CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE WHAT DID WE LEARN FROM BREXIT?

EOIN DREA SENIOR RESEARCH OFFICER, WILFRED MARTENS CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES

INTRODUCTION The Conference on the Future of Europe (CFE) is a joint undertaking of the European Commission, European Council and European Parliament designed to identify the reforms required to optimise the longer term functioning of the European Union (EU). Formalised from an original Franco-German proposal published in November 2019, the CFE is organised on the principle of active citizen participation through events, European citizen panels and Conference plenaries. The plenary is composed of representatives from the European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission, as well as representatives from all national Parliaments, on an equal footing with ordinary citizens. The concept of “European citizens, from all walks of life and corners of the Union, with young people playing a central role in shaping the future of the European project” is an active participation model similar to those previously undertaken in member states such as Ireland and France.65 Conclusions and recommendations from the CFE are expected by early 2022. This chapter sets out to address whether the CFE’s formalisation has been uniquely informed by the process of Britain leaving the European Union.

BREXIT. WHAT BREXIT? Remarkably, given the fundamental consequences of Brexit on the workings of the EU, neither the Political Guidelines for the European Commission proposed by (then Presidentelect) von der Leyen in 2019 or the subsequent Franco-German proposals offer any direct mention of Britain leaving the EU.66 The subsequent Joint Declaration of the EU institutions officially launching the CFE refers only to the “multiple challenges” facing the EU and to the COVID-19 pandemic.67 Similarly, in Strasbourg at the launch event of the CFE in May 2021, President Macron referred to “an unprecedented pandemic that has affected us for more than a year worldwide, but most particularly in Europe. With these huge crises forced upon us. And we've had many, many such occurrences in the past. There are always very deep seated doubts and national instincts that start to make themselves comfortable.”68

The absence of Britain from the founding rational of the CFE can, in part, be ascribed to the onset of the Coronavirus pandemic in early 2020. It’s subsequent fallout—a level of socio-economic disruption not seen since the Second World War—has resulted in significant economic disruption across Europe and indeed globally. The fiscal supports required to combat the worst effects of the pandemic have significantly increased national debts. The Eurozone’s debt to-GDP ratio is forecast to exceed 100% in 2020/21 (up from 84% in 2019)

65  In Ireland, the Citizens’ Assembly on Gender Equality was established by parliamentary resolution in July 2019 to consider gender equality and make recommendations to the Irish Parliament. 66  Conference on the Future of Europe. Franco-German non-paper on key questions and guidelines. Politico. November 2019. <https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Conference-on-the-Future-of-Europe.pdf > 67  Joint Declaration on the Conference on the Future of Europe. Engaging with citizens and democracy – building a more resilient Europe. European Commission. 10 March 2021. <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/ default/files/en_-_joint_declaration_on_the_conference_on_the_future_of_europe.pdf > 68  Statement by President Macron, launch event of the Conference on the Future of Europe, Strasbourg, 9 May 2021.

with debt levels already exceeding 130% of GDP in Greece, Italy and Portugal.69 The public response to the pandemic—unprecedented fiscal supports to match a very loose monetary policy—means that Europe now finds itself confronting an almost unprecedented set of economic circumstances. Low interest rates (a remnant of Europe’s sluggish recovery from the Great Recession) have now been paired with tapering fiscal supports, soaring consumer savings, booming assets prices (including housing), increasingly unequal labour markets and rapidly rising public and corporate debt.

In this context, it is clear that the ongoing pandemic has superseded Brexit as the key rationale underpinning the CFE. The scale and potential difficulties arising from the protracted Brexit negotiations since 2016, and the many disagreements between Britain and the EU which remain in 2021, pale in comparison to the fundamental challenges raised by the Coronavirus. For the EU, Brexit has now just become one challenge of many.

THE PANDEMIC AS A DRIVER OF FURTHER EUROPEAN INTEGRATION The Coronavirus has also fundamentally changed the political landscape in Brussels. The nature of the pandemic—a public health crisis impacting across all member states and social strata—has strengthened the rationale of those seeking a bigger, more confident EU with wider competencies enabling it to undertake more European wide policy initiatives. This is addressed in the Joint Declaration on the CFE which specifically sets out that:

“To address geopolitical challenges in a post COVID-19 environment, Europe needs to be more assertive, taking a leading global role in promoting its values and standards in a world increasingly in turmoil.”70

To this end, it appears that the CFE has been primed to become the vehicle for delivering a post-COVID vision of the EU. A vision that is based on a more assertive, powerful EU. A more coherent EU, better able to respond to challenges, both political and economic, arising from Afghanistan, China, the US and beyond.

However, the strategy of attempting to use the CFE as an umbrella response for multiple challenges—in the Joint Declaration this includes everything from social justice to combatting climate change—is problematic. The challenges are so big that the final recommendations risk becoming generalised statements of approach, rather than discernible policy actions. Also, the entire CFE will be compromised if its final recommendations are seen to just broadly mimic the existing priorities of the European institutions. Given the prominence allowed to specific issues highlighted in the Joint Declaration this latter possibility should not be discounted.

In this context, the entire Brexit process—including the lessons learnt for the EU—has been subsumed into the much broader questions to be tackled by the CFE. This makes it

69 Eurostatistics. Data for Short-term Economc Analysis. 01/2021. Publications Office of the Eurpean Union, Luxembourg, 2021. 70  Joint Declaration, 1.

very difficult for the CFE to specifically address how Brexit has (and will continue to) alter the operation of the EU in the years ahead. This approach also carries the risk that the EU, in seeking to increase its relevance in the post-COVID environment, will simply regard the aftermath of Brexit as just another challenge in the post-COVID world, rather than giving this issue the detailed analysis it requires. Because trying to understand the voluntary detachment of one of EU’s largest economies after nearly forty years of membership must be one of key priorities for Brussels in the years ahead. Unfortunately, this is not now the case with the current structure of the CFE. “Moving past Brexit” in Brussels risks becoming synonymous with failing to heed its important lessons.

WHAT EXACTLY WERE THE DRIVERS OF BREXIT? As noted, if the CFE is serious about strengthening the EU in the years ahead, it must take account of the multitude of factors which underpinned the Brexit vote in the UK. It must also then apply those lessons to the future development of the EU. Unfortunately, the broad scope of the CFE, the onset of the pandemic and the fact that the UK is no longer an EU member (and thus its citizens cannot directly involve themselves in the CFE process) all indicate that the motivations of Brexit will not feature prominently as a learning tool for the EU.

The multi-faceted nature of the Brexit vote is often, erroneously and simplistically, ascribed to British “exceptionalism.”71 This is a convenient narrative which allows Brussels to “move past Brexit” without confronting the underlying causes of the British exit. It also, whether implicitly or explicitly, gives credence to the analysis that the “awkward Brits” were holding back the process of European integration. However, the widespread acceptance of these conclusions will do little to strengthen the EU in the years ahead. Rather, attributing Brexit to British related factors only, risks minimising its true impact.

The reality is much more complex. However, on a macro level, it is clear that Brexit can be seen as a triumph for a misrepresented and selective view of British imperial history and an unbending belief in the primacy of the nation state. This narrative was combined (quite quickly and unpredictably) with a rise in economic nationalism and populism stimulated by the global economic crisis that commenced in 2007. This combination, in turn, challenged long-established political norms such as Britain’s membership of the EU.72

Yet, no one factor in isolation drove the Brexit process, but rather a combination of political, economic and socially related issues. It is true that many of the hard Brexiteers policy lines were totally contradictory. The “taking back control” debate for instance witnessed “right wing populists claiming they are avid free traders and simultaneously saying that one of the purposes of taking back control is to be able to rig domestic markets/competitions in favour of British suppliers/producers.”73

71  Andrew J. Crozier: British exceptionalism: pride and prejudice and Brexit. International Economics and Economic Policy. 2020/3. 635–658. 72  Eoin Drea: The Empire Strikes Back: Brexit, History and the Decline of Global Britain. European View. 2019/1. 118–119. 73  Ivan Rogers: 9 Lessons in Brexit. Short Books, London, 2019. 56.

But, it is not enough to just ascribe Brexit to British uniqueness and reckless politicians. It is clear also that decades of rising insecurity played an important role in allowing economic grievance to express itself as cultural or values driven behaviour.74 The illiberal sentiments often expressed as a type of hyper-nationalism during the Brexit process are not unique to Britain. The United States and Brazil are just some of the many states experiencing variations of this process in recent years. Values, or the perceived alienation of the main political parties from the beliefs of many people, fed directly into the result of the Brexit referendum.75

Although the purpose of this chapter is not to provide a review of the reasons Britain chose to leave the EU, it is important to highlight that Brexit was the result of decades long forces operating in Britain, Europe and globally. To borrow Professor Kevin O’Rourke’s conclusion Brexit really is complicated.76 But, what is certain is that the consideration of the impact of EU membership on Britain’s voters cannot be ignored. From the reunification of Germany to the enlargement of the EU, European political decision-making played an important role in the evolution of British domestic debate. No serious consideration of the future workings of the EU can take place without an analysis of how these major European developments drove policy formulation in the main British political parties. For example, debate surrounding the free movement of labour from Central and Eastern European member states was an important element in the Brexit referendum campaign. The underestimation of these inflows—initial estimates forecast up to 13,000 arrivals annually, while by 2014 over 1.5m workers from these countries actually lived in the UK—played a major role in shifting British sentiment on inward migration.77

WHY BREXIT MATTERS FOR EUROPE For the EU, Brexit should have been a clear wakeup call in terms of informing the future development path of the entire European integration process. Unfortunately, and as noted in this chapter, this has not proved to be the case. A combination of the ongoing pandemic and a desire to “move past Brexit” has facilitated the EU’s more expansive approach to discussing its future. The principal mechanism for this is through the CFE.

The EU has not, however, facilitated any detailed consideration of the EU’s role (either direct or indirect) in Britain’s gradual disengagement from Brussels over the past decades. The CFE will likely offer no examination of the lessons of Brexit for the future of the EU. Brexit, it seems, was an entirely British problem. A narrative made easier to digest owing to the chaotic and (borderline dishonest approach) adopted at various stages by successive British governments since 2016.

But the EU’s approach is fraught with danger, both in the context of its own development and in the context of future relations with Westminster. In terms of its own future, the EU,

74  Martin Sandbu: The Economics of Belonging. A radical plan to win back the left behind and achieve prosperity for all. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2020. 48–49. 75  Geoffrey Evans–Anand Menon: Brexit and British Politics. Polity Press, Cambridge, 2017. 73. 76  Kevin O’Rourke: A Short History of Brexit: from Brentry to Backstop. Pelican Book, London, 2018. 180. 77  Evans–Menon, 15.

in framing itself as the primary solution to the big meta-topics of our time—such as climate change—risks detaching itself further from public support at a local level. It is not that the vast majority of Europeans don’t want to take real action in combatting global warming— they obviously do—but in adopting a clear top/down approach with binding numerical targets, Brussels will likely become the lightning rod for public anger in the years ahead. An anger that will manifest as the public becomes more aware of the fundamental economic changes required in many traditional industries to fulfil these targets in the future. This will reinforce the narratives among more populist parties who paint the EU has increasingly out of touch with ordinary voters. This issue is relevant when considering Brexit because this sense of “being on your own” was a key factor in the Brexit referendum campaign. By painting the main political parties— Conservatives, Labour and Liberals—as “out of touch” and uninterested in the real problems of working voters, Brexit campaigners (primarily through the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), were able to harness longer term worries over economic insecurity and the erosion of traditional values. This was a strategy also made possible to the lack of coherent pro-European message on the Remainer side. Threats of economic doomsday in the event of Brexit proved a poor riposte.

The ultimate conclusion to the Brexit campaign in Westminster was the adoption of a hard Brexiter position by the ruling Conservative Party and the effective neutralisation of pro-EU sentiment within the opposition Labour Party. This was a dénouement thought impossible in 2016.

The EU is already susceptible to criticism from across the political spectrum about its ivory towers. And the EU’s current approach—in subsuming the consideration of Brexit into broader post-pandemic challenges—risks making all the same mistakes that elements of the British political establishment undertook before, during and after the Brexit referendum campaign. By attempting to “go big” the EU risks losing sight of the daily issues—affordable housing, access to education, accessible jobs, local facilities—that determine a significant portion of voters’ satisfaction. And, as Brexit showed, once narratives are established that link political leadership/institutions with economic insecurity, social anxiety and societal decay, they can be almost impossible to rewrite. In this context, the CFE shows that Europe has not learned the lessons of Brexit.