Volume #23 Al Manakh 2 Gulf Continued

Al Manakh ARCHIS

Al Manakh 2 is a special edition of Volume, a project by Archis + AMO + C-Lab + Pink Tank + NAi + ...

Volume 23 this issue € 29.50

EXCERPTS

A Al Manakh 2 Under the exclusive sponsorship of the Abu Dhabi Urban Planning Council, Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi is moving towards realising its overarching ambition to be globally recognised as the sustainable Arab Capital and the gateway city to the Gulf.

The exclusive sponsorship of Al Manakh 2 offers the Abu Dhabi Urban Planning Council (UPC) the opportunity to initiate and participate in international and regional discussions on the growing importance and influence of the cities within the Gulf.

The UPC is committed to strategic and sustainable urban planning and creating dialogue with communities. Its partnership with Al Manakh 2 allows the UPC to reinforce and further demonstrate this commitment and join in the wider global debate on the implementation of best practice sustainability within urban planning techniques.

This second edition of Al Manakh captures the events of 2009 and tells the urban stories on how events, people and trends affected the Gulf. The collection of analysis, contributions and interviews within Al Manakh 2 converges into one main conclusion: the success of the Gulf region will be decided in its cities.

Introduction

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When we first conceived a second Al Manakh, the global crisis was not yet reality. ‘An eventual correction’ loomed over every new development plan in the Gulf, but it would be difficult to find anyone today who predicted the crisis’ onset and in what form it would come – a liquidity shortfall that started far away, then spread globally, and relentlessly exposed real estate bubbles in the Gulf.

In January 2009, we started Al Manakh 2 in the midst of a terrible cloud of no-information and misinformation. Crisis had bungled our initial plans and given us a new assignment: to follow its course and look for the ideas that might suggest the Gulf region’s way out of it. Several times elucidation seemed near, but almost every lead proved a ruse.

In the end, crisis was just part of the story.

Al Manakh 2 had to take the next step. It had to begin uncovering the structures and networks that lay underneath the images easily found. To do that, we asked people living and working in the region to contribute.

And as is the nature of the region, we couldn’t rely just on voices in the Gulf cities; we reached out also to people who felt the Gulf in other corners of the world: Malaysia, China, Egypt, India, the US and the UK. More than 120 people contributed to this book. Al Manakh 2 assembles voices that sometimes unknowingly collude together and other times contradict one another. Distinguishing the voices ‘on the ground’ from those offering an outsider’s commentary is not difficult, and therefore it is clear that more work is to be done in stimulating the exchange of ideas and opinions over supposedly porous boundaries.

The first Al Manakh was a photographic documentary, in text and images: Gulf cities were what you saw, and what you saw was unde­ni­ able. The book relied on a process of collecting facts and figures that up to that point had not been gathered in one place. If Al Manakh was the first book to assemble an urban history of this region, Al Manakh 2 could be the first that explores the cultural linkages among these cities in regard to their ambitions, predicaments and needs. Our attempt here charts an experiment to show congruence and contradiction – both mutually inclusive to any collaborative effort. And both are recon­cep­ tualizing the Gulf.

The editorial voice of the Al Manakh team attempts not to summarize these views, but to link them through cross-references, and to find within them what events of 2009/early 2010 did with the past and what they’ve meted out for the future. Assembling information in lists and timelines, the team searched for the larger pictures in the fractured news media, finding hints of the Gulf’s next agenda (see Pink Tank’s monthly sum­ maries at the end of the book).

After this book goes to print, some ideas will be surely proven wrong or obsolete. That’s how it goes in this region. To publish a book on the Gulf is a risky endeavor because the region moves at a rate more suit­able for other media outlets. But the Gulf does need books about it. And in the midst of a financial crisis – when much time has passed and more time must still be endured – the Gulf is at a point where the information available at this moment should be considered and examined.

United?

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A book that covers six cities in five autonomous countries – no matter how much it tries to underline their differences – assumes they share some­ thing in common. Each of the countries has elected to collaborate to some degree through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).1 There is relative ease in moving over GCC borders (especially if you are a GCC citizen), and with that ease, there has been a seeping of ideas and expertise from one place to another. One idea of 2009 loaded with considerable social implications for the GCC countries was the return of the GCC railway proposal.

Huge infrastructure projects – Guinness World records for engin­eering feats, thousands of kilometers of highway (and some rail), vast seaports and airports – have characterized the region’s modernization over the last 60 years. Physical infrastructure is worth more than its weight in concrete and steel; it lends the space for other kinds of infra­structural development: educational, healthcare, economic and cultural. Highways, telegraph technology and a postal system all have their roots in a twentieth-century idea of a unified Gulf. And if the 1970s were characterized by legions laying roads and pipes, the 80s, 90s and 00s were about harnessing those systems in order to build societies.

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As with many other good ideas, the rail project is not a result of the crisis, but current economic conditions have certainly given the project resuscitation. In addition to the proposed GCC rail network, other countries are developing their own national rail plans. Saudi Arabia is fueling its economy by expanding upon the region’s sole rail line between Riyadh and Dammam. Abu Dhabi is also pursuing rail to con­ nect its oil industries to its cities and port. The bridge connecting Bahrain to Qatar (auspiciously called the ‘Friendship Causeway’) will not only serve automobiles but will also include a rail corridor. In addition to rail connection, the GCC-wide electrical grid went online in 2009, aiding the region in sharing energy resources and paving the way to overcoming the paradoxical electrical blackouts some areas suffer in this oil-rich region. The energy link also suggests further unity as oil runs out and some governments move toward developing alternative forms of energy with export potential.

Not to be undervalued, infrastructure also aids in the imaginative process of understanding a common cause. Cities that seem far apart might suddenly be drawn together, physically and psychologically. Right now going from Abu Dhabi to Doha requires one to go through the same routine as from Abu Dhabi to London. Simplifying a travel routine would draw the two cities together, more than ever before.

The GCC does not spark the popular imagination. It elicits a trail of political setbacks, especially this past year – disputes over the location of a central bank; the decreasing likelihood of a monetary union; deflated claims for an ‘Arab agenda’; images of droves of UAE trucks trapped at the Saudi border. It might be infrastructure’s role, once again, to demonstrate how the physical can generate ideas and ignite a regional enthusiasm.

Vision, which earns a chapter in this volume, bears many meanings, from a leader’s direction for his city or country to a popular cause for the future. This region’s resilience is based on a steadfast dedication to vision. Its modern history is one of futures – futures described in speeches and written words. Prosperity first started with words, organ­ izing wishes and emotions into rational, though not always reasonable, milestones. And vision continues to define these cities’ futures. The terms and conditions of vision can change. Take Bahrain, for instance, it has ’master-planned’ its entire island, but it reserves the word ‘vision’ for Vision Bahrain 2030, which has more to do with strategically positioning the island within a global context. Vision is ensuring and developing opportunities for people. Abu Dhabi has also made strides in reexam­ ining vision’s meaning. Its Plan Abu Dhabi 2030 downplays the physical to give process a chance at ensuring prosperity.

It’s a cruel joke to ask a newcomer: ‘What do you think of Abu Dhabi?’

To be asked the question is paralyzing, especially if compared to being asked the same question in Paris or New York. There, ‘Great.’ would

suffice. How do you answer – acknowledging the socioeconomic conditions, yet not dwelling on them entirely? How do you talk about the ‘speed’ without oversimplifying or missing the point? If it’s cruel to ask the newcomer, it is laborious to ask the resident or citizen about his or her city. Globalized media have made these cities grow under inter­national scrutiny. The oversight aids in some regards, others not, and in every regard creates complex issues of self-awareness. Each writer here, putting pen to paper, finger to keyboard, is thinking how that word just written relates to a whole network of global opinions. It can be dizzying, discouraging and stimulating all at the same time.

Words and visions are not reserved for the power base. In the Gulf, the written and spoken word is a serious endeavor. This is a region where poetry recitations are televised, where blogs provide evidence of complex and non-complacent societies, and where debates happen in living rooms and cafes. Western critics might miss the voting booths, but the level and magnitude of discussions are by no means lacking.

Trade data reveal that each of these cities is more connected to places beyond the Gulf than to each other. Al Manakh 2 argues that there is a united Gulf, united in resilience but distinguished greatly in details and far from unison. A united GCC is not just around the corner, but the ideas, however latent, are there to support its becoming. While cities in the West remain stagnated in the face of the global crisis – looking for ways to bring things back to the way they were, these cities move for­ ward. There is a propelling energy that aggravates any tendency toward enervation. Grave errors have been made, and leaders will address them, but critics will also be asked to see these mistakes in perspective.

One can disagree with leaders’ arguments, and chastise their lack of transparency, but the pace and the perseverance of these cities require that the world take note. We hope that Al Manakh 2 helps you in the process.

We wish to thank the Abu Dhabi Urban Planning Council for making this book a possibility.

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1 The Gulf Cooperation Council is a union of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Oman pursuing cooperation on economic, social, political and other matters.

Excerpts from Introductions

stresstest – Rem Koolhaas …In fact the genius of Dubai was to suspend reality for one euphoric decade. The result, in the form of the Palm, the Burj Khalifa, Business Bay, Dubai Marina, are significant prototypes that even if they read today as Al Manakh symptoms of excess will soon become recognizable as defining achieve2 ments – the crisis a potentially check of the of thecreating early twentieth century,embarrassing both good andreality bad.....

It is also obvious that Dubai’s energy and talent are book. not spent: it has reached a point and where arguments that informed the first But the crisis happened, it it can onlyDubai have aand great future. reached the Gulf. Among other agendas, the first Al Manakh Crisis Dubai’s and Crises - Daniel Camara Mitra Khoubrou (Pink Tank) freude, discomfiture.

Whereand pre-crisis Dubai was ridi culed for its … There are also tales of resilience. Abu Dhabi, Doha and Riyadh are richer unchecked surrender to Anglo-Saxon modes of development, post-crisis cities. They reinforced their projections by digging into the deepest public Dubai has been blamed by its American and European critics for not budgets the region has ever seen. Launches are still happening and opening being immune Wallsent Street’s ‘Model Dubai’ hasofbitten invitations are to being as thetoxic Gulf corruption. is ahead of the game in terms the dust, maybe forever.

But in fact, such a reading only reinforces our on-going projects, especially in infrastructure. How can it be a crisis when initial accusation of laziness: Dubai is an entirelyunveiled different construct, the Dubai, the poster-child for 2009’s annus horribilis, the tallest tower brainchild of and a local that generously invited manpower and in the world the minority first metro system of the Gulf? expertise from everywhere to assemble an artificial community, to test, explore and put into practice the relationship between Islam and modernity.

Consultants - Todd Reisz Where a Western perspective could only register unguided frivolity, …The constant cycles of adding consultants to problems addressed Dubai from an Iranian perspective would represent freedom; from by anthe ones before them eventually add up, leaving lumpy layers of history that not Indian, opportunity; to an Arab, the hope that Arab modernity can work. only obfuscate the lack of a solution but also make the problems disappear The nature of this experiment and its success or failure should have been in a confusion of PowerPoint slides and terminology. At some point, will the land stacking stop? Do the Gulf cities have the time to find their own way ofbans

4

It is true that at one point a grotesque developer’s euphoria created in the Gulf-aOle number of unsustainable ‘visions’, some barely built, others Vision Bouman (NAI) …This attempt is nothing lessthe than an historical mission epic proportions. mercifully evaporated.

With yearly Cityscape as a of nightmarish Never before so much wealth was spent so fast on so much city, forin so little apotheosis, Dubai became an experiment in what would happen direct reason.

Can this city survive without the fuel that made it run?

Can a world where the developer would no longer encounter resistance. it findthe a new fuelon timely enough,remains to let it run?

But reality the ground much more complex.

Seen this way, the speed of development can no longer be seen as insane or What has been surprising is how Dubai in particular, and the Gulf in general, arrogant. Suddenly the speed becomes a bare necessity. Where there is a have been discussed and criticized strictly as ‘new’, as a freeze-frame – time limit to the availability of the fuel, you need to work fast for finding new aone. single moment in time, typically the duration of an too brief visit.

And this is what happens.

Keeping momentum toall create enough critical The history of Dubai’s modernization – the 70s beginning, the oil running urban gravity within a few decades that justify continuity for centuries to out in the 90s, development as the new raison d’être, the consultantcome.

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defining a city?

Cohabitation - Arjen Oosterman (Archis) …The gradual coming into existence of a middle class – or its recent acceptance as reality and opportunity – is an important one. It changes the game on many levels. This middle class has needs and expectations that are not part of the blueprint. This middle class might prove to be the incubator for innovation and renewal, provided that open access to information and certain personal and professional amenities are guaranteed. This middle class needs rental houses and mortgages, efficient public transport, affordable education, leisure activities, and a public realm to socialize and relax. It will in the process become more independent. Yet, as a non-ruling class, the middle class might demand more openness and more influence; cautious experiments with participation in planning signal an emerging awareness of Al Manakh these new realities. But will it do?

2 – the crisis creating a potentially embarrassing reality check of the arguments that informed the first book. But the crisis happened, and it reached Dubai and the Gulf. Among other agendas, the first Al Manakh Export Gulf – Todd Reisz …The cities of the Gulf convey strong images to the imaginations of people from countries Egypt, India, Pakistan.

The Gulf is still seen a place freude, Dubai’s like discomfiture.

Where pre-crisis Dubai was ridias culed for of its opportunity – chances of financial gain laced with stories of terrific risk. With unchecked surrender to Anglo-Saxon modes of development, post-crisis the help of Gulf investments, the Cairo film industry has been able to deliver Dubai has been blamed by its American and European critics for not the Gulf Dream to replace the American Dream of the last century. Cairo and being Wallstudies Street’s ‘Model Dubai’ bitten Keralaimmune serve astocase in toxic this Alcorruption.

Manakh. They are only twohas places in the dust, maybe forever.

But in fact, such a reading only reinforces our of the world where ‘Gulfanization’ is an everyday term. The stories from each initial of laziness: Dubaisocial, is an entirely construct, theseaccusation places accentuate economic, religiousdifferent and cultural ties thatthe brainchild a local minority that generously invited manpower and on expose theofGulf’s variated influences in countries whose people depend Gulf salaries. expertise from everywhere to assemble an artificial community, to test, explore and put into practice the relationship between Islam and modernity.

Where a Western perspective could only register unguided frivolity, Dubai from an Iranian perspective would represent freedom; from an Indian, opportunity; to an Arab, the hope that Arab modernity can work.

The nature of this experiment and its success or failure should have been land bans

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5

It is true that at one point a grotesque developer’s euphoria created in the Gulf a number of unsustainable ‘visions’, some barely built, others mercifully evaporated. With the yearly Cityscape as a nightmarish apotheosis, Dubai became an experiment in what would happen in a world where the developer would no longer encounter resistance.

But the reality on the ground remains much more complex.

What has been surprising is how Dubai in particular, and the Gulf in general, have been discussed and criticized strictly as ‘new’, as a freeze-frame – a single moment in time, typically the duration of an all too brief visit.

The history of Dubai’s modernization – the 70s beginning, the oil running out in the 90s, development as the new raison d’être, the consultant-

Content 4

stresstest

Rem Koolhaas

Introduction 10 14 16 38 40

The Process: United?

City Ranks City Reports Global Visibility Yearly Investment Breakdowns Crisis and Crises

44 51 52 55 58 64 66 68 69 70 72 74 79 83 84 90 94 97 101 106 110 111 112 114 117 118 120 122 126 128 134 137 138 146 147 151

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Introduction Daniel Camara and Mitra Khoubrou The Global Crisis and the Gulf’s Money Souks Matein Khalid Diversification, Clustering, and Risk in Dubai Stephen Ramos Dubai World, Its Roots, and Its Creations Sandra Bsat Jumeirah Gardens and the Urban Checklist Todd Reisz Dubai World & Nakheel Compiled by Sandra Bsat, Daniel Camara and Mitra Khoubrou Dubai: Crisis & Reinvention Compiled by Sandra Bsat, Daniel Camara and Mitra Khoubrou The Final Plan Dubai Bashing: A List of Headlines and Quotations Chronicling a Year of Dubai Bashing Dubai Bashing Article Generator Rory Hyde Business Bay, Dubai, 2009 Todd Reisz A Tall Emblem Structure for Dubai Aleksandr Bierig Cityscape 2009 Reviews Todd Reisz The Strength of Dubai – Khalid Al Malik Interviewed by Rem Koolhaas and Todd Reisz Planning for Growth H.E. Falah Al Ahbabi Abu Dhabi Crisis & Reinvention Compiled by Sandra Bsat, Daniel Camara and Mitra Khoubrou What’s Next in the City of Dream Buildings? Bradley Hope Abu Dubai: A Forward Tale of Two Cities That Could Only Be One Mishaal al Gergawi Power Networks: Dubai Power Networks: Abu Dhabi Modern Gulf Cities Shafeeq Ghabra Institutional Real Estate: Investing in the GCC Faisal Khan and Anuscha Ahmed Time to Reflect Hamda al Kindi Ajman in 2009 Daniel Camara and Mitra Khoubrou From Increasing Supply to Managing Demand: Resourceful Efforts in the United Arab Emirates Kevin Mitchell Abu Dhabi: Paving the Way to Sustainability? Volker Soppelsa and Neil Mallen The Paradox of Sustainability and Abu Dhabi Jim Heid Tackling the Paradox: Homegrown Solutions to Sustainability Salem K. Al Qassimi Kuwait’s Future Prospects Yasser Mahgoub Welcome to Saudi Arabia Riyadh Timeline Natalie al Shami Riyadh Ready?: The Megacity of 2020 Joumana al Jabri Makkah’s Crest The Hajj is a Myriad of Details – Bodo Rasch Interviewed by Reda Sijiny Master Plan for Pilgrims Accommodation, Mina (Muna) Kayoko Ota Jeddah between Crisis and Hope Ziad Aazam Qatar 2009: Weathering the Crisis Daniel Camara and Mitra Khoubrou Qatar Headlines 2009

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Consultants 156 158 160 164 167 168 170 172 176

Introduction Todd Reisz At Your Service: Ten Steps to Becoming a Successful Urban Consultant Reinier de Graaf Measuring the Presence of Consultants Rory Hyde Selling Adelaide Rory Hyde Abu Dhabi’s French Enlightenment: French Professionals and Institutions Coming to Abu Dhabi Compiled by Natalie Al Shami and Jonathan Hanahan From Extreme Skateboarding to Stalled Globalization: The Changing Rhetoric of McKinsey in the Gulf, Before and After the Crisis Rory Hyde KSA – Open for Business?: A Report from the Construcion Week Saudi Arabia Conference Reda Sijiny Two or False: Vancouver Replicants Timothy Moore Will the Last Consultant Please Turn On the Light?

A Meeting with Andrés Duany in Al Ain, UAE Todd Reisz Vision

180 182 182 191 194 195 196 204 212 216

Introduction Ole Bouman Regulate Sachin Kerur and Philip Corfield-Smith Closing the Gap Rami el Samahy and Kelly Hutzell Bahrain: Another Vision Digby Lidstone Petals and Atolls: Atkins Makes Islands – Rob Ruse Interviewed by Nicholas Kothari Sheikh Zayed: The Urbanized Arab Emirates Sultan Sooud Al Qassemi National Housing: An Opportunity for Change X-Architects The People’s Icon? Urban Rail and Socio-spatial Cohesion in Dubai Tabitha Decker Abu Dhabi’s Renewed Urbanism – Larry Beasley Interviewed by Rem Koolhaas The Abu Dhabi Urban Planning Council: Update – Michael White Interviewed by Rem Koolhaas and Todd Reisz

224 226 229 232 236 239 242 243 244 246 248 254 264 266 269 272 273 274 276 278 280 282 286

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The Modern Majlis: Public Participatory Planning in Shaham and Bahia Lia Gudaitis Capital District Plan 2030 – Jody Andrews Interviewed by Mitra Khoubrou The Abu Dhabi Investment Forum Lucy Bullivant A Cultural Island: Abu Dhabi Imports Cultural Institutions to Build Upon Tradition Negar Azimi Yas Island Katrin Greiling Shrink to Fit C-Lab Doing by Learning: Abu Dhabi Opens the Masdar Institute of Science & Technology – Georgeta Vidican Interviewed by Natalie Al Shami KEO: International Consultants Advise – Uwe Nienstedt Interviewed by Holley Chant Masdar 2009 Headlines Sandra Bsat Masdar Takes a Pulse Yasmine Abbas The National Spatial Strategy for Saudi Arabia Mohamed Abdel Rahman and Saleh AlHathloul The Doxiadis Effect: A Master Plan for Riyadh Joyce Hsiang A Vision for Riyadh: Arriyadh Development Authority’s Ongoing Work for Riyadh Joumana al Jabri and Todd Reisz Cities Solve Problems City of Knowledge – Redwan Zaouk Interviewed by Joumana al Jabri, Todd Reisz, Reda Sijiny City of Industry – Mohammed Ahmed Al-Attas, Zahir Bin Hassan, Fadi Farouk Jabri Interviewed by Reda Sijiny The Social Responsibility in City Making: Linking Jazan to Malaysia Suetlin Lo Thoughts on Growth AbulAziz Aldukheil Planned Development Projects in Makkah Sporting Cities Marisa Mazria Katz Express Integration: The Return of the GCC Rail Project Tabitha Decker Promises on a Friendship Causeway: From Qatar to Bahrain Nicholas Kothari Going Nuclear in the Gulf Jonathan Hanahan A Demand for Water Jonathan Hanahan Educational Entrepreneurship Bimal Mendis

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220

About 297

The Abu Dhabi Urban Planning Council (UPC) Cohabitation

322 326 332 334 336 338 340 342 346 352 354 355 356 358 364 366 370 372 374 376 377

Introduction Arjen Oosterman Line 1 Madeha Al Ajroush Pregnant Women Walk – Madeha Al-Ajroush Interviewed by Joumana al Jabri and Todd Reisz The Abu Dhabi Waterfront Alamira Reem Al Ayedrous The Boundaries of Sharjah Sean S. Anderson Wrestling for the Masses Skateboarding in Riyadh Laith Sadeldin, Mohammad Balobaid, Shady Fanous and Hisham Ziard If It’s Not Green It Will Become Invisible: A Sociological Account of a Color in Bahrain Gareth Doherty Global Village Katrin Greiling Burj Khalifa is Downtown Many Questions, No Answers: Riots in Khobar, Saudi Arabia Ahmed al Omran Legal Protests in Bahrain Nicholas Kothari Human Rights Watch in Bahrain – Faisal Fulad Interviewed by Mitra Khoubrou Makkah Preparing for the Hajj Bernhard Zand Ithmaar for the People: Affordable Housing in Bahrain – Mohammed Khalil Al Sayed Interviewed by Sheyma Buali Color Correction: Bahrain’s Rainbow Houses Nicholas Kothari Bachelor Ban: A Form of Gentrification of Muharraq, Bahrain Sheyma Buali A Case for Urban Change: Revitalization in Manama, Bahrain Ahmed Al-Dailami KSA on Message – Muna Abu-Sulayman Interviewed by Joyce Hsiang Infinite Possibilities: Riyadh’s Vast Cultural Projects Carol Fleming Al-Ajroush Creation of a Mortgage Culture – Philip Thigpen and Mike Scott Interviewed by Joumana al Jabri and Todd Reisz

382 384 388 391 396 399 400 404 407 408 412 418 419 420 424 426 427 430 432 438

Saudization Update Fiona Hill The Bidoon and the City: A Historical Account of the Politics of Exclusion in Kuwait Farah Al-Nakib New Generation Expats: Fear and Belonging Alia al Sabi Exodus to the Gulf From God’s Own Country: Travails of a People Doomed to Vaga-bondage Shajahan Madampat 26 (or so) Museums Brian Salter Abu Dhabi Art Reem Al Ghaith Kamp Ka Champ Katrin Greiling Towards a Lasting Richness: Finding Space for Culture in Kuwait Tim Koehn Makeshift Mosques After the Party: Culture in Dubai Antonia Carver Controlled Experiment: The Opening of KAUST John Gravois The American Invasion of Science: Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Mai al Jadawi While KAUST Takes the Spotlight, Princess Nora University is for the Masses: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia Joumana al Jabri Saudi Arabia’s Modernity Mashary al Naim Preserving the Past Rashad Faraj To Be Buried in Bahrain Mohamed Duaij Al Khalifa Making Souk Waqif: Doha, Qatar – Mohamad Ali Abdullah Interviewed by Todd Reisz The Flattening of Riyadh Joumana Al Jabri Abu Dhabi’s Empty Quarter Katrin Greiling Khawater (Thoughts): The Shugairi Show Sandra Bsat Export Gulf

446 448

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Introduction Todd Reisz Gulf Model Export Jonathan Hanahan Qatari Diar: From Expansion to Entanglement Rory Hyde Too Littoral: Gulf Export to Lebanon and the Case of Cedar Island

Rami Abou-Khalil

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444

454 456 464 468 470 470 472 474 476 480 484 488 490 493 494 496 498 501 502 504

Dubai, Copied and Pasted: A Photoshop Campaign in Turkey Emre Altürk Gulfworld: Corporate Profiles and Networks of Gulf Cities Ronald Wall Food Security Jonathan Hanahan The Gulfanization of Egypt Khaled Adham and Mostafa Hossam Immigration and Experts Gulf Real Estate Portfolio in Egypt Cairo's Boulevard of Dreams: A Visit to Emaar From the American Dream to the Gulf Dream Report from Kerala Todd Reisz Gulf Houses of Kerala Todd Reisz Three Kerala Interviews Interviewed by Todd Reisz and Sahil Latheef Pay it Back: Measuring Remittances Sandra Bsat The UK and the UAE: Best Frienemies 2009 Rory Hyde On a Flight New Silk Road: The Fate of the Old Continent Jiang Jun GCC and China Sandra Bsat Faithfully Qatari With A Global Resonance Hady Amr and Noha Aboueldahab Building Bridges of Culture: Qatar Museums Authority Roger Mandle The UAE Pavilion – Lamees Hamdan Interviewed by Mitra Khoubrou The Gulf in the Media Hugh Miles Appendix

532 534 536

Volume 23

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Monthlies Update January–December 2009 Al Manakh Network Map Biographies Colophon

Compiled by Daniel Camara and Mitra Khoubrou

Note to our readers: Throughout the book the green dot and green text are used to provide references to other related texts in the book and also provide additional information from the editorial team. Contributors’ footnotes are found at the end of articles.

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City Statistic // United Arab Emirates ABU DHABI

independence

DECEMBER 2 1971

form of government

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ruler

H. H. SHEIKH KHALIFA BIN ZAYED AL NAHYAN

currency

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population

4.48 MILLION (NATIONAL) 1.46 MILLION (EMIRATE) most populous cities

Abu Dhabi Al Ain

| 896,751 | 651,904

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Al Manakh 2

16

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The Global Crisis and the Gulf’s Money Souk Matein Khalid

Conventional wisdom goes: in 2009 liquidity dried up, real estate projects suffered a great blow and this impact on economic output was felt across the Gulf. But there are other ways to look at 2009. Matein Khalid tells the story with a financial angle to reveal a fresh reading on the impact of the crisis and the future of Gulf cities.

Dubai’s DIFC Gate, Bahrain’s Financial Harbor, Doha’s West Bay and Riyadh’s King Abdullah Financial District are visible, futuristic symbols of the world’s newest financial hubs. As a symbol of international power and influence, a financial center is deemed by most Gulf states to be as critical as a national airline, an aluminum smelter or a central bank. Despite the fallout from the recent crisis, these centers will wield influence in the decades ahead as the Arabian Gulf is still home to a $2 trillion pool of private wealth.

However, the global financial crisis will define the future prospects of the Gulf’s financial centers and even the social DNA of their emerging, cosmopolitan urban clusters.

The UAE: A Tale of Two Cities

•

For a chronicle of the past year’s purchases, p. 88.

•

Abu Dhabi Update: Aabar Investments will acquire 32% of Richard Branson’s Virgin Galactic, the space tourism flight division of Virgin Group, for about $280 million. The agreement gives Aabar exclusive regional rights to host VG tourism and scientific research space flights according to a statement released by both companies. Aabar has announced its intention to build a facility in Abu Dhabi from which space flights can be launched (Gulf News, July 28, 2009).

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44

Despite spectacular losses in the white knight investments made by its sovereign fund in Citigroup and Advanced Micro Devices, Abu Dhabi’s oil revenues and accumulated investment reserves made it somewhat immune to the worst impact of the credit crunch in the Gulf. In fact, Abu Dhabi’s sovereign funds and quasi-sovereign companies used the crisis to snap up highly visible investments• in the West. These include the Abu Dhabi Investment Company’s purchase of New York’s Chrysler Building, Aabar’s shares in Daimler and Virgin Galactic• and Taqa’s stake in several North Sea and Canadian oil and gas producers.

Abu Dhabi has made no secret of its ambition to emerge as a technology hub, an Arabian Silicon Valley, with its high profile forays into semiconductor chip manufacturing and, above all, clean energy. Abu Dhabi’s Masdar City, a carbon neutral ‘green technology’ hub and the region’s most ambitious renewable energy project, recognizes most astutely that the post-oil era will create perhaps the greatest issue for the GCC’s next generation.

Masdar City is a natural response to the West’s obsession with reducing its dependence on imported oil after the oil shocks of 2008, when prices soared to $148 per barrel. Currently exporting 2.5 million barrels of oil a day, Abu Dhabi’s natural alternative is solar energy.

Abu Dhabi has not trumpeted its ambitions to create a financial center but its sovereign wealth funds are among the largest, most ambitious deal makers in international finance. The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) has been the flagship fund for the emirate and is now one of the world’s largest sovereign wealth funds. It has emerged as one of the world’s most well-managed and respected, if secretive, money managers with none of the rogue insider scandals or reckless losses that have plagued the sovereign wealth funds of Kuwait, Brunei and Gabon. Abu Dhabi’s other investment arm Mubadala has even reassured investors with a new model of transparency, notably having disclosed its losses on Pearl Energy. Mubadala’s reward for this measure has been its success in securing funds from international lenders.

One way the crisis has benefited Abu Dhabi is that there is a boost in international investor demand for its debt. Despite its colossal reserves, the government of Abu Dhabi issued a bellwether sukuk• to establish a benchmark yield curve and enable its stateowned funds and companies to borrow $15 billion. Every debt deal from a quasi-sovereign

Dubai: Crisis & Reinvention Compiled by Sandra Bsat, Daniel Camara and Mitra Khoubrou

Late 2008 brought to a close what had defined Dubai’s ‘diversified’ economy: the value of daily land transactions plummeted. The real estate bubble was exposed and popped.

As the news continued to give a steady 30…40…% loss of local property values, Dubai’s authorities promised, and in some cases delivered, clarity through new regulation.

$1.6 billion

Value of Land Transactions Moody’s cut the outlook for 4 banks last month: Dubai Islamic Bank, Dubai Bank, Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank and First Gulf Bank. The National, February 2, 2009 Moody’s places Dubai Inc corporate ratings on review for downgrade. Zawya.com, February 2, 2009

Standard & Poor’s cuts ratings of seven Dubai companies. The National, M $1.4 billion

$1.2 billion

Dubai Government prevents cancelations of property contracts and encourages developers to extend payment plans. Quote: ‘We are trying to stop the panic’.

Emad Eldin Farouq, Dubai Land Department. The National, January 28, 2009

$1.0 billion

Bulk bookings on Indian carriers to fly 20,000 workers in March. Emirates Business 24|7, February 8, 2009 DUBAI LAUNCHES $20 BILLION BONDS. The National, February 22, 2009

‘The number of Dubai property developers dropped by 47% to 427.’ RERA CEO Marwan Bin Ghalita. Zawya.com, February 25 DUBAI 2015 STRATEGY UNDER REVIEW. The economic component of the Dubai Strategic Plan 2015 is being revised with an emphasis on stabilizing the emirate’s financial system and safeguarding jobs. The National, March 16, 2009

$0.8 billion

HOUSE PRICES COULD PLUNGE BY 70%: UBS. Zawya.com, April 23 DUBAI COMMITTEE WILL SCRAP ‘UNVIABLE’ PROJECTS. Construction Weekly Online, May 7, 2009

CONSTRUCTION FIRMS OWED BILLIONS. The National, May 10, 2009

$0.6 billion

Rothschild’s roadmap for Dubai’s economic recovery.

The National, May 17, 2009

$0.4 billion

Dubai World hires reform consultants. The National, June 22, 2009 Nakheel cuts 400 more jobs in overhaul. Zawya.com, July 9, 2009 $0.2 billion

Dubai World piles up debts of $59 billion.

Khaleej Times, August 21, 2009

UAE: Mall delay by Nakheel. Zawya.com, March 25, 2009 Nakheel Tower hits further delay. AMEinfo.com, March 14, 2009 Dubai World, MGM Mirage talks on CityCenter loan said to collapse.

Business Intelligence Middle East, March 5, 2009

$0.0 billion

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Still, developers were slowly exposed. And there was more bad news in store as the value of land transaction struggled not to go further south over the course of the year. Like a post-traumatic reaction, the line on value couldn’t sustain a continuous decline, until the late-2009 ‘standstill’ announcement from Dubai World. The reality check delivered the news that land values hadn’t finished bottoming out. The only way now was not yet up.

March 18, 2009

Moody’s takes multiple rating actions on Dubai government-owned corporates: Outlook negative. Zawya.com, April 1, 2009 Moody’s downgrades Dubai companies, says $10 billion federal funds provide assurance. Business Intelligence Middle East, April 2, 2009 Moody’s places ratings of 4 Dubai banks on review.

Arabian Business, August 11, 2009

Moody’s downgrades five Dubai companies. The National, November 4, 2009 DUBAI DEBT STANDSTILL BRINGS SWIFT RATINGS DOWNGRADE. Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s downgrade several Dubai-government related companies. The National, November 26, 2009

5, 2009

‘THE WORST IS OVER FOR DUBAI’, SAYS SHEIKH MOHAMMED. ‘And I want to tell those people who nag about Dubai and Abu Dhabi to shut up.’ Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktoum, Ruler of Dubai. Arab News, November 10, 2009

3, 2009

DUBAI REAL ESTATE AMONG ‘RISKIEST POST-WAR MARKETS’.

CROWN PRINCE TELLS WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM UAE ECONOMY IS ‘HUMMING’. Mohammed Alabbar says the emirate’s economy would expand by 5% this year. He also says Dubai’s population has grown by 400,000 this year. A recovery in Dubai’s property market may take 12 to 18 months.

Arabian Business, June 23, 2009

The National, November 21, 2009

Dubai poised to introduce standard property contract.

Arabian Business, 25 May 2009

MOHAMMED UNVEILS DUBAI 2020. His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice-President and Prime Minister of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai unveils Dubai 2020, a new initiative that presents Dubai’s potential to host the World Expo and the Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2020. Emirates Business 24|7, June 29, 2009 RERA cracks down on unregistered property brokers.

Emirates Business 24|7, July 11, 2009

DUBAI FACES PROSPECT OF OVER 30,000 EMPTY HOMES BY END 2009, SAYS JP MORGAN.

DUBAI RESHUFFLES BOARD OF STATE INVESTMENT UNIT. The ruler of Dubai has reshuffled the board of the Investment Corporation of Dubai, the state conglomerate that owns Emirates airlines, naming two of his sons as directors. Khaleej Times, November 21, 2009 DUBAI STUNS DEBT MARKETS. ‘This will destroy confidence in Dubai, the whole process has been so opaque and unfair to investors.’ Eckart Woertz, Dubai’s Gulf Research Centre.

Financial Times, November 26, 2009

WHERE NEXT FOR THE RULING FAMILY IN DUBAI? The ‘Dubai vision’, which has suffered a crushing blow from the freewheeling Gulf emirate’s sudden debt crisis, is the creation of one man who failed to apply the rules of open governance. Quote: ‘It’s too early to write Dubai’s obituary.’ Martin Hvidt, Middle East Studies Professor.

Business intelligence Middle East, August 16, 2009

Reuters, November 27, 2009

Dubai rejects guarantee for Dubai World. Financial Times, November 30, 2009 DUBAI WORLD SEEKS DEBT PAUSE. Dubai’s Government asks creditors of Nakheel’s $3.5 billion Islamic bond maturing on December 14 for a standstill. The National, November 25, 2009 NAKHEEL, DUBAI WORLD DISCUSS REPAYMENT OF $0.96 BILLION SUKUK.

Nakheel bond prices plunge.

Gulf Daily News, October 16, 2009

Dubai World restructures top level management.

Gulf News, September 19, 2009

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Dec Credit Ratings

2010 Regulations

Dubai World

Nakheel

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The National, September 17, 2009

Jul

Khaleej Times, November 12, 2009

NAKHEEL SETTLES $1.2 BILLION BANK DEBT. The National, October 20, 2009 DUBAI WORLD HAS CUT 12,000 JOBS. Rothschild and AlixPartners have been advising the company on the realignment. The National, October 17, 2009

Nakheel assets moved to Istithmar.

Riyadh 1932–1950

The First Years of a Unified Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 1 Early Riyadh Justice Square, Old Riyadh, Riyadh rooftops, Justice Palace.

2 1932 Karl Twitchell’s 1932 report has no good news about water prospects in Saudi Arabia, but reveals evidence of oil in the Eastern Province. With King Abdul Aziz’s blessing, Twitchell returns to the US to rally American oil companies to invest in Arabian oil exploration.

3 1939 King Abdul Aziz’s car.

By 1939 there are 300 cars in a city of 30,000.

4 1945 President Franklin Roosevelt invites King Abdul Aziz to meet him aboard the USS Quincy, docked in the Suez Canal. The king guarantees to give the US secure access to Saudi oil.

In exchange, the US will provide military assistance to Saudi Arabia.

5 1946 King Abdul Aziz visits government sectors in Egypt.

6 1946 The first plan of Riyadh.

Expansion outside the old city walls starts in 1937 when King Abdul Aziz moved his residence north of the walled city to Al Murabba’a Palace.

7 1949 Alharaj souq.

8 The towers and wall of Riyadh.

1

3

4

6

5

7

8

11

9

128

13

10

12

Eastern Province Hundreds of kilometers from the Saudi capital, the Eastern Province supplies the wealth integrally linked to Riyadh’s modernization. The Eastern Province’s oil required foreign expertise to be extracted. A series of existing cities are transformed, and new cities built, to manage the wealth of natural resources. The Eastern Province delivers Riyadh not only the funds it needed to finance its development, but also the spirit of modern organization.

9 Aramco 1936 Texaco buys 50% of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company, which would eventually become Aramco (Arabian American Oil Company). With oil still a prospect, the first American wives and children start to move into their homes in the kingdom’s Eastern Province.

10 Lucky 7 King Abdul Aziz inspects ‘Lucky 7’ well on his visit to Dhahran, May 1939, to celebrate the striking of commercial quantities of oil.

Newfound wealth is directed toward Riyadh.

11 1946 Aramco’s first publication, Arabian Sun and Flare.

12 The Flying Camel The first airline in Saudi Arabia is Aramco airlines.

13 Newly built villas in Dhahran for Aramco employees.

14 Aramco company car.

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Qatar 2009 Weathering the Crisis

Daniel Camara and Mitra Khoubrou

The economic slowdown of 2008-9 reinforced the exceptionality of Qatar.

Over the last few years, Doha has emerged out of the shadows of its more high-profile Gulf neighbors to become one of the most dynamic economies of the region. The country has been growing at record levels and has heavily invested in infrastructure and diversification strategies as set in the Qatar National Vision 2030. Dotted with unique natural resources, Qatar has reinvested its wealth into nation-building and longterm projects. The economic slowdown did not entirely spare Qatar: property prices fell and banks did not lend as easily. Yet it is obvious that amid the downturn, Qatar has revenues. 2009 proved to be a year of visionary decisions.

•

Read article on Qatar’s diplomatic ambitions, p. 498.

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Over the last decade and in anticipation to a tipping point in oil and gas, Qatar has been pushing for a more diversified economy. The country has invested in transformation: from developing a mature property sector to positioning itself as a strong diplomatic hub•.

In April 2009, Qatar announced an expansionary budget, the largest in the country’s history. It was a further acceleration of the public investment policy by committing to infrastructure projects: a new bridge between Bahrain and Qatar, a new airport as well as plans for a metro in Doha.

As part of its diversification strategy into non-oil industries, Qatar attracted banks from around the world to open offices in the Qatar Financial Tower. Also in 2008, Shell announced that it will have over 250,000 employees in Qatar in the next five years. Qatar also engaged in cultural and knowledge development. The Qatar Science and Technology Park opened in April 2009, backed by a $1 billion endowment from the Qatar Foundation. Following the opening of the Museum of Islamic Art in 2008, the first Doha Tribeca Film Festival took place in November of 2009 building a reputation for Doha to become Arab Capital of Culture for 2010.

Qatar has also made its marks internationally. 2009 headlines were marked by the country’s foreign investments, most notably in London’s property markets with investments in the Shard, Chelsea Barracks and One Hyde Park. Qatar’s $75 billion sovereign wealth fund, Qatar investment Authority (QIA), made the news by recapitalizing Barclays and Credit Suisse and taking stakes in Porsche and Volkswagen Group. On the real estate front, Qatari Diar – the real estate arm of QIA – invested in more than 35 countries with investments of up to $60 billion, along with more than 60 projects in cooperation with more that 125 world companies. The company also opened 11 branches abroad.

Inside the country, the Qatar National Master Plan 2010-2032, unveiled last January, outlined the country’s development for the next twenty years. Qatar placed infrastructure and the development of regulations as main priorities for its urban sector. While construction firms shed jobs and projects were stalled in other cities of the Gulf, Qatar – along with its neighbor Saudi Arabia – used this as an opportunity to source staff for its own

Key Historical Events 1991 – Gulf War 1989 – Iraq War ends

1980 – Iraq War begins 1979 – OPEC Oil Crisis

Oil price

British Protectorate 1910 1920

1930

1940

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

Gross Domestic Product ($US Billion)

1973 – OPEC Oil Embargo 1971 – Formation of United Arab Emirates

1966 – Sheikh Zayed becomes Ruler of UAE

1932 – Formation of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

1918 – Fall of Ottoman Empire

1908 – Young Turks enact process of modernization 1908 – Discovery of Oil in Persia (Iran)

ColliersKSA 350 Sunland Group Jones Lang Lasalle Fosters Carlyle Group Urbis 300 Hopkins Gensler Burt Hill Benoy Tilke 250 Woods Bagot Contrack NORR RTKL Iran Gulf Consult 200 D & AR Khatib & Alami Oil Price Waterhouse Coopers Van Oord SOM UAE Mott Macdonald 150 HOK EDAW (AECOM) Cansult Maunsell (AECOM) ARUP Hyder 100 Dewan Kuwait RMJM Adnan Saffarini Atkins KEO 50 Overseas AST Qatar Halcrow Bechtel Halliburton Grey Mackenzie Costain 2010

Year Graph of consultancy arrivals mapped over the GDPs of various Gulf countries.

Revenue Compared Between Knowledge Consulting and Architecture

The combined revenues of the eight largest architectural/planning consultancies operating in the Gulf is roughly equal to the revenue derived solely by PriceWaterhouseCoopers.

Although both disciplines offer expert knowledge, the product of architecture remains constrained by working for a percentage of the construction value of a physical building. By comparison, there seems to be no limit to the value of intangible advice and report documents produced by management and financial consultancies.

Should architects bemoan the relative wealth and success of the knowledge consultant? Or can we overthrow the burden of our fee scale in order to operate competitively in the knowledge economy? Either way, right now the safe money is with reports, not resorts.

KNOWLEDGE

PriceWaterhouseCoopers $715mn1

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

ARCHITECTURE

700

Atkins – $280mn2

Halcrow – $135mn3 KEO – $68.1mn Gensler – $50.0mn RMJM – $50.0mn Perkins & Will – $48.6mn Dewan – $45.0mn Burt Hill – $37.3mn

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Abu Dhabi’s French Enlightenment French Professionals and Institutions Coming to Abu Dhabi Compiled by Natalie Al Shami and Jonathan Hanahan

all of the French national collections, allowing specific projects to be under­taken thanks to French loans, while also assisting in the devel­op­ment of Louvre Abu Dhabi collec­tion’, says Henri Loyrette, Director of the Louvre Museum www.uaeinteract.com 27/5/2009 * There are five outlets of the French super­ market Carrefour in Abu Dhabi www.carrefouruae.com * President Nicolas Sarkozy formally opens France’s first permanent military base in the Gulf in the UAE www.BBCnews.com 26/5/2009 * France’s Bombardier Trans­portation: ‘We are looking at upcoming oppor­tu­ni­ties for light-rail projects in Abu Dhabi and Doha.’ The Gazette 09/11/2009 * Fabrice Bousteau of Beaux Arts Magazine curates for Abu Dhabi Art 2009 www.abudhabiartfair.ae * Francois Pinault, owner of the retail company PPR, is on the Abu Dhabi Art Inter­national Patrons Committee www.abudhabiartfair.ae

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The Institute for Enterprise Development (IED) at Abu Dhabi University and the HEC School of Man­ age­ment in Paris signs a memorandum of under­ standing www.ameinfo.com 13/5/2006 * The Paris Sorbonne University-Abu Dhabi is estab­lished by Emiri Decree www.uaeinteract.com 30/5/2006 * The Abu Dhabi 2030 Urban Planning Project has generated widespread interest among French businesses. French Minister of Foreign Affairs: ‘French com­panies are world leaders in areas such as water distribution and treatment, transport infrastructure – especially railway transport networks – and urban street furniture’ www.ameinfo.com 27/4/2007 * ‘President H.H. Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan issued a decree establishing an Abu Dhabi chapter for the Paris Sorbonne University.’ Abu Dhabi will restore France’s Chateau de Fontainebleau www.ameinfo.com 30/4/2007 * INSEAD, a world-re­nowned international business school with cam­puses in Singapore and France, officially opened its Centre for Executive Education and Research in Abu Dhabi last week gulfnews.com 15/9/2007 * Etisalat and France Telecom will make joint in­vest­ments in a number of diversified areas includ­ing home services, contents, and inter­ national net­works www.khaleejtimes.com 03/7/2008 * Nathalie Criniere, of French design house Agence NC, is chosen to create the design for Louvre Abu Dhabi gulfnews.com 07/1/2009 * Anne Baldassari, Di­rec­tor of Musée National Picasso in Paris, curates the first major survey of artists working in the United Arab Emirates called Emirati Expressions Khaleej Times 03/4/2009 * President Nicolas Sarkozy of France makes a two day state visit to the UAE to review relations of friendship and cooperation between the UAE and France in various fields www.business24-7.ae 24/5/2009 * French President Nicolas Sarkozy launches the ‘Desert Louvre’ project in Abu Dhabi www.france24.com 26/5/2009 * ‘All of the major French museums have been involved in creating Agence France-Mu­seums: Centre Pompidou, Château de Ver­sail­les, Musée d’Orsay, Musée Rodin and Bibliothèque Nationale de France. This is a won­der­ful oppor­tu­ni­ty to link

Regulate Each Gulf country has developed its own set of urban development regulations. These tend to be a mixture of historic building codes and modern urban development planning laws, which take into account the issues faced by the recent increase of population and construction activity. Urban development is not limited to issues relating to development projects but is much wider, integrating land-use, transport and environmental planning. General property laws have also been developed to provide a legal framework to govern property ownership, and in certain countries, to assist in attracting foreign investment. New regulation across the Gulf has started to deal with improving energy efficiency when planning developments. The importance of developing a considered urban development framework can not be underestimated. The value and success of modern-day projects is not only reliant on the design and build-quality of the buildings and structures but also the surrounding development and infrastructure plans. The costs of addressing issues during the course of constructing a development retrospectively, far out-weigh the costs that should have been spent at the front-end ensuring that such issues do not arise.

Sachin Kerur and Philip Corfield-Smith Location Bahrain Plan/Vision Bahrain 2030 National Planning Development Strategy / Bahrain Vision 2030 Planning Agency Ministry of Housing (The Ministry of Housing divests its authority to a number of ministries responsible for the various elements of development) / Economic Development Board (EDB) / Housing and Urban Development Committee (HUDC) / Consultants for Bahrain Vision 2030: PricewaterhouseCoopers New Regulation Law dealing with the reconstruction of different areas within the kingdom issued at the end of 2009 Sustainability No green regulations but historic environmental laws exist

Location Doha Plan/Vision Qatar National Vision 2030 / Greater Doha Master Plan Planning Agency Ministry of Municipality and Urban Planning / General Secretariat For Development Planning / Urban Planning and Development Authority (UPDA) Sustainability QSAS (Qatari Sustainability Assessment System) / Qatar Green Building Council (QGBC) (Qatar is the newest member of the World Green Building Council (WGBC), under a new initiative that sees the formation of the Qatar Green Building Council (QGBC). This new model will become the standard for all developers in Qatar and will take into account local culture and traditions) / Qatar is the first GCC country to join the World Bank’s Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership to control gas flaring / The Texas A&M University launches the Qatar Sustainable Water and Energy Utilization Laboratory to promote sustainable water use. / ‘SustainableQatar’ (a group created to support Qatar’s sustainablity aspirations)

Location Riyadh Plan/Vision MEDSTAR (A Vision for 2050) Planning Agency Arriyadh Development Authority (ADA) / Riyadh Municipality New Regulation An anticipated mortgage law, expected for the last several years, is necessary to help solve the city’s housing shortage (applicable to all Saudi cities)

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Location Makkah Plan/Vision Master Plan for the Development of Central Makkah Planning Agency Makkah Development Authority

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Location Jeddah Plan/Vision Jeddah Strategic Plan (a 20-year plan) Planning Agency Jeddah Municipality / Jeddah Development and Urban Regeneration Company (JDURC) / Consultants: Space Syntax New Regulation An anticipated mortgage law, expected for the last several years, is necessary to help solve the city’s housing shortage (applicable to all Saudi cities) Sustainability Jeddah Urban Observatory (JUO) with the UNDP plan to develop an Environmental Master Plan for Jeddah. The plan will take two years to develop

Location Kuwait City Plan/Vision Third Kuwait Master Plan (3KMP), 1996 Planning Agency Municipality of Kuwait / Higher Council of Planning and Development / Consultants: SSH / WS Atkins Overseas Ltd. New Regulation Mortgage Law (March 2008) (‘Mortgage law, economic crisis hit Kuwait real estate market’, Kuwait Times, February 24, 2009)

Map Sandra Bsat

Location Abu Dhabi Plan/Vision Plan Abu Dhabi 2030 Planning Agency Abu Dhabi Urban Planning Council (UPC) New Regulation Abu Dhabi Framework Development Regulations (FDR) / Abu Dhabi Municipality Building Code / Five laws, similar to those of Dubai, have been drafted and are waiting for official approval. They include a strata law, defining the roles of property owners in multiple-occupancy developments; a trust-account law similar to Dubai’s escrow requirements; a law establishing a regulator; a mortgage law to protect financiers; and a law to ensure that developers have acquired titles and permits before selling properties to the public Sustainability Estidama Sustainability Guidelines 2008 (The Pearl rating system / Interim Estidama Community Guidelines IECG / Estidama Integrative Design Process (EIDP) / Interim Coastal Development Guidelines) / Energy Vision 2030 / Abu Dhabi Strategic Water Plan / International Energy Conservation Code (IECC) / MASDAR (Masdar City has used the ten principles of One Planet Living as minimum standards to build a sustainable development. The ten principles comprise of reducing to zero carbon emission and waste, implementing sustainable transport, promoting local and sustainable material, food, and water, respecting the natural habitats, the wildlife, the culture and the heritage of the region and supporting equity and fair trade. Masdar City is committed to meet, and even exceed, the targets set by One Planet Living)

Location Dubai Plan/Vision Dubai Strategic Plan 2015 Planning Agency Dubai Urban Planning Committee / Real Estate Regulatory Agency (RERA) New Regulation I-Code (International Building Code relating to performance, fire, mechanical, energy conservation, etc., – adopted June 2009, effective 2010) / Four new regulations to clarify role of homeowners associations within a housing community / RERA Price Index / Amendment of the law regulating the Interim Real Estate Register regarding off-plan contracts (New developers in Dubai will now have to pay 100% of the land price to start selling properties ‘off plan’ and will have to inject a minimum 20% of project value to commence construction) / Law to address the perceived imbalance that was created by the Interim-Registration Law (The new law will look to address some of the issues faced by property purchasers that have invested in projects that are now heavily delayed, suspended or cancelled) / Draft law for credit checks on loans Sustainability Emirates Green Building Council 2006 / Green Building Code / LEED system (It has been two years since buildings in Dubai were ordered to conform to sustainability standards to reduce their environmental impact on the city, but only six such buildings currently exist. ‘Only six green buildings in Dubai yet’, Gulf News, November 2, 2009)

Location Ajman Plan/Vision Ajman Master Plan Planning Agency Ajman Real Estate Regulatory Agency (ARERA) / Consultants: HOK New Regulation Emiri decree No 11, 2008 (Ajman Real Estate Regulatory Agency (ARERA) has begun to put land and property regulations in place to streamline the emirate’s growing real estate sector. Developers who want to build projects in Ajman now must register with ARERA, according to the newly issued Emiri decree No 11, 2008, which is aimed at regulating the emirate’s properties and construction sector. ‘Ajman tightens land regulations’, Gulf News, Feb 8, 2009)

Location Al Gharbia Plan/Vision Plan Al Gharbia 2030 Planning Agency Abu Dhabi Urban Planning Council (UPC) / Western Region Development Council (WRDC) / Western region Municipality (WRM) New Regulation Abu Dhabi regulations apply Sustainability Estidama Sustainability Guidelines 2008 (The Pearl rating system / Interim Estidama Community Guidelines IECG / Estidama Integrative Design Process (EIDP)/ Interim Coastal Development Guidelines). / The Western Region Municipality plans to make Al Gharbia the ‘greenest’ region in the emirate by giving all six cities at least three parks each. ‘Green goals for arid Al Gharbia region’, The National, January 25, 2009

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Location Al Ain Plan/Vision Plan Al Ain 2030 Planning Agency Abu Dhabi Urban Planning Council (UPC) / Al Ain Municipality / Consulant for second phase Plan Al Ain 2030: Duany Plater-Zyberk & Company New Regulation Abu Dhabi regulations apply Sustainability Estidama Sustainability Guidelines 2008 (The Pearl rating system / Interim Estidama Community Guidelines IECG / Estidama Integrative Design Process (EIDP)/ Interim Coastal Development Guidelines). / ‘Plan Al Ain 2030 strikes a delicate and much-needed balance between conservation and development’, said Falah al Ahbabi, General Manager of UPC. (The plan, which describes Al Ain as the ‘soul’ of the emirate, emphasises that growth will be ‘measured rather than uncontrolled’, maintaining the city’s low-built scale, spaciousness, greenery and traditions. Zawya.com, April 10, 2009)

Key Cultural Concerns For Locals How is the relation to the commercial and community facilities?

good 30%

good 25% no good 35%

good 65%

Mosques

no good 75%

good 50%

no good 70%

Schools

Gym

Commercial

Don’t know 10%

Common 10%

Semi-Private 30%

Not important 10%

No 40% Private 60%

What is your preference for your personal garden?

good 29%

no good 50%

Normal 24%

Yes 60%

Is there a need for separate male & female Majlis, entry, etc.?

no good 71%

Children Playground

Very important 19% No 45% Yes 55%

Important 37%

How important is the need for future expansion?

Would you use local transport like monorail / tram if sufficient connection is provided?

Key Cultural Concerns For Locals 1. Program 1.1 No. of bedrooms 1.2 Majlis 1.3 Car space

2. Expandability 2.1 Service area 2.2 Bedrooms 2.3 Majlis 2.4 Additional family unit

5 bedrooms

2 Majlis

2 Car spaces

How important is the need for future expansion?

80%

80% of the UAE citizens interviewd responded important or very important.

3. Privacy/Security 3.1 Visual privacy for villa from neighbors 3.2 From street

What is your preference for your personal garden?

60%

private

30%

10%

semi-private

common

60% private 30% semi-private 10% common

yes mosque

25%

30%

yes schools

yes gym

60% 60% said yes yes

4. Community Facilities Access 4.1 Mosque, kindergarten, play area, etc.

65%

Is there a need for separate male & female Majlis, entry, etc. in a villa?

50% 20% yes yes commercial children playground

Is the relation to the commercial and community faciliets good?

65% good for mosques 25% good for schools 30% good for gym 50% good for commercial 20% good for children playg.

Would you use local transport like monorail/ tram if sufficient connection is provided?

55% 55% said yes yes

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The analysis of the Emirati housing questionnaire was critical in evaluating the core principle of users existing and future needs. The results from the survey gave our team a clearer perspective on the essential elements that define life in the average Emirati house­hold. Items such as car usage, number of bedrooms, majlis (including sizes and locations) and levels of security and privacy all contributed to our refinement of the design parameters. Families stated that villa expansion was an essential item that should be considered. We also obtained information on essential community facilities that the families would expect for their housing community.

Yas Island Photos Katrin Greiling

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Yas Island’s master developer says that the island ‘will be as smooth and simple as driving around the F1 Track itself, but at less speed of course’. For now, it is a landscape-in-formation experienced over a vast highway connecting to Abu Dhabi Island. Last fall, the Formula One Grand Prix was held on Yas Island. Yet work still continues on the $36 billion project with: hotels, shopping malls, and a Ferrari theme park (featuring the world’s fastest roller coaster). As it prepares for an esti­ mated popu­lation of 110,000, Yas Gateway Park completes its ‘green spread’ of 500,000 square meters providing 10,500 parking spaces, sporting fields, pedestrian pathways and cycling paths.

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Photo Katerin Greiling

City of Knowledge Redwan Zaouk interviewed by Joumana al Jabri, Todd Reisz, Reda Sijiny October 17, 2009

SAGIA• wants to build for Saudi Arabia six new cities, six economic cities. Such a huge

ambition, however, has been difficult to follow and analyze. It seems that only three of the cities are anywhere near underway (King Abdullah Economic City is nearing delivery of its first residences), and each of these, while under the aegis of SAGIA, is pursuing its own trajectory of planning and financing. Though this also holds true with media relations, they have all maintained a careful distance when addressing public inquiries. Redwan Zaouk, who oversees marketing efforts for Medina Knowledge Economy City (KEC),1 indicates that this distanced approach has to do with being careful not to promise too much.

•

See previous page for more on SAGIA’s mandate.

AM2 One of the reasons why we are interested in talking with you is that it has been difficult to get an understanding of the story behind some of these new economic cities. The international press can make it seem that they are pursued with little planning behind them.

But given how we understand Saudi Arabia’s changing demographics, we suspect there is a strong narrative. We also got the sense that KEC has been moving along further than most of the others – an IPO3 is set for later this year or early next year.

Redwan Zaouk Since 2006, we haven’t engaged

the press all that much or made any big marketing campaigns. One reason is that we don’t want to promise and then not be able to deliver later.

The crisis came before we got started so that actually benefits us. To give you an example, our infrastructure estimate was at SR2.7 billion.4 Now it’s at SR1.5 or 1.6 billion. So we’ve saved over 1 billion. So the crisis has been to our favor.

[Referring to a PowerPoint presentation] The vision of KEC is to become a global icon for excellence in Saudi civilization. Our mission is to leverage Madinah as the beacon of knowledge, to develop KEC as a planned community, a smart environment and a distinctive lifestyle. One of our aims is to establish a central business district for Madinah. In

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Several sources indicated KEC is one of the more advanced economic cities in terms of planning. It has a master plan and an on-site office readying for a 2010 ground-breaking after the initial public offering (IPO) launch, which will give it the boost of capital needed to begin. As with the other economic cities, KEC intends to be a fully private sector endeavor. Operating on $1.5 billion in capital, the company plans to offer shares in 30% of the company. Questions have been raised in the press whether any of these new cities can move forward without governmental support, but there has been no indication that such help is coming.

Whereas most of these new economic cities are being built as new independent cities (though in proximity to existing cities), KEC is located within Madinah, but just outside the second ring road – as close as non-Muslims can get to Madinah’s center and haram.2 A quick fact list: the project is estimated to generate $8 billion in investments, 20,000 new jobs, 150,000 residents, 30,000 residential units and 30,000 annual visitors. It is the smallest economic city at 4.8 square kilometers with an estimated 8 million square meters of built area.

Promises on a Friendship Causeway From Qatar to Bahrain Nicholas Kothari

•

See map on previous page.

•

Read p. 151, p. 184.

•

Read Atkins interview on p. 194.

in 1878. Besides this potential destination, many Bahrainis have relatives in Qatar, making the forthcoming physical connection a family reunion of sorts and another cause for traffic. On the Bahrain side, the bridge will come over the horizon and touch down near Askar, a fishing village, and a lonely desert highway will take one either to the urban centers of the north or to the Durrat Al Bahrain• development in the south.

The QBC is also expected to jump-start Bahrain’s other transit projects, including its delayed 180 kilometer transportation system to align with Qatar’s metro system. From a regional perspective, the Bahrain-Qatar Causeway is an important link in the proposed GCC Railway master plan. Any passenger and freight train that connects to the GCC railway at the Iraq-Kuwait border (from the Middle East and Europe) will have to traverse Qatar and Bahrain to reach the UAE and Oman. From the opposite direction, every passenger wishing to enter into Saudi Arabia to visit the holy cities of Makkah and Madinah must pass through the two countries as well. The potential of becoming an international rail hub is incentive for both country’s to complete major infrastructure projects on time.

The bridge will offer access to jobs for Bahrainis, as the King Fahd Causeway did in the 80s and 90s. Another expectation is that Qataris will use the causeway similar to the Saudi travelers who take day trips to Bahrain as a lifestyle and entertainment destination. Even if Qatar has enough resorts, cinemas, malls and schools in place by 2015 to keep nationals at home, Bahrain still has the chance to offer such amenities not yet available in Qatar, as it has done for Saudi Arabia over the King Fahd Causeway. Some unfortunate news for Bahrain optimists, however, was revealed in a study by the Bahrain government which speculates that nearly 55% of Qatar travelers will pass through Bahrain only to go to Saudi Arabia. Conversely, Qatar will now be accessible to the 28 million living Al Manakh 2

280

The long awaited Bahrain-Qatar ‘Friendship’ Causeway project, scheduled to start construction in early 2010, has the right numbers to make it noticeable: a record-breaking 40 kilometer distance at a cost just below $3 billion in less than five years.

The causeway will cut through expanses of desert and a body of water that separate the economic hubs of Qatar and Bahrain, decreasing the driving distance between Manama and Doha from five hours to just thirty minutes. News from a 2009 conference in Abu Dhabi boosted interest in the project, with the disclosed redesign by Danish firm COWI that included a railway component to link• with the GCC railway project.

Aside from the impressive technical statistics, there are social aspects to the Friendship Causeway that carry historical significance and future hopes. The Friendship Causeway was announced in 1999 prior to the conclusion of a ten-year dispute regarding maritime borders between the two countries. The International Court decision favored Qatar, which received drilling and exploration rights in waters now known to be abundant liquefied gas fields that are fueling the country’s construction boom•. Bahrain’s lasting hope is that the causeway project will produce economic benefits similar to those generated by the King Fahd Causeway (completed 1986) connecting Bahrain to its other rich neighbor, Saudi Arabia. Similarly, Qatar’s incentive for joint-financing the giant bridge is the eventual connection to Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province via Bahrain. Vehicular traffic on the QBC is to reach 12,000 a day within four to five years.

This figure is paltry when compared to the 50,000 vehicles per day crossing the King Fahd Causeway between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia; however, this does not take into account passengers and cargo loads using the railway.

Both countries expect development opportunities to result from the QBC. At the Qatar end is the ruined town of Zubarah, the former home of Bahrain’s ruling Khalifa family until its destruction

KUWAIT In January 2010 Kuwait signed a cooperation agreement with France to develop nuclear energy. The renewable twenty year accord involves the exchange of information, training of personnel and the supply of nuclear equipment and facilities.

‘After signing, we will be starting discussion, sharing information in such a way that the Kuwaitis will make their own decision in how to move forward.’ Bernard Bigot, chairman of France’s Atomic Energy Commission.

Reuters, December 29, 2009

BAHRAIN Bahrain signed a cooperation with the United States in 2008 agreeing to rely on international markets for any future nuclear plants as opposed to domestic fuel enrichment.

AFP, March 24, 2008

IRAN In a speech marking the 31st anniversary of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, President Ahmadinejad declared Iran was a ‘Nuclear State’. ‘We have the capacity to enrich uranium more than 20% or 80%, but we don’t enrich because we don’t need it’, Ahmadinejad said. He went on to warn the West: ‘please pay attention and understand that the people of Iran are brave enough, that if it wants to build a bomb, it will clearly announce it and build it and not be afraid of you.’

New York Times, February 11, 2010

Iran

Kuwait

Bahrain Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE

Oman

KSA France and Saudi Arabia said earlier this year they were close to finalizing a civilian nuclear energy cooperation agreement.

The United States also holds an agreement with Saudi Arabia, and Russia is interested in helping the world's top oil exporter to develop nuclear energy as well.

Reuters, December 29, 2009

QATAR ‘[Development of nuclear energy plants] is less economically viable now, and less attractive. The potential costs are changing with the turmoil in financial markets, the economic slowdown and development of alternative fuels,’ Yousuf Janahi, Manager of Business Development at Qatar’s state-owned power company Kahramaa, said. It is unlikely a reactor will be in operation before 2018 should Qatar be interested in developing a nuclear program.

Reuters, December 29, 2009

UAE In December the UAE inked a deal with a South Korean consortium headed by KEPCO for construction and operation of four nuclear reactors, the first of which will become operational by 2017 and the rest by 2020, generating 5600MW of power. Representatives said they hope to develop more nuclear projects beyond 2020 and plan to generate 25% of their energy needs atomically.

Reuters, December 29, 2009

283

Volume 23

OMAN Russia and Oman signed an agreement in June 2009 on nuclear energy cooperation that could see the two countries building reactors and conducting research together. The document was signed by the Deputy Head of Rosatom, Nikolai Spasski, and the Secretary General of Oman’s foreign ministry, Badr Al-Busaidi.

Times of India, June2, 2009

Misurata [Libya] Azzawiya [Libya] Shomrad [Israel] Ashdod [Israel] Palmahim [Israel] Palmachin [Israel] Haifa [Israel] Arzew [Algeria] Arzew [Algeria] Barka [Oman] Ras Abu Font B1 [Qatar] Buraydah [KSA] Bedok [Singapore] Bandar Imam [Iran] Gwadar [Pakistan] Karachi [Pakistan] S. Miami Hei [USA] Tampa Bay [USA] Corpus Chris [USA] Tampa Bay II [USA] Freeport [USA] Brownsville [USA] Mostaganem [Algeria] Algiers Zeralda [Algeria] Algiers Djinet [Algeria] Mirfa [UAE] Dana Point [USA] El Paso [USA] Shuqaiq II [KSA] Al-Zour North [Kuwait] Jebel Ali G RO [UAE] Palm Beach 3 [USA] Tabuk I [KSA] Point Lisas [Trinidad To.] Sinai [Egypt] Umm Al Nar IWPP [UAE] Ulu Pandan [Singapore] Carboneras [Spain] WA Perth [Australia] Hermosillo [Mexico] Iraq I [Iraq] Singapore I [Singapore] Hadera-Caesarea [Israel] Ashdod [Israel] Yantai [China] Zara Maain [Jordan] Zara Maain [Jordan] Murcia [Spain] Benghazi South [Libya] Boca Raton [USA] Negev Arava [India] Al Wasia [KSA] Shuwaikh [Kuwait] Malaga [Spain] Fujairah [UAE] Ras Laffan 2 [Qatar] Ras Laffan [Qatar] Al Bahah I [KSA] Jebel Ali K II [UAE] San Diego [USA] Huntington B [USA] Carlsbad [USA] Subiya [Kuwait] Subiya 2 [Kuwait] Ras Laffan [Qatar] Ras Az Zawr [KSA] Taweelah C RO [UAE] Taweelah A1 Ext [UAE] Tripoli [Libya] Fountain Val [USA] Orange Count [USA] Shuaiba IV [KSA] Al Khobar IV [KSA] Al Jobail III [KSA] Al Jobail I Ext [KSA] Hidd 3 [Bahrain] Mirfa [UAE] PR Puerto Rico [USA] Umm Al Nar [UAE] Fujairah [UAE] Taweelah B III [UAE] Minjur Chennai [India] Sulaibya [Kuwait] Jebel Ali N [UAE] Jebel Ali L-1 [UAE] Pt. Comfort [USA] Jebel Ali L-2 [UAE] Shuaiba III [KSA] Ashkelon [Israel] Al Jobail [KSA] Qidfa [UAE] Fujairah II [UAE] SanFrancisco [USA] Shuweihat 2 [UAE] Shuweihat [UAE] Al-Zour North [Kuwait] Jebel Ali M [UAE] Al Jobail II Ex [KSA] Ras Al-Zour [KSA] Shuaiba III [KSA]

Source: WorldWater.org

GCC Other

900000

800000

700000

600000

500000

400000

300000

200000

100000

0

287

Volume 23

Total Capacity m3/day

The Bidoon and the City

An Historical Account of the Politics of Exclusion in Kuwait Farah Al-Nakib

Al Manakh 2

384

The crisis of stateless people in Kuwait (known as the bidoon, or ‘without’ nationality) has been the subject of renewed concern and debate in the country over the past year.

A special committee of the Kuwaiti Parliament recently drew up a new bill that proposes granting the majority of bidoon a wide range of social rights and access to state welfare services (except housing). The bill was discussed at a parliamentary session on January 7, 2010, during which the cabinet turned it down citing ten legal inconsistencies in the draft including the fact that the legal and civil rights conferred upon the bidoon in the bill, such as state education and employment, were constitutionally reserved for Kuwaiti citizens. Although opposing the new legislation, the government has asserted its determination to resolve the humanitarian and social plight of the bidoon as soon as possible.

This situation has received renewed attention lately in local and international media, but it is nothing new in Kuwait where debates on the bidoon surface periodically without producing any long-term resolution to the crisis. Kuwait has, however, been receiving increased international attention over the past several years with reports by organizations such as Refugees International (2007) and the US Department of State (2008) providing detailed accounts of human rights violations practiced in Kuwait against the bidoon.

It is in the context of this heightened international scrutiny that Kuwait is up for Universal Periodic Review by the UN Human Rights Council in May 2010. The fact that Kuwait may be held accountable for not solving the bidoon crisis since the last review of its human rights record in 2006 has stimulated a renewed concern to address the social, political, and economic problems facing the approximately 100,000 bidoon residing in Kuwait today.

What makes the current debate on the bidoon in Kuwait unique is the socio-political atmosphere in which it is emerging. Questions of national identity are increasingly becoming important and contentious issues in the public sphere, as reflected in recent discussions on problems of dual citizenship and the safeguarding of national unity. One incident in particular brought these concerns to the foreground over the past couple of months. In late December 2009 former parliamentary candidate Mohammed al-Juwaihel made a controversial statement on the private satellite television channel al-Sur that caused outrage throughout the country. Al-Juwaihel identified ‘true’ Kuwaiti citizens as members of the hadhar (sedentary urbanite) community that once resided within Kuwait’s former town wall (the sur), and claimed that the Bedouin tribes currently residing in are not ‘real’ Kuwaitis regardless of the fact that they hold Kuwaiti nationality. Although publicly condemned, Al-Juwaihel’s comments clarify two underlying realities of identity politics in Kuwait. First, debates on Kuwaiti national identity are very much based on the politics of social differentiation and exclusion. Second, since the building of the sur in 1920 the country has been divided into a ‘hierarchy of spaces’ whereby notions of social inclusion and exclusion have become inscribed onto urban space.1 The sur was built around Kuwait Town in 1920 to fend off an impending attack by the Ikhwan tribes of Najd. As a new physical barrier separating the town from the desert, it developed over time into a psychological obstacle dividing the hadhar on the inside from the Bedouin tribes and villagers on the outside. The building of the sur in 1920 also forms the basis of the country’s definition of citizenship as per the 1959 Nationality Law.

Photo Reda Sijiny

413

Volume 23

A covered courtyard in KAUST’s laboratories. October, 18, 2009.

Gulf Model Export Jonathan Hanahan

The Shard: The fallout from the credit crunch will have no impact on the construction of the $3 billion Shard (on the South Bank of the Thames near London Bridge), which has already reached the fifth of its 80 floors.

(Times Online, December 3, 2009)

Gamsha Bay: Fate of planned Gamsha Bay tourism development is uncertain.

(Economic Intelligence Unit, March 31, 2009)

Algeria: Emaar closes its office due to a ‘lack of progress’ on $20bn worth of identified projects.

(Business Intelligence Middle East, July 4, 2009)

Bab al Bahr: Morocco: Abu Dhabi developer Al Maabar likens its $850mn project between Rabat and Sale to what Solidere did for Lebanon’s historic center. Managing Director: ‘The challenge is building in a very short time, not financial issues.’ (The National, December 12, 2009) Khartoum: Qatari Diar starts work on a $400mn mixed-use project on the Nile.

(Arabian Business, November 2, 2009)

Qatari Diar // Qatar Al Maabar // Abu Dhabi Sama Dubai (Dubai Holding) // Dubai Limitless (Dubai World) // Dubai Emaar // Dubai Damac // Dubai On-Hold

?

Canceled

4

Al Waha

Bab al Bahr

Al Rayyan Hills

Seychelles Resort

Khartoum

Ras Al Hadd

Dushanbe Diar

Sharm Al Sheikh

Ibn Hani Resort

Nile Corniche Towers

A Houara Resort

3

Chancery Building

2

The Shard

1

Cayo Lago

0

Chelsea Barracks

When the bottom fell out in 2008, expectations were that the ‘Dubai model’ would crumble both at home and abroad. It wasn’t the case for all projects. Some entered a fuzzy limbo; others were even launched or gained an injection of optimism thanks to the global crisis. The ‘Dubai model’, it seems was a ‘Gulf model’, with Abu Dhabi and Qatar revealing their own variations on the idea.

Throughout the past year, news headlines have tried to report certainties about the projects; developers have held fast, at least verbally, to their commitments and the optimism of yesteryear.

Investors, employees and governments voiced their displeasure• at the lack of clarity. Perhaps, flash marketing is to blame as it’s easy to forget that these are mostly large-scale projects which carry long-term timeframes. Investors want results, developers want time, and the slow nature of getting things built does not bode well for anyone’s mental stability.

The effects of the global recession are often underplayed so the official announcements of canceled and stalled projects may be much more about keeping on message than keeping out of the red. But announcements do keep on coming.

As any business residing in a saturated market, Gulf developers have to look elsewhere in order to survive.

?

(The National, December 12, 2009)

Total Investment US $bn

‘It’s not just about the Gulf, it’s about where the Gulf is going.’

Tinja: In October 2009, reports announced that foundation work had been completed and the super-structure is progressing, but just months later the project was stalled due to economic issues.

5 6 7

446

•

Djibouti Update: Djibouti relies heavily on investment from the once-rich, now-struggling Dubai in its port, logistics and tourism sectors. The country is the most fully developed example of a strategy pursued by Dubai World, Dubai’s government-controlled investment vehicle, to boost trade in a series of developing countries and capture some benefits for Dubai’s businesses. A similar strategy is being followed in Senegal and could follow elsewhere (Financial Times, January 25, 2010).

Al Rasheed

10+

Al Manakh 2

9

Marsa Zayed

8

(Reuters, November 10, 2008)

Sanaya Amman: 85% of the foundation work for the $300mn Sanaya Amman project is complete and development of the project will continue as planned.

Source Proleads

Great Domodedovo: A Dubai World spokeswoman said the company was not going ahead with the project. No reason was given..

Karachi Waterfront: Limitless drops waterfront project. ‘As a global developer, we explore many potential opportunities, some of which will fit our global strategy and some of which will not. Karachi Waterfront never progressed beyond memorandum of understanding stage, and did not fit our global strategy’, said Limitless spokesperson.

(Emirates Business 24|7, July 28, 2009)

Smart City Kochi: ‘Since [Smart City Dubai] doesn’t have money, they are now trying to come up with numerous excuses’, Kerala Chief Minister V. S. Achuthanandan told reporters when he was asked about the delay of the project.

(AMEinfo.com, December 10, 2009)

(Times of India, November 18, 2009)

Sydney: Nakheel pulls out of development bidding one week before the deadline, claiming financing would be difficult to obtain in the current global economic context.

?

(Arabian Business, April 9, 2009)

Tarin Hills: The chairman of the Kurdistan regional government’s board of investment stated, the government was ‘facing difficulties’ with Damac over the project considering ‘nothing has started on the ground’. ‘My team and I will discuss all possible scenarios before taking the last decisions’, he said. ‘However, our decision might not be pre-consulted with them.’

Nusajay

447

Tarin Hills

Hyde Park

Gamsha Bay

India Residential

Tanggu District

Abdali Master Plan

The Lombok Project

Eight Gate Mirador Villas

Fairmont Makkah

Jeddah Gate

Samarah Dead Sea Resort

Miwida

Lakeside

Marassi

Al Khobar Lakes King Abdulla Economic City

Algeria

Uptown Cairo

Marina Al Qusso

Sydney (Nakheel) Tinja

Puteri Harbour

Rasuna Epicentrum

Malaysa International Halal Park

Halong Star Bidadi Knowledge City (Nakheel)

Bangalore

Karachi Waterfront

Sanaya Amman Al Wasl

Yiti Resort and Spa

SmartCity Kochi Great Domodedovo

Century City

Volume 23

Dubai Towers

SmartCity Malta Amwaj Waterfront

Kabala (Bloom)

Marina de Casablanca

(The National, August 16, 2009)

Pay It Back

2009 began with calls from inter24% UAE 31% other national organizations that 44% KSA crisis was choking an overseas lifeline for certain developing countries.

Remittances channeled to developing countries have been estimated to be three times the official development assistance the countries receive. But that is just an estimate.

The amount of money wired by workers abroad to their families back home has always eluded experts. The total estimates provided for each of these countries receiving remittances from the Gulf depend on dozens of sources, and extrapolation from partial data. No one claims to have official numbers. One reason is the existence of multiple ways of transferring money. International banks demand too much commission and information. Money transfer agencies like Western Union have looked for ways to make it easier to make a transfer – no account, from a cellphone. Even less formal and cheaper means, like the hawala system, have made it difficult to track these monies. There have been efforts to set better controls on these transfers, giving companies like Western Union a stronger hold on potential customers. More informal ways are being squeezed out. Through this, numbers might become more convincing, until it is found that money is going back home in other ways.

Measuring Remittances Sandra Bsat

n

40

32

.8%

K

.7% uwait KS A

ar

at

n ma

O

Q

Bahrai

%

1.4%

5%

4.8

6.

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E

UA

wa

Ku

%

18

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12

56

%

4% other

8% UAE

88% KSA

4.3% GDP

A

KS

Egypt

$4.3b

2%

18

22 % .8

Bahrain

488

Officials said the global downturn would shrink Egypt’s 7% growth rate in recent years to 4% in 2008 and 2009. (‘Central Bank: Egypt’s remittances drop 26%’, Business Week, August 4, 2009.)

Sri Lanka Indonesia

$3.4b

0.7% GDP

$1.5b

3.8% GDP

‘We are studying [the cases] and considering a moratorium on migrant worker placement in Saudi Arabia and Jordan’, said Muhaimin Iskandar, Minister of Manpower and Transmigration.

It is estimated that there are about 2 million Indonesian migrant workers in the Middle East, with some 800,000 in Saudi Arabia. In July the ministry placed a ban on sending more workers to Malaysia and imposed similar sanctions on Kuwait in September. (‘Ministry Considers Moratorium on Sending Indonesian Migrant Workers to Saudi Arabia and Jordan’, Jakarta Globe, 4 November 2009.)

In 2002, 76% of all legal overseas Indonesian migrant workers were women.

Al Manakh 2

– Egypt’s Central Bank is reporting a nearly 26% decline in remittances for the first three months of the year. That’s another drop in one of the country’s major foreign currency earners as the global economy contracts. Egypt’s other top sources of foreign currency are Suez Canal revenues and tourism. Canal revenues dropped by more than 7% this year.

A AE KS t % % U wai .4 Ku 24 .5% Qatar

32

– Egypt came in first place on the list of the top 10 remittance recipients in MENA in 2007, finds the World Bank’s Migration and Remittances Factbook 2008 (worldbank.org).

$4.1b

2.4% GDP

1.1% Oman

5.1% Qatar 7% Bahrain 5.2% Kuwait

26% UAE

58% KSA

PRI is a joint initiative of the Ministry of Finance, Ministry for Overseas Pakistanis and State Bank of Pakistan, which is the country’s central bank. Launched in August this year, it aims to double the flow of remittances within three years. ‘We are aiming to take remittances up to $13-14 billion by 2011’, said Shaheen, who is currently touring Saudi Arabia as a representative of PRI, of which his bank is a member. His itinerary includes meeting top executives of Saudi banks. He arrived after visiting Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain.

Shaheen said that remittances sent by overseas Pakistanis are the country’s economic ‘lifeline’.

‘It’s second only to exports’, he added.

Shaheen made a passionate appeal to his countrymen not to use Hundi for remitting money. ‘It’s a risky business. The money may be used for terrorism with far-reaching consequences to you, your family, your country and the country of your residence’, he said. (‘Remittances to Pakistan from Kingdom soaring’. At: http://www.zawya.com, November 6, 2009.)

Philippines

$2.4b

1.5% GDP

More than 220,000 new jobs have been earmarked for Filipinos across the Middle East and North Africa, said the President of the Philippines. Just over 39,000 of those positions are available in the Emirates. Quote: ‘The world economy continues to challenge developed and developing nations alike’, Mrs. Arroyo said. ‘The economy has been particularly difficult in Dubai, but we thank the government and employers that Philippines workers are still the most sought-after in the UAE.’ A report compiled

by Filipino labour attachés, using data from recruitment agencies and employers, concluded that the region had 222,141 new jobs that would be advertised in the Philippines or to Filipinos living in the Middle East. The total does not include substantial new opportunities in Qatar, which has set aside 120,000 jobs for Filipinos this year. (‘Filipinos promised thousands more jobs’, The National, April 13, 2009.)

5.2

26%

% B 6.3 ahrain % Q % atar

6.7

UA

E

8.6

Kuw

%

Out of the five million population of UAE, 1.5 million or 35% are Indians and half of them are Malayalis. They are our real ambassadors’, Mr. Venu Rajamony, Consul General of India to Dubai. (‘UAE still favored destination for Indian workers’, The Hindu, July 24, 2009.)

UAE official figures show 6,62,000 new labour visas were issued between October 2008 and March 2009. He also said there has been ‘no signs of sudden exodus’. (‘Recession impact on Indians in UAE marginal: diplomat’, Deccan Herald, November 25, 2009.)

Dubai World Update: Effect on remittances to India: The IMF says the Dubai World debt restructuring ‘will not have a large impact’ on the flow of remittances out of the UAE. The UAE accounts for nearly 13% of the total remittance flow into India, with as many as 42% of the 1.5 million population of Dubai being Indians. Remittances rose 8.6% to $1.45 billion in September from a year earlier. (‘Remittances to India unabated’, Gulf News, December 5, 2009.)

ait

Om

KS

an

A

India

$12.9b

1.1% GDP

Bangladesh

$5.5b

6.9% GDP

Nearly 875,000 Bangladeshis went abroad officially in 2008 against 832,000 in the previous year.

The total remittances sent by five million expatriate workers was $9 billion in the year against $7 billion in the 2007. ‘But due to the current slowdown overseas recruitment is likely to be curtailed and many expatriates may lose jobs, affecting remittances very badly’, said Mostafa, President of the Bangladesh Association of International Recruiting Agencies. He suggested the Bangladesh government should immediately launch vigorous diplomatic efforts to keep the manpower export sector unaffected.

Remittances from Bangladeshis are the country’s second biggest source of foreign income after exports of ready-made garments which fetch around $10 billion annually. (‘Global slowdown seen hitting Bangladesh remittances’, Reuters India, February 23, 2009.)

489

The Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE), the government agency responsible for all aspects of migration of workers abroad, notes that there has been a tenfold increase in the number of migrants in the last two decades. Current estimates suggest that over one million migrants are working abroad with an annual outflow of about 200,000 men and women. Of this number an average of 54% are women in low skilled domestic work.

The feminization of the migrant labour force is a unique character of the country with the number of women migrants increasing every year. In 2007, 114,677, or 52% of migrants were women. Generally, women amount to about 54% of migrants. (‘The Feminization of The Migrant Labour Force in Sri Lanka’, News Blaze, November 4, 2009.)

Volume 23

%

Pakistan

Building Bridges of Culture Qatar Museums Authority Roger Mandle

•

Refer to coverage of Souk Waqif, p. 427.

501

Volume 23

Qatar’s cultural initiatives are set out in the Qatar National Vision 2030 plan, which defines the nation’s goals in arts, culture, heritage•, education, economics, sociology and environmental development. This vision pursues the highest international standards, but on Qatar’s own terms; as the saying goes, ‘Qatar wants to modernize, not Westernize’.

The cultural developments in Qatar are expected to make an important contribution to Qatar and the world by building bridges of understanding among people inside the nation and outside.

The 2008 opening of the Museum of Islamic Art in Doha, and the significant responses it received from the region, signal Qatar’s intention to play a leading role in the development of Arab culture. While ‘thinking local’ and ‘acting global’, Qatar Museums Authority is creating a contemporary statement from the wellsprings of Islamic and Arab history that serves as a unique example in the Gulf. With its collections of Islamic, Orientalist, and modern and contemporary Arab art, as well as natural history (which Qatar’s royal family has assembled over the past decade or so), QMA is in the process of creating innovative ways of exhibiting and teaching from these items. The Tribeca Film Festival, the special exhibition program and the publications issued by QMA broaden the community’s resources in the arts. By linking to the universities and schools in Qatar, QMA is opening professional opportunities to Qatari students, founding a new generation of artists, designers and citizens sensitive to the arts and the environment. By connecting to government agencies, businesses and other foundations in Qatar, QMA is founding a network of agencies dedicated to the promotion of the aesthetic realm in all aspects of society. It is no accident that Qatar is being celebrated in 2010 as the Cultural Capital of the Middle East as it emerges on the world stage as one of the most active, original and grounded nations in the area.

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