Collapsing Methods of Handling the Nuclear Waste

Collapsing Methods of Handling the Nuclear Waste: the KBS-3 method doesn’t work! but the DRD method provides freedom of immediate action

Nils-Axel Mörner Head of Paleogeophysics & Geodynamics 1991-2005 President of the INQUA Comission on Neotectonics 1981-1989 Editor of “Neotectonics Bulletin” 1978-1996 Author of numerous papers and several books “Paleoseismicity of Sweden-A novel paradigm”, “The tsunami threat: research and technology”

morner@pog.nu

Only by extending the seismic database backwards via paleoseismology, are we able to assess future hazards in a meaningful way The nuclear industry limits their analyses to seismology, fails in assessing the future risk correctly and produces directly misleading scenarios

Paleoseismology records events of above M 5.5

The Swedish-Finnish case With increasing time units, the maximum earthquake magnitude increases dramatically; from below 4.8 to well above 8.

Seismology Historical data Late Holocene Deglacial phase

<100 years last 600 years last 5000 years 9â&#x20AC;&#x201C;11 Ka BP

<4.8 <5.5 >>6 to ~7 >>8

This implies that we can only achieve a meaningful long-term seismic hazard assessment, if the paleoseismic records of past earthquake events are included.

The long-term seismic risk is totally different â&#x20AC;&#x201C; a repository would not survive

After the Ice Age land has gone up by 800 m in the centre in Ă&#x2026;ngermanland and by 450 m at Stockholm

These movements (vertical & horizontel) made Sweden 9000-10,000 years BP a

high-seismic area

Even in the bordering zone, however, there are multiple records of postglacial earthquakes (above magnitude 6, the lower limit of geological recording)

in the Great Belt region in northern Germany in Poland (especially well recorded) in Kaliningrad region in Vilnius region in Estonia in NE Russia (very fine records) and other areas to come

1. Threats on Nuclear Power Plants

Earthquakes – up to ~7 magnitude Tsunamis – up to 20 m high Methane venting – anytime, anywhere

During the last 5000 years we have a record of 11 earthquakes in Sweden reaching magnitudes of up to ~7

17 big tsunami-waves in Sweden during the last 13.000 years

Wave-height in meters: The Baltic blue & The Kattegatt green

Actual tsunami threat in the Bothnian Bay

2. Threats on a KBS-3 high-level nuclear waste repository in the bedrock Earthquakes Bedrock fracturing Methane venting Tsunamis Repository aging Ground water movements etc.

Distribution of events in Sweden

As to paleoseismic magnitude, we have recorded

The following distribution of our 59 events Magnitude

Number of events

>8

7

7â&#x20AC;&#x201C;8

17

6â&#x20AC;&#x201C;7

29

<6

6

As to paleoseismic frequency, we have recorded

7 earthquakes within 102 years in Mälardalen (10,490–10,388 vBP) year

magnitud

epicenter

10,490

6–7

Stockholm

10,469

7–8

Mariefred

10,447

6–7

Stockholm

10,430

8–9

Stockholm

10,400

7–8

Säffle

10.410

~6

Stockholm

10,388

>8

Mariefred

Because we can tie the Swedish liquefaction structures to one single varve (year), we can calculate their spatial distribution & magnitude

Deformations at 3 sites 76 km apart in the autumn of varve 10,430 vBP, and the turbidite in 2 cores (from an area of turbidite spread of 200x320 km).

The safety distance used (from models) does not fit with observational facts implying that there is not room enough for a KBS-3 repository

The Boda Cave (above): a totally fractured bedrock hill with a 2600 m long system of subsurface passages.

Intensive fracturing of the bedrock up to 50 km from the epicentre.

The Boda cave 12,5 km from epicentre is totally fractured into pieces.

Leggesta-Ärja a 6-8 m high fault dated 10,430 vBP

The main E–W fault that moved 6 times times in 10,490–10,388 vBP. 1 km the the North a new 6-8 m high fault was formed This reveals the nonsense in SKB:s talk about a safe distance of only 50-100 m

The claim of a â&#x20AC;?safe zoneâ&#x20AC;? only 50-100 m from a regional fault is, of course, sheer nonsense.

Repository at 500 m for 100,000 years:

Red River Fault in Vietnam recording a continual addition of new faults no safe respect-distance can be identified here

Methane Venting Tectonics is a novel factor recorded at several sites in Sweden and Finland The last one occurred 2000 years ago and set up a 20 m high tsunami wave This factor seems to invalidate all serious talk about guarantees and long-term safety when it concerns a repository of KBS-3 type

= 168 liter

= 1 liter

M 8 earthquake in Hudiksvall at 9663 years BP

CONCLUSIONS 1. The intensity of seismicity, the tsunami wave-heights and the methane venting events recorded in Late Holocene time imply that the nuclear power plants operating today do so ignoring serious threats of active natural phenomena.

2. The long-term storage of high-level nuclear waste in the bedrock according to the KBS-3 method seems firmly invalidated by modern geodynamics and observational facts with respect to paleoseismics, tsunamis and methane venting tectonics.

References Mörner, N.-A., 2003. Paleoseismicity of Sweden - a novel paradigm.

Contribution to INQUA from its Sub-commission on Paleoseismology, 320 pp.

Mörner, N.-A., 2008. Excursion Guide. Excursion No 11, 33rd IGC, 2008, 107 pp.

Mörner, N.-A., 2009. Late Holocene earthquake geology in Sweden. In: Reicherter, K., Michetti, A. M. & Silva, P. G. (eds) Palaeoseismology: Historical and Prehistorical Records of Earthquake Ground Effects for Seismic Hazard Assessment. Geological Society, London, Special Publications, 316, 179-188.

Mörner, N.-A., 2010. Natural, man-made and imagined disasters. Disaster Advances, 3 (2), 3-5 Mörner, N.-A., 2011. Paleoseismology: the application of multiple parameters in four case studies in Sweden. Quaternary International, 242, p. 65-75.

Mörner, N.-A. & Dawson, S., 2011. Traces of tsunami events in off shore and on shore environments. Case studies in the Maldives, Scotland and Sweden). In: The Tsunami Threat: research & technology (N.-A. Mörner, Ed.), p. 371-388.

Mörner, N.-A. & Sjöberg, R., 2011. Excursion guide. Second International Conference on Granite Caves. SSF, Svenska Grottor No. 12, 27 pp.

Mörner, N.-A., 2011. The Tsunami Threat: research & technology. 714 pp, InTech.

Now we know that the KBS-3 method does not work Now we have to do something different

”the best under the circumstances”

This is a storage in a Dry Rock Deposit (DRD) – remaining accessible and controllable –

Freedom of Immediate Action â&#x20AC;&#x201C; a DRD-repository To hell with the KBS-3 method (the place where it rightly belongs) Keep the control and freedom of action (only by the DRD method) DRD is to do the best under the circumstances (no solution) DRD is not a solution justifying extended nuclear power and uranium mining DRD is much cheaper DRD excludes Clab (the temporary storage of zero safety)

Mountains of high-level radioactive waste in the World What to do with it?

CLAB offers no safe interim stock-piling The NPPs offers no safe interim stock-pining

I propose a DRD-storage

Reserve In case of questions

The high-level nuclear waste will have to be stored in one way or the other for at least 100,000 years • To guarantee ”safety” for 100,000 years or more is of course impossible.

• No such claims are backed up by geodynamics and paleoseismics – on the contrary; such claims violate modern observational facts.

• Seismology covers far to short time periods to allow meaningful hazard assessments for time periods a 1000 times longer (or more).

• Instead, we have to rely on detailed paleoseismological records for meaningful hazard assessments over the time periods required.

The seismic database of the nuclear waste industry only consider seismology (and a few historical events) The geological database is based on paleoseismology and its observational facts When extended 100,000 years into the Future, the two databases give totally different pictures.

The energy release by the geological database exceeds that of the nuclear industries by 1000 billion times.

Therefore, it is highly unlikely that a repository of KBS-3 type would stay a chance of surviving intact over the required period of 100,000 years

Seismic Hazard Prediction for the next 100,000 years A: Blue box – based on seismic data only (SKB, Posiva) max 1 M 6 event in 100,000 years B: Yellow box – based on paleoseismic data (Mörner) 100–1000 M 7 events, ~10 M 8 events and even some M ~9 events

The 18 Swedish tsunami events predominantly represent events of intensity XIâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;XII

The methods used in Sweden and Finland

All the damage recorded on the Fukushima Dai-ichi Reactor Unit Number 4 was self-inflicted damage caused by the intense radioactivity of the irradiated fuel, which drove the temperature up to about 900-1000 degrees Celsius, whereupon the zirconium cladding reacted chemically with the steam from the boiling water, releasing hydrogen gas which caused the explosion;the additional heat from this exothermic chemical reaction also caused the zirconium to catch fire, accelerating the release of radioactive gases, vapors and ashes.