Asian Military Review - September 2008 by Asian Military Review

VOLUME 16/ISSUE 9

ASIA PACIFIC’S

SEPTEMBER 2008 US$10

LARGEST

CIRCULATED

DEFENCE

COMMUNICATIONS ENCRYPTION

MAGAZINE

MILITARY CBRN IN ASIA CARAT 08

UNMANNED MARITIME VEHICLES

ACEH – THE LONGEST CONFLICT?

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Contents SEPTEMBER 2008 VOLUME 16 / ISSUE 9

John Mulberry Just as the last decade has seen an explosion in the use of and interest in unmanned air vehicles so the other sectors of the unmanned systems industry have also seen substantial growth. The development of new technologies, and an increasing understanding of how to build and use autonomous systems, has led to major developments in both the unmanned ground vehicles market and the unmanned maritime vehicle (UMV) sector.

Front Cover Photo: The Royal Malaysian ship Tun Abdul Jamil (Hull 135 ) seen leading a line of naval vessels during CARAT 08. The Royal Malaysian Navy has 4 Laksamana Class corvettes currently in service. On paper these vessels are extremely well armed and capable. The Malaysian Navy has grown rapidly in capability in recent years and is probably now one of the premier armed forces in Asia. (PHOTO:US Navy)

What lies beneath (and above)

The Military CBRN threat: assessing Asian capabilities

Andy Oppenhiemer In terms of nation-state capabilities, the ‘N’ part of the new ‘CBRN’ nomenclature, that is, what used to be called NBC – nuclear, biological and chemical weapons - is still of prime concern to the military planners and politicians controlling the world’s armed forces. This article sets out to define the strategic and battlefield NBC capabilities of the main protagonists in the Far East, with the emphasis on nuclear strategy and proliferation, as well as ongoing threats of potential NBC development.

Modern Radio Encryption

16 Adam Baddeley After ensuring communication in voice, data and video, reaches the recipient and in an understandable format, the next goal is ensuring no advantage – tactical or strategic - can be gained by the enemy from that transmission. A variety of vulnerabilities and threats prompt an equally varied palate of countermeasures and technologies in response.

ACEH – THE LONGEST WAR

CARAT 2008

Stuart Notholt On December 26, 2004 the South East Asian tsunami slammed into the historic seaport of Banda Aceh, capital of the province of Aceh within Indonesia, killing over 250,000 people out of a local population of 4 million, and rendering a further 500,000 homeless. Amid the carnage, one silver lining to this particular cloud was that it focused the minds both of local separatists, who for decades had been fighting for an independent state, and the Indonesian government.

Gordon Arthur In light of this history, it is therefore appropriate that the modern Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) naval exercise blends East with West. The USA is the common denominator in CARAT, a series of bilateral exercises conducted annually in Southeast Asia. It encompasses six nations Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.

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hile last months editorial mused on the idea that “war” was less likely in Asia, it may be that the very definite “War” currently underway, as this is written, in Georgia, may be another object lesson in the simple fact that war in the 21st Century will essentially match the norms we saw in the 20th.

Will war change? Of course, but only in so much as states choose to wage it in a different way. If you have large forces equipped with main battle tanks, self propelled guns, and armoured personnel carriers, then war is going to follow a fairly familiar and well-understood form. Should that mould be broken, then we’ll see something else evolve, but it will still probably be the product of a national economy and government. Hezbollah is the product of national funding, as are countless Chinese “advisors” and “technicians” found all over Africa. War will continue to be the domain of nations. Both sides may not be nations, but we have yet to see “Tribes” going to war in a way that defies the normal conventions. So what does this mean for Asia? If Asian Armies continue to mimic the Western Combined Arms paradigm, then any open conflict will be constrained in that regard. Where terrain posses significant problems, combined arms formations have always had limited effect. A quick look at the war in Laos between 1954 and 75 holds some useful lessons. As this Editor has opined many times, it would only take some quite small changes, to radically change everything, but the approaches needed are not commonly recognised. Very few nations in Asia have actually any idea of where or how they should be planning to fight, or how to operate. Obviously the exceptions are South Korea, India, Pakistan and to a slightly different extent, Australia, but most national defence forces exist purely to exist. The so called “lessons learned” or the Russia Georgia War of 2008 will pass from view fairly quickly, because they will probably be irrelevant to the majority of observers. What Asian armies may want to study is how Georgia chooses to develop after the war. The size and more importantly, the shape of Georgia’s armed force do not seemed to have leveraged much advantage to them. Losing a war is often far more useful than winning one, in terms of advancing any degree of military thought, as the development of the post 1918 German Army shows so clearly. It is no wonder that the Israeli Defence has seen a vast increase in requests for co-operation since the fiasco of the 2006 Lebanon War, as others seek to build on the hard gained experience. Whatever the outcome of the war, it seems that Georgia will have more to learn than Russia.

William F. Owen, Editor

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N A V A L T E C H N O L O G Y

What lies beneath (and above) Just as the last decade has seen an explosion in the use of and interest in unmanned air vehicles so the other sectors of the unmanned systems industry have also seen substantial growth. The development of new technologies, and an increasing understanding of how to build and use autonomous systems, has led to major developments in both the unmanned ground vehicles market and the unmanned maritime vehicle (UMV) sector. by John Mulberry

A DCN developed French project seen during sea trials (PHOTO: DCN)

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N A V A L T E C H N O L O G Y

he latter is perhaps the smallest of the three sectors, but with both unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) and unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) making substantial inroads to some specialist military tasks they are beginning to come to the notice of armed forces in the Asia-Pacific region. Traditionally, in the military context UUVs have been mainly restricted to mine counter measure (MCM) and oceanographic tasks, although until recently many Asian navies have not been technically advanced enough to even look at procuring such systems. At the same time USVs are relatively new on the scene and few navies around the globe have yet to clearly define whether there is a requirement for such systems. Importantly, several reports suggest that UUVs and USVs have the potential of being real ‘gamechangers’ altering the balance of how naval power is projected and exploited.

Below the surface Significantly, Asia-Pacific navies are now beginning to come of age at a time when UMVs are themselves becoming sophisticated capabilities that can readily be

dropped in to fill gaps. As a result, UUV manufacturers in particular are seeing a growing interest from the region in their products and are actively MAARS with Weapon – Company’s like FosterMiller are beginning to experiment with weaponsing UGVs.

Importantly, several reports suggest that UUVs and USVs have the potential of being real ‘game-changers’ altering the balance of how naval power is projected and exploited. marketing systems particularly for the MCM role, but also for oceanographic research, port security and other tasks. For those navies wanting to purchase such capabilities there are a number of routes that can be taken. Internationally there are a number of companies that specialise in UUVs, particularly for MCM tasks. As navies in the region procure more multi-role ships instead of specialist vessels the ability to incorporate such systems is likely to grow. In recent years several companies have been actively engaging with the Asian market. ECA is a France based company that specialises in automated

systems for harsh environments, including sub-sea mine warfare systems. The company has several systems of note the first is the Alister UUV which has a maximum operating depth of 300 m. The system, which is designed for shallow water mine reconnaissance weighs 790 kg and has a cruising speed of three to four knots. Dependent on customer requirements the company offers a number of differing payloads including a side-scan or synthetic aperture sonar, forward looking sonar, multi-beam echo sounder, CTD probe, or

SEPTEMBER 2008

video camera and search lights. The company has also developed the K-Ster mine killer system based on its experience with Alister and other systems. K-Ster is a smaller mine destruction system weighing 50 kg and capable of speeds over five knots at depths down to 300 m. The system has a maximum range of over 1km and has a hovering capacity to stay on station when destroying a mine. The system has a tiltable head (-90° to +90°) integrating the sensors (colour video camera, sonar and searchlights) and a shaped charge for the mine disposal. Although autonomous, the system can be linked via fibre-optic wire to the commander to ensure safety and correct recognition of the target. According to the company, it has struck major success with K-Ster in Asia having sold several hundred units to a number of undisclosed customers. Another European manufacturer, Atlas Elektronik, has also been keenly pursuing the Asian market. The company has developed a number of MCM systems that utilise UUVs. The product line includes the proven SeaFox, SeaWolf and SeaOtter systems. As the company has developed the capabilities of its UUVs it has looked to extend the capabilities that they can provide making them multi-role platforms. This advanced version of the SeaOtter is a good example of this being specially designed for various military purposes and adhering to a modular approach with regard to its superstructure, propulsion, energy, communication, navigation and payload. The main tasks the system can undertake include mine detection and countermeasures, covert intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and rapid environmental assessment. Weighing in at around 1100 kg the SeaOtter MkII is capable of operations of up to 24 hours at a speed of four knots and is capable of carrying a variety of sensors.

US muscle Elsewhere, there are a number of US companies concentrating on the production of UUVs.

N A V A L T E C H N O L O G Y

At the smaller end of the scale two Massachusetts based companies, Bluefin Robotics and Hydroid, dominate the market and have had success selling to a number of Asia-Pacific customers. The former was founded in 1997 from a core team of the Autonomous Underwater Vehicles Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and is still closely associated with it. The company has developed a number of modular UUVs including the Bluefin-9, 12 and 21, with the number referring to the diameter of the systems. The modularity of its systems allows the company to fit the endurance and sensor demands of its customers. In recent years the company has been working with the USN to develop further its Bluefin-21 In its standard configuration the system carries a high-performance 455 kHz sidescan sonar that provides a 10 cm resolution along track and a 7.5 cm resolution across track. The combination of this high-res sensor and good navigational accuracy, results in high probability of detecting mines, covering up to 8 square nautical miles per dive. Bluefin, in conjunction with the US Navy, has also developed a Hovering Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (HAUV) that it is pitching squarely at the Asian market for tasks such as ship hull inspection. At an Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International conference in Singapore early in the year the company’s representative in the region Singapore Precision Technologies explained in some detail the benefits of such a system. The HAUV is around one metre square and weighs 82kg. Unlike traditional torpedo shaped AUVs the HAUV is designed more like a traditional oil-inspection Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV). However, unlike an ROV, it can autonomously guide itself along ship hulls using Doppler radar and the eight thrusters mounted around its chassis. While manoeuvring autonomously it can map the hull with sonar to locate mines or hull damage. This is a port security task that is currently undertaken by divers that can be hampered by the murkiness of the waters they operate in. The HAUV has a three hour endurance and can dive to depths of 100 m. The battery life of the systems is enough for the HAUV to map 2,100 square metres of hull. The inventors of the Remus founded

Although autonomous, the system can be linked via fibre-optic wire to the commander to ensure safety and correct recognition of the target.. Hydroid in 2001. According to the company the UUV is the product of over 15 years of leading edge research and development. Since its inception the company has had a strong amount of success with the system and boasts over 150 AUV system sales to a variety of domestic and international customers. The company now has a family of Remus vehicles including the 100, 600 and 6000, this time denoting the depth of operations in metres. In the military market the Remus 600 in particular has had major successes being sold to a number of nations including the Royal Australian Navy. The RAN took delivery of the UUV late last year to assist in the development of an advanced mine counter-measure and charting capability. At the time Lieutenant General David Hurley, Chief Capability Development Group, said that ‘UUVs will provide an efficient way to conduct undersea search and survey. Charting the ocean floor through to mine-hunting will be able to be conducted without exposing ships and divers to considerable risk.’ The 240kg Remus 600, which has a maximum diameter of 12.75in, is capable of carrying a number of different sensors. The

Australian Defence Force Personnel lower a Remus 600 in to the water during trials.

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standard sensor suite includes the likes of conductivity and temperature sensors, an inertial navigation system, acoustic doppler current profiling/Doppler velocity log, a side scan sonar, and pressure sensor. Further options include a dual frequency side scan sonar, synthetic aperture sonar, video camera, acoustic imaging sensor, and electronic still camera. At the larger end of the UUV scale in the US several of the leading US defence manufacturers are involved in work aimed at the US Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship project. Boeing has developed the Long-term Mine Reconnaissance System while Lockeed Martin is developing the Mission Reconfigurable UUV (using

N A V A L T E C H N O L O G Y

Bluefinâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Bluefin-21 on trials with the US Navy.

Above or below

Bluefin-21 technology) and the semi-submersible snorkelling Remote Mine-hunting System. The advantage of the latter according to Lockheed officials is the endurance and speed that being able to use an air breathing diesel-electric drive rather than battery power allows. The above surface mast also allows for much greater communications capability.

In fact, those capabilities are also being explored elsewhere. In the UK UMV efforts have been centred on two companies in particular. The minnow of the two is Autonomous Surface Vessels (ASV) Ltd, which is exploring the potential of a semi submersible vessel. The companyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s SASS-Q demonstrator is a 6 metre vehicle that has a maximum speed of 10 knots

and a payload capacity of up to 200 kg. It is designed to be launched and recovered from a ship or can be deployed from the shore. The SASS-Q can carry a variety of fixed sensors for both above and below water surveillance. To date, the vehicle has been successfully operated with sonar for underwater survey and with cameras for above water surveillance. Most recently the UK Ministry of Defence, under their concept capability demonstrator program, evaluated the vehicle. At the heavyweight end of the scale BAE Systems has sunk a lot of money in to its Talisman UUV demonstrator program. The project leverages the autonomy work being done in other business areas, such as Military Aircraft, and applies it to the maritime environment. BAE Systems believes that Talisman has a wide range of potential roles including MCM, security and surveillance. Talisman has a free-flooding hull and internal pressure vessels that contain the electronics systems and payloads. The demonstrator hulls have been manufactured from lightweight carbon fibre composite by Lola Cars. Communications to and from the vehicle are

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being provided via WiFi or Iridium SatCom whilst surfaced, or acoustic communications when submerged. Propulsion and control is achieved by means of externally mounted vectorable thruster pods, whilst the manoeuvring controller provides a full hovering and 360 ° turn capacity. A full suite of batteries provides endurance of more than 24 hours. The UUV can carry both integrated and variable payloads and as standard is equipped with a suite of environmental sensors. Payload options are mission or role specific and include sonar systems and other UUVs such as the mine destruction system Archerfish. Last year during trials off Panama the company successfully demonstrated using Talisman as a launch vehicle for Archerfish and the ability to provide a full MCM mission from one autonomous platform. The company is yet to get full traction with the system but is looking at the Asian region as a potential customer base.

This image of a wreck shows the level of detail that can be achieved with modern side scan sonars.

The Protector, like many of its contemporaries is based on existing small vessel hulls, in this case a 9 metre rigid-hulled inflatable boat (RHIB). Powered by a single diesel engine the platform is capable of speeds of up to 40 knots depending on sea conditions and has a modular design to allow for dif-

prompted a number of other companies to also enter the market. Turning its hand from the UUV market to the USV market ECA has come up with two offerings its Inspector and JetStar systems. Like the platforms above Inspector is based

Surface potential Such hybrid systems offer some of the best of both worlds, but alongside the developing UUV market there is also the beginning of a thriving USV market. As in many other areas of unmanned systems development Israel is taking a lead on the development of USVs. Major manufacturers such as Aeronautic Defense Systems, and Rafael have developed USVs for maritime reconnaissance and interdiction operations. One of the most successful systems to date is Rafael’s Protector USV. In 2005 the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) purchased several Protector systems to operate alongside its Endurance class landing platform dock on an operational deployment to the North Persian Gulf as part of the peacekeeping mission in the region. During the deployment the RSN was able to operationally evaluate the Protector and according to reports were highly complimentary of the capability of the system.

‘UUVs will provide an efficient way to conduct undersea search and survey. Charting the ocean floor through to mine-hunting will be able to be conducted without exposing ships and divers to considerable risk.’ 08

ferent payload configurations. In a normal configuration the Protector offers surveillance, identification and interception capabilities. It can be equipped with a MiniTyphoon stabilised weapon system, a TOPLITE electrooptical surveillance and targeting system and also has a public address system to aid in communication with interdicted targets. Aeronautics offering is the 11m SeaStar USV. According to the company, SeaStar presents a revolution in maritime operations, featuring unmanned capabilities for the entire array of homeland security and naval applications. SeaStar has an open-architecture system design that is controlled by Aeronautics’ UMAS Multi-application command and control system allowing it to integrate with other assets. The SeaStar has a cruising speed of 45 knots and endurance of around 10 hours. As with its competitor it is capable of carrying a full suite of maritime sensors and weapons. Initially Israeli success in this area has

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Israel’s Protector system has been successfully operated by the RSN.

on a RHIB design. It can carry a variety of payloads including the company’s K-Ster mine destruction system. The company has delivered six systems to an undisclosed customer in the Asian region. ECA’s other offering is a slightly different concept. Rather than being based on a RHIB design JetStar is based on a jet ski. The JetStar is a modular USV consisting of a remotely operated small surface vehicle and an UUV controlled by an umbilical deployed from the

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surface vehicle. It enables deployment of a set of easily projected materials without endangering crews using a minimal infrastructure. The main roles for the system are environment monitoring and security. In the US some of the work on USVs has been pioneered by UAV manufacturer AAI, which is now part of Textron. AAI is conducting two parallel USV developments for a fast patrol system and a heavy tow USV.

The former replaces work it had been carrying out in conjunction with Marine Robotic Vessels International (MRVI) to develop a craft known as Interceptor. The latter system is being designed as a potential organic mine clearance and anti-submarine warfare asset for LCS, but officials say that it will also probably be offered on the wider market for carriage aboard a variety of warship types. According to reports, the system is powered by a Caterpillar C90 series marine engine and is expected to be capable of speeds upwards of 30 knots. MRVI itself has continued separate efforts

The wide variety of UMVs on the market presents an opportunity to naval forces in the AsiaPacific region. The developing technologies mean that UMVs can now perform some of the tasks that would have previously taken relatively large specialist manned naval platforms to undertake. Tasks such as littoral surveillance, port security and MCM are now all within reach of such unmanned assets. However, the technologies continue to mature and there are still some draw backs to the use of such systems. Technology is yet to crack the difficulties of underwater commu-

ward for navies in Asia will be how to balance these new capabilities with existing systems and future requirements. The move towards multi-role vessels provides an ideal opportunity to exploit the emerging UMV systems that can provide some of the capability that such multi-role platforms require. The US Navy is showing the way forward in this regard with the integration of mission packages aboard the LCS. In the UK BAE Systems has developed the concept of a UXV carrier, essentially a mothership for a wide variety of UMVs and UAVs. The other difficulty that some countries in the region will face is getting access to the technologies. Off the record several companies told Asian Military Review that the major difficulty they faced in operating in Asia was the issue of technology transfer restrictions. US companies in particular have faced major challenges selling systems in the region even to major US allies like South Korea and Japan. As a result, some countries may be forced to turn to indigenous capabilities or to countries where restrictions are less severe. From a survey of the region very few countries yet have a real indigenous UMV capability. In part this reflects a grading of priorities. even the likes of

nications and keeping the ‘man in the loop’ is much more difficult with UUVs than it is with UAVs. At the same time endurance and speed is also a challenge when operating by battery power alone. Some of that challenge can be overcome by using semi-submersible or USVs designs, but these, even more so than UUVs, are in their infancy. That said the utility of USVs in interdiction and port security has been validated both outside the region in places such as Israel and by regional leaders like the RSN. One of the major challenges going for-

Australia is still very much in the early developmental stage of discovering how they are likely to use such systems. What is in no doubt is that as the technology progresses and costs come down UMVs will provide a compliment to existing naval capabilities. Importantly they will be able to increasingly take over some of the ‘dull, dangerous and dirty’ missions such as MCM and border protection. Navies in the region must continue to monitor the progress of UMV technologies and select the right time to begin integrating AMR these systems in to their force structures.

In 2005 the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) purchased several Protector systems. on the development of its own system. It still sees a potentially large market for such systems and believes the Asian market is one that would be good for its product. The company mainly sees its system as being aimed at the homeland security role in the protection of port facilities and other infrastructure.

Seizing the opportunity

SEPTEMBER 2008

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The Military CBRN threat: assessing Asian capabilities In terms of nation-state capabilities, the ‘N’ part of the new ‘CBRN’ nomenclature, that is, what used to be called NBC – nuclear, biological and chemical weapons - is still of prime concern to the military planners and politicians controlling the world’s armed forces. This article sets out to define the strategic and battlefield NBC capabilities of the main protagonists in the Far East, with the emphasis on nuclear strategy and proliferation, as well as ongoing threats of potential NBC development. by Andy Oppenheimer

an Indian Army Pinaka MBRL system is almost certainly capable of delivering a chemical payload (PHOTO: Ranjit Rai)

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n East Asia the main nascent nuclear threat has come from North Korea, which although in the on-off phases of dismantling its plutonium programme, still possesses a small arsenal of 8-12 nuclear weapons. It is not known how deployable these weapons are. It is one thing to boast of a fledgling nuclear capability that could

wreak havoc and mass destruction if used, but quite another when assessing the delivery methods and military deployment capacity of that state. In this respect the DPRK cannot be compared with China or the Indian subcontinent in strategic terms, but until its arsenal is stood down, it may be considered a marginal threat to the region. One North Korean plutonium device was tested in October 2006, but did not produce the expected explosive yield. Although not successful in technological terms, it was the culmination of Pyongyang’s policy to develop nuclear weapons over recent years and confirmed suspicions that it was racing to establish itself as a

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nuclear weapons state (NWS). According to IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei, the test was a “cry for help” from a country that feels that a nuclear weapon is “the only trump card they have”. North Korea’s decision, under pressure chiefly from China, to end its plutonium-processing programme in return for security guarantees and aid, has continued to arouse suspicion that the DPRK will pursue covert activities at home and in collaboration with other ‘nations of concern’, most notably Syria and Iran. It is likely that North Korea has been using its nascent nuclear

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It is likely that North Korea has been using its nascent nuclear capability as a bargaining chip, rather than a tangible battlefield threat..

The flow down of technology from the Cold War still has significant impact (PHOTO: DIA Image)

capability as a bargaining chip, rather than a tangible battlefield threat. Many feared an atomic arms race in Northeast Asia if the North Koreans had continued their nuclear programme, and particularly if they had conducted further tests. Japanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s constitution forbids nuclear weapons produc-

tion for obvious historical reasons, but it has the plutonium resources, facilities and expertise to join the nuclear club. South Korea and Taiwan are, however, less able to proceed with a weapons programme, although both countries have established civilian programmes. The North Korean force of indigenous

SCUD missile derivatives and medium-range Nodong and Taepodong missiles would in any case need further work for adaptation to a nuclear strike, but they could be used for chemical attack. North Korea could, however, launch thousands of artillery rounds and has hundreds of forward-deployed SCUD-B, Frog5 and Frog-7 missiles, and has about 30 SCUDC missiles available that could be armed with chemical warheads. South Korea estimated in 2007 that half of North Koreaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s long-range missiles and 30 per cent of its artillery pieces are capable of delivering chemical or biological weapons. However, details about precise weaponisation and delivery of these agents are still to be fully ascertained. Artillery platforms

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also include MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket Systems) of up to 320 mm, which are deployed near the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ). This deployment is a significant threat to Seoul as well as to the entire Korean peninsula should there be a southward invasion by the North Korean People’s Army (KPA). CW munition stockpiles are estimated at between 2,500 and 5,000 tons, but it is not clear whether these estimates are old and chiefly concern the weight of chemical agent and it is not certain if it includes the overall munitions stockpile and biological agents. The US military has assessed that the North is capable of independently producing components only for first-generation (World War I) chemical agents, phosgene and mustard, and that importation of some precursors may be necessary for the production of more advanced nerve agents. As with the North Korea’s CW, the biological weapons programme has likely been initiated to help provide a mass area-denial capability. The US State Department estimated in the early part of the century that there is a capabil-

In terms of nuclear military strategy, Chinese doctrine has shifted from minimum to limited deterrence.. ity to produce sufficient quantities of biological agents for military purposes within weeks. South Korea claimed in 2001 that the North had a vast anthrax stockpile of 2,500-5,000 tons. While BW have long been regarded as unreliable, difficult to deliver, and dangerously unpredictable as battlefield weapons - leading to most military chiefs being reluctant to use them - North Korea may keep its alleged BW as a deterrent against a South Korean invasion.

China maintains hegemony As for true nuclear capability, both strategic and battlefield, China remains the chief power in the region. Its rapid economic growth and enhanced status as a world power may also lead to a more confident and aggressive region-

al policy towards issues such as Taiwan, but a gradual opening up of Chinese society, not least in its Olympic hosting year, may have the undesired effect of bringing the country under unprecedented scrutiny. In terms of nuclear military strategy, Chinese doctrine has shifted from minimum to limited deterrence. China maintains capability to launch a delayed second strike (DSS); that is, Beijing would retaliate after withstanding a nuclear strike, rather than attempting either a Launch-Under- Attack (LUA) or a Launch-OnWarning (LOW)-type strategy, where missiles are launched after detection of an attack - but before impact. It is possible that China does not possess the requisite early warning capabilities to move toward a LOW-type policy. However, recent upgrades to China’s nuclear arsenal mean that Chinese strategists may, under certain circumstances consider using nuclear weapons in response to a precision conventional strike on China’s nuclear facilities. This could be in retaliation to a largescale conventional attack (such as is being con-

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Concerns about security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have been heightened following the Bhutto assassination in December 2007 and the subsequent instability of the Islamabad regime.. sidered by the US and Israel on Iran’s facilities}. Modern conventional attacks are so damaging that they can resemble a small-scale nuclear attack. But any move by China to abandon the no-first-use doctrine or even make statements to this effect – such as that made in 2005 by Maj Gen Zhu Chenghu of China’s National Defense University, that Beijing could respond with nuclear weapons if attacked by the US during a conflict over Taiwan - would indeed be very destabilising in the region and beyond. China may regard the US Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system being provided for Taiwan as a spur to push higher China’s aims at reunification. China’s renewed confidence and regional aspirations have led to a massive upgrade of nuclear warheads, strategic delivery systems and CBW agents. The modernisation programme (greatly enhanced through acquisition of vital US intelligence) has been under way for the past several years and the nuclear force is expected to be completely modernised by 2010. Chemical detection equipment inside a Fox NBC reconnaissance vehicle

British Forces were prepared for Iraqi use of Chemical Weapons in 2003. Ironically the only chemical attacks have occurred during the insurgency.

Technological improvements include weapons of smaller size, more accurate delivery, enhanced radiation effects and the development of MIRV (multiple independent re-entry vehicles). China is being regarded as an increasing threat to the US; it is estimated by US intelligence that by 2015 it will have added several dozen more survivable land- and sea-based mobile missiles, including the Julang-2 (JL-2) SLBM version (submarine-launched ballistic missile), which with a range of 8,000 km will become a strategic weapon against the United States. Chinese ICBMs with sufficient range to reach the US are forecast to increase to about 30 by 2005 and up to 60 by 2010. Smaller nuclear warheads also indicate moves towards more ‘usability’ in terms of limited nuclear attack. Beijing has been instrumental in countering the North Korean nuclear threat. It has long feared that North Korea’s nuclear arsenal might provoke other Asian countries to pursue similar weapons programmes, but even more, that a collapse of the Pyongyang regime could result in an uncontrollable refugee exodus across the Chinese border. Therefore, the Chinese have avoided pushing North Korea too hard, to avoid any precipitation towards its collapse, while furthering the negotiations to bring the country and its nuclear ambitions to heel.

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The biggest threat: Pakistani instability The real wildcard in Asia remains Pakistan. Concerns about security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have been heightened following the Bhutto assassination in December 2007 and the subsequent instability of the Islamabad regime. Ongoing insecurities arise from radical Islamicist threats within the country. With Pakistan’s record in proliferating nuclear technologies – most notably, by the A Q Khan transcontinental nuclear ‘Walmart’ network of front companies and intermediaries – the country’s unstable position has long been a worry to the region and beyond. The nightmare scenario persists – that is, of an Islamic extremist group taking power, and hence, control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Not only would this severely threaten regional security but could also lead to Al-Qaeda or its affiliates acquiring a nuclear warhead or nuclear materials. Risks of a ‘loose nuke’ going amiss due to insider theft, and of expertise, components, blueprints and fissile material being acquired, are uppermost in the minds of the international community and concerned observers. Pakistan’s intelligence agencies were deeply involved with establishing the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s, and it is widely believed in Pakistan that the relationship between sections of the military intelligence establishment and Islamic militants remains intact. As well as increased domestic instability, the long-standing rivalry and history of conflict with India pose an on-off threat to weaken the safeguards of its nuclear weapons arsenal. Pakistan has twice come close to a war with India (1999 and 2002) in which nuclear weapons might have been used. But much of the concern centres on the way in which

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Helicopters also present simple and effective methods of delivery (PHOTO: DIA Image)

Pakistan holds its nuclear arsenal. It has dispersed its weapons and oversight of them to multiple strategic and security authorities, making it more possible for corrupt officials to divert weapons or materials. The increase in the nuclear arsenal to a possible 100 warheads (from 40) means more people having access to the weapons facilities.

Securing the arsenal There have, however, been attempts to improve nuclear weapons security, with claims there are sophisticated electronic locks on all Pakistani weapons - but that only President Musharraf (about to be impeached) has the PALS – the permission action links, or access codes. Were he to be assassinated, Pakistan’s ability to retaliate would be severely compromised. Should instability increase to the point where the commandand-control structure is threatened, or the armed forces fragmented, nuclear insecurity could reach an unprecedented level. Therefore, the US has been actively planning contingency measures to secure Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Frederick Kagan, architect of the US surge in Iraq, drew up contingency plans in late 2007 for US troops to invade Pakistan and secure the nuclear arsenal in the event of the country falling into chaos. Nuclear personnel who guard Pakistan’s facilities are being sent for training in the US. Some Strategic Plans Division (SPD) officers were trained in the US and its officers regularly visit American military institutes to learn the art and craft of deterrence. But, while Pakistan’s cooperation with the US on the ‘war on terror’ would appear to strengthen its position internationally, it has, conversely, enhanced its insecurity at home. And while proclaiming to the world that it can protect its nuclear weapons, Islamabad has also warned the west against any attempt to step in to protect or neutralise them.

Pakistan’s desire for maximum balance and diversification in its external relations has led to close political and strategic relations with China. Worsening Sino-Indian relations provided new opportunities for this alliance, which has reportedly included nuclear weapons help and missile exports in past decades. Many in Pakistan look to China rather than the US and should Pakistani instability increase, Beijing will likely be involved in mitigating further chaos. Some of Pakistan’s military spokespeople are attempting to allay fears. According to one such, Brig Shaukat Qadir: “Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are only as much at risk as those of the US or India... There are differing layers of security and everyone is checked and double checked while entering and leaving the facility.” He believes that even highly trained troops would find it almost impossible to storm Pakistan’s nuclear facilities, most of which are built deep underground, making penetration nearly impossible. Because the delivery systems are not paired with their warheads, they argue it would be an almost insurmountable task for a militant organisation to steal the nuclear warheads and then find a missile or aircraft to deliver them. Other measures of command and control have also been put in place. In February 2000, Islamabad formally announced the creation of the National Command Authority (NCA) to oversee the nuclear arsenal. The NCA’s

So long as the exact locations of the weapons are not fully disclosed it will be virtually impossible to safeguard them in the event of a national emergency. SEPTEMBER 2008

two committees are served by and connected through the SPD, which is manned entirely by military personnel. The SPD is also responsible for the security of all strategic organisations (including the Kahuta research laboratories, which were allegedly involved in Khan’s proliferation of nuclear materials and designs to Iran, Libya and North Korea between 1989 and 2003). But problems remain. So long as the exact locations of the weapons are not fully disclosed it will be virtually impossible to safeguard them in the event of a national emergency. It also does not account for fissile material, small amounts of which are much more likely to be purloined than actual weapons. Given that only 25 kg of HEU is needed for a Hiroshimatype bomb, and only 5-8kg of plutonium for a Nagasaki type device, once acquired it would not be impossible to concoct an improvised nuclear device (IND). The other main proliferation threat is, once more, with the scientists. Renegade Pakistani nuclear scientists could help terrorist acquisition of nuclear materials – not so much in the manner of the A Q Khan network, which involved mainly entrepreneurs with the scientist at the centre of the web, but more single, lower level, or small groups of trained individuals with access to nuclear facilities. Pakistani nuclear experts, however, are making assurances that the days of smuggling centrifuges out of Kahuta and other facilities ended with the shutdown of AQ Khan and, it is assumed, his extensive network. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London, told a briefing in Washington in June 2008 that the Khan network had been made ineffective; and that the international community were also watching out for signs of its re-emergence. However, the IISS warned that there former Khan network operatives in Europe may be willing to assist other countries or groups interested in acquiring nuclear weapons. It must be remembered, taking all this into account, that nuclear weapons are still a matter of great national honour in Pakistan. Countries which have struggled to develop a nuclear arsenal to achieve hegemony in their regions – such as those in Asia - are determined to hold on to this still potent symbol of power, and countries which aspire to this, such as Iran, to attempt to develop them. This is a lesson that must be learnt by the west and the non-proliferation ‘community’ as a whole, if they are to understand the dynamics of the Bomb beyond AMR their own regions and cultures.

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Veiled Speech? Modern Radio Encryption

After After ensuring ensuring communication communication in in voice, voice, data data and and video, video, reaches reaches the the recipient recipient and and in in a a understandable understandable format, format, the the next next goal goal is is ensuring ensuring no no advantage advantage â&#x20AC;&#x201C;â&#x20AC;&#x201C; tactical tactical or or strategic strategic -- can can be be gained gained by by the the enemy enemy from from that that transmission. transmission. A A variety variety of of vulnerabilities vulnerabilities and and threats threats prompt prompt an an equally equally varied varied palate palate of of countermeasures countermeasures and and technologies technologies in in response. response. by by Adam Adam Baddeley Baddeley

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n the tactical environment, solutions being deployed emphasise compact, low power integrated designs. The Selex Communications Personal Role Radio (PRR) family is one of several radios to provide security through RF design, using spread spectrum techniques with an absence of encryption to disguise signals within the inherent cluster within a frequency. While sufficient for voice only communications, the next generation PRRs now entering service combine this with commercial encryption such as the ubiquitous Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) using both 128 and 256 bit encryption common in other ‘soldier radios’ being fielded to support soldier modernisation programmes. Power is another advantage to ensuring communication gets through. To burn through ‘fog’ on the battlefield, electronic or otherwise, Harris RF Communications have recently added a 5W Power Amplifier to the 100mW RF-7800W Broadband Ethernet Radio deployed by the US Army and Marine Corps. Other features currently being developed from the RF-7800W include a move away from simply AES 256 and adding FIPS-197. Comsec as well as Transec are being addressed, the latter also being a greater factor in the overall security package. Harris have developed the proprietary Traffic Flow Security solution to militarise TRANSEC vulnerabilities perceived in wireless solutions. A number of companies who provide tactical communications obtain the software algorithms necessary for security from third parties. The popular Eritac area communication systems supplied by Kongsberg uses the CD510 Multi-Link Encryption System with algorithms supplied by Swiss firm Crypto AG. The systems can support up to five duplex trunk connections supporting Eurocom D/1, G.703 and V11 protocols, using the rack mounted solution. The system supports up to 8Mbps and supports both on line and offline security management. Crypto AG provide encryption products to over 130 countries. The company also makes

Harris users can opt to use the company’s proprietary Citadel encryption package in the absence of a national solution (PHOTO: Harris)

Power is another advantage to ensuring communication gets through. To burn through ‘fog’ on the battlefield electronic or otherwise,… SEPTEMBER 2008

it own products with recent additions being the Crypto Mobile Client HC-7835 IP VPN to create an highly probable IP funnel for all office applications and is easily connected to PCs using a USB port and works independently of the operating system. For satellite communication the company have launched a satellite security system which embeds, in the same case as the terminal, a pre configured, pre wired solution that supports all common desk top functions a satellite connection might be asked to support. Outside the office environment the company’s new MultiCom Radio HC-2650 encryption with IP supports all radios and encrypts in all frequency bands and virtually all operating modes and is a ruggedised appliqué lightweight design for field use. The Raytheon’s EPLRS has recently experienced an export makeover in terms of encryption. For domestic users, the US uses Type 1 encryption. Exporting this can be problematic to export and not necessarily wanted by the customer. In response, Raytheon has developed the EPLRS XF-I, superficially indistinguishable from the Standard EPLRS for the US customer but incorporating AES 256 encryption and also expanding the frequency range in UHF to 225-450MHZ. Canada has acquired 1300 of these radios in two batches beginning in December 2007.

UK: CWID and beyond The UK contribution to the Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration (CWID) 2008 offers insights into the security systems being pursued to ensure security across the entire tactical domain. One of the goals for CWID’s Core Secure Network in 2008 was multi-level security. Despite being an exercise, the system deployed met all the UK current security policies and was accredited by the UK’s Defence Security Standards Organisation. This was provided by QinetiQ via its Access Node which included an intrusion detection capability prototypes and Boundary Protection Device with real time virus updates via a Deployed Network Management System, interfacing with Bowman the Falcon Wide Area System, and Link 16 with their own security system with gateways between them and the UK fixed ‘office’ network, including the new Defence Information Infrastructure. Well known COTS provider, Symantec better known for its Norton anti-virus products supported CWID in two ways with its

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Integrated Information Assurance Operations Centre (IAOC), a development of the previous year’s Intelligence Guided Network Defence contribution to CWID, and the company’s Agile End Point Protection capability. The IAOC provides the Information Assurance (IA) commander with their own ‘Cyber’ Common Operating Picture, able to bring in global intelligence on what is happening outside the CWID network, as well as showing the CWID network’s topology with alarms and warnings. The Agile End Point Protection works with IAOC, allowing security updates to a variety of user access devices at HQ and in the field to be undertaken automatically rather than manually. Thales’ Secure Enterprise Delivery was used to provide service to the CWID community using both secure and insecure web services allowing managers to tightly control who has access to these services as access become less stovepiped as part of new Service Oriented Architectures (SOA). While CWID was largely focused on an Afghanistan scenario, circa 2011, the ultimate goal of the UK for Network Enabled Capability (NEC) is to establish a secure Endto-End Command Information System providing a managed, globally accessible information domain based on IP. NEC is delineated in terms of Epochs. As part of NEC Epoch 3/4 in 2019-2028, a wider Mature Joint Information Grid will be established. At that stage a Secure IP v6 network will be established, linking platforms, sensors and decision makers in a single Security Architecture based on software defined crypto devices. The next step toward this will be during Epoch 2 roughly between 2013 -18 with much greater emphasis on IP security with adoption of HAIPE (High Assurance Internet Protocol Encryptor) IP crypto.

…the ultimate goal of the UK for Network Enabled Capability (NEC) is to establish a secure End-to-End Command Information System providing a managed, globally accessible information domain based on IP.

Wireless networks Wireless networks, employed allowing easy access and rapid set up, are tactically attractive but pose particular problems for security, with its broadcast nature offering potentially uncontrolled access relative to a fixed, wired network. Harris RF Communication’s SECNET 11 Plus PCMCIA card is currently the only US National Security Agency endorsed US Type 1 encrypted wireless Network Interface card for use over 802.11b networks, allowing users to provide up to Secret communication in data video and VoIP with link rates of up to 11Mbps with ranges of up to 15km with

external antenna of power amplifiers. This provides the basis of a family of SecNet 11 products which provide up to Secret level communications via the use of a combination for the Sierra encryption module and Intersil’s PRISM chip set, embedded within the card itself. The system is designed to operate with Windows XP and earlier operating systems, including pocket PC 2002 and 2003 and Linux kernel 2.4, allowing users all standard operating systems to use the system. The SecNet family is NATO compliant and can be straightforwardly acquired as it has received SECAN endorsement, the NATO Agency which evaluates encryptions and communications security equipment, allowing any NATO nation to acquire it. A key requirement for many US users is access to other Type 1 networks, which almost certainly won’t only be 802.11b. To overcome this interoperability issue Harris have created the Wireless Bridge, part of the same SecNet 11 family. This receives or transmits the 802.11B and then has a wired, 10 base-T Ethernet or 802.3c cable link into Ethernet compatible systems. The Wireless Bridge then acts as an access point between two Type 1 independent networks. The more recent Harris SecNet 54 takes as its core, the updated Sierra II software programmable encryption module, supporting Type 1 up to and including Top Secret. Embracing the more recent 802.11g standard at 54Mbps, hence its name, the system also has an Ethernet Module for wired communication and a WiMAX module, the later to support the increasingly militarily popular 802.16 protocol. Using the system, Harris envisage users on the lower security NIPRNET can connect to the more secure SIPRNET using a bulk encryptor such as the company’s KIV-54EM01 with the SECNET 54 infrastructure encrypting data before sending it over a COTS infrastructure. This has replaced hitherto bespoke solutions at fixed site with SecNet 54 simply moving with the user. The AN/PRC-148 JEM uses GD’s AIM software encryption chip

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Programmable encryption and new standards With the advent of software defined radio, has come software encryption, producing a programmable cryptographic module with advanced key management functions. Rather than be set with an immovable algorithm, just as a new waveform can be added to an SDR, a new algorithm can be added to the cryptographic module or reprogrammed allowing multiple or new software to be added, according to new roles or if an older encryption solution becomes broken. The advent of IP and other protocols has been encouraged by the new generation of embedded programmable module which enable new algorithms to be added throughout the hardware life, rather than making a decision on a single hard wired protocol at its inception. Harris’ Sierra II received NSA certification in 2004 protection of voice and data traffic up through the Top Secret/SCI level. Data rates up to 300 Mbps are possible, dependent on mode selected. The Sierra II is widely used in the tactical role with the company’s AN/PRC-152 radio being one of the first to employ the module. The Sierra II chip is the standard for the Boeing led JTRS Cluster 1/Ground Mobile radio programme, with Raytheon's Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Mode 4/5 system using the same solution as part of the US Air Defense Interrogator programme. Harris is currently working on a new version of the Sierra under a contract from 2006 to support satellite terminals due to be deployed from 2010. Under the US Army’s Programmable Objective Encryption Technologies (POET) programme, part of the National Security Agency’s Cryptographic Modernization Initiative, General Dynamics C4 Systems is producing an Advanced Cryptographic Module. POET will provide typical multilevel security but its most important feature will be to support very high capacity through in programme such as the Army’s nascent

High Capacity Communications Capability terminals which will ultimately embrace ultra high speed laser communications. Rockwell Collins’ Janus programmable crypto engine, a Cryptographic Modernization Initiative (CMI) compliant solution received its NSA type 1 certification in April and is designed as a low weight, low power solution supporting unclassified through top secret communications. HAIPE is mandated by NSA for IP security as part of the Cryptographic Modernization work, enabling two secure environments to communicate over networks that do not share

the equivalent security rating as well as encrypt multicast data. There is also a UK specific HAIPE standard being implemented for example with EADS’ Ectocryp Blue described as the first high grade completely reprogrammable Gigabit encryptor and Harris’ BID/2370 End Cryptographic Unit. The latter was developed under the UK-funded Common-good High-grade INFOSEC Module (Programmable) or CHIM(P) programme, a rack mounted solution with a Sierra II chip inside its US by a non-US user, only made possible by a unique government to government agreement.

A PRR - the need for SA data is driving the need for encryption at the dismounted level (PHOTO: Adam Baddeley)

The anticipated benefits of end to end seamless communication, from the battlefield to the desk tops requires relevant levels of security both in terms of technology and Tactics Technique and Procedures. SEPTEMBER 2008

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Sectra’s Tiger XS product line has recently been selected and implemented to support IP-based communication terrestrial and for satellite communication in support of the Nordic Battlegroup a 2500 strong EU rapid reaction force. As part of an end to end approach that takes in all aspects of communication, the US developed the Secure Communications Interoperability Protocol (SCIP). To ensure that even CNRs – perhaps the most disadLeft: General Dynamics AIM encryption chip (PHOTO: Adam Baddeley)

vantaged user - can operate SCIP, all that is required is 2.4 Kbps throughput with the increasingly used Mixed Excitation Linear Prediction (MELP) standard. SCIP works by two communication devices first contacting each other over a CNR, PSTN, ISDN and VoIP networks or combination thereof and then establishing the optimum secure path. Although initially a US protocol, SCIP has been licensed as a common interoperability standard within NATO with a range of companies including, CISCO, EADS, Selex, Thales and Rohde and Schwarz as well as a number of US companies.

Network defence Defending the network means, the entire network not just the tactical environment. The anticipated benefits of end to end seamless communication, from the battlefield to the desk tops requires relevant levels of security both in terms of technology and Tactics Technique and Procedures. It is often the latter issue – caused by human error - that has weakened networks, not in the foxhole but rather a coffee cup strewn desk in the home nation with an unsuspect-

ing and careless user for example surfing the virus strewn Internet. The USAF is the lead in the DoD for network security standing up provisional Cyber Command in 2007. Work on the multi-block

Below: The new Harris PRC-325 HF manpack provides Bowman users with encrypted communications using the UK’s Pritchell encryption (PHOTO: Harris)

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A key requirement for many US users is access to other Type 1 networks, which almost certainly won’t only be 802.11b.

These Data enabled PRR embrace encryption with the introductions of AES. Previous versions relied exclusively on short range and spread spectrum technology for information assurance. (PHOTO: Adam Baddeley)

incremental Cyber Control Systems (CCS) programme is ongoing and is designed to consolidate and enable existing cyber-assurance tools as well as add additional capabilities over time to allow the new Command to do its job.

Other enablers for basic security for IT systems is ongoing. As part of the Air Force’s NETCENTS contract the USAF recently tasked General Dynamics Information Technology as part of the US Air Force’s NET-

CENTS to supply 13 locations worldwide. These centralise security, administration and performance functions for the Air Forces intranet, at far fewer sites. Further out, smarter solutions are being rapidly researched and implementel. DARPA have recently tasked Raytheon with partners Teknowledge to assess an undisclosed new technology to support a future multi-domain situational awareness system designed for information assurance for defense and homeland security. The system monitors users for inadvertent or malicious actions related to the current status of the systems they are using. If an action would harm or compromise the system the software simply blocks that action and alerts networks managers. Mobile or cell phone technology is unavoidable at home and increasingly useful for deployed operations as well as day to day business at home. Thales’ TEOREM is designed to managed fixed and cellular secured telephony for secure government and military using mobile GSM/UMTS public networks, fixed public systems including PSTN, ISDN and VoIP and specific government and military networks. The solution begins with key generation facilities undertaking cryptographic initialisation and end to end key distribution of black key distribution of TEOREM telephones with additional registration and certification for remote management including rekeying, zeroisation, distribution of compromised key lists and users registration with the option of cross certification for other organization TEOREM telephones which uses Tempest compliant hardware crypto processor with red/black separation. With militaries increasingly tasked with supporting the homeland security task, greater effort is also being made to support domestic first responders. One of the most recent is Sectra’s contract to embed a SIM based encryption solution on tetra handsets used on Sweden’s TETRA –based Rakel public safety network used by the emergency servicAMR es and well as the country’s defence forces. Harris’ secure personal radio has multiple encryption options (PHOTO: Adam Baddeley)

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ACEH THE LONGEST WAR On December 26, 2004 the South East Asian tsunami slammed into the historic seaport of Banda Aceh, capital of the province of Aceh within Indonesia, killing over 250,000 people out of a local population of 4 million, and rendering a further 500,000 homeless. Amid the carnage, one silver lining to this particular cloud was that it focused the minds both of local separatists, who for decades had been fighting for an independent state, and the Indonesian government. On August 15, 2005 a peace treaty, mediated by former Finnish president and UN negotiator Martti Ahtisaari, concluded over a century of conflict between the fiercely independent Acehnese and their Dutch and Indonesian adversaries. The worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s longest war was over for the present. by Stuart Notholt Historically, Aceh was the gateway for Islam into the South East Asian region

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ceh is a land of some 22,000 square miles at the north of the island of Sumatra. Guarding the Malacca Straits between Sumatra and Malaya, it has always had a strategic role as a gateway for regional trade. Aceh was the route through which Islam entered South East Asia, and as early as 850 a successful Islamic kingdom was established that went on to seed other Muslim states throughout the region. By the 19th century Aceh, having seen off several attempts at annexation by the Portuguese, was a locally influential power, with a modern army, diplomatic relations with Western powers (including the United States) and a major stake in the international spice trade, particularly black pepper, producing more than half the world supply. However, other powers were now encroaching on the region. The Dutch and the British, initially rivals, cut a deal in 1824 whereby the British abandoned any claims to Sumatra, and the Dutch accepted India and Singapore as being within the British sphere of influence. Acehnese independence was recognized by both the

Netherlands and Britain, but in 1871 the treaty was amended to allow for Dutch control over the whole island of Sumatra. In 1873, after debating in Parliament the legality of attacking a sovereign state, the Netherlands formally declared war on Aceh and invaded, claiming Acehnese piracy as the immediate casus belli. The initial assault was a disaster. As The New York Times reported: “The attack was repulsed with great slaughter. The Dutch general was killed, and his army put to disastrous flight. It appears, indeed, to have been literally decimated.” The Dutch plowed on, but their South East Asian imbroglio, like that of another superpower a century later, became a protracted nightmare. It was, in fact, the longest and most expensive war the Dutch ever fought, costing them more than 10,000 lives. Not less than thirty years later, the Acehnese Sultan Muhammed Daud Syah finally surrendered, but he and his supporters later took to guerrilla warfare in the dense Acehnese hinterland. Effectively, Dutch control rarely extended beyond Banda Aceh,

their occupation constantly punctuated by ambushes and assassinations. Significantly, Aceh was never legally incorporated into the Dutch East Indies. This continued to be the situation until March 1942, when the whole region was overrun by the Japanese. As in other parts of the archipelago, East Indian leaders, seduced by Tokyo’s talk of an ‘East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere’, initially co-operated. However, the Acehnese, together with nationalists in other regions, soon appreciated that they had merely swapped European colonialism for an even worse Asian variant, and resumed guerrilla warfare. Just two days after the 1945 Japanese surrender to the Allies, Indonesia declared itself independent. Dutch sovereignty over the East Indies was nominally restored, but, in the face of general resistance, this was only patchily implemented, and the Dutch made no effort to re-occupy Aceh.

Indonesia Many Acehnese militants actively supported

Indonesia’s military has traditionally been geared towards an conventional external threat assessment

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the Indonesian national movement, but relations rapidly soured amid Acehnese claims of betrayal. In mid-December 1949, just prior to formal Dutch withdrawal, the Indonesian Emergency Government announced the establishment of a separate Aceh province, but when, on December 27, the Dutch East Indies officially ceased to exist, the new Federal Republic of Indonesia merged Aceh with other districts to form a North Sumatran province. This was itself dissolved when Indonesia became a unitary state in 1951. Simmering unrest erupted in 1953, when Acehnese militants aligned themselves with the Darul Islam (‘House of Islam’) movement fighting to establish an Islamic Indonesian state, and in September Aceh’s independence from Indonesia was proclaimed. The Darul Islam uprising was finally suppressed in the late 1950s, and in 1959 Aceh was granted ‘special territory’ (‘daerah istimewa’) status, allowing it a high degree of autonomy in religious and cultural matters. This concession did not extinguish nationalist demands, however. On December 4 1976 a new armed movement, the Gerekan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, or Free Aceh Movement) came into being to fight for Acehnese sovereignty, the separatists hoisting for the occasion the thousand-year old Aceh flag and making a renewed declaration of independence. Neither military action nor repression succeeded in crushing the movement – although its leaders were driven into exile – and in 1989 the declining security situation promoted the declaration of a ‘Military Operational Area’ – Daerah

“The attack was repulsed with great slaughter. The Dutch general was killed, and his army put to disastrous flight. It appears, indeed, to have been literally decimated.” Operasi Militer – over Aceh. The Indonesian military, the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) launched a major counter-insurgency sweep under the codename ‘Red Net’ but this and subsequent campaigns failed to permanently suppress the uprising. With the general South East Asian economic crisis of 1997, the longstanding militarist regime of President Suharto collapsed and a significant retrenchment of TNI activities was necessitated. The most dramatic outcome was Indonesian retreat from East Timor, which voted for independence, under international supervision, in August 1999. Within weeks of this referendum, a new civil mass movement, the Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh came into being to demand a similar poll for Aceh and held a series of massive demonstrations, involving up to half a million people. Although the Daerah Operasi Militer was suspended in 1998 amid some conciliatory noises from the government, it became clear that Jakarta still essentially saw the solution to the insurgency in military rather than political terms. Conflict in Aceh once more reverted to a grim pattern of repressions and arrests, interspersed with counterinsurgency drives that were often punctuated with episodes of extreme violence towards civilians. The GAM, for its part,

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fought back with assassinations of local government officials and their replacement with GAM appointees, who levied ‘war taxes’ from local communities. Peace talks in 2003 collapsed and the cycle of violence continued until the tsunami intervened. Regular national forces that have had their origins in guerrilla movements have often proven surprisingly inept at dealing with subsequent internal unrest. There are perhaps a number of reasons why this should be so. The first is that in the formation of a conventional national army, many of the skills and tactics of the guerrilla may be abandoned or forgotten. Many Soviet client states, for example, invested in heavy armor and adopted Warsaw Pact doctrines that, while they may have had application in a potential European head-to-head with NATO, were not necessarily relevant locally. Strategically, the military planning in a state forged through a national liberation struggle may be orientated exclusively towards the threat from ‘imperialists’ or other external enemies. Similarly, ideology may make the state psychologically unprepared to deal with opposition. As ‘liberators’, they may be unwilling to concede that elements of the population have genuine grievances against the new order. We saw this, for example, in Mozambique, where the FRELIMO regime was unable to understand the resilience of the RENAMO insurgency in terms other than of imported Rhodesian or South African aggression. Last and not least there is geography: the same topography, ethnography, and other features that facilitated the original ‘war of liberation’ may similarly benefit successor movements. The Indonesian military, which grew out The devastation caused by the 2004 tsunami focused minds of reconstruction rather than conflict

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The Indonesian military, the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) launched a major counter-insurgency sweep under the codename ‘Red Net’ but this and subsequent campaigns failed to permanently suppress the uprising. of the rebel insurgencies of the 1940s, suffers from all of these defects. The TNI has, for much of its history, claimed an overt political role: under its dwifungsi (‘dual function’) doctrine, it had, in addition to the normal military duties of defending the territorial integrity of the state, the task of guiding Indonesia politically and economically. This led to long periods of military or semi-military rule, and the conflation of military and political aims rendered difficult any effective analysis or internal criticism.

Nationalism? The contradiction in the militant Indonesian defence of its territorial integrity is that Indonesia, as a separate historical or ethnic entity, has only very shallow roots. An Indonesian nationalist slogan has it that the sun rises at Merauke and sets in Sabang, the latter being an island off the coast of Aceh, while Merauke is located in West Papua near the border with Papua New Guinea. Loss of either of these two peripheral provinces would, like the actual loss of East Timor, be a severe blow to Indonesia’s national self-view. Aceh, furthermore, has a symbolic significance to many Indonesian Muslims, serving as an important memorial to the power and prestige of Islamic states before the arrival of Christian colonial powers. Before the days of air travel, steamships carried pilgrims from Aceh, otherwise known as ‘Serambi Mekkah’ - the gateway to Mecca - on their way to hajj in Saudi Arabia, and even today Aceh is known as “the front porch of Mecca”. More prosaically, Aceh is Indonesia’s main producer of natural gas and one of its most profitable regions for foreign investment. Unsurprisingly, the perspective of Acehnese nationalists is somewhat different. They are fond of pointing out, with some justification, that their country has a thousand year history, in sharp contrast to modern upstarts like Indonesia. As Tengku Hasan Di Tiro, head

of GAM, noted archly in 1976, “There never was such a people, much less a nation, in our part of the world by that name (Indonesia). No such people existed in the Malay archipelago by definition of ethnology, philology, cultural anthropology, sociology or by any other scientific findings. ‘Indonesia’ is a Javanese republic with a Greek pseudo-name.” A further issue is that the Indonesian military has traditionally been geared towards an external threat assessment. TNI planning assumed that a more powerful aggressor would be capable of securing a beach-head on one or more Indonesian islands, but, once drawn into the hinterland, could be successfully interdicted and ultimately worn down by popular militias. All states, not unreasonably, have defense against foreign invasion high on their military agendas, and with a history of occupation by the Dutch and the Japanese, Indonesia is no exception. However, there has long been no credible scenario under which Indonesia could come under serious external assault. In contrast, threats posted by domestic ethnic insurgencies, and by Islamic terrorists, are very real. As was noted in a previous article Stuart Notholt, Indonesia’s Military Faces the Future, AMR, March 2007, Jakarta has struggled with re-orientating its military and security apparatus towards the new dangers. As the world’s largest Muslim nation by

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population (around 85% of the population of 233 million profess Islam), Indonesia is of crucial interest to Islamists, whose strategic aspiration is the ‘restoration’ of the Caliphate – the unitary Islamic polity embracing all Muslims. Indonesia was never part of the actual historical Caliphates. However, modern Islamists interpret the Caliphate as including all countries once under Muslim rule (by which definition thereby including Portugal, Spain and India) as well as all modern states in which Muslims are in a majority. Many Islamists view even this wildly ambitious programme as merely the first step in the creation of a global Islamic state, or umma. As early as the 1990s, and increasingly so after his expulsion from Sudan in 1996, Osama Bin Laden regarded South East Asia as a vital theatre for his developing Al Qaeda network, and intelligence reports indicated a significant level of organizational and capacity-building investment in the region. In 1999, Bin Laden issued a fatwa (holy war) against Australia in response to Canberra’s involvement in facilitating East Timorese independence, and agitation amongst Indonesian Muslims saw the creation of a variety of politicized militia purporting to ‘protect’ Muslim populations, particularly in outlying regions where they A vibrant local culture: a food market in Banda Aceh.

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are in collision with other communities.

Islam As in other countries, Al Qaeda operated though a number of groups closely aligned with the main national Al Qaeda organization, Jemaah Islamiyah. Factions included the Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI; Indonesian Mujahideen Council), and paramilitary groups such as Laskar Mujahideen and Laskar Jundallah. In addition, there were a number of groups not directly affiliated to Al Qaeda, such as the Islamic Defenders Front and the international Islamist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir. Links were established with Malaysian extremists and with the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines. Connections with the latter, which is fighting for greater autonomy for the Muslim population of Mindanao, in the southern Philippines, proved particularly valuable to the Indonesian jihadists, providing them with relatively accessible training facilities as well as the possibility of direct combat experience. Most of these groups had overlapping leaderships. Members of Jemaah Islamiyah’s shura, or ruling council, such as Abu Jibril and Agus Dwikarna, as well as the group’s spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, were also leaders of the MMI, Laskar Mujahideen, and Laskar Jundallah. The last two organizations were specifically created to harness and ferment religious ethnic conflict in the Malukus and Central Sulawesi. Ostensibly Muslim ‘self defence’ groups, they were in fact responsible for much of the violence in those regions in the 1999-2001 period, which left several thousands dead. Jibril was arrested in Malaysia in 2001 and deported to Indonesia; thereafter Laskar Jundallah and Laskar Mujahideen faded somewhat from the scene (at least under their original names) although some observers implicated the latter in renewed ethnic violence in the Malukus in 2004. In addition, an international Muslim relief

Similarly, ideology may make the state psychologically unprepared to deal with opposition. organization, the Medical Emergency Relief Charity (MER-C), established several offices in Indonesia. MER-C was founded with Saudi financial backing in 1999, theoretically to provide humanitarian relief to areas of afflicted by ethnic strife. It also operates in Pakistan, Iraq and Afghanistan, and has been criticized by some as adopting a highly sectarian interpretation of religious conflict in its areas of work.

The Global War on Terror Following the 9/11 attacks on the USA, Indonesia itself came under direct Islamist attack, most dramatically at the Bali bombings. Understandably, the Indonesian authorities lost little time in associating themselves with the US-led ‘war on terror’ and in characterizing its opponents as terrorists. A public relations campaign was stepped up against the GAM and other movements, such as the Free Papua Movement, which is fighting for an inde-

The Acehnese coastline

ASIAN MILITARY REVIEW

pendent West Papua. Practical benefits to the Jakarta government included renewed US links with the TNI, which had been limited since the violence surrounding East Timorese independence. In 2002, the Bush administration committed $50 million to supporting the TNI and an additional $15 million for the police. Restrictions on the provision of lethal arms remained in place, but Washington nevertheless argued that engaging with the Indonesian security forces was the only way to promote democratic and human

rights reforms. Diplomatic success in aligning Jakarta’s overall counterinsurgency issues

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As the world’s largest Muslim nation by population (around 85% of the population of 233 million profess Islam), Indonesia is of crucial interest to Islamists, whose strategic aspiration is the ‘restoration’ of the Caliphate – the unitary Islamic polity embracing all Muslims. with the ‘war on terror’ was more limited. In 2002, Washington designated Jemaah Islamiyah a terrorist organization, and pressurized Jakarta into taking a harder line against it and other Islamists, but declined to

Qaeda by several decades. Its aim was also comparatively modest – an independent Aceh. The creation of new, separate states, even Islamic ones, is counter to Al Qaeda’s ambition of unifying all Muslims into one global Caliphate and it is noteworthy that Al Qaeda support for Islamic secessionist movements worldwide has been tactical rather than wholehearted. More fundamentally, Aceh’s Islam is indeed, as detractors observe, conservative and puritanical, but many Acehnese are adherents to the Shia confession rather than the Sunni-ism embraced by most Islamists. Indeed, some indication of the potential antipathy between the GAM and the Islamists emerged after the tsunami, when Muslim groups from elsewhere in Indonesia were quick to offer ‘humanitarian’ assistance. Against a background of a sluggish response

The Indonesian military is generally far more skilled and than it’s regional counterparts (PHOTO: US Navy)

list the GAM as a foreign terrorist group. Similarly, whether the West Papuan separatists are ‘terrorists’ of course depends on one’s perspective, but Islamists they are clearly not – indeed, with many Papuans being Christian or followers of indigenous religions, West Papuan nationalism has brought them into conflict with local Muslim factions. Tarring Acehnese agitation with a broader ‘Islamic terror’ brush also proved problematic. The GAM was in most regards a ‘conventional’ secessionist insurgent movement, with a pedigree that predates Al

by the Indonesian authorities, the MMI was first off the mark, dispatching over 70 volunteers on January 4, followed shortly by over 150 reinforcements. Laskar Mujahideen also re-surfaced, sending 250 volunteers. The MERC and the Islamic Defenders Front also rushed in sizeable contingents. With the possible exception of MER-C, none of these groups was exactly renowned for their expertise in the field of disaster relief. The IDF, for example, was previously better known for smashing up bars in Jakarta’s red light district. Although some genuine relief work was

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undoubtedly undertaken, particularly by Laskar Mujahideen, it is unlikely, given these groups’ affiliations and political agendas, that their motivation was entirely altruistic. Indeed, even within a generous interpretation of humanitarian aid, their contribution was mostly narrow and sectarian. The MMI identified its primary role as being to provide ‘spiritual guidance’ to survivors and to participate in the reconstruction of damaged mosques. Others saw their mandate as ensuring that Western aid workers and soldiers did not breach Islamic law. At the most benign level, being seen to intervene speedily and effectively, at a time when the official response was laggardly, would present Islamist groups as the true supporters and defenders of local Muslim communities. The GAM, in contrast, evidently saw the arrival of ‘foreign’ groups as a deliberate attempt to usurp their influence and authority, and was among the loudest in their criticism both of the newcomers and of the government, which they accused of colluding with the jihadists. The GAM’s complaints do have some credibility. Some of the IDF’s aid workers were flown into Aceh on military transports, and other logistical support appears to be have provided by the authorities. It is entirely possible that the military saw involving the Islamists as an opportunity both to cover their own inadequacies in disaster relief and to undermine the GAM, freeing up resources for military operations against the separatists. GAM protests went unanswered, and it was only after international aid bodies raised concerns over the propriety of some of the Islamic groups operating on the ground that some of the more obviously partisan participants were removed from the field. The scale of the natural disaster shocked both the GAM and the Indonesian government into actions aimed at resolving their differences. Commentators observed that the tsunami, perversely, acted as a positive ‘circuit breaker’, providing both parties with a face-saving opportunity to secure a peaceful outcome to what otherwise would remain a bloody stalemate. Negotiations, in fact, proceeded remarkable swiftly, with concessions on both sides. Acehnese autonomy and custodianship of economic assets was reiterated, while the central question of independence was left in abeyance. Gubernatorial elections in 2006 saw the election of Irwandi Yusuf, a former GAM separatist who had previously been jailed. For the time being at least, long-term reconstruction is taking precedence over armed conflict. AMR

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CARAT 2008 A CARAT OR STICK APPROACH?

Covering an area of 4,000,000km_, Southeast Asia is home to nearly 600 million people. It can be subdivided into two geographic regions â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Mainland (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam) and Maritime Southeast Asia (Brunei, East Timor, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore). While the former tends towards Buddhism as the main religion, Islam predominates in the latter. ASEAN is a unifying influence in this region bracketed by India to the west and China to the northeast. Possessing approximately 10% of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s population, Southeast Asia is important strategically and economically. by Gordon Arthur 28

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he peoples of Southeast Asia have a seafaring tradition that stretches back thousands of years, with their oceangoing vessels reaching as far as Madagascar in the Indian Ocean. Western influence arrived in the 1500s, with the British, Spanish, French and Dutch colonising various parts of Southeast Asia. This contact established trade with Europe and introduced Christianity. In light of this history, it is therefore appropriate that the modern Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) naval exercise blends East with West. The USA is the common denominator in CARAT, a series of bilateral exercises conducted annually in Southeast Asia. It encompasses six nations – Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand – with half of these countries having Islamic constitutions. CARAT consists of separate bilateral training evolutions that follow one another over a period of three months. Asian Military Review was given exclusive access to CARAT 2008, the fourteenth iteration of this exercise. The following article summarises this year’s events and examines the wider strategic implications of what may be termed the USA’s “carrot” approach in this part of Asia.

United States Navy Commander, Logistics Group, Western Pacific (COMLOG WESTPAC), which is the primary logistics agent for the Seventh Fleet in this part of the Pacific. The current commander is Rear Admiral Nora Tyson, who took up the reins in September 2007. This command has been stationed in Singapore since 1992, after American forces vacated facilities in Subic Bay, Philippines. The inaugural CARAT took place in 1995 with precisely the same countries that still participate. Combining a number of annual and regional exercises into one larger, sequential event created CARAT. This offered the benefits of simplified

Background of CARAT CARAT

organised

the

KD Laksamana Tun Abdul Jamil, a Malaysian Navy corvette, leads the USS Jarrett during the at-sea phase in the South China Sea. (PHOTO: Gordon Arthur)

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The inaugural CARAT took place in 1995 with precisely the same countries that still participate. planning and logistics. Host nations are given a free hand in setting priorities and deciding what discrete skills they wish to hone during the exercise. Such an openarchitecture format maximises the usefulness of CARAT, especially since it is often the primary naval exercise for many of the host navies. Though the order of visits and phases may vary each year, CARAT generally occurs around the months of June to August.

CARAT 2008 CARAT is the largest annual naval exercise in Southeast Asia, and this year it featured 5,000 personnel (1,400 from the USA), 19 warships and 17 U.S. aircraft. More than 100 diving events were carried out, and a total of 22 Community Relations (COMREL) projects saw 5,000+ people receiving medical and dental treatment. RDML Tyson explained there were two main thrusts this year –maritime security and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HADR), both of which have grown more prominent in recent years. With heightened terrorism and WMD threats since 9/11, maritime security has taken on a new lease of life, especially as international trade grows and people rely on undisrupted sea lanes. In terms of disaster relief, RDML Tyson confessed, “Countries have learnt a lot in the last five or six years, both in the USA and Asia, when responding to disasters. We realise we can do it better, and we need to work together. We also need to work across militaries, other agencies and NGOs worldwide.” While two of the foci might be HADR and maritime security, basic war-fighting skills are not being dismissed. Every country knows it must defend its sovereignty, so traditional combat skills at sea will never slip off the CARAT radar screen. Warfighting proficiencies need to be maintained and honed, though perhaps they will not dominate the agenda as they once did. An important element of CARAT is

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forging U.S. and host-nation vessels into mixed squadrons as they perform free-play tactical scenarios. This division into Blue and Orange forces fully tests cooperation and communications. Officially, CARAT has three purposes – enhancing regional cooperation, building friendships between the USA and partner nations, and strengthening professional skills at every level. Cooperation is certainly the key to CARAT, with RDML Tyson noting, “We already know how to drive ships. We can already do that. It’s all about learning how to work alongside each other and building confidence.” One way of doing this is by cross-decking officers and enlisted personnel so they spend time on a foreign vessel. One example of working relationships that can be created is a Malaysian communications specialist aboard the USS Tortuga. He admitted the Royal Malaysian Navy had equipment they were not fully familiar with, but he was able to learn how to better utilise it by working alongside his American counterpart. Not only does this kind of sharing promote interoperability, but it also produces a deeper American cross-cultural understanding An SH-70B Seahawk from one of the American frigates lands aboard the USS Tortuga during a medevac scenario. (PHOTO: Gordon Arthur)

of Asian culture. “Everyone gathers something personally and professionally,” enthused RDML Tyson.

element of 41 U.S. Marines from the 3rd Marine Division’s Combat Assault Company (CAC) from Hawaii, plus a pair of Landing Craft Utility (LCU) were also embarked.

American participants In 2008, Destroyer Squadron One (DESRON One), based in San Diego, California, executed the exercise. Captain Mike Selby’s CARAT Task Group utilised five ships drawn from all over the Pacific. The flagship was USS Tortuga (LHD 46), a Whidbey Island-class dock landing ship forward deployed in Sasebo, Japan. It was accompanied by a pair of guided-missile frigates – USS Ford (FFG 54) from Everett, Washington, and USS Jarrett (FFG 33) from San Diego. Accompanying them was the salvage ship USNS Safeguard and USCGC Morgenthau (WHEC 722), a Coast Guard cutter from Alameda, California. A detachment of U.S. Navy Seabees from Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133, a platoon-sized

With heightened terrorism and WMD threats since 9/11, maritime security has taken on a new lease of life, especially as international trade grows and people rely on undisrupted sea lanes.

ASIAN MILITARY REVIEW

Phase 1 - Philippines CARAT 2008’s first port of call was Puerto Princesa, Palawan. The exercise kicked off on 26 May with several medical and engineering civic action projects (MEDCAP/ENCAP) before moving to an at-sea phase with the Philippine Navy and Coast Guard. This included Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) training, maritime safety, damage control, surface gunnery, manoeuvring and tactical free play. On 21 June, the MV Princess of Stars tragically sank off Sibuyan Island after Typhoon Fengshen struck the Philippines. Travelling from Manila to Cebu, the capsized ferry claimed more than 800 lives. The USNS Safeguard with embarked divers was initially dispatched to give emergency assistance, though in the event it was ordered to turn back before reaching the site.

Phase 2 - Thailand The CARAT Task Group then proceeded to Sattahip Naval Base, the Thai Navy’s largest base, for

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Singapore is one of the USA’s staunchest allies in the region, and this phase with the Royal Singapore Navy kicked off on 23 June. the commencement of the next phase on 10 June. Forces were soon involved in COMRELs such as medical clinics and school visits. Once the vessels were underway, the Thai Marine Corps conducted an amphibious operation with its AAVs.

Phase 3 – Singapore Changi Naval Base, probably the best naval facility in the region, was the next port of call. Singapore is one of the USA’s staunchest allies in the region, and this phase with the Royal Singapore Navy kicked off on 23 June. It included maritime interdiction, VBSS, surface gunnery, force protection, air defence and diving/salvage components. One highlight was the RSS Endeavour firing a SAM at a target drone launched from the USS Tortuga.

Phase 4 - Malaysia Even as the Malaysian government was reeling from political tensions surrounding the incumbent prime minister, the CARAT Task Group docked at the port of Kemaman on the eastern side of the Malaysian Peninsular. Kemaman held a

double advantage – it is Malaysia’s deepest seaport, plus it is also out of the public eye. This ten-day phase opened on 8 July with various symposiums and workshops. Use was made of the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS), a text- and web-based information sharing system that eases language barriers. CENTRIXS stations were installed on vessels of both nations before they headed out to sea for four days. In Malaysia, primary underway events included maritime interdiction and surveillance, air defence, surface gunnery and diving in the South China Sea. The climax was an amphibious landing and HADR scenario for the USMC and 9th Royal Malay Regiment. The Malaysian Maritime Enforcement

A Northrop BQM-74E target drone of the U.S. Navy is prepared for takeoff. A single Williams J400WR-404 turbojet offers the drone a top speed of 972km/h. (PHOTO: Gordon Arthur)

ASIAN MILITARY REVIEW

Members of the Malaysian Ranger Regiment coming shore. (PHOTO: US Navy)

Agency (MMEA), which performs a coast guard function, trained independently with the Morgenthau. They performed VBSS training both on the pier and at sea. With dangers of piracy, smuggling and terrorism in the Malacca Straits and East Malaysia, this training was very beneficial.

Phase 5 – Indonesia Reflecting the somewhat strained links between the USA and Indonesia, the latter’s involvement did not go under the banner of CARAT. Instead, this phase was termed a Naval Engagement Activity (NEA). Because Indonesia refuses foreign naval vessels access to its bases, the American ships docked at the commercial port of Surabaya, Indonesia’s second largest city and home to the Indonesian Navy’s Eastern Fleet Command. The NEA took place between 21 and 26 July but involved no naval manoeuvres. While leaders from both nations spoke of “mutual respect and understanding”, the NEA failed to ignite any dynamic activity apart from a smallscale amphibious raid conducted by the USMC detachment and their Indonesian counterparts. Instead, events included symposiums, ship tours for school students, diving in Surabaya Harbour, a sports day and CENTRIXS training. The fact that Indonesia does not participate fully in CARAT is due entirely to Indonesia’s choice. While Indonesian sailors and Marines worked enthusiastically at the personal level, resistance higher up the political chain results in Indonesian

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These natural disasters, as well as Hurricane Katrina in the USA in August 2005, provide timely lessons on how better to provide relief. CARAT allows the USA and other nations to be better prepared when disaster strikes.. U.S. Marines storm a beach the good old-fashioned way after disembarking from an LCU. This amphibious landing was conducted with the 9th Royal Malay Regiment. (PHOTO: Gordon Arthur)

recalcitrance to fully engage with the USA. A U.S. Navy official expressed the view that the USA would be happy to perform a full-spectrum exercise with Indonesia, but this depends on Indonesia and is something that cannot be rushed.

Phase 6 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Brunei Commencing on 4 August, the final segment took place in Brunei, a sultanate with a population less than 400,000. As far as the Royal Brunei Navy was concerned, a special focus for CARAT 2008 was HADR. The at-sea phase in Brunei lasted just over 24 hours, but included manoeuvres, gunnery, VBSS and HADR exercises. At the same time, the USMC contingent trekked into the Brunei interior for four days of jungle survival training.

SEACAT Occurring immediately after CARAT, the

South East Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT) exercise is a multilateral counterterrorism event involving all CARAT countries. Requiring participants to work together to solve a problem, SEACAT is conducted at the conclusion of CARAT while the U.S. task group is sailing home. Each country receives a scrap of information that they must communicate to others in the exercise, with each piece of the jigsaw allowing the crisis to be resolved. This kind of problem solving builds confidence in relationships, and aids the ability of countries to work together in real-world situations.

Recent trends in CARAT According to Commander Daryl Borgquist, U.S. Navy Public Affairs chief for CARAT, HADR has become a core part of U.S. military maritime strategy. This emphasis is especially relevant in the Pacific, a region

A Singapore Navy Submarine seen during surfaced close manoeuvring during CARAT. (PHOTO: US Navy)

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with more than its fair share of natural calamities. Because it lies on an intersection of tectonic plates, Southeast Asia suffers regular seismic and volcanic activity, as illustrated by the Boxing Day Tsunami on 26 December 2004, which killed more than 225,000 people in 11 countries. Other recent natural disasters include Cyclone Nargis that made landfall in Bangladesh on 2 May 2008, killing more than 140,000. These natural disasters, as well as Hurricane Katrina in the USA in August 2005, provide timely lessons on how better to provide relief. CARAT allows the USA and other nations to be better prepared when disaster strikes. This type of HADR cooperation also needs to expand beyond just ASEAN, for many countries (e.g. USA, Australia, Japan) will want to respond in the event of another mass disaster in Southeast Asia. All these countries should know how to interact and work together, and this symbiosis can only be developed through everyday cooperation such as occurs in CARAT. This year Vietnam sent observers during the Singapore phase, the second time they have attended CARAT. Meanwhile,

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Bangladeshis were on hand in Brunei to watch proceedings there. Both countries have expressed a desire to be involved in CARAT, so it is quite possible these nations will be admitted as full participants at some stage in the future. Seeking a bulwark against Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea, Vietnam in particular is keen to cement closer ties with the USA. Vietnam is also one example of how basic the needs of many ASEAN countries really are. When asked what help Vietnam would like from the USA, their two biggest priorities were oceanographic and meteorological assistance - this was because they lost too many sailors at sea because they were not able to accurately predict the weather. This goes to show that war fighting is not always the top priority for many countries. There is also a possibility of CARAT moving beyond a one-on-one format towards a multilateral event. Since maritime security is truly a transnational problem, it requires a genuine multinational solution. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Mike Mullen, proposed the bold prospect of a “1,000-ship navy”. By this he meant an international coalition that leveraged regional partnerships, where vessels of the U.S. Navy would join together with other nations to create a formidable worldwide alliance able to tackle issues of maritime security. This proposal The USS Tortuga arrives at Muara, Brunei’s only deepwater port, ahead of the final CARAT phase on 3 August. (PHOTO: Gordon Arthur)

is partially being realised in CARAT as willing nations work alongside the USA.

Strategic implications The USA is actively pursuing a policy of engagement in Southeast Asia, and CARAT provides unequalled opportunities to build capabilities and cooperate with participating nations. Obviously it also increases the operational readiness of the world’s largest navy. When tackled on the question of whether China’s military expansion was a threat to the USA and if it gave added significance to CARAT, RDML Tyson gave a categorical denial. Instead she underscored the official USA policy of bringing China in as a partner - “If we get China to understand their role as a player on the global scene, then the better it is.” Rather than seeing China as a threat, the USA would prefer to engage China and get them to fulfil their role in promoting maritime security. “The challenge is to bring them into the fold,” said the Rear Admiral. While this might be the official line, USA would be seriously remiss in their strategic policies if they were not preparing to treat China as a significant threat in the near future. CARAT fosters good cooperation and positive relationships in Southeast Asia, and such alliances with the USA serve as a counterbalance to any future tension that may arise from China’s growth. Naturally, such stability is desired by both the USA and other regional

ASIAN MILITARY REVIEW

A member of the 1st Battalion of the Royal Brunei Land Forces waves down an approaching vehicle during Vehicle Checkpoint (VCP) training with U.S. Marines. (PHOTO: Gordon Arthur)

powers. While it is true the USA is pursuing a carrot rather than a stick approach in Asia, we might ask the question whether we will ever see China participating in CARAT at some point in the future. Perhaps such cooperation would be proof of success for Washington’s current foreign policy towards Asia and China. At this time it just does not seem likely somehow...so in the interim CARAT remains a AMR good way of keeping the stick sharp!

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AUSTRALIA

First KC-30B readied for final certification In July the first of the KC-30B multi-role tanker aircraft for the Royal Australian Air Force entered its final phase of ground and flight testing keeping it on schedule for a delivery in 2009. Officials said that the aircraft had successfully completed Phase I flight testing clearing the way for the final Phase II tests. During these trials the KC-30B will continue the ground and flight test programme allowing the aircraft to gets its final military certification and qualification. Preparations for Phase II include the installation of an updated state-of-the-art Boom Enhanced Visual System, the addition of the aircraft’s Remote Aerial Refueling Operator console and installation of military avionics systems. In parallel to work on the first aircraft the second A-330 being converted to the KC-30B role has arrived in Australia to begin conversion work. In all the RAAF is taking delivery of five aircraft.

Thales awarded radar support contract Thales Australia has secured a contract from the Department of Defence for the in-country support and sustainment for one of the Australian Defence Force's (ADF's) The Australian Man-portable Surveillance & Target Acquisition Radar (AMSTAR). The contract commences next month with the company's contract involving the maintenance, engineering, supply and operational support of AMSTAR. Officials said that the new initiative also represents a significant investment in the transfer of technology from the UK to Thales Australia. The AMSTAR is an all-weather surveillance radar that can be carried by two soldiers and operated by one, and is tailored to the ADF's needs. Thales is a leader in the ground surveillance radar market, with a portfolio of

capabilities covering all the major requirements from short-range radars for critical site surveillance to long-range radars for battlefield or border applications. Chris Jenkins, managing director of Thales Australia, said the contract provided Australia with a flexible, low-risk solution. 'Thales in Australia will have the skills on hand to support AMSTAR, and deliver expertise to the ADF exactly when and where it is needed,' he stated.

and covers the purchase of 57 M777A2s and 57 AN/VRC-91F Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems. Australia currently operates the 105mm Hamel howitzer and the 155mm M198 howitzer. Land 17 is the programme tasked with their replacement. As well as the M777 the Defence material Organisation is also evaluating the potential purchase of self-propelled system to update the ADF’s capabilities.

New chiefs begin work

RAAF to get L-3 Link F/A-18F trainers

In early July a new senior military leadership team took over command of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). The changes involved new appointments to the positions of Vice Chief of the Defence Force, Chief of Navy, Chief of Army and Chief of the Air Force. The outgoing chiefs, the Royal Australian Navy’s Vice Admiral Russ Shalders, the army’s Lieutenant General Peter Leahy and the Royal Australian Air Force’s Air Marshal Geoff Shepherd, all took part in a number of leaving ceremonies. The new chiefs respectively are Vice Admiral Russell Crane, Lieutenant General Gillespie and Air Marshal Mark Binskin. At the same time Lieutenant General David Hurley, previously the Commander Joint Operations became new Vice Chief of the Defence Force. The current Chief of the Defence Force, Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston, continues in post.

ADF to get M777 gun In a much predicted move the Australian Defence Force has opted for the BAE Systems M777 light-weight howitzer to fulfill part of the Land 17 artillery replacement project. The howitzer is being procured through a US Foreign Military Sale to Canberra and includes both the M777A2 155mm light-weight howitzers and associated equipment and services. The contract is expected to be some $248 million

ASIAN MILITARY REVIEW

L-3 Link Simulation and Training (L-3 Link) has been selected to produce two F/A-18F Tactical Operational Flight Trainers (TOFTs) for the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). The company said in July that it had received a contract from Boeing as a result of a contract award from the Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division for the TOFTs as part of a Foreign Military Sale to Australia. The two systems are scheduled for separate deliveries to RAAF Base Amberley in 2010. Each F/A-18F TOFT will consist of independent cockpits and visual display systems for both the pilot and weapons sensor officer. Using the trainers the RAAF’s F/A18F aircrews will be able to undergo a full spectrum of advanced tactical training. Each TOFT will be integrated with L-3 Link’s 360˚ SimuSphere visual display, SimuView image generator and Boeing’s simulated Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System to provide both pilots and weapons sensor officers with a completely immersive training environment. The company will also deliver two fully integrated mission briefing and debriefing systems that will capture all mission event data as the aircrews undertake air-to-air and air-to-ground simulated exercises. Following mission execution, RAAF aircrews will be able to evaluate their tactical performance and capture lessons learned to maximise training time.

REGIONAL NEWS A N D

NEW ZEALAND

RNZAF tests first upgraded Boeing 757 The Royal New Zealand Air Force’s (RNZAF) first of two aircraft (NZ7571) has completed successful test flights at Mobile Aerospace Engineering in Mobile, Alabama. The aircraft has had significant structural modification and officials said that the aircraft performed and handled well under the stewardship of an RNZAF 757 test pilot. Of particular interest was how the aircraft would handle with the changes having been made to the aircraft fuselage com-

bined with the increase in thrust from the engines. If the test programme continues on schedule the RNZAF hopes to have the aircraft signed over to the Ministry of Defence and then returned to New Zealand in the next two months. Two RNZAF Boeing 757 aircraft are currently undergoing a modification programme at Mobile Aerospace Engineering in Mobile, Alabama, and Boeing Integrated Defence Systems in Wichita, Kansas. The programme includes extensive airframe and avionics (navigation/communication) modifications.

SINGAPORE

RSAF purchases close to $1 billion of weapons According to the US the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) is in the process of securing a $962 million air launched weapons package under Washington's Foreign Military Sales programme. The city-state has requested a possible sale of a variety of systems including both air-to-air and air-to-ground systems. The buy includes: 72 AIM-120C-5 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM)

128 AIM-120C-7 AMRAAM

50 MK-82 (GBU-38) Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) with BLU-111 Warhead

71 AN/AVS-9 (V) Night Vision Goggles

50 Link 16 Multifunctional Information Distribution System-Low Volume Terminals (Fighter Data Link (FDL) Terminals)

30 AGM-154A-1 Joint Standoff Weapons (JSOW) with BLU-111 Warhead

30 AGM-154C JSOW

200 AIM-9X SIDEWINDER Missiles

8 Tactical-9X WGU-51/B Guidance Units

12 CATM-9X WGU-51/B Guidance Unit

100 KMU-556/B JDAM Bomb Tail Kit Assemblies

Also included are testing, integration, devices, missile containers, common munitions built-in test reprogramming equipment, aircrew safety equipment, mission data production sys-

The modified 757 will provide the RNZAF with the ability to rapidly change the role of the aircraft to any given task, converting from standard passenger configuration to a combination freight/passenger, full freight, Aero Medical Evacuation (AME) and VIP set up. The NZ$221 million dollar acquisition and modification project commenced in May 2003 when the RNZAF replaced its aging Boeing 727 aircraft. The second RNZAF 757 is expected to return later in the year with both modified 757 aircraft expected to be fully operational and available from early 2009.

tem, drones, repair and return, electronic warfare systems and support, weapons trainers, software support and test equipment, life support and survival equipment, and spares and repair parts.

Down-select for trainer aircraft made In July the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) took the next step in its advanced jet trainer project. The service had been evaluating three aircraft Alenia Aermacchi’s M-346, BAE Systems’ Hawk and the KAI/Lockheed Martin T-50 Golden Eagle. However, in the week before the Farnborough International Air Show defence officials announced that Hawk had been eliminated from the competition leaving two aircraft for further evaluation. BAE Systems’ officials told Asian military Review that it was a set back for the company’s ambition with the aircraft. It is now expected to focus its efforts on upgrades for existing Hawk customers. Now that the aircraft down-select has been made the focus of the competition moves to the prime contractor arrangements that the RSAF also wants to put in place. The long-term contract will be for the management and support of the country’s trainer programme. Some 10 companies have so far expressed an interest in this work and the RSAF is set to release the requirements for the tender. Responses are expected to be scheduled for return in the October timeframe.

SEPTEMBER 2008

D E V E L O P M E N T S

PAKISTAN

F-16 deliveries completed Acting commander of the US Central Command, Lieutenant General Martin E. Dempsey, was in Pakistan in late July to participate in a ceremony at Air Force Base Mushaf to mark the completion of deliveries of Pakistan’s F-16 Foreign Military Sales buy. In a ceremony also attended by head of the Pakistan Air Force Air Chief Marshal Tanvir Mahmood Ahmed Gen, Dempsey handed over the final four F16 fighters. It completes the delivery of 14 F-16 aircraft The first two aircraft were delivered in December of 2005 before a cooling in relations between the two countries. Deliveries were resumed in July 2007 when a further two aircraft were delivered. After another hiatus two more aircraft were delivered in February 2008 and a further four in June 2008.

REGIONAL NEWS A N D

D E V E L O P M E N T S

INDIA

AEW&C deal In July Embraer revealed that it had signed a contract with New Delhi for the delivery of three EMB 145 Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) aircraft to the Indian Air Force (IAF). The company said that the undisclosed value contract includes a comprehensive logistics package comprising training, technical support, spare parts, and ground support equipment. The ERJ 145 platform, being used in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance roles by Brazil, Mexico and Greece, will be part of the AEW&C programme under the responsibility of India's Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO). 'Embraer is proud to have the Indian Government as a customer. Our relationship started in 2003 with the purchase of five Legacy aircraft for transporting public officials,' said Luiz Carlos Aguiar, Embraer Executive Vice President, Defence and Government Market. 'In our commitment to a long-term relationship with the Indian Government, we look forward to continue collaboration in strengthening the country's airborne operational capabilities,' he added. The first aircraft is expected to be delivered in 2011. The three aircraft will be outfitted by DRDO with cabin equipment and mission systems including an indigenously developed phased array radar, and will join four Legacy jets in operation by the IAF used to transport Indian VIPs, as well as foreign dignitaries. The primary mission of the EMB 145 AEW&C (equipped with a powerful air surveillance radar and command and control system, plus a complete set of mission support systems, such as electronic measures, communication systems with data link, and self-protection devices) is to detect, track and identify targets in its patrol area and transmit this information to friendly forces, in order to provide them with an accurate and com-

prehensive operational picture. IAF concerns about the DRDO project mean that India is also separately procuring another AEW&C capability. In 2004 New Delhi signed a $1.1 billion deal with Israel Aircraft Industries for the delivery of three Phalcon AEW systems installed aboard three Il-76MD 'Candid' aircraft.

Augusta Westland. As well as offering the right aircraft all the companies will be expected to offer industrial offsets of at least 50 per cent. The aircraft the companies are being asked to offer are all off the shelf. Ongoing maintenance and support of the helicopters is to be handled by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd.

HAL roles out first Hawk The first Hawk Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT) being built under license by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) has been completed, industry officials confirmed to Asian Military Review at the Farnborough International Air show in London. HAL is building the BAE Systems aircraft under license from BAE Systems. At the same time BAE Systems said that it was working hard to resolve the outstanding issues with the Indian Air Force (IAF) on the aircraft that were reported here last month. A BAE systems spokesman said that the last problems were being ironed out. BAE Systems has a $1.75 billion contract to deliver a total of 66 Hawk AJTs to the IAF. Under the terms of the contract 24 of the aircraft are being built at the companyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Brough manufacturing facility in the UK with a further 42 being built under license by HAL.

Light helicopter tender launched In July the Indian government released a much-anticipated tender for light utility helicopters that could be worth up to $750 million. The tender is for 197 helicopters to replace the army and air force's ageing fleet of Cheetah and Chetak aircraft. The tender is expected to request deliveries of the aircraft to begin in 2010 with the army to take 133 aircraft and the Indian Air Force requesting 64 helicopters. The tender is being issued to six companies these are US manufacturers Bell Helicopters, Boeing, Sikorsky as well as Eurocopter, Rosenbroexport and

ASIAN MILITARY REVIEW

ATGM enters final test phase According to local reports, the indigenously developed 'Nag' (Cobra) fire-andforget anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) is nearing the successful completion of its trials and undertook final development tests in late July. As Asian Military Review went to press the ATGM was scheduled to conduct a further two days of trials in the Pokhran desert according to officials from Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO). A total of seven missiles were to be fired against both static and moving targets during the trials on 27-28 July The ATGM was first conceived over 20 years ago and DRDO has struggled to fully develop the system as requirements were incrementally adapted over that time. However, DRDO is satisfied that the Na, which has a range of four kilometres, is up to the job. If successful next week DRDO officials said that user trials of Nag by the Indian army would follow closely on the heels of the Pokhran trials. Currently officials are aiming for the first Nag systems to enter service by the end of this year. However, DRDO will have to struggle against the Indian Army's recent acquisitions of some 4,000 ATGMs from Russia and France to fill part of the capability gap that Nag is meant to occupy. The defence ministry is believed to be about to float new tenders for up to 4,000 more ATGMs in the near future. DRDO officials hope that their indigenous capability will be top of the list.

REGIONAL NEWS A N D

D E V E L O P M E N T S

SOUTH KOREA

MPA delivery delayed According to press reports in Korea in July, the delivery of refurbished US P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) to the Republic of Korea Navy (RoKN) has been delayed. The Korea Times quoted military sources as saying that the delay was due to technical problems with systems integration on the aircraft. Officials are worried that the delay will hamper the RoKN's abilities to develop independent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities in advance of the country taking wartime operational control of its armed forces in 2012 as the US presence in the country is drawn down. The original $496 million contract to buy eight upgraded P-3B MPA's was signed by Seoul in 2005 as a US foreign military sales project. According to the schedule delivery of the first aircraft had been expected to begin this month with the delivery phase to be completed by the end of 2010. Officials said that they now expected the first delivery to not occur before December this year due to difficulties in the US with the systems integration elements of the programme. The aircraft are having a number of new systems fitted in order to meet RoKN operational requirements. The RoKN currently now operates eight P-3C Update III aircraft and plans to deploy the further eight aircraft alongside these airframes. Under the terms of the 2005 contract L-3 Communications Integrated Systems in the US is responsible

MALAYSIA

RMAF to get ACMI system DRS Technologies and Malaysia's Aerotree Defence and Services signed a letter of intent (LoI) for the US company to furnish a complete Air Combat Manoeuvring Instrumentation (ACMI) system to the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) at Farnborough International Air Show in July. A signing ceremony at Farnborough Air Show was attended by the Malaysian Ministry of Defence Secretary General and the RMAF Chief of the Air Force. Aerotree will be the prime contractor to the RMAF under the terms of the agree-

for the upgrade of two of the P-3B to the P3C Update III configuration. The six remaining aircraft are to be the responsibility of Korea Aerospace Industries The upgrade of the aircraft includes a new sensor suite, and advanced data management, avionics and navigational systems, as well as a ground support system. It also includes a service life extension on the 1960s airframes, including rebuilding the wings.

Seoul has already purchased some 24 CN-235s from both Spain’s CASA and Indonesia’s IPTN the joint developers of the airframe.

Attack helicopter development

In a potential first for the region South Korea is believed to be looking at a deal to exchange two of its ageing diesel-electric attack submarines for Indonesian-built patrol aircraft. The possible deal was revealed to reporters in July ahead of talks between the two countries. The deal is believed to cover the exchange of two of the Republic of Korea Navy’s (RoKN’s) Chang Bogo class (Type 209) diesel-electric submarines for eight CN-235s. The RoKN currently has a fleet of nine Type 209’s but is also in the process of purchasing three updated Type 214 (Son Wonil class) vessels from Germnay’s Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft. The new boats, which include advanced systems such as Air-Independent Propulsion, are being built in South Korea by Hyundai Heavy Industries. The new vessels will greatly increase the RoKN’s capabilities allowing it to pair back the number of Chang Bogo class submarines.

According to local reports, Seoul has decided to indigenously develop its own helicopters in partnership with foreign defence firms rather than purchase an off the shelf capability. However, the project faces a challenging timeframe the army pushing for an initial capability deployable between 2013 and 2018. The Defence Acquisition Programme Administration (DAPA) made its final decision following a 19 month feasibility study of the Korea Attack Helicopter (KAH) project. The development of the aircraft is expected to cost between $5 billion and $10 billion, but follows Seoul’s continuing drive to bolster its defence industrial expertise. The KAH is expected to replace the army's aging fleet of AH-1S Cobra and Hughes 500MD TOW attack helicopters. However, in the interim Seoul is mulling the idea of purchasing 36 US AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopters as a gap filler before KAH comes on stream. The purchase is expected to cost some $864 million and will include an upgrade to the newest Block III standard. While Seoul continues to mull its option a number of leading helicopter manufacturers have begun positioning themselves for the KAH project.

ment. The LoI reflects the parties' mutual desire to enter into a definitive contract under which Aerotree would purchase the ACMI system for lease to the RMAF. The contract would be managed by DRS Command, Control and Communication (C3) Systems in Fort Walton Beach, Florida. Twenty two ACMI pods with associated spares, ground equipment, Air Combat Training Integrated Visualization Environment (ACTiVE) debriefing systems, training, maintenance and logistics support will be delivered within 18 to 24 months after the contract award. Options are expected to provide for six internal ACMI systems and

follow-on logistics support. The system will be used on various RMAF aircraft including the SU-30MKM, F-18D, MiG-29N, F-5E, Hawk, and MB-339CM. 'This letter of intent signals a new solution that will deliver a true state-of-the-art training system using the latest in computer processing technology,' said Richard Danforth, president of the DRS C3 business segment. 'DRS has delivered more pods to customers around the globe than all other competitors combined and this award further solidifies our position as the recognised leader in ACMI pod technology,' he added.

Submarine exchange pondered

ASIAN MILITARY REVIEW