Number 1
AUGUST 1979
Talking Point
Chairmans Report Notes and News
Published by the Association for Petroleum and Explosives Administration
Danger, Areas on Forecourts Electrical Equipment for use in flammable atmospheres London News
Spanish Camp Site Disaster Conveyance Legal Notes Legal Proceedings Correspondence
GLC Conveyance Report Branch Report
1 2 3 6 9 14 17, 22 24 25 27 28 31
Opinions expressed in this Journal are not necessarily the views of the Association
Having just taken over as Editor I must echo the words of my predecessor in his swan song, that the production of this journal does seem" awesome and immense". I only hope that in time I may reach his high standard. The journal is not only the result of the efforts of the Editor, but also yours as members and associates and I do ask for your support with material and comment during my term.
The Oil crisis hits the world headlines again, one reads of gun fights and murder at service stations in the States! At home for the Petroleum Inspector it means increase of storage of "loose" petrol in cars and homes and the hazards that go with it. It is expected a larger number of filling stations will close, leaving an increasing number of disused tanks. The last Bulletin reported on this and made recommendations; the HSE however should be made more aware of this growing problem and -. difficulties Authorities face 1n mak1ng tanks safe and the cumberSome legislation which exists.
As you all well know, I have held the affairs of this A.ssociation very close to my heart for many years now As a member and than as your Honorary Secretary I have seen its affairs change in a variety of ways, none more so than at the time of Local Government Re organisation We have had some very lean years since that time, but like my predecessor in this office, I feel that we are noW re-emerging into a promising future.
During my year of office I have set myself the task of giving all the SUpport I can to our Branches, giving assistance to those already in being, and giving initiative to the formation of others. I thank the Association most sincerely for the singular honour it has paid me by electing me Chairman. This office has been occupied by many good men in the past, I hope that I can live up to the same high standards that many of them se t
On January 4, 1977, a serious fire and explosion occurred at the Braehead Container Clearance Depot at Renfrew in Scotland. After investigation it was discovered that it had accidently been started by three boys who had lit a fire to warm themselves at a den which they had made, during the New Year holiday, from cardboard cartons stacked beside the warehouse.
As the walls of the warehouse were coated on both sides with bituminous material they quickly caught fire. Within minutes flaming droplets of bitumen were falling onto the contents of the 'bUilding. These included not only 1,700 drums (67 tonnes) of sodium chlorate, but also milk powder, bottles and combine harvesters.
The effect of the fire and the series of explosions which followed wrecked both the shed directly involved and a neighbouring bonded warehouse containing more than 20,000 cases of whisky, 80 barrels of spirit and general cargo.
No serious injury
It was fortunate that the fire broke out on a public holiday and not on a normal working day when up to 50 people would have been working in the area, the report says. As it was 12 members of the public and a watchman were injured _ none seriously and debris scattered up to five miles away. The local fire brigade was also attending another fire when it received the report of the incident or they too might have been present when the drums exploded.
The investigation was carried out by local factory inspectors assisted by specialists including an explosives inspector. The results led them to conclude that the main blasts stemmed from the sodium chlorate, although this contradicted the accepted view of the substance's behavour.
The Research and Laboratory Services Division of the Health and Safety Executive conducted a series of four tests designed by the explosives inspector to the behaviour of the chemical when exposed to intense heat. The first three, carried out at the Division's test centre in Buxton, used differing quantities of the chemical and differing heat intensities. All were carried out in the open-air and none resulted in an explosion.
A fourth test was devised as a direct result of studying six explosions, dating as far back as 1899, which involved sodium or potassium chlorate. All six had taken place in an enclosed place such as a ship's hold or A building was specially constructed to simulate, as far as possible, the storage .of sodium under the type of confinement cond1t1ons that would be likely to exist in a warehouse. A stack of 36 drums, each containing 55lb of the chemical, was engulfed in a bonfire built inside a three-sided, roofed enclosure. Loose sodium chlorate was added prior to ignition to increase the intensity of the fire.
Six-and-a-half minutes after ignition, says the report, and 1i minutes after the more intense fire associated with the loose chlorate, an explosion occurred, followed, seconds later, by a second explosion. Pieces of drum were hurled out of the fire and blast gauges placed at a distance of 20ft were uprooted.
Appendices to the report include a technical report by the explosives inspector involved in the investigation.
Schedule 1 to the draft Hazardous Installations (Notification and Survey) Regulations, published on June 16, 1978, now contains prOVision for sodium chlorate to be taken into account.
The Association which was formed in the West Midlands in April 1958 is 21 years old. Congratulations and Happy Birthday!!
The treasurer has asked me to remind those of you who have not yet paid your annual subscription to please do so as soon as possible, prompt payment helps keep costs down. Thankyou.
The Codes of Practice is at present being reprinted due to continual demand from both members and interested persons.
Due to increased printing and postal costs when the new issue is ready cost will be £2 per copy which includes postage.
The Association welcomes the following new members
Mr Percival Chief Fire Officer Vauxhall Motors Limited
Mr E. Melrose Grampian Regional Council
Mr B. Taylor Beds C.C.
Mr M.G. Young GLC
Mr Newson Sussex C.C.
Mr Ovenden sussex C.C.
Mr A. Smith Associate member
Mr L. Adams Associate member
Mr Iyn Kagak u Shin Bun Sha from Tokyo
Japan
There has been in recent years increasing interest in the possibility of repairing old petrol tanks. Due to high replacement cost this is being looked at as an alternative to replacing a petrol tank when it fails. In the next edi tion it is hoped to have a paper from one of the main contractors who carry out this work. It is known that some authori ties have already accepted the lining of petrol tanks and I would like to hear from anyone wi th first hand knowledge.
Anyone whose job involves constantly and manhole covers knows what a backbreaking experience it can be espeCially when many of the heavy duty versions can now weigh up to 4-5 cwt.
Brickhouse Dudley have now taken the hard work out of the lifting operation by introducing a simple lever operated device aptly named "Bri-lift".
Apart from being capable of lifting covers weighing up to 250kg, "Bri-lift" is collapsible and can be carried in the boot of a car, and it has the added advantage of being virtually maintenance-free.
Already many local authorities and even the Royal Observatory in Sussex have found "Bri-lift" ideal for their particular manhole cover lifting problems. So, if you're worried about the possibility of back injury, "Bri-lift" could be the answer you're looking for.
A petroleum inspector was assaulted while taking a sample during the course of an inspection at licensed premises in the London area, this resulted in him attending hospital and being off work injured for three weeks.
As a result of this unprovoked attack one of the two licensees appeared at Thames Magistrates Court on June 6th and pleaded guilty to causing actual bodily harm to the inspector. He was fined £75 with £60 costs and was bound over for 12 months on the sum of £50 to keep the peace. The magistrate asked the inspector if he had to visit these premises again, when it was found that he did, he also was bound over for 12 months to keep the peace for a similar sum.
It has not escaped notice that Police officers assaulted in the course of their duty'are not treated in the same way!!
A prosecution is impending for alleged infringements of licence conditions arising from the inspection.
At the AGM in Birmingham the following officers were elected and form the Council of the Association.
Chairman Mr J.W. Frid, County Safety Officer Treasurer, Mr C.T. Peacock, Secretary, Mr E. Brown,
Honorary Editor Mr J.A.J. Thompson,
Mr Mr Mr Mr
B. Lowe Beds C.C. H.J. Smith Humberside R.G. Kitching Humberside D. Riley Glamorgan
A vicar wants his flock to 1 pray for peop e who operate petrol pumps in the area because, he says, they are under "great temptation" to profiteer in th crisis and their jobs are at ris: wIth petrol shortage.
The Rev. 1vo Morshead, vicar of Whitchurch, near Tavistock, Devon made appeal in his parish magazine. He sa1d yesterday: "I am not be1'ng t' sarcas 1C, but we pray for various groups, and as some of my congregation work 1'n I felt they should be included."
garages,
A fitter was blown 250 feet by an explosion in a tank at the factory where he worked.
His employers were prosecuted by the Health and Safety Executive after the accident.
Magistrates were told that the explosion occured while cat walks were being welded onto storage tanks containing fuel oil. Previously employees at the factory had had to jump from one tank to another.
A barrister told the court that the fuel oil inside the tank was being heated at the time, and so no welding should have taken place.
The top of the tank was blown 160 feet and parts of it were discovered a quarter of a mile away.
The Barrister asked for the case to be'heard at a Crown Court in view of its seriousness and the limit on penalities imposed by Magistrates. The Court, however, decided to hear the case.
The fitter's employers admitted failing to ensure a safe system of work, failing to provide training, instruction and supervision for employees and failing to show employees a written statement of health and safety at work policy.
They were fined £425 by the Magistrates, and were also ordered to pay costs of £650.
The tragic burning garage worker, whose desperate cries for help were ignored by passing motorists, has died.
IIFather of four 39 year old John BurnS of Messing, died from 86 per cent burnS in Mount Vernon Hospital on Monday evening where doctors had fought for nearly two days to save his life.
Mr. Burns, a general labourer at Lynfield Motors, Witham is believed to have been burning rubbish in an incinerator at the garage on Sunday morning when a five gallon drum of paint thinners exploded and engulfed him in flames. Mr. Burns, who was alone at the garage, staggered over 150 years to the busy A12 slip-road with his clothes blazing just after 9 a.m.
Four off-duty firemen stopped to help him and afterwards one of them spoke of his disgust with the motorists who ignored the terribly injured man.
Mr. Burns of Montgomery Cottages, Messing was taken to the Chelmsford and Essex Hospital, but plans to have him air-lifted to the nearest burns unit Mount Vernon in Middlesex ran into problems and he was taken by road wi th a police escort. His wife was at his bedside when he died.
Essex Leader 26/6/79
L.P.G.
The Fire Protection Association is to organise a conference on Liquified Petroleum Gas which is to be held at the Connaught Rooms in London on March 5th and 6 th 1980.
The conference is being held following concern at the number of accidents involving LPG and is hoped to help those who use and control the product.
TopicS being discussed will include, transportation in bulk and cylinders cylinder handling and storage; industrial fire hazards; aerosols propellants and industrial emergencies.
Speakers from all sections will take part and information can be obtained from The Secretary of Fire Protection Association Aldermary House Queen Street London, EC4N 1 TJ
H.S.E.
The Health & Safety Executive has announced the working party on Flammable Liquids Regulations which is set up with representatives from Industry, the trade unions and local authorities (taken from AMA; ACC & COS LA) It is expected that the new regulations will eventually replace the Petroleum Act and cover a wider scope of flammables that at present covered by the Act. It is hoped that the working party will recognise the expertise built up by officers authorised in this field and that those Local Authority members of the working party (some of whom are Association members) will put this point.
The Home Office and APEA Codes were produced some years ago and it is a fact that over the years technical progress brings problems not foreseen when the codes were drawn up. One such area is on the petrol forecourt with the now common. type of high level electronic pump I recall this was discussed at the 1978 AGM when the LAJAC code concerning this was discussed and again more recently in The Bulletin (Vol 17 No 3) S.O. Atherton among other things raised the question of danger areas on these pumps. It is for this reason I feel the subject should be aired in The BUlletin.
The drawings produced here show the danger area for conventional pumps and high level pumps with similar arrangements for the pump with separate dispenser. Many Local Authorities already adopt this system for the danger areas while others have not yet seen it. It is for this reason this is published and I ask for members comments.
This paper appeared in Fire Prevention and is reproduced by the kind permission of the Editor.
The problems of choosing safe electrical equipment for use in flammable atmo:;pheres are well known to plant engineers and managers -:- the sol.utlons are often not so familiar. This 'paper g!ves a useful survey of the reasoning and principles behind national and international standards, and how they relate to one
All equipment is a potential source of Ignition when it is used in a hazardous area such as any part of an industrial installation in which a flammable gas, vapour or dust may be present during operations, either normally or because of a plant failure. Flammable liquids can be included to the extent that they are capable of creating vapour concentrations above their lower explosive limits. Dusts of explosives are not discussed in detail, although some of the requirements for use in flammable dusts are applicable for explosives.
The two principal sources of danger in flammable atmOspheres are electric sparks, occurring either in normal working or under electrical fault conditions, and hot surfaces. There are other incidental sources of such as frictional or impact sparking, which are not confined to electrical equipment. Hot surface ignition, in particular, is not solely related t? the use of electrical equipment although it sometimes appears that only electrical engineers are concerned about the possibility. must be taken in the selection, installation and of electrical apparatus in such areas. It IS clearly impossible for operational and economic to install all such equipment in nonazardous areas, although this should be done whenever it is bl' should b .y but failing this It the Installed In a position where it is exposed °t t e least possible risk of operating in a flammable a mosphere I th' simult . n IS way, the probability of.' the Occurrence of an ignition source and an Ignitable even if both are abnormal OCcurrences, IS much reduced.
Tlhe fi.rst step. in and siting of suitable equipment In any modern installation is to IVI e the hazardous area into zones of risk. In the UK, BS Code of Practice CP 1003' P t 1 1964 sub-divided areas into three Divisions' ,and 2 according. to whether a flammable gas' or vapour concentration was likely to OCcur in the
atmosphere continuously or very frequently (Div. 0) ; occasionally during normal operation (Div. 1); or infrequently and for short periods in abnormal circumstances (Div. 2). Subsequently, an essentially similar classification was adopted internationally in Publication 79: Part 10 of the International Electrotechnical Commission (I EC). The I EC Divisions were called Zones, a practice which has been followed in the new BS Code of Practice 5345.
Clearly, classifying an installation into Zones is a complex task and involves factors ranging from the number of individual sources of release of gas or vapour and the quantities likely to be released in both normal and abnormal operation, to those factors affecting rate of dispersal such as wind-speed or degree of ventilation and gas density. This is by no means an exact science, and experience has indicated that there are two approaches to classification. One adopts a generalised approach taking large areas of a plant into consideration as individual entities and the other considers individual sources of leakage, assigning area classification to the immediate vicinity of each source. Each method has its advantages and disadvantages and the better method is probably that with which the operator is more familiar.
Fortunately, the time is now passing when classificationwas considered to be exclusively the electrical engineer's problem. As important safety implications outside the electrical field are being recognized, it is rapidly becoming the joint responsibility of all plant engineers employed on large installations.
Having classified a hazardous Zone, it is possible to select suitable electrical equipment for use in that area. Equipment designed to normal industrial standards is not usually suitable, particularly if the area is classified Zone 0 or Zone 1. Equipment which is safe for use in hazardous areas generally incorporates one or more of a range of protective
features now called 'types of protection' in order to achieve an appropriate level of safety. The types of protection available to equipment designers have increased significantly in recent years, becoming more flexible but atso more complex. The types of protection that are now internationally recognized are: flameproof enclosure symbol 'd' intrinsic safety 'i' increased safety 'e' pressurization 'p' oil immersion 'a' powder-filling 'q' encapsulation 'm' Zone 2 equipment 'n' or 'N'
These types of protection are defined by various basic principles. Some can be applied to all types of electrical equipment but others have more limited application.
FLAMEPROOF ENCLOSURE is essentially a mechanical method of protection in which the enclosure is designed to contain any internal explosion caused by the equipment within it. It must have sufficient strength to withstand explosion pressures, typically 8 bar, and be constructed with gaps in its structure that are so small that they will not allow the explosion to be transmitted. Permitted values vary from 0.1 mm up to 0·75 mm depending on joint width, enclosure volume and the flammable gas concerned.
INTRINSIC SAFETY is based on the principle that sparks whose electrical parameters (eg energy, current. voltage) do not exceed certain levels are incapable of igniting a flammable atmosphere. The minimum ignition energies of flammable atmospheres can be as low as 0,02 mJ, although this value is much greater with some gases and with some combinations of circuit parameters. This means that the concept of intrinsic safety can only be applied to low energy circuits such as instrumentation and control systems. It has not yet proved possible to predict the ignition capability of any particular circuit and all intrinsically safe apparatus has to be tested by producing sparks with a special switching ('breakspark') apparatus in the appropriate gas mixture. This switch is inserted in the circuit where sparks are possible, either normally or under specified failure conditions, and with higher than normal levels of current and/or voltage so as to ensure a safety margin. Two categories of intrinsic safety are recognized, 'ia' and 'ib', the former requiring tests with two simultaneous faults applied and the latter with one.
INCREASED SAFETY equipment relies on the selfevident fact that with no sparks there can be no spark ignition. Standard equipment which does not spark in normal operation cannot be relied upon to remain non-sparking in service, and for this type of protection, therefore, the equipment is de-rated to increase insulation life. The quality of insulation must meet specified levels, clearances between terminals etc and lengths of creepage paths across insulation must exceed specified dimensions, and terminals are designed to reduce the risk of loosening.
PRESSURIZA TION is a very simple concept. Access of flammable gas from the atmosphere to the interior of the equipment enclosure is prevented by maintaining an overpressure of air or inert gas inside the
enclosure. In practice, the system is complicated by the to take additional precautions to maintain safety In the event of pressurization failure and the need to ensure thorough purging of flammable gas that may have entered the enclosure before the electrical supply is connected. A: further variant of this system is now being conSidered by the lEe for application to instruments such as gas analysers, where the source of leakage of the flammable materials is inside the enclosure. It possible to ensure safety by arranging for a sufficient flow of air or inert gas through the enclosure to ensure that with the worst possible leak the internal atmosphere remains non-ignitable. The description 'continuous dilution' is applied' to this technique.
OIL IMMERSION AND POWDER-FILLING are selfignition sources being covered to a sufficient depth In oil or powder (usually sand) so that the possibility of ignition of any flammable atmosphere above the surface is eliminated. These techniques are used in a few countries for a limited range of applications but are' rarely applied in the UK.
TlON of electrical circuits in a suitable resin Isa re.latlvelynewtec.hniqueforwhich a European IS currently being written. Until recently It has use? in a number of countries under the ail-embracing of '.special' protection, designated by the s, but IS now sufficiently widely used to warrant ItS own safety Standard.
ZONE 2 AREAS are relatively less hazardous and it is con.sidered that all of the types of protection described above ensure a level of s f t h· h . h' a e y w IC IS muc hlghe.r than is necessary; there is generally a.n economiC penalty in using them for Zone 2 equipment. The U K, in particular, has there!ore developed Standards for equipment specifically Inte.nded for .areas. This has been done by setting do,:,,",n for the selection of normally of adequate reliability or by speCification of constructional and/or test fO.r other suitable equipment. whether or not It contains normally-sparking parts. In the UK, this has become known as type 'N' equipment but in current international discussions, the symbol 'n' has been adopted to conform with the other lower-case symbols.
When agreement on the requirements has been reached, standards for Zone 2 may well include a number of new protection concepts, such as the U K 'restricted-breathing' construction for limiting the rate of flammable gas access.
Electrical equipment for use in a hazardous area must have an appropriate type of protection for the Zone concerned. There are slight variations in the codes ?f of various countries but. generally, only safe apparatus of category 'ia' is permitted I.n 0, plus some equipment in the 'special protectl.on category. The possibility of using equipment With a dual form of protection, such as increased equipment in a flameproof enclosure, has been discussed internationally but no agreement has yet been reached.
All of the types of protection, with the exception of
type of protection n, are considered in most countries as suitable for Zone 1 use. However, individual countries have restricted the use of some protection types For example, the Italian code does not permit 'e' type equipment in Zone 1, and the UK places some restrictions on such use. The UK also considers oil-immersed equipment as an unacceptable fire-risk in Zone 1 and, together with the virtually unused type 'q' equipment recommends that it be limited to Zone 2 applications.
There are a number of inherent limitations on the type of protection that may be used for any individual type of equipment. Flameproof enclosure is generally suitable for all equipment although it becomes heavy and costly for large enclosures. Limiting intrinSIC safety to instrumentation and similar lowpower equipment has already been mentioned and although the rapidly increasing use of a variety of barrier circu its, eg Zener diode barriers, to permit connection to higher-power circuits in a nonarea has extended the range of application, the inherent limitation in the hazardous area remains.
Pressurization has a limited number of special applications for which it is an economic alternative to other techniques. Very large electrical machines and conduit-connected systems of a number of items of equipment eg a lighting installation have been Installed with this type of protection but the largest use of it is for the special purpose of control room pressurization where the whole area in which the equipment is housed and in which personnel must work is itself pressurized.
Increased safety is used predominantly for electric motors and luminaires. It can only be applied to non-sparking equipment so cannot be used, for example, for commutator motors, but it has been used on a large scale, particularly in Germany, for a.c. cage rotor machines of a wide range of sizes. It IS likely to find increasing application in the UK in the future.
A further limitation of choice arises from the nature of the gases and vapours that could be present . possibility of ignition by a hot surface, as from ignition by a spark, has already been However, thermal ignition and minimum temperatures as understood and measured In. the laboratory, are not easily applied to industrial Situations The temperature at which a hot surface ' 11 ' f WI Ignite a gas depends on a number of actors Such a . f . s size and nature of the source unl- ormlty of t ' of e I en:perature, convection and the volume nc Osure If the' '" These h mixture IS inSide the enclosure. can ave a subst . . . temperat antlal effect on the minimum ignition will occur.
restriction on' tlhe been found necessary to place a electrical equipme surface temperature of much stricter tha n t at IS for many applications Certainly, the be considered essential that placed on bthe n IS often more severe than may be immediately r of the Installation which ment. However in sa Jacent to the electrical equip.' ,ome clrcUmst h tlon IS realistic and 0 ' 1 ances, t e restncn y a very small safety mar"'in eXists. '"
The limit on surface temperature whl'c h . I' d h h iS app le IS t at t e temperature of any paTt of th f e sur ace to
which the gas has access and on which ignition could create a hazard must be below the ignition temperature of the gas as measured by a specified method. Only in cases where it can be shown by test that for example, because the size of the hot component is small, ignition will only occur at higher temperatures is this limitation relaxed.
In order to simplify the selection of equipment when taking thermal ignition into account, all protected electrical equipment is now marked with a temperClass, ranging from T1 to T6, indicating maximum surface temperatures ranging from 450 0 C down to 85 oe, so that it can be selected not to exceed the ignition temperatures of the gases or vapours concerned.
In the cases of flameproof enclosure and intrinsic safety only, it is also necessary to choose the appropriate Group of equipment. The safe gaps for flameproof enclosures and the minimum igniting currents for intrinSically safe apparatus vary widely for different gases and vapours In principle, and in some cases in practice; it is possible to design equipment with these types of protection so that they are safe for use in all g'ases, but the design limitations which arise make it necessary generally to design for use in a restricted range of gases. Thus, in current Standards, provision is made for four GroupS of equipment, Groups I, IIA liB and lie, the first solely for coal-mining applications and the others for use in atmospheres of increasing ease of ignition. Fortunately, there is a good correlation between the ease of ignition of a gas through a joint in a flameproof enclosure and the ease of ignition by a spark, so that the same Grouping can be used for both flameproof and intrinsically safe equipment. Confirmation of this correlation has enabled the earlier UK flameproof Groups (I,ll, III & IV) and the intrinsic safety Classes (1 , 2 (a) 2 (f)) to be eliminated, but unfortunately the same correlation does not exist with ease of hot surface ignition , so that it is not possible to use one system of classification alone.
The safe selection, installation and maintenance of explosion-protected equipment is only possible if it can be readily identified. All countries have therefore developed systems of marking which enable this to be done, but these are unfortunately very different. A new syste'm of marking has therefore been recommended internationally and accepted in Europe. This consists of a primary symbol Ex (international) or EEx (Europe) indicating com pliance with one or more of the international or European Standards for explosion-protected equipment. This symbol is followed by the symbol or symbols for the type(s) of protection employed and by the Group mark , I for coal mining and 11 , followed by A, B or C when necessary , for other industries Finally , the temperature class , T1 to T6 , or in special cases the actual surface tempe rat ure is given Thus all the necessary information for ensuring that th e safety characteristics of equipment can be readily re cognised is given in a coded form
Cert i fication of equipme nt Be cau se of the serious risk s of explos io n if equipment
I is not suitably designed for use in a hazardous area, most countries have instituted certification schemes which permit equipment designed to comply with a recognised Standard to be certified independently. In some countries, the use of certified equipment is
Ienforced lega!ly, in others such as the UK it is a recommended, though not a mandatory, requirement.
The certifying authority may be a Government body such as. the British Approvals Service for Electrical Equipment for Flammable Atmospheres (BASEEFA) or the Physikalische Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB) in Germany, or it may be an independent testing organization such as the Underwriters' Laboratories (UL) in the USA. When equipment is certified as complying with a recognized Standard, the name or symbol of the certifying body is usually affixed to the equipment and the certificate number is marked on it.
The drawings of the certified equipment are also registered and the certification documents may also apply certain conditions for the safe installation and use of the apparatus. It is essential that the user complies with these conditions and in the latest international and European Standards this is emphasised by the requirement to add the letter 'X' to the certificate number on the equipment when such conditions have been applied. This will supercede the use of the letter 'B' for this purpose by BASEEFA and some other authorities.
Equipment even though appropriately designed and manufacturEd, is only safe when installed and maintained correctly. The requirements for safe installation and maintenance include those which would apply in any non-hazardous area, but there may be supplementary requirements for hazardous area applications. The letter 'X' or 'B' on the marking plate may indicate some of these. The safety characteristics of the particular type of protection must be maintained in accordance with the requirements of the relevant Standard and certificate, and any particularly adverse environmental conditions must be guarded against so that the level ot protection is not reduced, by corrosion of joint surfaces of flameproof equipment for example.
I n the U K, the need for special care in these respects was recognized by the publication of the BS Code of Practice CP 1003, Parts 1 to 3. Although Part 1 was published as early as 1964, it was already recognized that all explosion-protected equipment was not suitable for all hazardous areas and that different types of protection required different installation and maintenance rules. The greater use of such equipment and the greater variety of the types of protection available has now made it necessary to revise and expand this Code. BS5345 is therefore being prepared, in 12 parts, some of wh ich have already been published. Some Parts will deal with particular needs of individual types of protection, others such as the Parts dealing with Basic Requirements and Classification of hazardous areas are of general application. International discussions on installation rules are also in progress in the I EC. It is of Course impossible to summarize these lengthy documents adequately in this survey, but a Bibliography of those available and in preparation is appended.
The preceding. sections have been concerned solely with protection against hazards arising from flammable gases and vapours that may be present in the atmosphere. Where the hazard is due to a flammable dust, different precautions are needed. Although these precautions are under discussion, both nationally and internationally, there are no Standards or Codes currently available, other than those produced by individual companies or organizations. Nevertheless, some general principles are emerging. It is generally recognized that area classification for dusts cannot be based on exactly the same principles as for gases and vapours. Dusts, once settled, do not readily disperse so that the concept of frequent or infrequent occurrence, and short persistence is inapplicable. Thermal ignition is complicated by the blanketing effect of a dust layer which will raise the surface temperature of the equipment above that of the surface exposed, apart from the problems of smouldering and subsequent ignition of dusts at different temperatures according to the depth of dust. Among the main requirements for safe operation is therefore that of 'good housekeeping', limiting the amount of .dust that can escape into the atmosphere and removing dust deposits frequently. Equipment generally should be of a dust-tight construction with surface temperature below the ignition temperature of the conc.erned. Each of these subjects is active with a view to the preparation of appropriate national and international Standards and Codes of Practice.
It has already been indicated that there is a considerable in the preparation and publication of new British, European and international Standards and Codes. Some of the published documents and documents in preparation are listed in the attached Bib.liography. The existence of a published document does not, however, indicate that no further work is in progress on a particular topic, since many of the existing documents are under revision. This document would not be complete, however, without reference to the interaction between the various Standards-r:naking organizations concerned with explosion-protected equipment and to forthcoming European legislation.
The I EC comprises over 40 national committees, from all continents, and including all of the major industrialized countries. Its Standards when produced are in the form of recommendations to national committees, who it is hoped will adopt them in any National Standards, as far as national conditions permit. with any deviations clearly indicated.
In Europe, in 1973, a new organization, the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization, CENELEC, was set up with the objective of producing European Standards or harmonization documents which all the members would be expected to implement as national standards. The members of CENELEC consist of the national committees of the nine members of EEC, all the Scandinavian countries, Austria. Portugal, Spain and Switzerland. Its in-
ternal regulations require that, where IEC documents exist, these should be used as the basis of CENELEC work
In the field of explosion-protected equipment. both organizations have been very active in recent years and each has produced a series of Standards, the I EC document being Publication 79, with 12 Parts to date, and the CEN ELEC documents being the seven European Standards EN 50014 to EN 50020. These last documents are, in accordance with CEN ELEC procedures, not published as CENELEC Standards as such, but are reproduced as national Standards by all the countries concerned, when agreement has been reached. Consequently , the British Standards Institution has just published the English language versions of EN 50014 to EN 50020 as BS 5501 Parts 1 to 7.
Nation'al and international work is also in progress on Codes of Practice. CENELEC is awaiting the outcome of I EC work before undertaking the preparation of a Code, but BSI committees are active in producing the planned 12 Parts of BS 5345, three of which have already been published. All of this work is of importance , but none more so than that of CENELEC. This is because of the Significance of its explosion hazards Standards in the legal Directives of the EEC. The Commission of and the European Mines Safety and Health ommlsslon are producing Directives which will be legally binding on all member States. The first of
these makes it obligatory that the national laws and regulations of member States shall not result in trade barriers between . member States for non-mining equipment if the equipment complies with specified Standards and is certified as such by the certifying authorities of the various countries This Directive is already in force in principle but not yet in practice as the specified Standards have not yet been named However, the importance of the CENELEC European Standards is that a second draft Directive has been prepared which names the Standards EN 50014 and EN 50020 as the specified Standards for the purpose of the first Directive*. The Mines Commission is producing a similar Directive for mining applications, and thiswill also be based on the European Standards, with some additional requiremen.ts. The procedure under which these Directives are being prepared is that of 'optional harmonization' which does not require that equipment made to the specitied Standards is the only equipment permitted (total harmonization) but only that if equipment manufactured and certified to these Standards in one country is allowed to be used for any particular application, then equipment made and certified to the same Standards by a manufacturer in another member State shall also be allowed for the same application , without restriction Thus , for the first time in the UK, the use of certified explOSion-protected equipment is becoming subject to a degree of legal control.
British Standards BS 229 1957 FI as 1958 enclosure of electrical appa ratu s n nnSlca y safe electrical ap BS 4137 explosive atmospheres paratus and CirCUits for use In 1967 GUide to the se l ec t i f Division 2 areas , on 0 e l ec trr cal equ ipment for us e In 8S 4533 Electric luminaires Section 21 protection 'N' , 1976 Lumlnalres with type of B S 4683 Electrical apparatus for I Classification of atmospheres Part 1 1971 Part 2 1971 The enclosures of electrical a and testing of flameproof Part 3 1972 pparatus P Type of protection 'N' BS 5000 ar t 4 1973 Type of protection ·e .· Rotating e l ec tric a machines of applications Part 16 1 972 T particular ty pes o r for particular BS CP 1003 Code of practice for use ojP:1 N elec tTlc motors atmospheres of gas 0 ectrlcal appara tus in explOSive Part 1 1964 Ch r vaP<?ur other than mimng applications fl OIce, Inst a llat ion and ameproo f and intrinsically_ f maintenance of Part 2 1966 MethOds of than by th e u se of flameproof org th e hazard other equipment intrinsically sa fe elec trical
BS Part 3 1967 Division 2 areas
5345 Code of Practice for the selectio electrical apparatus for use in and maintenance of (other than mining e XJ?loslve atmospheres manufactUring) r explOSive processing and
.Since this paper was prepared the second non-mining Directive the European Standards has been published to become effective In August 1980 Europ-ean
Part 1 Basic r equiremen ts for all P Pa rt 4 In stallation and maintena: rts of the Code appa ratu s with typ e o f prot ec tion for electri cal appa ratus and sys t ems
IntrinSiCally sa f e electrical
Part 6 1978 Installation and main t electrical apparatus with type f requiremen t s for (Parts 2 3. 5. 7 12 deal i ng 'e' InCreased sa f ety protect ion, dus t s spe ci fic indust class ification, other types o f are In rl es and the u se of ga s
BS 5501 Ele c tri cal apparatus for potentiall
Pall 1 1977 Gen eral atmospheres
Part 2 1977 Oil immer Si on '0 ' (ENS 500 1550014 )
Part 3 1977 Pr ess uTlsed ap paratu s" )
Pall 4 1977 Powder filling ' q ' (EN 0 1 6)
Part 5 1977 Fl ame proof enc losure 'd ' (EN 50018
Pall 6 1 977 Incr eased sa fety 'e ' (EN 50019) )
Part 7 19 77 In tTl nslc sa fety 'i (E N 50020)
A small porcelain-lined ball mill at a West London paint factory was washed out with iso-propyl-alcohol before being recharged. The first charge consisted of 26 litres of a hydrocarbon solvent having a flashpoin t of 100 F. The next stage involved the addition of 25 litres of white spirit from a metal vessel. During the early part of the second charging operation the operator rested the vessel on the charging gantry over the mill He then lifted the vessel to empty it and an explosion occurred at the opening to the mill which blew him about six feet across the gantry. The small fire which ensued was quickly dealt with by staff using fire extinguishers. The operator suffered minor burns and shock.
At the time of the incident the operator was wearing PVC gloves; his shoes were not of the anti-static type. It is understood that the vessel from which the white spirit was being poured was not bonded to earth It is possible that the source of ignition was a spark from a discharge of static electricity. The licensee i s looking into the question of trea tin g all hydrocarbon solvents used at the factor y with anti-static additive.
An inte r esting feature, which has a l so b e en obse r ved in other similar inciden t s , lies in the fact that static b uild-up a pparently occurred during the a d di t i dn of a non-polar hydrocarbon to a ball mil l in whic h the balls were damp wi th a p olar liquid . Some simple tests c a r r ied out after the fire tended to · conf i rm th e e x iste n ce of this phenomenon
A ring mai n is u se d to f eed pet r oleum sp ir it to the 10 on e mil li on gallon a bov e g r ound storage t a nk s at East Gre en wich gas wo rks .
As t he spi r it s t orage at t h e pre mi ses is being r un down, water h a s be e n u sed to flush cert a i n t a n ks and pipe l ines Unfortun a t e ly, s o me wate r and s pirit were together in t h e r in g mai n du r ing the prolonged cold spe ll o f ea rly Jan u a r y .
The freezing of the water caused damage to two of the valves in the ring main and leaks occurred involving both wRter and spirit. It is estimated that some 50 gallons of spirit leaked onto the ground and vapourised, the ground being too frozen to absorb the liquid.
Foam blankets were applied, the valves were repaired and arrangements have now been made to ensure that the valves will in future be in a petroleum spirit environment in case of further sub-zero temperatures.
Freezing conditions caused delays in testing a tank installation in Redbridge. At the first attempt the surface of the water in the tank was found to be frozen hard. After adding antifreeze to dispel the ice the readings of the pressure gauge were found to be erratic because the gauge was frozen. Eventually the test was carried out satisfactorily.
When an inspector called at a back street filling station in Croydon in connection with a vandalised tank ventilating pipe he learned that a petrol pump had been stolen and that the thief had considerately capped off the suction lines in the approved manner.
Over a period of years high losses of petrol were recorded at a petrol filling station in Merton When investigations were made , including a tank test , records became satisfactory for a while The cause of the losses was never established, except for one occasion when a pump was found to be dispensing one and a half times the meter readi n g This attrac ted the suspicions of t he Consumer Pr o te c ti on Depa rt ment and eventually a pump maintenan c e fitter was c augh t f i ddling p u mp t ot alisers
F ou r pump atte ndant s employ ed a t t he prem i s e s a nd th e pump f itt e r we r e subsequen t ly tried a nd s ent t o pr is on
As part of a six-week secondment to Fire Prevention Branch, two Malaysian Air Force officers spent a day with Petroleum Section to gain some knowledge of the operation of a section dealing with a particular aspect of fire prevention petroleum storage. After an explanatory session with the Head of the Section, they accompanied a senior inspector to a bulk distributing depot , a large garage workshop complex and an up-to-date self service filling station. The officers showed interest in all that was explained to them, and it is to be hoped that practice in the Malaysian armed services will reflect sound United Kingdom practice.
An employee at a BARNET petrol filling stat10n received burns to his hands and when cleaning out an inspection pit 1n a lubrication bay. He used petrol to up some oil at the bottom of the P1t, then poured in six buckets of water and switched on the sump pump There was an explosion and the doors of the lubrication bay were blown off.
The sump pump switch was situated at low level and was not suitable for use in a flammable atmosphere. It is believed that operation of the switch ignited petrol vapour in the pit. Appropriate remedial action is being taken .
A fire in a pigment grinding shop at a paint factory in Kingston resulted in the death of an employee. I t appears that he had just finished decanting toluol from a 45 gallon drum into a ball mill when fire broke out at the mill . He was seen to be in flames on the charging platform over the mill; he then either jumped or fell from the platform and sustained head injuries. He was taken to hospital but died shortly afterwards due to shock and severe burns. A possible source of ignition was from a spark caused by a discharge of static electricity.
All buildings at the factory are protected by automatic fire extinguishing system. The system in the pigment grinding shop was activated by the ball mill fire and also triggered a general fire alarm. By the time appliances reached the scene from the nearby stat10n the fire was virtually extinguished
At the subsequent inquest a verdict of "Accidental Death" was recorded.
While the fuel tank of a b . car was e1ng drained in an unlicensed k" garage wor shop , f1re broke out and caused minor damage to the building and m ore severe damage to car and another near it . Afte r the was e x tinguished the car was mov ed 1nto the open y a r d Du ' " . r 1ng the e v en1ng 1 t caught fi r e again and was v i r tuall y gut t ed The causes of the fi r es we r e not e s t ablished
The ca r i n q u e s t i on had two tank s ; o n e was e mp ty a f ter t h e e a r l i e r f ire b u t t h o t h e r , s til l re mai ne d un damag e d a f te r t h : s econ d f i re . The o ccupi er o f t he p re mi ses has b e en adv is ed o f the n eed to c omply wi th the P etroleum Spirit (Motor Vehicle s , etc.) Regulations 1929 .
full y jack- An articulated tank wagon laden with 19 000 litres of petrol knifed and when the driver 'TIle swerved and braked to avoid a car. and two tank wagon struck six parked cars " moving cars before it came to rest 1n Cricklewood Broadway. The battery" and switch which were located beh1n " ' " Id f the wagon , the f1re-resisting sh1e 0 1his formed a protrusion behind the cab ., f one protrusion caused a small 0 " the veh1cle compartment when jack-knifed
About 150 litres of petrol leaked the SW1 tc the road; some sprayed over
" kly a rr ived Emergency services qU1 C at the inCident. A foam b;Lanket ,:as . " h"cle unt11 the ma1n ta1ned a r ound the v e l. contents were transferred to anothe r tank wagon To ma i ntai n a seal ov er t he f r acture and to minimise t he r isk of v apou r and r esidual pet r ol esc a p ing t he damaged compa r tment wru, f illed wi t h wat er befo r e t he wagon was t owed away to Bun cef i eld Depo t.
Det ai l s o f the incident have been s uppl i ed to H M Expl o siv e s In s pectorate and attenti on has once again b e en drawn to the appare nt unsatisfactor y location of the battery box and switch behind the fire resisting shield
An inspector arrived home one Saturday afternoon after investigating an explosion in an inspection pit to be greeted by a message asking him to check on a reported smell of petrol in premises adjoining a filling station.
Explosimeter checks of the site drainage runs gave "100% explosive" readings but tank and pump records were inconclusive in that some tanks showed large losses whilst others showed large gains. The site is unusual in that the off-set filling pipes run beneath a garage-workshop to the main tank block (one triple and two double compartment tanks installed March 1965 in pre-GLC days) at the rear of the premises; the suction lines also pass beneath the garage-workshop to the forecourt where there are seven pumps and a further tank ( installed 1934). The Northern Line tube runs under the garage workshop but no smells were reported by London Transport. There had been a previous history of suction line failures which had led to the coupling of some compartments. Petrol was uplifted, with some difficulty, during the Sunday and follow i ng days All compartments and pi p ework were then tested . Five off-set f illi n g lines , th r ee suction lines and the tank un der the forecourt all failed under pre ssu re. The site is to be completely r ede v e l oped and in these Circumstances it h a s b een agreed that it may operate for the t ime b eing on the remaining fill and suction li nes an d wi th fu r the r coupling of compa r tme n ts.
At 10.30 p.m. on a Monday evening, having already spent Saturday and Sunday investigating an explosion and a leak, an inspector set out to check on a new report of a smell of petrol in the porch of a house in Barnet.
After some detective work a nearby filling station was found to have petrol in its tank manhole chambers, in the first chamber of its petroleum interceptor and in a drainage inspection chamber. The manager was adamant that there had been no spillage during deliveries. No records were kept and it was therefore not possible to detect how much petrol had been lost.
Checks carried out by the inspector revealed a delay on delivery from one pump and subsequent tests confirmed that the suction line was faulty.
There is a high water table in the area and this enabled the petrol to reach the tank manhole chambers. There must also be a broked drain line to enable petrol to reach the sewers. The smell became noticable in the house because a plug was missing from a drain rodding eye. The suction line has now been repaired and a check on drain lines and early replacement of the rodding eye plug have been advised.
The licensee has been cautioned for not keeping proper petrol records as required by the petroleum licence.
The bi ter bi t
When carrying out follow up inspe c tions at licensed premi s e s in Brent an inspector was invariably confronte d by a fierce guard dog before gaining a ccess to t he premises. The dog had been acquired by the licensee t o minimise the f t and vandalis m wh ich are c ommonp l ace in the area. On visiting the premises recently the inspector missed his customary welcome and enquired about the dog. He was informed that th e dog h ad been stolen
On Tuesday the 11th July 1978 an unprecedented disaster occurred in Spain. A tanker carrying liquefied petroleum gas exploded killing over 100 people lnstantly, and many were beyond recognition. A further 180 men women d h'l ' an C 1 dren had suffered very severe burns which for many were to prove fatal In the United Kingdom many similar vehicles constantly use our roads and rail links. Their construction is like those in Spain and they transport similar materials British , and Spanish regulations the transportation of LPG materials are also similar. Could such a disaster occur in this Country? What could we learn from the Spanish holocaust? These were the pressing issues which I was asked by my Chief Officer to evaluate at first hand in San Carlos de la Rapita.
At the time of my arrival, which was just before 1,000 hours on Thursday 13th July, (44 hours after the incident) t t 1 was qUl e.obvl0US that difficulty would be experlenced in trying to get th f .' e ln orma tlon requlred from the Los Alf raques camp Sl te ln any unofficial capacity A t 1 .' s rong Po lce contlngent was present and the general public were kept at a co ' d nSl erable distance from the site' photogra h , p s could only be taken by permit holders and th main road past the camp si te was still e open to traffic, which had to keep mOvlng. It was therefore proved necessary to approach the Spanish Police in an offi cial capaci ty as a fire office r, however once identification was established and the purpose of the visit explained, full access to the site and perm i ssion to take photographS was r eadily given.
Without over-reacting in any way, this is one of the most terrib le tragedies anyone could have possibly witnessed. Whole families had died a most horrible death within minutes; row after row of tents, caravans and camping trailers were completely burned out. One could virtually see what each family had been doing seconds before the explosion. In one case a was still intact with food in the pan on the stove. 'TIlere were about 500 people on the camp site at the time within the tent area and on the beach at the time of the explosion. Some of the caravans were only about 10 metres from the main road. As had been said, about Id were kll led people, men, women and Chl ren instantly and a further 180 badly bu: ned , I t f thelr burns. , many of whom died as a resu 0 Fi ve days later 12 orphaned children were '11 t shocked to too badly burned and stl 0 . . d ntity give any clue as to thelr 1 e
It is not uncommon in the United Kingdom to have camp sites on the side h · les of main roads with such heavY ve lC passing within a few metres of camping areas The Los AlfraqueS camp was heavily congested with both tents and caravans and appeared to be very overd It crowded by United Kingdom standar s . is not thought however that such overcrowding occurs in the United Kingdom on similar sites .
There had been li ttle or no blast . ' . . th blast damage to the camp Sl te 1 tsel f , e , d windward appeared to go in an upward an direction. A close study of the blast damage revealed a very interesting feature. About 75 metres from the seat of the explosion in one direction, a single sto:ey building of substantial constructi on , WhlCh was used as a di scothe que, was completely demolished causing the death of four people. In the opposite direction a motorcycle was still standing on its footrest only about 20 metres from the blast area, but completely burnt out.
Propylene, the product involved in the Los Alfraques dis as ter, is one of a family of industrial gases conveniently transported in liquid form, where a very large volume can be stored, by compression or refrigeration or a combination of both, in a relatively small space. Propane, Butane , or a mixture of both commonly known as Calor Gas, Bottogas, Gaz etc. are familiar examples. When a pressure vessel containing one of these liquid gases ruptures, the liquid gushes out, vaporises and being heavier than air forms a blanket along the ground. The liquid LPG in vaporising increases in volume about 250 times and when mixed . between 3 to 4 per cent of air, creates a fire-b all effect when a source of igni tion is applied. It should also be made clear that vaporisation of the liquid depends very much on the ambient temperature when exposed to the atmosphere. For instance, if liquid Butane were to leak from a container at 0 C then very little vaporisation would occur. But on the other hand (as happened in Spain when the temperature at the time was 28 C) if the ambient temperature is high then vaporisation takes place very quickly indeed. The boiling point of other LPG gases does vary slightly , usually resulting in vaporisation much '!be possible Cause
The precise cause of the disaster is under intensive investigation by Spanish Authorities and by the time this report is published the results of the investigation may have been made public. However I feel that an opinion could be given from the point of view of a Senior Fire Officer without there being any intention to prejudice the findings of the official investigation .
It must be realised at the outset that most of the people in the immediate vicinity were killed and therefore the opinions of witnesses varied The most reliable witness appeared to be a young " man who worked in the camp shop . At 1429 hours on Tuesday 11th July he was se rving a customer in the shop when he hear d a min or explosion which he thought had occurred on the site. Realising that something was wron g he went outside to inve s tig ate , walked to his car, which was parked o n a nearby c a r park, and was about to drive through th e camp site when a second , far more viole nt e xpl osion occurred On seeing the huge fireball and experien c ing the effect of the heat, he fled in fear o f h is life into the sea The ti me l apse b etween the t wo explosions is
estimated to be about two minutes. Many witnesses talked of two explosions but suggested that they may have been much closer together than that. A study of the extent of the spread of" the gas cloud showed that it certainly was not possible for both explosions to have occurred simultaneously.
Two theories have emerged as to how the road tanker carrying 22,000 litres of liquid propylene came to develop a severe leak and cause such an explosion.
One theory is that the driver lost control of his vehicle, it ran across the road and turned over down a small embankment, demolished a small retaining wall and in so dOing, ruptured the 10mm steel wall of the tank, spilling a very large quantity of liquid propylene. Because the heat of the day was at about 28 C, (the higher the temperature the greater degree of vaporisation), the liquid vaporised very quickly and formed a gas cloud. The gas was ignited by a naked flame, say a camping stove within the camp site, and a violent explosion occurred.
A second theory is that the explosion happened on the roadway itself. I t was suggested that the tanker for some reason developed a severe leak of liquid propylene, the gas cloud formed and ignited giving rise to an explosion which blasted the dri ving unit and cab about 100 metres in one direction and the tanker shell, found in many separate pieces, about 75 metres in the opposite direction. The tanker wheels were found over a radius of some 200 metres.
In the absence of any futher evidence at this stage, I would support the latter theory as there was no evidence that the tanker ever left the road prior to the second explosion. In fact, due to the nature of the formation of the gas cloud, it would seem likely that the vehicle had stopped perhaps to investigate a leak The wind at the time was coming in from the sea, consequently the elongated gas cloud had spread over a distance of about 300 metres in the windward direction
A time lapse of approximately 2 minutes would be reasonable as the gas cloud had covered about! of a square mile before igniting.
I understand that the initial tests in Madrid revealed that metal failure could be the cause of the seve r e leak
If me t al fatigue , as opposed to impact damage is conclusively found to be the c ause of the leak, then this will give cau se for a great deal of concern.
The prime question is of course could a similar explosion happen in the United Kingdom? Without any prevarication the answer must be 'yes'.
Tankers in the United Kingdom are of similar construction; a 10mm steel shell with welded joints and carrying up to 20 tons of produce. Tankers leave many depots regularly throughout the day and proceed along all types of roads and through City Centres with no imposition of special restrictions.
The regulations which govern the transportation of highly flammable materials in Spain take the form of an agreement Signed in 1957 "Accord European relatif au transport international des marchancies dangereuses par route" commonly known in Europe as ADR which apply until 1980. The regulations cover lebelling, packaging and conveyance of dangerous goods carried freely across Europe.
Although British tankers are constructed to British Standard 1500 or 1515, the regulations governing the loading transportation and delivery of LPG at present take the form of a voluntary agreement between the companies involved. The agreement, which forms part of the 'Transport and Drivers Manual' does not impose any restrictions the class of roads which should be used.
Prior to the Spanish disaster, in the United Kingdom the Code of Practice gove rnlng the Transport of Hazardous Substan b ces y Road was already under review and the Code is expected to be made law in the near future under the Health & Safety Legislation. However as a result of the Sp . h . ' anlS dlsaster one hopes that the provi Slons of the Code are carefully revlewed.
The tanker' S . the V 1 ln paln was en route to a encia a t thus rea rave ling on the N340 tOll avolding the Motorway and the £7 , tankers Motorway b advlsed to use the ut lt lS not ever it h compulsory. How, as recently b Spain foIl . een announced ln , OWlng this trag d h vehicles ca ' e y, t at all rrYlng hazardous t . use roads wh o h' ma erlals must lC avold highly areas in th populated e summer and at holiday periods It 1S 1mpor tant to consider wh th . e er su c h a restr1ct1on would be reasonabl . . e ln the Unlted K1ngdom, although it is l' nevltable that ,tankers carrying ha zardous mate rial s will at times have to use minor roads pa ssi ng through populated areas to load
and deliver LPG products to specific addresses.
Examining the tanker involved, and those of similar construction, it became obvious to me that 10mm steel welded jointed vehicles should be more adequately protected against impact. I could not help feeling that, had a tanker of similar construction been involved in a several vehicle accident on a motorway, a comparable rupture could take place and with similar consequences. In addition to this the delivery pipe work under the main body of the Spanish tanker also seemed very vulnerable to mechanical damage. If during an accident this pipe work was damaged, liquid could flow from a 100mm pipe causing a very swift large losS of the con ten ts.
The transportation of hazardous materials on our roads is a very complex matter and I am aware that the problem has been given serious consideration for a number of years, but impact protection to the outside of road tankers carrying LPG remains, in my mind, is a matter for urgent consideration.
It is understood that up to 300 pressurised gas tankers are travelling regularly on British roads, but information from one of the larger companies suggests that this could be an underestimate of the true pOSition. They carry mainly highly flammable petroleum related gases i.e. Propane, Butane, (or a mixture of both), Chlorine and Propylene, although it should be stated that most of the LPG transported in the South of England is . by sea, underground pipeline or by rail . pressure vessels on road tankers are said to be strong and representatives from the United Kingdom industry have expressed surprise at the suggestion that any of their specially constructed tankers could rupture so completely without being subject to violent impact
In support of their optimism, there was an inCident which occurred at Fe rry Hill , County Durham , about 18 months ago whe re a rail tanker of simila r construction, ca rrying approximatel y 30,000 lit re s of LPG was dragged for half a mile on its side , crashed into a pi le of ra i Is and suf fere d only superfici al dents. However, a further incident occurred in 19 74 in Aberdeen where a BOC road tanke r carryi ng 16,000 1i tres of butane was involved in a road accident c aused by icy roads. The main
tank ruptured on impact and liquid butane flowed out. It was fortunate on this occasion that the temperature was at :freezing point (boiling point of Butane 0 C) and therefore very little vaporisation of the butane occurred. However the limited amount of vapour that was present was igni ted by a car which was involved in the accident.
If we are to compare this incident wi th the one in Spain, it is quite obvious that, had the temperature been much higher, vaporisation would have taken place more quickly, the gas cloud would have been much larger and when ignition occurred the consequences may have been far more serious. Significantly, the fact that the tanker had no external impact protection contributed to the cause of the rupture.
Although during last year alone, Bri tish tankers carrying LPG products have travelled over 30 million miles on British roads with no loss of life, our record is not altogether perfect. Incidents have occurred where LPG has leaked from road tankers and formed gas clouds of limited size, but fortunately due to varying circumstances (including the very swift attendance of the emergency services) the consequences have not been so disastrous as the one in Spain.
During the course of my investigations, One important organisational pOint arose. Du r ing the afternoon of Thursday 13th Jul y I visited the mortuary in Tortosa, about 15 miles from San Carlos de la Rapi ta There I saw at first hand the difficulties of coping with 100 very badly burned bodies . 'Ihe German POlice (most of the v ictims were thought to be German) had taken r egist r ation numbers of vehicles i nvo l v e d in t h e fi r e together with the e n gine and chassis numbers in a bid to t r ace the families inv olved . It is un d er s t ood th at th ere were man y nationa li ti es o n the site at the time .
A Ge rman fo r e n si c team , whose specific t as k i t was to t ry and identif y bod i es, f o und th is t as k t o be extremel y difficult. All the v i c tims Wh o h a d suffered fat a l burn s had be en moved ve r y soon after the explo s ion in to a n a r ea away from the camp s ite and lai d ou t on a pathway ready for remova l to the mortuary. Because they were mo v ed from thei r c amping area without any f orm of labelling, it was impossible to trace them back to the si te where they were staying. I f th ese bodies had been labe lIed in some way before removal. they
could have been identified with their car registration number and relatives could have been informed almost immediately.
Unfortunately some relatives had to wait up to two weeks to see if people who were thought to be in San Carlos de la Rapita returned home. (The Spanish Police are not entirely sure if all the eodies have been accounted for, as some were later recovered from the sea.)
If a local authority in the United Kingdom is ever faced with a massive death toll where bodies are burned beyond recognition and scattered over a wide area, it is imperative that a labelling system should be used in order to identify at least the places from where the bodies had been recovered. A nilmbering system on each body with a sketch plan would suffice.
Whilst appreciating the difficulties involved in dealing wi th such an unprecedented disaster, a very controversial issue arose concerning the treatment of the badly burned survivors. The immediate and natural human impulse was to utilise the very limited intensive care facilities to help those who were most badly burned. However, the hindsight it would appear that, had these limited resources been used to help those whose burns less severe (say less than 75%), more 11ves may well have been saved. A sobering and very agonising thought.
If we in the United Kingdom are to do as much as possible to avoid a similar disaster it will be important to ensure that the tankers which carry LPG products are more adequately protected against impact than they are at present, even if the results of the enquiry reveal that the more disturbing possibility of metal fatigue was the cause of the leak in the Spanish tanker.
In addition to the points raised about tanker construction and legiSlative control, if we are to prepare for a similar disaster in the United Kingdom (and the possibility cannot be r uled out), the Spanish e x pe r ie n ce:
a) d r ew atte n tion t o th e safest r outing o f such v e h ic l es ;
b) Highli g h t e d t he added d an ge r of Camp Si te s b e i n g s i t u a t ed n ear to t he r oa d s i de with t heir i mme ns e i g n ition potenti al , rai s in g th e qu es t ion as to whe ther th e ro a d over which LP G produ ct s are transported s hould b e re s tricted during holiday s eas on s ;
c) proved the need for a reliable system to help identification of bodies;
d) raised the controversial issue of the allocation of limited intensive care facilities.
An preventive steps which are taken will only be truly affective if backed by legislation rather than voluntary agreement. Obviously any such legislation should be valid across Europe and not simply an internal measure in the United Kingdom. APPENDIX 1
Some investigations which have been carried out in Spain following the disaster have revealed that the tanker involved was being used in an owner/driver capacity. The pressure relief valve had been blanked off for some reason, and the capacity of the tank was overloaded by 3%. If the tanker was being used in a private capaci ty, it is now understandable why the vehicle was not using the motorway and the overloading was in the interest of the driver being paid on carrying capacity
'T' steel tankers manufactured by the Mississippi Company of America, which were identical to the Spanish tanker involved, were in the past hydraulically tested to 375 psi, with a working pressure of 250 psi; the pressure relief mechanism to operate at 210 psi. The body of the tank is of 0.384 inches and the ends of 0.25 inches tempered steel, carrying 17 tons of product.
It is also understood that the tanker was used for carrying ammonia on occasions, and when this occurs the pressure relief valve is blanked off. It has also been revealed that when ammonia is carried in 'T' steel tanks, corrosion is more apparent and cracking of the main body of the tank is more susceptible.
Some tests on British tankers of the same construction and manufacture, has revealed some small crack in the body of tanks but not to any serious degree. All such tankers of the American design have been taken out of service for hydraulic testing, the test period has been reduced from 10 years to 5 years and the testing pressure has been risen to 50 psi. During the rest of their serviceable life they will only be carrying Butane.
The issue by the Health and Safety Commission of a consultative document on proposals for Dangerous Substances (Conveyance by Road) Regulations is the culmination of many years of work by various Working Parties and Groups.
The proposed Regulations while being comprehensive are, nevertheless, general in nature for the sake of flexibility and conciseness. They set out objectives to be achieved leaving the method bf achievement to be covered in supporting Codes of Practice and Guidance Notes. Pending the issue of these Codes and Notes, persons and companies engaged in the conveyance by road of dangerous substances will need to satisfy the Courts, in the ultimate, that their method are safe and meet the requirements of the Regulations; this follows established practice under the Health and Safety at Work , etc ., Act 1974 In due course, the Regulations will replace provisions already in existence under the Petroleum (Consolidation) Act, 1928 and the Hazardous S ub stances (Labelling of Road Tankers) RegulatioGS 1978
The matters covered in the Regulations include:-
a ) the provision of information on dangerous substances conveyed;
b) packagi n g and labelling; c) constru c tion of vehicles ; d ) safety e qUipment and precautions ; e) lo ad i ng, unloading and marking of v e hicl es ; and
f) driver t r a in ing
Th e cl a s s i fi c a t i on of dangerous substances ha s b ee n b ased togeth er wi t h many of the r e quirem ent s o n recommenda t ions prepared by a United Na tion s Committe e of Experts on the Tran s po r t o f Dan ge r ous Goods However there has be e n s l ight mo d ic a ti o n of some of the recommend a tions wh e r e v e r local indus trial practice in the U K de:m.ande d this and at the same ti me has p rovided an equivalent or higher standard of s afety.
Industry did at the last moment press for adoption of the system of classification set out in the European Agreement concerning the international carriage of dangerous goods by road (ADR) and the conSUltative document seeks special comment on this aspect. Industry's motives in seeking this change are not clear. There are in fact only minor differences between the two systems and discussions already in hand are likely to result in their elimination so that in the future ADR will follow the U.N. system more closely. In all the circumstances, it is suggested that V.N. system of classification already used in the draft Regulations is the one to be preferred.
The draft Regulations do meet an urgent need and their early introduction should be welcomed.
Page 18 Regulation 25 The duty of enforcement of Regulations which the proposed Regulations will replace has always in the past been placed on the licensing authority under the Petroleum (Consolidation) Act, 1928, i.e currentl the upper tier authority which is also y the fire authority. Over the years an expertise has been built up within thes authorities which should be retained eIt is believed that the Health and Safet Executive share this view; their y difficulty is said to be in clearly defining where the responsibility l'les so that there lS no overlap of duties The method they have chosen in Regulation 25 does not achieve what has been stated as their purpose The Regulation should be amended so that after the words 'veh' 1 . , lC e 1S the fi r st li n e of (a) the wo r d ' moving' 1S added and th e whole of (b) is r eplac ed by the wo rds '( b ) i n any other case the Greate r Lond on Co u n ci l , the county coun c il in En glan d and Wa le s and the regio n al council in Scotland ' The Ass oci ati on has put the s e view s to th e H . S . E .
These Regulations come into operation on 28th March 1979 and replace the existing voluntary scheme by making statutory requirements under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 for the display of hazard warning panels on road tankers carrying any of the prescribed hazardous substances listed in Schedule 1 of the Regulations. For the purpose of the Regulations "road tanker" means a goods vehicle which has a tank which forms part of or is permanently attached to it, other than a tank used solely for the operation of the vehicle as a means of transport.
APPLICATION (Regulation 3)
Except for certain emergency situations or where the vehicle is engaged in an international transport operation and is labelled in accordance with the European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (A.D.R.), the Regulations apply from the commencement of loading of a hazardous substance until the tank or compartment has been completely cleaned out and is free of the substance and its vapour whether or not the vehicle is on a road.
One panel must be displayed at the rear of the vehicle and one on either side as close as is practicable to the front of the carrying tank. Each panel must have its lower edge at least one metre from the ground. When a tank has been emptied and cleaned or purged the panels must either be covered or removed. The Regulations provide for the telephone number to remain visible if desired.
a) The appropriate multi-load emergency action code.
b) The work "multi-load" in place of the substance indentification number.
c) The appropriate hazard warning diamond if the substances are of the same hazard or a whi te diam.ond wi th a black mark in the top half of the diamond if the substances are of varying hazards.
b) The remaining information as in paragraph 3 above.
Each compartment containing different prescribed substances must be labelled on either side with the substance identification numbe r, the appropri ate warning di amond and optionally the name of the substance. The hazard warning diamond need not be displayed on the compartment label if substances present the same hazard. When a compartment has been emptied and cleaned or purged the compartment label must be covered or removed.
Emergency action code for the SUbstance.
Substance identification number.
PARTICULARS TO BE DISPLAYED FOR A SINGLE LOAD (Regulation 4) a) b) c) d)
Hazard warning diamond. number indicating where pec1al1st advice can be obtained.
The name of the subs tance and the name of the man f addi t· u acturer or owner may h 10nally be incorporated in the azard Warning panel.
COMPOSITION, POSITION ETC WARNING
" OF HAZARD (Regulations 5 and 7)
The colour must b e orange, except for the space for the h d . azar Warn1ng d1amond wh1ch must be whit Th e. e borders, 1nternal d1v1d1ng lines, letters and figures must be black except that if breathing apparatus is required for fire only the emergency action code letter must be an orange letter in a black rectangle.
8, 9 and 10)
The Regulations imposed a duty on the operator of a road tanker to ensure that it carries the prescribed warning panelS and to instruct the driver who is required to keep them clean and to ensure that they continue to be displayed. The consignor is made responsible for giving the necessary information for compliance:
Labelling under these Regulations 1 sufficient to comply with any provisi?n of Section 5 of the Petroleum (Conso 11da tion) Act 1928 and any Regulation made under Section 6 of that Act relating to labelling road tankers conveying any prescribed hazardous substance.
·s
The police are responsible for enforcement on a road and the H.S.E. elsewhere. Although Petroleum Officers have no locus, inspectors, when reporting a tank wagon inspection on or after 28th March 1979, should indicate whether the hazard warning marking is displayed.
The emergency action code is the same at Fire Brigade's Hazchem Scale except that a distinction is made when breathing apparatus is needed for fire only
The substance indentification number for petrol is 1203. As an alternative 1270, which is the number for petroleum fuel not specified in Schedule 1, may be used for petrol, kerosine and gas-oil.
E Fu r niss , Assistant County Trading S t anda r ds Officer Kent County Council
Haz a rdous Substances (Labelling of Road Tankers ) Regulations 1978
These Regulations came into force on t he 2 8 t h Ma r ch 1979 Regulation 13 places th e du t y of enfor c ement upon the Police wh e n t h e t anker is on the road, and upon th e Health and Safety Ex ecutive in any oth e r cas e.
Howe v e r , pet r ole u m officers should take not e of Reg u lation 11 whereby labe l l i n g i n a c co r dan ce wi t h these Regula Re g u l a t ions i s d eemed to be sufficient comp l ianc e wit h Se c tion 5 of the Petroleum (Con s olid at ion) Ac t 1 928 and an y Conveyance by Ro a d Regulat ion s made unde r Section 6 of th a t Act .
The effect of thi s i s t ha t a pe trol tanker need no longer bear t he wo r ds "Petroleum Spirit. Highly I n flammable ", nor the flmoo symbols at th e fr o n t and rea r, provided that it carried the correct h az ard warning panels. If however there i s s ome deficiency in the marking unde r the s e Regulations then offences under Section 5 o f the 1 928 Act and Regulation 4 (1) of the I nf l ammable Substances (Conveyance by Road) (L abe ll i n g ) Reg ul ations 1971 may be commi tted.
In a similar way a tanker carrying corrosive need not carry corrosive symbol at the front and rear, nor the red and white notice indicating the contents provided that it has all the necessary hazard warning panels required by the Hazardous Substances (Labelling of Road Tankers) Regulations 1978.
It is therefore important that all petroleum officers are aware of the requirements of these Regulations even though they have no responsibility for their enforcement.
To legal pOints, which had been the subject of some dispute since the advert of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, have been clarified by means of these Regulations.
The first was whether or not petroleum licensing authorities were enforcing authorities as defined by Section 18(7) of that Act. The difficulty was that whilst the Petroleum (Consolidation) Act 1928 gave the Greater London Council, the County, Regional and Island Councils and authorities the power to issue petroleum licences, it did not specifically give them a duty of enforcement. This duty is now spelt out by Regulation 2(1) of these Regulations in respect of both the 1928 Act and a number of Orders made under it.
The second point upon which there was some dispute was whether or not an offence existed under the various Conveyance by Road Regulations in View of the fact that they were made under Section 6 of the Petroleum (Consolidation) Act 1928 which had been subsequently repealed by the Pet r oleum (Regulation) Acts 1928 and 1936 (Repeals and MOdifications) Regulations 1974 (No . 1942) . The weight of legal opinion was that an offence was st i ll in being. , but that it could be tr ac e d onl y b y a somewhat to r tuous path . A c lea r and disti nc t r o u te is now p r ovided t o t h at c onc lusion b y v i r tue of the mo di fi c at i on s l i s ted in the Sch e dule t o the s e Regu la ti on s
The Re gu lati on s c ame i nto f orce on 1 s t J u ly 1979 a s omewh a t belate d r es ponse t o th e uncertainty which had exi s ted since 1 s t January 1975.
A number of breaches of the Petroleum-Spirit (Conveyance by Road) Regulations 1957 resulted in a Company and their driver appearing before the West MaIling Justices on 14th June 1979.
The driver, William Waghorn of Charlton, London SE7, asked to be dealt with separately from the Company, Alfred Manchester and Sons Limited of Anchor and Hope Lane, Charlton, London SE7.
He pleaded guilty to a charge of carrying the key to the cap of the filling openings. A not quilty plea was entered in respect of the other two charges against him, namely carrying a lighter (Reg 4) and failing to keep the filling opening locked (Reg 12(2».
. His defence was firstly that the l1ghter did not work, and, secondly, that he had, in fact, locked the filling opening. However, the Court obviously accepted the evidence of the Prosecution on these points, and Mr. Waghorn was convicted on all three charges and a find of £75 was imposed on count.
A separate trial of the Company then followed d 1 , an a p ea of not gU1l ty was entered in respect of all three charges. charges related to the filling opening be1ng unlocked, the key being carried and the f . 1 ' a1 ure to ensure that their driver ca . d rr1e out the provisions of the Regulations (Reg 26).
P A number of cases were cited by the to show the vicarious 1 y of the Co Griffith mpany. These 1ncluded d -v- Studebaker (1924) 1 KB 102 an Hard1ng -v P . 283 Tb r1ce (1948) 1 A 11 E R • e defence in re 1 • • Warner _ _ M . P Y referred to v etropo11tan Police C . . and argued that ' omm1ss10ner, '. mens rea' was an essent1al 1ngredient for th be proved. e offence to
In the event the Company were found gU1l ty on all three charges and th C e ourt 1mposed a f1nd of £100 on the Regulation 26 offence, with no seperate penalty on the others. Prosecution costs of £50 were awarded.
On 4th April 1979, before the Dartford Justices, Leslie James Acott of 52 Bradfield Drive, Barking, Essex pleased guilty to a charge of carrying matches whilst attending a vehicle conveying petrol Acott, the driver of a tanker admitted that the matches were carried in a door pocket, and that he was aware of the Regulations prohibiting such carriage. The Magistrates imposed a fine of £50.
On the same day before the same Court, Joseph Francis Martin of 38c Wickham Road, Brockley SE14, pleaded guilty to a similar offence. In this instance the matches had been discovered on the top of the dashboard. Again, a find of £50 was imposed.
At Tottenham Magistrates' Court City Petroleum Co. Ltd. were fined £100 for each of twelve infringements of the petroleum licence and was ordered to pay £100 costs. The offences related to uncapped and unlocked tank filling pipes, a variation in arrangements and failure to notify a suspect leak from a suction line.
These offences were revealed when the inspector noticed contractors carrying out excavation work on the forecourt and he carried out an inspection.
A furniture manufacturer was fined £300 with £105.25 costs at Stoke Newing ton Magistrates' Court for keeping petroleum mixture without a licence. He appealed against the judgement. His appeal was heard at Bow Crown Court; the previous judgement was confirmed but the fine and costs were reduced to £200 and £50 respectively.
At Thames Magistrates' Court a chemical firm was fined £300 with £100 costs for transporting drums of octanoyl Chloride through Blackwall Tunnel in contravention of No. 8 of the Blackwall Tunnel By-Laws.
A licensee was fined £100 with £25 costs at Redbridge Magistrates' Court for contravening No. 16(5) of the Petroleum Spirit (Conveyance by Road) Regulations in that a competent person had not been appointed to be in charge of the storage tank. At the same hearing a tank wagon driver was fined £25 with £20 costs for commencing delivery before a certificate had been completed in contravention of No. 16(7) of the Regulations.
As a result of the offences a tank was overfi lIed.
Petroleum Spirit (Conveyance by Road) Regulations, 1957.
On 3rd May 1979, at Tameside Magistrates Court, Ashton-under-lyne, B.P. Oil Ltd., and Mr. E. Scott (tanker driver) of Goostrey, Cheshire, both pleaded guilty to charges of a) failing to keep the filling pipe caps of a tank trailer locked, and b) carrying the keys to unlock the filling pipe caps on the said tank trailer.
The charges followed an inspection of a tank trailer during the course of a delivery of petrol at a garage. It was found that all the filling pipe caps were not locked and that the key was in the lock of one of the caps.
Both the company and the driver were fined £100 on each charge, and the company were also ordered to pay £10 costs.
At Haverhill Magistrates Court on 23rd May 1979, Regent Transport Limited of Ripple Garage, Renwick Road, Essex, were fined a total of £150 with £40 costs for :
1) failing to maintain in good condition the locking device of a manhole lid (Guilty plea £100 fine).
2) using a tractor unit of an articulated tank wagon, the design of which was not approved by a government inspector (Guilty plea £50 fine)
3) Using a manhole cover, the design of which was not approved by a government inspector (Not Guilty p le a no evi dence of fe red by the the prosecution dismissed).
The case was the result of a spotch eck of a 5,500 gallon capaci ty articulated road tank wagon, which was carrying 1760 gallons of toluene and 3,300 gallons on iso Propyl Alcohol which , was parked outside a chemical factory at Haverhill, Suffolk, on 27th September 1978.
The prosecution was brought by Suffolk County Council, Trading Standards Depart ment,
At Bedford Magistrates Court on 8th May 1979 Mr. R.K. Shah of Wellingborough pleaded guilty to the following fOur infringements.
I. Conveyed petroleum spirit in a vessel with exceeded 50 gallons (Reg. 23 (1) (a) PS (Conv by Road) Regs. 1957).
2. Used a vehicle for conveyance of petroleum spirit which did not comply with Part 1 of First Schedule of PS (conv. by Road) Regs. 1957.
3. Vehicle not conveying prescribed flammable diamonds to front and rear. (Infl . Sub. (Conv . by Road) (Labelling) Regs. 1971.
4. Container of Petroleum Spirit not labelled as prescribed by Regulations (Infl. SUb. (Conv. by Road) (Labelling) Regs. 1971 .
He was fined £400 with £25 costs.
I am writing to request your views on the question of the qualifications required by an Electrical Contractor in order to satisfactorily carry out an electrical test at a petroleum installation.
At the moment we require a contractor to be either:-
a) A professionally qualified Electrical Engineer;
b) An approved electrical contractor on the Toll of the N. I. C. E. I. C. ;
c) A member of the Electrical Contractors Association:
d) A suitable professionally qualified person, approved by the local authori ty.
Up to the present time, all the contractors who have submitted electrical test certificates have fallen within categories (a), (b) or (c). However we h ' ave recently received an enquiry from a.contractor who does not come within of the first three categories and who w1shes to know whether he can be approved by the local authority.
We are at th . of . . e moment 1n the process matter, but before eC1S10n we would b for the views of th' " e grateful e Assoc1at10n on h t gU1de11nes to follow h " w a w en dec1d1ng whether a con tractor 1's "s . t b . . U1 a ly qua11f1ed".
Any observations that you might have would be appreciated.
Yours faithfully, H. Lewis
County Trading Standards Officer.
From time to time we have found people using Ex Government Jerricans for carrying Petroleum spirit, after some worrying incidents we now prohibit their use for the following reasons:
1) They are unstable as their base. is narrow.
2) The cap is not vapour proof and if the can is agitated it is not petrol proof.
3) They do not confirm to the '29' Regulations (2 x 2 gallons) as they are 3! gallons.
4) They were never intended to transport petrol as most of them have pressed in the sides by the manufacturer the Legend 'Water". I know the 'desert rats' used them fQr petrol, if necessary they would have and probably did use their hats, but thats a long way from city streets.
There are in existence modern copies of these Jerricans complete with screw cap, these are in a different category.
A number of these cans were found to be used by the local authority leisure services carrying petrol in large quantities round to stores and used by gardeners cutting grass, felling trees, and roto-vating in parks, gardens and cemeteries. It is suprising how much petrol was found wandering around the town every day, until it was finally controlled.
I would be pleased to hear other peoples opinions and experience with these vessels.
Yours faithfully, E.W. Dean Senior Inspector
The question of what to do with disused underground petrol tanks has occupied the thoughts and time of Officers for some time.
In this authority the practice is to allow one year filled with water and then the tank has to be either removed or filled with sand or cement slurry.
I see there have been a number of meetings in the Anglian area at which the subject has been discussed at some length. I would be pleased to receive any information or perhaps I may be permitted to attend. The type of problem found in this area are as follows:Tanks are not generally removed from the ground , as there is no means of disposal of a contaminated vessel, after a fatality at a scrap yard some years ago . Most of the tanks are very old, and almost all of them have no bolted manhole as such, merely welded fittings in the top of the tank, how does one fi 11 this ty pe of t ank,? Some of this type have been dealt with by filling the tank with wate r, e x posing the end of the tank as far aw a y f r om the contaminated manhole as pOSSi bl e , drill a h ole in the tank to ma ke su r e it is full of water right to the h o l e , t h en d r ill a se r ies of 3/8 " holes in a s qu a r e about 12 inches and remove the piec e o f p late u sing bo l t cutters between the hole s
The ma in purp ose of th is letter , howeve r , is to re por t th a t an e x petrol s t ation in t h i s a r e a 3 x 3000 gal l on tankS i nstal l ed in 1958 i s a t pre se nt b e i ng u sed as a plumbers whole sa l e r s an d t h e f irm a r e r e lu ctan t to f i ll the tanks wi th concr e t e as t h e y are h oping th a t i f t h e r ese nt v e nture fa i ls t h e r e may b e a Phanc e to di s p ose of t he s i te a s a ;otential fillin g s t at ion a g a i n .
After a long discussion with the owners they have produced a contractor who is prepared to clean and de gas the tanks thoroughly and then spray a thick layer of polystyrene foam on the whole inside surface of the tanks and we are given to understand this will make the tanks permanently safe, and the foam may be removed at any time and the tanks revert to their previous use as petrol tanks.
We understand the work is to be carried out in September this year.
Yours faithfully, E.W. Dean, Senior Inspector
For many years the construction and operation of road vehicles cOnveying petroleum spirit have been closely regulated by the Petroleum Spirit (Conveyance by Road) Regulations 1957 to 1966. Petroleum inspectors have examined wagons encountered in Greater London in two ways:-
a) senior inspectors have made annual inspections of tank wagons based in London , including detailed checks of their internal fittings, and
b) all inspectors have carried out' casual ' i n spe c tions when in the normal course of thei r duties they have encountered vehi c les ca rry ing petroleum spi r i t; 'c asual ' i n s p ec t ion s a r e limited to an e x ami n at i on of e x ter n al fittings but t h e y d o pr o vide a c he ck on the continuous obse rvan ce o f op er a t i on al r e qu i r e me n t s .
Somewhat similar Regulations have been made regarding the conveyance by road of carbon disulphide but very few vehicles convey this substance in London and none is known to be based here.
Regulations have also been made to control to some extent the conveyance by road of inflammable liquids, corrosive substances and organic peroxides. These Regulations do not yet control the construction of conveyance vehicles but simply make certain operational safety requirements, for example that warning notices must be displayed. Thus inspectors cannot make full inspections of the vehicles but can make 'casual' examinations when vehicles are encountered on premises visited in the normal course of their duties. ThiS, however, does not happen very often and arrangements have been made for petroleum inspectors to examine some vehicles when they are stopped on the road for Department of Transport checks or by arrangement with a local authority carrying out weights and measures checks.
There has been no new conveyance legislation affecting the work of the Section during 1978. Proposals to revise Regulations governing the conveyance by road of petroleum spirit are in abeyance and wi 11 in due course be incorporated in new Regulations governing the conveyance by road of hazardous substances generally. The Hazardous Substances (Labelling of Road Tankers) Regulations 1978 provide for the display of hazard warning panels on road tankers carrying certain prescribed hazardous substances (including petroleum spirit). These Regulations come into force on 28th March 1979 and in effect make mandatory the voluntary marking scheme which many haUliers and tankers operators have been observing. Enforcement powers under these Regulations rest with the Health and Safety Executive and the police.
FULL INSPECTIONS OF VEHICLES details of such inspections are set out in Appendix A.
3.1 FAULTS FOUND details are given in Appendix A. COinCidentally the faults listed under both 'full' and 'casual' inspections were found in 27 of the vehicles examined in each group.
4.1 PETROLEUM SPIRIT (CONVEYANCE BY ROAD) REGULATIONS 1957 four letters giving advice were sent and 11 cautions were recorded concerning faults found on vehicles. One operator was prosecuted for infringement of the Regulations and was fined £800 with £75 costs.
Details of operational requirements disregarded are also set out in Appendix C. One advisory letter was sent and seven cautions were recorded; action on one other case is pending. An outstanding case from 1977 produced a fine of £50 when a forecourt attendant was found guilty of infringing Regulation 16(6) (a) and (c).
4.2 OTHER CONVEYANCE REGULATIONS details of faults found are given in Appendix C. One advisory letter was sent and action is pending in a case involving various infringements of the Corrosive Substances (Conveyance by Road) Regulations 1971.
5.1 FULL INSPECTIONS 133 vehicles were inspected at 18 premises compared wi th 110 at 15 premises in 1977. The majority of inspections were carried out by two senior inspectors. This is due mainly to the uneven distribution of premises where the vehicles are garaged. Faults were found on 20.3% of the vehicles inspected (20% in 1977).
5.2 CASUAL INSPECTIONS 346 vehicles were checked on casual inspections compared with 373 in 1977. The wide variation in the number of vehicles checked by individual inspectors seems to reflect the inspector's personal approach to the value of the work rather than the distribution of tank wagons in service in London. Faults were found on 7.8% of the vehicles inspected compared with 11.2% in 1977.
5.3 OTHER CONVEYANCE BY ROAD REGULATIONS six vehicles were checked for compliance with other conveyance Regulations. One of the inspections was as a result of a notification received concerning an incident involving the carriage of a corrosive substance. The other inspections were made in the normal course of the inspectors' duties.
Failure to ascertain contents of storage tank before delivery Storage tank not n umbered Of f- set filling pipe not cl ear ly marked De l ivery commenc e d before c ert if i cation has been signed Wat c h no t ke p t on tank du r ing del i ver y No c ompet e nt person in c har g e of s torage tank De l ivery h ose no t p r oper ly c onne cted Di p pi n g o pen i ng n ot secu r el y closed Tank wago n u n attended for sho r t period
Full Casual 2 1 9 2 1 2 a 7 1 2
f a ult s report e d.
(CON VEYANCE BY ROAD) REGULATION S 19 71 Driver not acquainted with the Re gula t ion s (for labelling fault s involving tank wa gons carryin g p'etro l eum spirit see A. above).
5 2 9 5 1 2 1 6 3 1 36 35 1 2 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 2 1
MINUTES OF THE ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING OF THE EASTERN BRANCH HELD AT THE CAMBRIDGESHIRE FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE DIVISIONAL H.Q., PARKSIDE, CAMBRIDGE 4th APRIL 1979
1) The meeting was opened by the Chairman, Mr. J.A.J. Thompson, who welcomed the 23 members and visitors.
2) Apologies Eight members tendered their apologies.
3) Minutes of the last A.G.M. These were agreed and signed by the Chairman.
4) Matters arising None
5) Correspondence None
6) Chairman's Report Mr. J.A.J. Thompson felt that the last year had been successful for the Branch. There had been a visit to Ipswich where an talk was given by Mr. S. Worsfold on Tanker Conveyance and Inspection. A visit to Luton and Vauxhall Motors and a business meeting at Cambridge. Running alongside this was the Working Party which reported on disused tanks. Mr. Thompson went on to thank everyone for their support and hoped that attendance would continue to be high. Mr. Thompson finally thanked the Branch Secretary for his support and good work.
7) Secretary/Treasurer's Report Mr. E.B. Brown endorsed what Mr. Thompson had said concerning the satisfactory year and the continued support of members. Mr. Brown emphasized the fact that the Branch is for members and if they had any SUggestions on how to improve the BranCh then they should let it be known.
The Branch Membership stands at 24. The balance of funds started the year at £29.59 and ended at £31.47. No capitation fees had been claimed as it was felt not necessary as expenditure had been kept low.
Mr. Brown thanked the Branch and its Officers for their support during the past year.
The Statement of Accounts was approved.
8) Appointment of Officers Chairman Mr. G. Bailey proposed Mr. B. Lowe (Beds) be elected Chairman for the ensuing year. 'Ibis was seconded by Mr. G. Clark and agreed by the meeting. Mr. Lowe thanked the meeting and was pleased to accept office. He further thanked Mr. Thompson for his efforts during his year of office.
The meeting discussed the election of the past Chairman to this post but it was decided to involve other members in the running of the Branch.
Mr. D.B. Hills then proposed Mr. J. Wright.
Further discussions then followed as to the qUestion of non-association members who were Branch members holding office.
It was decided to put thiS question to the A.G.M. of the Association and the Committee would then appoint a Vice Chairman.
Secretary/Treasurer Mr. E. Brown was nominated and elected to this office.
Auditor Mr. L. Brooks was nominated and elected to this office.
Two Members to Executive Committee
Mr. B.J. Thompson and Mr. John Chesworth were nominated and elected to these offices.
Branch Representative Mr. E. Brown was nominated and elected to this office.
9) Any other business -A good discussion followed on various subjects including disused tanks, Conveyance of hazardous materials, licensing of can stores, keeping under the Motor Vehicle Regulations, and the involvement of District Councils in low risk premises.
After lunch the programme was amended due to Mr. Jackson being unable to give his talk on Emergency Arrangements due to illness. Two films were shown by kind permission of the London Fire Brigade.
The meeting closed at 3.00 p.m.
