EU–UK: COMMON FOREIGN POLICY GOALS AND CHALLENGES DISCUSSION ON A JOINT FOREIGN POLICY APPROACH

JAROLIM ANTAL CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES, FACULTY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, PRAGUE UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS

Foreign policy belongs to policies where the competence of the EU as whole remains limited. Despite the number of reforms which strengthened the EU’s powers and capacity to speak with a single voice, Member States still play a prevailing role, directly influencing the EU foreign policy and maintaining certain exclusive powers. At the same time, the complex EU decision-making processes often slow down the ability to respond immediately, so, when it comes to issues that would need a fast reaction, the EU must seek a common position approved by all Member States. Hence, as a result of Brexit, the UK may, through its regained “sovereignty,” move more independently, and eventually faster, with more room to manoeuvre in the global arena. However, let us stay realistic. The complexity of international affairs and global issues requires partnerships and the ability to build coalitions that can help states to talk with a stronger voice and provide more concerted (re)actions. And, whether before Brexit or after, the partners of the UK and likeminded countries that defend and promote liberal values and democracy remain the same. The new era of relations between the EU27 and the UK has opened discussions on mutual future cooperation. This is also happening inevitably in the field of foreign policy, where the UK must search for a new position and re-establish a framework and ways of interactions with its partners.

This chapter describes the outcomes of Brexit and discusses the ways and the areas where the EU and the UK need to interact, given their status in the international arena. It argues that the EU–UK cooperation in foreign policy can only work if the parties leave behind their sentiments on Brexit and re-establish mutual trust.

UK AND ITS INTERESTS IN WORKING WITH THE EU Looking back in the past, some relevant observations can be made about what the UK’s position was in relation to foreign policy when it was still a EU Member State. The UK was a respected voice within the EU, with one of the biggest military capacities, a military budget exceeding 2% of its GDP, and one of the biggest diplomatic and intelligence services. On the top of this, the UK actively contributed to the military operations promoted by the EU. Interestingly, just during the Brexit transition period, the UK contributed to 7 out of 16 EUled military operations.31 Furthermore, the UK also remains one of the five members of the UN Security Council, a member of various platforms such as G7 or G20, and a nuclear power within NATO. The UK is also active in giving development aids and, before Brexit, Britain’s budget for aid spending was 0.7% of its GNI, meeting the binding target set by the UN. At the same time, the UK was perceived in the EU as part of the so-called “liberal wing,” what was often reflected in its support for a more open trade policy or in ambitions toward the completion of the single market. In addition, it has been also a proponent of a strong transatlantic partnership. During the Brexit negotiations, the UK officials often made clear that the UK wanted to further

31  Claire Mills–Ben Smith: End of Brexit transition: implications for defence and foreign policy cooperation. Briefing Paper. House of Commons Library. 19 January 2021. <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/ documents/CBP-9117/CBP-9117.pdf > Accessed: 10 September 2021

cooperate with the EU on what were perceived as common interests and priorities.32 Former prime minister Theresa May portrayed Britain “as being a confident country that [was] in control of its own destiny once again.” Theresa May promoted Global Britain as an ambition of the British government even before Brexit. She stated that “we [would] build a new, bold, confident Global Britain and shape a new era of globalisation that genuinely works for all.”33 Nevertheless, this ambition lacked more concrete contents. Developments in 2019 showed that pledges from the above-mentioned political declaration were turned down, and UK’s foreign, security, and defence policy did not have any concrete structure.34 Hadfield and Wright argue that a U-turn in “any institutionalised relationship with the EU in foreign, security and defence policy (FSDP) is arguably the most noteworthy feature of the post-Brexit dispensation.”35 Prime minister Boris Johnson explained the UK’s approach, emphasising that “while we [the UK] [would] always co-operate with its European friends in foreign and defence policy whenever our interests converge—as they often, if not always, [would]—this [would] not... necessarily require any new treaty or institutions.” He also added that this could not be a subject of a legal agreement due to the simple reason “that the UK [was] not a European power by treaty or by law but by irrevocable facts of history and geography and language and culture and instinct and sentiment.”36

Following Brexit, the UK became a “third country,” meaning that the CFSP and CSDP do not apply to the British. The preamble of the TCA refers to the “importance of the global cooperation to address issues of shared interest.” The international dimension of the common principles includes: • the principles of democracy, the rule and law and respect for human rights • the fight against climate change (commitment to the Paris Agreement on climate change) • countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction • implementing obligations to counter the illicit trade in conventional weapons • cooperation to combat acts of terrorism

32  Theresa May at Davos 2017: Her speech in full. 19 January 2017. <https://www.weforum.org/ agenda/2017/01/theresa-may-at-davos-2017-her-speech-in-full/ > Accessed: 10 September 2021. 33  Idem. 34  Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom. HM Government. 19 October 2019. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/ uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/840656/Political_Declaration_setting_out_the_framework_for_the_ future_relationship_between_the_European_Union_and_the_United_Kingdom.pdf > Accessed: 10 September 2021. 35  Amelia Hadfield–Nicholas Wright: Fog in the Channel? The impact of Brexit on EU and UK foreign affairs. European Institute for Security Studies. 11 June 2021. <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/fog-channelimpact-brexit-eu-and-uk-foreign-affairs > Accessed: 10 September 2021. 36  PM speech in Greenwich. Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s speech in Greenwich. GOV.UK. 3 February 2020. <https:// www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-in-greenwich-3-february-2020 > Accessed: 10 September 2021.

• global cooperation on issues of shared economic, environmental and social interest, including the two parties’ cooperation on global issues and coordination of positions in multilateral organisations (the UN, the G7, G20, OECD, IMF, World Bank, and the WTO)37

In March this year, the UK published the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. The review identifies opportunities and different platforms that should enable the UK to play a leading role in the global arena. The document also recognises crucial changes in the global environment, where challenges to the liberal world order have been rising. The stronger role of China or, at the time, Donald Trump’s administration have created pressure to defend liberal values and multilateralism more than ever before. For this reason, the Integrated Review sets what the priorities for the UK in this dynamic and unpredictable world are. The US is at the centre of the British relations with other countries as its “most important bilateral relationship, essential to key alliances and groups such as NATO and the Five Eyes [intelligence-sharing relationship between the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand], and our [UK’s] largest bilateral trading partner and inward investor.”38 The Indo-Pacific tilt also gains evident attention in the review. The ambition of the UK is to be “deeply engaged in the Indo-Pacific as the European partner with the broadest, most integrated presence in support of mutually-beneficial trade, shared security and values.” The UK, in this regard, should extend the cooperation from China, India, or Japan to South Korea, Vietnam, India, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines. Regarding China, the document underlines both the benefits and the risks of closer relations between the UK and the Asian power. It suggests that UK will need “robust diplomatic framework” to manage its relations with China. At the same time, the UK wants China to follow existing agreements and, therefore, “will not hesitate and stand up for values and interests where they are threatened.”39

As for the future of the EU–UK relations, they lack more concrete steps and ways of engaging with the EU, as the UK only focusses on selected partnerships with single Member States. In particular, the review focuses on the bigger ones, calling for “growing foreign policy partnership with Germany or France” assuming the beginning of “deep and long-standing” security and defence cooperation. Hadfield and Wright describe missing forms of cooperation with the EU as “an EU-sized hole that now exists in British foreign policy thinking.”40

37  Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community. EUR-Lex. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/?qid=1580206007232&uri=CELEX%3A12019W/TXT%2802%29 >. Accessed: 10 September 2021. 38 Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. GOV.UK. 2 July 2021. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-theintegrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-theintegrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy > Accessed: 10 September 2021. 39  Idem. 40  Hadfield–Wright.

AFTER BREXIT: BAND TOGETHER OR FALL APART? According to the Integrated Review, from London’s perspective, there are only very marginal references to the relations with the EU. Nevertheless, despite the preferred flexibility for which the UK is calling when it comes to new relations with the EU, there must be interactions with the bloc in the field of foreign policy, given the geographical proximity and overlapping interest.

HOW? A reconfiguration of the relations with the EU is for naturally important the UK. Currently, the UK foreign policy seems to lean towards cooperation with single Member States and excluding Brussels. Recently, some formats gained attention and became a useful tool for common discussion and joint coordination. For example, the E3 format, where Germany, France, and the UK cooperated back in 2003 on the nuclear agreement with Iran, could be promising. The E3 gained a new momentum under Donald Trump’s administration and with other issues, such as the poisoning of agent Skripal, when the leaders of these countries met frequently. Some experts argue that the E3 could provide diplomatic coordination and crisis response and expand its focus to address a new set of thematic, regional, or multilateral topics.41

The Quad is another platform where the UK is involved in foreign policy cooperation. It includes Germany, France, and the US on a level of political directors, focussing on coordination and exchanging information. Under the new US administration, the formation met several times discussing the matters of Iran, Myanmar, and China. Surely, small groupings and specific policy-oriented formats bring benefits and build trust between the countries. However, closed clubs are often criticised for their exclusivity, and, in regard to the EU, this may raise concerns about the possibility that these formats will undermine the EU’s unity. At the same time, looser forms of cooperation may contribute to better information exchange and building trust among single EU Member States and the UK. Flexibility, therefore, may enable the UK to explore new opportunities in its relations with EU Member States and eventually help foster cooperation in specific foreign policy areas.

WHAT AREAS? In foreign policy, the missing framework for cooperation between the EU and the UK affects various areas. It surely brings uncertainty, but, at the same time, some basic orientation and direction remains unchanged in some fields. Here, therefore, certain predictability is present. As result of Brexit, the UK set its own sanctions framework, which gives the UK the power to actively implement the sanctions autonomously. Nevertheless, the UK and the EU are required to follow the international obligations based on UN resolutions. So it can be expected that the British position in this area will resemble that of the EU. However, there is currently no formal cooperation on dealing with policy challenges involving these sanctions. It should also be added that, in order to be effective, a sanctions policy should be coordinated with partners;

41  Alice Bilon Garrand–Richard G Whitman: E3 Cooperation Beyond Brexit: Challenging but Necessary. Expert Comment. Chatham House. 2 September 2020. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/09/e3-cooperationbeyond-brexit-challenging-necessary > Accessed: 10 September 2021.

so, for the UK, working together with the EU is an essential element to successfully implement sanctions and have a common stand on issues they both share the same views about, for instance, on Belarus or Russia. In the case of Belarus, Britain was the first European country introducing sanctions against the Lukashenko government in 2020; and it is only one of the most recent cases in a series of similar situations.

Coordination in climate policy also remains an open question in EU–UK relations, even if it is exactly regarding fighting climate change that the EU is mentioned as a possible partner in the Integrated Review. No doubt that both entities are committed to the very ambitious goal of reaching carbon neutrality by 2050, but more efforts are needed. The COP26 in Glasgow is a unique opportunity to find a way to work with other countries and to agree on a common action with the EU, too. Here, the UK, together with the US and the EU, can play a vital role. Wachowiak points out that the EU should use its current momentum to set a triangular climate alliance with the US and not leave the UK out of their plans for establishing a High-Level Climate Action Group.42 Despite the binding nature of the Paris agreement, more action is needed at the national level to implement it and to contribute to achieving the states’ commitments.

World trade is now threatened by protectionist waves, and not only as a result of the pandemic. The need for a functioning multilateral body is, therefore, urgent. However, there has not been enough support to move further with the reform of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. Here, again, coalitions are crucial and the core group is represented by likeminded countries in the West. The EU, together with the UK, could contribute to this reform and be among those promoting it to their partners. Other fields where collaboration is desirable are trade liberalisation and environmental sustainability. The already-mentioned lack of structure for cooperation also affects the area of defence. Here, the missing channels and platforms can become a real hurdle in the EU–UK cooperation, at least at this initial phase.43 The UK military personnel contributing to the CSDP missions will return to the UK, and this also applies to the military staff seconding EU institutions. It remains unclear what direction the UK will choose, as the decision about joining the CSDP operations with the EU needs to be approved by the parliament and has to be in line with the national interest.44

In addition, by leaving the EU, the UK also lost influence in shaping the EU defence initiatives. For instance, withdrawing from the European Defense Agency and, therefore, assuming a third-country status does not allow Britain to be part of the European Defence Fund and, consequently, to have an access to its projects. The UK will most

42  Jannike Wachowiak: EU–UK climate cooperation post-Brexit: A case for optimism? European Policy Centre, Policy Brief. 28 June 2021. <https://www.epc.eu/content/PDF/2021/EU-UK_Climate_cooperation_PB.pdf > Accessed: 10 September 2021 43  Paolo D’Alesio: EU-UK Defense Cooperation After Brexit. Finabel. June 2021. <https://finabel.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/06/22.-EU-UK-Defence-Cooperation-After-Brexit.pdf > Accessed: 10 September 2021. 44  Claire Mills–Ben Smith: End of Brexit transition: implications for defence and foreign policy cooperation. House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper Number 9117. 19 January 2021. <https://researchbriefings.files. parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9117/CBP-9117.pdf > Accessed: 10 September 2021

probably focus on NATO and seek ways through its diplomacy to single Member States to gain information and influence in the activities of the EU’s CSDP.45

The recent step of the US government to withdraw from Afghanistan represents another challenge in the relations between the EU and the UK. This even proves that it is becoming harder for both of them to rely on the US to ensure their own defence. Neither the UK nor the EU managed to persuade the US to delay the withdrawal from Kabul airport in order to evacuate more people. For the EU, this may help catalysing the forces advocating the establishment of EU permanent military forces and, for the UK, rethink its approach to the US and seek ways for cooperation and alliances with other partners.46 The UK was also an active EU Member State in the field of cybersecurity. With its capacities and knowledge, it also contributed to the staff of ENISA and Europol. It also led actions investigating cybercrimes in the EU and called for closer cooperation among the Member States. Stevens points out that, because of Brexit, the UK has lost access to the information and is excluded from the EU’s cybersecurity decision making. This does not mean that the EU and the UK cannot cooperate, but the UK will eventually look at other platforms, such as NATO or the FVEY, and new bi- and multilateral relations for cybersecurity cooperation—more than at the EU, albeit the participants may often be EU states.47

Transatlantic relations are a key aspect of foreign policy strategy in both the UK and the EU. The result of the US elections and the new administration led by Joe Biden brought more predictability in the relations with the US’s traditional partners, but whether the “America First” approach is gone in American foreign policy remains still questionable.

A wave of optimism in the EU also followed Biden’s election. Brussels hopes that the Democratic administration is more willing to strengthen the EU–US relations and, eventually, it can have a strong advocate for trade liberalisation and regulatory cooperation on its side. For example, the position of the new US administration on trade matters is already evidently different from that of the Trump administration. During the 2021 G7, the US has been nudging the UK government to accept the EU’s proposal for aligning UK products with the European rules, which would have helped avoid imposing controls at the Irish sea ports. The UK has denied the proposal, emphasising that flexibility in standards on foods could be beneficial for new trade agreements with countries with different standards, such as the US.48 In this sense, the UK is a new special actor that left the largest free market in the world, trying to set its own regulatory framework. To what extent it will diverge from the EU and how close it could eventually be to the EU in the future will only be visible in the long term. Nevertheless, the UK’s ambition to catalyse negotiations on a trade agreement with the US will not be

45  Mills–Smith. 2021 46  Daniel Boffey: US withdrawal from Afghanistan will lead to EU army, says top diplomat. The Guardian. 2 September 2021. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/02/us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-willlead-to-eu-army-says-top-diplomat > Accessed: 10 September 2021. 47  Tim Stevens: Brexit and Beyond: Cyber Security. King’s College London. 5 February 2021. <https://www.kcl. ac.uk/cyber-security-brexit-and-beyond > Accessed: 10 September 2021 48  George Parker: EU leaders to pressure Boris Johnson over Northern Ireland at G7. Financial Times. 11 June 2021. <https://on.ft.com/3twYaKe > Accessed: 10 September 2021.

easy, as the US president warned that, for now, the priorities for his administration are to increase competitiveness at home not through new trade deals with other countries.49

THE WAY TO GO: RENEWING TRUST IN THE EU–UK RELATIONS Despite the fact that the Brexit chapter is formally closed, uncertainty persists and directly affects the UK’s relations with the EU and mutual confidence between the country and its European partners. The trust between the UK and the EU was further harmed by several diplomatic incidents. Currently, the UK government is challenging the already agreed parameters of the Northern Ireland Protocol, forcing the EU to launch legal actions against the British government. Criticism towards the UK government came from the House of Lords, which deemed that Johnson’s attitude was damaging the UK’s international reputation, and, later, from the US. As a response, and still in regard of the Northern Ireland Protocol, the UK started accusing the EU of low flexibility in implementing the withdrawal agreement, as the new customs regime and the border controls could become an obstacle in delivering supplies from the UK to Northern Ireland. The issue escalated at the 2021 G7 summit, where prime minister Boris Johnson accused the French president Emmanuel Macron that the EU is preventing the sales of British chilled meat in Northern Ireland.50 In this climate, the UK government threatened to not give the EU ambassador to London full diplomatic status, a decision then withdrawn.51 However, Wachowiak points out the essential role of the levels in the EU–UK relations other than the official ones. The EU should focus more on the subnational level to support and promote relations between substate actors on both sides, such as devolved administrations, regions and cities, civil society, academia and think tanks.52 This could contribute to renewing trust and find grounds for mutual cooperation, also in foreign policy matters.

CONCLUSION Brexit opens a new chapter in EU–UK relations. With the introduction of the TCA, the process is formally concluded, but many questions still remain unanswered. As the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borell stated, “[w]ith Brexit, nothing gets easier and a lot gets more complicated. How much more complicated depends on the choices that both sides will make.”53 The EU and UK share

49  Patrick Wintour: Joe Biden warning dashes UK hopes of early US trade deal. The Guardian. 2 December 2020. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/dec/02/uk-hopes-of-early-us-trade-deal-dashed-by-biden-warning > Accessed: 10 September 2021. 50  As a result of the Withdrawal Agreement, the EU and the UK agreed on a protocol providing border checks between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK 51  Jim Brunsden–Michael Peel: Brussels’ Brexit enforcer warns UK over diplomatic snub. Financial Times. 26 January 2021. <https://www.ft.com/content/bd9491fe-f9ae-4cfb-a966-8330bbe8643e > Accessed: 10 September 2021. 52  Wachowiak. 53  Josep Borell: After Brexit, how can the EU and UK best cooperate on foreign policy? EEAS. 29 January 2021. <https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/92345/after-brexit-how-can-eu-and-uk-bestcooperate-foreign-policy_en > Accessed: 10 September 2021.

common values and interests and this is reflected in their foreign policy. But thelack mutual trust to work closer. For now, the UK does not perceive the EU as an essential partner with established channels for cooperation. The British are rather looking at different partners and, in some cases, establishing closer relations with single EU Member States. At least this is what it can be read from the UK government’s official positions. The flexibility in cooperation for which the UK government is calling is more an ambition than a recipe of success. When it comes to concrete issues, the UK needs to actively seek to build coalitions and partnerships that can increase the influence and the efficiency of its national positions. In this respect, the EU represents the neighbour whose doorbell could be rung. There are several areas and opportunities where the EU’s and the UK’s interests will inevitably intersect. However, in this climate of uncooperativeness, it is hard to estimate when we will see more concrete steps. At the last G7 summit, it was still clear that Brexit is a topic that is stealing the show and unnecessarily overshadowed the summit’s agenda. Perhaps the COP26 conference can bring more achievements, and the EU and the UK’s common ambition on the issue as well as the necessity to implement the commitments in the Paris Agreement can open the way for a new rapprochement. This is made even more urgent by recent developments in Afghanistan that should help the two sides focus on stronger cooperation on not only trade issues but also defence and security matters.