devolution and power-sharing with financial and administrative capacity-strengthening in order to make local governments catalysts in local development. Some countries, however, have made major strides.

In India, local governments were strengthened with two amendments to India’s Constitution in 1992, leading to the election of about 238,000 local councils across the country. They are made up of 3 million elected representatives, one-third of whom are women. In Bangladesh, militarydominated governments in the past have attempted to strengthen decentralization processes to enhance political legitimacy in the absence of national democratic frameworks.

9.3.2 Political and administrative organization of the state Organization of the state and the styles of national political systems affect the implementation of decentralization policies and programmes.

State organization has both territorial and functional dimensions. Organizational structures of local government in federal states such as India, Nigeria and Brazil are different from those in unitary states such as Bangladesh. In the former, states are empowered to decide on many issues of local government. Functional and representational issues might require different types of local government structures. Some countries in Asia have extended or created local governments to ensure adequate representation of various regional and ethnic groups. At the same time, the emergence of metropolitan regions in many countries is necessitating the creation of systems and processes to plan, implement and monitor

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development projects covering many local government jurisdictions. The increasing number of small local governments with poor administrative and financial capacity and the emergence of densely populated urban local governments with relatively large resource bases is creating such policy dilemmas as how to balance the need for greater representation to promote representation and democracy, and the need to achieve economies of scale and more effective service delivery by folding small local governments into higher governments.

9.3.3 The scope of local government responsibilities Another implementation issue concerns the responsibilities assigned to local governments. Subsidiarity, autonomy and the need for effective delivery of goods and services are the main reasons for assigning responsibilities to local governments. In practice, implementation is affected by many factors (UCLG, 2008).

Central governments have the tendency to shift more responsibilities to local government without corresponding financial resources and adequate technical support from the centre. A more common set of responsibilities includes local public services such as water, solid waste, local markets, urban and land-use planning, social policy, and primary health care and education. Often the process of shifting these responsibilities is not clearly delineated.

Local governments need resources in proportion to their responsibilities. Because of difficulties in collecting property taxes and in most cases the political unacceptability of capitation taxes, many municipalities rely on different forms of business taxation. Transfers are essential tools at the disposal of the central government to fund services provided by local governments on its behalf, to ensure that decentralization does not take place at the expense of equity owing to differences in the resource bases of sub-national governments, and to influence sectoral patterns of local expenditures.

9.3.4 Financing local governments The performance of local governments is strongly influenced by the supply of infrastructure and other public services, as well as by their quality. The adequacy of financing for current and capital expenditures is a key determinant of both supply and quality. There are four dimensions of this issue. The first is about the adequacy of local government resources in proportion to the scope of their responsibilities. This is important because it allows local governments to deliver services to citizens and thus gain their trust and confidence. The second is the percentage of

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local government expenditure that emanates from local governments’ own resources. Where local governments are too dependent upon central government’s tied grants, their autonomy is negatively affected. The third is the efficiency of revenue collection and revenue-sharing arrangements that promote partnerships between the central and local governments. Finally, an efficient management of expenditures is equally important to maximize returns and achieve long-term fiscal balance.

9.3.5 Mechanisms for local participation The primary rationale of democratic local governance is that it brings government closer to the citizens. Mechanisms for participation and accountability at the local level are essential elements to ensure that local governance promotes participation and is also accountable to citizens.

Significant progress has been made in Asia in holding regular local elections, in many cases through multi-party systems. However, many of the municipal executives – mayors and municipal presidents – have been elected through indirect means. Most countries in Asia (India, Pakistan and the Philippines) have mechanisms below formal local government to engage citizens in the local decision-making process through consultations. The gram sabha in India and the barangay in the Philippines are examples of such locally based informal administrative units.

As in the case of democratic governance at the national level, local participation is both a means to an end and an end in itself. As a means, effective mechanisms for local participation facilitate service delivery and access, mobilization of community resources and implementation of local development projects. As an end, local participation promotes local democracy and participatory decision-making.

9.3.6 Accountability mechanisms Accountability of elected local governments and the effectiveness of anticorruption strategies at the local level are essential to promote and sustain political and economic devolution. Effective financial, political and administrative accountability mechanisms at the local government level compel local officials to focus on results, seek clear objectives, develop effective strategies and monitor and report on performance. In the absence of organized and disciplined political parties, local elected councils in developing countries tend to be weak and unable to perform their constitutionally guaranteed powers. This requires specific mechanisms to make local governments both democratic and effective. Civil society can play an important role in promoting the accountability of local public officials.

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In Asia, there are many good practices of active engagement of civil society. In Abra in the Philippines, the non-governmental organization (NGO) Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Governance investigates projects for sub-standard materials, poor construction techniques and fraudulent contracting procedures. It is an example of a participatory public audit with the engagement of citizens. In Bangalore in India, since 1994 the Public Affairs Centre has utilized Citizen Report Cards, which rate and compare agencies on the basis of public satisfaction and the responsiveness of public agencies. The Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism is an independent, non-profit media agency specializing in investigative journalism.

A review of experiences in developing countries shows that many factors influence the implementation process, including resistance from those whose interests are served by the concentration of power and resources in the central government, and the need to create a conducive political and economic environment for designing and implementing decentralization programmes over a longer period of time. Successful decentralization “always requires the right ingredients, appropriate timing, and some degree of experimentation” (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007: 9).

Civil society engagement in each of these can contribute to more effective decentralization and inclusive local governance.

9.4 Practice in Asia Civil society organizations (CSOs) are playing a vital role in promoting decentralization and democratization at national and local levels in Asia.

To understand the dynamics of civil society engagement and its strengths and weaknesses, however, there needs to be an analysis of their contextspecific history and patterns of growth, the legal framework under which they are established, their capacity to deliver on their mission, and their upwards and downwards accountability. Also important are the entry points for CSOs to play a role in the promotion of democracy at local and national levels.

9.4.1 Patterns of growth The history of civil society engagement and the pattern of growth are both necessary to understand the democratic governance practice in a country. They reveal the evolution of CSOs, conditions under which they were formed, the relationship between state and civil society, and the modes in which civil society groups have been active (watchdog, advocacy, etc.). The corresponding pattern of growth is crucial to understanding

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civil society engagement dynamics. The history and pattern of growth also explain the unique typology of civil society in each country. For example, in India it is rather difficult to bring the entire gamut of civil society initiatives under common definitions and characterizations that could be applied in other countries, because every known terminology seems to leave some elements out of their coverage. This definitional complexity also highlights what makes Indian civil society vibrant (similar to Thailand), as innumerable ad hoc initiatives disappear as quickly as they coalesce.

The pattern of CSO growth in China reveals the massive influence that political orientation, socioeconomic history, cultural influences and the forces of globalization can have on the sphere, and accordingly how CSOs are situated differently in different cultural contexts/landscapes (Roy, 2010). The new limited space for civil society in China emanated from two factors: first, the need for a new social safety net because the liquidation of many state-owned enterprises left millions of Chinese unemployed and without health care, while the state’s role in providing social welfare shrank as part of the marketization of the economic system; and, second, a slight loosening of restrictions on political discussion.

Unlike China, Indonesia has undergone a complete transition from authoritarianism to democracy, with CSOs playing a prominent role (Brodjonegoro, 2004; The Economist, 2011). In turn, the democratic government and decentralization reforms have facilitated further growth of CSOs and embedded them in the political and social landscape. This transition and freeing of society were an uneven process. In the 1980s, CSOs went from complete emasculation to the gradual acknowledgement by Suharto’s government that the state alone could not bear the full costs of development and therefore needed the participation of communities. The advocacy groups established in the 1980s were a building block for the democracy movement. They formed an important element in the aggressive public pressure on the Suharto government that emerged in the mid1990s. The fall of the Suharto regime and the ensuing democratization process in Indonesia led to the emergence of a discourse on good governance, accountability and the transparency of public institutions. With the basic freedoms of expression and association upheld, the civil society sector has grown rapidly and intensely.

The evolution and growth of civil society in Malaysia can be divided into four distinctive periods, reflecting social and political changes in the country (Jayasooria, 2010). The first phase (pre-1957) was characterized by people’s activism in Malaya through political parties based on ethnicity and religion. The colonial rulers introduced repressive laws such as the Societies Ordinance to check either the spread of illegal secret societies or the activities of the communists. During the second phase (1957–

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1980), the colonial legacy of preventive arrest and curtailment of fundamental rights was continued in order to suppress communist ideology and racial tension, even though the Constitution provided for the protection of fundamental human rights. However, the labour movement continued to be active. During the third period (1981–2003) under Mahathir, the concepts of strong state and Malaysia-specific democracy provided the context within which fundamental liberties were curtailed. The “Asian values” argument was presented to justify strong government actions vis-à-vis individual liberties. The fourth phase started with the resignation of Mahathir in 2003. Though no major amendments to laws dealing with fundamental liberties were made, more space was provided to citizens through such mechanisms as Internet websites, blogs and related tools of information technology. These new tools empowered small organizations and activists to challenge the strong arm of the state and led to the emergence of new civil society networks “transcending ethnicity, religion and area of advocacy” (Jayasooria, 2010).

There are more than 78,000 NGOs in Bangladesh registered with the NGO Affairs Bureau or other government agencies such as the Department of Social Services and the Department of Women’s Affairs (Salim, 2010). Most NGOs were established to provide social services to the poor and to promote the concerns of deprived groups. Owing to the disillusionment of many donors at the incapacity of the state to ensure effective delivery of services to the poor, external funding for NGOs increased from US$120 million in 1991 to US$534 in 2008. Because NGOs have to obtain formal clearance from the NGO Affairs Bureau to receive and spend external funding, they are likely to avoid those advocacy activities that are not favoured by the government.

CSOs in Pakistan have gone through different phases since the independence of the country (Mehboob, 2010). Four military coups led to severe constraints on the functioning of CSOs, followed by a gradual opening up of space for CSOs in the current civilian government. In recent years, there has been a dramatic increase in the role of civil society in the democratic governance process. Civil society engagement led to the resignation of the military-led government of former President Musharraf and the holding of relatively free and fair elections. The recent reinstatement of the Chief Justice of Pakistan (who had been fired by the military-led government) as a result of peaceful demonstration was a significant event in the promotion of the democratic process in the country.

In comparison with other regions, in Asia the role and activities of CSOs were traditionally more circumscribed, because governments had taken an active role in the promotion of economic development while limiting the ability of these organizations to form and participate in governance. These conditions changed during the course of the 1990s, which

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laid the foundation for the increased growth of CSOs within the region: (i) legal conditions for the existence of CSOs generally improved; (ii) fiscal cutbacks and conservative market philosophies led to declines in service provision and access; and (iii) many democratic transitions generated greater expectations among citizens but reform measures were left uncompleted. Globalization, the communications revolution and economic liberalization measures compounded these issues by increasing the flow of information and resources both within countries in Asia, as well as at the supra-national and sub-national levels.

These factors created a space for CSOs to increase their participation in local governance processes, while improving their ability to organize.

Although many reforms had been implemented to promote effective democratic governance at the national level in Asian countries, many countries reached a turning point at which local democracy could not be achieved without the increased involvement of CSOs and greater decentralization of administrative and financial authority to local units of government and administration. Neither governments nor the private sector were able to address these gaps on their own, owing to organizational and bureaucratic limitations, conflicts of interest and other issues. On the other hand, CSOs had three characteristics in their favour: the flexibility to approach and mobilize diverse populations; the credibility and independence to challenge existing policy; and the ability easily to coordinate their efforts both vertically and horizontally with little bureaucratic change. Consequently, new activist CSOs appeared at both national and local levels. Because of the differences in national political frameworks, however, the degree of engagement of CSOs ranged from very limited in China to very active in India and Indonesia.

9.4.2 Legal framework The legal basis for CSO formation and the legal framework in which civil society operates are perhaps the key dynamics between state and civil society. They directly influence the extent to which civil society can contribute to ensuring accountability of local public officials and, thus, strengthening the quality of local democracy. Through these mechanisms, the state can to some extent dictate the rate of CSO formation and in what sectors, both directly through permissive or harsh standards for formal recognition of organizations and the associated direct financial support, tax benefits or other costs.

The Japanese case is revealing of the importance of the legal climate.

One would expect a flourishing Japanese civil society because Japan ranks highly on the two most reliable predictors of the level of development of a nation’s civil society – income and education. However, Japan

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has perhaps the strictest regulatory environment in the developed world and an accordingly weak civil society with respect to the ability to affect democratic processes. Likewise, in the Republic of Korea there are huge differences in the numbers of registered and unregistered CSOs because the minor incentives of registration are offset by increases in regulatory oversight.

In China, CSOs operate under two burdens: a strict regulatory environment and major disincentives to registration (Roy, 2010). These burdens compound existing challenges, such as the need for consistent sources of funding and, in the case of autonomous private organizations that may have a political agenda, the constant threat of suppression and dissolution because they might undermine the legitimacy of the party or the state. The government maintains several layers of restraint on CSOs that make the legal and political environment in China non-conducive to the flourishing of independent CSOs. Registration with the government involves three requirements: acceptance of the application by the authorities, finding a sponsor, and payment of the prescribed fee. The Ministry of Civil Affairs, which processes applications for registration of a CSO, might hold up processing or deny the application for many reasons, many of them non-transparent, but an important legal hurdle is that no new CSO is allowed in a part of the country that already has a CSO with a similar mission (foundations are not bound by this restriction). In some cases, this means an extant organization that is ostensibly “voluntary” but is in effect government controlled will preclude the registration of an independent counterpart CSO. In fact, most of the legally registered organizations are governmentorganized NGOs that are deeply penetrated by the government in that they receive substantial funding from the government and are led by current or former government or party officials. Only a tiny percentage of China’s truly autonomous, grassroots CSOs are registered as social organizations. The more common way of avoiding the obstacles involved in registration is simply to operate unregistered. Of the estimated 3 million CSOs in China, only about 300,000 are registered. The authorities generally tolerate them, but the rule of thumb is that unregistered CSOs will become a target if they are discovered to be involved in a significant financial scandal or if they appear to present a challenge to the regime.

Malaysia is a prime example of a highly prescribed legal process for the organization of civil society, such as to provide many avenues for state oversight and control (Jayasooria, 2010). The legal requirements for CSOs in Malaysia can be met through one of four mechanisms. Most CSOs are registered under the Societies Act 1966. The Act provides a wide range of powers to the Registrar of Societies, including the power to refuse and cancel registration, without provision for a judicial review. The

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second form of registration is as a company limited by guarantee under the Companies Act 1965 (revised 1973). Most foundations are registered in this way. Because this form of registration is expensive to incorporate and to maintain, advocacy-based CSOs do not register under this structure. The third form of registration is as a private company with paid-up share capital (under the Companies Act 1965, revised 1973). The fourth mechanism is through a trust deed, and a number of charitable and development organizations are registered in this way. Legislation such as the Societies Act provides the state with the legislative powers to curtail CSOs and to monitor, regulate and compel societies to operate within certain parameters.

The legislative framework in Malaysia is not an enabling one nor is it conducive to advocacy-based CSOs. Given the sensitivity of the issues raised by some of the advocacy-based CSOs, policy-makers and government officials view these negatively, which reflects the nature of the political system. However, welfare-based and charitable organizations rarely face problems with the Registrar of Societies. With a growing middle class, there is an increasing demand for more freedom, as happened in the Republic of Korea.

9.4.3 The capacity of civil society In order effectively to perform their tasks related to strengthening decentralization and local democracy, CSOs require capacities for fundraising and financial management, information-gathering and research techniques, and communication skills to attract broad publicity. Other capacities that can facilitate their roles are networking skills to develop coordinated advocacy, documenting and up-scaling best practices, professionalism and trust-building to educate citizens, and a willingness and ability to “speak truth to power”. These capacities allow for the sustainability of their work, and ultimately for organizational sustainability.

The Philippines is a textbook illustration of a burgeoning and active civil society that is quick to champion specific issues, often for a narrow public, but that lacks the capacity to ensure these organizations are not ephemeral.

CSO capacity is important as a distinct area of analysis because it provides the means not only to drive the reforms/change that are ascribed to the sector but to sustain them as well. Civil society organizational capacity is inexorably linked with issues of the means of financial support.

In contexts such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia and Thailand, where CSOs appear largely dependent on international funding for continued action, sustainability is too dependent on international funding priorities remaining constant. Such instances are particularly important from a re-

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search perspective because they allow us to highlight systemic weaknesses such as the lack of financial sustainability of much of the Filipino CSOs, but also to identify specific areas where funding can be channelled as leverage points for future action.

Improving the capacity of CSOs in Indonesia is conceptualized as improving internal governance and the quality of human resources, improving the quality and effectiveness of their programmes, adopting innovative resource mobilization approaches and principles, and strengthening both domestic and international networks pursuant to the above. Improving the internal governance and quality of human resources is a matter of adopting many of the principles that CSOs exhort the state to undertake, including gender mainstreaming and transparency of financial information. This alignment of internal and espoused external values would also benefit human resources by helping to attract quality volunteers.

The Malaysian case shows that the strengths of CSOs’ capacity are that: they consist of committed activists who want to bring about change; over the years, their ability to undertake research related to policy advocacy has increased; and, with the recent electoral successes of the multi-ethnic political parties, some civil society leaders are now holding representative offices as well as leadership of CSOs, which will enhance their influence on public policy (Jayasooria, 2010). Yet, with the incorporation of civil society leaders within the government, there is a vacuum in civil society leadership in terms of presenting an independent and nonpartisan voice on issues of societal interest. Staff turnover in civil society is high because of low salaries. Although civil society is relatively effective at the micro level in urban areas, its outreach in semi-rural and rural areas and in the interior of Malaysia is weak. The need is to build the capacity of grassroots organizations.

In Bangladesh, most NGOs/CSOs have inadequate technical, professional and managerial skills and depend on seasonal hired professional consultants (Salim, 2010). Corruption and unparalleled nepotism weaken the quality of management capacity. Insufficient attention is paid to weak monitoring and evaluation systems for project activities. Small NGOs/ CSOs feel that they have less access to the support and services of the Co-Financing Agency than do big NGOs. Many NGOs have a loose structure, often with limited accountability to beneficiaries, and are unduly influenced by donors’ interests. On the other hand, larger CSOs in Bangladesh have significantly increased their sectoral capacity. The case study below of the Centre for Policy Dialogue demonstrates how, in acting as a means for interface between stakeholders and government, the process of engagement creates better-informed segments of civil society with built-in networks with which to leverage policy change. It is important to note this process of interface with community stakeholders, because it is

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a means not only for ensuring government accountability to civil society but also for creating accountability of civil society to government.

A considerable challenge to CSOs in the years ahead relates to capacity deficits, which can further complicate the legitimacy issues posed by accountability insufficiencies. The rapid expansion of CSOs has not been accompanied by increasing capacities and resources. Consequently, CSOs may be unable to: identify or institutionalize steps to improve the way they operate; form the requisite complex relationships with stakeholders, governance partners and fellow organizations; train and retain staff; and participate in necessary stages of the policy process as it relates to their mission. Even assuming that CSOs have the financial capacity to identify and implement measures to ensure that they operate transparently and accountably, they may be incapable of following through and achieving the desired effects through their organizational capacity. In many CSOs that operate at or below the national level, capacity deficits are often most visible in the areas of technical expertise, financial management, operational ability (using data generated by accountability systems to redefine roles, responsibilities and approaches) and human resources (staff identification, training and retention). However, contributors have shown that additional results could also be achieved through enhanced capacity development in the areas of research and policy advocacy management.

9.4.4 Accountability of civil society Two important issues in civil society engagement within the region are: (i) upwards accountability of CSOs to the government and (ii) downwards accountability to the communities they serve. Where civil society has upwards and downwards accountability, it is more likely to contribute to strengthening decentralization because civil society in such situations is seen by both citizens and the state to be more legitimate. In contrast to many governments, CSOs frequently lack clear, enforceable rules that govern the ways in which their officials relate to beneficiaries. This performance accountability issue has played out visibly in countries such as the Philippines, although it should be noted that Filipino CSOs have made tremendous progress in NGO self-regulation (Lowry, 2008). Exacerbating such issues, CSOs are often highly dependent on international donors whose programme priorities can overlook or undermine the needs and aspirations of their intended beneficiaries. For all of these reasons, it is feared the gap between local priorities and NGO accountability can be wide. Innovative self-evaluation, such as is undertaken by Wildlife Fund Thailand, a Thai NGO that originated as a domestic wing of the World Wide Fund for Nature, can help bridge this divide and be instructive for good practice across the region.

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The Malaysian case reveals a weakness of civil society in ensuring its own accountability and transparency of funding sources, utilization and financial management practices (Jayasooria, 2010). Here, most CSOs do not have published and audited accounts that can be shared publicly.

Moreover, few CSOs have a common position on external audits or impact assessments of their activities. No accountability or audit panel is available to certify that CSOs observe universally accepted standards of governance practices or are accountable for their funding. Consequently, few organizations have undertaken an independent impact assessment of their projects to determine past effectiveness. The indicators are not well established in this context and common standards are seldom utilized.

CSOs must have a common position on external audits, as well as impact assessments of their projects, programmes and activities. The argument of civil society is that it is accountable to funders who are overseas, in the case of advocacy-based organizations. However, the public views this argument as a double standard. Civil society is not credible when it asks for government accountability but is unwilling to abide by its own codes of ethics and accountability mechanisms.

In coming years, a key obstacle to be overcome by CSOs in Asia concerns their legitimacy. As these organizations come to play an increasingly significant role in policy identification, implementation and assessment, the question of their legitimate moral authority will come increasingly into play. CSOs often question the policies of elected officials, yet they themselves are not elected. Similarly, CSOs often promote anti-corruption measures, yet their internal accounts are frequently unavailable to the public. Citizens may question how representative their views are, especially in the case of global CSOs with insufficient linkages to the grassroots. The methods that they employ in development efforts, the projects that have been chosen or discarded, their correlation to the understood mission of the organization, and the resources that have been invested are other frequent issues of interest. In extreme cases, CSOs may engage in fraudulent activity, which further demonstrates the importance of measures that enable stakeholders to hold them accountable.

A related accountability issue is that CSOs that operate in Asia often have diverse stakeholders, with differing concerns and degrees of power.

Large donors, government agencies and international institutions often have more voice as stakeholders, because they hold the purse-strings and influence the legal climate. Therefore, their policy concerns and requests for responses by CSOs tend to receive more attention, whereas the concerns of customers and staff may be de-prioritized. If CSOs continue to place more value on their accountability to the former group, this shortterm approach will effectively undermine their credibility over time.

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Many CSOs within Asia now use a variety of methods to improve their own governance. Increasingly, groups of civil society organizations have pooled their expertise and form partnerships with other governance actors to provide sectoral standards that can be used as a basis for assessing CSO behaviour and to create codes of conduct and peer reviews (for example, the Philippine Council for NGO Certification). Moreover, new CSOs have formed to provide consultancy services to other organizations that wish to assess their accountability and management practices (for example, the Society for Participatory Research in Asia).

9.4.5 Civil society and policy advocacy With the widespread growth of civil society in Asia over the past decade, many governments within the region have officially made civil society a participant in local and national development. However, the level of this participation varies widely across and within countries. At one extreme, civil society may partner with government for planning, policy-making and decision-making; receive access to government budgetary resources and external assistance; and be tapped to assist in public service delivery and project implementation. At the other extreme, countries may publicly profess a policy of civil society participation but do not translate this into action. In yet other cases, governments create and support the operations of CSOs and use these for specific purposes. To date, a few governments continue to consider civil society to be a threat and prohibit its organization. Furthermore, local governments may also vary widely in their position and attitude towards civil society in terms of its participation in governance and local development processes, particularly where government is decentralized and local governments possess some measure of autonomy.

With a few exceptions, CSOs already play an important advocacy role in shaping policy. Throughout the Asia-Pacific region, the respective roles of the state, market system and civil society are being re-examined. At the forefront of this re-examination are developmental CSOs, which are challenging the traditional ways in which the state and the market have allocated societal resources. Several political and economic developments have led to this re-evaluation, for example, the increasing interdependence of centralized economies such as China and Viet Nam with open capitalist economies, the fiscal crisis and the effects of structural adjustment. Assertions regarding the relationship between democracy and economic development became fashionable. Civil society, then, became an exciting prospect for this agenda.

To a large extent, active CSO communities in several countries in the region were spawned by the emergence of the high social and environ-

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mental costs of a primarily growth-focused development strategy and globalization. As governments became perceived as insensitive to these ill effects of dynamic economic growth, civil society was spurred into action. With or without help from outside organizations and entities, various groups formed to assume roles in public policy advocacy and community empowerment.

One such group that has assumed this mantle, as has been alluded to previously, is the Bangladesh Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD). CPD has regularly interacted with political society with the explicit goal of engaging both government and opposition parties to discuss national problems and policy options. As the state remained uncomfortable with criticisms by segments of civil society on the status of the democratic process, CPD has been particularly influential in working towards a reciprocal flow of ideas and influence between the state and civil society.

Drawing upon its experience in organizing policy dialogues, CPD sought to contribute towards enhancing the quality of the policy discourse during the course of the 2001 elections to the national parliament. CPD’s objective was to prepare a series of pre-election Policy Briefs with a view to informing the political parties about the important problems of particular concern, encouraging the political parties to move away from confrontational rhetoric, focusing on creating policy alternatives designed to respond to public concerns and influencing subsequent executive action to be undertaken by the future elected government. Their success can be seen in the CPD’s annual review of Bangladeshi development, which has been established as a set of key benchmarks of civil society’s effort at making successive governments accountable for their stewardship of the development process (Sobhan, 2010).

9.4.6 Civil society and democratic change In recent years, CSOs have expanded tremendously in terms of their role, number, size, activities, focus areas and influence. This phenomenon has been particularly evident in Asia, where CSOs now play a pivotal role in strengthening effective democratic governance. A series of emerging trends for civil society engagement in the democratic process are discernible. Civil society is now playing a vital role in stimulating democratic change within Asia in many ways: direct involvement at different stages of the electoral process, including voter registration, voter education and electoral monitoring; engagement with parliamentarians and local government leaders to communicate the concerns of citizens; the provision of paralegal aid and other support mechanisms for access to justice; access to the media to highlight abuses of power, especially by the local elite; the protection of the rights of minorities and marginalized groups;

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supporting the independence of the judiciary; and holding local officials accountable to improve access to services. Each of these aspects is crucial in promoting and sustaining democratic local governance, where local public officials and civil society are engaged in local dialogue to identify local priorities and needs, participate in local decision-making and hold elected local political leaders and government officials accountable. However, in order to ensure that they remain effective advocates of the public good, CSOs must strengthen their linkages with other organizations, address issues related to their legitimacy, strengthen accountability through various measures, without subtracting from their organizational flexibility, and improve capacities.

The fact that CSOs play a pivotal role in decentralization and democratic change is one of the premises upon which this chapter hinges, and it has been actualized throughout the region, from the “People Power” demonstrations in the Philippines and the direct and indirect role of citizen groups in the shaping of contemporary Indonesian democracy, including the recent Law on Decentralization, to the CSOs in the Republic of Korea that often serve the democratic vanguard and are a key intermediary between citizens and the state. The Centre for Policy Dialogue in Bangladesh provides a forum for dialogue and discussions on governance and development issues among the governance stakeholders from the government, the private sector, civil society and the academic community. CSOs played an important role in the most recent elections in Malaysia, where the multi-ethnic political parties won a majority in some of the state elections and came close to obtaining a majority of seats in the national parliament. In Pakistan, civil society, especially the Lawyers’ Movement, has been instrumental in the transformation of the political system from the military-dominated presidential system to the parliamentary system, with the parliament serving as the sovereign body.

Another essential factor in the CSOs’ role in democratic change is the stage of political development in the country. This often determines citizens’ access to political institutions and in turn the need for CSOs as intermediaries or rallying points for mobilization against the state. Like the history of CSO growth, the stage of political development is a key context for framing contemporary patterns of engagement between the state and civil society. In the case of Pakistan, for example, a comprehensive local government reform with devolution of powers and resources to elected local leaders did not create democratic local governance mechanisms because of the domination of the military-led government at the national level and severe political restrictions on national and local democratic institutions.

Social networks are widely believed to play a different and more prominent role in Asian societies, especially those with a Confucian heritage,

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than in Western states, particularly Western states with mature capitalist economies, liberal-democratic political systems with robust civil societies, and well-developed legal systems characterized by rule of law and a modern bureaucratic administrative system. Civil societies in Asian countries are highly diverse in composition, resource endowments and goals.

The number of CSOs engaged in the promotion of democratic change remains relatively small.

In Indonesia, civil society was instrumental in regime change, democratization processes and the emergence of a public dialogue on good governance, accountability and transparency of public institutions. CSOs were active in monitoring the activities of political institutions at national and local levels. Starting with the intense involvement of CSOs in the 1999 election, nowadays almost all aspects of state institutions at all levels are being watched by CSOs. Through CSOs and as an actualization of civil society concepts, citizens in Indonesia have a myriad of ways to make their voices heard and to fill spaces opened by democratization and decentralization, and they are in the process of building a new relationship with the state. Since the fall of Suharto, citizens have been able to express their opinions publicly and to speak out on the issues that concern them most. Although state-sponsored corruption and power abuses have not been eliminated, civil society continues to grow stronger. There remains today a flowering of new ideas and social actors, as people who had been denied participation for a long time sought to get involved.

There is a momentum for negotiating and reformulating the balance of power between the state and its citizens. CSOs have had and continue to have an important role to play in this, both in Indonesia and throughout the region.

Civil society in Pakistan has been playing an instrumental role in promoting and sustaining democratic governance. However, the democratic political process in Pakistan has been disrupted four times in its 60-year history when the military took over political power through coups. Each military takeover was followed by the introduction of elections and civilian government. Severe constraints were placed on civil society by the military-led governments of Ayub Khan (in the early 1960s), Zia-ul-Haq (in the 1980s) and Pervez Musharraf in the recent past. During the civilian governments, however, civil society continued to be an active partner in governance. During the Musharraf period, an expanding urban middle class, freedom of the media and judicial activism led to the emergence of such CSOs as the Lawyers’ Movement, which agitated to have the emergency lifted and called for President Musharraf to resign and the former Chief Justice of Pakistan to be reinstated to ensure the independence of the judiciary. The role of peaceful demonstration by the Lawyers’ Movement was dramatic in ensuring the independence of the judiciary.

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In India, the Right to Information Act 2005 gave CSOs a potent tool with which to make local governments accountable for public expenditure, for the execution of development policies and for free and fair local government elections (Pandey, 2010). The reservation of seats for women in the local government elections increased the participation of a large segment of the population. In their efforts to promote inclusive political participation, CSOs find a strong ally in the media as a watchdog. They also have outreach programmes with young people to get them more engaged in the democratic process. CSOs are actively involved in issues related to minority rights in India and seek the wider participation of minorities through reserved constituencies. The most significant contribution of CSOs to democratic local governance is their engagement with citizens to hold local government officials accountable for service delivery and access.

9.5 Conclusion In recent years, CSOs in Asia have expanded tremendously in terms of their role, number, size, activities, focus areas and influence. They play a pivotal role in strengthening democratic local governance by providing opportunities to citizens to engage in the local development process, holding local public officials accountable and protecting the interests of minorities and the poorest segments of society. This chapter argues that the space for CSOs in Asia has expanded and new patterns of relationships with governments are emerging. There are, however, clear differences between the Asian countries in the degree of engagement of civil society, ranging from a very limited role in China to an active role in India, Bangladesh and Indonesia.

The Asian cases discussed show that the degree to which civil society can influence the quality of decentralization and local democracy depends upon the characteristics of the national political system, which shape the government–CSO dialogue and the internal capacity and accountability of CSOs. In multi-party political systems such as India and Indonesia, CSOs can positively influence the empowerment of local communities, the utilization of opportunities provided through the decentralization of powers and resources, and the extent of the accountability of local public officials. Where local units of government and administration have adequate powers and resources, civil society utilizes such local frameworks to improve the quality of decentralization practice. The CSOs, however, continue to face challenges, including the need for vertical and horizontal coordination, the need to improve their legitimacy and organizational accountability and the need to enhance their capacity.

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Acknowledgements I am grateful to Cameron Lowry for his assistance in preparing this chapter.

REFERENCES Brodjonegoro, B. (2004) “Three Years of Fiscal Decentralization in Indonesia: Its Impact on Regional Economic Development and Fiscal Sustainability”.

Unpublished paper presented at the International Symposium on Fiscal Decentralization in Asia, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, February.

Cheema, G. S. and D. Rondinelli (2007) Decentralizing Governance: Emerging Concepts and Practices. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Jayasooria, D. (2010) “Civil Society Engagement in Malaysia”, in G. S. Cheema and V. Popovski (eds) Engaging Civil Society: Emerging Trends in Democratic Governance. New York: United Nations University Press, pp. 214 –231.

Korten, D. and F. Alfonso (eds) (1981) Bureaucracy and the Poor: Closing the Gap. Singapore: McGraw-Hill.

Lowry, C. (2008) “Civil Society Engagement in the Philippines”. Unpublished paper prepared for the Workshop on Civil Society Engagement in National and Global Governance, East-West Center, Honolulu, 14 –16 July.

Mehboob, A. B. (2010) “Civil Society Engagement in Democratic Transition in Pakistan”, in G. S. Cheema and V. Popovski (eds) Engaging Civil Society: Emerging Trends in Democratic Governance. New York: United Nations University Press, pp. 193–213.

Pandey, M. (2010) “Case Study of Civil Society Engagement in India”. Case Study Commissioned by the East-West Center, Honolulu.

Rondinelli, D. A. (1981) “Government Decentralization in Comparative Perspective: Theory and Practice in Developing Countries”, International Review of Administrative Sciences 47: 133–145.

Rondinelli, D. A. (1993) Development Projects as Policy Experiments: An Adaptive Approach to Development Administration, 2nd edn. London: Routledge.

Rondinelli, D. A., J. R. Nellis and G. S. Cheema (1983) “Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience”. World Bank Staff Working Papers No. 581, Washington, DC. Roy, D. (2010) “China’s Dilemma over Civil Society Organizations”, in G. S. Cheema and V. Popovski (eds) Engaging Civil Society: Emerging Trends in Democratic Governance. New York: United Nations University Press, pp. 174 –192.

Salim, M. (2010) “Case Study of Civil Society Engagement in Bangladesh”. Case Study Commissioned by the East-West Center, Honolulu.

Sobhan, R. (2010) “Civil Society, Policy Dialogue and Democratic Change in Bangladesh”, in G. S. Cheema and V. Popovski (eds) Engaging Civil Society: Emerging Trends in Democratic Governance. New York: United Nations University Press, pp. 149–173.

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The Economist (2011) “Power to the People! No, Wait . . .”, 17 March. Available at <http://www.economist.com/node/18399113?story_id=1839911> (accessed 15 April 2013).

UCLG (United Cities and Local Governments) (2008) Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World. Barcelona: United Cities and Local Governments.

UNCDF (United Nations Capital Development Fund) (2005) Delivering the Goods: Building Local Government Capacity to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals. New York: United Nations Capital Development Fund.

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (2007) “A Guide to Local Governance and Decentralization: Programme Experiences and Strategies from a UNDP E-Discussion”. New York.

UN-HABITAT (2007) International Guidelines on Decentralisation and the Strengthening of Local Authorities. Nairobi: United Nations Human Settlements Programme.

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10 Popular aspirations, decentralization and local democracy Olle Törnquist

10.1 Introduction Decentralization of power and governance from centralized and often authoritarian institutions to local state units and governments as well as to markets and widely defined civil society organizations (CSOs) has been a crucial element in the worldwide attempts since the 1980s at crafting democratic institutions through international support for agreements between moderate elites. The postulates have been based more on normative theory and associated ideologies about the causes and effects of liberal democracy than on empirical theories about actual historical development.

Thus it has been emphasized that decentralization would (a) undermine authoritarianism in favour of economic and political liberalism, (b) facilitate popular participation, accountability and local democracy, and (c) promote dynamic development in accordance with local needs and possibilities. Today, by contrast, it is widely accepted that these assumptions have not proved generally valid and that there have been mixed outcomes.

In crucial cases such as Indonesia there has even been less decentralization of fledgling democratic regimes than dispersion of power to local elites, businessmen and influential non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with extensive and at times global networks (for example, Klinken, 2009; Nordholt, 2004; Nordholt and Klinken, 2007; and references therein).

Hence there is a need to abandon the normative and ideological assumptions about the logics involved and to focus instead on the actual politics of decentralization, in its various forms and in different contexts.

The imperative of good local governance: Challenges for the next decade of decentralization, Öjendal and Dellnäs (eds), United Nations University Press, 2013, ISBN 978-92-808-1229-9

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In this chapter, I draw on data from longitudinal studies since the 1980s of how a number of significant political and citizens’ rights organizations in favour of popular aspirations in the particular contexts of India, Indonesia and the Philippines have tried to foster decentralization and local democracy.1 This may be particularly useful because (i) one may assume that the agents involved (in contrast to many others) have tried their best to promote democracy in different settings and (ii) their specific approaches can be compared while also keeping in mind the contextual differences.

I shall focus on three such more specific approaches. The first may be called a social perspective, stressing the importance of independent CSOs and movements trying to work from below. The second may be labelled the new party perspective, emphasizing the need for pro-democrats and CSOs to engage also with locally rooted political vehicles in liberaldemocratic elections. The third may be called a supplementary perspective, giving priority to additional forms of democratic participation that at best may be combined with established popular organizations as well as liberal-democratic institutions of governance. I shall begin by sketching these approaches and the different contexts, in order then to be able to focus on four points and a conclusion from the longitudinal studies.

10.2 Approaches and contexts 10.2.1 The social perspective The social perspective was particularly important in Indonesia, where it was adhered to by the majority of the democracy movement, first during the struggle against Suharto’s dictatorship, then also in the attempts at developing democracy after the fall of the regime in 1998. Suharto’s regime had three major pillars.2 The first was centralistic and neopatrimonial political and military control and distribution of resources to privileged clients. This generated rather successful but exclusionary economic development until 1997, in cooperation with international business and Western powers. The second pillar was repression of one of the world’s largest radical popular movements and thereafter subordination of ethnic and religious groups too, in addition to a monopoly on membership-based socioeconomic and political organizations. The third pillar was political legitimacy based on the claim that stability and development rested with conservative nationalism in terms of the revival of Indonesia’s (or primarily Java’s) authoritarian culture.

In this context, the advocates of the social perspective focused on undermining the state and mainstream politics by exposing its repress-

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ive, corrupt and exploitative character, as well as by strengthening various communities of people and trying to make them socially and economically more independent of the state and capable of building a prodemocratic civil society.

Indonesia’s despotic liberal capitalism was particularly hard hit by the Asian economic crisis in 1997. The pro-democrats were far from able to offer an alternative social and economic contract, but they were decisive in undermining the legitimacy of the regime, which finally proved unable to govern the country. This paved the way for the inclusion of businesspeople and social and political leaders who had been held back by the previous regime. It also opened the way for the repositioning and renegotiation of strategic and tactical alliances within the dominant elite as a whole.

The main basis for this was liberal freedoms, rights and elections, radical decentralization and privatization of the centralist political and military governance, and fostering of the rule of law. However, the commonest conclusion of consistent proponents of the social perspective was that Reformasi and “procedural democracy” had been hijacked by businesspeople and “crooked politicians”. This made it necessary to put on hold the previous priorities of confronting state and mainstream politics in favour of advocacy and self-management in widely defined civil society in order to build better conditions for more genuine democratization.

10.2.2 The new party perspective The new party perspective was more crucial in the Philippines and the semi-autonomous Indonesian province of Aceh. Between 1983 and 1986 it proved possible to undermine and overthrow President Marcos’s dictatorship through popular electoral mobilization and “People Power” demonstrations in response to cheating and attempts at a military takeover.

This was in sharp contrast to what the forceful Philippine Maoists and many other radical leftists had predicted (Törnquist, 1991). However, the transformations paved the way for the restoration of “cacique democracy”, to use Ben Anderson’s (1988) widely acclaimed notion of how the electoral institutions exported by the former colonial power (the United States) evolved in the context of both feudal-like and capitalist practices.

These practices in turn had become less based on patronage and clientelism than previously. Now they were more dependent on coercion, outright cheating, money politics and media dominance (Sidel, 1999, 2004).

But, to attract the discontented middle classes, the radicalized CSOs and popular movements, there were also a number of alternative programmes.

Two of the latter measures were of particular importance for the thinking of sections of the political left and the CSOs, who appreciated the

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possibilities of moving ahead by way of peaceful democratization. The first was decentralization, which enabled CSOs to engage in local development planning. The second measure was a separate national party list system, which made it possible for programme-oriented new parties to get into parliament with a few representatives in spite of the otherwise predominant machine politics. Together, the two schemes made it worthwhile for CSOs and left-oriented democrats to try to build new parties that in turn could gain media attention and serve as a platform for coordinating various CSOs and popular organizations nationally as well as locally, thus building political alternatives from below (Törnquist, 1993; Quimpo, 2004).

In parts of Indonesia, new parties seemed to be an important option too. This was in spite of the fact that pro-democrats, as I have already said, typically argued that the post-Suharto Reformasi and “procedural democracy” in the framework of decentralization had been hijacked by businesspeople and “crooked politicians”, so that one had first to build a stronger civil society for more genuine democratization. Some activists added, however, that it might be possible for genuine democrats to advance politically if independent candidates and local parties were allowed in elections. This is what happened in the war-torn and tsunami-affected autonomous province of Aceh. The successful introduction by prodemocrats of the right for local parties and independent candidates to run in elections in Aceh was a vital part of the peace talks in 2005 and served to replace civil war and natural disaster with peace and reconstruction. Thus the new institutions were even projected as a model for the country at large as well as for other conflict areas.

10.2.3 The supplementary perspective The supplementary perspective was primarily pioneered in the Indian state of Kerala. In the mid-1980s concerned scholars, school teachers and professionals, most of whom were also political and civil society activists, became increasingly disturbed by the problems of sustaining Kerala’s world-famous model of human development. This had been a crucial source of inspiration for actors such as the United Nations Development Programme and scholars such as Amartya Sen. Now it was becoming unviable (Isaac and Franke, 2000; Törnquist with Tharakan, 1996).

Contextually there were three basic historical factors underlying the model. The first was the promotion in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries of commercial agriculture by semi-autonomous princely states in the southern part of today’s Kerala. The second was that some of the extensive socio-religious reform movements that fought the rigid caste system had supported cultural pluralism in addition to demanding equal

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citizen rights and state support rather than special privileges for specific communities. In this way, they initiated Kerala’s remarkable combination of an extensive civil society and public welfare policies. The third factor was the class-based agrarian reform movement, which grew strongly in the 1930s. This was led by socialists and communists, who also demanded homestead plots for agricultural workers, a multitude of profession-based trade unions, educational groups and credit cooperatives. Later on this became the backbone of the leftist political fronts, which won several elections after the foundation of the state of Kerala in 1956.

However, by the 1980s production had stagnated, in spite of the land reforms and more. The leftist parties had failed to foster a new social pact that could combine welfare reforms and growth. Rather they had become increasingly dependent on their powerful party-related interest groups and unions. In addition, they relied on centralist governance of both their parties and the state, as well as on environmentally unsustainable projects to generate cheap energy for Kerala’s few modern industries and ever-increasing and consumerist middle classes (which benefited from extensive migrant labour remittances). Meanwhile, vulnerable people (for example among the most subordinated castes, tribal populations and fisher folk) who had not benefited from the reforms tended to rely on their communities and rarely supported the left.

In contrast to Indonesia, however, the extensive mass-based parties, popular movements and organizations, and citizen groups had not been eliminated. Hence, most of the dissident scholars and activists did not turn their back on organized politics. To promote change, however, the reformists could not just work from inside the existing parties and organizations (with which many of them were anyway rather frustrated).

Instead, they further developed a science literature association (Kerala Sastra Sahitya Parishad, KSSP) into an educational mass movement of knowledgeable and innovative reform facilitators. This movement initiated a number of campaigns related to education and literacy, the mapping of local resources and cooperation among farmers. The main aim was to show how popular participation in community-based welfare and development policies (in contrast to policies driven by special interests) could reform and thus reinvigorate the Kerala model in a sustainable way.

Although some of these campaigns were local success stories, it proved difficult to link them up with existing organizations and to attract leftist politicians who could help scale them up. The next step was therefore to add a campaign for scholarly and professionally planned participatory development, which called for devolution of many resources and decisions to local governments. These governments in turn would be able to develop forums for public administrators, professionals, interest groups

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(including among farmers and other producers), unions, citizens’ associations and reformist activists in order to fulfil the requirements of centrally sponsored local development plans.

These ideas caught the imagination of more and more scholars, activists and some crucial politicians, including India’s and Kerala’s communist patriarch E. M. S Namboodiripad, which meant that the influential left front parties did not reject the scheme. All these crucial actors committed themselves to support the format if they won the next elections.

So, when they did win the elections in 1996 they had to provide some space for the dynamic reformist activists, in spite of much scepticism and even resistance among the majority of the political, union and interest group leaders. Thus democratic decentralization was initiated both as a policy and in practice, and the reformists gained control of the state planning board. This made it possible to combine devolution of substantial resources to local governments with carefully designed schemes for participatory local planning – involving politicians as well as various other groups, activists and ordinary citizens – of how the funds should be used.

In short, state and organized politics was not abandoned, but campaigns generated by civil society called for supplementary expansion of public local government, which in turn could foster joint efforts by politicians, administrators, professionals, interest groups, citizens’ associations and people in their neighbourhoods.

What conclusions can briefly be drawn from these longitudinal studies on the politics of fostering popular aspirations through decentralization and local democratization in a variety of contexts? I shall summarize the main results in four points and a conclusion.

10.3 Main results from the longitudinal studies 10.3.1 Room for manoeuvre but divisive and floating democrats It is true that power has not become more equal at the local level; at times, quite the opposite. In reality there are no Gandhian “village republics”. In Indonesia, where the most extensive and radical decentralization occurred, numerous studies have shown that the related politics and policies paved the way for the expansion of powerful elites and the abuse of public resources at the local level (for example, Aspinall and Fealy, 2003; Klinken, 2007, 2009; Nordholt, 2004; Nordholt and Klinken, 2007; Robison and Hadiz, 2004). Yet it is also a fact that, irrespective of the context, decentralization has opened up space for the involvement of CSOs and activists with alternative ideas and followers who would rarely have had the chance of being anything more than discussed in seminar rooms

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under more centralist regimes. Hence Antlov and Wetterberg are wrong to suggest (in Chapter 11 in this volume) that I agree with structuralists who exclude the possibility of change brought about by civic and popular actions.

In contrast to Antlov and Wetterberg’s positive view of what civil society groups can achieve through advocacy and deliberation, my results suggest that such democratic changes also and primarily require organized and representative democratic politics. Kerala’s decentralization paved the way for extensive popular engagement in alternative development plans. Many Philippine CSOs expanded and made an impact at the municipality and village levels, which enabled them to develop alternative policies in conjunction with progressive politicians. And in Indonesia there were similar though more modest tendencies in several districts, but perhaps less so at the village level, where decentralization was held back. However, organizations adhering to the social perspective were unable to make decisive contributions to democratization within the increasingly dispersed and fragmented forms of localized governance, especially in the Philippines and Indonesia but finally also in Kerala. All this will be expanded upon in more detail below.

The empirical evidence from surveys and case studies (which were carried out in consultation with the activists themselves) is unambiguous (Budiman and Törnquist, 2001; Prasetyo et al., 2004; Priyono et al., 2007; Samadhi and Warouw, 2009). Activists who adhered to the social perspective typically associated themselves with fragments of directly affected sections of the population and rarely connected them and facilitated cooperation. For instance, there were few attempts to link activities in workplaces and residential and other communities. Thus these activists contributed to segmented participation in particular localities and on a great variety of specific rights and complaints, neglecting broader perspectives of how to promote better governance, development and public welfare for large sections of the population. The campaigners focused on the institutional means of democracy to promote the rule of law, justice, human rights and basic needs, civil control of the army, attempts to curb corruption, freedom of the media and citizen participation. They paid much less attention to equal and inclusive citizenship, democratic political representation, issue- and interest-based representation, and the government’s capacity to implement policies. Hence, our surveys and case studies point to a more diversified civil society engagement than do Antlov and Wetterberg’s data (Chapter 11 in this volume).

Moreover, the activists’ presence was quite limited within public administration, in public and private workplaces and in organized politics.

Their most frequent activities were the collection and dissemination of information, lobbying and pressure group action, and the promotion of

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self-management as an alternative to public service and self-help activities against poverty. The activists’ sources of access to power and their ways of gaining authority and legitimacy remained focused on their own knowledge and participation in public discourse, at the expense of organization and attempts to gain a public mandate and win elections.

Finally (and in spite of some advances over the years), the advocates of the social perspective remained poorly connected to social movements and popular organizations (and vice versa). Collective action was based mainly on individual networking, popular leaders or alternative patronage, rather than on broad and representative organizations; and their work in relation to elections, parliaments and the executive institutions of the central and local government remained primarily by way of the media, NGOs and pressure and lobby groups.

No doubt this provided the limited number of people involved with some more influence and benefits. And that was a major advance compared with the subordination of people under Suharto, when organized politics (beyond that of the government party) was prohibited at the grassroots level and when ordinary people should thus become a “floating mass”. Yet at this point the pro-democracy activists themselves were usually “floating” too, in the sense of lacking extensive and solid social constituencies. They were rarely able to generate substantial democratic improvements in terms of popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality, with fundamental principles and criteria such as a well-defined demos and public affairs, political equality and democratic representation. One may even argue that several of the organizations contributed to more polycentrism and privatization, thus weakening the basis for local democracy – its just mentioned basic principles. Meanwhile, the same groups were often marginalized or co-opted by more powerful local actors within politics, administration and business as well as by not very democratic but stronger CSOs and international organizations and donors.

Hence one may well agree with Antlov and Wetterberg (Chapter 11 in this volume) that there are a number of positive examples of deliberative citizen engagement in local politics. But, aside from their unconvincing selection of cases, Antlov and Wetterberg do not discuss what conclusions one can draw from their accounts with regard to democratic representation and an enduring political impact given the well-known critical results, which are summarized here.

10.3.2 Subordinated political contracts One partial exception is organizations that sought to build a variety of strategies to take advantage of what may be termed “post-clientelist” op-

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portunities (see Manor, 2010, 2013). In the Indonesian context, this refers to groups that tried to make an impact by entering into cooperation with strong political actors who anyway needed to broaden their alliances and support base by going beyond their predominant clientelist arrangements (Törnquist, Tharakan et al., 2009). Thus they engaged in programmes that attracted broader sections of the population who for instance wished to see less corrupt governance and better public welfare systems. And the politicians very much wanted to improve their reputation by engaging high-profile experts and NGO activists, whose groups would then be given financial support and special favours in return. In this context – and in exchange for lending their good name and endorsing the politicians in elections – pro-democratic groups typically then tried to sign a public memorandum of understanding or “contract” with the politicians on what measures would be implemented in the event that the politicians won the election. They sought to become indispensable to the politicians, to get the measures that they contribute institutionalized, and to design them in such a way that they increased the capacity of wider sections of the population.

Many of these arrangements were limited, however, by the general character of the measures adopted in the agreements, which, moreover, tended to focus on the rather narrow policy areas in which the activists had some influence. Furthermore, most civil and popular actors did not have sufficient bargaining power to enforce the deals. They typically lacked vital campaigners, were unable to deliver a substantial number of votes and were without sustainable organizations to keep successful politicians accountable after the elections. The most positive cases, such as the election and performance of a progressive mayor in the Central Java city of Solo (Surakarta) since 2005 and the 2012 governor election in Jakarta, point to the importance of broader social movements and instrumental populist party politics (see Manor, 2010, 2013; Pratikno and Lay, 2013).

10.3.3 Marginalized alternative parties In the Philippines in the mid-1990s, NGO campaigners, social movement activists, socialists, communists and former Maoists managed finally to achieve what seemed an impossibility – to build a joint Citizens’ Action Party (Akbayan) that was committed to both electoral and extraparliamentary work on matters of common concern (Quimpo, 2004; Rocamora, 2004; Törnquist, 1993, 2004; Törnquist, Tharakan et al., 2009).

First, Akbayan did make some difference in attempts to develop a number of inspiring showcases of alternative governance and development at the very local level. However, it has remained very difficult to

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scale up these endeavours. Secondly, the new party became a node for liberal-democratic leftists at the central level, in addition to workers’ and farmers’ activists. So far Akbayan has not been able to initiate broader political alliances; it has succeeded only in getting some particularly able leaders and experts accepted in influential positions, for instance as government advisers. Also, it has been particularly difficult to combine the immediate need for decisive activism at the central level with long-term efforts towards alternative government politics at the local level. Similarly, the separate party list enabled the party to gain some national-level representation. But the maximum number of seats for each such party was very low and the national-level party list was not the answer to how to combine governance and development work with the electoral struggle at the local level, where the mainstream machine parties and bosses retained full hegemony.

In Indonesia’s semi-autonomous province of Aceh, however, the strategy of fostering political inclusion within the framework of decentralization – by way of local parties and independent candidates in the election of local political executives – was decisive in the peacebuilding process (Törnquist et al., 2011). (One may even say that agreement on democratization preceded peace.) Much of the strategy to promote peace and post-tsunami reconstruction through democratization was promoted by leading reformists in the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) and related CSOs. Remarkably, these leaders and activists even managed to build an alliance and to win the 2006 elections for local executive posts, in spite of resistance from the aristocratic GAM leaders in exile and, of course, the mainstream Indonesian politicians.

Thereafter, however, the advances were rapidly undermined. The international development aid community was busy with post-tsunami reconstruction work and did not make much effort to employ the huge programmes to foster better governance in Aceh. And international political institutions applauded the democratic Ahtisaari peace agreement, but they failed to (or did not want to) understand what international support was needed to sustain its aims. This helped to enable the aristocratic leaders and local strongmen with access to the command structure of the rebel movement to become dominant, to develop power-sharing agreements with former enemies, even in Jakarta, and to do their utmost to marginalize the reformists. Moreover, the reformists themselves were not very successful in using their new executive positions in the provincial government and in most of the districts to promote inclusive alternative development and thus were not able to resist clientelism and corruption when needing to retain their positions. They also neglected the need to foster popular movements and democratic channels for in-

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terest group representation as crucial supplements to liberal-democratic party politics, elections and lobby groups, which the powerful local elite were more skilled in abusing for their own purposes (Törnquist, 2013a).

10.3.4 Supplementary democracy side-tracked In Kerala, the advocates of the supplementary democracy perspective were initially very successful. Temporarily they even gained hegemony in fostering democratic decentralization combined with a full range of the kind of supplementary channels of democratic popular influence that were instrumental in promoting inclusive development agendas at the local level. The initiatives were even broader than the participatory budgeting practices in Brazil (see Blair, Chapter 6 in this volume). Yet there were also a number of serious challenges (Tharakan, 2004; Törnquist, 2004; Törnquist with Tharakan, 1996; Törnquist, Tharakan et al., 2009; see also Heller, 2005; Heller et al., 2007).

The main challenge was to combine the new channels of participation with the established system of interest-based representation and the elected institutions of local government – all of which in Kerala were also affected by the fact that Kerala was modernized in the context of reform movements based on caste and religion. The contradictions between the established liberal-democratic system and the new forms of participation and representation were a problem of democratic principles as well as of power. In Brazil, both mainstream political representation and interest and community groups were seriously de-legitimized by being elitist and clientelist, whereas the new Workers’ Party, which initiated the participatory budgeting process, was seen as an unsullied newcomer. In Kerala, the established system of representation had indeed deteriorated but was still acting as a channel for the most powerful interests and popular aspirations. In fact, most major leftist leaders and parties were very much rooted in the old system too. So, when the Kerala reformists initiated new avenues of democratic popular influence by way of top-level support for decentralization and popular participation, this was seen as a threat by a wide array of established politicians, interest organizations (for example, among workers, farmers, employers, special castes and religious communities) and central bureaucrats, line departments and associated contractors.

Moreover, this was a question not just of central versus local but also of competition between vested interests in different channels of influence, including at the very local level. So, when the new processes of planning and participation proceeded beyond discussion to the altering of power relations and the distribution of funds, conflicts increased,

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accusations ran wild and compromises and accommodation of various interests became inevitable. This made implementation quite difficult, even to the extent that the new participatory channels of influence could rarely be utilized to restrain political and other special interests and to contain abuse and corruption. Hence it is remarkable that the reformists, who wanted to foster more democratic space for ordinary people who were marginalized or critical of the special interests anyway, never paid serious attention to how it would be possible in theory and in practice to combine conventional democratic representation and interest group influence, on the one hand, with new and additional channels of more direct participation, on the other hand. (And, at the time of writing, it is obvious that the issue remains unresolved even at the national level, given the current conflict in India over the authority of elected but often corrupt politicians versus self-appointed anti-corruption campaigners.)

Another major challenge was the focus on targeting the poor in the decentralized planning of various developments and welfare measures.

On the one hand, it was a priority that all people in need of support should be dealt with on an equal basis irrespective of political or other affiliations, in addition to special support for women’s concerns. In principle this was applauded by many people who were frustrated with the special privileges accorded to well-connected people and were sympathetic to more universal and impartial practices. On the other hand, however, the targeting of the poor also meant that huge numbers of less vulnerable people and not least the resourceful and entrepreneurial middle classes felt that there was very little for them in decentralized participatory planning; and hence they rarely engaged with it.

A third stumbling block was the lack of a viable strategy for linking the democratic practices and welfare measures to a strategy for economic growth. The most fundamental reason for decentralization and participatory planning was that the Kerala model of human development had been undermined by economic stagnation. Yet the new efforts never managed to foster growth coalitions that acknowledged and even benefited from welfare measures (for example, George, 1993, 2011). Decentralization and participatory planning had an insignificant effect on production and employment. One apparent reason was that this would have called for the politically uncomfortable exposure of petty rentseeking among some of the supporters of the leftist parties themselves, as well as for much more priority being given to production-oriented measures in development planning than to separate welfare measures that might attract specific voters. In this respect, one may thus agree with Romeo (Chapter 3 in this volume) that it is crucial to analyse the political economy and developmental aspects of decentralization, not just

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“good governance”. Yet, although normative rather than empirically rooted analyses of “good governance” are certainly problematic, one should also consider the historical fact that improved governance and democratization too have fostered growth, at best even inclusive growth, including by way of the representation of production-oriented interests among employers and employees (see Stokke and Törnquist, 2013a, 2013b).

A final major challenge was that most of the reformists tried to stay out of organized “dirty” politics without forming any alternative vehicle, thus being easy to silence and marginalize. When the immensely influential communist patriarch E. M. S Namboodiripad passed away in 1998 it was even possible for conservative communist critics to suggest that those who subscribed to his longstanding ideas of decentralization and reduction of the party-politicization of interest organizations in favour of development priorities were actually influenced instead by the World Bank and neo-liberalism. Likewise, conventional politicians were fielded as candidates in the local and state elections in 2000 and 2001, even in constituencies where reformists (including several women) had gained a good reputation. Thus, ironically, the left-oriented parties did not just have a poor election in the state at large but they also lost where decentralization and participation had been quite successful. Meanwhile, the conservative communists gained the upper hand in various ideological and factional struggles inside the parties. This in turn implied that many of the civil society activists who were not very active or even formally enrolled in any of the parties had lost influence and confidence in the concerted efforts and campaigns, no matter whether they were expelled or branded as next to traitors by the conservative party leaders. It is true that decentralization had survived when the left parties got back into power in 2006 and that several leaders now said that they would support a second phase of participatory planning. But critical public discussion and evaluation remained held back and most of the political and popular momentum to use decentralization to foster local democratization and to combine welfare and growth had been lost.

10.4 Conclusions and implications: The primacy of transformative politics In spite of the problems in all the cases that have been reported above, there are clear indications that, when an organization made substantive advances in any of the contexts, these advances were related to political coordination among the groups themselves, as well as popular-based cooperation with democracy-oriented politicians and local governments

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that could open up positive channels of influence for actors of change and thus also the strengthening of their organizations and joint work.

The kind of new “citizen politics” that Antlov and Wetterberg point to (Chapter 11 in this volume) has rarely made any long-lasting political impact and typically also neglects the basics of democracy in terms of well-developed representation. In other words, the advancing of popular aspirations by way of decentralization towards local democratization required demands from below for political coordination and top-down schemes that opened the way for actors in favour of democracy and inclusive development to have a beneficial influence. The keywords are thus transformative politics towards improved democratic representation (see Stokke and Törnquist, 2013a; Webster et al., 2009).

However, most of these efforts were not strong enough to survive. This raises the question of how such attempts can be strengthened and become more viable. The experiences from the earlier studies point in two directions.

The first is to recall (as stated in the introduction) that the normative postulation that decentralization of power and governance from centralized and often authoritarian institutions to local state units and governments, as well as to markets and widely defined CSOs, would open the way for “everything good”, including local democracy and popularoriented growth, has not proved generally valid. Hence it is necessary instead to specify the aim in terms of a democracy that can be used by ordinary people and not just the elite (see Ribot, Chapter 4 in this volume). This is easier said than done because democracy itself is a multidimensional moving target.3 But it is not impossible, and the next step would be to engage in critical empirical studies of whether and how the politics of decentralization has actually fostered or contradicted such goals in different contexts.

The second measure is to engage in comparatives studies in these respects. The frequent assessments of the deficits in local democratization specify what should be improved but say very little about how it could be done; and this allows for arbitrary interpretations of the results. It is better, but also not enough, to know the dynamics of the roots and challenges in a particular context in order to discuss possible options and opportunities. To gain the necessary alternative perspectives, one must also add comparative studies of previous experiences with transformative politics.

What can be learned, for instance, from the most positive attempts to tackle the challenges that have been identified in this chapter? Scandinavia may be a prime case in point. Its unique and historically successful experiences of fostering a combination of, on the one hand, strong interest-based movements among farmers and workers in particular and

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citizen rights based organizations and, on the other hand, effective and trustworthy central and local government institutions have contributed to social pacts between trade unions and employers on how to combine welfare and economic growth (for example, Berman, 2006; Esping-Andersen, 1985, 1990). Currently these experiences are attracting increasing attention in the global South, as reflected, for instance, in the recent flagship report from the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development on combating poverty and inequality (UNRISD, 2010).

This does not imply that specific institutions and policies can be exported, but the structures and forms of democratic politics are less contextual and characteristic of their time and may thus serve as a source of inspiration (see Stokke and Törnquist, 2013b). A recent example is the district of South Aceh. As already indicated in this chapter, contextual research from a theoretical perspective shows that the inclusive democratic model that facilitated peace and reconstruction in Aceh has been weakened by the dominance of powerful elites, insufficiently accountable and development-oriented government, and the lack of interest-based organizations beyond clientelism, middle-class NGOs and lobby groups (Törnquist et al., 2011; Törnquist, 2013a). In South Aceh, these tendencies are very explicit. A local research team has mapped the problems of public action and tried to understand why it is so difficult for the main actors and ordinary people to come together to discuss and decide on welfare and development priorities despite the new freedoms and elections. A major conclusion is that the basic problem is the weak position and capacity of development-oriented administrators, producers and labourers (Avonius, 2013). There are numerous schemes for consultation, as well as associations and community and customary groups, but they materialize mainly when top-down instructions are given and support is expected. Most importantly, they tend to be driven by the already powerful vested interests and they usually fail to represent potential actors of change. Based on how similar problems were addressed historically in Scandinavia, one may therefore study the possible potential of a supplementary development forum with a clear focus on fostering a welfarebased growth coalition related to productive sectors with the best potential, such as fishing, and based on key representative actors from government as well as the businesspeople, small-scale producers and labourers involved. Most importantly, it should also provide preferential treatment in support of better interest-based democratic representation of such key actors to enhance their capacity and power to foster political transformation.

It has been argued by James Manor among others (Manor 2010, 2013, and Chapter 2 in this volume) that transformative strategies and practices for better representation call for strong political support, which is

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simply not available in most contexts in the global South. There is much to this concern but I would like to conclude by putting forward three counter-arguments.

The first argument is that much of the success of the Kerala experience was in spite of rather than thanks to the political support of the left front parties, and the Communist Party of India(Marxist) (CPI(M)) in particular. As already indicated (in sub-sections 10.2.3 and 10.3.4 on the Kerala experiments), some leading leftist politicians did indeed support the efforts, especially in the initial stages, but large parts of the CPI(M) as well as of other leftist parties and their related interest associations were quite reluctant to introduce decentralization and supplementary institutions and practices of participatory democracy; and after 2001 some of them even denounced the efforts as revisionist. It may also be added that when the CPI(M) leaders did come out in defence of the efforts for a brief period in 1999 and 2000 it was mainly in response to criticism by competing leftist parties, which even caused some CPI(M) cadres to try to dominate the new institutions, thus at times causing harm rather than providing support.

The second contention is that even the Scandinavian experiences, which later turned into an idealized model, did not develop out of as supportive historical conditions as is generally taken for granted. In fact, the most important lessons are from the period just before social democracy became hegemonic, that is, when the foundations of the major advances were shaped. The key period of transformation unfolded in the late 1920s and early 1930s with poverty, economic crisis, extensive conflicts in the labour market, weak governments and emerging threats from fascist and Nazi welfare policies; and the unique lessons are precisely the social democratic politics that dealt with these challenges. Innovative political strategies were thus crucial (Berman, 2006; Esping-Andersen, 1985, 1990; Stokke and Törnquist, 2013a). I would argue that the same applies to the periods of success in Aceh, the Philippines and Kerala.

The third argument relates to Manor’s own proposition (2010, 2013) that the dynamics of post-clientelism have generated a new space for local democratization. My studies support this, and one may add that there is a new need in rapidly industrializing countries such as India for general social and employment security schemes (see Chatterjee, 2008; Harriss et al., 2011; UNRISD, 2010). If so, it may be possible to identify new opportunities for innovative pro-democratic strategies beyond local post-clientelism. And, even if it is implausible, it would be rational if the Scandinavian countries redirected – in the interests of sustaining their own welfare states in a global order – their international policies and development cooperation towards innovative strategies and agents of similar democratic and welfare-oriented regimes.

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Notes 1. In this chapter I shall therefore primarily refer to the reports from these studies. These reports in turn include additional references to related research that I draw on and/or criticize. For a general review of the results up to 2001, see Törnquist (2002) and relevant chapters in the anthologies edited by Harriss et al. (2004) and Törnquist et al. (2009).

2. See Törnquist (1990, 1997 and 2000), in addition to Budiman and Törnquist (2001) and Prasetyo et al. (2004); for the more general political economy and mainstream politics, see, for example, Aspinall (2005); Robison (1987); and Robison and Hadiz (2004).

3. Space does not permit me to engage here in the challenges of defining the basic institutions of democracy and the crucial factors that have an impact on their quality as well as on whether and how people can use and further develop them. See, however, the theoretical and methodological sections in the two basic reports from the national participatory democracy surveys in Indonesia (Priyono et al., 2007; and Samadhi and Warouw, 2009), the elaboration on democratic representation in Törnquist (2009), and the summary of lessons learned in Törnquist (2013b).

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11 Citizen engagement, deliberative spaces and the consolidation of a post-authoritarian democracy: The case of local CSOs in Indonesia Hans Antlov and Anna Wetterberg

11.1 Introduction This chapter focuses on the debate over the capacity and role of civil society and citizen participation to deepen democracy and improve the performance of local governments, focusing on the developments at the local level in Indonesia. We argue that grassroots experiences demonstrate that a focus on citizen participation and accountability among state and civil society actors can consolidate decentralization and democratization to produce positive development outcomes. We demonstrate a shift in the methods and magnitude of citizen engagement with the state and argue that these changes point to new deliberative spaces that are consolidating decentralized democracy. The extent to which these shifts contribute to improved policies and development outcomes, however, depends on the degree to which they can challenge existing power structures, such as an entrenched bureaucracy, a culture of entitlement among officials and patronage networks. In particular, we note the mutually reinforcing roles of civil society organizations (CSOs) and innovative/pro-reform government officials in challenging existing power structures, and the use of more sophisticated civil society strategies that put these organizations on a more equal footing with state representatives.

To these ends, we first introduce the debate on civil society and decentralization, arguing for a greater role for CSOs to complement that of progressive local leaders and institutional designs. We support these The imperative of good local governance: Challenges for the next decade of decentralization, Öjendal and Dellnäs (eds), United Nations University Press, 2013, ISBN 978-92-808-1229-9

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claims with data from a local governance project in Indonesia, to assess the extent to which state–society relations are shifting. Case studies demonstrate specific ways in which civil society engagement has strengthened democracy through local-level innovation, mobilization and higher standards for accountability that reflect changed relations between officials and CSOs. We conclude with the broader implications of our findings from Indonesia and their relevance to the theme of this book.

11.2 Civil society, decentralization and the consolidation of democracy During recent decades, development debates over the links between democracy and good governance have ebbed and flowed.1 One view that was dominant in the donor community until the 1990s and channelled to many developing countries was the idea that the civil service is the key to change. Training and new tools for local administrators are therefore needed to make government more modern, efficient and responsive, as a means to consolidating decentralized democracy (see, for example, Barzelay, 2001). If technically sound decentralized structures are put in place, democracy follows, as citizens take advantage of new opportunities to engage in the political process. In this view, development policy is the domain of economists, technocrats and bureaucrats capable of designing technically and administratively sound policies. Although the result may be well-designed technical and administrative policies, they can be difficult to implement and are criticized by citizens for not corresponding to their needs. Further, the support for reforms is often disconnected from the society in which the institutions are rooted – the structures of power, authority, interest, hierarchies, loyalties, patronage and traditions that make up the political weave and are thus unable to create systemic change (Evans, 2004).

Since the technical template approach to democratization and good governance generally has not worked, decentralization proponents began to focus on democracy-building and identifying under what conditions improved public policies could be institutionalized. At the same time, experiences with decentralization accumulated across a swathe of low- and middle-income countries, often pushed forward by international financial institutions and, in some cases, local populations’ demands for greater influence over public affairs. As these empirical realities of globalization, decentralization, privatization and democratizing have taken shape, revealing a range of outcomes, reform sequencing and process interaction have become more important: policy reforms have become a “dynamic combination of purposes, rules, actions, resources, incentives, and beha-

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viours leading to outcomes that can only imperfectly be predicted or controlled” (Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2001: 5).

These developments have led to the present prevalent view, emphasizing interaction between the “supply side” of government and the “demand side” of civil society. Differences in democratic outcomes and the quality of governance after decentralization can be explained by civil society’s ability to engage with the state (Cleary, 2007; Fox, 1996; Putnam, 2002). The technocratic approach assumed that civil society would automatically rise to participate in decentralized structures as spaces were opened, but empirical experience suggests that, rather than empowering disadvantaged sections of civil society, decentralization has largely taken off without them.

The dissatisfaction with procedural democracy and technocratic approaches to solving society’s problems has given rise to a substantial literature and set of practices with deliberative democracy and citizen participation.2 The concept of “citizen politics” broadens the role of citizens beyond that of being objects of state policy or passive recipients of government funding; citizens and their organizations are called upon to assume greater responsibility in addressing community needs. When citizens and their elected officials work together for better public governance, it is argued, the outcomes will be a visible improvement in the quality of democracy, at both the local and the national levels. This has taken the form, in the global North, of the revitalization of deliberative democracy, and, in the South, of various attempts at deepening democracy through citizen participation. These new forms of substantive democracy include citizen juries, “21st Century Town Meetings”, citizen forums, consensus conferences, focus group discussions, issue forums, deliberative polls, planning cells and participatory budgeting.

The civil society approach clearly diverges from the technocratic approach, but it has also been criticized for ignoring larger patterns of dominance and marginalization (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Harriss, 2001; Harriss et al., 2005). Assistance to civil society often disregards power relations; it rarely helps pro-democracy activists engage with political parties or challenge power structures. Civil society approaches are criticized for using non-threatening and apolitical language of building trust, establishing pacts, promoting social cohesion and creating spaces, producing “hybrid” democracies that fail to substantially involve broad segments of civil society. A focus on civic engagement in technical processes of planning and public service delivery may restrict citizen input to the task of petitioning, making connections and lobbying, rather than creating a culture of accountability or a sense that citizens have a right to demand effective government. This has been seen as a larger neo-liberal agenda of depoliticizing society by weakening the state politically and promoting

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self-help and citizen choice in society through bypassing interest-based groups such as labour and farmers, and cheapening the cost of aid (Crook and Manor, 1998; Mohan and Stokke, 2008: 11). In the name of democratic decentralization, resources and power are being transferred to local institutions, resulting in a fragmentation of public powers (Ribot, 2007) and thus reinforcement of dominant state structures, including (in developing countries) patrimonial ties and patronage politics. These critics instead emphasize the need for analysis of “political practices and actors involved in making, using and changing local political space and practices” (Mohan and Stokke, 2008: 27; see also Goldfrank, 2002, and Romeo, Chapter 3 in the present volume).

The present case of Indonesia seems to confirm this pattern. One prevalent view among observers of Indonesian politics holds that civil society continues to operate within an environment in which “predatory interests nurtured under the Suharto regime’s formerly vast, centralized system of patronage have largely survived and remain intact” (Hadiz, 2003: 711) and therefore has not had any real impact on basic political structures.3 After three decades of depoliticizing local organizations and citizens’ priorities, the groups most capable of operating in the decentralized context are not citizens’ initiatives but patronage-type interest groups that flourished under Suharto. Civil society activists in Indonesia have been characterized as “floating democrats” hovering above, but unconnected to, Indonesian society, and thus unable to gain popular legitimacy and muster a broad base sufficient to mobilize political support or influence (Priyono et al., 2007; see also Manning and van Diermen, 2000). The compromised democracy that emerges as a result does not empower ordinary people, since the spaces opened up through this form of democratic decentralization are captured by various forms of “predatory interests” (Hadiz, 2003) or “bad guys” (Törnquist, 2002).

We agree that technical support for the bare minimum democratic cornerstones of national-level state institutions, elections or an open public sphere does not by itself create social justice or a substantive democracy.

To support democracy and make government responsive to citizen needs, it is not enough simply to bring government closer through decentralization or to open up spaces for civil society through democratization. It is also necessary to deepen and improve the nature of civil society engagement with decentralized state structures. In what follows, we provide evidence that support to democracy-making through civil society need not depoliticize or undermine social justice. In Indonesia, practices that allow new voices to be heard and power to be given to people to be involved in governing their communities are leading to social change. This means that the image of Indonesia’s democracy being hijacked by predatory interests is only one side of the coin: there are counter-forces and alterna-

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tive struggles that need to be recognized – departing from the “local needs” developmentalist perspective outlined by Romeo in Chapter 3 of the present volume.

11.3 Indonesia – Change and continuity Indonesia is typical of a country in the South under the third wave of democratization. It experienced more than three decades of centralized and authoritarian rule, dominated by a single party that concentrated power in the president and an entrenched bureaucracy (referred to as “the New Order”). Since 1998, Indonesia has introduced sweeping decentralization reforms, shifting resources and decision-making power to more local levels of government with the aim of buttressing democratic rule. The country has seen radical changes in the relationship between government and citizens, in two main respects.

First, the country has moved from a repressive authoritarian regime to a democracy: competitive general elections have been held three times; mayors are directly elected; freedoms of speech and assembly have been established, creating a vibrant public sphere (see Cheema, Chapter 9 in the present volume). As a result of more open local elections, some impressive local reformers have been elected and have brought real changes to their communities (Widianingsih and Morrell, 2007). Indonesia is now classified by Freedom House as a free and democratic country.

Secondly, the country has gone from a highly centralized government to one characterized by decentralized governance. Around 500 subnational governments have been empowered to deliver public services, and district legislative councils (Dewan perwakilan rakyat daerah, DPRD) control budgets and regulations, taking regional differences and needs into account. Among citizens, there has also been enormous social change and entrepreneurship by newly established CSOs. The passing of national laws on legislative drafting, local governance and participatory planning in 2004 provided the legal framework for citizen engagement. Many international organizations and donors launched development programmes on civil society engagement in local governance. In the words of Larry Diamond (2009), Looking in historical terms, and in comparative terms, what Indonesia has achieved in the last 10 years (in terms of the development and improvement of democratic institutions, a critical and substantial base of public support for democracy, of trust in public institutions, and, surprisingly perhaps, robust support for liberal values relative to elsewhere in the region) is quite remarkable and is deserving of admiration.

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As far as the institutions go, then, considerable gains have been made during the past decade. However, in terms of substantive democracy and governance, Indonesia still has some way to go to fundamentally reform undemocratic institutions and practices.

Historically, administrative structures in Indonesia were constructed as inherently anti-political. In the 1970s, the New Order regime instituted a hierarchical structure of local administration – province, district, subdistrict and village – whose heads were appointed by and accountable to the president. This administrative machine was marshalled in the service of development, with government leaders at all levels on the front lines responsible for ensuring grassroots support for government policies and programmes (Evers, 1999, and Ito, 2007). Local governance structures were further depoliticized by prioritizing growth and stability. This resulted in a technocratic approach that emphasized efficiency by ensuring that all decisions were made and implemented by officials. Local governments channelled programmes designed by the central government, making them dependent on central planning and actively hampering local creativity and innovation (Widianingsih and Morrell, 2007: 2). The central government also actively undermined local efforts to organize outside the state-sanctioned structure, weakening local structures to the benefit of central ones.

With this army of officials and civil servants comes an organizational culture characterized by upward accountability, technocratic decisionmaking, entrenched patron–client relationships and widespread corruption (Choi, 2007). National political cultures are historically contingent and therefore resistant to change (Dobbin, 1994). It might be particularly challenging for the Indonesian public administration to consolidate democratic decentralization because it is oriented towards higher levels of authority rather than input from citizens – the civil service has an inherent distrust of citizens’ abilities and demands (Kristiansen et al., 2009).

A major challenge to consolidating democracy in Indonesia thus lies in the strong state and entrenched government processes. The bureaucracy remains dominated by people trained under the authoritarian regime, which, as we have seen, was oriented away from serving the public interest. Many officials continue to use their positions to further their own vested interests, rather than those of citizens. They further see it as their right to define public policy and provide services as they see fit, considering citizens “as end users, not as stakeholders or customers to be consulted or served” (Antlov et al., 2010).

However, if we shift our perspective away from the broader political economy and towards the local level where people live, there is a variable, but encouraging, picture of local politics and governance patterns.

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The picture painted by Törnquist (in Chapter 10 of the present volume), Hadiz (2003) and others of elite capture is not necessarily in contradiction to this – it is more a case of the glass being half full. The potentials embedded in electoral accountability, freedom of assembly and citizen engagement are taking root, with new leaders challenging old power structures to enlarge and deepen local democracy. Even though it is easy to be pessimistic when looking at Indonesia through a Jakarta prism, if we look from the bottom up we can see changes occurring that might eventually lead to more radical changes at the national level. Local governance is at the forefront of social and political change in Indonesia today because this is where the density of social forces is to be found, where political recruitment and the building of constituencies are taking place, and where people are translating national policies into local programmes and local issues into national ideology. These innovations are being spearheaded by civil society activists, by newly emerging social movements and by community-based social action groups. Some are even pushed by brave government officials who support local-level reform and democracy. There is a lot of energy in Indonesia today, a lot of experimentation and trying out of new governance forms, such as citizen forums, town hall meetings and budget hearings. Local politics is being reinvigorated.

In the following pages, we demonstrate this point. We will present cases of CSOs changing the nature of their engagement with the state in ways that bring Indonesia closer to consolidating decentralized democracy.

After presenting some numerical trends and changes, we explore examples of how shifts in CSO engagement interact with innovative local leaders and existing power structures, such as the entrenched bureaucratic culture and patterns of patronage – and how sometimes they fail.

Finally, we present evidence of emerging shifts in power structures, increased standards for accountability, and changes in policy and state practices. We will also briefly touch upon the role of a donor project in promoting these local governance processes.

Empirical data for the chapter were collected through the Local Governance Support Program (LGSP), an effort funded by the United States Agency for International Development to support the expansion of participatory, effective and accountable governance through engagement with local governments, legislative councils and CSOs.4 The figures are based on data collected in December 2005 and January–February 2009 in 45 partner jurisdictions across six provinces in Indonesia; two independent evaluations of the civil society programme in 13 jurisdictions conducted in 2008 and 2009; and overall insights from the LGSP’s civil society strengthening team (led by Hans Antlov, one of the present writers). Numerical data draw on diagnostic assessments in 2005 and the

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results obtained from 371 questionnaires administered to civil society activists in 2009. The respondents are from LGSP partner jurisdictions and most are local activists in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) themselves actively pursuing transparency and greater citizen participation in public policy-making and oversight. Thus, this was not a random sampling. Since there is no control group and the respondents are primary actors in local governance (thus, not those activists choosing to stand outside), the results are used only to highlight achievements in LGSP-supported districts by partner organizations and can be seen as partial and subjective. Nevertheless, they do reflect the situation in each jurisdiction as perceived by the civic activists and officials who are most active there.

11.4 Changes in citizen engagement Let us begin the exploration with how the nature of CSO engagement has changed since 2005 in Indonesia. In the past, many CSOs used a standard method of advocacy, a legacy of the Reformasi period: organize a public advocacy campaign and take to the streets to mount rallies and demonstrations outside government offices (Antlov et al., 2010: 428). This “engagement from a distance” is typical of societies with distrust and a distance between state and society.5 However, the data gathered from LGSP activists show that, in recent years, there has been both an overall increase and a change in the type of CSO engagement (Figure 11.1).

This reflects the increasing democratization and diversification of local politics.

Almost all types of activities show a dramatic increase, with the notable exception of demonstrations, which have remained the same at 32 per cent. However, if demonstrating was the second most common activity reported in 2005, it was the least common in 2009. CSOs have clearly added methods to their repertoire to communicate more nuanced information to officials. Of these, budget and regulatory analysis show the largest relative increase. Civic engagement in the participatory planning and budgeting processes is a critical step in ensuring government responsiveness to citizen needs – making budgets more responsive to citizen priorities, ensuring that funds are used efficiently and transparently, building the capacity of civil society to advocate for more responsive budget allocations and to promote budget transparency in drafting and implementation. An increasing diversity of citizen strategies to mobilize resources and demand rights is by no means an automatic result of decentralization (see Grindle, Chapter 8 in this volume, for relative uniform citizen strategies to mobilize support in Mexico).

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Question: Has your organization carried out any of the following activities?

Figure 11.1 Forms of CSO engagement, 2005–2009 Source: LGSP (2009: Fig. 6.3).

Note: Figures show percentage answering “Yes”.

Overall, there are encouraging signs that civil society engagement in government planning and decision-making processes is becoming more common (Figure 11.2). Whereas only around 35 per cent of CSOs said they had been involved in public consultations and development planning meetings in 2005, more than 80 per cent had done so by 2009.

Given that there is evidence of greater involvement of CSOs in the operation of local government processes, what does this mean for relations between citizens and government? As seen in Figure 11.3, CSOs have a generally positive perception of the changes in local government commitment and in access to official documents. Many CSOs reported an improved governance climate, greater trust in the commitment and openness of the government, and better access to key documents. Many have been invited to design and facilitate public forums for development planning (Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan, or Musrenbang) or public consultations.

However, activists had a less favourable view of sector department practices. This appears to relate to a more general phenomenon where

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Question: Has your organization participated in?

Figure 11.2 CSO involvement in public consultation, 2005–2009 Source: Based on LGSP (2009: Figs. 6.5 and 6.7).

Question: In these fields, has the government become better, worse or remained at the same level during the past three years?

Figure 11.3 Changes perceived by CSOs in local government commitment to citizen participation, 2005–2009 Source: LGSP (2009: Fig. 6.8).

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Figure 11.4 Local government perceptions of changes in openness and CSO capacity, 2005–2009 Source: LGSP (2009: Fig. 6.14).

local government leaders’ political commitment is not shared by their staff. Government heads sometimes describe challenges in implementing good governance practices that may be undermined when sector department staff continue to tightly control documents and exclude citizens from policy decisions, a theme we will return to in the case studies below.

Conversely, Figure 11.4 shows how officials (mostly finance and planning staff) perceive CSO capacity. Asked about changes in government openness and CSO involvement during the previous five years, officials felt strongly that CSOs had become more engaged: 89 per cent of government staff felt that more opportunities had been provided to CSOs and that civil society was more willing to engage with the government.

However, CSOs still need to address the perceived quality of their input; most officials felt that CSOs did not provide accurate data. Officials thus remained reluctant to fully embrace input from CSOs that are inexperienced and whose enthusiasm may exceed their analytical capacity.

Even after 10 years of civil society strengthening, analytical skills remained a general weakness among CSOs (see Cheema, Chapter 9 in this volume).6 These data illuminate the direction of change in Indonesian local governance. CSO reports of greater openness to both citizen participation in planning processes and improved oversight mechanisms indicate an increased willingness among elected officials to be held to account. Rather than exclude CSOs and individual citizens from state processes, the evidence suggests that officials are inclined to show greater responsiveness

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to citizens and are willing to let citizens hold them accountable, which is a better opportunity for citizens to monitor officials and provide feedback than has been available in the past. There has been an accompanying shift in CSO strategies to engage with the state, and an indication that CSOs and local governments are, to a certain degree, developing some mutual trust and respect.

However, these patterns do not help us understand the substance of this engagement and changing relations. Below, we outline a set of cases, chosen to illustrate variation in experiences with increased citizen engagement, which demonstrate how CSOs use new strategies to create opportunities for engagement that can shift existing local power structures.

We also show how CSOs interact with decentralized structures and, in particular, with innovative leaders to produce changes in local policy and provision of services.

11.5 Case studies of citizen engagement in local governance 11.5.1 Budget analysis and transparency regulation (Madiun, East Java) Madiun is a rural town on the border of East and Central Java. In 2006, a CSO coalition began a collaboration with the municipal government and local council that led to improved local budgets as well as greater trust and mutual respect. It started when a group of reform-minded DPRD members launched an effort to increase budget transparency in their district by organizing a series of monthly meetings with the village leadership to discuss needs and current expenditures. Discussions ended after three months when the mayor banned the village heads from working with DPRD members (see McLaughlin, 2008).

In 2007, the reformers tried to publish the city budget, but were again blocked by the mayor. They then used their own funds to copy the budget document and distribute it to all wards in Madiun. Although reformers were able to change internal council regulations to require public consultations on the budget, they were still frustrated by the mayor’s continued barriers to budget transparency.

Up to this point, there had been little productive collaboration between the DPRD and CSOs in Madiun. Local elected representatives perceived CSOs as interested mainly in patronage or outright extortion, based on past experiences. Activists, for their part, viewed the DPRD as incompetent and focused on personal gain.

In the same year, a group of activists came together under LGSP facilitation to analyse the city budget. Their request for the budget document

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was initially blocked; they eventually obtained it in secret from the head of one of the line agencies.7 The alliance produced a comparison between planning documents and the budget, as well as an analysis of a series of annual budgets. This investigation uncovered disparate goals and inconsistencies in allocations, as well as discrepancies in expenditures claimed.

The CSO alliance submitted the findings to the DPRD, which organized a hearing to discuss the next steps. Impressed with the attention to detail of the analysis, a few DPRD members forwarded the paper to the finance department of the Madiun government, which eventually rectified all but one of the discrepancies that had been found. The hearing also broadened into discussion of transparency and budgets, which dovetailed with reformist DPRD members’ frustrations.

DPRD reformers were sufficiently impressed with the alliance’s work to initiate collaboration with the activists to focus on two substantive areas. First, the alliance assisted DPRD members in analysing the 2008 budget during the short period that it was available for review. Although the final budget allocations were not greatly affected, the coalition’s endeavours helped to reduce the number of grey areas in the budgeting documents (which provided potential for leakage) and alerted the implementing agencies that they were being scrutinized. Second, the alliance was entrusted with drafting a background document for a regional regulation on transparency and participation that was eventually approved in 2009. The alliance devoted considerable time and effort to this assignment, also working to expand the regulation to ensure greater civil society engagement in Madiun’s decision-making processes.

In 2008, to ensure that the problems of budget transparency would not happen again, one of the leading NGOs in the alliance developed opensource software called Simranda for analysing local budget information.8 Based on core figures from past budget documents, the software allows for analysis of these figures to measure the consistency of the planning and budgeting documents and to track specific agency expenditures, overall spending trends and fund allocations for pro-poor or genderresponsive programmes. Simranda allowed activists in Madiun to do a quite advanced analysis of the budget document with just a few clicks of a mouse button. The programme also allowed users to compare several years of local budget figures. It rapidly became an effective advocacy tool to strengthen the ongoing transparency and accountability campaign in Madiun and was picked up by DPRD members – and eventually it spread to other districts.

This case points to the greater leverage for reforms that can result from collaboration between citizen groups and elected leaders. Reformist DPRD members had been thwarted in their efforts to increase transparency by a recalcitrant executive, but were able to shift the direction of

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the initiative because of new information and impetus provided by CSOs. Notably, reformers had been blocked by the mayor, highlighting the range in attitudes towards reform among officials and the possibilities for overcoming such blocks through allegiances between reformers inside and outside the state.

CSO use of budget analysis, and later development of computer software and background information for local legislation, points to the shifting nature of engagement with the state, with CSOs being better at providing important data to local governments. Further, because these efforts provided novel and useful information to elected representatives, they opened up space for deliberation that led to greater accountability (of agencies for their budgets) and a discovery of common interests in budget reforms. These, in turn, produced trust in CSOs (in an environment where they had not previously had much legitimacy) and further collaboration.

We also see a change in the entrenched bureaucratic culture of entitlement and impunity in Madiun. The CSO alliance’s original analysis was a new form of scrutiny, to which pressured line agencies had to respond.

This higher level of accountability represents a reduction in the previously uncontested control over budget allocations and actual expenditures. Finally, this example demonstrates actual reforms and changes in state practices, in the form of a local transparency regulation and the repeated use of budget analysis by the DPRD.

11.5.2 Citizen forums and the CSO alliance (Jepara, Central Java) Jepara is a rural town in Central Java, most well known for its woodcarving industry. It is also a stronghold for Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia’s largest Islamic organization. Since Reformasi, NU’s research and development institute LAKPESDAM has supported the establishment of a citizen forum (in 2001), a group of concerned citizens mobilizing around a common cause in order to make a difference.9 A citizen forum is outside of – but can feed into – formal political institutions, often building on experiences of traditional associations, such as rotating savings schemes, mutual assistance groups or religious classes, and taking these traditional forms to discuss issues of democracy and governance. Rallying around pro-poor and gender-sensitive budget allocations and improved public services for the poor, the Jepara citizen forum has organized two large town hall meetings – in 2005 and 2008, the latter of which was supported by the LGSP. Organized by the local branch of LAKPESDAM, the January 2008 meeting brought together over 400 people. Farmers, fisher folk and street vendors met with government agency officials and local councillors to

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evaluate the 2008 budgets and prepare for the 2009 budget. Discussions took the form of deliberations using participatory techniques, encouraging everybody to express their view – many for the first time. The result was a series of recommendations for budget reallocations favouring development of farms and fisheries. Budget analysis had shown that development programme allocations at the fishery and agricultural agencies were mainly for the procurement of laptops, projectors and staff motorbikes, whereas what was needed was machinery, fertilizer, fishing nets and traps to increase agricultural and fisheries production. Some of the recommendations were accommodated in the revised 2008 budget and others were accommodated in the 2009 budget (LGSP, 2009: 6–14).

The Jepara citizen forum also spawned a CSO alliance called Jaran.10 Jaran took an analysis prepared through Simranda (which by now had spread among budget NGOs) on “budget road shows” to village government officers, religious schools and university campuses and publicized it through community radio.11 In early 2009, they made presentations to the local planning agency (Bappeda) and the local council on the findings and results of the Simranda analysis of the 2007–2009 budgets. Bappeda was so impressed with the results that it planned to use the Simranda software in upcoming public hearings on the 2010 local budget. Jaran has made plans to train the newly elected councilors in using the software. (LGSP, 2009: 6–15)

In Jepara, there were clear shifts in budget allocations based on the 2008 citizen forum towards poor constituents’ priorities. In addition, the Simranda software encouraged civil society groups to be much more proactive in their budget analysis and government agencies to be more appreciative of CSOs. CSO strategies to introduce new information and provide useful analysis have thus both had concrete policy impact and increased local government’s accountability for funds allocations.12 Insofar as budget reallocations removed resources from state agencies, they also chipped away at the bureaucracy’s feeling of entitlement to prioritize local funds for their own benefit.

However, the budgeting process is also an example of the resilience and remains of the technocratic and patrimonial state – and how proactive supporters of democratic governance need to be to ensure that promised shifts in allocations actually take place. As noted by Harry Blair in Chapter 6 in this volume, there is a well-documented disconnect between the participatory planning results and eventual budget allocations in Indonesia.13 Plans developed during Musrenbang meetings are rarely taken into account; instead, local councils and executive budget teams often use their own figures based on the previous year’s allocations.

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Budgeting staff prioritize the internal needs of government agencies and the vested interests of council factions over Musrenbang results. Planning and budgeting at the district level proceed largely disconnected from the strong village planning focus and fail to connect procedurally with the budget requests made by local government agencies and service units.

Specifically, this involves drafting of the budget – when figures from the Musrenbang are put onto activity lists and tentative figures are attached to produce a General Budget Policy and Temporary Budget Ceiling (KUA-PPAS). Although citizens are legally entitled to participate, only some of the more innovative jurisdictions are beginning to involve citizens in General Budget Policy meetings; as we remember from Figure 11.3, the scores for citizen involvement in General Budget Policy meetings show relatively low participation, compared with other forms of public consultations.

It is thus a continued challenge to open up budget discussions for citizens. However, this problem is not limited to Indonesia; budget decisions around the world are highly political and prone to intense negotiations between various government and legislative stakeholders.

That even some civil society groups are involved in Indonesia is an achievement – almost 40 per cent report that they perceive positive changes (Figure 11.3).

11.5.3 Monitoring the quality of public services (Gowa, South Sulawesi) Gowa is a suburb of Makassar, the capital of South Sulawesi. In 2007, a local NGO coalition, Jaker-P3G,14 was supported by the LGSP to carry out a Citizen Report Card survey (CRC) for education and health, sectors in which the Gowa government was committed to provide free services.15 For education, the survey found levels of citizen satisfaction with elementary education services were higher than for higher . . . education services. In the health sector, citizen satisfaction levels with community health centers (Puskesmas) and outpatient care in public hospitals were higher than for dental care and mobile units. The survey also revealed low satisfaction with doctors’ treatments, with the delays in responding to complaints, the excessive time spent in clinic visits, and a general lack of effectiveness in health-care officers’ assistance.

After a public hearing with government officials, the mayor became interested in the results. The newly elected and reform minded mayor saw the CRC as an opportunity to shake up the poorly performing government agencies.

After a number of informal meetings between the mayor and the citizen coalition, the mayor agreed to discuss the CRC on a television talk show with two

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civic activists from Jaker-P3G. . . . A week later, the mayor invited Jaker-3PG [sic] to sit down with the local education and health-care agencies to review the findings and suggest improvements. As an example, doctors claimed to be too busy with administrative matters to meet patients. In response, the health agency hired health service administrators to manage the red tape, freeing up doctors to see patients. (LGSP, 2009: 6 –25)

The mayor also expressed interest in subsequent collaboration with citizens’ groups. In November 2008, the government of Gowa and JakerP3G organized a town hall meeting on government plans for education and healthcare services in 2009, similar to the one in Jepara. At the request of the mayor, the CRC survey was also repeated in 2009. With government commitment to future surveys, citizens can now focus on providing substantive input to local government agencies on public service standards, as well as having a medium to question government agencies about their performance.

The Gowa experience reinforces the use of innovative CSO strategies to open up new space for deliberation and underscores the effective collaborations that can result between CSOs and pro-reform leaders. In this case, the mayor was explicitly interested in improving bureaucratic performance and was able to leverage CSO data to achieve this outcome.

There was clear policy impact, both in the restructuring of clinic management and in adoption of the CRC methodology. By raising the accountability of health service providers and enabling continued citizen input, this example had a demonstrated effect on entrenched bureaucratic practices.

11.5.4 Long-term development plan (Kediri, East Java) In the past, long-term development plans have generally been prepared by the government without any public feedback. In 2006, the city government of Kediri, East Java, decided to open up preparation of the long-term plan for public input. A multi-stakeholder Working Group was established, led by the head of the Regional Development Planning Agency (Bappeda), which at the behest of the LGSP also included a couple of NGO activists. Bappeda and some other local officials were generally seen as open to and supportive of public involvement in government activities, after positive experiences with citizen input in shaping outcomes in prior development programmes.

The Working Group’s identified priorities were carried forward into a set of public consultations to flesh out the content in each of the seven mission areas. Each mission area was addressed by a multi-stakeholder group appropriate for the topic. Based on these discussions, comments on

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content were gathered in each of the seven areas. Following the public consultations, a larger, multi-stakeholder team was established with the goal of reviewing the initial vision and mission statements and adding information from the mission consultations to develop a complete draft document for broader public discussion. It was composed of representatives from NGOs, religious leaders, academics, media representatives and government staff.

Bappeda continued to have trouble finalizing the vision and mission statements. Part of the problem was an inability to prioritize between the issues that emerged during the public consultations. Bappeda decided to gather general public comment on the basic components of the plan (with LGSP support). A simple two-page questionnaire was developed to allow ranking of priorities and space for comment on the mission statements. Of 1,500 questionnaires, 518 came back and 418 were useable; according to respondents, top priorities were education and small business development. The top inhibiting factors identified were the need for better law enforcement (41 per cent) and for improved professionalism of public servants (38 per cent) and the lack of public participation (28 per cent).

Radio discussions and one television discussion also were funded by Bappeda. The call-in radio shows were moderated by a number of individuals, both within government and from civil society. Radio shows were publicized as a way for citizens to provide feedback on the plan, but it was unclear how those comments were compiled and fed into the planning process.

The Kediri long-term plan was approved in 2009, after lengthy negotiations between Bappeda and the DPRD. Surprisingly, after the numerous ways that the local government sought citizen input, there was little evidence that any aspect of this information was incorporated in the long-term planning document.

The Kediri case highlights the variation in what citizen engagement may entail and an ambiguous effect on democracy. Although citizens reported satisfaction with being involved, the case looks much like the traditional planning exercises, with a few consultative embellishments. Such efforts are unlikely to produce a culture of accountability (Grindle, Chapter 8 in this volume.) The process does seem to have built new relationships between citizens and local government and increased constituents’ trust in the state. Although the consultations had no evident impact on power structures, since officials retained complete control over content, they may enable further collaboration. There is also considerable risk, however, if citizens eventually discover that their extensive input produced no effect, resulting in a return to apathy and a refusal to participate further.

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This example also underscores that innovative leaders, even if open to more citizen engagement, are often not sufficient to push through substantive reform. It is unclear whether Bappeda was thwarted by a recalcitrant DPRD or line agencies disinclined to give real weight to citizen input. The head of Bappeda may also have viewed consultation as an end in itself rather than as a means to consolidate democracy.

11.6 Is democracy consolidated in Indonesia?

There are thousands of citizen-based social action groups around Indonesia in which concerned citizens collaborate to solve local problems. There is no single pattern: some work closely with the government, while others are more advocacy oriented and remain outside the formal political sphere. These groups share a desire to affect policy-making and see public funds reallocated to benefit their constituencies. Even if members are not formally involved with political parties, they are nevertheless engaging in local politics.

Our data reflect this high level of citizen engagement. There were considerable improvements in both the quantity and quality of citizen engagement in partner jurisdictions. From 32 questions asked of CSO activists in 45 jurisdictions about the changes since 2006 (a total of 11,520 individual answers), 46 per cent of responses noted improvements in commitment and reform among officials and local councils; only 8 per cent indicated a worsening since 2006 (the remaining reported “no change”). This positive attitude shows emerging trust in local governments, encouraging progress towards building sustainable governance partnerships. Local government is more accountable to the people, and local governance reforms are becoming the main source of public innovation and social change in Indonesia. The increased esteem in which officials hold CSOs (Figure 11.4) translates into the use of information from citizens’ groups to reallocate budgets, change bureaucratic practices, hold agencies accountable for expenditures and draft local legislation. This is a good example of the “post-clientelist politics” that democratic decentralization has provided, with civil society groups able to broaden their alliances and support base by capitalizing on political actors’ need to go beyond predominant clientelist arrangements (see Manor in Chapter 2 and Törnquist in Chapter 10 in this volume).

The question remains, however, whether there is real impact on public policies and political structures or whether this is all donor driven. As our case studies illustrate, there are some very encouraging achievements but also significant variation in outcomes from citizen involvements. The more diverse strategies used by CSOs have, in these examples, opened up

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new space for deliberation and, in some cases, collaboration. Importantly, because citizens’ groups acted as information providers, they were on a more equal footing with officials than if they had simply been petitioning their representatives. Backed by facts and numbers, civil society groups could sit down with government agencies and discuss public service improvements – no longer the passive clients of services provided by a beneficent patron. Acknowledging the utility of outside information and analysis, instead of only relying on internal data, represents a departure from the norm within Indonesian local government of looking inwards (and upwards?).

Hard data on staff performance, pricing and service quality gave organized citizens’ groups the kind of information that they needed to hold public agencies accountable for their actions. This is in itself a shift in power relations, as citizens become sources of valuable resources and thus political actors in their own right, rather than mere subjects. Participation theorist Robert Chambers (2007: 3) argues that the past 10 years had a seen “a quiet tide of innovation . . . by which local people themselves produce numbers”. Around the world, improved data-gathering has become a powerful tool of community empowerment that can lead to changes in government policy and practices. The CRC and Simranda experiences in Indonesia highlight the dual processes of empowerment and impact on policy.

As was evident in Madiun and Gowa, these efforts were particularly effective when innovative CSO strategies were taken up by reformist state officials. Although pro-reform leaders have occasionally been quite effective on their own, our cases show that innovative officials may also be easily blocked by conservative forces, or may not fully implement constituent input unless there is clear and consistent citizen pressure (as was the case in Kediri). In contrast to other countries where progressive officials are key to consolidating decentralized democracy (Grindle, 2007), the established power structures can hamper these actors in the Indonesian context. Working in concert with innovative CSOs can at times produce a synergy that destabilizes entrenched practices to a point where reforms succeed. There is encouraging evidence that a more active and re-politicized citizenry can reinforce the positive changes introduced by reformist governments. Eckardt (2008: 15) finds that “better performing governments were consistently more open to pressure of informed, organized and politically active communities, which strengthened their incentives to be responsive and manage and deliver services more efficiently”.

The changes described in our examples are far from the large shifts in political relations and class structures envisioned by critics of the civil society perspective (Mohan and Stokke, 2008). As discussed in section

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11.3 of our chapter, many long-term observers of Indonesian politics have been quite critical of what they saw as a whole sale adoption of the neoliberal tenets of civil society and administrative decentralization. They warned against elite capture, patronage politics and the emergence of local warlordism. However, a few years later, it seems that Indonesia has been able to manoeuvre away from these pitfalls. Not all is rosy and successful, but the processes described in these pages are excellent training grounds for wider political involvement: through them people learn to argue a case, compromise, relate to a constituency and take decisions in a more open and participatory manner. Meanwhile, the decision-making process has become a bit more democratic and the deliberations have produced better-informed citizens, who have often learned important political skills and how to build relations that can be applied in other arenas. As argued by Sandercock (1998: 129), transformative political action often begins with “a thousand tiny empowerments”, not grand designs. In this sense, shifts in CSO strategy, and the political space they open up for collaborations with (innovative) state officials, may eventually produce broader impact. If, as Romeo argues in Chapter 3 in the present volume, demand is a key factor for local-level reforms, the role of an active citizenry cannot be overrated (see also Chapter 9 by Cheema in the present volume).

At the same time, challenges clearly remain. Not all citizen groups are producing the effective research and engagement strategies described above. Some CSOs prefer to focus on extracting short-term benefits and perpetuating patrimonial relations to local government rather than representing citizens and creating new space for political engagement (as in the case of NGO activists using their knowledge of district budgets to blackmail officials – see endnote 7). More transparency and accountability are needed from CSOs, as well as from local governments (Cheema, Chapter 9 in this volume). Other groups may be trying to engage more creatively but fail to put continuous pressure on officials and demand responsiveness and accountability for policy changes (as in Kediri). This can restrict citizen input to petitioning, making connections and lobbying – that is, strengthening existing patterns of patronage – rather than creating a culture of accountability where citizens have a right to demand effective government. In such situations, power relations remain unchanged and the community is no more democratic than previously.

Even when CSOs do open up political space, there is a risk of falling into patrimonial relations with officials over the longer term. In Madiun, the CSO alliance developed a very close relationship with a particular set of DPRD representatives and performed work at their request, sometimes in secret. In environments with established political competition, such ties to officials may increase civil engagement (Lavalle et al., 2005:

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960). In spite of improvements, effective political competition is still not a full reality in Indonesia (Choi, 2007; see also Törnquist, Chapter 10 in this volume). Thus, although the Madiun collaboration was initially effective in changing state practices, more transparency is needed over the longer term to avoid backsliding into more traditional relations. One way to overcome this risk could be Olle Törnquist’s call (in Chapter 10 of the present volume) for “transformative politics” that goes beyond political parties and rather focuses on building broad issue-based coalitions of reform-minded public officials and civic activists.

Other challenges include the risk of innovative leaders promoting change that eventually turns out to be only cosmetic. Kediri provided the most egregious demonstration of this type of “citizen empowerment”, but other, more substantive CSO achievements also may not persist unless budget negotiations are opened up to citizens for scrutiny and input. As evident in both Figure 11.3 and some of the case studies, these processes remain closed. Continued effort is thus needed, building on the successes with budget analysis, to increase accountability at this level (see also McLaughlin, 2008).

Finally, because our focus has been on CSO interactions with local officials, we have bracketed a range of other interactions that must be taken into account to consolidate decentralized democracy in Indonesia. Perhaps most importantly, our cases have not traced reactions to changes in power structures resulting from citizen engagement. The empowerment of previously marginalized groups is an inherently conflictual process of shifting interactions with more or less powerful groups (Gibson and Woolcock, 2008: 154). Further work needs to address how the “losers” in these outcomes react and attempt to recapture their lost advantages.

11.7 Conclusions In her study on local governance reforms in Mexico, Merilee Grindle (2007) identifies four factors that might influence the divergent outcomes of governance reforms at the local level: political competition, state entrepreneurship, public sector modernization and civil society activism.

For the Mexican case, Grindle concludes that state entrepreneurship is the most important factor: “mayors and other elected and appointed officials are the most important source of change in local governments” (2007: 170). In Indonesia, many observers would agree. During the past 10 years, innovative local leaders have been the shining lights of local reforms. However, it is also becoming clear that we cannot expect good governance reforms to happen only though government initiatives. With-

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out constructive citizen engagement, state officials will not be held to account, and the culture of entitlement and upwards orientation cultivated during the New Order will persist, jeopardizing improvements in local governance and democratic decentralization. Power structures must also be shifted away from patronage networks to ongoing engagements between citizens and the state to debate priorities and incorporate feedback, building the capacity of civil society to engage government – to repoliticize communities. The results from the LGSP show that relations can be improved, with reform-minded officials beginning to appreciate and listen to activists and CSOs. Moving forward, citizen demands and pressures will play only increasingly important roles for the success of local governance reforms in Indonesia. This is a move away from the “free-market politics” of managerial democracy and administrative decentralization, towards a participatory democracy involving the disenfranchised that empowers them to be part of the collective decisionmaking process.

The cases in this chapter point to the importance of shifting power relationships in support of state–citizen interactions, whether in public consultations, CRCs or citizen engagement in development planning.

Acknowledging the critics of the civil society paradigm, democracy promoters must be aware of changing power relations in local governance reforms – both empowering and disempowering in support of state–citizen interactions. These are important steps towards creating a local governance system that is more responsive to citizens, transparent in its handling of public funds, and accountable to the public for its actions – which is what we want out of a consolidated democracy.

Notes 1. For a review of governance paradigms, see Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2001); Carothers (1999); Denhardt and Denhardt (2007); Fischer (2003); and Kettle (2002).

2. Recent books include Boyte (2004); Fishkin (2009); Frantzich (1999); Fung (2004); Gastil and Levine (2005); Smith (2009); and Stoker (2006).

3. Chapter 10 by Olle Törnquist in the present volume quotes a number of studies on the hijacking of Indonesian democracy.

4. The Local Governance Support Program (April 2005 – September 2009) was an integrated set of assistance activities designed to support both sides of the good governance equation – supply of and demand for good governance. Its objectives were twofold.

First, it supported local government to become more democratic, more competent at the core task of governance and more capable of supporting improved service delivery and management of resources. Second, it aimed to strengthen the capacity of local legislatures and civil society to perform their legitimate roles of legislative representation and oversight, and citizen participation in the decision-making process. See LGSP (2009) for more details.

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5. We wrote this as the demonstrations in Liberation Square in Cairo were taking place – having no other means to express their grievances, people take to the streets. The same happened in Indonesia in 1998 when Suharto fell.

6. Along these lines, a brief on budget transparency in Indonesia noted that “the budget work in Indonesia is, for the most part, not as technically sophisticated as that done by CSOs in some other countries” (International Budget Partnership, 2009: 3).

7. Other CSOs that obtained the budget tried to use it extort money from DPRD members around the same time, further reinforcing the dominant view of CSOs. 8. Simranda is the Indonesian acronym for Sistem Informasi Anggaran Daerah (local government budget analysis software).

9. See Husna (2009) and Nierras and Husna (n.d.) for more background on civil society in Jepara, including the deliberative town hall meetings.

10. Jaran is the Indonesian acronym for Network for Budget Advocacy.

11. The extent of these changes in CSO budget engagement has been recognized internationally. Indonesia’s experience in budget advocacy and transparency has been termed a “civil society budget movement” (International Budget Partnership, 2009) in light of the sheer number of groups active in the field and their success in advocating for higher budget allocations.

12. Recall Figure 11.4, highlighting government lack of trust in CSO data. In jurisdictions that have adopted Simranda, 60 per cent of respondents report that CSOs provide valid data, compared with 39 per cent in those not using Simranda (LGSP, 2009: Fig. 6.16).

13. See, for instance, Ahmad and Weiser (2006); Dixon and Hakim (2009); DRSP (2006, 2009).

14. Jaker-P3G is the Indonesian acronym for Jaringan Pemerhati Pelayanan Publik Kabupaten Gowa, Gowa’s CSO network for public services monitoring.

15. The Citizen Report Card is an international best practice to improve public services and promote government accountability. It is based on the premise that feedback on service delivery collected from actual users through sample surveys provides a reliable process for citizens and communities to engage in dialogue and partnership action to improve public services (see <http://www.citizenreportcard.com/crc/index.html>, accessed 18 April 2013).

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Mohan, G. and K. Stokke (2008) “The Politics of Localization: From Depoliticizing Development to Politicizing Democracy”, in K. Cox, J. Robinson and M. Low (eds) The Handbook of Political Geography. London: Sage Publications.

Nierras, R. and L. Husna (n.d.) “The Jepara Deliberative Forum: Deliberation Java Style”. Unpublished.

Priyono, A. E., W. P. Samadhi, O. Törnquist et al. (2007) Making Democracy Meaningful: Problems and Options in Indonesia. Jakarta: DEMOS Press.

Putnam, R. D. (2002) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ribot, J. (2007) “Representation, Citizenship and the Public Domain in Democratic Decentralization”, Development 50(1): 43– 49.

Sandercock, L. (1998) Towards Cosmopolis: Planning for Multicultural Cities.

Chichester, UK: Wiley.

Smith, G. (2009) Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stoker, G. (2006) Why Politics Matters: Making Democracy Work. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Törnquist, O. (2002) Popular Development and Democracy: Case Studies with Rural Dimensions in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Kerala. Oslo: Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo.

Widianingsih, I. and E. Morrell (2007) “Participatory Planning in Indonesia”, Policy Studies 28(1): 1–15.

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Part IV Local governance as state-building

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12 Reconstruction in Cambodia?

Decentralization as a post-conflict strategy Joakim Öjendal and Kim Sedara

12.1 Introduction Cambodia has been subject to considerable international attention ever since the largest United Nations intervention at the time, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, was instigated to end civil war and establish multi-party democracy in the early 1990s (United Nations, 1991, 1995). Although the degree of its success has been fiercely debated (Doyle, 1995; Findlay, 1995; Mehmet, 1997) and frequently criticized (Doyle, 1998; St John, 2005), it effectively moved Cambodia into a postconflict reconstruction phase, with the particular challenges that this entailed (Hughes, 2003; Junne and Verkoren, 2004; Lizee, 2000; Öjendal and Lilja, 2009; Peou, 2007). An integrated part of the Peace Agreement itself (United Nations, 1991) was an ambition to rapidly reconstruct Cambodia’s political system to become a liberal democracy. This transition fell in line with different theories at the time, including the “transition paradigm” (Linz and Stepan, 1996; see also Prum, 2005),1 the then hype about the “third wave of democratization” (Huntington, 1991) and the widespread conception that there was no alternative to this form of governance (see Fukuyama, 1989). However, this modus operandi of the United Nations system – intervention, elections, exit – has been seriously questioned (Ottaway, 2002, 2003; Paris, 2004, 2006; Paris and Sisk, 2009; Richmond, 2005), and in Cambodia the anticipated transition has been criticized for not producing effective democracy. Instead, it has been seen as wishful thinking to expect that the new system would take root The imperative of good local governance: Challenges for the next decade of decentralization, Öjendal and Dellnäs (eds), United Nations University Press, 2013, ISBN 978-92-808-1229-9

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through external pressure, and it has even been seen by some as a cover for continued authoritarianism (Ashley, 1998; Heder, 2005; McCargo, 2005; St John, 2005).

However, much of this debate may have missed the point. With hindsight it seems obvious that a time-limited United Nations engagement could not bring about a full transition to democracy, making it meaningless to criticize the United Nations for failing to deliver this change. At best, the United Nations could pave the way for the start of a sustainable process, and only now are we beginning to see the results of this (see Richmond and Franks, 2007). Cambodia’s political culture, violent recent history and structural limitations (lack of institutions, low levels of education and deep poverty) are major obstacles to democratization. In addition, the process is likely to take decades to achieve and it needs to be accompanied by a strengthening of the state, other democratic reforms and institutional development (Richmond and Franks, 2007). The political will for reform must come from within and must enable broad-based development and the inclusion of localized civil society (Diamond, 2002; Lederach, 1997; Öjendal, 2005; Ottaway, 2002; Paris, 2004).

More than 17 years after the implementation of the Peace Agreement, these factors are still scarce and this calls into question the credibility and success of Cambodian democratization. For instance, the judicial sector does not meet the standards required of a democratic system (UN, 2009), elections continue to be insignificant in relation to the shaping of policy (Hughes, 2009) and the “liberal peace” remains “virtual” (Richmond and Franks, 2007). Increasingly, Cambodia’s political system is considered to be a hybrid of liberal-democratic and other forms of governance, and as such shows only limited progress towards deep and sustainable democratization (Öjendal and Lilja, 2009; see also Carothers, 2002).

Despite these problems, there are encouraging signs. In contrast to the UN intervention and imposition of liberal democracy in the 1990s, and attempts at judicial reform or anti-corruption legislation in the 2000s, decentralization reform does seem to be internally driven, and there are early indications of success (Ahmed et al., 2002; CAS, 2008; COMFREL, 2007a, 2007b; Kim, 2012; MacAndrew, 2004; Mansfield and MacLeod, 2004; Ninh and Henke, 2005; Öjendal and Kim, 2006, 2008; Rusten et al., 2004).2 Therefore, decentralization reform may represent the most progressive process to date of democratization in Cambodia. If so, this would then fit with ideas (and ideals) of democracy as a gradual bottom-up process (Chambers, 1983; Schumacher, 1973; see also Kim and Öjendal, 2009), and also be in accordance with strategies for post-conflict reconstruction that consolidate the new order from the bottom up (Lederach, 1997; Romeo, 2002). Therefore, in this chapter we aim to empirically ana-

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lyse the content of this reform according to a number of key dimensions: the role of the reform in post-conflict reconciliation; local democratization; and local development. This helps us to evaluate the benefits of contemporary democratic decentralization in a country such as Cambodia.

The three dimensions cited here are those that are officially cited by the Royal Government of Cambodia as goals of the reform (Sar, 2005; Prum, 2005).3 Below we will first discuss the design and methodological approach of our study and elaborate some theoretical perspectives. Then we will review the context and describe the evolution of decentralization reform.

We proceed to address the key issues highlighted by our empirical investigation, before finally drawing conclusions about the development of the decentralization process and presenting an analysis of some future challenges for democratic decentralization in Cambodia.

12.2 Methodological approach and research design As is almost always the case, there was no baseline prior to the introduction of decentralization reform. The change in relations between the (local) state and the people has been so great that it is hard to imagine how such a baseline would have looked. However, attempts have been made to define a qualitative baseline by drawing on secondary literature to identify earlier features of local governance (Blunt and Turner, 2005; Chandler, 1991; Luco, 2003; Öjendal and Kim, 2006; Slocomb, 2004; Vickery, 1986). This baseline is crudely estimated and entered as 2002 data, and should not be read as numerically exact quantities.4 There is broad agreement that commune governance prior to 2002 (and even more so prior to 1993) was authoritarian, power oriented, centralized and based on fear and coercion. This way of exercising authority held few democratic qualities, did not encourage participation and provided limited development because it functioned largely in the context of the lingering civil war with the Khmer Rouge and was designed to enable the government to maintain control and acquire a degree of legitimacy (see Slocomb, 2004; Vickery, 1986).

This chapter draws mainly on two large surveys and extensive qualitative fieldwork from several sites. The quantitative surveys were conducted four years apart, either side of important elections (2005 and 2008/2009).

They were held in five selected provinces and involved the participation of 646 general respondents and 73 commune councillors, with gender balance a consideration (42 per cent of respondents were women; 58 per cent were men5). The surveys were conducted in Khmer by experienced staff, who were given training, supervision and in-field feedback by Kim

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Sedara, co-author of this chapter. The qualitative fieldwork consisted of several lengthy stays in villages of more than three months in total. In this chapter, we investigate the perceptions held by the general population and the commune authorities of the evolving decentralization reform. The fact that the survey was repeated using identical questions asked by the same interviewers at the same sites makes it unique and of high reliability. Moreover, since respondents included both commune councillors and randomly selected members of the general (rural/semirural) population,6 the survey addresses the possible tensions between rulers and the ruled. We were able to trace changes in perceptions over time with a high degree of accuracy, looking at the contrast between the views of the new power holders and those of people who are subjected to this new mode of governance.

12.3 Key dimensions of decentralization: Theoretical underpinnings Although decentralization has sometimes been dismissed as yet another “cul-de-sac” (see Schuurman, 1997), this seems an incomplete conclusion.

Blunt and Turner argue that “[i]n the last twenty years or so political decentralization has become an integral component of the ruling paradigm . . . of democratic governance reform in developing countries” (2006: 1).

Bahl claims that “[o]ne important lesson of the past two decades, learned especially well in East Asia, is that strong central government[s] cannot sustain themselves without granting appropriate decision-making autonomy to their sub-national governments” (2000: 94). Turner and Hulme (1997) argue that every state needs to find its particular balance between central and local affairs. Since peace agreements are so central, it is natural to expect a degree of decentralization in a particular phase of postconflict reconstruction. Although it has been part of the democratization/ development agenda for a long time (see, for example, Rondinelli et al., 1983; Smith, 1985), the rationale for decentralization has become stronger since the end of the Cold War (see Blair, 2000; Cohen and Peterson, 1999; Crook and Manor, 1998; Johnson, 2001; Manor, 1999; Turner and Hulme, 1997; Yusuf et al., 2000). There are many good reasons for this.

First, the devastation, stress, distrust, destruction and confusion caused by protracted violence demand that state structures are rebuilt upwards from the ground (Lederach, 1997; Romeo, 2002; Woodward, 2002; see also Ledgerwood, 2002; Öjendal and Lilja, 2009). Reforms – including local elections, the invention of appropriate state institutions and popular participation – are often included in the package of decentralization and are expected to aid in reconstruction efforts.

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Secondly, in the light of the many shallow democracies that developed after rapid implementation of reforms following the restructuring of the international system in the 1990s, democratic decentralization has become a crucial way of grounding and legitimizing these fledgling democracies, described as “quasi-”, “semi-”, “Asian” and “hybrid” democracies.

“Substantial” – as opposed to “procedural” – democracy (Bastian and Luckham, 2003; Diamond, 1999; Robinson and White, 1998) requires the type of legitimization that democratic decentralization may be able to provide, because it can narrow the gap between rulers and the ruled; between voters and the elected.

Thirdly, local development is extremely important in the context of poor and conflict-ridden countries, particularly for rural communities, which typically bear the brunt of violence and extreme poverty (Romeo, 2002). Although the correlation between decentralization and economic development is far from clear (Braathen and Hellevik, 2006; Heller, 2001; see also Rusten and Öjendal, 2003), when the local state has collapsed, infrastructure has been shattered, the educational system has broken down and the agricultural sector is under-performing, there is a case for dramatic strengthening of local, development-oriented government.

These generic arguments in favour of decentralization fit well with the case of Cambodia. The rapid implementation of democracy was a bold but in many ways impossible mission (Heder, 2005; McCargo, 2005). At best, real democratization has only just begun. The grounding and legitimization of reforms are now key steps in the transition from the country’s post-conflict identity and to sustain the process of democratization (see Diamond, 2002). Moreover, Cambodia is performing not only “reconstruction” (as the post-conflict literature puts it) but also “invention” (Öjendal and Lilja, 2009) of the state structures required for creating political stability and basic development. These structures have never existed and, when attempts have been made to promote stability and development, this has not been done in the type of democratic fashion that can generate political legitimacy. It is a contradiction in terms to pursue liberal democracy by means of distance, fear and violence; to create legitimacy the state must close “the gap” (see Mabbett and Chandler, 1995) and reduce “the fear” (Luco, 2003) between rulers and the ruled. A more dynamic local state is clearly also necessary for improving rural infrastructure and local development in order to reduce poverty (Beresford et al., 2003; Rusten and Öjendal, 2003).

However, the fact that we can find theoretical and normative reasons to justify the need for democratic decentralization in democratizing postconflict countries does not mean that it is suitable or will work in this particular case.7 Although the early phase of reform in Cambodia has been deemed largely successful, this does not imply that it has been with-

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out problems or even that there is full knowledge of its results. Let us briefly review the evolution of decentralization reform in Cambodia, highlighting the key issues that have been contested.

12.4 The context and background Decentralization was being considered as early as 1994, although it was formulated in policy only between 1998 and 2000 and was inscribed in law in 2001. The reform focuses on the commune level and on the establishment of popularly elected commune councils. It was put into effect through the first commune elections in 2002 and backed up with subsequent development funding. This phase is now well documented (Ayres, 2004; Blunt and Turner, 2005; Öjendal, 2005; Pellini, 2005; Roome, 1999).

To the surprise of many, the introduction of “soft” decentralization was received positively (Ayers, 2000; CAS, 2008; Kim and Öjendal, 2006; MacAndrew, 2004; Manor, 2008; Mansfield and MacLeod, 2004; Ninh and Henke, 2005; Öjendal and Kim, 2006) and was judged a fruitful and sustainable step towards constructing a democratic state apparatus in the post-conflict period (Kim and Öjendal, 2009). However, a number of key issues have been raised, including: • have fear, coercion, lack of trust and state–civil society interaction been addressed by this reform (Luco, 2003; MacAndrew, 2004; Öjendal, 2005)?

We refer to this as the “reconciliation dilemma” of decentralization.

• To what extent is the reform producing democratic local governance, or merely helping the ruling party maintain its grip on power (see Pak et al., 2007)? We refer to this as the “democratization dilemma” of decentralization.

• To what degree are commune councils limited by issues of capacity, resources, mandates and the will to undertake local development work, and does this lead to shallowness, low ambition and a failure to improve local conditions (Blunt and Turner, 2005)? We call this the “development dilemma” of decentralization.

We shall empirically investigate perceptions of these issues in turn in order to see the change in values that decentralization brings.

12.5 State of the art of decentralization: Empirical indications 12.5.1 Public perceptions of decentralization Historically, the Cambodian state has used fear and distance as primary tools of governance (Mabbett and Chandler, 1995), and three decades of

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1 = Harmony in village; 2 = CCs respect villagers; 3 = CCs solve conflicts; 4 = CCs take complaints seriously; 5 = Villagers feel comfortable to approach CCs Figure 12.1 Villagers’ perceptions of atmosphere and attitudes in village Note: CCs = commune councillors

civil war have exacerbated this situation (Luco, 2003; Slocomb, 2001).

However, Öjendal and Kim (2006) claim that, by 2006, democratization, particularly of local governance, had worked to reduce these factors. This trend seems to be continuing unabated (see Figure 12.1): almost 94 per cent of respondents in 2009 claim that the situation in the villages is more harmonious now than it was before the first local elections in 2002; this is twice as many as held this view in 2005 (48 per cent).8 Almost 96 per cent (up from 87 per cent in 2005) now think that the commune councillors respect ordinary citizens, and 81 per cent (up from 55 per cent) believe that commune councillors generally manage to solve conflicts in villages.

More than 91 per cent (92 per cent in 2005) claim that general complaints are taken seriously by local authorities and an astonishing 99 per cent (up from 61 per cent) say that they would turn to the commune authorities if they had a serious problem. It seems clear that the initial phase of democratic decentralization has addressed the “reconciliation dilemma” effectively by reducing fear, establishing a mechanism for conflict resolution and reducing the gap between people and local authorities. It also seems as though this success has persisted, as reflected in high rates of approval in the 2009 survey.9 However, the question remains of whether a reduction of fear and distance leads to proactive involvement and engagement by the rural population. Although one might expect fear to abate following the end of conflict, it is less sure that participation will occur in a hierarchical political culture such as Cambodia’s. Figure 12.2 shows that, in 2009, 91 per cent of the villagers knew what the Commune Development Plan (CDP) was,10 up from 57 per cent in 2005; and 90 per cent believed that villagers themselves had been crucial in formulating it (83 per cent in 2005). Interestingly, 37 per cent claim that they have actually voiced demands directly to the commune council (up from 26 per cent), and in this group 87 per cent believe that their concerns have been taken into consideration by the council (up from 69 per cent). Finally, when villagers are asked

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1 = Know about CDP; 2 = Formed CDP; 3 = Voice opinions to council; 4 = Opinions considered; 5 = Willing to contribute collectively Figure 12.2 Villagers’ proactive interaction with the commune council

1 = Attend meeting because required to do so; 2 = Council equally accessible by any social stratum; 3 = Help from councillors only if financial compensation is offered Figure 12.3 Signs of backlash at commune councils

whether they would be willing to contribute to the running of commune council projects even if this did not benefit them directly, 96 per cent say they would (up from 82 per cent).11 Whereas these indicators show some success with participation, other indicators suggest problems (see Figure 12.3). As many as 71 per cent of respondents say that they go to meetings because it is required of them, an increase of 50 per cent since 2005.12 However, 13 per cent state that they attend to voice their opinion, which is impressive in this political culture. Something that may seem positive in a patronage-based culture is that 45 per cent believe that the commune councils are equally accessible for people of any social stratum; however, the figure has fallen from 73 per cent in 2005. Even more disturbing is the fact that, although 98 per cent of people believe that councillors would try to assist with tasks out-

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side regular service delivery if they were asked, half of them believe that this would happen only if financial compensation (Prak Upathorm) was offered. This percentage has tripled since 2005, whereas the number of those who do not mention economic compensation has shrunk considerably. There is also a notable perception that the wealthy enjoy greater access to commune councils.

Our interpretation – supported by the qualitative fieldwork – of these somewhat contradictory figures is that broad changes such as reduction of fear, rebuilding of trust, narrowing of distance, enhancing of popular knowledge about commune councils and increases in participation do indicate remarkable success. However, there is also a negative trend of people being required to attend meetings, a growth in low-level corruption and a strengthening of traditional patronage structures.13 One way of viewing this is that Cambodia is now facing problems similar to those of other developing countries after three decades of violence, oppression and extreme state authoritarianism. This may sound depressing (see Blunt and Turner, 2005), but it nevertheless represents significant progress when we consider the situation in rural Cambodia in the 1980s and 1990s. Whichever way it is looked at, there exists today a new set of challenges that require urgent attention.

The next issue is the hotly debated “democratization dilemma” of decentralization. It may be said that the dominant Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) has replaced an authoritarian system with one based on democratic practices, including elections, transparency and pluralism, while simultaneously using “soft” social control to strengthen its own power.14 The controversy concerns whether or not reform can be considered democratic when it has been designed and implemented by a dominant party and has reinforced the party’s power, albeit largely through democratic means.

Figure 12.4 shows that a large majority, 88 per cent, of the villagers believe that the commune councils are democratically elected, up from 72 per cent in 2005; and 84 per cent (up from 77 per cent) believe that political pluralism has increased the responsiveness of the local authorities.

Almost 86 per cent feel that the commune councils are honest in the information they disseminate about commune affairs (up from 65 per cent), and 62 per cent say they think that information reaches villagers in an adequate and correct way (up from 30 per cent).

Despite the continued dominance of the CPP following the elections, 77 per cent of respondents (up from 53 per cent) say that there has been a change in leadership (see Figure 12.5), indicating that the representatives (and their attitudes) of the different parties have changed as a result of the elections. Perhaps most importantly, 97 per cent believe that, if the council does not do a satisfactory job, it can be replaced at the next

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1 = Councils are democratically elected; 2 = Pluralism has increased councils’ efficiency; 3 = Councils are honest; 4 = Information reaches villagers in correct way Figure 12.4 Perceptions of commune councils’ democratic qualities

1 = Change in leadership due to election; 2 = Council can be replaced through elections; 3 = Afraid to voice opinion Figure 12.5 Perceptions on elections making a difference in leadership

election (up from 91 per cent). “Only” 10 per cent (down from 22 per cent) say that they are afraid to voice their opinion.

This all suggests that there is an emerging local democracy, and it is hard to find perceptions that contradict this. Two results are particularly prominent. Although almost all respondents in 2005 believed that the councils could be influenced, in 2009 fewer believed that they can be “strongly influenced”. When people were asked how the commune councils may be influenced, most responded (in both 2005 and 2009) that this was possible not by “voicing one’s opinion at meetings” but instead by “gathering many villagers”. Village meetings seem now to be considered less dynamic political arenas, but the local authorities do seem to be sensitive to public opinion.

The other intriguing finding is that, when asked who the most powerful person in the village is, 81 per cent said “the village chief”. The fact that

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this has increased from only 33 per cent in 2005 shows that the authority of the village chief – appointed by the commune council according to directive No. 004 of the Ministry of Interior on 1 March 2006 – is considerably greater now. This could be interpreted as a “de-democratization” of sorts or it could show that local authorities with a formal mandate (that is, the commune authorities) have become more democratic, despite a possible power shift to the village chiefs (see below). A sign of growing public indifference is also borne out by 51 per cent responding that they “do not know” how many parties are represented on the commune council. Once again, the results suggest that the democratization and legitimization of the new order have initially been successful but that there is a realization that being able to voice one’s opinion does not mean that one will get what one wants, a painful truth in all democracies. Popular engagement may therefore diminish, as has happened elsewhere in Cambodia (see Kim and Öjendal, 2006).

Our last field of enquiry in this section – the “development dilemma” of decentralization – elaborates the extent to which councils are publicly seen to be proactively and successfully advocating for local development.

Figure 12.6 shows that the majority of people – 94 per cent (up from 80 per cent) – believe that the councillors are knowledgeable about the local situation (often cited as a key justification for decentralization). This is not surprising because councillors normally come from the villages and live in similar conditions to other villagers. More impressive is the fact that 80 per cent of the villagers think that the activities of the councils correspond to local needs (although, when they were asked to qualify this, the majority chose “fairly well” over “very well”). It is equally reassuring that 97 per cent (up from 57 per cent) claim that “all villagers” are benefiting from the CDP and, when given an option to say who benefits

1 = Councillors are knowledgeable about development situation; 2 = Council projects are well designed; 3 = “All” villagers benefit from the CDP; 4 = “Being connected” is central; 5 = Satisfaction with speed and quality of council responses Figure 12.6 Perceptions of commune councils’ development knowledge

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most, the response that it is those who are well connected was down from 15 per cent to 3 per cent.15 Another interesting observation is that, when asked to explain why the village is more harmonious now than it was before the introduction of multi-party elections (asked of those who claimed it was), most (57 per cent) said that the councils have managed to build local infrastructure and enhance the standard of living.16 In the 2005 survey, most claimed that the “end of war and no more threats from Khmer Rouge” explained why the atmosphere was more harmonious.

Hence, fear of violence and repression has been replaced with concern about local development and the quality of life. For those who believe that the village is not more harmonious,17 social issues (gangs and robberies) and economic concerns (livelihood and natural resource management) are the dominant concerns; neither political repression nor fear of violence is a key problem, in contrast to earlier perceptions. Furthermore, more than two-thirds are satisfied with the “speed” and “quality” of the commune council’s responses – typically, the choice and implementation of development projects were executed “satisfactorily” or “very satisfactorily” (see Kim, 2012, for a full account).

There is, however, a degree of shallowness in the councils’ governance of communes. Only 31 per cent (up from 23 per cent) believe that the commune councils have enough resources and capacity to respond fully to the demands of their constituencies, and 71 per cent (compared with 66 per cent in 2005) are “dissatisfied” with the number of projects (see Figure 12.7).18 Almost 86 per cent (up from 71 per cent) claim that the commune councils do not affect their everyday lives; and the percentage of those who claim to know the content of the development projects included in the CDP is down from 10 per cent to 5 per cent.

It would appear that villagers consider that commune councils perform their current tasks well; it is what they fail to do that bothers villagers.

1 = Councils have enough resources; 2 = Villagers dissatisfied with number of projects; 3 = Councils do not affect everyday life; 4 = Villagers know content of CDP projects Figure 12.7 Perceptions of commune councils’ development capacity

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This fits with our interpretation above. Commune councils are successful in fulfilling their role in post-conflict reconstruction but this does not solve everyday problems. The involvement of the councils in local politics is pro-democratic but political interests influence community life outside of the councils, despite their best efforts to maintain control. The public is generally positive about the councils’ efforts to engage in development work, though the lack of financial resources and political clout constrains their influence.

These perceptions reflect villagers’ view “from below”. Let us therefore now turn to the councillors’ own assessments of the situation “from above”.

12.5.2 Commune councillors’ perceptions of decentralization We might expect different views when the perspective of local authorities (commune councillors) on these issues is elicited. In this study, 84 per cent of the councillors were men, around half were in their fifties and they had on average six to seven years of schooling. We review their perceptions of the dilemmas of “reconciliation”, “democratization” and “development”, respectively, in relation to decentralization.

Regarding the “reconciliation dilemma” of decentralization, all councillors (100 per cent) interviewed stressed that the current system clearly differs from the previous forms of governance they have experienced.

Many claim that fear and anger have largely been replaced by a degree of respect and trust.

The bottom-up approach is great. What we work with is the will of the majority, therefore there is a political will to carry out our ideas. The commune councils also hold full responsibility for carrying out the job. (Vice commune chief, Kampot, July 2009)

Figure 12.8 shows that 85 per cent of commune council respondents (compared with 38 per cent in 2005) say that “power”, which used to be pursued in its raw form, has taken on a new meaning in which the legal qualities of the new system are emphasized. In particular, the way power is exercised (rot am nach) is different now (see Öjendal and Kim, 2006), and a completely new discourse on governance is emerging. The only way of getting things done, one councillor told us, is “to deliver development; [and one should] act gently, never be authoritarian and always avoid appearing corrupt” (Kampot, July 2009). Although these may not appear to be particularly ground-breaking insights into how to ensure good governance, they do represent a new kind of discourse about commune-level governance in Cambodia.

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This has had an impact on how closely councillors can interact with their subjects: 96 per cent of the councillors interviewed report feeling that they have the necessary knowledge to pursue good policies. Clearly, the commune councils believe that the “governance gap” has diminished: During project implementation I often go and see what is going on. Elderly people then tell me that they have never before seen a commune chief who is interested in village development and who comes to observe and engage with villagers. On these occasions, villagers freely speak their mind to me. (Commune chief, Kampong Speu, July 2009)

Moreover, the majority of councillors (84 per cent, up from 76 per cent in 2005) say that they regard themselves as primarily accountable to their citizens. This relationship is complex given that the voters elect the councillors but financial resources come from above. Moreover, those elected sit on the council not as autonomous individuals but as party representatives who must carry out the party’s demands. One councillor expressed it thus: “We have to spend the money wisely and villagers must always be consulted, but there is also an internal accountability to consider, between us and our [party] interests” (commune councillor, Kampot, July 2009). Accountability is to be achieved first and foremost by means of transparency (according to 66 per cent, up from 35 per cent in 2005). The majority (56 per cent) of the councillors in our investigation think not just that this is a requirement in the new system, but that it is also the most efficient way to be accountable to the citizens. A commune chief in Siem Reap explained: Villagers always ask for many things from the commune. When they ask for ten projects, they get only one, if they are lucky. . . . we must be humble and honest with them since we do not have enough financial resources to carry out all the projects that the villagers request. (Commune chief, Siem Reap, April 2006)

1 = Power as legal mandate; 2 = Accountability achieved through transparency; 3 = Time working with commune affairs; 4 = Accountability primarily to citizens Figure 12.8 Commune councillors’ views of reconciliation qualities in decentralization

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More than 90 per cent of the councillors (up from 80 per cent in 2005) claim that they spend most of their time working with and for their community.

Councillors proudly promote “pluralism” and “bottom-up” approaches, all in the context of recovery from a civil war in which the communes were the primary actors at local level, with an authoritarian system known for its hierarchies, with distance between state and people, and in a system characterized by ruthless political practices. Long-serving commune chiefs express relief that they are now encouraged to close the gap between government and citizens and to govern with a soft hand. The idea prior to the reform that it would be difficult to convince the commune chiefs to adapt to the new demands of local governance seems to have been far from correct.19 Regarding the politics of decentralization, 93 per cent of commune councillors (the same percentage as in 2005) say that the way they exercise power is different from before (see Figure 12.9). Non-accountable authority (rot am nach) has been replaced with more collective and consultative leadership. More than two-thirds (compared with 35 per cent in 2005) say that the multi-party nature of the regime has been the key difference from earlier modes of commune governance. Interestingly, 85 per cent (the same as in 2005) see no problem with this pluralistic set-up.

The situation is very relaxed now. It is very easy, and it is completely different from any previous system. It is amazing how well councillors with different backgrounds cooperate . . . [Governance through] decentralization is very much about cooperation. (Vice commune chief, Kampot, July 2009)20

When asked about the difficulties of national-level party politics, a group of commune councillors smiled: “Don’t compare this to nationallevel politics. Forget it! Here we are all working for the community. Why

1 = Think exercise of power is different; 2 = Multi-party politics is the key change; 3 = No problem with multi-party councils; 4 = People have power to oust council Figure 12.9 Commune councillors’ views on democratic decentralization

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should we fight? There are still objections and disagreement between us though” (Kampot, July 2009). Moreover, both the villagers and the councillors believe that it is primarily the voters (70 per cent) who have the power to oust the commune council (no data from 2005), whereas 18 per cent believe it is the party.21 Although the politics of the commune council – vertically vis-à-vis the population as well as horizontally between parties – seems to be taking shape well in the new system, the commune council’s concerns focus on how to develop and protect the commune. This brings us to the “development dilemma” of decentralization.

Almost 96 per cent of the councillors (up from 85 per cent in 2005) believe that their policies are in line with the needs and demands of citizens (see Figure 12.10). The confidence councillors feel in meeting public demands seems to emanate from bottom-up approaches.

The flow of development has to go through different steps. It has to begin with our activities being transparent [Tomlar Pheap]. Then we earn the trust of the villagers. From this, we get participation and can collect [financial] contributions for projects. (Commune chief, Kampong Speu, July 2009)

In this instance, this was not simply a matter of self-promotion because this particular commune council had managed to raise local contributions to the CDP from the mandatory 3 per cent to 10 per cent in the previous year. However, 81 per cent of the commune councillors think that lack of funding is the key problem (up from 69 per cent) and they lament their lack of power in generating their own resources. As a remedy for this problem 90 per cent favour increased local taxation rights (up from 47 per cent).22 They are guaranteed a minimum level of funding from the central government through the Commune Sangkat Fund (CSF), amounting to around US$10,000 per commune per year. The council cannot yet

1 = Policies in line with popular demand; 2 = Lack of funding is key problem; 3 = Local taxation is solution to funding problems Figure 12.10 Commune councillors’ views on local development issues

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generate its own local resources and this means that the “social contract” between state and citizen is incomplete and lines of accountability are blurred (as noted above). It also means that the resources available for local development are grossly inadequate. The council may gather contributions from non-governmental organizations but, although income from these sources seems to be rising, it is uneven and unpredictable.

This is also reflected in the councillors’ perceptions of their development work: 49 per cent consider their work to be unsatisfactory in terms of the amount that is done (down from 74 per cent in 2005), which seems unusually self-critical since 96 per cent feel that the speed of development work is satisfactory and 97 per cent think that it is of acceptable quality (see Figure 12.11). In 2005, these figures were far lower at 27 and 35 per cent, respectively. More troubling is the fact that the number of councillors who regard villagers as “highly active” in development work has fallen from 30 per cent to 1 per cent (although 88 per cent rank them as “rather active”).

Although the projects that are implemented seem to be appreciated, their number (and scope) are not satisfactory. The remedy in other cases of decentralization, and favoured here, is to extend local taxation rights.

Villagers are also clearly less active now that the reform has become embedded than they were in the initial phase.

There used to be very high demand on us. But now we explain how few resources we have and people learn and demand less. . . . The educated understand, but the poor and uneducated keep nagging. It is a real headache. (Councillor, Kampot, July 2009)

Ultimately, the commune councils’ work seems to be well designed, but they have far too few resources and rights to make a clear impact on development in the local context.

1 = Dissatisfied with number of development projects; 2 = Satisfied with implementation speed; 3 = Satisfied with implementation quality; 4 = Think villagers are “highly active”; 5 = Think villagers are “rather active” Figure 12.11 Measurements of quality of local development work

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12.6 Conclusion: What are the effects of democratic decentralization?

Overall, our results point to a broad agreement that there has been improvement in the quality of local governance following decentralization reform. To what extent then do our results tally with previous research?

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, our findings fit well with various studies and evaluations of different phases of the implementation of the reform; this includes broad-based appreciation, greater democratic space, improved commune administration performance and increased accountability (COMFREL, 2007a, 2007b; MacAndrew, 2004; Ninh and Henke, 2005). There are also some critical remarks in these investigations concerning the lack of depth of participation (MacAndrew, 2004: 21), limited gender equality (COMFREL, 2007a: 6) and the lack of administrative capacity (Mansfield and MacLeod, 2004). We partly or fully endorse all of these findings.

Decentralization does seem to have been successful in Cambodia for addressing the legacy of war and violence. It has aided political reconstruction with its re-establishment “from below” of a benevolent state presence, its consolidation of peace and its easing of endemic fear.23 This supports Lederach’s (1997) ideas about the importance of grounding any post-conflict process at the local level, but it also adds something new.

In our case, it is the combination of a bottom-up approach with the reconstruction of the state that is central. We contend that the particular version of decentralization that has taken place in Cambodia has so far achieved two things. First, it has opened up political space in a benevolent (that is, democratic) way and enabled the growth of a positive relationship between civil society and the local state. In the process it has reduced the “governance gap” and enhanced the legitimacy of local authorities. Secondly, it has reconnected local government with the central state since local government has been awarded a central role in the initiation of a bold public sector reform that has attracted considerable attention and some financial resources. The new political space may mean that citizens start to cultivate loyalty to the state and this would create muchneeded regime legitimacy. The connection between local and central government has reduced the possibility of “warlordism” or anarchy giving rise to civil strife or instability, also lessening the risk of state failure. Unlike the situation in the 1970s, there no longer seems to be a discontented rural class that can be mobilized for violent rebellion. As such, and in combination with other developments, decentralization has played a key role in the post-conflict reconstruction of Cambodia.

Decentralization seems to have exceeded expectations in terms of establishing local democracy and acting as a “learning ground” (see Manor,

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1999) for broader democracy. Although the concept of local democracy is far from straightforward,24 there is little doubt that democratic sentiments and expectations are spreading rapidly, that elections make a difference locally (and are seen to make a difference) and that people as well as the authorities are becoming increasingly accustomed to the rules of the democratic game.25 The fact that Cambodians have so little previous experience of democracy and their low expectations of it may help account for their positive perceptions of what is, after all, only limited democratization, but the fact that they do have positive perceptions is meaningful.

However, there are real problems with implementation. First, local taxation is not yet permitted and this limits the full application of local accountability as well as the ties of reciprocity between local government and the people. The relationship between state and citizen is therefore shallow and state legitimacy is undeveloped; both parties can and do sometimes choose other “patrons”. Secondly, the amount allocated to the CSF is small and, because democracy is maintained primarily through the commune councils and the resources they command, this puts local faith in the system at risk as local democracy occupies only a limited part of each individual’s everyday life. Governance outside the commune councils is increasingly being executed by the village chiefs, whose democratic mandate is relatively indirect and unmonitored. Finally, and aligning with the views of Smoke presented in Chapter 7 in this volume, the ultimate effects of local democratization may be quite the opposite of what democracy advocates would like to see. Although it may include stronger opposition locally, weaker dominant-party control and real chances of a change of government at local elections, the overwhelming CPP presence and “soft” influence at local levels have in reality not been weakened by the introduction of democratic practices. In other words, the changing dynamics at the commune level – largely democratic – have in reality strengthened the CPP’s hold on power, at least in the short to medium term. Viewed like this, the reform may not result in the type of dynamic change it was designed for, and may have been intentionally designed to stall in order to fit the overall national-level interests (see Smoke, Chapter 7 in this volume).

Given that decentralization is not simply a formula for local development and poverty alleviation, the development dilemma of the reform needs to be viewed from several angles. In short, development activities undertaken within the mandate of the commune councils are broadly considered to be well designed, carried out within acceptable time-frames and of reasonable quality. These activities seem to address various commune interests and are appreciated by the local population. However, the limited scope of local activity – primarily focused on small-scale

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infrastructure – and its seeming irrelevance for the everyday lives of large segments of the population reduce its viability as a development mechanism. According to councillors, the CSF should be larger and local taxation should be permitted. At some point, more comprehensive and dynamic development plans will be necessary, which may encompass a broader scale than the commune and focus on different kinds of services.

Overall, although decentralization may not have achieved substantial poverty alleviation, it has helped put in place the mechanisms for achieving this by opening channels for resources for development and democratization to be meaningfully delivered to rural areas.

Cambodia has been successful with its post-conflict reconstruction, and decentralization reform has played a large part in this. Our data tell us that Cambodia is beginning to leave earlier post-conflict problems behind as it shifts towards more “normal” developmental problems. Local democratization is progressive and promising, though at the national level it remains in hybrid form. Progress beyond this, however, could hardly be expected in a country with one of the lowest levels of education in the world and with a gross national product of approximate US$700 per year (at purchasing power parity rates). Given the essentially democratic nature of commune authority, it is interesting to note from a developmental point of view that local development is likely to have democratic effects as well. In other words, what seems to be hindering the deepening of democracy is not repressive local authorities but the socioeconomic factors that local development is designed to improve. Our conclusion therefore is that local development efforts will have direct economic and political effects. The greatest current risk for decentralization reform is that it does not receive sufficient resources and is therefore unable to compete with other processes of change, ultimately falling into obscurity and irrelevance.

Notes 1. The idea of transition is institutionalized in the United Nations system; see, for example, <http://europeandcis.undp.org/data/show/D97B115E-F203-1EE9BC0B1ABB9A85941C> (accessed 26 April 2013).

2. What is here referred to as “the decentralization reform” began in 2001 and forms part of a larger public sector reform (called “the Decentralization and Deconcentration Reform”. It constitutes the most advanced, concrete and thus far successful part of this reform package.

3. “The reform of the government is based on democratic participation via local elections. . . . The main purpose of the reform is to strengthen national stability, national consolidation, and political development” (Sar Kheng, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior; Sar, 2005).

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4. This is not a baseline constructed for measuring impact. It is a sensitive reading of a wide range of secondary literature and a qualitative assessment of the local governance situation before the reform. It also draws on our extensive accounts of the Cambodian local context prior to the reform (for example, Öjendal, 2000). Although well grounded, exact measurements of this baseline are lacking. In broad terms we can be confident that we have captured key traits, and we therefore include them in the present analysis.

In Figures 12.1–12.11 they are added as a crude point of reference.

5. For the interviews with the 73 commune councillors there is a male dominance owing to the overwhelming majority of men in the councils. The ratio of 16 per cent female councillors we interviewed corresponds almost exactly to the national average.

6. Hence there is an acknowledged lack of representation for the urban areas.

7. Two well-known authorities on decentralization have evaluated this process and arrived at diametrically opposed positions. Turner argues that democratic decentralization is not appropriate in Cambodia because it does not fit with the political culture, which is hierarchical and top down (Blunt and Turner, 2005). Manor (2008), on the other hand, argues that the chance of decentralization being successful in Cambodia is high. He bases this on the fact that it has already been relatively successful in only a short period of implementation. Our empirical investigation supports Manor’s position.

8. Figures have been rounded.

9. This was remarkable because we had anticipated a slight downturn since initial expectations were unrealistically optimistic.

10. The CDP is a plan drawn up by the commune councils, supposedly with broad participation by the villagers, for utilizing the Commune Sangkat Fund for local development.

11. Some of these questions may invite a “self-glorifying” or biased response and should not be taken too literally. However, since we are measuring perceptions, these are relative and thus make sense in context.

12. This rather troublingly recalls features of the pre-decentralization era.

13. The issue of corruption is complex, and it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss it in depth. When we speak of corruption here, we are referring to something at the margins of legality. Some commune councillors offer “services” that may be outside their mandate and for these they request small fees. For instance, they may charge for providing assistance in conflict resolution or for acting as witnesses to business deals between two villagers. They may also take fees for services that are supposed to be free (for example, issuing birth certificates). Fees may also cover charges for services that the councillors are permitted to charge for and are now enforcing, whereas villagers believe that these things should be free of charge and therefore speak of corruption.

14. The strengthening of the CPP’s power is shown by the results of the two commune elections that have been held so far. In the national elections of 2008, the CPP won 90 out of 123 seats in parliament, and in the commune elections of 2007 the CPP won 1,591 commune chief posts from 1,621 communes. This has given the CPP almost total political control of the commune level. Repeated election monitoring has found these elections to be largely free of direct fraud. The “soft control” mechanism behind this remains unexplained, although references to “patronage” are frequent.

15. There may be a hidden bias here. The CDP typically deals with small-scale infrastructure construction (roads, bridges, schools). The reasons for this have to do with history and funding (the Commune Sangkat Fund). These “collective goods” typically benefit the many, not simply individuals. However, although the meaning of absolute levels can be discussed, the tendency is still valid.

16. The cause is unclear here. Clearly there are other factors that contribute to perceptions of enhanced quality of life, but it is largely credited to the commune councils.

17. This sub-group was small and therefore not representative.

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18. The number of projects is only partially in the hands of the commune councillors since it depends on external funding. Obviously, needs are limitless and cannot be satisfactorily met by the commune councils in the short to medium term.

19. This is partly because the old commune chiefs seem to have embraced the new system surprisingly quickly. Also, prior to elections, popular locals were put at the top of the party lists and thus they effectively replaced the old, less popular commune chiefs. It is likely that the majority of the “old” commune chiefs have been replaced by now (Rusten et al., 2004).

20. This was stated in a commune council that had a multi-party, mixed-gender and multiethnic composition.

21. The fact that 18 per cent believe that the party can oust councillors might be thought to signal the way villagers perceive their loyalties. However, these villagers’ beliefs are technically correct since councillors can remain on the council only as long as they are on the party list. The commune chief in the preceding quote was replaced after the last election because the CPP changed its mind about who should be its top candidate.

22. Taxation rights are described in the Decentralization Law and were expected to have been established by now. However, the Ministry of Economy and Finance has been blocking this by failing to draft a sub-decree to regulate tax collection and failing to develop instruments for implementation. This is a longstanding issue at the national level. An embittered commune chief complained to us, “Maybe we will have the authority to collect taxes when we are all dead”.

23. Again, there are factors other than decentralization that affect the situation but these do not reduce the significance of solid local political reconstruction.

24. In this case, it does not relate meaningfully to the role of the media, the courts or the right of assembly because of local circumstances. Moreover, it has a complicated relationship to systemic democracy; local democratic space may be opened without necessarily creating systemic democracy. This relationship could, as this case indicates, even be contradictory.

25. According to Diamond (1999), this is the core of democratic consolidation.

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13 Local politics, civil society and state formation in Uganda Anders Sjögren

13.1 Introduction As is illuminated not least in this volume, over the last 20 years or so most countries in the developing world have experienced a nominal and/ or real shift from centralized development strategies towards an emphasis on local politics. Different combinations of political, administrative and fiscal powers have been delegated to political institutions at sub-national levels. The typical official rationale for decentralization rests on the assumption that such a policy “brings government closer to the people”, as the catchphrase goes, and thus enhances bureaucratic and political accountability and responsiveness. This proposition has been echoed by a discursive emphasis on community participation in local settings, where development is supposedly more efficiently and democratically promoted.

A great many factors, ranging from formal decentralization by design to informal localization by default, have contributed to a variety of expressions of “localization of politics” (Harriss et al., 2004: 2), involving economic relations as well as political institutions. The main dimensions of this shift include the erosion of central state capacity, privatization and decentralization reforms. Political liberalization has also played its part in intensifying local politics, with emergent competing political forces at both national and local levels. The combined outcome of such processes is, predictably, much more complex, as well as much more ambiguous in terms of development and democracy, than textbook templates allow for.

This chapter seeks to capture that complexity. To that end, it analyses The imperative of good local governance: Challenges for the next decade of decentralization, Öjendal and Dellnäs (eds), United Nations University Press, 2013, ISBN 978-92-808-1229-9

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local politics in a broad sense, including, but going beyond, decentralization proper.

Uganda has not been an exception to this tendency. As a consequence of military rule and civil war during the 1970s and early 1980s, state capacity in Uganda underwent serious decline. One of the main ways in which the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party has sought to establish control for itself and for the state at large since taking power in 1986 has been by creating institutions for local government. Decentralization has been promoted since the early 1990s, and was for long presented as a success story by both the government and donors. Strong claims were made about the transformative role of local councils in reshaping the Ugandan state in democratic and developmental directions.

New openings for exercising citizenship were said to have been created (Brett, 1998; Wunsch and Ottemoeller, 2004); recently, however, verdicts have been much more cautious (see Smoke, Chapter 7 in this volume).

Again, though, the scope and content of local politics in Uganda have been shaped by factors that go far beyond decentralization reforms alone.

Longstanding informalization of public institutions, downsizing of the central state and ethno-regional demands have in different ways mediated the structuring of local political arenas.

This chapter examines the implications of localized politics for state formation and state–civil society relations in Uganda. It does so through an analysis of how this has played out in Masaka district in the Buganda region. The broader discussion of local politics, the local state and civil society is illustrated by two different forms of civil society organization operating in the field of health services: the Buganda Cultural and Development Foundation (BUCADEF), and World Vision, an international development non-governmental organization (NGO). Together, these two rather different expressions of civil society capture the empirical tendency towards a pluralization of development actors at the local level, where international NGOs and ethno-political groupings are prominent types, as the broader literature demonstrates (De Coninck, 2004; Dicklitch, 1998). I first address the different theoretical and empirical dimensions of local politics and state formation. I then outline the historical development of local politics in Uganda, Buganda and Masaka. Following that, I examine the different manifestations of state–civil society relations in Masaka district. The chapter concludes with a discussion of contemporary local politics and state formation in Masaka district and in Uganda at large.

13.2 Local politics, sources and content The combination of a decentralized state, civil society and market forces has frequently been claimed to constitute a key mechanism for giving

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ordinary citizens political voice and to bring about improved service delivery and increased political and administrative accountability, especially when contrasted to what was seen as failed centralized states (Harriss et al., 2004: 3). The main features of the current development orthodoxy comprise neo-liberal economic policies contained within decentralized political structures; state reforms were introduced in order to provide the institutional corrective to market reforms. To draw on Harrison’s discussion of the “governance state”, decentralization has been a key element in this “project to embed neoliberalism” (Harrison, 2004: 5). Great expectations initially underpinned this most recent wave of decentralization.

Just as with civil society (White, 1994), enthusiasm for the emancipatory potential of local politics was voiced by neo-liberal, radical and culturalist proponents alike (Crook and Manor, 1998: 1–2). The obvious possibility that power relations may remain unaffected or might even be strengthened in local arenas was frequently overlooked. More broadly, Mamdani (1996) has argued that, because most people in rural Africa are deprived of the capacity to exercise real citizenship, decentralization has more often than not meant bringing authoritarianism rather than accountability closer to the people. Local political arenas have in this view essentially been marked by oppression as opposed to popular democracy.

Another strand in the literature emphasizes the pervasive structures of patron–client relations, which are predicted to be revived as local political arenas are reactivated (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 105).

The mixed experience of practice has tempered previous optimism, and most observers are now aware not only that reforms are often hampered by a lack of resources and capacity, which tends to result in recentralization, but also that decentralization is an inherently political process.

Political variables are key, not because of variations in formal structure or broad regime types, or technical failure of implementation, but because decentralization is essentially about the distribution of power and resources, both amongst different levels and territorial areas of the state, and amongst different interests in their relationship to ruling elites. (Crook and Sverrisson, 2001: 2)

It is of course common that, in real terms, nominal decentralization often remains underwritten by centralized control. This appears to be the case in Uganda too. Smoke (Chapter 7 in this volume) notes that, during the last decade, administrative and political dynamics have generated a tendency towards recentralization. The administrative dynamics stemmed from concerns among actors in the central bureaucracy that they were losing their influence. Given the increasingly obvious mismatch between relatively extensive allocation of resources and powers to local governments on the one hand and their limited capacity on the other, and the

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frustrations this gave rise to, actors at the centre made use of the opportunity to claw back some of their lost control. The political dynamics that tend to weaken local governments include, according to Smoke, their fiscal dependency; the multiplication of districts by the central government, mainly for political expediency, resulting in smaller and weaker units; and the resurfacing of federalist demands from Buganda kingdom, and the central government’s heavy-handed response to such claims.

Regardless of the democratic potential of the reforms, local governance has re-emerged as an arena for struggles over access to resources.

This tends to expand the scope for political actors at that level, along with their connections upwards and downwards. Such connections are, with regard to social policy, critically related to semi-privatized development, which occasionally turns into an important source for accumulating money or influence, based on religion, ethnicity and/or political affiliation. This tendency is what prompts the examination of the role of civil society in local development politics. All these forms of local politics are in turn shaped by the nature of central–local relations, through the ways in which central governments seek to engage with local elites and to penetrate communities for political support, and by responses from different sections of local society.

The recent turn to local politics thus has different and contradictory sources, all deeply embedded in power struggles. What are the implications of decentralization and localized politics and development for relations between state and civil society? In order to address this issue, I suggest here that a necessary starting point is the need to approach local governance in a historically and conceptually broader sense than the preoccupation with contemporary institutional reforms allows for. Broadening the scope conceptually means including all forms of social power in local arenas. The argument advanced here sets out from the premise that the realization of decentralization and local governance reforms will be shaped by struggles among different social forces, including, crucially, efforts by ruling elites to structure their relations with other groups.

The general theoretical perspective on state formation applied here is that the institutional composition and political orientation of the state are shaped by, and in turn reshape, relations of domination among political forces. Political forces with access to state power seek to uphold political domination through institutions and policies in the context of their chosen strategies for reproducing, for example, accumulation and legitimation, including recurrent crises with regard to these material and ideological sources of power, as well as in relation to competing demands on the state in other directions. The state is shaped by being embedded in relations of domination between certain social forces and external constituencies. In pursuing projects for capitalist accumulation and develop-

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ment, conflicts arise between different political interests and their various demands, and structural contradictions emerge between, for example, strategies aimed at rapid but destabilizing accumulation and the conditions necessary for reproducing the political and economic order in a longer perspective. Strategies for ensuring control range from coercion to more sophisticated and legitimate forms of reproducing social relations politically.

Decentralization is normally undertaken for a variety of stated and tacit political purposes; this creates variation in the structuring of local politics within countries as well. Institutional reforms take root in different ways owing to interventions and contestation by competing actors, both central and local, who seek to create access and influence through channels of external connections and local control. Central authorities seek to maintain or transform local political arenas and the mechanisms that mediate between the central state, the local state and local society.

These processes are likely to include pressures from or concessions to interest groups or regional or local elites that seek to establish or consolidate their own political influence (Boone, 2003). Local social forces and politicians struggle to negotiate the terms of engagement. Local governance is thus shaped in the interface between different forms of externally intervening political projects and the range of aspirations and responses that emerge locally.

For these reasons, local governance is never distinctly “local”. Just as institutional reforms are interwoven with political struggles over access to resources in terms of property, power, prestige or hegemony, local politics is fundamentally connected to wider arenas. This holds both for temporary networks linking local elites to national centres of power and for the way central governments have historically structured their relations to different regions – a most significant factor in the case of Buganda.

Furthermore, there are several levels within the local, from the village to the district, where issues are negotiated. At all of these levels, civil society organizations are often centres of influence in themselves through the way they seek to mobilize and represent different sections of society (see Kassimir, 2001).

It has been argued that, in the absence of the effective presence of the state in parts of rural Africa, elite sections of local society have taken on the function of exercising public authority (Bierschenk and de Sardan, 1997). This observation needs to be qualified. State formation and public authority are not just complicated by the absence of the state or of formal structures of regulation, which creates room for informal modes of rule. More to the point, formal and informal regulatory structures are closely connected, in immediate local arenas as well as in the ways in which these arenas are linked to actors and institutions at higher levels of

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politics. Lund (2001: 40) makes the observation that “the local” is not necessarily distinctly local in a spatial sense. Equally importantly, it functions as a point of reference for different forces invoking authority.

Hence, local politics is constituted both by the ways in which central governments have institutionalized their relations to different sections of local society, in the form of direct intervention or mediated by brokers, and by the specific trajectories shaped by the constellation of forces that emerge among different sections of local society.

What factors are central for explaining variations in the political content of decentralization? In a review essay on the topic, Crook and Sverrisson (2001: 2, 4) identify as critical the nature of political relations between central and local governments, “which derives principally from the character of and power bases of the ruling elite and their relationships with local elites” in combination with “the configuration of local . . . economic, social and political structures”. Power relations in local society underlie central–local relations, in terms of shaping the political resources and interests of local elites and by way of the strategies developed by central governments to deal with these elites.

The period under study here, from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s, was characterized by economic, and in some cases political, liberalization and the resurrection of civil society organizations. These came to play an important role in the local governance agenda. Ugandan society underwent relative stabilization from the late 1980s. Yet, at the level of civil society, macroeconomic stabilization corresponded to a stabilization of already relatively fluid informal coping strategies, giving these strategies greater predictability without necessarily formalizing them. As will be explored below, the combination of a plural and fluid society and a re-established state resulted in evolving but tentative and internally incoherent formal and informal regulatory mechanisms that went hand in hand with continued overall fragmentation. At the level of national politics and civil society, this social pluralism evolved within a context of consolidation of political control and deliberate separation of social pluralism from political power. What happened in the local political arena?

13.3 Local politics in Uganda Tense and unresolved relations between the central government and regional power centres, notably Buganda, have shaped state formation in fundamental ways – see, among a vast literature, Burke (1964); Richards (1982); Sathyamurthy (1982); and Tidemand (1994); and, for Buganda, Apter (1997 [1961]); Fallers (1964); Karlström (1999); and Mafeje (1977).

Two aspects are particularly relevant for this chapter. One concerns

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Uganda’s dramatically uneven regional development, following from a combination of colonially imposed economic underdevelopment and indirect rule, reinforced by elite-controlled politics after independence.

The other aspect is related to the informalization of the economy and society, which expanded dramatically during the years of institutional decay and which set off a multiplicity of informal institutions, mainly local in scope.

The first dimension – regionalized centrifugal tendencies – resulted in struggles between central and regional centres of power at the level of national politics. These struggles were temporarily settled with the independence constitution of 1962. Buganda kingdom alone enjoyed federal status; other kingdoms were given semi-federal powers. The remaining parts of the country were directly subordinated to the central authority.

However, the struggles took off again immediately after independence and resulted in the constitutional crisis in 1966. After an armed confrontation with Buganda, the government of the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) abolished all kingdoms and regional political entities. The new order that followed ushered in centralization in terms of real control over district councils, as codified in the Local Government Act of 1967.

Frequent changes in the institutional regulation of local government throughout the entire post-independence period and the great swings between centralization and decentralization point to the importance accorded by all state rulers to controlling local arenas. Simultaneously, the rapid decay of formal institutions from the early 1970s – the dimension of informalization – resulted in a “great discrepancy in post-independent Uganda between the formal rules and actual performance of local administration” (Tidemand, 1994: 56).

Upon taking power in 1986, following a five-year guerrilla war, the NRM suspended all party-political activity with the stated aim of putting an end to elite manipulation of ethno-regional and religious sentiments, codified as “sectarianism”. The NRM employed several means for reshaping state institutions and for securing its control over them. At the national level, a broad-based government was formed that included members of antagonistic parties and factions. Locally, institutional channels for linking the rural population to the state were established. This involved a five-tier system, running from village to district, of so-called Resistance Councils, later renamed local councils (Ddungu, 1994; Kasfir, 1991, 1999; Mamdani, 1994, 1996; Ottemoeller, 1996; Tidemand, 1994).

Having downsized the central bureaucracy, the government embarked upon a decentralization programme, which gradually re-expanded the size and cost of public administration in the local state. Apart from seeking to restore state capacity, this shift was also directly political because the NRM leaders were known not to have trusted the political leanings

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of the inherited civil servants and were happy to replace them with more reliable cadres in the local state (Kjær, 2001: 138–139), functionaries who could furthermore anchor the NRM among local communities. Both civil service reforms and decentralization were policy arenas where donor and government interests coincided. The process towards localized politics was further compounded by traditionalist aspirations for ethnic communities and by the informalization of economic and social life, which generated informal networks.

13.3.1 Buganda in Uganda Relations between the central government and Buganda kingdom have been both delicate and decisive for the politics of the entire territory. The Luwero war that took place in rural Buganda in the early 1980s added further animosity towards Obote and the UPC among most Baganda, something that the NRM took advantage of. The NRM was initially hostile to politicized ethnicity in general and “feudal kingdoms” in particular, for a set of reasons that include the complicated history of political ethnicity in general; the radical leftist outlook of leading NRM politicians during the 1980s; and considerations of difficult future alliances, because most of the high-ranking NRM politicians and National Resistance Army officers came from western Uganda. In a move to accommodate Buganda and ensure the continued political support of the Baganda, the NRM had a change of mind, and in 1993 kingdoms were restored on the premise that they would restrict themselves to the purely “cultural” domain (Karlström, 1999).

When it became clear to Buganda kingdom politicians that their autonomy remained circumscribed, relations with the central government turned sour. The kingdom set up its own government structures and continued to push for federalism and real autonomy by engaging in negotiations behind the scenes and expanding its repertoire of activities in, for instance, arenas of development work and the media. The push was combined with regular public demonstrations and far-reaching demands. That Buganda would not succumb to the requirements of restricting kingship to the sphere of culture was made clear during the discussions preceding the making of the new constitution in 1995, when a highly contested political issue concerned the unit of local government. Decentralization advocates came up against proponents for the restoration of federalism as the extension of ceremonial kingship. The government insisted on decentralization – one objective of which, according to Crook (2001), was to fragment and undercut important sub-national political entities, and in particular the Buganda region. The government remained dependent on the political support of the Baganda and has sought by various stick-andcarrot measures to contain their discontent, although with increasing

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difficulty. Buganda has not been entirely domesticated as a stable government power base or a united electoral bloc.

13.3.2 Masaka district in Buganda Masaka district is located roughly 100 km south-west of Kampala, and is part of the Buganda region. According to the 2002 census, the population of Masaka Town stood at 61,300 and that of the district at 767,759. The majority of its inhabitants are Catholic Baganda, with religious (Protestant and Muslim) and ethnic (mainly Banyarwanda and Banyankole) minorities. The bulk of the population are smallholding peasants. Historically, the area has been one of the most important food-producing regions in the country. Coffee is the main cash crop and matooke (plantain) the most important food crop. Following the slump in world market coffee prices, an overall decline in agricultural production and a series of more specific misfortunes, the former bread basket of Kampala sank into stagnation (Bazaara, 1997: Chapter 5). This has been reinforced by a lack of investments and employment facilities in Masaka Town and other urban centres. Poverty is further deepened by the severe impact of HIV/ AIDS in the region. There is a looming agricultural crisis, caused by land fragmentation and erosion, overpopulation and falling coffee prices after a brief mid-1990s boom.

Like all districts, Masaka is economically dependent on revenue from the central government. Political dependence on the national centre is evident, but not entirely straightforward. The district leadership occasionally takes on importance in its own right, as for example in struggles between the central government and the kingdom leadership at Mengo for local support, where local leadership is given the opportunity to exercise some degree of bargaining power in either direction. Central–local relations further interact with intra-local relations of domination. There are important constituencies that the district political leadership needs to accommodate, critical among which are representatives of Buganda kingdom, the Catholic Church and landlords – not seldom in combination.

The Catholic Church is an influential social institution, both on a general level of spiritual guidance and as a political player in a more mundane sense (Kassimir, 1998). Religious leaders, especially at lower levels (for example, parish priests), are prominent brokers or mobilizers of political support, making them targets for appeals and pressure from politicians.

13.4 State–civil society relations in the health sector The involvement and engagement of civil society organizations with local government and communities depend on their point of entry and their

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base in local society. There are evidently great differences in that respect.

The stagnation of Masaka district, along with the dramatic transformation of political arenas, has made the population politically dependent and vulnerable. In the context of a region in decline and with a rampant HIV/AIDS epidemic, and in the absence of viable state structures, World Vision, an evangelical Christian organization, has established itself as a provider of social welfare with claims to spiritual empowerment. The scope for action and the legitimacy it enjoys are shaped by the vast resources at its disposal and its possible effectiveness as a development organization, but also by having penetrated the heartland of Ugandan Catholicism and entered into unvoiced competition with the welfare arms of the Catholic Church and the religious factionalism this is likely to set off. BUCADEF embodies the developmental efforts of Buganda kingdom to reclaim a foothold among the peasantry and to regain relevance at community level. Its presence needs to be understood in the context of changing economic, social and political conditions for ethnic monarchism.

The historical depth of monarchism and cultural mobilization embodies a series of tensions, including the role of Masaka district in Buganda, the unresolved issue of decentralization or federalism, the fear of potential ethnic exclusion and the nature of citizenship in Uganda.

13.4.1 World Vision: Community empowerment through faith World Vision is an international evangelical Christian development and relief NGO, founded and based in the United States. According to Bornstein (2002: 6), some years back it was operating in 95 countries, and it is one of the biggest NGOs in Uganda, where it is active in many districts.

Most of its extensive economic resources come from private donations.

World Vision has operated in Uganda since 1986 and in Masaka district since 1990, where its presence was originally motivated by the devastating effects of HIV/AIDS. World Vision is engaged in rural development in a general sense. In the health sector, its main contributions are the construction of health units, undertaking surveys of sanitation and immunization needs, and providing training for community health workers. These mundane activities are informed by an evangelical perspective on development that seeks to achieve transformative worldly and spiritual empowerment through participatory community activities. World Vision is the main foreign NGO in the district, and World Vision staff and local politicians alike are very aware of their crucial role in social service delivery in Masaka district.

World Vision is included in forums for decision-making at district level.

Politicians, technocrats and NGO staff emphasized that the relationship is marked by close cooperation. World Vision staff were keen to point

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out that they engage in development, not politics. This distinction is a key feature of NRM ideology and is upheld as a regulatory principle for the NGO sector through threats of more restrictive legislation and selfimposed practice. Local political leaders and NGOs seek mutual accommodation, as long as this follows the logic of relations at the level of national politics. Although state supervision of NGOs is weaker at the local level, NGOs have learned to keep within the limits imposed by the strict legislation.

Representatives of World Vision were aware of the tensions between its own ideas of harmonious community empowerment and local power politics, which might prevent such empowerment from occurring. To avoid such difficult issues, World Vision prefers to emphasize the lack of education and enlightened cultural habits, rather than structural conflicts over property and power (see Kelsall and Mercer, 2003). Thus, World Vision avoids being seen as a political actor in the public arena. It does, however, play an important role in the context of state formation.

World Vision and similar NGOs are crucial in anchoring state reform and semi-privatized development. The creation of an “enabling environment” for NGOs is a key dimension of the formation of state capacity and legitimacy in the field of social welfare, as well as a boost for local politicians who predictably try to capitalize on the presence of foreign NGOs. Most NGOs develop institutional structures for community participation, which, in combination with the resources they command, may occasionally turn them into influential development actors at the local level (see also De Coninck, 2004: 64 – 65).

13.4.2 Buganda Cultural and Development Foundation: The power of the kingdom?

BUCADEF is in itself a rather modest NGO. It is also, however, a component in a political project for restructuring the relationship between state, nation and ethnicity. In its own words, BUCADEF is the “grass root development arm of the Buganda Government” (interview, BUCADEF Chief Executive Officer, D. M. Kyewalabye, 23 November 2000).

Hence, the sources of BUCADEF’s capacity to articulate concerns and mobilize support are defined not only by its relationship with the local state but also by relations between Buganda kingdom and the central government and between the kingdom and local governments in Buganda region.

BUCADEF was established in 1995 for the purpose of improving the standard of living of the people of Buganda kingdom. In the field of health it is engaged in preventive health care, such as nutrition projects, early childhood development, protection of water sources, and immunization

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programmes on behalf of the district. Its main source of funding is the kingdom, although BUCADEF has also managed to attract resources from donors, including the United States Agency for International Development, the UK’s Department for International Development and the World Bank. Ordinary and not-so-ordinary Baganda in Uganda and among the diaspora also contribute in cash or kind. Although contributions from ordinary Baganda display an element of commitment and popular support for the kingdom, there is certainly also a degree of social pressure, which gives the contributions the character of informal taxation (Englebert, 2002: 355).

The contours and orientation of any civil society organization are shaped within the broader political context within which it has emerged.

Although the capacity of BUCADEF to become a prominent development actor is limited, the importance of the kingdom in regional and national political arenas gives all its institutions a special role and obliges all political leaders to deal with them. The political importance of BUCADEF should be seen from the perspective of politicized ethnicity at large and the contestation over ways of organizing political participation and public life. Although BUCADEF and kingdom representatives claim to work for all the people in Buganda, this formulation points to fundamental unresolved issues about the precise meaning of political citizenship in Buganda as a political entity, because ethnic minorities perceive it as a threat. There is also a class dimension to this, related to social struggles over land and ultimately to struggles over the political meaning of ethnicity and monarchism.

13.5 Conclusions: State and civil society in local political arenas This chapter has sought to bring out the complexities of local governance. At that level, struggles over power shift from one parish to another.

At the same time, there are general patterns within which local complexity is played out. In this chapter, the capacity for influence has been explained with reference to the balance of power between social forces and state interventions to regulate them, but also by factors internal to the organizations and to the local settings. Relationships of domination shaping different social forces and the local state have both central–local and intra-local dimensions. In the case of Masaka politics, significant factors include the role of Buganda in national politics; the legacy of Catholicism and the Democratic Party; past wealth built on coffee production; civil war and local decline; the HIV/AIDS epidemic; and the rise of the NRM to domination in local political arenas. For their political survival, leaders

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of local government need to consider both the central government and local power holders. They have to manoeuvre in relation to a variety of political interests that are mobilized by, for instance, landlords, Buganda kingdom, the Catholic Church and donors. The scope for any of the civil society groups studied here to influence policy directions is changing but overall relatively limited.

Owing to their varying capacity for interest representation, the organizations under study encounter the state in very different ways. BUCADEF is accommodated into structures for community development in an ad hoc manner, through the interconnectedness between public, private and NGO forms of provision. At lower levels, it tends to negotiate its presence with the local state informally. World Vision has been taken on board in more important forums for decision-making at the level of the district council but prefers to exercise influence behind the scenes. Structures of regulation are overlapping and shifting, and these groups target different regulatory mechanisms. Many issues remain beyond democratic control because they are handled by institutions that are privatized and informalized. At lower levels and with regard to welfare functions, it is certainly possible to speak of a degree of “civil societisation of the state” (Gibbon, 2001: 833), in the sense of overlapping responsibilities, resulting, as is discussed by De Coninck (2004: 68– 69) and Ribot (Chapter 4 in this volume), in diffuse and often democratically questionable forms of interest representation and accountability within both the political system and civil society organizations.

The organization of local government along the lines of “popular participation” has been an important dimension of restructuring state– society relations. In the early 1990s, Resistance Councils were transformed by more general decentralization reforms, which resulted in a change from their initial role as vehicles for political participation to more conventional arenas for local government, by placing the responsibility for service delivery with local councils. On one level, the dynamics of local politics are shifting between districts owing to variations in local government capacity and the specific local social structure. More broadly, however, a main tendency has been a gradual shift in the political identity of local government institutions from democratic organs to stateparty vehicles for local mobilization. Although local councils did move the role of local government in a more democratic and participatory direction by replacing the institution of the chief with elected councils, the limits to both participation and democracy have gradually become more visible.

Political participation was until 2005 exclusively confined to local councils within the NRM system. The real as opposed to the formal autonomy of local councils is circumscribed by their generally low capacity for

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revenue extraction, leading to dependence on centrally allocated, and to a large extent earmarked, financial grants. This reinforces the political vulnerability of these economically unviable local entities. It would be an exaggeration to describe local councils as through and through politicized by the government. They have harboured contradictory tendencies, being at the same time arenas for popular participation, NRM structures and local state forms. Regional support for suppressed opposition forces places limits on the imposition of NRM hegemony, and consistent and effective political penetration from above is typically more limited at lower levels. As the tensions inherent in the construction of the NRM itself grew, however, the political and bureaucratic dimensions of local councils gradually came to overshadow the democratic aspect. By and large, local councils have over time become increasingly significant in cultivating a rural political base for the regime. This rural electoral support has in turn been instrumental in securing NRM victories in the presidential and parliamentary elections of 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2011.

At lower levels of the political system, state–society relations become even more blurred and state institutions only weakly and unevenly exercise routine functions of taxation, administration and welfare provision.

Links between different levels of local government are often disconnected. The scope for influencing higher instances of decision-making is for most sections of society very limited indeed. This does not exclude the possibility of occasional individual or collective economic “empowerment”, but it points to the limits set to systematic political engagement by a combination of factors, including poverty, hierarchical social relations and political closure in terms of the absence of both (until recently) political parties and organizationally and politically viable civil society groups. Local politics is strongly shaped by the interpenetration of social, economic and political inequality.

Turning finally to the more general theoretical theme of state formation at the local level, I offer a few reflections. The enquiry into what constitutes “the state” locally sets out from the observation that central states in developing countries lack the capacity to penetrate society in order to extract resources, engage in nation-building or enforce legislation and administration evenly, consistently and reliably over their entire territory; in the words of Michael Mann (1986), they lack “infrastructural power”. This theme has been the subject of a vast literature. It has been suggested that the state is unable to capture society (Hydén, 1983) or that it finds itself captured by powerful local figures in society (Migdal, 1988). Without going into detail about the relative merits of these contributions, I have drawn on arguments that stress the mutual constitution of state and society (Boone, 2003; Migdal et al., 1995) in terms of how state institutions are rooted in and reshape power relations in society. State-

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centred views, with their focus on the capacity of state rulers to penetrate and control society, tend to gloss over the ways in which state intervention is fought out at different levels, as well as the different and occasionally competing trajectories of state–society relations. Not only are state institutions, especially at the local level, shaped by the political calculations of the regime and the presence of a state-party machinery to ensure electoral loyalty. They are also formed by the social forces that try to mould them.

In the present conjuncture, the downsizing and decentralization of state structures have opened up space for political forces at the local level. From the perspective of communities, these forces intervene as parallel political entities with specific resources to offer. International NGOs may undertake the role as welfare providers and ethno-regional movements may operate with tacit claims to statehood, to draw on two of the cases discussed here. This has been interpreted as the creation of a continuum of governmental apparatuses (Ferguson, 1998: 58) or “degrees or kinds of ‘state-ness’ ” (Doornbos, 2000: 255), where the redrawing of lines between “state” and “society” is crucial for the construction of authority (Hansen and Stepputat, 2001). Where the lines should be drawn keeps being contested in all political arenas.

Again, there are important regional and local variations on this theme.

Many peripheral areas – not only in the north, but also in the east, the far west and within the central region, such as Kalangala district to the immediate east of Masaka, in Lake Victoria – are weakly integrated into the national economy and state structures. This again has many causes, including historically rooted underdevelopment in combination with contemporary political marginalization. Even in core areas, effective state presence is geographically, temporally and institutionally uneven.

The territorial, institutional and social dimensions of state formation most often overlap and are expressed as ethnicized regional underdevelopment. Inequality and politicized ethnicity – though obviously more or less fluid in their precise manifestations – tend to be structurally fixed by way of vertical separation and horizontal hierarchies. Within such structural constraints, claims to belonging typically seek to link identity to space. The latter may be social or territorial; in the case of access to land, such space is always territorial and often social as well. Territorial claims may be more or less collective in orientation. Claims are occasionally made about privileged access to land on a certain territory for a particular group. In some cases, influential claims are made about the necessary and binding links between geographical territory, social identity and political entity, to the point where mechanisms of exclusion become more important than the content of belonging. Invocations of history are often made by the territorialization of collective memory so as to justify a

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territorialized future. All over the country, the meaning of community, as based on lineage or on territory, is deeply contested. The central government, running short of developmental and democratic credibility, is (wittingly or unwittingly) fuelling the politics of identity and territoriality by granting district status to ever more contenders – often on an ethnic basis (Green, 2008: 443– 444). Distinctions between two levels of crystallization of identities and institutions – informal “ethnic” regions (kingdoms or not) and statutory political entities (districts) – are not clear-cut any more, if indeed they ever were.

The Ugandan experience of state formation through decentralization points, among other things, to ad hoc regulation of welfare functions and the simultaneous systematic creation of new institutional linkages that deepen the political presence of the central state in local arenas, but with deep regional differences. Although the fragmentation of state authority is more visible in relation to the welfare functions of the state, its coercive apparatus is often marked by its heavy presence. Analysis of locallevel complexity needs to be connected to patterns of central–local relations, including the way central power holders have developed specific strategies in order to deal with regional power configurations, in combination with the capacity of these social forces to respond to intervention. This requires that both state and civil society are analytically disaggregated, and that the “presence” or “absence” of the state is discussed in relation to the balance of forces in society.

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Bazaara, N. (1997) “Agrarian Politics, Crisis and Reformism in Uganda 1962– 1996”. Unpublished PhD thesis, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada.

Bierschenk, T. and J. P. O. de Sardan (1997) “Local Powers and a Distant State in Rural Central African Republic”, Journal of Modern African Studies 35(3): 441– 468.

Boone, C. (2003) Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bornstein, E. (2002) “Developing Faith: Theologies of Economic Development in Zimbabwe”, Journal of Religion in Africa 32(1): 4 –31.

Brett, E. A. (1998) “Responding to Poverty in Uganda: Structures, Policies and Prospects”, Journal of International Affairs 52(1): 313–337.

Burke, F. G. (1964) Local Government and Politics in Uganda. New York: Syracuse University Press.

Chabal, P. and J. P. Daloz (1999) Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument.

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Crook, R. (2001) “Strengthening Democratic Governance in Conflict Torn Societies: Civic Organisations, Democratic Effectiveness and Political Conflict”.

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Crook, R. and J. Manor (1998) Democracy and Decentralization in South Asia and West Africa: Participation, Accountability and Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Crook, R. and A. Sverrisson (2001) “Decentralisation and Poverty-Alleviation in Developing Countries: A Comparative Analysis or, Is West Bengal Unique?”

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Ddungu, E. (1994) “Popular Forms and the Question of Democracy: The Case of Resistance Councils in Uganda”, in M. Mamdani and J. Oloka-Onyango (eds) Uganda: Studies in Living Conditions, Popular Movements and Constitutionalism. Vienna: JEP, pp. 365– 404.

De Coninck, J. (2004) “The State, Civil Society and Development Policy in Uganda: Where Are We Coming From?”, in K. Brock, R. McGee and J. Gaventa (eds) Unpacking Policy: Knowledge, Actors and Spaces in Poverty Reduction in Uganda and Nigeria. Kampala: Fountain Publishers, pp. 51–73.

Dicklitch, S. (1998) The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa. Lessons from Uganda. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Doornbos, M. (2000) Institutionalizing Development Policies and Resource Strategies in Eastern Africa and India: Developing Winners and Losers. London: Macmillan.

Englebert, P. (2002) “Born-again Buganda or the Limits of Traditional Resurgence in Africa”, Journal of Modern Africa Studies 40(5): 345–368.

Fallers, L. A. (ed.) (1964) The King’s Men: Leadership and Status in Buganda on the Eve of Independence. London, New York, Nairobi: Oxford University Press.

Ferguson, J. (1998) “Transnational Topographies of Power: Beyond ‘The State’ and ‘Civil Society’ in the Study of African Politics”, in H. S. Marcussen and S. Arnfred (eds) Concepts and Metaphors: Ideologies, Narratives and Myths in Development Discourse. Occasional Paper No. 19, International Development Studies, Roskilde University, Denmark, pp. 45–71.

Gibbon, P. (2001) “Civil Society, Locality and Globalization in Rural Tanzania: A Forty-Year Perspective”, Development and Change 32(5): 819–844.

Green, E. D. (2008) “Decentralization and Conflict in Uganda”, Conflict, Security & Development 8(4): 427– 450.

Hansen, T. B. and F. Stepputat (2001) “Introduction. States of Imagination”, in T. B. Hansen and F. Stepputat (eds) States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, pp. 1–38.

Harrison, G. (2004) The World Bank and Africa: The Construction of Governance States. London: Routledge.

Harriss, J., K. Stokke and O. Törnquist (eds) (2004) Politicising Democracy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hydén, G. (1983) No Short-Cuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Karlström, M. (1999) “Civil Society and Its Presuppositions: Lessons from Uganda”, in J. L. Comaroff and J. Comaroff (eds) Civil Society and the

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Kasfir, N. (1991) “The Ugandan Elections of 1989: Power, Populism and Democratization”, in H. B. Hansen and M. Twaddle (eds) Changing Uganda. London: James Currey, pp. 247–278.

Kasfir, N. (1999) “ ‘No-Party’ Democracy in Uganda”, in L. Diamond and M. F. Plattner (eds) Democratization in Africa. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 201–215.

Kassimir, R. (1998) “The Social Power of Religious Organisation and Civil Society: The Catholic Church in Uganda”, in N. Kasfir (ed.) Civil Society and Democracy in Africa: Critical Perspectives. London: Frank Cass, pp. 54 –83.

Kassimir, R. (2001) “Producing Local Politics: Governance, Representation and Non-State Organizations in Africa”, in T. Callaghy, R. Kassimir and R. Latham (eds) Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa: Global–Local Networks of Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 93–112.

Kelsall, T. and C. Mercer (2003) “Empowering People? World Vision & ‘Transformatory Development’ in Tanzania”, Review of African Political Economy 96: 293–304.

Kjær, M. (2001) “The Politics of Civil Service Reform: A Comparative Analysis of Uganda and Tanzania in the 1990s”. PhD dissertation, Political Science, Aarhus University, Denmark.

Lund, C. (2001) “Politics in a Sahelian Town: Dori and the Art of Alliance”, in T. Benjaminsen and C. Lund (eds) Politics, Property and Production in the West African Sahel: Understanding Natural Resource Management. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, pp. 40 –56.

Mafeje, A. (1977) “The Legitimacy of the Uganda Government in Buganda”, in L. Cliffe, J. S. Coleman and M. Doornbos (eds) Government and Rural Development in East Africa: Essays on Political Penetration. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 99–116.

Mamdani, M. (1994) “Pluralism and the Right of Association”, in M. Mamdani and J. Oloka-Onyango (eds) Uganda: Studies in Living Conditions, Popular Movements and Constitutionalism. Vienna: JEP, pp. 519–563.

Mamdani, M. (1996) Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Mann, M. (1986) “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results”, in J. A. Hall (ed.) States in History. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 109–136.

Migdal, J. (1988) Strong Societies and Weak States: State–Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Migdal, J., A. Kohli and V. Shue (eds) (1995) State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ottemoeller, D. (1996) “Institutionalization and Democratization: The Case of the Ugandan Resistance Councils”. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Florida, USA.

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Richards, A. (1982) “Changing Local Government Policy, 1950 –1970”, in A. F. Robertson (ed.) Uganda’s First Republic: Chiefs, Administrators and Politicians, 1967–1971. Cambridge African Monographs No. 1. Cambridge: African Studies Centre, Cambridge University, pp. 20 –36.

Sathyamurthy, T. H. (1982) Central–Local Relations: The Case of Uganda. Manchester Papers on Development. Manchester: University of Manchester.

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Wunsch, J. S. and D. Ottemoeller (2004) “Uganda: Multiple Levels of Local Governance”, in D. Olowu and J. S. Wunsch (eds) Local Governance in Africa: The Challenges of Democratic Decentralization. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 181–209.

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14 Who won and who lost?

The role of local governments in post-conflict recovery David Jackson

14.1 Introduction Do local government and decentralization reforms contribute to building stability following a civil conflict? What, if any, difference do they make? This chapter attempts to contribute to answering these questions.

The chapter starts with a theoretical review, followed by four case studies from Mozambique, Angola, Timor-Leste and Indonesia. I have been directly involved in designing and implementing local government solutions to post-conflict situations in each case, from the Mozambican General Peace Accords of 1992 to the Aceh Peace Agreement in August 2005.1 The chapter knits together strands from the discourse on decentralization with the literature on post-conflict recovery. The resulting thread is examined in the context of scholarly research on the nature of the state and nationalism. This provides the foundation for the chapter’s case studies on how local government and decentralization (or the lack of it) have contributed to or hindered stability in the immediate postconflict period.

The potential role of local government is not always considered in the literature on post-conflict recovery.2 Where it is mentioned, there is an implicit premise that peace can be promoted by social and economic benefits provided through local governments, whether they are (ideally) politically and culturally rooted local democratic institutions or (less ideally) relatively benign local administrations with limited autonomy, reporting to an autocratic central authority (Collier, 2009; Collier and Hoeffler, The imperative of good local governance: Challenges for the next decade of decentralization, Öjendal and Dellnäs (eds), United Nations University Press, 2013, ISBN 978-92-808-1229-9

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2002; Collier et al., 2003). Efficiency linked to proximity to the citizen is often cited as the comparative advantage of local government vis-à-vis national governments. By involving the citizen in local planning and decision-making, the idea is that a better understanding and consensus for decisions will emerge, contributing to stability. Although the literature often applies a generic approach to post-conflict environments, there is also recognition that sensitivities surrounding the specific circumstances and nature of the conflict should be taken into account while planning the recovery and the role of local government within it. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, there is little in the literature that directly asks: Who won the conflict? Who lost it? And what does that mean for the role of local government?

Rondinelli and Montgomery (2005) review the extensive experience of Western countries in post-conflict “nation-building” since 1945. West Germany, Japan, Grenada and Panama are cited as cases where “the types of democratic governance systems that the US sought to build continue after 10 years”. The review illustrates the joined-up effort that is required to change the nature of the state and suggests that elections and local government can sometimes be counterproductive. There is an assumption of “good guys” and “bad guys” and a reflection that too much democracy too soon can let the bad guys back in – even if only at the local level. Implicit in Rondinelli and Montgomery is that the purpose of post-conflict recovery is not simply peace – it also represents an opportunity for the winning side to change the purpose of the state.

Awareness and recognition that post-conflict environments usually include winners and losers enable consideration of the new realities and new perceptions amongst both victors and vanquished. States are usually different afterwards, irrespective of whether boundaries have altered and new countries are formed. But what has changed? The visible systems of the state often demonstrate a resilience to conflict; the functions, civil servants and institutional lineages often survive, albeit with different uniforms and acronyms. The post office, the central bank and other fundamental structures and responsibilities continue in some form or another, yet new acronyms for the old institutions point towards what has really changed – not only parts of the state system but the very “idea” of the state (Abrams, 1988). The conflict creates an opportunity to reconfigure the notion and purpose of the state, often according to the preference of the victors. Indeed, the conflict itself may have been partly over different interpretations of what a particular state is all about. The state ideas of post-1945 Germany and Japan were strikingly different from their respective fascist and imperial predecessors. The reform of local government in both cases was partly designed to reinforce the new state idea. In post-apartheid South Africa, the role of local government (in particular

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the provinces) has been to entrench the Rainbow Nation concept in which different interests and ethnic groups share power within a unitary state. But what if the new state idea is not universally accepted? Or what if local governments work against the grain of the state idea encouraged by the victors to the conflict? Answering these questions will lead towards a deeper understanding of the role of local government in postconflict recovery that goes beyond simply extrapolating or stretching the usual arguments for decentralization and local government to fit postconflict environments.

One function of a successful state idea is the peaceful, acquiescent accommodation of differing nations within a country – the Zulu nation within South Africa, the Scottish nation within the United Kingdom, or the Maori nation within New Zealand. Other state ideas implicitly or explicitly exclude segments of the population, which can lead to conflict.

The state idea is a historically contingent feature and conflict presents an opportunity to change it. Delegating political power and resources to sub-national levels can be part of the change. Anderson (2006) does not refer to the state idea in his work on national identity, but it can be considered as the lowest common denominator of the shared concepts that bind his “imagined community”. Taking the state idea and changes of it into account helps us to understand the role of local government and decentralization in specific post-conflict situations.3 Brinkerhoff (2005) provides a categorization of the degrees of state failure and then groups the rebuilding of governance into three areas: reconstituting legitimacy; re-establishing security; and rebuilding effectiveness. The route to reconstituting legitimacy is through expanding participation and inclusiveness, reducing inequities, creating accountability, combating corruption and introducing contestability (elections).

Delivering services, which links to the effectiveness dimension, is also important for establishing legitimacy; it demonstrates government willingness and capacity to respond to citizens’ needs and demands. Further, this category includes constitutional reform, re-establishment of the rule of law and institutional design (e.g. checks and balances, allocation of functions and authorities across branches and levels of government), as well as civil society development.

(Brinkerhoff, 2005: 5)

For Brinkerhoff, legitimacy results from both democracy and effectiveness. However, this misses the point that a “democratic state” is not valueless and the state idea defines the parameters of discourse within it.

The Basque citizens of Spain, the Arab citizens of Israel, the Malay citizens of Thailand and the nationalist citizens of Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom are examples of groups that may not identify with the

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purpose or premise of the state they live in, whether or not it is democratic. Decentralization and local government may play a role in resolving this generic dilemma.

Yet the emphasis in the literature is often on fostering inclusion through ring-fenced “participation” in individual micro decisions (frequently inspired by Chambers, 1986), rather than promoting broader political engagement. This practice provokes criticism that alleges the “tyranny” of participatory methods and questions the usefulness and legitimacy of their synthetic and circumscribed decision-making processes (Cooke and Kothari, 2001).

Jackson also refers to this risk and documents how in Sierra Leone formal and “informal” (but perhaps more legitimate) local governance structures are uneasy partners – particularly where taxes and natural resources are concerned (Jackson and Albrecht, 2011). Chandran et al.

(2008) allude to how normal development intervention does not function well in post-conflict environments owing to accountability gaps. Woodward (2002) argues against generic local governance responses and recognizes that sustainable peace is deeply entwined with the nature of the conflict and the manner of its ending, and that a failure to understand this point can lead to formulaic approaches to decentralized governance reforms in post-conflict societies. In summary, the literature on local government and post-conflict recovery shares an assumption that local government’s role is linked to economic, social or institutional performance – the realization of a peace dividend.

Blunt and Turner (2005) apply the categorization of cultural dimensions developed by Hofstede (1980) to the decentralization reform in Cambodia and conclude that societal cultural factors such as “high power distance”, “high collectivism” and “high uncertainty avoidance” were prevalent and were not receptive to decentralization, which may explain why commune councils were slow to exercise significant political power in practice – despite the favourable legislation. These cultural factors play an important role in defining the Cambodian state idea. Öjendal and Kim (Chapter 12 in this volume) build on Blunt and Turner to demonstrate how the lowest level of governance tier in Cambodia, the commune councils, played a role in sustaining the peace by reconnecting the citizen and the state, providing a niche and “safe” political space that at least establishes some basic democratic rules and redefines, to a degree, the state idea from a bottom-up perspective – this despite the limited resources of the communes and the consolidation of real power at the centre. Öjendal and Kim conclude by arguing that the function of local government in promoting local development highlighted by Romeo (Chapter 3 in this volume) is unlikely to be performed by institutions such as the commune councils. Instead they imply that there can be other ways that local

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government cements post-conflict recovery that are not necessarily linked to a meaningful economic peace dividend at the local level.

14.2 Analytical and methodological approach 14.2.1 Criteria for the effectiveness of local government’s post-conflict role Taking into account the extant literature and the dynamic context of the state idea, what would be the criteria to judge the effectiveness of decentralization and local government in maintaining stability? What could, hypothetically, a local government do to promote post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation? Can decentralization reforms also play an important role in reconstructing and rebuilding the notion of the state?

Below I develop four criteria that will be used in the empirical sections to assess the role of local government in the post-conflict period.

One criterion for analysis would be the degree to which local government increases the legitimacy of the decentralized state institutions, both the local institutions themselves and by proxy, or by association, the wider state machinery and new state idea. In this respect, specific responsibilities of local governments, or even their very creation, can be a fundamental part of the peace agreement.

A second criterion, linked to the first, would be their ability to foster a sense of inclusion, motivation, hope or even happiness. Tendler (1998) has documented the role of leadership in fostering performance and development outcomes in different Brazilian local government jurisdictions.

She demonstrates that the motivations and incentive structures at work in the local public sector are not always those assumed by the theories of public management and new institutional economics. Instead, she presents an interface between these theories and the impact of citizen voice – the motivational power of leadership, inspired by factors such as ego and the importance of ideology. Together these provide a more holistic explanation for local government performance, and the approach can have particular relevance in a post-conflict environment.

A third criterion relates to the importance of inclusive and/or effective service delivery. In some kinds of peace dividend, local governments contribute to improved effectiveness of state institutions and therefore provide an improvement in basic socioeconomic indicators in the post-conflict period. There is a contrast between this role of local government and the two criteria above. The case studies illustrate that improved service delivery alone often is insufficient for the achievement of lasting peace and that, whereas the first two criteria are associated with political and ad-

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ministrative decentralization, the third criterion requires a degree of fiscal decentralization.

Finally, there is the role of local governments in promoting post-conflict economic recovery and even spearheading the sort of local development described by Romeo in this volume (Chapter 3). It can be useful to occupy both ex-combatants and their commanders in lucrative economic activity, but this may also be problematic if the nature of this activity has other negative effects, for example in the case of the narcotics trade. Economic empowerment of ex-combatants can be as effective as the provision of services – but will also depend on the nature of the conflict and its settlement. It may be that the conflict was explicitly about control over economic activity and some have ended up on the losing side.

14.2.2 Methodological approach The case studies on Mozambique, Angola, Timor-Leste and Indonesia apply these four criteria to assess the role of local government in postconflict recovery.4 In the first and fourth cases, local government contributed to maintain peace and in the second and third it did not. In all of the case studies, decentralization and local government reforms were mandated as part of the peace settlement.5 In all case studies I provide a time limit to the post-conflict period. Following Rondinelli and Montgomery (2005), the post-conflict period is taken as the decade following the cessation of fighting. This coincides with the 10-year threshold for defining a public policy achievement proposed by Bebbington and McCourt (2007). Likewise, I exclusively focus on the role of local government in maintaining stability and peace and make no value judgement on the nature or desirability of that peace and its associated polity.

The methodology used to analyse the conflicts is based on Jackson (2008). This posits both material concerns and subjective feelings as drivers of conflict. Material conflict drivers include disputes between interest groups, social classes and elites over resources and power that arise from territories, their populations, their economies and their natural resources. Wider geopolitical issues also comprise material conflict drivers; during the Cold War and the more recent “war on terror” many locallevel conflicts were partly subsidized by geopolitical material interests.

Local government connects to material conflict drivers through its territory, fiscal arrangements and public finance structure, which include the mechanisms of extraction and distribution of public resources and the regulation and taxation of private resources. For example, the division or destination of specific resource sets (such as oil revenue from a particular territorial area) may become a material conflict driver. Local government may play a role in facilitating how the state contributes to the

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conflict or it can play a role in mitigating or opposing the contested policies. In either case, resolving the conflict may require some amendment to the fiscal and public financial arrangements and the role that local government plays within them and in the governance structure of the country.

Conflict is also driven by subjective concerns. Those motivated by material conflict drivers may promote subjective conflict drivers in order to win support and inspire combatants. These are connected to powerful feelings of identity, entitlement, inclusion and exclusion that are related to imagined communities (at national or sub-national levels) and the state ideas of prevailing national jurisdictions. Violence is a form of exit from the state system and rejection of the state idea. Peace becomes closer if: (a) the intensity of feelings can diminish over time; (b) the material conflict drivers can be redressed (or disappear); and (c) former belligerents can be incorporated into the political system through expression of voice, rather than violence.6 Local government, being close to the citizen concerned, can play a role in reducing subjective and material conflict drivers.

Although each country has its own governance structure and local government nomenclature, for ease of reference a common terminology of province for first-tier local authorities and district for the second tier will be used. The first three cases were Portuguese colonies for which freedom arrived suddenly when a military coup in 1974 reversed colonial policy and realigned that European nation towards the European Union.

The third and fourth case studies also involve consideration of the Indonesian state idea.

14.3 Case studies 14.3.1 Mozambique – conflict profile and the state idea Eduardo Mondlane, the father of Mozambican independence, had the insight that Mozambique would have to be “created” in the popular imagination before the territory that carries its name could be freed from Portuguese rule (Cravinho, 1995). Historically, Portuguese colonialism had taken different forms in different places: a semi-feudal system in the Zambezi valley, a “franchised” mercantilist system in other northern areas, where trading companies played a governance role, and more direct rule south of the river Save. A unified state system had evolved on the eve of independence, but the legacy of the previous arrangements, amongst other factors, delayed the crystallization of an imagined community amongst the multi-ethnic population.

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From 1975, the first president Samora Machel, with the slogan “kill the tribe to build the nation”, continued Mondlane’s emphasis on the importance of national identity. Traditional, religious and community governance structures were sidelined as obsolete and some populations were relocated around agro-industrial cooperatives. Subjective conflict drivers emerged centring around a belief that FRELIMO (Mondlane’s and Machel’s party) was oppressing religious and traditional structures and beliefs (Vines, 1991).7 Mamdani (2002) describes how political identity can be defined alongside cultural, ethnic and market identities. One way to characterize the motley Mozambican opposition movement is in terms of a political position that did not accept the official independence narrative.

Material conflict drivers were related to geopolitics. Neighbouring Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and apartheid South Africa saw that majorityrule Mozambique would pose a threat to their minority regimes and sponsored an armed insurgency (RENAMO) that capitalized on feelings of disenfranchisement and disaffection.8 The ending of apartheid removed the material sustenance for the conflict and led to a peace agreement in 1992, which included provision for elected local government.

Peace was initially fragile: RENAMO still had access to arms and controlled large swathes of the countryside, where feelings of exclusion remained.9 Mondlane’s work was only partially complete. Mozambique had a state system with jurisdiction over the territory but large numbers were boycotting its institutions (education, health, vital registration, etc.) and therefore delaying the recovery. Local community leaders warned mothers that vaccinating children could be a form of inculcating communism. Many were exiting the state system rather than expressing voice through it.

Local governance policy response At the time of the General Peace Accords in 1992, Mozambique was divided into 10 provinces and 126 districts in a system of deconcentration and dual upwards accountability in which government officers at local level reported, on the one hand, to the ministerial hierarchy and, on the other hand, to the political hierarchy of district administrator and provincial governor. Provincial and district expenditures were part of the central budget approved by parliament. There was little citizen voice in district government and a blurred division (in practice) between party and government.

The peace agreement included provisions for national and local elections. FRELIMO won the 1994 general election, with RENAMO in close second place, securing most votes in central provinces; Nampula province was split 50:50. Legislative proposals for district mayors were withdrawn

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when the government reflected upon the implications of contiguous districts under RENAMO control. The alternative policy was two-fold.

First, elected municipalities (autarquias) were created, comprising the urban core of 33 towns and cities, with responsibility for some urban services such as sanitation and urban planning. These did not displace the district system but coexisted as overlapping jurisdictions. The district capital became simultaneously the host to an elected municipal administration covering its urban core and an appointed district administration also covering the urban core but including the rest of the district. After a turbulent start, the municipalities produced improvements in urban management and enabled the “safe” introduction of party politics at local level in which the overall state idea is not contested but improvements to the management of the state system are part of the electoral debates (Weimer et al., 2004).

Secondly, from 1998 the northern province of Nampula was the location of a pilot exercise in expanding voice in deconcentrated planning and budgeting by connecting the district administration to District Consultative Councils (DCCs) that brought together representatives from RENAMO and FRELIMO, Islamic and Christian faiths, traditional and clan leaders, district government bureaucrats and other actors in local governance. The experiment was backed by the innovation of all-purpose budget allocations to district governments that were not tied to a particular line ministry (Jackson, 2004, 2007).

Figure 14.1 illustrates the importance of the district reforms in terms of fiscal decentralization and demonstrates that both recurrent and investment transfers to districts from the provincial budget were very small, leaving many unfunded mandates, such as, for example, rural water provision. This was corrected in Nampula province to the extent that the annual district investment programme (of 23 districts) approximately equalled the provincial investment budget of around US$2 million per year for the immediate post-war period. Figure 14.1 does not include the Nampula district investments, which in 2001 and 2002 were on budget but managed through a special treasury account.10 Voice was expanded through a strategic approach to planning that enabled the DCCs to discuss alternative district development strategies.

This raised the debate above squabbling over competing priorities for annual “projects” to a more substantive discussion about development pathways and how to influence them within a local government structure.

An influential tribal leader in Meconta district outlined how, prior to the exercise, he did not really believe that peace had arrived and had indeed been influencing the boycott of the state services. However, he was now convinced otherwise and would be collaborating with the district government, representing the present state idea of Mozambique.11 The

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Figure 14.1 Breakdown of Mozambique provincial budgets, 2000 and 2001 (per cent) Source: Jackson (2004).

“Nampula model” was scaled up nationally and in 2003 the Local State Bodies Law (Lei dos Orgãos Locais do Estado) extended its features nationwide, including increased transfers to district administrations through a District Development Fund.

This dual approach of rural deconcentration and partial urban municipalization was successful in gently reducing subjective conflict drivers.

The second city (Beira, approximately 600,000 citizens) elected a RENAMO-backed mayor, whose route to success lay in improving local government services. In other RENAMO-supported cities with a history of conflict, such as Angoche, the municipal process directed politics towards the civic and away from challenges to the state idea. In Nacala municipality, for example, the value of receitas proprias (municipal own revenue) soon exceeded the provincial transfers to autarquias for recurrent and capital expenditure that Figure 14.1 illustrates as a small percentage of provincial expenditure.

In the districts this strategy also paid off. The Nampula experience was credited with defusing tensions and creating unity around a development

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plan. The Consultative Council model allowed for the incorporation of key interests, in particular local chiefs, without a challenge to political power.

The contribution of local governance to the post-conflict period In this section I shall apply the four criteria introduced above. Independent observers note the increased legitimacy of district government institutions (Borowczak et al., 2004; Galli, 2003; Pijnenburg, 2004; Roll, 2004).

Although a causal link is difficult to establish, it is notable that the FRELIMO vote in Nampula rose significantly between the 1994 and 1999 general elections – in contrast to its vote in other previously RENAMOsupporting areas of Zambezia and Sofala provinces. District administrators and other high-ranking FRELIMO party members have testified to the effect of the Nampula model in changing perceptions in rural districts.12 Local state institutions were no longer seen as synonymous with FRELIMO but instead perceived as representing the citizen. Despite this, Weimer (2012) illustrates that by 2012 effective party control of the state apparatus was greater than ever and Consultative Councils have crystallized into vehicles for rent distribution overtly designed to promote a local business sector. There are similarities here with the outcome in Cambodia and lessons on achieving balance between the local developmental state and open local democracy. The two are not necessarily mutually exclusive but tensions can exist. It may be that increased legitimacy means that relatively autocratic rule is no longer contested (or at least passive-aggressively tolerated) by populations enjoying the fruits of wider economic growth and therefore established without challenging the ruling group.

This leads us to the impact of the local government changes on the wider state idea. In Mozambique this was perhaps partial. Certainly there was a change in rural perceptions in Nampula for long enough to pass the Rondinelli and Montgomery (2005) and Bebbington and McCourt (2007) 10-year threshold for peacekeeping and development success, respectively. Yet Weimer (2012) comprehensively documents how the reforms had decayed by 2012. The advent of municipalities and the novelty of municipal elections were temporarily significant (witness the RENAMO-supported mayor elected head of Beira). However, limited resources and circumscribed revenue-raising powers were ceded to the municipalities and their arrival has not ushered in a real plural power structure.

The issue of resources is linked to the criterion on service delivery.

In Nampula between 1996 and 2006 over US$10 million was spent directly by district governments (Jackson, 2007). This was approximately one-fifth of the other local public investments by international agencies

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and central bodies, but the key factor is that the districts became active participants – their voice was heard – in the post-war reconstruction rather than being passive recipients. It is the fact of district activity, rather than the volume of their 20 per cent contribution, that appears to have contributed to the peace. In the case of the RENAMO-supported mayor, it was similarly the improved urban environment of Beira that signalled change rather than the overall level of service provision.

The role of local government in promoting local economic development and economically empowering ex-combatants was not a significant criterion in the Mozambique case. Indeed, Hodges (2004) illustrates that many key RENAMO leaders were incorporated into the parliamentary system rather than through local government. In the municipalities, FRELIMO was careful to limit the power of locally elected mayors, and at district level the Consultative Councils did not play a role of promoting ex-RENAMO combatant interests.

In conclusion, local government reforms in Mozambique were able to cement peace by extending the legitimacy of the prevailing state idea to citizens supporting the losing side of a civil war for an initial period. This contributed to a second electoral victory for the governing party, which arguably ended any potential for renewed armed conflict. In doing so, the state system was able to expand its reach and accelerate immediate socioeconomic recovery. The resulting peace has been stable, although central control has been enhanced and local democracy circumscribed. Service delivery partially played a role in this, but the role of local economic development was limited. The overall economy has grown consistently, despite concerns over rising inequalities.

14.3.2 Angola – conflict profile and the state idea In 1974, the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA13) claimed independence from Portugal, triggering a civil war with UNITA – an alternative independence movement with a nationalist and less socialist ideology.14 In a country endowed with the “curse of abundant resources”, oil and diamond wealth financed this conflict until the death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi and the ceasefire agreement of 2002. The country was also a proxy battlefield in the Cold War. The United States and South Africa provided backing to UNITA whereas the Soviet Union and Cuba supported the MPLA (Hodges, 2004).

MPLA support was largely drawn from the coastal cities and the urban elite. UNITA, on the other hand, reflected a more “Africanist” tradition identified with inland ethnic groups and cultures. Modernism versus tradition is one way to characterize the distinction. The MPLA sought “modernizing” development paradigms (socialism as a development

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instrument was followed swiftly by other technocratic fixes). The coastal mestizo communities had for centuries looked outwards towards Brazil and Europe rather than identifying with the territorial hinterland. For the elite, the Angolan state idea was a version of Rostow’s model of economic growth (Rostow, 1960); the purpose of Angola was to “enlighten” its population and modernize its economy – taking it through the stages of development and to some extent continuing the Portuguese “civilizing mission”. This transformational state idea was not universally accepted, contributing to subjective motives for conflict.

The long conflict resulted in large numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs) and extensive tracts of territory left uninhabited. In 2002, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that as many as 30 per cent of the 11 million Angolans were IDPs. These were not a chaotic heterogeneous mass of individuals; instead, whole communities migrated as one, taking their governance structures with them (for example, births and marriages were registered according to the original villages of those concerned, even though some camps were over 20 years old). The host districts, applying their mandate of vital registration, faithfully maintained registers linking the IDPs to their original locations. These data were not available in the aid agency registers (UNDP, 2002). IDPs were located either in discrete settlements amongst a host community – farming marginal land and working as labourers for the hosts – or in officially organized camps linked to aid organizations. Some went to the larger urban centres, where there was a degree of dissipation. At the time of the peace agreement in 2002, most IDPs lived in areas under government control waiting patiently for the chance to go home.

The prerequisite for return expressed by many IDPs was the presence of order and security represented by official local government structures.

This took precedence over social services, with IDPs saying that they had lived in their ancestral homes before there were schools and they could do so again. For many IDPs, despite a generation’s absence, the notion of peace was synonymous with a return home. As stated above, the IDPs maintained a parallel governance system (not the official state system) during their exile from their own territory.

Local governance policy response In 2002, Angola comprised 18 provinces and 163 districts (called municipios). There are similarities to the system of dual subordination in Mozambique but also differences. Constant conflict and communication difficulties contributed to the provincial governors acquiring delegated politico-military powers and controlling some line agency budgets. Provinces, de facto if not de jure, operated as devolved authorities and imple-

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Figure 14.2 Breakdown of Huambo province expenditure, 2002 (per cent) Source: UNDP (2002).

mented investment programmes. Districts performed business processes involving significant sums (for example, processing line agency staff salaries), but political autonomy and discretionary resources at district level were negligible, as illustrated by the provincial transfers to districts in Huambo province in 2002 (Figure 14.2).

Although lines of communication existed between local government and rural citizens (IDPs or otherwise), the opportunity for exercising voice was minimal. The constitutional amendment of 1992 envisaged local elections at district level – at the time of writing (2012) these have not taken place.

This case study examines an attempt to apply a local government solution to accelerate the return of the IDPs to their homes immediately following the peace agreement. The ministry responsible for territorial administration and other champions of local government argued that the homecoming of IDPs presented an opportunity to begin the rebuilding of local governance structures in areas previously vacated as a result of the conflict and to re-legitimize the state there – along the lines of the Mozambique case study. Yet it was the IDPs themselves who presented the clearest answers. They insisted that they wanted to go home, with one prerequisite: the assurance that “government” had been restored in their areas of origin. By this they meant not UNITA or MPLA but rather security and established authority.

Facilitating the return of IDPs appeared to be a route towards reestablishing services and government legitimacy in depopulated areas.

Yet there are echoes of my introductory discussion about the link between territory and nation or sense of self. IDPs were not seeking better

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service delivery; they simply wanted to go home. Government officials collaborated in drawing up detailed maps indicating where the IDPs were located now and where they would return to, and designing a programme for their transport and resettlement. In Huambo province, 370,000 people were affected; of these, 86 per cent would return to a home location within the same district, indicating that the proposal was challenging but practical (UNDP, 2002).

District and sub-district administrations would have responsibility for allocating resources, including resettlement packs, establishing zones of settlement and supervising the return in coordination with international agencies. A distinction was made between the delegation of decisionmaking, the administrative logistics of implementation and the financial management of funds. Given the quasi-military nature of the state system, a separate account would disburse funds but enable local government to take the lead in decision-making and, as far as possible, administration. Government could also potentially contribute its own resources. This provided a role for local government in a newly repopulated territory and would link citizens back to the (local) state, weaning them away from parallel agencies. In time this structure would enable the introduction of district and sub-district development funds, providing a pathway for the decentralization reform envisaged in the peace agreement and enabling a recovery of the local economy. Figure 14.3 outlines this intervention logic.

However, there was a flaw in the proposal: it neglected to consider the overarching state idea of modernism over traditionalism. The proposal was resisted by those in government (including some provincial leaders), who felt that it would be more effective to develop the now vacant lands as plantations or ranches and to create job opportunities by locating, for example, processing plants next to the camps, enabling IDPs to graduate to wage-earner status. Some aid agencies, possibly fearing a loss of control and influence, also argued that a network of social infrastructure had been built around the camps and these investments would be wasted if the IDPs returned home. These arguments were motivated by a modernist vision that equated progress with wage labour and social services rather than smallholder and subsistence farming – accelerating Angola’s progression up Rostow’s ladder. The private interests involved presented themselves as promoting development. The proposal was rejected; conflict did not return.

The contribution of local governance to the post-conflict period The previous paragraph illustrates that the government did not feel the need to enhance its legitimacy or listen to IDPs. Unlike the Mozambique case study, the victory of the MPLA over UNITA was overwhelming and

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Figure 14.3 Intervention logic of the local government approach to the reintegration of IDP: From good local governance to post-conflict recovery and IDP reintegration.

Source: UNDP (2002).

electoral popularity and legitimacy were a secondary matter. The local government approach held little appeal and the legitimacy criterion for the role of local government in post-conflict environments was not applied. The local government proposal for the return of IDPs evoked Tendler’s study (1998) on leadership and sought to encourage district administrators to develop new peacetime roles as promoters of local development rather than guarantors of security. However, this was not seen as an initial priority. Linked to the inapplicability of my first two criteria is the broader position on the status of Angola’s polity following the peace agreement. The protagonists in my first case study fought themselves to a draw and RENAMO bargained from a position of some strength. UNITA was not in this position and in effect surrendered.

My third criterion provides the key to understanding why some international aid agencies supported the option of keeping the IDPs in their

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camps. There was no recognition of the ability of local government to provide a more efficient or effective set of services. In addition, many agencies felt that the investments in schools and other infrastructure would be superfluous if the IDPs returned home (UNDP, 2002). These considerations may have been motivated by a fear (partially correct) that there would be a reduced role for the agencies themselves had local government assumed leadership of the IDP issue.

A further lesson from this case study relates to my fourth criterion.

The potential local government role in promoting local economic development, and indeed the notion of local development itself (as presented

by Romeo in Chapter 3 in this volume), was an anathema to those seeking to use the changes brought by the conflict to reshape the rural economic and demographic landscape. The peace agreement followed an earlier power-sharing agreement that had broken down in renewed conflict. Therefore this time round there was little appetite for sharing the spoils with UNITA. To conclude, the Angolan state idea was transformational and the demographic changes created by the conflict were used to transform socioeconomic relations in areas considered undeveloped and create a “modern” labour force. Unlike in Mozambique, the peace agreement did not imply a nominal move from subject to citizen with regard to the involvement of the population in civic affairs. During the last decade, investment has taken place in some of the locations referred to and many IDPs never returned “home”. There was no role for local government in post-conflict recovery because strengthening local governance institutions might have complicated the post-conflict changes envisioned by the victors and therefore the four criteria were not relevant. Now that a decade has passed since the ending of the conflict, there is renewed consideration of greater decentralization. However, this should be seen in the context of Angola’s broader institutional development and not as a postconflict measure.

14.3.3 Timor-Leste – conflict profile and the state idea Similar to the previous case studies, this small territory of fewer than 1 million people comprising one-half of the island of Timor was also a Portuguese colony that initially achieved independence in 1974 when the Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) assumed power.15 Indonesia forcibly annexed the territory shortly afterwards and Timor-Leste became an Indonesian province until the referendum and subsequent violence in 1999. Full independence was achieved in 2002 following three years as a UN protectorate, although internal conflict has sporadically returned.

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The oil deposits under the Timor Sea were a material motive for the annexation. However, subjective factors linked to the state idea played a large role. Timor-Leste is half of an island in the Indonesian archipelago.

Anderson (2006) chronicles in detail the construction of the Indonesian imagined community from a myriad of local cultures and languages spread over 20,000 islands. For Indonesians, it is logical that the East Timorese should be part of this. The state idea of “unity in diversity” was cemented during the independence war with the Netherlands in the 1940s, of which the East Timorese were slumberous observers under the benign neglect of the Portuguese. Unlike in the larger, richer African colonies, there was no real struggle for Timorese independence from its European colonial ruler. On the contrary, the Timorese proudly focus on their links with Portugal since the sixteenth century and their conflict with Dutch Protestantism and Javanese Islam ever since. Indonesia considered Timor-Leste a natural part of its family; the Timorese did not wish to be adopted.

The imagined community of Timor-Leste is rooted in its Portuguese and Catholic heritage, and the state idea, or purpose, of the newly independent country is about establishing a sustainable model for this unique identity sandwiched between the giants of Indonesia and Australia.

Within this framework, politics is polarized into two camps: the FRETILIN party, which briefly assumed power in 1974, and the National Council of Timorese Resistance (Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorense, CNRT), which became an umbrella resistance group during the Indonesian occupation. The case study will examine the role of local government in establishing a stable and peaceful state in the post-independence period.

Local governance policy response The territory is divided into 13 districts, 65 sub-districts and over 450 sucos (a level of community organization in the rural areas and a block of housing in urban locations). On the eve of independence the districts, led by provincial governor appointees, played an important role in managing many government processes and were responsible for significant resources. In 1993, over 17,000 predominantly Timorese staff worked at district level prior to independence, directly managing US$32 million (Gomes, 2001). This compares with around 304 district administration staff managing US$2.8 million – which included their salaries – in 2002.

Line agency staff in the districts did not control budgets or manage business processes in 2002 and depended on Dili, the capital city, for most operations (República Democrática de Timor-Leste, 2003) Following the post-independence exodus of Indonesian loyalists, the few capable officials who remained were drawn to Dili, where a key feature of the post-independence period has been the building up of

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national institutions where none previously existed. New ministries were hungry for qualified Timorese staff. Most district staff under the Indonesian administration had been Timorese and many moved to the capital.

The emergent institutions were largely underwritten by donor support and were consequently structured as “projects”. For example, the initial state finances were organized under a World Bank trust fund and at first the embryonic Ministry of State Administration and Territorial Management functioned under United Nations Development Programme financial regulations. District heads (originally expatriate appointees) had financial approval authority limited to US$50 petty cash, in contrast to their much larger earlier role. Channels for local voice were limited outside the CNRT, FRETILIN political formations and a community grants project whose structures became a forum for contact with development agencies.

Although the 26 years as an Indonesian province were characterized by repression of East Timorese political identity, they also involved significant economic growth, partially driven by local government’s promotion of local economic development and an inward migration policy for Javanese and others from elsewhere in Indonesia. The failure to return swiftly to a (democratized version of) local territorial administration was holding up the ability to deliver development results on the ground despite increased flows of official development assistance. Newly created ministries were unable to maximize the benefit from the international assistance and the money fuelled a bubble economy in Dili.

In 2003, the government commissioned a report on options for local government in the new state (República Democrática de Timor-Leste, 2003). From the six options presented, the government chose a districtbased system including elected assemblies and municipal mayors. A local government support project tested discretionary grants to local levels and rebuilt the concomitant local public financial management and planning capacity in readiness for significantly increased intergovernmental fiscal transfers to the new local governments.16 By 2009, central government had incorporated the system into its budget and extended it nationwide, but the institutional architecture of local government had not changed – district and sub-district heads were still centrally contracted staff of the Ministry of State Administration and Territorial Management, had minimal operational budgets and most local development resources, including the oil funds that came on stream in 2010, were channelled through central ministries.

Conflict reappeared in 2006 and 2007 in the form of a power struggle between FRETILIN and CNRT, which also involved disputes within the security services between those from the east of Timor-Leste and those from its west. The UN intervention extended its mandate with new terms

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of reference and there was a change of government from FRETILIN to a CNRT-led coalition, although the new administration was as hesitant as its predecessor on local government reform. Politics remains a zero-sum game: power and resources remain in Dili and there are no alternative political outlets or plural power structure to accommodate differing identities. Despite reference in the Constitution to a system of municipal local government and despite its potential economic and political benefits, at the time of writing (2012) such a system has not been created in TimorLeste.

The contribution of local governance to the post-conflict period Again I apply my four criteria. As in the previous case study, there was no need for local government to perform a role in increasing state legitimacy because the newly established state already had a high level of legitimacy – having just been created following a popular referendum.

Leadership and feel-good factors were connected to the recently concluded national independence struggle. Yet the failure to consider seriously the role of local government meant that there was no space for politicians in the regions or for those not working for the government of the day. This led to frustration amongst the ambitious and talented in Timor-Leste’s fractious political class. Greater emphasis on the potential for local government with respect to my second criterion may have reduced the scope for renewed conflict.

With regard to service delivery, the picture is stark. The Local Government Options Study (República Democrática de Timor-Leste, 2003) demonstrated the potential for district-led service delivery by documenting the scale of district responsibilities and capacities under the Indonesian regime. The government subsequently moved ahead to increase district budget allocations marginally and to introduce an investment component.

Yet, without the concomitant assignment of functions to the local level, the main responsibility for service delivery remains concentrated in central ministries located in the capital, which struggled to deliver in the initial post-war period. The priority has been building a central state capacity where previously none existed. Before independence, more civil servants worked in the districts than in the provincial (now national) capital; this situation is now reversed. It can be argued that part of the reason for continued unrest was the difficulty in reactivating the role of the districts in providing employment and services. There is an irony that, whereas Timor-Leste has centralized, the neighbouring Indonesian province that includes West Timor has (as part of Indonesia’s 1999 reform) moved in the opposite direction, and the gap in rural development between the two halves of the island has widened in West Timor’s favour.

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A similar case can be made for the role of local government in local economic development. This function was prioritized under the Indonesian administration in an attempt to win Timorese “hearts and minds” and also to provide employment for the inward migration encouraged from other parts of Indonesia. The newly independent state did not continue this policy. It is significant that the re-occurrence of conflict was over issues of employment and alleged regional discrimination within the security and police forces – linked to the local identities described above.

It is symptomatic of the failure to prioritize local solutions that this type of employment is so important.

Timor-Leste presents an example of a missed opportunity for local government to contribute successfully to post-conflict recovery and stabilization – which might have avoided the renewed violence. Why was there such reluctance to decentralize when the economic and political advantages appear so clear? Arguments about low capacity ring hollow in the light of the Indonesian decentralization process in neighbouring islands with similar human resource constraints. Instead, two reasons can be put forward. First, Timor-Leste has a brand-new state system and a state idea enjoying high legitimacy. The central government institutions are only now becoming sustainable and shedding donor support. There is little appetite amongst these new and growing institutions to devolve power. Secondly, there is an attendant lack of enthusiasm amongst politicians when in power (from both main political groupings) to create a platform for their opponents, who, given the evenly balanced standing of the two sides, would be likely to gain the leadership of a number of districts.

14.3.4 Indonesia (Aceh) – conflict profile and the state idea Aceh is at the other end of the Indonesian archipelago from Timor-Leste, and the Acehnese, like the Timorese, were never totally subdued by the Portuguese, the Dutch or the Javanese. Islam entered the archipelago through Aceh and for centuries the territory was a wealthy independent sultanate with links to Persia and Turkey, which provided a modicum of protection during disputes with the Dutch. Although eventually absorbed within the Dutch East Indies, Aceh remained restless and, in contrast to Timor-Leste, the Acehnese elite played a major role in the independence movement and in the shaping of the Indonesian imagined community from its multiple identities.17 The state idea is embodied in an official state philosophy known as Pancasila, or the five principles. These are: belief in one God; just and civilized humanity; unity; democracy (literally, decisions taken by deliberations of representatives); and social justice.

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Each president interpreted Pancasila differently, yet it constantly defined a key purpose of Indonesia – the world’s fourth-largest country with a population of 240 million – as resisting centripetal forces and maintaining unity amongst the different ethnicities and religions spread across over 20,000 islands.

Yet for the Acehnese independence was a disappointment. The province moved from a proud semi-subdued nation and protagonist in the independence struggle to becoming just another province under centralized control from Jakarta. Further ignominy ensued as oil and gas revenues from Aceh contributed to Indonesia’s economic growth while the province itself slipped to being the fourth poorest (out of 33) in 2005. This fuelled the separatist conflict waged against Jakarta by the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM). Partly in acknowledgement of Aceh’s “difference”, the central government implemented a sharia law system in 2003, though this was not a key demand of the largely secular GAM. Some observers considered this to be a divide and rule tactic appealing to the conservative Islamic population of the province over the heads of the GAM leadership.

The 2004 tsunami and earthquake changed everything. The merciless destruction and loss of life (on both sides) immediately halted fighting.

Imprisoned GAM leaders escaped, and a ceasefire was negotiated together with legislation on “special” autonomy for the province, including a constitutional amendment to allow local (and not only national) parties to stand in local elections. This option was not open to Timor-Leste but it approximated the demands of some East Timorese pre-1999. There is evidence that Jakarta had learned from losing Timor-Leste when it acceded to legislation that allowed full self-expression of the Acehnese nation, including a guaranteed provincial share of revenues from natural resources, extra powers not available to other provinces and the right to use previously taboo symbols such as the Acehnese flag. The peace agreement acknowledged the special status, but would the reforms (including to the local state system) be sufficient to diminish separatist feeling?

A further post-tsunami development was the establishment of the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi, BRR), which had ministry status but was based in Aceh and charged with overseeing the tsunami recovery. BRR was a temporary central agency with special, far-reaching responsibilities. It was not directly linked to the peace process yet its heavy field presence and budget of US$2 billion, together with its mandate to coordinate the inflows of aid (a further US$2 billion), gave it a status that dislodged provincial and district local government and led to distrust from some who saw BRR as an agent of Jakarta.

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Local governance policy response Separatist leader Irwandi Yusuf won the gubernatorial election and inherited a weak provincial bureaucracy accustomed to working in conditions of conflict and martial law. Like other Indonesian provinces, Aceh was also seeking to redefine its role in the light of the growing power – and number – of districts since the 1999 big bang decentralization reforms (Ahmad et al., 2008; Sudarmo and Sudjana, 2009). On the eve of his inauguration, Yusuf expressed a fear that the position would be tantamount to returning to prison because the provincial state system would still be loyal to Jakarta.18 A further concern was whether the provinces and districts would have the capacity to absorb the additional responsibilities in the special autonomy legislation and manage the reconstruction following the closure of BRR and the handing over of its programmes.

The scale of this challenge is illustrated by Figure 14.4. Although in 2005 Aceh was the fourth-poorest province in the country, it became the third-richest in terms of resources per capita. In addition to the reconstruction resources shown in Figure 14.4, the province benefited from the formula-based block grant system to provinces and districts introduced in the 1999 decentralization reform partially motivated by Timor-Leste’s

Figure 14.4 Evolution of Aceh’s local revenue, 1999–2006 Source: World Bank (2007).

Note: Kab/Kota = district/municipality.

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breakaway. Under this formula, 3 per cent of government expenditure in any given year is allocated to provinces and districts as a block grant. In Aceh this was augmented by an additional 2 per cent paid as a special autonomy grant from 2008 to 2033 as compensation for the declining emergency funding, together with a 55 per cent share of oil revenues and a 40 per cent share of gas revenues emanating from the province. These were shared between the province and the districts on a 60:40 basis, with the province maintaining final approval of the district budgets. The Aceh Government Transformation Programme was a twin-track reform package designed to support the province in meeting this challenge. Like the Nampula model, the design was partly inspired by Tendler’s insights on what motivates government bureaucracies (Tendler, 1998).19 First, provincial department head positions were advertised and applications sought from across the country. Malaysian and British consultants designed a recruitment process that emphasized a public service ethos and introduced state-of-the-art techniques in candidate assessment. This was unprecedented within the Indonesian state system and contrasted with the usual patronage system for appointments. The innovation enabled the new administration to refresh the departmental leadership whilst demonstrating a pioneering approach to public sector reform that stressed Aceh’s positive progressive difference, in contrast to its hitherto negative image.

Secondly, a temporary team of advisers was created to incorporate key members of the governor’s network. These included ex-ministers, academics, civil society figures and even ex-combatants. The team enabled Jakarta and BRR to know who to call as they established links with the new administration and provided a constructive role for important figures who otherwise would have remained influential but shadowy and outside the formal system. The temporary teams were disbanded in 2007 but their policy impact remained and some were otherwise absorbed into the provincial administration. The teams were charged with policy development, such as charting a course for the peaceful integration of demobilized combatants, smooth realignment of political and economic relations with central government and the policy for the distribution of the share of the now increased natural resource revenues to the districts. An illustration of success was the significant increase in budget execution rates from less than 60 per cent prior to the tsunami to over 80 per cent across local government institutions. In 2009, the provincial budget was approved in January – the first month of the budget year – rather than during the second quarter, as previously practised. The province had a reputation for high levels of corruption during the 30-year conflict.

This local governance policy response was controversial. Some critics of the programme argued that providing such open support to the incoming

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administration was risky and that replacing heads of department negated previous capacity-building efforts. A further case was that, because BRR and the Multi Donor Trust Fund for Aceh and Nias (a vehicle for pooling donor funds) were established for post-tsunami work, they should not be used for anything linked to post-conflict Aceh (whereas in fact the two processes were inextricably intertwined). Others argued that local government capacity-building was not relevant to the post-disaster agenda.

At root the objection was to the methodology employed, which was different from mainstream capacity-building and overtly linked local government to the peace-building process. However, this phased approach to post-disaster work culminating in capacity development was later adopted and presented as one of the key lessons of the support to Aceh’s recovery (Multi Donor Trust Fund for Aceh and Nias, 2012).

The efficacy of this model can be seen in the changes to the Acehnese state idea. In public speeches, the governor initially preferred to locate Aceh not as part of Indonesia but within Nusantara – a term for the wider Malay region, embracing Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Brunei. At the end of his first mandate, in contrast, Aceh was referred to in speeches as a (special) province of Indonesia.

The contribution of local governance to the post-conflict period Looking at the Aceh example through the lens of the four criteria highlights differences from Timor-Leste. In this case, the province remained part of Indonesia and therefore the legitimacy of the provincial government and the new arrangement with Jakarta were crucial to the wider success of the peace agreement. Although Aceh received a special status, there was limited concentration of power in the province and the districts remained the direct beneficiaries of the increased fiscal transfers from the oil revenues, distributed through a formula designed by the province – further enhancing the legitimacy of the new arrangements.

The leadership of governor Irwandi Yusuf in shepherding this process was an important factor, and the inclusion of the advisory team as part of the provincial government created a sense of change and hope. The team included high-profile and controversial figures, and the local and national press picked up on their inclusion. Their presence inside the administration indicated that things had changed. Among the four case studies this is the strongest example of the effectiveness of the second criterion for local government to contribute to peace-building.

The improvements in budget process and budget delivery at both provincial and district levels reduced service delivery delays (including previous delays in salary payments) and also perceptions of corruption and misuse of funds, which could provoke resentment. The formula-based nature of the block grant means that, as Indonesia’s economy grows, so

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does local government revenue. From 2011 to 2012 the Aceh grant increased from 4.4 trillion rupiah to 5.4 trillion rupiah, illustrating the importance to the peace of legitimacy and strengthened public financial management. As in my first case study, local governments were active participants in the recovery process rather than passive beneficiaries, which may have improved decision-making quality.

Given the sheer volume of investment in post-conflict Aceh, it is difficult to separate the specific contribution of local government to the postconflict economic recovery. Yet there were provincial initiatives designed to provide livelihoods for ex-combatants while simultaneously meeting other goals. One of these was Aceh Green, which sought access to carbon credits (for not cutting down rainforest). There was an attempt to use the local government’s economic influence to further the peace.

To summarize, the reforms to the local state system helped foster a new Aceh state idea that actively promotes the province within the broader context of Indonesia and not in contrast to it. This begins the process by which the Acehnese embrace their position within Indonesia – just like the other ethnicities on the island of Sumatra. The price of this is Jakarta’s acceptance of Aceh’s historical difference and the provision of additional resources and powers to local government. The process also reflects a strategy of asymmetric decentralization in interpreting the Indonesian state idea, where government is prepared to adopt unique measures with the objective of keeping the country together. Like the first case study, the Aceh case is an example of the positive role of local government in post-conflict recovery in which all four of my criteria are applied.

14.4 Conclusion In this chapter I have argued there can be a role for local government in sustaining the peace following civil conflict. However, defining this role requires a challenge to formulaic approaches to post-conflict environments that fail to ask the questions: Who won? Who lost? And what are the consequences? Instead, I suggest that these questions must be an integral part of any examination of post-conflict societies and of local government’s role within them. This illustrates the relevance of Abrams’ (1988) concept of the state idea, which permits us to examine the innate purpose and premise that underpin the polity and its institutions and that define the parameters of accepted political discourse.

I have attempted to answer these questions through four criteria to measure local government effectiveness in contributing to post-conflict recovery: the fostering of state legitimacy in the aftermath of conflict; the

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encouragement of feelings of inclusion, hope, happiness and opportunity; the provision of infrastructure and services; the promotion of local economic development and economic empowerment, including for excombatants.

In Mozambique, the ruling party narrowly won the election following the conflict and used an enhanced local planning process and local discretionary budget allocations (initially in Nampula province and then nationwide) to reinforce the state idea in rural areas under a system of deconcentration and district administrations. Limited devolution to elected municipal assemblies was applied in urban areas. Central government was careful to avoid challenges to its political hegemony. However, in the municipalities it did enable some political pluralism within the context of the prevailing state idea, and in the rural areas government bodies did improve services. There was little economic empowerment. In this model, local government played a role in reducing conflict drivers and establishing peace and a feel-good factor, particularly in a key province. This set the stage for social and economic improvement, but local democracy was not fully developed.

In Angola, the ruling party also won the conflict but by contrast did not use local government to reinforce the state idea. A local government solution to the return and reintegration of large numbers of IDPs was rejected (it would have resulted in a similar rural governance model to that in the first case study). Instead, policy-makers suggested using the new demographic reality to prioritize agro-industrial wage labour programmes for the IDPs. There was no interest in developing local government or increasing citizen voice. Through the peace agreement most subjective conflict drivers had largely been diminished owing to war weariness. The criteria for local government effectiveness in peace-building were not tested. However, the peace was sustained for the 10-year period and Angola experienced rapid economic growth, rising inequalities, autarchy and autocracy. There is now renewed interest in decentralization reform – but this is not linked to conflict resolution.

In Timor-Leste, government legitimacy and the feel-good factor were present in the initial post-conflict period. There was no need for a decentralization policy to contribute to stability. Yet optimism faded because the new state was unable to organize itself to deliver local development, local employment and services. Resources, both human and financial, were drawn to the capital and the focus was on creating and building national institutions rather than investing in the regions. As a result, conflict reappeared. There were many missed opportunities to introduce local government into the state system. In the context of Timor-Leste this would not question, and could indeed reinforce, the state idea. However, this long-term vision was not present amongst the political leader-

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ship and reform was stymied. At the time of writing (2012), the newly available oil revenues are largely distributed through the centralized structures, further concentrating political and economic activity. The Timor-Leste case study demonstrates conditions in which my third and fourth criteria (service delivery and local economic development) could have been effective in maintaining post-conflict stability.

In Aceh, all four criteria demonstrated the effectiveness, in the right circumstances, of local government in securing post-conflict stability and peace. The acceptance of Acehnese political and representative identity legitimized its provincial government. The state system was reformed and provided with additional resources. Existing decentralization legislation already provided a degree of political, administrative and fiscal autonomy to the districts, meaning that the province could not concentrate powers and was obliged to deliver its policies and share of oil revenues through these districts. At the time of writing (2012), this particular local government solution to post-conflict settlement appears to be delivering both economic and political benefits. These provide a background to the ongoing debates about the nature of Acehnese society, its relationship with Islam and its place within Indonesia. Local government and local development may influence the outcome of this debate towards a confident, open Aceh.

To conclude, policy-makers should look beyond simplistic solutions in post-conflict environments. The route to peace often lies not only in service delivery and economic development but also in addressing the feelings, emotions, identities and ideologies that drive the combatants and those supporting them. Local government becomes important when the local state is a practical vehicle for resolving these issues. Whether or not it can do so depends on the nature of the conflict and the nature of the peace settlement – and can be judged on a case-by-case basis using the four criteria proposed in this chapter.

Notes 1. My involvement is as follows: in Mozambique from 1992 to 2001 as adviser to the Ministry of Planning and Finance, then Chief Technical Advisor of the District Planning and Financing Project referred to in note 10; in Angola in 2002 and 2006 as consultant for the United Nations and the European Union, respectively, including design (with Leonardo Romeo) of the IDP return proposal presented in the case study and contributions to the European Union Country Strategy Paper 2008–2013; in Timor-Leste in 2003 as co-author of the Local Government Options Study commissioned by the Timor-Leste government, with subsequent visits in 2005 and from 2009; in Indonesia as decentralization adviser for the United Nations responsible for the design and initial implementation of the Aceh Government Transformation Programme presented in the case study.

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2. For reviews of the literature, see Brinkerhoff (2005) and UNDP BCPR (2008). For two symposiums involving practitioners, see reports and papers from UNDP (2008) and UNPAN (2008).

3. The state idea and state system dichotomy presented by Abrams (1988) was part of a wider argument within political sociology on the nature of the state, involving Milliband, Easton and Poulantzas. The “imagined community” concept of Anderson (2006) stems from his analysis of the roots of nationalism. The argument presented here brings the two separate, but linked, concepts together.

4. Each case study draws on my concrete engagement and my previously published material (with associated bibliographies). For Mozambique, see Jackson (2007). For Angola, see UNDP (2002). For Timor-Leste, see República Democrática de Timor-Leste (2003). For Indonesia, see Republic of Indonesia and United Nations Development Programme (2008). The technical distinctions between the local government arrangements in the four case studies are detailed in Jackson (2008).

5. Mozambique: General Peace Accords, October 1992. Angola: Law 23/92 (constitutional revision), September 1992. In the case of Angola this constitutional amendment anticipated the Lusaka Peace Accords of the same year. Conflict broke out again, but the final ceasefire in 2002 referred back to the original agreements. Timor-Leste: Constitution adopted in March 2002. Indonesia: Law on Governing Aceh, November 2006.

6. Voice in local government does not necessarily require elections. Mohamad G. Alkadry (2003) usefully points out the voice exercised by bureaucrats either on their own behalf or on behalf of lobbying citizens – who can also be neighbours and share the group characteristics. See Hirschman (1970) for a discussion of the terms “exit” and “voice” in economic and political transactions.

7. FRELIMO stands for Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front).

8. RENAMO stands for Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance).

9. A map in Vines (1991) indicates the territory controlled by RENAMO in 1990, which corresponds closely to the voting patterns in the 1994 elections.

10. The District Planning and Financing Project supported the Nampula experiment. It was financed by the Netherlands Government and the United Nations Capital Development Fund.

11. Interview with tribal leader (regulo) from the district of Meconta captured on film produced for the Provincial Directorate of Planning and Finance, Nampula, 1999.

12. Personal interviews with senior party members, including the then governor of Nampula province.

13. MPLA stands for Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola.

14. UNITA stands for União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola).

15. FRETILIN stands for Frente Revolucionária do Timor Leste Independente.

16. The Local Development Programme supported the piloting of the district grants. It was financed by the Government of Ireland and the United Nations Capital Development Fund.

17. For example, the air force of the independence movement was provided by wealthy Acehnese.

18. Interview by me with Irwandi Yusuf, 2006.

19. Tendler (1998) provides a substantiated analysis of the role of varied factors such as identity, pride, leadership and good working environments in successful “good government” initiatives.

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REFERENCES Abrams, P. (1988) “Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State”, Journal of Historical Sociology 1(1).

Ahmad, T., Darmawan, D. Jackson, S. Nazara and D. A. Purwanto (2008) Evaluation of the Proliferation of Administrative Region in Indonesia 2001–2007.

Jakarta: BAPPENAS and UNDP. Available at <http://www.undp.or.id/pubs/ docs/pemekaran_EN.pdf> (accessed 23 April 2013).

Alkadry, M. G. (2003) “Deliberative Discourse between Citizens and Administrators: If Citizens Talk, Will Administrators Listen?”, Administration & Society 35(2): 184 –209.

Anderson, B. (2006) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso.

Bebbington, A. and W. McCourt (eds) (2007) Development Success: Statecraft in the South. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

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15 Decentralization as a path to democratic governance and state-building? Conclusions on emerging challenges Anki Dellnäs and Joakim Öjendal

15.1 Approaches and ambitions To establish “Good Enough Local Governance” (to paraphrase Grindle, 2004) in a decentralized structure under a democratic regime is in essence an effort to forge deep, sustainable and efficient state–society relations. This is achieved through reforms that are well designed and policies that attempt to correct a previously inadequate system and/or promote a more durable one. Such efforts are urgent in instances where the state has not reached its potential, politically or administratively, a common condition in a more globalized world in which the role of the state is rapidly shifting and the expectations of citizens rising. It is even more urgent in situations of state failure and in states going through post-conflict reconstruction processes.

Although this volume was mainly meant to focus on decentralization and emerging trends in local governance, it is also solidly situated in the state–society tradition of social science (Dahl, 1971; Evans et al., 1985; Migdal, 1988, 2001), adopting a political economy perspective that looks at “who gets what and why” (see Manor, 1999). It also explicitly links to the good governance literature (Craig and Porter, 2006; Eaton et al., 2010; Grindle, 2007) in order to put the critical political economy approach to work in a framework of policy-making where good governance can be crafted through democratic decentralization, provided it is fitted to particular contexts and needs.

The imperative of good local governance: Challenges for the next decade of decentralization, Öjendal and Dellnäs (eds), United Nations University Press, 2013, ISBN 978-92-808-1229-9

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Taking both state and society seriously led to a focus on how decentralization could and should be crafted within the context of the state, alongside looking at the need for reform from a societal point of view.

The imperative for synergy between state and society is stressed throughout the volume, culminating in contributions particularly examining the potential for decentralization in fragile and post-conflict contexts. In order to fully examine the different dynamics, we developed several sub-sections for this volume to better understand the complexity of decentralization and good local governance, including a theoretical section, more empirically oriented sections on the design of and demand for decentralization, and concluding with a section looking at the potential of decentralization reforms for state-building in post-conflict contexts.

The two major objectives of this volume were to bring together some significant research efforts in the current debate on decentralization presented by prominent agenda-setting thinkers; and to discuss how and to what extent this structural change of decentralization reform actually delivers, or can deliver, the enhanced efficiency, improved accountability and strengthened democracy that is widely believed to be within reach, especially for post-conflict states. The first objective has itself been fulfilled in the preceding chapters, and this conclusion seeks to tie the contributions presented here together in addressing the second objective.

Clearly the second objective has both a learning and a policy dimension. The provision of cutting-edge research in the field and the broad experiences presented here must be translated into policy and – benefiting from the great insight and experience in policy development of the different contributors – each chapter attempts to lead to policyrelevant conclusions. To fulfil the second objective of this volume, we first analytically recap the core messages from the contributions (the learning), part by part, before continuing to policy-related findings.

15.2 Catching the key arguments As highlighted by Crawford and Hartmann (2008: 251), decentralization is a thorny research topic, spread out over a wide segment of the social sciences as it touches on various aspects of the state (and the public sector). This is reflected in the broad perspective on decentralization and how to achieve good local governance. Categorization of different aspects of decentralization into design (Part II), demand (Part III) and state-building (Part IV) shows how these aspects both overlap and complement each other. Let us review the findings part by part.

James Manor (Chapter 2), preparing the ground for Part II, paints a rich canvas of aspects of decentralization, strongly emphasizing the polit-

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ical side and the need for strong support from the top (and/or the centre). In the words of Manor, “[d]ecisions to decentralize, and to sustain decentralized systems once they are in place, require – ironically – strong centralized leadership from the apex of political systems”. Furthermore, simplicity of design is of utmost importance and those who design systems must “understand the need to devise comparatively simple, straightforward processes and . . . explain them with great clarity to those who must operationalize them”. Clarity of division of responsibilities between central government and elected governments at lower levels is paramount, and must be spelled out in detail to give these elected bodies the autonomy and discretionary powers they need to function effectively.

However, this is easier said than done, especially in countries heavily dependent on donor funding (and hence donor agendas) and where there are power struggles within the government, the political parties and the bureaucracies.

In closing the introductory section of this volume, Leonardo Romeo (Chapter 3) argues that there is too much emphasis on the importance of political will and international good governance agendas in decentralization reforms, and that a better understanding of the relationship between decentralization and (local) development would produce better results. In his view, “[d]evelopment is local if it is endogenous, open and incremental, that is, if it makes use of locality-specific resources, combines them with national/global resources and brings them to bear on the national development effort as an additional benefit in a positive-sum game”. Decentralization reforms must therefore be developmental and demand driven, taking the specific local context into account. This requires autonomy at the sub-national level in combination with a good enough governance structure. Local development is not about localizing national or international goals; it is giving local authorities the power to make use of the specific local circumstances in development and policy-making.

The need to focus on the design of decentralization is generally agreed upon. However, despite broad collective experience, getting the right mix still seems to be one of the biggest challenges. The principles for a good design are simple, yet practical application appears to be rare. Manor strongly calls for sufficient powers and resources for local authorities and functioning accountability mechanisms as the basis for good design.

Sharma (2005) goes further to argue that at least seven components of the design aspect are crucial for success.1 Although those components indeed are crucial, several of our authors go beyond these base ideas, making them more realistic yet also more complicated.

The cases in Part II (“Local governance by designing decentralization”) point to different aspects being key. Jesse Ribot (Chapter 4) reminds us of the importance of how to choose which local institutions

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to partner with during decentralization reforms, and this demonstrates the responsibility that donors and other agencies have in the process of choosing implementing local partners. Pointing to the fact that “new fledgling local elected governments are imbued with or starved of powers through decisions made elsewhere”, Ribot suggests that the choice of partner institutions is vital to avoid reforms leading to fragmented forms of local authority and belonging. Ribot reminds us of the actual power of interventions in developing countries, and stresses that building parallel structures not only undermines the authority of the elected institutions but also weakens their capacity. The institutions chosen as partners need to be able to allocate or withhold important powers, such as the power to decide who has access to resources and markets, labour opportunities, training and construction contracts.

By asking what the core purpose of a local government system is, Andrew Nickson (Chapter 5) identifies two Weberian ideal types of local government systems, which derive from fundamental differences in how citizens and donors understand the purpose of local government. In the first case, the responsibility of local government is first and foremost effective public service delivery. The second type is broader, viewing service delivery as important but giving a wider role to the local government, both as the mouthpiece of shared community interests and in making policy choices within the wider political body “as a natural part of an organic whole” (Norton, 1994: 22). Popular participation becomes a “means” as well as an “end” in itself. Local government reflects the interests of the community and is primarily accountable to citizens. However, to avoid confusion and problems later in the process, it is important to have a clear, early understanding of what type of local government system the reform is meant to produce, although in reality both aspects will always be present – but probably in different degrees of importance, which may even change over time. Early on in state-building exercises, decentralization may be seen primarily as a “means”, whereas efficiency aspects become more important later on.

Harry Blair (Chapter 6) addresses a particular aspect of design, namely the mechanisms that make local government budget processes transparent and participatory, and assesses one of the most explicit attempts to substantiate participation and accountability at the local level. Through this, he feeds into Sharma’s findings, and shows in his analysis how there is a high risk of elite capture and parallel governance structures when programmes are initiated and designed by donors. This links to the case study by Paul Smoke (Chapter 7), which shows that the slowdown of reform in Cambodia might be the result of the number of different stakeholders involved, the disparity between their agendas, and the lack of

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full understanding of the internal political power structure in the country.

Despite international agreements on donor harmonization, in many countries there is still a lack of coordination and weak communication among donors and between government and donor representatives (for example, Boex et al., 2010). The experiences of Cambodia and Uganda also show how the long-term consequences of certain design issues are initially not always fully understood in political circles, and that they can disrupt vested interests and provoke counter-reactions when revealed, leading to the reversal of reforms.

In opening the demand section (Part III) of this volume, Merilee Grindle (Chapter 8) looks at citizen demand for good local governance and raises three fundamental questions essential to democratic and social accountability. Her findings underline the argument that demand from citizens does not always harmonize with decentralization reforms and that the good governance agenda frequently disregards the specifics of the local context in the design of reforms. Increased citizen participation in local decision-making does not automatically lead to enhanced accountability of local government, and some methods can actually weaken accountability systems and lead to citizens not claiming their rights in demanding effective government.

The utility of civil society organizations (CSOs) in decentralization reforms is stressed by G. Shabbir Cheema (Chapter 9), who shows that, by representing citizen demand, they can act as watchdogs and oversee government actions. However, as argued in other chapters and by Cheema, questions can be raised over who CSOs represent, who they are accountable to and whose interests they pursue.

Olle Törnquist (Chapter 10) digs deeper into how decentralization comes about. Examining case studies of India, the Philippines and Indonesia, he asserts that in these cases it was a combination of demand from below for political coordination and top-down schemes that allowed for the influence of a range of actors to work in favour of democracy and inclusive development. Hans Antlov and Anna Wetterberg (Chapter 11) advocate for the positive role of CSOs in deepening democracy at the local level. The shift from local government to local governance has opened up space for CSOs but, far too often, power relations and vested interests are not analysed and taken into consideration. The analysis by Antlov and Wetterberg develops a constructive approach to how CSOs can be an important pillar in a local governance system. Despite the risks of creating parallel systems or undermining democratically elected representatives, there is nevertheless a need for an engaged civil society in a flourishing democratic society. Accountability, and even democracy, will never be offered if it is not demanded.

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The final empirical part in this volume (Part IV) brings the previous parts together as it addresses the relationship between decentralization and state-building. Strong local governments and inclusive local government arrangements are often seen as essential in peace- and statebuilding processes in post-conflict countries (see Brinkerhoff, 2011). In this process, local government authorities can play a key role in bringing formal state institutions into direct contact with citizens and establishing inclusive patterns of post-conflict governance. David Jackson (Chapter 14) discusses the important but rarely asked question of who won and who lost from conflict, and the consequences in terms of the design of decentralization reforms as state-building projects and of demand from citizens. Jackson innovatively links the role of local government in postconflict recovery in Indonesia, Mozambique, Angola and Timor-Leste to the idea and manifestation of the state, arguing that analysis of local government’s role in post-conflict environments requires an appreciation of the relationship between the local state and the conflict. This entails bifurcating the state and looking at the local state system while seeking to understand the effect of the conflict on the state idea. It also requires an understanding of the nation, the state, bureaucratic motivation and spatial political economy.

Anders Sjögren’s study of Uganda (Chapter 13) shows that decentralization has been an important part of the central government’s strategy to stabilize the conflicts between different kingdoms, but also to fragment and undercut sub-national political entities within specific regions. The Ugandan experience of state formation through decentralization points to ad hoc regulation of welfare functions and the simultaneous systematic creation of new institutional linkages that deepen the political presence of the central state in local arenas, but with significant regional differences. Although fragmentation of state authority is more visible in relation to the welfare functions of the state, its coercive apparatus is often apparent as well.

Joakim Öjendal and Kim Sedara’s chapter on Cambodia (Chapter 12) aims to empirically analyse the content of the ongoing reform, looking at its role in post-conflict reconstruction and local democratization and its function as a mechanism for local development. The authors argue that the reform has had a positive outcome for local democracy, but also that in Cambodia there has been very little experience of democracy and therefore not much was required for reforms to alter the landscape. The overwhelming presence and obvious influence at the local level of the ruling Cambodian People’s Party have not been weakened by the decentralization and the introduction of democratic processes. Ironically, and as is often the case also in other countries, the changing dynamics at the

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local level have in reality strengthened the dominant party’s hold on power, although still primarily through democratic means.

15.3 Making policy of research In response to the second objective of the volume, the contributions allow for much reflection and for rich analysis. Although the findings in many cases are quite clear and recommendations distinct, the question of how to transform such findings into generic policy across cultures and contexts is not a given, linked as they are to specific experiences and historical trajectories. However, below we will offer some key insights, which are generally applicable irrespective of the context.

First, as suggested in Chapter 1 and witnessed in the contributions, most notably in the cases of Indonesia, Mexico and Cambodia, sensitively designed local governance reform that meets local demand has major potential. However, success is neither easily reached nor always sustainable, as demonstrated in Chapter 7 by Paul Smoke. The key tenets of powers, budget and (downward) accountability must be substantial, balanced, transparent and institutionalized. Romeo (Chapter 3), Manor (Chapter 2), Ribot (Chapter 4) and others leave no doubt on this point and this may constitute the strongest and most obvious policy message emanating from this volume. The most common shortcoming in decentralization processes might be that the budget, including issues of local tax collection, does not match local authority mandates or responsibilities. Even when it does, as Ribot points out, if there are vague accountability mechanisms and practices the process may fail. It is intellectually and administratively relatively simple to construct systems that balance these three factors for success, but for political economy reasons it is nevertheless hard to achieve.

Secondly, authors increasingly emphasize the importance of a better understanding of the political dimension. Interestingly, although we now know to quite a large degree how to pursue successful decentralization, the process is not necessarily becoming simpler. Contributions by Grindle (Chapter 8), Cheema (Chapter 9) and Sjögren (Chapter 13) show that with knowledge comes complexity and higher demand for noticeable results. More crucially, the more we know how to do it, the more important the underlying political economy of reforms and the associated change in power structures become, as suggested by Ribot (Chapter 4), Nickson (Chapter 5), Törnquist (Chapter 10) and Smoke (Chapter 7).

After two decades of intensive reform on a global scale, it can be argued that decentralization and its associated shift of political power to the

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local level have deepened and started to seriously threaten central elites’ hold on power, thereby triggering resistance. It is likely that we will notice more politicized approaches to decentralization in the decade to come (see Eaton et al., 2010). This cannot be wished away; it should rather be treated as a reality that calls for realistic plans, ambitions and reforms.

Thirdly, and related to the above, decentralization is a beneficial reform not only in itself but under certain conditions and when pursued with an educated approach. This volume sees strong potential for good governance at the local level through decentralized and downwardly accountable authorities. It does, however, also strongly emphasize that decentralization cannot be applied as a blunt tool to every problem in every situation, and it cannot be expected to deliver what it promises if it is not applied with key conditions being taken into account. If the right conditions are not present or cannot be created, decentralization should probably not be attempted, as Manor emphasizes. This is another key message from the volume.

Fourthly, to establish accountability and create local government legitimacy is not a straightforward task. Öjendal and Kim (Chapter 12) and Grindle (Chapter 8) point out that, in spite of local elections and various democratic mechanisms, citizens are not always able to hold local government accountable and hence cannot fulfil their contribution to the equation. They may lack the education, trust or incentives to perform their role. As a variation on the theme of the “tragedy of the commons” (see Hardin, 1968), even if reforms may benefit the collective, it may not pay off individually for people to engage with local authorities and they therefore may choose “exit” over “voice” (see Hirschman, 1970; Sharma, 2005) and fail adequately to demand accountability. Prevailing norms and cultures may also mean that they prefer to avoid confrontation or even engagement with state authorities. It should be clear that solid processes of accountable governance require both a readiness by authorities to offer accountability and the preparedness of citizens to demand accountability, a key message of Chapter 11 by Antlov and Wetterberg.

Blair (Chapter 6) and Ribot (Chapter 4) also point out in different ways how attempts at deeper accountability are as necessary as they are elusive.

Fifthly, decentralization should probably be termed “decentralizations”.

Although commonly referred to in the singular, in reality the process may move forward along different dimensions and achieve different results.

Nickson (Chapter 5) reminds us of at least two macro directions that decentralization can take, and Öjendal and Kim (Chapter 12) demonstrate the diverse effects it may have on different sections of society. More often than not it seems that there are more or less random outcomes (see

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also Grindle, Chapter 8). From a policy point of view, variations and differing processes of decentralization may need to be considered in greater depth in order to achieve more precise and successful outcomes and to avoid reversal of reforms, as mentioned above. As Smoke shows (Chapter 7), stop–go processes of decentralization and recentralization are awkward and inefficient.

Sixthly, it has become painfully clear during the process of compiling this volume that to consolidate weak, fragile or even collapsed states from below through the creation of local governments is an undervalued process and an understudied field, according to the contributions by Jackson (Chapter 14) and Sjögren (Chapter 13). In fact, the benefits of a good decentralization process – such as direct development responses, enhanced downwards accountability, democratic consolidation and regime legitimization – are precisely what is urgently required in post-conflict reconstruction. In spite of what is on the face of it a perfect match between the potential of decentralization and the needs of post-conflict countries, in practice the requirements for successful decentralization seem rarely to be methodically applied. A more systematic consideration of democratic decentralization would most likely be beneficial in such cases.

Finally, as Smoke (Chapter 7) reminds us and as is explicit in the historical review in Chapter 1, decentralization is a process that takes place in relation to a historical over-centralization of state administration and in the face of a process of globalization that is breaking up the idea of a simple and homogeneous world in which political authority can be monopolized by the central level in constructed nation-states. Although powerful central interests have an interest and tendency to amass power, which often needs to be balanced by explicit reforms to the contrary, if taken too far the governance system can become “over-decentralized”.

Hence, despite the promotion of decentralization in the past two or three decades as a remedy for excessive historical centralization, decentralization should not be taken as a goal in itself; rather, good local governance should be the goal. Put differently, decentralization is a policy tool that can be applied in order to achieve empowered and accountable local governments that are able to act as agents of local democracy and local development, which is what practitioners are truly striving for.

Of course, these are merely fragments of the lessons that could be derived from the rich empirical chapters, and it is equally obvious that these lessons are more easily stated than achieved. Nevertheless, we do believe that these findings and the policy lessons are worthwhile and progressive.

We hope that this volume will trigger new, wider and deeper debates on these issues and take decentralization reforms a step further towards the realization of their potential.

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Note 1. These are: (i) Finance should follow function; (ii) Increase local participation through encouraging meaningful public opinions and voices in decisions; (iii) Mechanisms for making local priorities known and heard must be put in place; (iv) There must be clear incentives for people to participate; (v) There must also be compelling incentives for politicians to be responsive and accountable; (vi) Appropriate incentives for sub-national governments to maintain fiscal responsibility must be established; (vii) The decentralization instruments must support a variety of political objectives.

REFERENCES Boex, J., D. Kimble and J. H. Pigey (2010) “Decentralized Local Governments as a Modality for Post-conflict Recovery and Development: An Emerging Natural Experiment in Northern Uganda”. IDG Working Paper No. 2010-01, Urban Institute Center on International Development and Governance, Washington, DC. Brinkerhoff, D. W. (2011) “State Fragility and Governance: Conflict Mitigation and Subnational Perspectives”, Development Policy Review 29(2): 131–153.

Craig, D. and D. Porter (2006) Development Beyond Neoliberalism? Governance, Poverty Reduction and Political Economy. London and New York: Routledge.

Crawford, G. and C. Hartmann (eds) (2008) Decentralization in Africa: A Pathway out of Poverty and Conflict? Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Dahl, R. A. (1971) Poliarchy: Participation and Opposition. Princeton, NJ: Yale University Press.

Eaton, K., K. Kaiser and P. Smoke (2010) The Political Economy of Decentralization Reforms: Implications for Aid Effectiveness. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Evans, P. B., D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (eds) (1985) Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Grindle, M. S. (2004) “Good Enough Governance: Poverty Reduction and Reform in Developing Countries”, Governance 17(4): 525–548.

Grindle, M. S. (2007) Going Local: Decentralization, Democratization, and the Promise of Good Governance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hardin, G. (1968) “The Tragedy of the Commons”, Science 162(3859): 1243–1248.

Hirschman, A. O. (1970) Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Manor, J. (1999) The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Migdal, J. S. (1988) Strong Societies and Weak States: State–Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Migdal, J. (2001) State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Norton, A. (1994) International Handbook of Local and Regional Government: A Comparative Analysis of Advanced Democracies. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.

Sharma, C. K. (2005) “When Does Decentralization Deliver? The Dilemma of Design”, South Asian Journal of Socio-Political Studies 6(1): 38– 45.

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A administrative decentralization. See also decentralization about, 9, 24n1, 31, 61–62 about who receives powers, 113 country-specific decentralization and, 61 defined, 10 “free-market politics” of managerial democracy and, 297 good-enough governance and social/ economic development support, 62 government accountability to citizens, increased, 207 human security, human rights and human development achieved through, xv in Indonesia, 295, 297 neoliberal tenets of civil society and, 295 Africa civil society organization (CSO) in, 74 democratic decentralization in, 39, 48, 52–53 elite capture in, 52–53 Angola, 23, 362–66 Argentina, 180, 183 Asia CSOs in, 74, 239, 252, 258 local democracy in, 242, 252

B Badan perencanaan pembangunan daerah [Regional Development Planning Agency] (Bappeda) (Indonesia), 155–56, 167, 289, 291–93 Badan perencanaan pembangunan nasional [National Development Planning Agency] (Bappenas) (Indonesia), 156, 167–68 Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi [Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency] (BRR), 371–74 Bangladesh Centre for Policy Dialogue, 245, 249–50 civil society organization (CSO), 51 democratic (political) decentralization in, 35, 42, 51 local council and election campaign in, 35 NGOs in, 241, 245 Bappeda. See Badan perencanaan pembangunan daerah [Regional Development Planning Agency] (Bappeda) (Indonesia) Bappenas. See Badan perencanaan pembangunan nasional [National Development Planning Agency] (Bappenas) (Indonesia) beach village committee (BVC) (Malawi), 100

395

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396

INDEX

benefits of ante- and post-natal care, 41 in Cambodia, 41, 307, 315–16 citizen groups and extracting benefits from government, 226 collective actions to acquire, 209 decentralization and, 94, 109, 235 decentralization and political, 78 of decentralization process, 393 of decentralization reforms, 64, 75 decentralization reforms vs. recentralization, 197 of decentralized systems, 55 defined, 20 of democratic decentralization, 307 of improved service delivery and efficiency, 126 in Indonesia, 262, 295, 377 lacking in Indonesian poor KDP villages, 157 from local governments as a right of citizenship, 208 in Mexico, 20, 109, 208, 218–24, 226–27 in Mozambique, 42 organizing to acquire, 218–24 of peace, 350 of tapping the fiscal potential of local government (Latin America), 126 in Timor-Leste, 369 Benin, 109–11 Bolivia Comité de Vigilancia [Vigilance Committee] (CV), 149–51, 161, 165–69, 172n18 Democratic Development and Citizen Participation project, 169 elite capture in, 162, 168 local governance in, 149, 167 NGOs in, 169 Organizaciones Territoriales de Base (OTBs), 149–50, 161, 167 participatory budgeting in, 149–50, 160, 162, 164–67, 169–70 Popular Participation Law (PPL), 149–50, 161–63, 167, 171n5, 172n16 sanctions and, 165 USAID in, 162, 165, 169 bottom-up. See also top-down approach in Cambodia, 306, 317, 319–20, 322, 353 demand by citizens for accountable government, 7

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development and centralized states’ decentralization and civil society, 51 local authorities role in peace-building and state-building, 15 local development and, 85 meetings to elicit and consolidate local priorities, 155 Musrenbang system, 156 perspectives and “third wave of democratization,” 6 politics, poor performance of, 56 process of Brazilian participatory budgeting programmes, 157 project decisions in Indonesia, 162 Brazil bottom-up process of participatory budgeting programmes, 157 civil society organization (CSO) in, 101, 110 Conselho do Orçamento Participativo [Participatory Budget Council] (COP), 147–48, 161, 166 democratic (political) decentralization in, 34, 37–38, 265 elite capture in, 162 elites in, 148, 150 Fundação Viver, Produzir e Preservar (FVPP), 100 NGOs in, 100 participatory budgeting and Municipality of Porto Alegre, 138, 145–49, 159–60, 163, 165–67 participatory budgeting in, 146, 157, 160, 162, 164, 166, 169–70, 265 recentralization in, 183 sub-national government in, 180 traditional decision-making machinery in, 166 World Bank in, 157 BRR. See Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi [Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency] (BRR) BUCADEF. See Buganda Cultural and Development Foundation (BUCADEF) Buganda Cultural and Development Foundation (BUCADEF), 332, 340–43 BVC. See beach village committee (BVC)

pp. 396–415

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INDEX C Cambodia benefits in, 41, 315–16 bottom-up approach in, 306, 317, 319–20, 353 Citizen Monitoring Committee (CMC), 158–61, 165, 169 Commune Development Plan (CDP), 311–12, 315–16, 320, 325n10, 325n15 Commune Sangkat Fund (CSF), 320, 323–24, 325n10, 325n15 democratic (political) decentralization in, 41, 307, 309, 311, 319, 322, 325n7 elite capture in, 13, 162, 168 good governance in, 317 Local Administration and Reform Program (LAAR), 158, 162–63, 169 local autonomy in, 186–87 local democracy in, 314, 322–23, 360, 390 local development in, 22, 315–16, 320–21, 323–24, 325n10–11, 360 local governance in, 190, 307, 310–11, 319, 322 Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), 187–89, 326n22 Ministry of Interior (MOI), 187–89 NGOs in, 169 participatory budgeting in, 146, 160, 162–64 post-conflict democratization in, 309 post-conflict reconciliation in, 307, 317 post-conflict reconstruction in, 306, 322, 324 public financial management in, 189, 194 recentralization in, 183 rights in, 320–21, 326n22 sub-national government in, 158, 186, 307–8 traditional patronage structures in, 313 USAID in, 158, 162–65, 169 Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), 158, 163, 168, 172n22, 185–90, 313, 323, 325n14 CDP. See Commune Development Plan (Cambodia) (CDP) centralism, 5, 7, 140–41 Centre for Policy Dialogue (Bangladesh) (CPD), 245, 249–50 China, 13, 50, 234, 240, 242–43, 248, 252 Citizen Monitoring Committee (Cambodia) (CMC), 158–61, 165, 169

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397

Citizen Report Card (CRC), 22, 239 Abra, Philippines, 239 Gowa, South Sulawesi Indonesia, 290–91, 294, 297, 298n15 civil society organizations (CSOs) in Africa, 74 in Asia, 74, 239 in Brazil, 101, 110 Buganda Cultural and Development Foundation (BUCADEF), 332, 342 codes of conduct and peer reviews, 248 community development, skill improvements for sustainable livelihoods and access to basic social services, 233 consultancy services to organizations, 248 decentralization and assistance for poor groups, 40 decentralization and inclusive governance, promotes, 20, 233 decentralization reforms and, 389 democratic decentralization and, 51 elite capture and, 51 Governance and Local Democracy (Philippines) (GOLD), 173n24 in Indonesia, 169, 275 international funding, dependence on, 244 Local Governance Support Program (LGSP) and, 156, 169 localities, penetrate a small minority of, 51 in Malawi, Benin and Senegal, 110 in Philippines, 152 power structures and innovative/ pro-reform government officials, 275 skill shortages and, 37 social audits by, 37 in Uganda, 332, 336, 339, 342–43 World Vision, 332 CMC. See Citizen Monitoring Committee (Cambodia) (CMC) CNRT. See Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorense [National Council of Timorese Resistance] (CNRT) Colombia, 183 Comité de Vigilancia [Vigilance Committee] (CV) (Bolivia), 149–51, 161, 165–69, 172n18

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398

INDEX

Commune Development Plan (Cambodia) (CDP), 311–12, 315–16, 320, 325n10, 325n15 Commune Sangkat Fund (Cambodia) (CSF), 320, 323–24, 325n10, 325n15 Community Revitalization through Democratic Action (Serbia) (CRDA), 154–55, 162–63, 168 Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Governance (Philippines), 239 Conselho do Orçamento Participativo [Participatory Budget Council] (COP) (Brazil), 147–48, 161, 166 Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorense [National Council of Timorese Resistance] (CNRT), 367–69 COP. See Conselho do Orçamento Participativo [Participatory Budget Council] (COP) (Brazil) CPD. See Centre for Policy Dialogue (Bangladesh) (CPD) CPP. See Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) CRC. See Citizen Report Card (CRC) CRDA. See Community Revitalization through Democratic Action (Serbia) (CRDA) CSF. See Commune Sangkat Fund (Cambodia) (CSF) CSOs. See civil society organizations (CSOs) CV. See Comité de Vigilancia [Vigilance Committee] (CV) (Bolivia) D DCC. See District Consultative Council (Mozambique) (DCC) decentralization. See also administrative decentralization; democratic (political) decentralization; fiscal decentralization after state failure, 11 as an emerging paradigm, 5–8 balance of decentralized and centralized powers, 9 benefits of equity, efficiency and democratization, 109 benefits of improved access to services, citizen participation and mobilization of local resources, 235 benefits predicted by economists, political scientists, and management specialists, 94

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central government, requires a very strong, 8 defined, 10 demand for democracy, rights, participation and inclusion requires reforms in, 10 demanding, 12–14 design and state-building, 14–16 designing, 11–12 for development and local development, 86 downward accountability and countervailing powers to keep devolved powers in check, 9 effects on service delivery, corruption, fiscal management and growth, 8 empirical evidence and change of perspectives, 8–9 local autonomy and, 17, 64, 67–71 local development and, 75, 103, 387 local governance and, 6, 15, 20, 23, 235–36, 334, 385–86, 393 negative consequences of, 8 political, 5, 61–62, 113, 208–9, 234, 308 political drivers and, 186–87, 192–93 political progress, enhanced responsiveness and deepened accountability, 8 post-conflict, 4 reform gives central government more legitimacy, capacity and stability, 10 reform strategy and local development, 80 reforms, 3–4, 7–17 reforms and local autonomy, 86 reforms and local development, 68–69, 73, 81–82 reforms and state-building, 386 state failure prior to, 14 state-building and, 5, 8, 11, 14–16, 386, 388, 390 sub-national system of local governance and, 82 Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World by United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), 235 Decentralization Secretariat (Uganda) (DS), 193–94 Delivering the Goods: Building Local Government Capacity to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals (UNCDF), 235–36

pp. 398–415

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INDEX democratic (political) decentralization. See also decentralization about, 3, 10–15, 17, 31 accountability counts for more than transparency, 36–37 accountability mechanisms and, 43 in Africa, 39, 48, 52–53 Arab citizens of Israel and, 252–353 in Bangladesh, 35, 42, 51 Basque citizens of Spain and, 352–53 benefits of, 307 in Brazil, 34, 37–38, 265 bureaucrats and, 41, 44–45 in Cambodia, 41, 307, 309, 311, 319, 322, 325n7 caste hierarchies and, 52 central control vs., 190 choice and recognition framework to analyse, 17 civil society and, 33, 50–51 collective consultation, group formation and action, 40 corrupt acts, increases number of people involved in, 33 country-specific decentralization and, 61 defined, 10, 113–14 democracy outcomes of, 94 design of, special attention to, 54–56 devolution and, 24n1 direct participation of institutions, 14 economic growth and, 50 elected bodies at lower levels and, 48–49 elected representatives and bureaucrats, interactions between, 42–46 “elite capture” and, 51–53 essential components of, 32 extreme arguments, beware of, 53 fiscal indiscipline and, 49–50 focus on poor, women, low castes and underprivileged groups, 112 in Ghana, 42 good governance agenda, 60, 358 good-enough governance and support for social and economic development, 62 how to make it work well, 31–32 human security, human rights and human development achieved through, xv in India, 33–34, 39, 41, 49–53, 260, 265 in Indonesia, 278, 280, 293, 297 informal political interventions weaken, 45–46

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information flows between government and ordinary people, enhances, 33 in Latin America, 35–36, 39, 74–75 local councils, user committees frequently undermine legitimacy of, 48 local democracy and, 94 local institutions receive powers, 98–99 lower level elected leaders, council members and mass meetings of people, 36 mainstream government institutions and parallel agencies/bodies, 47–48 in Mozambique, 41–42, 50 multiple accountabilities and the need for “balance,” 42–44 overall public sector and, 15 in Pakistan, 32 patrimonial ties and patronage politics, 278, 297 in the Philippines, 57n26 as policy and in practice, 260 “political capacity” of ordinary (and poor) people, enhances, 33 political parties and, 35–36 political space for women’s engagement in local politics and, 14 political systems, levels in, 42 politics, importance of, 34–35 popular pressure and, 54 positive incentives and, 37–38 in post-conflict countries, 393 post-conflict reconstruction and, 15–16 poverty reduction and, 38–40 powers to transfer, 98–99 preconditions for, 12 the promise of, 32–34 public justifications of local institutions, 99 resources, need for adequate, 49 senior politicians wish to undermine, 46 service delivery efficiency or equity, effects on, 94, 112 social audits and, 37 solidarity of interest groups and traditional rulers, 13 in South Africa, 46, 55 space for “politics,” empowering and creating, 55 state–society relations and, 14–16 taxation and, 48 technocratic overload, dangers of, 46–47, 55

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400

INDEX

democratic (political) decentralization. See also decentralization (cont.) in Thailand, 352–53 traditional rulers, dominant elites and “elite capture,” 52–53 transparency, enhances, 33 in Uganda, 34 victim blaming and, 54 winner-take-all attitudes and, 33 World Bank studies of, 32 democratic space, 4, 13–14, 266, 322, 326n24 democratization, third wave of, 6, 279, 305 Department for International Development (UK), 342 Dewan perwakilan rakyat daerah [district legislative council] (DPRD) (Indonesia), 155–56, 279, 286–88, 292–93, 295 District Consultative Council (Mozambique) (DCC), 358 DPRD. See Dewan perwakilan rakyat daerah [district legislative council] (DPRD) (Indonesia) DS. See Decentralization Secretariat (Uganda) (DS) E East Asia, 308 El Salvador Cabildos abiertos, 138, 153, 159, 162, 168 elite capture in, 162, 168 Municipalidades en Acción [Municipalities in Action] (MEA), 153, 163, 168 NGOs in, 153 participatory budgeting in, 159–60, 162–65 post-conflict programmes in, 162 USAID and, 153, 162–65 elite capture. See also participatory budgeting in Africa, 52–53 in Bolivia, 162, 168 in Brazil, 162 in Cambodia, 13, 162, 168 decentralization vs., 235 defined, 38 democratic deficits and, 6 donor designed programs and risk of, 388 in El Salvador, 162, 168

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in India, 167 in Indonesia, 157, 162, 167, 281, 295 local civil society organizations vs., 51 local councils and, 39 local democratic authorities vs., 103 locality-specific conditions and, 67 in the Philippines, 162, 168 poor people and poor votes, 39 risk of, 167–68 in Serbia, 162, 168 social capital and, 65 elites. See also traditional abuse of power by local, xvi in Brazil, 148, 150 in Cambodia, 168 central and local governments and, political relations between, 336 central governments engage, 334 central–local relations and the political resources and interests of local, 336 decentralization and, 29–30, 148, 333–34 democratic decentralization and, 33 democratic institutions and support agreements with, 255 devolution of power and, 47 district government aligned with, 101 “divide and rule” and, 7 elite capture and, 52, 148, 168 in India, 52–53, 167 in Indonesia, 255, 260, 269 investments serving elites vs. poor, 101 local governance reforms and, 334 local government institutions vs., 18 local institutions vs. traditional local, xvi local power structures and, 20 material conflict drivers and, 355 in Mexico, 208, 220 political influence of, 335 political power at local level vs. power of central, 391–92 political struggles over resources, 335 political will of central, 76 poor people and, 39 power of elites within political parties, 137 power-grabbing and dominance by, 7 private sector, 167 risk, 167–68, 171 in Serbia, 168 town councils vs. local, 150 in Uganda, 195

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INDEX F fiscal decentralization. See also decentralization about, 11, 31 about the kind of power received (finance), 113 country-specific decentralization and, 61 critical preconditions for, 12 defined, 10 good-enough governance and social and economic development, 62 human security, human rights and human development achieved through, xv in Latin America, 74–75, 123 local autonomy and, 72 local government’s post-conflict role, 354–55 national legislation discourages local governments, 68 national programme to implement, 80 requires substantial powers matched by substantial resources, 11 sub-national government and, 10 in Uganda, 180, 193, 358 Frente de Libertação de Moçambique [Mozambique Liberation Front] (FRELIMO), 357–58, 360–61, 378n7 Frente Revolucionária do Timor Leste Independente [Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor] (FRETILIN), 366–69, 378n15 Fundação Viver, Produzir e Preservar (Brazil) (FVPP), 100 G GAM. See Gerakan Aceh Merdeka [Free Aceh Movement] (GAM) (Indonesia) GDP. See gross domestic product (GDP) Gerakan Aceh Merdeka [Free Aceh Movement] (GAM) (Indonesia), 264, 371 Ghana, 42, 45 global south, 3, 269–70 globalization, 6–7, 234–35, 240, 242, 249, 276, 393 GOLD. See Governance and Local Democracy (Philippines) (GOLD) good governance agenda, 6, 17, 60–61, 83, 85 in Cambodia, 317 citizen’s right to, 225–26

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Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Governance, 239 decentralization reforms and, 86, 387, 389 democracy and, 276 democratic decentralization and, 385 democratization and, 267, 276 good-enough governance and social/ economic development, 62 government initiatives and, 296 in Indonesia, 240, 251, 285, 296, 297n4 literature, 385 Local Governance Support Program and, 297n4 at local level, 392 right demanded by citizens, 225 sub-national governance vs., 85 Governance and Local Democracy (Philippines) (GOLD), 169, 172n23, 173n24, 173n26 government “by the people,” 20, 207 governmental type of local government, 18, 127–31, 133–37, 141 gross domestic product (GDP) of Mexico, 212, 214 Guatemala, 109–11, 131, 134, 139 “A Guide to Local Governance and Decentralization: Programme Experiences and Strategies from a UNDP E-Discussion” (UNDP), 235 H HDI. See Human Development Indicator (HDI) Human Development Indicator (HDI), 31 human rights. See also rights about, 6, 112, 261 democracy and, xv groups, 208 in Malaysia, 241 promoting, 234 violations, 104, 191 I ICLD. See International Centre for Local Democracy (ICLD) IDEA. See Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) IDP. See internally displaced person (IDP) IGFT. See intergovernmental fiscal transfers (IGFT)

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402

INDEX

India civil society organization (CSO), 51 democratic (political) decentralization in, 33–34, 39, 41, 49–53, 260, 265 elite capture in, 167 elites in, 52, 167 local council in, 53, 236 local democracy in, 112 local governance in, 252 middle classes in state of Kerala, 259 National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, 45, 49, 56n6 NGOs in, 167 rights in, 258–59 Indonesia administrative decentralization in, 295, 297 Badan perencanaan pembangunan daerah (Regional Development Planning Agency) (Bappeda), 155–56, 167, 289, 291–93 Badan perencanaan pembangunan nasional [National Development Planning Agency] (Bappenas), 156, 167–68 benefits in, 262, 295 bottom-up project decisions in, 162 civil society organization (CSO) in, 169, 275 conflict profile and the state idea, 370–75 democratic (political) decentralization in, 278, 280, 293, 297 Dewan perwakilan rakyat daerah [district legislative council] (DPRD), 155–56, 279, 286–88, 292–93, 295 elite capture in, 157, 162, 167, 281, 295 elites in, 255, 260, 269 Gerakan Aceh Merdeka [Free Aceh Movement] (GAM), 264, 371 good governance in, 240, 251, 285, 296, 297n4 Kecamatan Development Program (KDP), 146, 156–58, 160–62, 164–65, 169–71 local council (LC) in, 167, 293 local democracy in, 256 local development in, 377 local governance in, 156, 167, 169, 276, 279–82, 285–93, 297

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Local Governance Support Program (LGSP), 21, 156, 163, 169, 173n25, 177, 281–86, 288–92, 297, 297n4 middle classes in, 269 Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan [public forum for development planning] (Musrenbang), 155–56, 160–63, 165–69, 171, 172n11, 283 Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), 288 NGOs in, 255, 262–63, 269, 287, 289, 295 participatory budgeting in, 155, 160, 162–67, 169–70, 277 post-conflict democracy in, 145–46 post-conflict period and local government in, 372–75 post-conflict state-building in, 23 public financial management (PFM), 375 recentralization in, 182–83 rights in, 257 USAID in, 156, 163, 165, 169 World Bank in, 163–65, 172n19 Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 12 Inter-American Development Bank, 122, 126 intergovernmental fiscal transfers (IGFT), 125, 129, 132, 134–36, 140, 142n6 internally displaced person (IDP), 362–66, 376, 377n1 International Centre for Local Democracy (ICLD), xvii International Guidelines on Decentralisation and the Strengthening of Local Authorities (UN-HABITAT), 235 K Kecamatan Development Program (Indonesia) (KDP), 146, 156–58, 160–62, 164–65, 169–71 Kenya Local Authority Service Charge, 180 recentralization in, 182 sub-national government in, 180 L LAAR. See Local Administration and Reform Program (Cambodia) (LAAR) Latin America benefits of tapping the enormous fiscal potential of local government, 126 centralism in, 140–41

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INDEX democratic (political) decentralization in, 35–36, 39, 74–75 fiscal decentralization in, 74–75, 123 local governance in, 139 local government in, 126 participatory budgeting in, 138–39 sub-national government in, 140 LC. See local council (LC) LDLC. See local development through local governments (LDLC) less developed countries, 29, 46, 48, 51 LGC. See Local Government Code (Philippines) (LGC) LGSP. See Local Governance Support Program (LGSP) Local Administration and Reform Program (Cambodia) (LAAR), 158, 162–63, 169 local autonomy in Cambodia, 186–87 decentralization and, 17, 64, 67–71 decentralization reforms and, 86 fiscal decentralization agenda and, 72 functional reassignments and, 72 intergovernmental cooperation and, 72 local development and, 62, 65, 71, 76 local governance and, 76 local governments and, 71 local-level interaction of state and society, 85 national local development policy and, 73–74 negotiation for respective rights and obligations, 72 political driver of reforms, 61 public services delivery, local revenue and employment creation, 76 structural controls constrain, 187 in Uganda, 191 local council (LC) accountability of local executives and administrations to, 70–71 ante- and post-natal care and, 33 autonomy and scope of, 70 decentralization and more corruption, 33 democratic decentralization and, 32–33 democratic legitimacy and, 77 elected local representatives and, 36 election campaign in Bangladesh, 35 elite capture and, 39 empowerment of elected, 52 health professionals and, 41

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in India, 53, 236 India’s dominant castes opt out of, 53 in Indonesia, 293 in Jepara, Central Java, 288–89 local arenas, have upper hand within, 43 in Madiun, East Java, 286 in Mozambique, 42 Musrenbang structure in Indonesia and, 167 National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (India) and, 45, 49 with neither fully accountable executive and administrative structures nor meaningful functions and related resources, 76 parallel institutions at local level and, 47–48 parallel structures substitute for ineffective, 171 in Serbia, 166 technocratic tasks damaged South Africa’s, 55 traditional panchayats vs., 53 in Uganda, 192, 332, 337, 343–44 local democracy. See also local government in Asia, 242, 252 in Cambodia, 314, 322–23, 360, 390 civil society approach to, 101, 110 CSOs and, 244, 268 decentralization and, 3, 6, 75, 252, 393 Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World by United Cities and Local Governments, 235 decentralization reforms and, 96 Delivering the Goods: Building Local Government Capacity to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals, 235–36 democracies in Africa, choiceless, 95 democratic consolidation and, 12 democratic decentralization and, 94 democratic local institutions and, 95 devolution of power and accountability, 113 discretionary powers of, 95, 109 efficiency and accountability improved and democracy strengthened, 4 electoral accountability, freedom of assembly and citizen engagement, 281 Governance and Local Democracy (GOLD), 169, 172n23, 173n24, 173n26

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INDEX

local democracy. See also local government (cont.)

“A Guide to Local Governance and Decentralization: Programme Experiences and Strategies from a UNDP E-Discussion”, 235 handbook on how to design systems for, 12 in India, 112, 256 in Indonesia, 256, 281 International Guidelines on Decentralisation and the Strengthening of Local Authorities, 235 limited by lack of resources and poor downward accountability, 95 local development and, 4 local governance and, 18 local institutional choice and, 17–18 local or sub-national democracies, 95 local public officials’ accountability and, 242 local units of government and, 242 in Mozambique, 361, 376 participatory decision-making and, 238 participatory style of, 141 in the Philippines, 256 polycentrism, privatization and the weakening of, 262 the poor and, 111–12 popular participation, accountability and, 255 stated objectives or expected outcomes, 102 three dimensions of, 94 local development about, 63–65 autonomous local governments and, 76–77 autonomy of local councils and, 70 in Cambodia, 22, 307, 309–10, 315–16, 320–21, 323–24, 325n10–11, 360 civil society and, 233, 248, 334 commune councils and, 310 CSOs in Asia and, 74, 239, 252, 258 decentralization and, 75, 103, 387 decentralization for development and, 86 decentralization reform strategy and, 80 decentralization reforms and, 68–69, 73, 81–82, 84–85 defined, 65 democratic governance and, 238

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development partner positions and, 83 efficiency and accountability enhanced and democracy strengthened, 4 financial and administrative capacitystrengthening and, 236 fiscal neutrality of decentralization and, 69 forums for public administrators, professionals, interest groups, unions, citizens’ associations and reformist activists, 259–60 in Indonesia, 377 linkages between decentralization reforms, improved local selfgovernance, local development and poverty reduction, 79–80 local authorities and, 74, 76, 387 local autonomy and, 62, 65, 71, 76 local democracy and, 393 local democratization and, 389–90 local governance and, 69, 80, 86 local governments and, 17, 63, 70–71, 74, 83, 353, 355, 365–66, 377 local political institutions and, 66–67 in Mexico, 221 national decentralization strategies and, 86 national governments and, 74 national policy to promote, 81 policy, importance of a national, 73–74 political drivers of the reforms, 61 post-conflict reconstruction and, 389–90 programmes support local government action for, 78 reform in post-conflict reconciliation; local democratization and, 307 services delivery and, 71 social capital and, 65–66 social demand and responsible local leadership, 17 state-building and, 66 state–society interaction and, 62, 72, 85 sub-national governance and, 76 sub-national governments and, 62 in Timor-Leste, 367–68, 376 “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches to, 85 in Uganda, 184, 194 local development through local governments (LDLC), 17, 63, 81, 83–84

pp. 404–415

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(p. 404) (CS4) 24 September 2013 10:53 PM PMU:

INDEX local governance. See also Local Governance Support Program (LGSP) access to resources and, 334 in Angola, 362–66 autonomy and downward accountability in, 17 in Bolivia, 149, 167 in Cambodia, 190, 307, 310–11, 319, 322 central governments and, 335 citizen demand for good, 389 citizen engagement in, 6, 286–93 citizen participation in, 139 civil society and, 233 civil society and democratic change and, 249–50 civil society engagement in, 239, 279 civil society organizations and, 336, 389 CSOs in Asia and, 242, 252 decentralization and, 6, 8–9, 15, 23, 235–36, 334, 385–86, 393 decentralization and democratic, 20, 234–35 decentralization and sub-national system of, 82 development partners, decentralization and, 83 efficiency and accountability improved and democracy strengthened, 4 engaged citizens and, 6 in Gowa, South Sulawesi, Indonesia, 290–91 “A Guide to Local Governance and Decentralization: Programme Experiences and Strategies from a UNDP E-Discussion,” 235 in India, 252 in Indonesia, 156, 163, 166–67, 169, 276, 279–82, 285–93, 297, 372–75 in Jepara, Central Java, Indonesia, 288–90 in Kediri, East Java, Indonesia, 291–93 in Latin America, 139 local authorities’ capacity-building and, 80 local demand and, 391 local democracy and, 18 local development and, 80 local employment growth and bettermanaged local environment, 80 local participation and, 238 local political representation and accountable local administrations, 80

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local social forces, politicians and, 335 local-level institutional innovation in, 84 in Madiun, East Java, Indonesia, 286–88 in Mexico, 296 in Mozambique, 357–58, 360 in Pakistan, 250 participatory budgeting and, 18–19, 145–46 in the Philippines, 150–52 political systems and, 22 popular participation in, 76 post-conflict period and, 369–70 post-conflict reconstruction and, 15 poverty reduction and, 80 in Serbia, 155 in Sierra Leone, 353 social demand for the reforms and, 86 state–citizen interactions and power relations, 22 state–society interaction, and local development, 85 state–society relations and, 276 at the sub-national level, 10 sustainable peace and, 353 in Timor-Leste, 367–70 in Uganda, 336, 342 Local Governance Support Program (LGSP) (Indonesia) about, 297n4 citizen engagement, changes in, 282–86 citizen participation for positive developmental outcomes, 21–22 civil society activists questionnaires, 282 CSOs and reform-minded officials, 297 in Gowa, South Sulawesi, 290–91 in Jepara, Central Java, 288–90 in Kediri, East Java, 291–93 in Madiun, East Java, 286–88 Musrenbang process strengthened, 156, 163, 169 participatory and accountable governance by local governments, legislative councils and CSOs, 281 USAID funding, 21, 156 local government. See also local democracy governmental type of, 18, 127–31, 133–37, 141 managerial (managerialist) type of, 18, 125–26, 128–31, 133, 135–36, 140–41 state-building and, 7, 11, 22

pp. 405–415

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406

INDEX

Local Government Code (Philippines) (LGC), 150–51, 161–63, 168 local political leadership, 5, 64, 169 M Malawi, 56n13, 99–100, 109–10 Malaysia capacity development, 374 civil society and, 234, 240, 245, 247 CSOs’, 245 fundamental liberties curtailed, 241 human rights in, 241 legislative framework, 244 middle classes in, 244 multi-ethnic political parties, 250 public service ethos, 373 state oversight and control, 243 Malidino Biodiversity Community-based Reserve project (Senegal), 107 managerial (managerialist) type of local government, 18, 125–26, 128–31, 133, 135–36, 140–41 MEA. See Municipalidades en Acción [Municipalities in Action] (MEA) (El Salvador) MEF. See Ministry of Economy and Finance (Cambodia) (MEF) Mexico benefits in, 20, 109, 208, 218–24, 226–27 elites in, 208, 220 gross domestic product (GDP), 212, 214 local development in, 221 local governance in, 296 Partido Acción Nacional [National Action Party] (PAN), 211, 215–17 Partido de la Revolución Democrática [Party of the Democratic Revolution] (PRD), 211, 216–17, 229n10 rights in, 208–10, 224–28 MFPED. See Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (Uganda) (MFPED) middle classes in Aceh, Indonesia, 269 decentralization and, 30 democratic decentralization and, 31 democratization, alternative programmes for, 257 local residents’ suspicions towards, 41 in Malaysia, 244 in Mexico, 220

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in state of Kerala, India, 259, 266 worldwide rise of, 6 Millennium Development Goals, 70, 236 Ministry of Economy and Finance (Cambodia) (MEF), 187–89, 326n22 Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (Uganda) (MFPED), 193–94 Ministry of Interior (Cambodia) (MOI), 187–89 Ministry of Local Government, 78 Ministry of Local Government (Kenya), 181 Ministry of Local Government (Uganda) (MLG), 193–94 MLG. See Ministry of Local Government (Uganda) (MLG) MOI. See Ministry of Interior (Cambodia) (MOI) Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola [People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola] (MPLA), 361, 363–64, 378n13 Mozambique benefits in, 42 democratic (political) decentralization in, 41–42, 50 District Consultative Council (DCC), 358 Frente de Libertação de Moçambique [Mozambique Liberation Front] (FRELIMO), 357–58, 360–61, 378n7 local council (LC) in, 42 local democracy in, 361, 376 local governance in, 357–58, 360 post-conflict and local government in, 360–61, 364–66 post-conflict state-building in, 23 traditional beliefs, structures, religious and community governance structures in, 357 MPLA. See Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola [People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola] (MPLA) Municipalidades en Acción [Municipalities in Action] (MEA) (El Salvador), 153, 163, 168 Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan [public forum for development planning] (Musrenbang) (Indonesia), 155–56, 160–63, 165–69, 171, 172n11, 283

pp. 406–415

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(p. 406) (CS4) 24 September 2013 10:53 PM PMU:

INDEX N Naga City People’s Council (Philippines) (NCPC), 151–52 Nahdlatul Ulama (Indonesia) (NU), 288 National Resistance Army (Uganda) (NRA), 191–92, 338 National Resistance Movement (Uganda) (NRM), 190–92, 195–96, 198n20, 332, 337–38, 341–44 National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (India), 45, 49, 56n6 NCPC. See Naga City People’s Council (Philippines) (NCPC) neo-patrimonial regimes, 67 NGO. See non-governmental organizations (NGOs) Nicaragua, 89n3, 123, 131, 134, 138–39, 183 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) authority of chiefs and headmen and, 105 in Bangladesh, 241, 245 belonging associated with democratic authorities and, 107 blackmailing of officials by, 295 in Bolivia, 169 in Brazil, 100 BUCADEF, 332, 340–43 in Burkina Faso, 97 in Cambodia, 169, 321 in China, 243 civil society and, 51 Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Governance (Philippines), 239 democracy of the recognition of local institutions and authorities and, 109 in El Salvador, 153 Fundação Viver, Produzir e Preservar (FVPP), 100 in Gowa, South Sulawesi, 290 in India, 167 in Indonesia, 255, 262–63, 269, 287, 289, 295 in Kediri, East Java, 291–92 LGSP partner, 282 local actors seek partners with links to authority, 97 local authorities, de-legitimate elected, 103 local democratic government and, 94 Local Development Councils and, 151 local governments, foster elected, 93

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407

local interlocutors, work with, 18 Naga City People’s Council (NCPC) and, 151–52 Philippine Council for NGO Certification, 248 in the Philippines, 151–52, 160–62, 169, 172n19, 246, 263 political decentralization and, 208–9 power over the public domain transferred to, 105 Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committees and, 151 privatization vs. decentralization, 96 privatizing public resources and powers to, 108–9 in Serbia, 154, 169 transparency and citizen participation in public policy-making and oversight, 282 in Uganda, 332, 340–41 welfare providers, role as, 345 Wildlife Fund Thailand, 246 World Vision, 332, 340–41, 343 north–south relations, 5 NRA. See National Resistance Army (Uganda) (NRA) NRM. See National Resistance Movement (Uganda) (NRM) NU. See Nahdlatul Ulama (Indonesia) (NU) O Organizaciones Territoriales de Base [territorially based community organizations] (OTBs) (Bolivia), 149–50, 161, 167 P Pakistan democratic (political) decentralization in, 32 local governance in, 250 PAN. See Partido Acción Nacional [National Action Party] (PAN) (Mexico) panchayats, 53, 100, 103 participatory budgeting. See also elite capture in Bolivia, 149–50, 160, 162, 164–67, 169–70 in Brazil, 146, 157, 160, 162, 164, 166, 169–70, 265

pp. 407–415

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(p. 407) 24 September 2013 10:53 PM

408

INDEX

participatory budgeting. See also elite capture (cont.) budget allocation, direct and indirect citizen participation level in, 160 in Cambodia, 146, 160, 162–64 citizen role in initiating, 164 defined, 18–19, 146 in El Salvador, 159–60, 162–65 in Indonesia, 155, 160, 162–67, 169–70, 277 Indonesian Kecamatan Development Program, 146 in Latin America, 138–39 local governance and, 18–19, 145–46 Municipality of Porto Alegre, Brazil, 138, 145–49, 159–60, 163, 165–67 in the Philippines, 152, 160, 162–63, 165, 169 policy implications for, 170–71 political champion for, 163–64 in Serbia, 146, 160, 162, 164–66 technical assistance and, 164–65 USAID and, 146, 150, 153–56, 158, 162–66, 169 Partido Acción Nacional [National Action Party] (PAN) (Mexico), 211, 215–17 Partido de la Revolución Democrática [Party of the Democratic Revolution] (PRD) (Mexico), 211, 216–17, 229n10 Partido Revolucionario Institucional [Institutional Revolutionary Party] (PRI) (Mexico), 211–13, 215–17 Peru recentralization in, 183 PFM. See public financial management (PFM) Philippine Council for NGO Certification, 248 Philippines Citizen Report Card (CRC), 239 civil society organization (CSO) in, 152 Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Governance, 239 democratic (political) decentralization in the, 57n26 elite capture in the, 162, 168 Governance and Local Democracy (GOLD), 169, 172n23, 173n24, 173n26 local democracy in the, 256 Local Development Councils, 151

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local governance in the, 150–52 Local Government Code (LGC), 150–51, 161–63, 168 Naga City People’s Council (NCPC), 151–52 NGOs in the, 151–52, 160–62, 169, 172n19, 246, 263 participatory budgeting in the, 152, 160, 162–63, 165, 169 Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committees, 151 recentralization in the, 182 rights in the, 152 sub-national government in the, 151 USAID in, 162, 165, 169 political civil rights organizations in India, Indonesia and the Philippines, 21 political decentralization, 5, 113, 208–9, 234, 308 political drivers decentralization and, 186–87, 192–93 of the reforms, 61–62, 192 Popular Participation Law (Bolivia) (PPL), 149–50, 161–63, 167, 171n5, 172n16 post-colonial state, 5 post-conflict. See also state-building in Cambodia, 22 contexts and decentralization, 386 countries and local governments role in peace- and state-building, 390 countries and successful decentralization, 393 decentralization, 4 democratization in Cambodia, 309 early-stage democracy in Indonesia, 145–46 environments and development intervention, 353 environments and local government’s role in state-building processes, 22 environments and new realities, 351 governance, 390 initiatives in El Salvador and Serbia to repair societal divisions and build linkages to the state, 145 local governance, local democracy and local development in areas of, 4 “nation-building,” 351 period and local government in Indonesia, 372–75

pp. 408–415

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(p. 408) (CS4) 24 September 2013 10:53 PM PMU:

INDEX period and local government in Mozambique, 360–61, 364–66 period and local government in TimorLeste, 369–70, 376–77 programmes in El Salvador, 162 programmes in Serbia, 154, 162 reconciliation in Cambodia, 307, 317 reconstruction and downwards accountability, democratic consolidation and regime legitimization, 393 reconstruction and local democratization, 390 reconstruction and local governance system, 15 reconstruction in Cambodia, 306, 322, 324 reconstruction processes, 385 recovery and local government, 350, 353–54 recovery in Indonesia, Mozambique, Angola and Timor-Leste, 390 role of local government, 354–55 situations and role of local government and decentralization, 352, 355 situations in Mozambique, Angola, Timor-Leste and Indonesia, 350 societies and decentralized governance reforms, 353 societies and role of local governments, 375 stability and peace and the role of local government in Indonesia, 377 state-building in Mozambique, Angola, Timor-Leste and Indonesia, 23 states and prerequisite for establishing critical regime/governmental legitimacy, 11 power-sharing, 4, 99, 186, 235–36, 264, 366 PPL. See Popular Participation Law (Bolivia) (PPL) PRD. See Partido de la Revolución Democrática [Party of the Democratic Revolution] (PRD) (Mexico) PRI. See Partido Revolucionario Institucional [Institutional Revolutionary Party] (PRI) (Mexico) public financial management (PFM) in Cambodia, 189, 194 in East Timor, 368 in Indonesia, 375 in Uganda, 195

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R recentralization in Argentina, 183 in Brazil, 183 in Cambodia, 183 in Colombia, 183 in Indonesia, 182–83 in Kenya, 182 in Nicaragua, 183 in Peru, 183 in the Philippines, 182 sub-national government and, 19, 182–83 in Uganda, 182–84 RENAMO. See Resistência Nacional Moçambicana [Mozambican National Resistance] (RENAMO) Resistência Nacional Moçambicana [Mozambican National Resistance] (RENAMO), 357–61, 365, 378n8 rights. See also human rights in Cambodia, 320–21, 326n22 citizen, 269 citizenship, 106, 208–10, 224–28 collective private rights democratically chosen by an ethnic leader, 109 conferred by authorities, 107 defined, 20 demand for democracy, rights, participation and inclusion, 10 democratic rights and institutions that are meaningful for people, 95 for effective government, 389 fair and equitable treatment from public agencies at local levels, 20 fundamental, 241 group rights in South Africa, 110 human, xv, 6 in India, 258–59 in Indonesia, 257 local autonomy and negotiation of the respective rights and obligations, 72 local councils and legal rights to manage forests, 108 of local governments, 208 local taxation, 320–21, 326n22 in Mexico, 208–10, 224–28 of minorities and marginalized groups, 249 minority rights in India, 252 monopoly representational, 150 in the Philippines, 152

pp. 409–415

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410

INDEX

rights. See also human rights (cont.) political and citizens’ rights organizations, 256 political civil rights organizations in India, Indonesia and the Philippines tried to foster decentralization and local democracy, 21 politics of recognition places “moral pressure on individual members to conform to a given group culture,” 104 property, 106 public authority and citizen, 108 in Senegal, 108 South Africa’s Commission on Restitution of Land Rights, 111 in Uganda, 191 voters can enforce changes in local power structures, 20 Rwanda, 15 S sanctions accountability by positive and negative, 102 Bolivia’s CVs and, 165–66 citizens have recourse to, 208 citizens should be able to hold officials and agencies responsible for, 208 citizenship rights vs., 225 defined, 20 downward accountability, efforts to encourage, 38 Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp), 84, 181, 194–95 self-rule in the former colonies, 5 Sen, Amartya, 258 Senegal, 108, 111 Serbia Community Revitalization through Democratic Action (CRDA), 154–55, 162–63, 168 elite capture in, 162, 168 elites in, 168 local council (LC) in, 166 local governance in, 155 NGOs in, 154, 169 participatory budgeting in, 146, 162, 164–66 post-conflict programmes in, 154, 162 USAID in, 154–55, 164–66, 169 Sierra Leone, 14, 353

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South Africa Commission on Restitution of Land Rights, 111 decentralization, 14 democratic (political) decentralization in, 46, 55 group rights in, 110 local council and technocratic tasks, 55 Southeast Asia, 105 state-building. See also post-conflict centralism and, 5 decentralization and, 5, 8, 11, 14–16, 386, 388, 390 decentralization reforms and, 386 democratic space and development potential and, 4 local development and, 66 local government and, 7, 11, 22 in Mozambique, Angola, Timor-Leste and Indonesia, 23 post-colonial, 5 post-conflict, 22 power-sharing and, 4 sustainable, 4 state–society interactions and civil society groups, 220 interactions and local development, 62, 72, 74, 85 interactions and local resources, 68 interactions and strategic alliances with local community and private sector organizations, 67 relations and citizen engagement, 109 relations and democratic (political) decentralization, 14–16 relations and democratic decentralized structure, 14, 385 relations and local governance, 276 relations and Uganda, 343–45 relations in Indonesia, 276 taxation, administration and welfare provision, 344 sub-national government administrative decentralization and, 10 in Argentina, 180 in Brazil, 180 in Cambodia, 158, 186, 307–8 central government politicians and bureaucrats limit functions of, 19 constitutional and legal reforms and fiscal resources for, 140

pp. 410–415

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(p. 410) (CS4) 24 September 2013 10:53 PM PMU:

INDEX decentralization and, 236 in East Asia, 308 fiscal decentralization and, 10 fiscal responsibility incentives, 394n1 governmental system and, 7 IGFTs and, 140 in Kenya, 180 in Latin America, 140 local development promotion, 62 in the Philippines, 151 recentralization and weak, 19, 182–83 recentralization for poorly conceived decentralization design, 19 in Uganda, 180, 182, 192 in the United States, 180 SWAp. See Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) T Thailand civil society, 240, 244 democratic (political) decentralization in, 352–53 Malay citizens of, 352 Wildlife Fund Thailand, 246 Timor-Leste benefits in, 369 conflict profile and the state idea, 366–70 local development in, 367–68, 376 local governance in, 367–70 post-conflict and local government in, 369–70, 376–77 post-conflict state-building in, 23 state-building in, 23 top-down. See also bottom-up agenda for improved governance at the local level, 7 authoritarian governance, 159 instructions to associations, community and customary groups, 269 interventions or controls and poor performance, 56 local development, 85 planning, citizens inject input into, 155–56 reforms must meet demand from below, 15 schemes for actors in favour of democracy and development, 268, 389 traditional. See also elites aspirations of ethnic communities, 338 authorities across sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America, 105

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belief, structures, religious and community governance structures in Mozambique, 357 Brazil, decision-making machinery in, 166 Cambodia, patronage structures in, 313 dominant elites, 53 ethnic and gender hierarchies in Benin and Senegal, 111 forms of belonging and identity, 105 forums on democracy and governance in Indonesia, 288 Latin America, structures and practices in, 140 leaders in Africa, 53 leaders/rulers/elites, 29, 53 local socio-political formations, 66 Malawi, headmen in the villages in, 100 mechanism of democratic governance, 228 municipal infrastructure and services, 69 panchayats, 53, 100, 103 rulers, dominant elites and “elite capture,” 52–53 Senegal, authorities in, 108 Uganda, Bantu kingdoms in, 191–92, 196 U Uganda Buganda Cultural and Development Foundation (BUCADEF), 332, 340–43 civil society organization (CSO) in, 332, 336, 339, 342–43 Decentralization Secretariat (DS), 193–94 democratic (political) decentralization in, 34 elites in, 195 fiscal decentralization in, 180, 193, 358 graduated personal tax, 180 local autonomy in, 191 local council (LC) in, 192, 332, 337, 343–44 local development in, 184, 194 local governance in, 336, 342 Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED), 193–94 Ministry of Local Government (MLG), 193–94 National Resistance Army (NRA), 191–92, 338

pp. 411–415

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(p. 411) 24 September 2013 10:53 PM

412

INDEX

Uganda (cont.)

National Resistance Movement (NRM), 190–92, 195–96, 198n20, 332, 337–38, 341–44 NGOs in, 332, 340–41 public financial management (PFM) in, 195 recentralization in, 182–84 rights in, 191 sub-national government in, 180, 182, 192 World Bank and, 194 Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC), 337–38 ultra vires principle, 18 UNDP. See United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] (UNITA), 366, 378n14 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 258, 368, 378n4 United States, sub-national government in, 180 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Bolivia, 162, 165, 169 BUCADEF and, 342 Buganda Cultural and Development Foundation (BUCADEF), 332, 340–43 in Cambodia, 158, 162–65, 169 Democratic Development and Citizen Participation project (Bolivia), 169 in El Salvador, 153, 162–65 forest management projects, 108 Governance and Local Democracy (Philippines) (GOLD), 169, 172n23, 173n24, 173n26 in Indonesia, 156, 163, 165, 169 Local Administration and Reform Program (Cambodia) (LAAR), 158, 162–63, 169

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Local Governance Support Program (LGSP) (Indonesia), 21, 156, 163, 169, 173n25, 177, 281–86, 288–92, 297, 297n4 municipal planning and budget monitoring, 150 participatory budgeting and, 145–46, 150, 153–56, 158, 162–66, 169 in Philippines, 162, 165, 169 in Serbia, 154–55, 164–66, 169 UPC. See Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) USAID. See United States Agency for International Development (USAID) W World Bank alternative development and, 6 in Brazil, 157 decentralization, 179 decentralization and local governance, 6 decentralization and politics, 34 democracy, early-stage, 146 democratic decentralization study, 32 development priorities, 267 domestic coalitions and, 122 in East Timor, 368 elite influence, 147 forest management projects, 108, 114 governance, multi-level systems of, 7 governance definition, 10 in Indonesia, 163–65, 172n19 Latin America, local government in, 126 Malidino Biodiversity Community-based Reserve project in Senegal, 107 participatory budgeting programmes, 157 poverty and well-being, studies on, 148 public financial management (PFM), 194 social programmes, 47 in Uganda, 194 World Vision, 332, 340–41, 343

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53-70, Jingumae 5-chome Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 150-8925, Japan Tel: +81-3-5467-1212 Fax: +81-3-3406-7345 e-mail: sales@unu.edu http://www.unu.edu