Atlantic Books Today COVER FEATURE
Learning from post-crisis response An edited excerpt from Barry Cahill’s Rebuilding Halifax
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istorically, the most significant aspect of the Halifax Relief Commission, apart from its achievement, is its sheer uniqueness. Is there another instance of the federal government setting up a special operating agency in response to a catastrophic disaster, which the provincial government then incorporated with paramount powers rivalling, if not exceeding, those of the municipality where the disaster occurred? The commission’s evolution over nearly six decades had less and less to do with emergency management and more and more to do with its desire and capability to perpetuate itself. It did not want for resources, material or moral. The commission’s greatest achievement was recovery in all its problematic diversity—rehabilitation, reconstruction, victim compensation, rehousing, town planning, urban renewal. The commission recreated the “urban morphology” (Janice Miller’s term) of Halifax’s North End section that constituted the Devastated Area.1 The commission’s most obvious and On this subject generally see Paul A. Erickson, Historic North End Halifax (Halifax: Nimbus Publishing Ltd., 2004), 111–25. 1
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best-known legacy is the so-called “Hydrostone District,” a visionary exercise in urban planning that helped modernize the city of Halifax. In other respects, too, the commission was ahead of its time. It developed and implemented a town-planning scheme long before the City of Halifax did; and, through its hiring of qualified professionals at the very outset, helped introduce scientific social work to Nova Scotia. Through its cooperation with, support of and, latterly, direct involvement in the work of the Halifax branch of the Massachusetts-Halifax Relief Committee (afterwards the Massachusetts-Halifax Health Commission), the commission also contributed significantly to the improvement of public health in Halifax. All these contributions however, were tied to the early and most productive years. On the other side of the ledger, the commission’s longevity is a black mark. After 1921, when recovery had effectively concluded, the commission magnified its residual tasks—property management and services to pensioners and other survivors—assuming an air of indispensability with a view
Photo courtesy of Formac Publishing.
This excerpt from Barry Cahill’s Rebuilding Halifax shows how a terrible disaster provided an opportunity to modernize a city and create sweeping policy to help its residents well beyond their hour of greatest needs. On the flipside, the relief commission that was formed ignored the old charitable adage of aiming to put itself out of business by achieving its mission and eliminating society’s need for its services. In doing so, Cahill argues, the agency—“a free agent with easy access to political leverage on the federal scene”—robbed provincial and municipal governments (and therefore citizens) of the opportunity to determine their own fates. Therein lie lessons of what to do and what not to do in the face of disaster, when trying to build back better.
