Attaché Journal of International Affairs 2014-15

Editorial Board Editors-in-Chief Christian Medeiros & Kaleem Hawa

Managing Editors Emily Tsui & Reid Dobell

Senior Editors Sarah Harrison, Sarah Tan, Liam Brister, William Zhang & Eimi Harris

Design Editors Bardia Monavari & Maddy Torrie

Junior Editors Nathan Postma & Ana Mercedes

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Sponsors

Arts and Science Student Union

International Relations Program, Trinity College in the University of Toronto

University of Toronto Student Union

Trinity College in the University of Toronto

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Trinity College Meeting

Unversity of Toronto, Department of Political Science

University of toronto, Munk School of Global Affairs

International Relations Society, University of Toronto

The Attaché Journal of International Affairs

A Message from the director Dr. Mairi MacDonald Welcome to the 2014-15 issue of The Attaché. The journal, entirely created by students of the University of Toronto’s International Relations program, provides a forum in which undergraduates can showcase some of their best and most provocative work on international topics. The papers in this issue ably carry on this tradition.

They range geographically from the Middle East through Russia to Scotland, thematically from the age-old concerns of the central actors of international relations – diplomacy and the laws of war – to the role of NGOs and other non-state actors, and temporally from the Russian Revolutions of 1917 to the role of social media in 2015.

This range of topics and the students who have addressed it speak volumes about the strengths of the International Relations program.

From its essential base of support at Trinity College, the program seeks to equip all our students with the tools to tackle complex international problems of global importance – those we foresee now, and those we cannot foresee. The program combines multidisciplinary analysis in economics, history and political science with interdisciplinary perspective to train tomorrow’s leaders, not only in how to approach multifaceted issues with tools drawn from a range of relevant disciplines, but in when and how to choose and combine the analytical paths that will lead to results that are both robust and sensitive to differing perspectives.

Congratulations to the team of editors and writers who bring you this issue of The Attaché. May you find plenty of food for thought in its pages.

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letter from the Editors-In-Chief Christian Medeiros & Kaleem Hawa Dear Reader, Over the last couple years on campus we have seen a renaissance and proliferation of academic journals. Part of that movement was motivated by established journals like the Attaché who decided to think bigger and to take their mission more seriously. Undergraduates are in a challenging position; they are the lowest in the academic food chain, their degrees have become commoditized, and their job prospects are bleak—all while facing unprecedented pressure to succeed.

Undergraduate journals such as the Attaché, offer an opportunity and respite for students to explore and achieve recognition for impactful research they are passionate about. We strive to empower undergraduates by providing an outlet for their voices. Whether you are a writer, an editor, a reader, or a casual passerby: we hope that this journal give you faith in the tireless work you do, the caliber of your mind and that of your peers and the fascinating world that we live in.

This issue will continue this publication’s long tradition of multi-disciplinarily and broad academic focus. Within these pages you will first find an article contextualizing secessionist attempts from diaspora communities within the precedents of international law – an essential companion to the recent Scottish referendum. After that, readers will stumble upon a piece on the pernicious effects of diplomatic immunity and its complex interactions with international corporate liability. This is followed up by a piece on the role of non-governmental organizations in international human advocacy against torture and another on the legal issues presented by the bin Laden raid and assassination. Following these examinations of law, peace, and conflict, comes a two-piece set focusing on traditional security and international relations, in the context of historic and contemporary Russia.

The first, examining the Great War as an ideological foundation for the Cold War, the second is an unpacking Russia’s resurgence as a

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“Great Power” under Putin. Insofar as these two articles provide an interesting narrative and temporal arch from past to present, the journal’s final piece on social media’s impact on diplomacy is a reflection on the future.

As the current and future Presidents of the International Relations Society respectively, we sought to better integrate the Attaché journal with its parent organization’s yearly academic programming. This meant the introduction of a dedicated global health section in this year’s journal that highlighted the impressive array of speakers secured the 2015 IR Society conference on Global Health. We see this as a vibrant complement to the material already featured in this edition.

As always, we must thank our editors for their hard work in producing this final product. From our Managing Editors Reid and Emily, to our design team Bardia and Maddie, to our first year representatives Nathan and Ana – all were instrumental to our work this year. Thank you to Mairi Macdonald and Marilyn Laville and the never-ending support from the International Relations department. A huge thank you goes to Jane Seto and the tireless ASSU team, as well as to our other vital sponsors.

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs

IRSOC CONFERENCE Health and High Politics: State Interests in Health Equity and Security Ana Mercedes, Kaleem Hawa & Hayden Rodenkirchen

Each year, the University of Toronto International Relations Society hosts a full-day academic conference. This year’s conference, “Health and High Politics: State Interests in Health Equity and Security,” focused on the intersection of international relations with questions of global health governance and health equity. Panel one, “The New Health Landscape,” discussed the evolving international political dimension of health, charting its arrival as an “interest” in politics among states. Moving into a discussion on practical considerations and action, panel two, “Global Collaboration in Action,” considered how positive outcomes in global health could be better achieved by the collaboration of actors outside the traditional scope of international relations, including but not limited to NGOs, private companies, and academic institutions. Finally, panel three, “Stress-Tests in Health Collaboration,” considered the long-term abilities of states to tackle emerging health security challenges, including pandemics, a rising incidence of non-communicable disease, and increasing strain on existing institutions for healthcare provision.

The day of lively discussion started with a keynote address from Dr. Peter Singer, CEO of Grand Challenges Canada, an organization funded by the Government of Canada and dedicated to supporting “Bold Ideas with Big Impact in Global Health.” Dr. Singer began by defining the extreme scope of today’s global health challenges. Contemporary international development results are simply unacceptable from a human perspective. Approximately 6.3 million children die globally each year before reaching the age of five. To combat disturbing statistics like these, Dr. Singer advocates collaborative state and civil society support for social, business, and scientific/technological innovation in delivering healthcare solutions to the world’s poor. He noted that, to governments, such innovation is more than an abstraction: states have a direct interest in the potential for innovative solutions to promote economic growth and to reduce dependency on international development. Dr.

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Singer called for ambitious, inter-sectoral action on global healthcare that focused on innovative models for healthcare provision. His consideration of the practical limitations of existing institutions provided an excellent basis for the day’s discussions, which addressed each of these themes in turn.

Our first panel, “The New Health Landscape”, featured University of Toronto Professors Jillian Kohler and Joy Fitzgibbon, as well as University of Toronto Law School student Amy Tang in discussion on the place of global health as an evolving area of state concern. Professor Kohler focused on the extreme complexity of international health systems and their consequent vulnerability to corruption––which brings with it institutional, political, and overwhelming human cost. Professor Joy Fitzgibbon, taking another view of the global healthcare sector’s complexity, argued that cooperation between states and their civil societies to form epistemic networks and best practices around healthcare challenges is crucial to preventing “stupid deaths”. Finally, Amy Tang lent a legal perspective to state interests in global health, chronicling the evolution of international law since World War Two and the creation of legal obligations incumbent upon states to maintain accessible and acceptable healthcare services for their citizens. The consensus between all three discussants was that global health is a growing area of state concern which, given the subject’s complexity, requires action not only from states, but from the institutions and civil society actors which comprise them.

The day’s second panel, “Global Collaboration in Action”, brought together Professors Mandana Vahabi and Helen Dimaras of Ryerson University and the University of Toronto, respectively, with internationally acclaimed global health practitioner and activist Dr. James Orbinski. The panelists discussed what the international, inter-sectoral cooperation identified by panel one practically requires. Professor Vahabi pointed to each institution’s acknowledgement of its essentially humane role as essential to success, using barriers to healthcare provision faced by new Canadian immigrants as an example of what can go wrong when this imperative is ignored. Professor Dimaras, meanwhile, showed that healthcare practitioners implementing solutions overseas must act in substantive collaboration with communities receiving those services if they are to have any lasting impact. Finally, Dr. Orbinski discussed how increased globalization has the potential to exacerbate pandemic threats and how the burgeoning prominence of non-govern-

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs mental organizations in the global health sphere will pose substantial challenges and opportunities for collaborative efforts.

The day’s last panel, “Stress Tests in Health Collaboration” focused on the capacity of contemporary institutions to handle healthcare challenges. Professor Haris Ali showed that physical infrastructure and effective communication channels are key to combatting communicable disease, using the response in Singapore and Toronto to an outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) as comparative case studies. Professor Leslie Davidson of Columbia University considered, by contrast, the non-communicable healthcare challenge of disability, and the potential for new methods of epidemiological data collection to dramatically reduce their institutional burden. By way of conclusion, Dr. Ophira Ginsburg discussed the global impact of cancer and noted that while promising “high tech” innovations are extremely important to combatting the disease, equally so are “low tech” efforts to combat stigma and increase the accessibility of basic surgical procedures to the world’s poorest people. Together, the panelists suggested that it is often at a basic level––the arrangement of physical infrastructure, the organization of information, or simple outreach to poor communities–– that contemporary healthcare fails.

We at the International Relations Society were thrilled by the day’s rich discussion. Most exciting, however, was the scope of student participation. Over 100 students from across the university’s international relations and global health communities joined us at Health and High Politics, a historically high number for our Society’s conference. Numbers like these speak to the place of the International Relations Society in the extracurricular experience of students at the University of Toronto. They point also to the University of Toronto’s undergraduate student body as an active driver of academic life within the university as a whole. On behalf of the executive of the International Relations Society executive, thank you for your participation in our 2014-15 conference.

We look forward to seeing you again this year!

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Contents For God and Country

P. 1

AdItya Rau

Secessionism and the International Status Quo Dionne Boahene

P. 12

Accounting for the Resurgence of Russia as a so-called ‘Great Power’ under Vladimir Putin

P. 16

Jerome Newton

Diplomacy 2.0: The Impact of Social Media on Diplomacy in the Middle East

P. 30

Sebastian Dutz

The Evolution of Diplomatic Immunity and Corporate Liability in International Law

P. 41

Derakhshan Qurban-Ali

The Third Force: Amnesty International’s Role in the Creation of the UN Convention Against Torture

P. 51

Minah AhN

Revolution, Non-Recognition, intervention: The Great War as the Ideological Foundation to the Cold War Haley O’Shaughnessy

P.63

The Attaché Journal of International Affairs

For God and Country - Geronimo, Geronimo, Geronimo: The Legality of the bin Laden Raid and Assassination under International Law ADItya Rau

Aditya is a fourth-year student at Trinity College, working towards a Specialist in Political Science. His academic areas of interest include foreign policy and political theory. Outside the ivory tower, his focus turns to innovative solutions for social impact that lie at the intersection of policy, culture and design. For God and Country was written as his term paper for POL340: International Law.

On May 2nd, 2011, under the cover of a moonless night, seventy-nine American Navy SEALs descended upon a compound in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad.1 Their mission, codenamed Operation Neptune Spear: to capture or kill Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda and mastermind behind the September 11th, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Centre. President Obama and senior administration officials watched from the White House Situation Room as, “SEALs [moved] methodically, scanning different angles, searching [for bin Laden] while protecting one another”.2 Entering a bedroom on the third floor, one of the SEALs rushed towards bin Laden’s two wives, smothering them in case of an improvised explosive device being triggered.3 Another stepped forward, firing kill shots into bin Laden’s chest.4 Back in Washington, President Obama deemed a ten year global manhunt complete - “We got him”.5 As President Obama memorialized those who had been lost on Sep1 Cooper, Mark Mazzatti, Helene Baker, and Peter Baker. “Clues Gradually Led to the Location of Osama Bin Laden.” NYTimes.com. May 2, 2011. Accessed February 12, 2015.

2 Bowden, Mark. “Inside Osama Bin Laden’s Final Hours—and How the White House Chose Their Assassination Plot.” Vanity Fair. October 12, 2012. Accessed February 12, 2015.

3 Bergen, Peter. “Did Robert O’Neill Really Kill Bin Laden?” CNN. November 4, 2014. Accessed February 12, 2015 4 Bowden, Mark.

5 Cooper, Mark Mazzatti, Helene Baker, and Peter Baker

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs tember 11th in the chilling image of “[t]he empty seat at the dinner table” the dramatic finale to the search for America’s most wanted fugitive was met with jubilation and acclaim.6 Among the plethora of reactions were questions concerning the legality of the capture or kill mission under international law. This paper will offer a critical analysis of the international legal issues that underscore the Osama bin Laden raid. The paper will argue that under international humanitarian law, or the law of war, the United States was legally justified in targeting and killing Osama bin Laden. Specifically, the paper will undertake an examination of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello frameworks, applying them to the Osama bin Laden case. Finally, the paper will also consider whether, in the context of the politics of morality, the legal killing of Osama bin Laden can be considered just under international law.

The principles concerning the legality of entering into the use of force - jus ad bellum - suggest that the United States was legally justified in pursuing and killing Osama bin Laden. The Charter of the United Nations clearly establishes conditions for the use of force - Article 2 prohibits the use of force “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”7 Article 51 provides a caveat, however, noting that “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, [only] if an armed attack occurs” [emphasis added] against a UN member state, remains unperturbed.8 Determining if the United States was acting in self-defense in its killing of bin Laden is contingent on whether the September 11th, 2001, attacks meet the legal definition of ‘armed attack’. Arriving at such an understanding is challenging since the UN Charter lacks specificity in its definition of an armed attack.9 In particular, the Charter fails to account for permitted responses in the case of an armed attack being carried out by nonstate actors. Given that an understanding of the parties which stake a claim to the use of force has evolved to include “elaborate non-state based networks,”10 the belief that “an armed attack requires an ele6 “Remarks by the President on Osama Bin Laden | Whitehouse.gov.” May 2, 2011. Accessed February 11, 2015.

7 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI 8 Ibid.

9 Hodgin, Sonny L. “Killing Osama Bin Laden: Legal And Necessary - Widener Law Review.”

Widener Law Review 20.1 (2014): 1-25. 2014. Accessed February 12, 2015 10 Shah, Sikander A. International Law and Drone Strikes in Pakistan: The Legal and Socio-political Aspects. New York: Routledge

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Aditya Rau ment of state-sponsored action is no longer appropriate […] international law must adapt to the new reality of the threat to global peace and security promulgated by non-state actors”.11 This establishment of “instant customary international law” to include terrorist activities under the definition of armed attacks confirms that the United States was, in fact, legally at war with al-Qaeda, borne out of self-defense.12

Further analysis of the bin Laden raid under jus ad bellum principles shows that the operation was permissible according to the Caroline doctrine, and the notion of anticipatory self-defense. The Caroline doctrine, put forward by United States Secretary of State Webster, states that the use of force for the purpose of self-defense must show that “necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation”.13 Concomitant with these criteria are the principles of “imminence, necessity, and proportionality,” which together inform a modern reading of the Caroline doctrine - one which suggests that an armed attack “need [not] occur before a state may use force to counter a threat”.14 Considered in its totality, the Caroline doctrine is complemented by the principle of anticipatory self-defense. Anticipatory self-defense asserts that if states believe an attack is imminent, they “retain the right to launch a defensive military strike upon an expected aggressor state in order to thwart” a potential attack. 15 Recognizing that “international law is not a suicide pact,” Beres posits that the jus cogens understanding that states will always ensure their security means that in certain cases, assassination is permissible as a means of anticipatory self-defense.16 In addition, since the bin Laden assassination did not risk the territoriality principle or political independence of another state, but was instead carried out as an act of self-defense, assassination was in fact permissible.17 11 Hodgin, Sonny L. 12 Shah, Sikander A. 13 Kearly, Timothy. “Raising the Caroline.” Wisconsin International Law Journal 17.2 (1999): 32546. Accessed February 12, 2015.

14 Howard A., Wachtel. “Targeting Osama Bin Laden: Examining the Legality of Assassination as a Tool of U.S. Foreign Policy.” Duke Law Journal 55.4:677-710. Accessed 12 Feb, 2015.

15 Rothwell, Donald R. “Anticipatory Self-Defence in the Age of International Terrorism.” University of Queensland Law Journal 24.2 (2005): 337-53. ProQuest. Web. Accessed 12 Feb.2015.

16 Beres, Louis R. “After Osama Bin Laden: Assassination, Terrorism, War and International Law.” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 44.1/2 (2011): 93-147. ProQuest. Web. Accessed 12 Feb. 2015.

17 Ibid.

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs Another consideration of jus ad bellum principles demands an evaluation of states’ right to respond with force against a continuing threat.

This evaluation, again, affirms the United States’ legal right to carry out a capture and kill mission against bin Laden. Wachtel cites Parks, who notes that in the case of a “‘a continuing threat’”, active defense theory - i.e. the accumulation of events theory - may be applied as an international legal framework.18 This theory notes that in the case of a pattern of aggression by terrorist organizations, the use of “preemptive strikes” offers a form of pragmatic response to the realities of terrorist behaviour.19 Recognizing that the letter of international law - such as Article 51 of the UN Charter - is often unable to lend clarity to many active international legal conflicts/cases, the direct application of active defense theory furthers the ideas of the theory of anticipatory self-defense and jus cogens norms about state security; thus, in this case, where the United States has provided evidence of a series of active and passive threats to national security, made by al-Qaeda under the command of bin Laden, the United States has a right to unilaterally effect a military mission so as to eliminate a threat.

Finally, further analysis under jus ad bellum principles points to concerns regarding the legality of the United States’ actions within Pakistan’s territory i.e. whether the principle of territorial sovereignty was violated. President Obama had decided not to inform Pakistan about the operation for fear that the information would leak.20 By the time Pakistan had “finally scrambled two F-16s [in response to the raid], the American force was safely across [the Pakistani border]”21 into the Afghan city of Jalalabad. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Salman Bashir’s subsequent condemnation of the United States’ “violation of sovereignty” throws into relief the legal ramifications of pursuing non-state actors into the territory of UN member states.22 Rogers and Dominic argue that the absence of Pakistan’s consent means that the United States’ actions were in clear violation of Article 2 (4) of the 18 Wachtel, Howard A 19 Ibid.

20 Schmidle, Nicholas. “Getting Bin Laden.” The New Yorker. 1 Aug. 2011. Web. Accessed 12 Feb. 2015 21 Bowden, Mark.

22 Bowcott, Owen. “Osama Bin Laden Death: Pakistan Says US May Have Breached Sovereignty.” The Guardian. 5 June. 2012. Web. Accessed12 Feb. 2015.

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Aditya Rau UN Charter, which states that member states cannot use force against the “territorial integrity” of another state.23 John B. Bellinger III, former legal adviser to the U.S. Secretary of State, echoes this belief, arguing that the United State’s use of force in Pakistan, without the latter’s consent, constituted a violation of international law.24 However, in the case of “overriding necessity of self defense,”25 which places Article 2 (4) and Article 51 (allowing for self defense in the case of an armed attack) in conflict - or if Pakistan was unknowing of, or unwilling to, effectively respond to bin Laden’s presence within the state though ignorance would be hard to feign considering the nearby location of the “prestigious Kakul military academy in Abbottabad, the West Point of Pakistan” and the accompanying security in place - the United States could be said to have a right to conduct a military operation on Pakistani soil in order to fulfill national security objectives. 26 The legality of the United States’ decision to militarily engage al-Qaeda - whether jus ad bellum principles were met - is certainly without question. This paper, then, turns to a specific examination of the military action that ensured during the bin Laden raid. In particular, the paper will consider jus in bello standards and their application to the United States’ actions during Operation Neptune Spear. jus in bello demands that the “legal standards of necessity, proportionality, distinction and humanity” are met in the application of force.27 This paper will consider each standard in turn, suggesting that each was in fact satisfied in the raid to capture or kill bin Laden.

The legal standards of necessity and proportionality are inherent to customary international law.28 In the Case Concerning Oil Platforms ruling, the International Court of Justice cites the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, noting that the exertion of force stemming from the right of self-defense demands “measures which are proportional to the armed attack and 23 Ibid.

24 Hodgin, Sonny L. 25 Ibid.

26 Rogers, APV, and Dominic McGoldrick. “Assassination And Targeted Killing - The Killing Of Osama Bin Laden.” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 60.03 (2011): 778-88. Web. Accessed 12 Feb. 2015.

27 Hodgin, Sonny L. 28 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 6 November 2003.

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs necessary to respond to it”.29 States using force must provide evidence that their decision to do so was, in fact, necessary to respond to an armed attack by an aggressor state or non-state actor; that is, whether or not an action is indispensable for securing the enemy position (gaining a significant military advantage) and ending the conflict as quickly as possible.30 In the case of the bin Laden assassination, the necessary condition is one that demanded a consideration of whether capturing or killing bin Laden would eliminate any threat that he, and by extension al-Qaeda, posed to the United States’ national security interests.31 Recognizing that bin Laden was responsible for the “bombings of two American embassies, the bombing of a U.S. Navy warship, […] attacks on the Twin Towers, and an attack on the Pentagon,” his assassination would result in an weakening of al-Qaeda’s leadership and a strengthening of United States’ national security.32 The necessity to eliminate future threats was compounded after the fact, with CIA analysts determining from retrieved intelligence that “bin Laden had remained […] involved in the operational activities of al-Qaeda […] developing plans to assassinate Obama and [United States General David] Petraeus, to pull off an extravagant September 11th anniversary attack, and to attack American trains”.33 Although one cannot claim that the assassination of bin Laden led to a cessation of conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda, the Abbottabad raid did render the United States a significant military advantage, thus satisfying the condition of necessity.

The standard of proportionality was also met by the United States’ military forces in their execution of Operation Neptune Spear. Sterio defines proportionality as a standard in which a state’s use of force must be “proportionate to the military campaign’s objective”.34 In cases of military action, such as the bin Laden raid, states must evaluate whether the collateral damage (damage to civilians and property) caused by the action is disproportional to the military advantage achieved.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Sterio, Melina. “The United States’ Use of Drones in the War on Terror: The (Il)legality of Targeted Killings Under International Law.” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 45.1/2 (2012): 197-214. Case Western Reserve University Law School. Web. Accessed 12 Feb. 2015.

32 Hodgin, Sonny L. 33 Schmidle, Nicholas.

34 Sterio, Melina.

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Aditya Rau International legal principles provide clear restrictions under the standard of proportionality - Article 51 (1) of the Additional Protocol I specifically prohibits indiscriminate attacks against civilians, by means of bombardment; and Article 57 (2, ii) demands that the “means and methods of attack [must minimize] incidental loss of civilian life”. In considering potential means by which to carry out the bin Laden raid, United States Navy Admiral McRaven, commander of the United States Special Operations Command, ruled out bombing.35 McRaven and the United States Air Force determined that the payload to be dropped on a compound of that size, in order to eliminate a high value target, would “kill everyone inside the compound and quite a few people nearby […] houses that were close the the compound […] would be destroyed”.36 President Obama concurred with McRaven’s analysis, dismissing an aerial bombing unless the blast radius could be significantly reduced.37 The decision to use SEAL Team Six to carry out the raid was intended, therefore, to minimize casualties and maximize intelligence gathering - the condition of proportionality was met in “the surgical precision” of the strike.38 Critics will argue that the four other deaths during the raid mean that proportionality was not satisfied. This objection, however, disregards the practical realities of a firefight in close quarters, the threat of five armed, or potentially armed, combatants - none of whom surrendered to the SEALs and the military advantage gained in comparison to the collateral damage caused.39 In addition, the United States took great care to ensure that disruption to the local area and the involvement of non-combatants was minimized: a translator was positioned on the dirt road in front of bin Laden’s compound, encouraging people to return to their homes as the chaos - communicated to locals as a security operation - erupted.40 Thus, as is evident from the United States’ national security team’s decision making, the standard of proportionality in the use of force was indeed met.

The standards of distinction and humanity are also required to be 35 Bowden, Mark.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Hodgin, Sonny L. 39 Hall, Mimi and Johnson, Kevin, “Only One of Five People Killed during Bin Laden Raid Was Armed.” USAToday.com. 5 May. 2011. Web. Accessed 12 Feb. 2015.

40 Schmidle, Nicholas

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs fulfilled in a state’s exertion of force. Sterio defines the principle of distinction as one that requires parties exerting force to “distinguish at all times between combatants and civilians […] [this only] permits targeting of individuals ‘who commit specific acts likely to influence military action’”.41Legal advisors to the International Committee of the Red Cross note that membership in an armed group - or combatant status - is dependent on “whether the continuous combat function assumed by an individual corresponds to that collective exercised by the group as a whole […] whether [a person has] direct participation in hostilities”.42 Melzer further argues that an individual is considered to serve a continuous combat function if he/she is involved in the “preparation, execution or command of acts of operations amounting to direct participation in hostilities”.43 As has been stated, the patterns of al-Qaeda’s and bin Laden’s behaviour, as well as retroactive CIA intelligence revealing bin Laden’s plans to execute future hostilities, suggest that bin Laden could indeed be conferred combatant status, and consequently, could in fact be targeted.

Alternative legal interpretations may argue that bin Laden was an unlawful combatant and, thus, could be lawfully targeted for the duration of a conflict. The Third Geneva Convention, which outlines the treatment of prisoners of war, extends certain rights to the members of armed forces who are lawful combatants. These combatants are identified in Article 4 (2, a-d) of the Third Geneva Convention as having, inter alia, “a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at distance; [and distinguished by] carrying arms openly.” Schmidle notes that bin Laden was “wearing a tan shalwar kameez and a prayer cap on his head,” confirming a lack of distinctive dress. Curiously, reports note that the SEALs found bin Laden clearly unarmed, with “weapons on the shelf in his bedroom”but not on his person; i.e. the possession, or lack thereof, of arms on his person was clearly visible.44 Bowden identifies the crux of the legal issue at hand - “[w]hen he was shot he had not been surrendering, but neither had he been resisting” - hinting at the reality that although the Obama administration would go 41 Sterio, Melina.

42 Melzer, N. Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law. Geneva: Cambridge U, 2008. International Committee of the Red Cross, May 2009. Web. Accessed 12 Feb. 2015.

43 Melzer, N. 44 Bowden, Mark

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Aditya Rau on to reiterate that bin Laden’s potential surrender would have been honoured, “the SEALs had no intention of taking bin Laden alive”.45 There appears here to be a clash between the letter of intentional law and the realities of military operations on a global stage. This paper, however, affirms that bin Laden could have been identified as either an armed combatant or unlawful combatant (thus, not afforded rights under the Third Geneva Convention), with both labels allowing for him to be legally targeted under international law.

Finally, the humanity standard must be considered in the context of the bin Laden case. This principle requires that military operations involving force show “a bias toward minimizing death, destruction and human suffering as much as possible”.46As the SEALs moved through the compound in Abbottabad, hostiles were eliminated swiftly.47 Moreover, after wounding bin Laden during their ascent to the third floor, SEALs were quick to seriously incapacitate Amal, bin Laden’s wife, by shooting at her leg and, subsequently, eliminating bin Laden - codename Geronimo - with rapid killing shots.48 No children were harmed in the raid; all nine in the compound, ranging in age from two to twelve years, were placed into Pakistani custody.49 The evidence provided here, as well as the arguments made for meeting the standard of proportionality, confirm that the humanity principle was met by the United States.

In considering both jus ad bellum and jus in bello principles, this paper has undertaken a comprehensive review of whether the United States’ raid on the Abbottabad compound, and assassination of bin Laden, was permissible under international law. Evidence points to the view that both actions were legal under a variety of international legal frameworks. This paper will now consider arguments that fall within the scope of the politics of morality, using Kenneth Roth’s (Executive Director of Human Rights Watch) belief that “that the killing [of bin Laden] was justifiable but [unjust]”as a point of departure.50 The distinction between ‘justification for’ and ‘justice for’ is 45 46 47 48 49 50

Ibid.

Hodgin, Sonny L. Mazzetti, Cooper and Baker Bowden, Mark Mazzetti, Cooper and Baker Berkowitz, R. “Assassinating Justly: Reflections on Justice and Revenge in the Osama Bin

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs certainly of interest to legal scholars. Many who believe that justice was not served by bin Laden’s assassination advocate for the idea that he should have been captured and put on trial. The importance of a trial is highlighted by the perception that legal proceedings reflect the “foundational idea that justice must be seen to be done”.51 Hannah Arendt supports this view, commenting that if “‘[j]ustice is a matter of judgement,” then trials are, in fact, critical for the execution of justice.52 However, in Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt posits, alternatively, that the justification for Israeli forces kidnapping Eichmann and taking him to Israel to stand trial was “the unprecedentedness [sic] of the crime.53 [Yet, there was perhaps] one real alternative […] the Israeli agents could have killed him right then and there, in the streets of Buenos Aires”.54 In this sense, Arendt condones assassination in situations where “the facts of the case [are] beyond dispute”.55 She draws upon the Schwartzbard trial - where Schwartzbard was accused and later acquitted (albeit in a mistrial), of murdering Symon Petlura for the pogroms in Ukraine - as precedent for this argument, a case in which the facts of the case were once again indisputable.56 Berkowitz notes that Arendt’s moral consideration stresses that “he who takes the law into his own hands will render a service to justice only if he is willing to transform the situation in such a way that the law can again operate and his act can […] be validated”.57 In the case of the bin Laden raid, President Obama stated that in the case of bin Laden’s surrender, “displaying the due process and rule of law would be [the United States’] best weapon against al-Qaeda, in preventing [bin Laden] from appearing as a martyr”.58 This statement parallels Arendt’s belief that justice must be served in the public realm. However, since the United States was responding to an armed attack where the facts of the case - a pattern of threats and bin Laden’s operational leadership - were indeed beyond dispute, the nation’s adherence to the Laden Killing.” Law, Culture and the Humanities 7.3 (2011): 346-51. Sagepub. Web. Accessed 12 Feb. 2015.

51 Berkowitz, R. 52 Ibid.

53 Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, revised and enlarged edition [1965] (New York: Penguin Books), 1977.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

56 Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, revised and enlarged edition [1965] (New York: Penguin Books), 1977.

57 Ibid.

58 Bowden, Mark.

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Aditya Rau principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello in their execution of the operation reflects the golden rule of international law - the categorical imperative to which Arendt herself alludes to. Ultimately, although ‘justification for’ and ‘justice for’ operate in tandem for the bin Laden case, international legal scholars must recognize that future cases may require a difficult reconciliation of both ideas.

The United States decision to pursue and assassinate Osama bin Laden was legal under several international legal frameworks. Responding to an armed attack by way of anticipatory self-defense, the United States was legally justified in declaring war on al-Qaeda, whose leadership had demonstrated a pattern of posing threats to the United States’ national security. Furthermore, in carrying out Operation Neptune Spear, the United States demonstrated compliance with the standards of the jus in bello principle - necessity, proportionality, distinction and humanity. The interesting parallel between ‘justification for’ and ‘justice for’ in the bin Laden case is also reason for optimism amongst international legal scholars. One must hope that the letter of international law and its moral premises remain intrinsically linked as the challenges of an inter-connected and uncertain world present themselves.

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs

Secessionism and the International Status Quo A Critical Annotation of Milena Sterio’s “International Law Should Matter – Thoughts on the Proposed Scottish Secession” Dionne Boahene

Dionne Boahene is a fourth year student at the University of Toronto pursuing a BA(Hons.) in Economics and International Relations. This article was originally an assignment for a senior undergraduate course in International Law.

I

nternational law is in need of ‘a normative framework on secession’ to guide the international community in evaluating separatist movements.1 This is the position advanced by legal scholar and professor Milena Sterio in her recent Opinio Juris article, “International Law Should Matter – Thoughts on the Proposed Scottish Secession” which analyzes the 2014 Scottish referendum and the larger notion of secessionism in international law. She asserts that ‘international law should develop a norm containing a positive legal right to secession under certain circumstances.’2 Sterio’s position is credible, yet her analysis is not explicit about how such a right would operate within an international system that prioritizes sovereignty and territorial integrity.

While the likelihood of a ‘positive legal right’ to secession being passed by the Security Council is slim, international law could instead develop a procedural norm to supervise the process of secession when 1 Milena Sterio, “Scottish Independence Insta-Symposium: International Law Should Matter – Thoughts on the Proposed Scottish Secession,” Opinio Juris, September 17, 2014, http://opiniojuris. org/2014/09/17/scottish-independence-insta-symposium-international-law-matter-thoughts-proposed-scottish-secession/.

2 Sterio, “International Law Should Matter.”

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Dionne Boahene cases do inevitably arise. Such a development in customary international law could see states, and the international community at large, constructively address secessionist claims. Secessionism is admittedly a controversial issue in an international system that strives to manage the proliferation of new states and in which sovereignty and territorial integrity are paramount. It is therefore difficult to imagine a ‘positive legal right to secession’ which would not undermine these principles.

Any such right would risk disturbing the established balance of the international state system,3 and encourage secessionist movements from otherwise dormant separatist groups. Sterio highlights the imperative fact that current international law has evolved to tolerate the prospect of external self-determination outside of its originally intended purpose for former colonial states.4 External self-determination permits a people to secede ‘only in the most extreme of cases’5 when their rights to internal self-determination have been blocked. She asserts that this development is indicative of an emerging discourse about the efficacy of a positive secessionist framework.6 Yet Sterio is unclear about how a right to secede would differ from the principle of external self-determination as it is understood in current discourse. Although self-determination is hailed as an essential principle in international legal theory, states are often averse to its practical implications when used by separatist groups to justify secession. Accordingly, a ‘positive legal right’ is unlikely to find cross-cutting support within this current international system. As it stands, the international community deals with secessionist disputes on a case-by-case basis; this is a strategy in which critical importance is placed on how preceding cases have been handled.

The precedent set by emerging secessionist cases dictates international legal norms, which, in turn, will govern how future cases are handled. Sterio notes that the legality of separatist movements is first analyzed from a domestic perspective. In Scotland, the 2014 referendum was deemed to be within the framework of British law. Consequently, the case became more of a national issue with international law taking 3 Ivan A Shearer, Starke’s International Law 11th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994), 13, quoted in John H. Currie et al., International Law: Doctrine, Practice, and Theory 2nd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc, 2014), 356.

4 Sterio, “International Law Should Matter.”

5 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217, paragraph 126.

6 Sterio, “International Law Should Matter.”

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs a back seat.7 The Scottish case followed the precedent set by the 1995 Quebec referendum. Both referenda were held with the cooperation, however reluctant, of national authorities. The Supreme Court of Canada has explicitly stated that had there been a yes vote, independence would not have been obtained without substantially more domestic negotiation;8 the Scotland case was modelled on a similar principle.

Both cases demonstrate a procedure of addressing a separatist group that could be adopted as customary in international law. But admittedly, these are relatively uncomplicated cases. The governments of Canada and the United Kingdom acknowledged the possibility of secession. Quebec and Scotland voted down independence and therefore, sovereignty and territorial integrity were maintained. This does not mitigate the efficacy of these examples as models for future cases, but rather renders them applicable only under specific circumstances.

More complicated cases arise when the sovereign authority refuses to acknowledge the separatist group’s ambitions. Since such cases are more nuanced, they are rarely held as exemplars of international legal procedure. Yet, Sterio states that a precedent may have been set by the 2008 Kosovar declaration of independence. She posits that international law “post-Kosovo may be analyzed as tolerating a limited right of secession.”9 This ‘limited right’ is consistent with the established principle of external self-determination and far from the ‘positive legal right’ Sterio advocates. Still, the Kosovo case is worth analyzing with respect to the procedure adopted. Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence came after a vote held by the Kosovar parliament. Despite condemnation by the Serbian government, the ICJ subsequently ruled that the Kosovar declaration of independence ‘did not violate any applicable rule of international law.’10 Contrary to the Quebec and Scotland examples, Kosovo pushed to secede without the involvement of Serbian authorities. For separatist groups whose claims are ignored by their sovereign governments, there seems little alternative to this procedure. This precedent set by Kosovo has been invoked by South Ossetia and Abkhazia in an ef7 Sterio, “International Law Should Matter.”

8 Reference re Secession of Quebec.

9 Sterio, “International Law Should Matter.”

10 Currie et al., International Law, 370.

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Dionne Boahene fort to legitimize their own secession.11 This procedure for unilateral secession is not ideal and comes with a number of drawbacks, the most pertinent of which is the problem of recognition. The Republic of Kosovo is currently only partially recognized. Since secession is such a controversial issue in international law and in international relations, many states are unwilling to recognize secessionist groups for fear of setting precedent. This phenomenon occurs particularly with governments which are countering separatist movements within their own state. Spain, Israel, and Greece are each fighting some form of secessionism within their own borders and have consequently refused to acknowledge the precedent set by Kosovo. 12 Cases such as the Kosovar example create an opportunity for greater participation from the international community. Sterio posits that factors such as an ‘examination of territorial history ... an evaluation of the mother state’s responsiveness ... and an overall assessment of the regional stability and security’ could be included in the ‘normative framework on secession’ that she so strongly advocates.13 Her position is not unwarranted however, as the current international system is wary that secessionism would disturbs the status quo that states are largely in favour of. The prospect of establishing a ‘positive legal right’ to secession is consequently rendered moot, particularly in light of that fact that such a right would undermine the political interests of a number of the veto powers on the UN Security Council. Since the international community cannot implement a positive right to legally dictate which groups can and cannot successfully secede, international law can endeavour to constructively address secessionist cases as and when they do inevitably arise. Instead, the prospect of a procedural norm for secession recognised in customary international law could be a step towards the ‘normative framework’ Sterio calls for.

11 Sterio, “International Law Should Matter.”

12 Sterio, “International Law Should Matter.”

13 Sterio, “International Law Should Matter.”

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs

Accounting for the Resurgence of Russia as a so-called ‘Great Power’ under Vladimir Putin Jerome nEWTON

Jerome Newton is a fourth year student at Trinity College studying International Relations. He wrote this essay for TRN410: Topics in International History.

His research interests include late-Soviet history and international investment law.

The notion of ‘great power’ status has always been central to Russia’s national identity. The end of the Soviet Union in 1991 thus created a perceptual disparity between Russian beliefs about its rightful status and the geopolitical reality of the post-Cold War era. Attempts to assert itself in foreign policy terms in the 1990s were met with foreign ambivalence. Even after its economic resurgence, it considered persistent Western disregard for its foreign policy as a growing threat against its national interests. Only near the end of Vladimir Putin’s second term, during which extreme rhetoric and military force were used to assert its interests, did it achieve success in slowing what it perceived as encroachment in its ‘near abroad.’

This essay examines the causes of Russia’s resurgence as a ‘great power’ under President Vladimir Putin since 2000. By defining ‘great power’ in terms of the Russian concept of derzhavnost, it approaches the topic from the perspective of Russia’s historically entrenched attachment to dominance of its geographic neighbourhood and to notions of ‘strong man’ leadership. It applies this concept to Russia’s history since the election of Boris Yeltsin.

This essay contends that Russia’s resurgence as a ‘great power’ is the consequence of Russia’s increasing aggression towards the perceived

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs encroachment of Western states and their institutions in its geographic sphere of influence. Domestically, this was brought about by tremendous popular opposition to President Boris Yeltsin, whose reforms, policies, and behaviour built a clamour for stronger leadership. This in turn made possible the rule of Vladimir Putin, whose nationalist policies and resistance to the West have engendered consistent popular support at home. These developments were undergirded by the persistence of derzhavnost and Western misunderstanding of the fundaments of Russian foreign policy thinking. Whereas the end of the Cold War changed much, it did not change the Russian way of thinking.

Russia’s resurgence as a ‘great power’ under Putin cannot be understood outside of the larger continuum of Russian history. For hundreds of years, Russian foreign policy has been undergirded by a common sense of national identity, purpose, and place in the world.

This notion is epitomized conceptually in the term derzhavnost, which translates roughly as ‘great power-ness.’1 This phrase contains a multitude of nebulous yet reducible beliefs about how Russia believes it ought to act and be seen.2 In Kremlin Rising, Peter Baker and Susan Glasser characterize derzhavnost’s international focus as a pre-occupation with a priori foreign policy influence and ‘great power’ status – derzhavnost is understanding Russia as a ‘great power’ by natural right.3 This tends to coincide with domestic preferences for “patriotism, appreciation of traditional values…and at the same time authoritarianism, dictatorship, and disregard for civil rights.”4 Derzhavnost has characterized Russian foreign policy behaviour for centuries. The term was used as far back as the 12th century in the Kievan Rus period, but examples of the practice are plentiful.5 In 1561, 1 Bobo Lo, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy, Royal Institute of International Affairs, (London: Blackwell and Chatham House, 2003), 13.

2 Mikhail Stoliarov Federalism and the Dictatorship of Power in Russia (New York: Routledge, 2003). 6.

3 Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, Kremlin Rising, in Robert Levgold, ed., “Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century and the Shadow of the Past” (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 113.

4 Stoliarov, Federalism and the Dictatorship of Power in Russia, 6.

5 Robert Levgold, Russian Foreign Policy during Periods of Great State Transformation, in Robert Levgold, ed., “Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century and the Shadow of the Past” (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 114.

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Jerome Newton Ivan IV insisted upon the protraction of the Livonian War because an even partition of the former Livonia would have insulted Muscovy’s natural superiority to Poland, Lithuania, and Sweden.6 Peter the Great characterized the modernisation and expansion during his reign as a reaction to the threat of European powers. Shortly before his death in 1725, he noted that “all other nations...were reluctant to admit us to the light of reason in all matters and especially military affairs, but they did not succeed in this…all human minds are nothing against the will of God and this must be emphasized.”7 Russia’s wariness of industrialized Meiji Japan and its defeat in the 1904–5 Russo-Japanese War emphasized the relevance of ‘sphere of influence’ factors to Russian foreign policy calculus. In the Soviet period, Stalin forcefully industrialized the Soviet economy and created the Eastern bloc buffer zone to ensure that his country was both competitive with and secure from external threats.8 In attempting to understand the path of Russian resurgence since 2000, it is necessary to understand the depth of derzhavnost. The dissolution of the USSR diminished Russia’s international standing to an unprecedented degree and upset traditional Russian psychology.

This essay emphasizes that the attitudes of Russia’s leaders and its populace towards regaining ‘great power’ status have been central to its history since 1991. They have been at the heart of Russian foreign policy for centuries, and were at the heart of the sequence of events that led Vladimir Putin to power in 2000 and to the re-emergence of Russia as a power under him. This essay understands ‘great power’ status in these terms.

The presidency of Boris Yeltsin positioned the Russian economy and its political structures for strong state leadership under Putin. The reforms Yeltsin enacted between 1991 and 1999 created domestic chaos and intensified clamour for change, accentuated by his own personal problems. By end of his presidency, the Russian people sought 6 David R. Stone, A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya (Westport, CT: Prager Publishers, 2006). 15.

7 Levgold, Russian Foreign Policy, 115.

8 Ronald G. Suny, Living in the Hood: Russia, Empire, and Old and New Neighbours, in Robert Levgold, ed., “Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century and the Shadow of the Past” (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 83-4.

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs a capable leader who would serve Russian interests. The nationalistic Putin was exactly that.

The ‘shock therapy’ economics of Yeltsin and Yegor Gaidar were central to the collapse of living standards that created popular hatred for reform and its advocates. The eradication of price controls and barriers to trade, enactment of constrained fiscal and monetary policies and high borrowing from the International Monetary Fund implemented between 1991 and 1993 imposed significant hardship on Russians.9 Consequent hyperinflation, which rose from about 1200 per cent in January 1992 to 2500 per cent a year later, led to the evaporation of state pensions, the continuous decline of spending power, and a poverty rate as high as fifty per cent.10, 11 These problems were compounded by the degradation of the internal business environment. Yeltsin’s acceleration of the privatisation measures begun under perestroika placed substantial wealth in the hands of Russian nomenklatura. This method of privatisation massively favoured company employees, who controlled 51 per cent of all shares in state companies.12 The wider public’s lack of information about privatisation auctions and the devaluation of the ten thousand rouble ‘share vouchers’ allowed shrewder employees to consolidate ownership of state corporations quickly.13 Within government, persistent controls on the price of energy and other tradable goods created a huge market for export licenses – essentially a right of arbitrage – in what Stephen Kotkin terms “pre-corruption.”14 Consequent capital flight brought vast sums of wealth to new Russian business interests (many of whom later became instruments of Yeltsin’s political power), but was also premised on the import of expensive foreign goods to Russia.15 The emergence of this criminal grey economy 9 John Olding-Smee, The IMF and Russia in the 1990s, International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 53 (2006). 181.

10 Russia Inflation Rate, 1991-2015, Trading Economics.

11 Piroska Mohacsi Nagy, The Meltdown of the Russian State: The Deformation and Collapse of the State in Russia (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2000). 32.

12 Celestine Bohlen, Yeltsin Outlines Sale of Industry, The New York Times, 20 August 1992.

13 Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 130.

14 Kotkin, Armageddon Averted, 125-128.

15 Kotkin, Armageddon Averted, 128.

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Jerome Newton problematized both social and economic conditions. On one hand, by 1994 seventy per cent of private businesses paid protection money to racketeers equal to as much as half of their profits.16 On the other, industrial production fell more than forty-six per cent between 1992 and 1998.17 The early war between legislature and President, a consequence of these reforms, was essential to the reconfiguration of the Russian presidency upon which Putin later capitalized. Under the 1978 Russian Constitution, the power of the Congress of Peoples’ Deputies was theoretically limitless, but its relationship to the new presidency was unclear. Its attitude to Yeltsin declined rapidly after the effect of his reforms became clear. A 1993 poll suggested that two-thirds of Russians believed that the West’s economic advice was a deliberate attempt to weaken Russia – precisely the sentiment conservatives and communists in the Congress sought.18 Growing opposition culminated in its refusal to confirm Gaidar as prime minister in early 1993 and the March impeachment attempt thereafter.19 Yeltsin’s September decree, dissolving the Congress and its Supreme Soviet, underscores his conviction that there was no other way to end a “fruitless and senseless fight to the death” between branches of government.20 The Supreme Soviet’s refusal to disband resulted in the standoff of 3 and 4 October, when KGB forces loyal to Yeltsin attacked the White House (the seat of the legislature) and forcibly ended the resistance.

Yeltsin thereby seized the right to answer the constitutional question about Russia’s executive-legislature relationship and set the precedent that executive power could be altered more or less without cost to the leader.

If Yeltsin had begun his presidency with any hope of maintaining accountable democracy, the 1993 Constitution surrendered this notion.

Replacing Congress with the State Duma and Federation Council had 16 Levgold, Russian Foreign Policy, 91.

17 Levgold, Russian Foreign Policy, 90.

18 Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010). 75.

19 Daniel Treisman, The Return: Russia’s Journey from Gorbachev to Medvedev (New York: Free Press, 2011), 211. This included giving Yeltsin permission to issue decrees for one year.

20 Treisman, The Return, 51.

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs the symbolic value of making the legislature a function of presidential whims. The new constitution expanded Kremlin power in other ways that later served Putin’s dominant rule.21 Its ‘super-presidential’ structure made the officeholder virtually unimpeachable. Yeltsin also enshrined in it the President’s right to issue decrees and dissolve the Duma as he saw fit.22 Scholars often underplay the consequences of 1993 for democracy in Russia. Mark Adomanis notes that the October crisis is ‘almost completely ignored’ when putting Putin’s authoritarianism in historical context.23 Yet the political structure that permits that practice was forged in the upheaval of 1993. In the two decades since the crisis, the branches of government made no attempt to reassert themselves.

Boris Yeltsin’s domestic reforms are typically understood in two ways. In the West, Yeltsin is portrayed as a reformer who temporarily brought liberal values to Russia. To Russians, he is understood as a “state destroyer” who tore down communist institutions and failed to build adequate replacements.24 More precisely, his presidency is one of contradiction. His rise to power in 1991 hinged on the aggressive repudiation of communist economics, and his initial reforms followed through on those promises. The pursuit of progress and, later, self-preservation led to the institutionalisation of authoritarianism and corruption, compromising his revolutionary principles for power. Crucially, this contradiction created the perfect structures and public desire for the strong leadership that Vladimir Putin could satisfy. But Yeltsin, afflicted by personal problems and the erroneous perception that he alone had deprived the Russian people of their wellbeing, could never assume that role. As Andrei P. Tsygankov states, “[Yeltsin] could have made either a great revolutionary or a great leader of Russia. The tragedy of Russia and his personal tragedy was that he could not be both.”25 Vladimir Putin’s rise to power and constant popularity domestically 21 22 11.

23 24 25

21

Treisman, The Return, 55.

Lilia Shevtsova, The Problem of Executive Power in Russia, “Journal of Democracy” (2000), Mark Adomanis, The Forgotten Crackdown, Forbes, 21 June 2013.

Tsygankov, The Strong State in Russia, 99.

Tsygankov, The Strong State in Russia, 99.

Jerome Newton was in large part a consequence of his strong leadership contrasting with Yeltsin’s weakness. Although Yeltsin’s revolution had rested on his populism and strength as a campaigner, his leadership style and personal problems contributed to Russian disdain in both government and the wider public. In addition to domestic perception that he capitulated to American interests, his public drunkenness and frequent heart attacks undercut the image of strength that Russians sought.26 That the worst of Russia’s economic problems occurred during his Presidency tarnished his popularity massively. By the end of his presidency, approval ratings were below five per cent.27 In contrast, Putin’s behaviour and personal history resounded well with the Russian public. His career in the KGB and frequent displays of classical masculinity (hunting and judo, among others) contrasted well against Yeltsin’s late-term catatonia. In his first two terms, approval never fell below sixty per cent.28 Putin’s consolidation of power and contribution to national stability were also the product of good timing complementing Yeltsin’s weakness. The outgoing President’s virtual nonresponse to the 1999 Moscow apartment bombing gave Putin the opportunity to differentiate himself even before his inauguration. His nationalistic address to the Duma led to a 24 per cent rise in his popularity. Thereafter, he based his campaign on the promises of “eradicating extremism” and “building a strong state.”29 As Lilia Shevtsova notes, “the Russian audience finally saw what it wanted…a strong man in the Kremlin…they were tired of watching Yeltsin fall apart.”30 Indeed, his election with 53 per cent of the vote was resounding, particularly given the high popularity of communist candidates just four years earlier.

Putin’s rise was also supported by the fortuitous surge in the Russian economy, able to benefit from the capitalist reforms Yeltsin had suffered to implement. Putin’s admirers also attribute the economic recovery in large part to the economic reforms of his first term. In 26 Jean MacKenzie, Bad Heart Hospitalizes Yeltsin Again [with timeline of medical issues], The Moscow Times, 27 October 1995.

27 Tsygankov, The Strong State in Russia, 104.

28 Tsygankov, The Strong State in Russia,103.

29 Tsygankov, The Strong State in Russia, 104.

30 Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, 37.

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Jerome Newton the early 2000s, the government reformed the national tax code and implemented cuts to income and capital gains taxes in an effort to promote investment. Although the new government had a large role in building currency reserves to control the exchange rate and inflation, the earlier fiscal policies were devised by Yeltsin’s government in the late 1990s – another contribution of the Yeltsin years from which Putin drew political benefit. 31 Stephen Kotkin gives more credit to Putin’s reforms, pointing to the ‘stagnation’ of Russia’s economy after oil prices rose above $100 per barrel.32 However, the slowing of GDP growth is as much attributable to saturation of Russian supply as it is to price. Moreover, much of the foreign investment Kotkin lauds was in oil and gas, upon whose high prices foreign corporations like BP and Shell were trying to capitalize. Overall, however, Treisman’s analysis that “Russia’s vigorous recovery after 1998 owed little to Putin’s early liberal reforms” holds truer.33 Yeltsin had endured the turmoil of transforming the Soviet economy into something closer to a modern capitalist state. Putin’s fortunate timing allowed him to capitalize on subsequent boons.

Like Russian leaders before him, Putin successfully appealed to Russian ideals of derzhavnost by connecting internal politics with foreign and security policy. Although Yeltsin gained substantial control over state media after 1996, his successors put state power to greater use in engraining rhetoric against Western encroachment. For example, the suppression of independent TV-6, as well as the media stations of oligarchs Boris Berezhovsky and Vladimir Guinsky, removed popular outlets opposed to the government and its hawkish attitude to international relations. Concurrently, growing state ownership of major media outlets allowed the state to control the narrative of foreign policy engagements.34 By 2010, Russia’s two largest TV news channels, accounting for almost 40 per cent of national viewership, were stateowned.35 A host of other TV and print media were also controlled by 31 Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, 236.

32 Stephen Kotkin, The Resistible Rise of Vladimir Putin, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2015.

33 Treisman, The Return, 236.

34 Sarah Oates and Gillian McCormack, The Media and Political Communication, In White, Stephen, ed., Developments in Russian Politics 7 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010). 128.

35 Oates and McCormack, 128.

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Jerome Newton the government.36 As The Economist argued, “The media can create and hunt enemies both in the country and abroad, blaming Russia’s troubles on traitors and ill-wishers.”37 This increased control, remarkably, has coincided with growing public support for Russian foreign policy. Public support for Putin, perpetually much higher than Yeltsin’s, spiked during periods of Russian assertiveness abroad when Putin deployed anti-Western rhetoric or launched military excursions.38 As Warren Cohen argues, “the people were willing to tolerate the deterioration of their new found freedoms in exchange for an increase of their sense of security.”39 Thus, although Putin’s rise had much to do with timing and differentiation, his domestic policy appealed to the popular understanding of good leadership; viz. the maintenance of a strong state that could support Russia’s concern with security and strength on the international stage.

On that stage, the reassertion of Russia’s great power status was crucially a product of NATO and European expansionism. Under Putin, Russian foreign policy became less tolerant of NATO member states as their involvement in the Russian sphere grew. Like Yeltsin’s, Putin’s early presidency was characterized by a cooperative attitude toward the West. However, the essential grappling between NATO’s determination to expand and Russia’s growing sense of isolation remained a central theme, particularly during Putin’s second term. Excluding the early acceptance of the Bush administration’s withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Putin’s assertiveness marked an elevation from Yeltsin. Most resoundingly, at the 2007 Munich Conference on Security Policy, he declared,

“I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust.” 40 36 Dreams About Russia, The Economist, 15 February 2014.

37 Dreams About Russia, The Economist, 15 February 2014.

38 Denis Volkov, Putin’s Ratings: Anomoly or Trend?, Institute of Modern Russia, 23 Demeber 2014.

39 Warren Cohen, The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Vol. 4: Challenges to American Primacy, 1945 to the Present (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2014). 280.

40 Transcript: Putin’s Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, Washing-

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Jerome Newton Like the Yeltsin presidency, NATO expansion plans nonetheless gave little heed to Russian fears. The accession of the Baltic states in 2004 placed NATO in Russia’s historical “near abroad”, yet gave little apparent strategic advantage to NATO.41 At the accession ceremony, US President George W. Bush conveyed this perceptual gulf by arguing that “NATO is acting to meet the challenges of our time… widening the circle of its friends, by creating a new chapter in our relationship with Russia.”42 The announcement of the Anti-Ballistic Missile shield system in 2007 and the European Union’s Eastern Partnership in 2008, both after the Munich conference speech, attested to Western disregard for Russian geopolitical concerns – or at least the assumption that Russia would be compliant. Rhetorical opposition peaked after the Bucharest NATO summit of April 2008, at which NATO members considered offering admission to Georgia and Ukraine. Alexander Grushko, Russia’s deputy foreign minister, declared, “Georgia’s and Ukraine’s membership in the alliance is a huge strategic mistake which would have most serious consequences for pan-European security.”43Although these protestations became louder as the object of NATO expansion plans neared the Russian border, the idea remained on NATO’s agenda until the 2008 Georgia War. Mirroring the perceived encroachment of NATO, Russian foreign policy towards states in its geographic neighbourhood became more aggressive. Both Yeltsin’s and Putin’s agendas were guided by the same end: to keep the ‘near abroad’ diplomatically close. The signature of the Russia-Belarus Union treaty in 1996 and the Russia-Ukraine friendship treaty in 1997 illustrated Yeltsin’s growing commitment to close relations with CIS states after his re-election.44 Although preventing separatism in the Caucasus was largely unsuccessful, Russia also brought the Central Asian states closer through heavy investment ton Post, 12 February 2007.

41 Laurence Peter, Why Nato-Russia relations soured before Ukraine, BBC, 2 September 2014.

42 Remarks by US President George W. Bush at the NATO Accession Ceremony, NATO, 29 March 2004.

43 John H. Mearsheimer, Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s fault, Foreign Affairs, September/ October 2014.

44 Tsygankov, Change and Continuity, 117.

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Jerome Newton in border security (ostensibly to prevent them slipping into the Iranian or Chinese spheres).45 The use of force was not unique to Putin’s presidency, either. Persistent military support in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria – regions with significant ethnic Russian minorities – affirmed the continuing connection between Russian nationalism and foreign policy. Although the 1999 Pristina incident was an “emotional response” to the Kosovo War, it showed that even Yeltsin’s docility had limits.46 Under Putin, however, the regional exercise of ‘great power’ escalated. Its hostility grew in step with the perceived threat that regional states would fall out of the Russian sphere. Putin’s support for Victor Yanukovich in the fraudulent Ukrainian election of 2004 contributed to impressions that Putin would use more devious machinations to achieve regional control – regardless of the substance of his involvement in that corruption.47 He was also more than willing to use Russia’s new economic power to cut Ukraine’s gas supply after price disagreements in early 2006.48 The Georgia War of 2008 represented Putin’s abandonment of rhetoric as a deterrent to perceived encirclement.49 This shift was reflected earlier in a 2007 Russian Foreign Ministry review, which declared that Russia’s position in the world had and would “become significantly firmer.”50 Crucially, the exercise of hard power was successful – plans to invite Georgia into NATO faded from the US foreign policy agenda. During Putin’s first term, the object of Russian regional foreign policy did not change, but the means by which Russia attempted to achieve these ends changed significantly. Thereby, Russia staked the claim that derzhavnost was once again an apt description of its foreign policy practice.

The underlying cause of changing attitudes towards Russia in the foreign policy sphere – the impetuses that, from the Russian viewpoint, necessitated reinforcing its derzhavnost – are twofold. First, the deep45 Tsygankov, Change and Continuity, 117.

46 Levgold, Russian Foreign Policy, 120.

47 Treisman, The Return, 102.

48 Peter Rutland, Russia as an Energy Superpower, New Political Economy 13 (2008). 5.

49 Rutland, Russia as an Energy Superpower , 5.

50 Oliver Crone, Putin’s Army: Between Decline, Reform and Revival, in Michel Korinman and John Laughland, eds., Russia: A New Cold War? (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2008). 76.

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Jerome Newton ening of perceived foreign encroachment into the Russian domain made passivity more politically challenging. In the 1990s, NATO expanded into the former Eastern bloc, long employed as the USSR’s ‘buffer zone’ against the West, and its military adventures in the region were transient. In the 2000s, it expanded into the former USSR. The Eastern Partnership was perceived to take those post-Soviet states on a path towards permanent political alignment with the West.51 Putin’s willingness to interfere in Georgia, Ukraine and other areas of Russia’s near abroad was a product of the growing threat that they would fall out of Russia’s remaining sphere of influence, essential to its status as a ‘great power.’ Thus, the extent of Russian tolerance changed.

Changes in global political leadership during this period were also crucial to the shift in policy orientation. Western conceptions of Russia and its foreign policy behaviour have been closely linked to the relationships and attitudes that leaders have developed with Russian presidents. The close rapport between Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton was essential for mitigating Russian anger over US and NATO foreign policy in the 1990s. Perhaps the most important means to this end was Clinton’s support for integrating Russia into global institutions. His desire to drive Russian economic and democratic development underlay his offer of G8 membership.52 This suited Yeltsin well, because it formalized Russia’s membership among the world’s great powers. Tsygankov contends that it was this relationship, and the pretence of Russian inclusion and integration, that secured the 1997 Founding Act in exchange for Yeltsin’s acceptance of the first round of NATO enlargement.53 This is supported by Primakov’s speech that December, in which he referred to the Act as a major accomplishment and evidence of Russia’s diplomatic success (much to the anger of the domestic audience).54 Clinton’s interest in Russian international integration gave the United States the leverage to force his NATO agenda without effecting a strong Russian response. Even Yegor Gaidar wrote that Clinton had seemingly done “the impossi51 Mearsheimer. Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s fault.

52 Angela Stent, Reluctant Europeans: Three Centuries of Russian Ambivalence toward the West, in Robert Levgold, ed., “Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century and the Shadow of the Past” (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 419.

53 Tsygankov, Change and Continuity, 104.

54 Tsygankov, Change and Continuity, 104.

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Jerome Newton ble…to implement NATO enlargement without causing irreparable damage to either democratic elements in Russia’s political establishment or to US-Russian relations.”55 In his memoirs, Strobe Talbott provides some insight into how Clinton’s unwavering support for Russia’s struggle with domestic reform might also have served to prevent Yeltsin taking more extreme action on the international stage.

He writes, “Every time we mentioned an area for possible assistance – humanitarian relief, energy, housing, agriculture, stabilisation of the currency – he asked why we couldn’t do more.”56 Clinton’s support for Russia and Yeltsin cultivated a relationship that delayed the exercise of greater Russian assertiveness over NATO enlargement and its activities in the Balkans – at least until 1999.

In contrast, the more oppositional relationship between Putin and George W. Bush made it difficult to smooth over foreign policy conflicts. The absence of political leverage and Putin’s more nationalistic policy stances prevented the cultivation of a comparably long-lasting relationship. Although Bush and Putin were united in their stance on the War on Terror, this entente did not survive the expansion of American unilateralism for long. In particular, Putin set the tone for his second term through a 2005 Shanghai Cooperation Organization communique that demanded a timeline for the end of the War.57 Both the ideological gulf and the lack of any kind of concession to soften American and NATO expansion plans made foreign policy negotiations difficult and less productive. America lacked a “trump card,” as Talbott termed Clinton’s unique ability to make Yeltsin seem to be an important leader on the international stage.58 By his independence from the United States, Putin created that impression on his own. At their final meeting, Bush and Putin praised a “respectful relationship” that had endured the “steady deterioration of relations since 2001.”59 By his intractability, Putin elevated the perception that Russia could no longer be disregarded as it had under Yeltsin. Putin 55 Angela Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999). 227.

56 Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy (Toronto: Random House of Canada, Ltd., 2002). 52.

57 Levgold, Russian Foreign Policy, 2098.

58 Talbott, The Russia Hand, 348.

59 Steven Lee Myers, Bush and Putin, at last meeting, agree to disagree, New York Times, 7 April 2008.

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Jerome Newton was willing to follow through on the rhetoric that Clinton had been able to contain.

The end of the Cold War plunged Russia and its people into an economic and psychological crisis whose recovery occurred in lockstep with growing political assertiveness abroad. Over that time, Russia’s politicians and population never relinquished the ideas deeply entrenched in their history. The intimate connection between domestic stability and foreign policy strength made the reassertion of internal control an essential part of restoring Russian national security. Russia’s resurgence as a ‘great power’ depended upon its ability to dominate its historical sphere of influence. Ultimately, pressure to do this was born of persistent Western encroachment against Russia’s historical interests and the perceptual gulf between Russia and the West.

Central to this was overcoming the instability and weakness that paralyzed Yeltsin’s presidency. Whilst Russia’s recovery far from re-elevated it to the status it enjoyed in the Soviet Union, the evolution from Yeltsin’s protesting acquiescence to Putin’s bellicosity was significant.

From the Russian standpoint, the resurgence of ‘great power status’ was less a restructuring of the country than a return to its rightful place in the world. Growing foreign policy assertiveness forced Western states in particular to be warier of Russian interests while simultaneously vindicating the Russian perception – derzhavnost – that the power and respect it was due had not dissipated.

Western scholarship and media since 2008 has largely characterized the return of Russia’s practice of ‘great power politics’ as the persistence of a Cold War anachronism. However, the political calculations that have motivated that behaviour are grounded in centuries of obsession with Russian protection from foreign threats. Its persistence is in many ways directly opposed to the growth of the international institutions of which Western states are the main proponents.

But when contextualized in derzhavnost, Russians’ preference for strong domestic leadership and increasingly aggressive foreign policy were quite predictable. If NATO had not expanded and the United States had not mounted forays into Russia’s ‘near abroad,’ it is unlikely that Russia’s resurgence would have been discussed internationally in terms of ‘great power.’

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs

Diplomacy 2.0:

The Impact of Social Media on Diplomacy in the Middle East

Sebastian Dutz

Sebastian is a fourth year joint-specialist in International Relations and Peace, Conflict and Justice. His research interests include the impact of information and communications technologies on development, diplomacy, and conflict. He will be studying international law next year at New York University. This paper was written for a political science intensive course titled The Middle East and International Diplomacy: Today and in the Future.

The development of social media has changed the way information is processed and social relationships are formed. Twitter, Facebook and YouTube are powerful new tools that can be used to resolve or entrench conflict. As a result, social media has become an important component of diplomacy, posing both new opportunities and new problems. This paper examines how social media strategies of public diplomacy are used and abused in the pursuit of peace in the Middle East. Analysis will focus on the use of social media by state and nonstate actors in the region. While social media is a double-edged sword, its positive benefits for diplomacy appear to outweigh its downsides.

The rise of digital media is fundamentally changing the practice of both Track I and II diplomacy. Consequently, this change should be welcomed and accelerated by both official and unofficial diplomats.

Diplomacy therefore can, and needs to be improved through social media.

Social media refers to “Internet-based applications that enable people to communicate and share resources and information.”1 New platforms such as Twitter and Facebook are the result of a revolutionary shift in media from a communications model of “one-to-many” to one of “many-to-many.” Initially, the Internet was composed of static websites where users could only view content. Like old media such as state television, information came from one source, forcing 1 Thorsten Hochwald, “How Do Social Media Affect Intra-State Conflicts Other than War?,” accessed March 21, 2014, 11.

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Sebastian Dutz the audience to be passive. With social media, there is no longer a state monopoly of control of the media. Social media technologies are centered on user-generated content, online collaboration, information sharing and collective intelligence2, with the user being active rather than passive.

Social media technology originated in North America, but has since spread worldwide. The ascendance of new media in the Middle East is a continuation of a process initiated by the creation of Al-Jazeera in 1996.3 Initially, social media dealt with the personal, not the political.

However, this has changed in recent years, as is evidenced by the change in Twitter’s slogan from “How are you doing?” to “What’s happening” in 2009.4 Social media is merely an additional layer of open communication for those in the developed world, and can often lead to inane conversation. However, in developing regions like the Middle East, it has had a near revolutionary impact, because it is the only means of open communication. As a result, social media use is highly significant in the Middle East. As of June 2012, there were approximately 90 million Internet users in the region, indicating that 40% of the population is connected to the Internet.5 Of those that used the Internet, 88% frequently used social media. Additionally, social media usage in the Middle East is not just prominent, but is also growing rapidly. The total number of Facebook users in the Arab world grew from a mere 14 million in 2010 to 55 million in 2013.6 While Twitter has fewer users, the estimated number of tweets produced per day in the Middle East is 10 million, showing a substantial flow of communication. As these statistics demonstrate, the effect of social media in the Middle East is an especially pertinent area of inquiry. Social networks have practically replaced the old public sphere previously occupied by traditional meeting places, such as the “suq” or the mosque.7 2 Brett Van Niekerk and Manoj Maharaj, “Social Media and Information Conflict,” International Journal of Communication (Online), May 1, 2013, 1163.

3 Philip M. Seib, Real-Time Diplomacy: Politics and Power in the Social Media Era (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 44.

4 Seib, Real-Time Diplomacy, 45.

5 “Middle East Internet Usage Statistics, Population, Facebook and Telecommunications Reports,” Middle East Internet Usage Statistics, Population, Facebook and Telecommunications Reports, accessed May 8, 2015.

6 Arab Social Media Report (Dubai School of Government, 2013).

7 Mahmood. Monshipouri, Democratic Uprisings in the New Middle East : Youth, Technology,

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs In theory, social media plays an important role by shaping the political views of its users. The theory of media discourse refers to “interactions that take place through a broadcast platform… in which the discourse is oriented to a non-present user.”8 This theory claims that individuals do not rely on political views as a basis for forming relationships, but instead shift their political attitudes towards those of their social contacts after a relationship is formed. Social media technologies such as Facebook can thus be seen as means of forming relationships, which in turn inform political views and more broadly, identity. Social media has also been lauded as a tool for mobilizing action, especially in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. As the Egyptian uprising demonstrates, social media, in the virtual realm, can help lead to change in the physical one. With this in mind, politics still comes first. It is a mistake to attempt to understand the role of any media in any political process, without first thinking about the political environment. As a result, the effect of social media depends heavily on this context. For example, Gulf countries exhibited the highest levels of social media but the lowest levels of protest during the Arab Spring.9 Social media can act as the catalyst for change, but they do not generate the initial conditions necessary for change. In terms of research, the academic literature is limited. As the development of social media is ongoing, factual data is fragmentary, and research on the connections between diplomacy and social media is incomplete. Unfortunately, the phenomenon is so new that a comprehensive quantitative study of the effects of social media has yet to be completed.

Nevertheless, the qualitative evidence and theoretical underpinnings of the impact of social media are compelling.

Non-state actors have effectively used social media to promote peaceful relations; social media has facilitated the rise of citizen journalists.

By creating a parallel field, new social media can bypass and subvert dominant media narratives, and ideology and beliefs become socially shared within a conflict group through the mainstream media. Yet Human Rights, and US Foreign Policy (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2014). 58.

8 Fatemeh Barzin and Ali Samiei, “The Role of Media Discourse in Diplomatic Behavior,” International Journal of Business, accessed March 22, 2014, 200.

9 Gadi Wolfsfeld, Elad Segev, and Tamir Sheafer, “Social Media and the Arab Spring Politics Comes First,” The International Journal of Press/Politics 18, no. 2 (2013): 118.

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Sebastian Dutz this phenomenon can also be problematic. In Israel, for example, the Maariv newspaper failed to report about Palestinian civilian casualties in an Israeli air raid on Gaza.10 In contrast, open social media helps lead to changes in perception of the “Other,” with this change in identity being crucial for resolving conflict. In this sense, the importance of social media is paramount. For example, Facebook can act as a platform for friendships, allowing its users to comment on each other’s walls, “like” posts and most importantly, get to know one another. The “Israel Loves Iran” and “Iran Loves Israel” Facebook campaigns of March 2012 are an example of powerful citizen diplomacy effectuated through social media. They emerged as a means of countering the hostile rhetoric coming from both Iran and Israel, with the initiatives celebrating mundane encounters and similarities between Israelis and Iranians to humanize one another. A major aspect involved connecting Israeli and Iranian women in dialogue, through Facebook’s chat function.11 A Facebook page filled with peaceful messages and images such as a picture of an Iranian and an Israeli kissing was created. Majid, the Iranian creator of the campaign explains that, “while the leaders threaten war and want to bomb our countries, we [Israeli and Iranian citizens] are already bombarding each other with love and peace.”12 This demonstrates how Facebook is an important medium for alternative voices in the region that call for peace and cooperation. It is also a striking example of citizen-to-citizen diplomacy.13 John Bell, a veteran mediator of the Middle East, notes that psychologically, human beings are herd animals that do not want to be deviant.14 The anonymity offered by social media allows people to deviate from social taboos and change their identity away from ethnic or religious hate.

Nevertheless, the citizen-led initiative of “Israel loves Iran” is not without its faults. It is important to recognize that social media mainly con10 Rawhi Afaghani, “News Media and Peacebuilding: Uncovering Opportunities That Can Facilitate Cooperation A” (George Mason University, 2011), 107.

11 Adi Kuntsman and Sanaz Raji, “‘Israelis and Iranians, Get A Room!’: Love, Hate, and Transnational Politics from the‘ Israel Loves Iran’ and‘ Iran Loves Israel’ Facebook Campaigns,” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 8, no. 3 (2012): 145.

12 Kuntsman and Raji, “‘Israelis and Iranians, Get A Room!’, 143.

13 Wolfsfeld, Segev, and Sheafer, “Social Media and the Arab Spring Politics Comes First,” 121.

14 John Bell, “An Investigation of New and Innovative Ideas,” Class lecture, The Middle East & International Diplomacy - Today & in the Future at the University of Toronto, January 30, 2014.

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs nects well-educated and tech-connected elites, with rural populations throughout the region lacking the same ease of access. Furthermore, Middle Eastern social media is a male-dominated sphere, as evidenced by how 65% of social media users in the Middle East are male.15 Thus female voices are , to a certain extent, relatively silent. Ironically, the citizens who most need social media to voice their grievances are the ones who have the most difficulty leveraging it. While ease of access should be improved, it is the socially well-situated elite that have the potential to effect the most change, through lobbying and pressuring the government. On the other hand, the magnitude of the effect of social media has also come into question. Malcolm Gladwell argues that citizen-led social media campaigns promote weak ties.16 He argues that “liking” something on Facebook requires little effort, which lulls people into thinking they are doing something meaningful. According to Gladwell, this “slacktivism makes it easier for activists to express themselves but harder for that expression to have any impact.”17 Despite similar accusations being leveled at the Israeli-Iranian campaign, it nonetheless forced leaders to recognize that significant amounts of their population were not as “hawkish” as it might have been previously assumed. Social media offers a tool that can be used by citizens to slowly, but surely erode state control of information.

More importantly, interactions through social media help undermine deep identity divisions between people in the Middle East.

However, there remains a dark side to social media. Non-state actors can use social media to reify group division and instigate conflict.

Selective exposure theory suggests that people try to find a media environment for themselves where the information coming to them supports, rather than challenges, their beliefs.18 A recent study found that 43% of Americans avoid interacting with opinion-challenging beliefs on Twitter.19 This provides a robust challenge to the claim that social media is conducive to breaking down ideological barriers. Ad15 Arab Social Media Report.

16 Sarah Joseph, “Social Media, Political Change and Human Rights.,” Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 35, no. 1 (2012), 105.

17 Joseph, “Social Media, Political Change and Human Rights.,” 105.

18 John H. Parmelee, Politics and the Twitter Revolution : How Tweets Influence the Relationship between Political Leaders and the Public (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2012), 10.

19 Ibid, 127.

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Sebastian Dutz ditionally, ideologically extreme people are even more likely to wall themselves off from others on social media. This theory is evidenced by a 2011 report from the Dubai School, which found evidence of a prominent “us vs. them” mentality among social media users in the Gulf region due to sectarian societal divides.20At the radical end of the spectrum, social media is used to recruit, train and organize terrorists.

A common strategy used by organizations is to create a Facebook group based on a seemingly innocent idea, such as supporting Palestinians or Islam in general.21 Such groups then direct users straight to the website and forums of the terrorist organization behind the Facebook group. YouTube videos demonstrating practices such as tactical shooting are also used for training.22 Between 1997 and 2006, the number of websites dedicated to terrorist groups rose from 12 to over 7000.23 The network effect of social media allow ideas such as the “cultural imperialism of the West” to move rapidly, connecting disparate populations linked by a common grievance. The rise of social media coincides with the rise of “homegrown” terrorism, thus rapidly expanding the reach of radicalization. These negative implications of social media reveal that social media increases participation, but whether this participation is desirable depends on the values emphasized. While new media and social networks allow users to humanize one another, they can also be used to dehumanize and radicalize the situation.24 Social media has also proved to be a potent, positive tool when used by state actors for diplomatic purposes. By empowering and engaging citizens through social media, states such as Israel and the United States have enhanced the possibility for cooperation in the region. The first formal inclusion of social media into diplomacy was the ‘21st-century statecraft’ program pioneered by the United States. Since Hillary Clinton launched the program in 2009, her ministry has created 194 Twitter accounts and 200 Facebook pages.25As stated by Clinton in 20 Joseph, “Social Media, Political Change and Human Rights,” 173.

21 Geoff Dean, Peter Bell, and Jack Newman, “The Dark Side of Social Media: Review of Online Terrorism.,” Pakistan Journal of Criminology 3, no. 3 (2012), 2.

22 Monshipouri, Democratic Uprisings in the New Middle East.

23 Monshipouri, Democratic Uprisings in the New Middle East.

24 Arzu Geybullayeva, “Nagorno Karabakh 2.0: How New Media and Track Two Diplomacy Initiatives Are Fostering Change,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 32, no. 2 (June 2012): 178.

25 “Virtual Relations,” The Economist, September 22, 2012.

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs a speech, the goal is “to work with partners in industry, nongovernmental organizations and the public to…harness the power of connection technologies and apply them to our diplomatic goals.”26 This bottom-up approach to diplomacy, as articulated in Obama’s Cairo speech, is premised on dialogue, mutual respect and understanding.27 While the strategic element of “soft power” is at play, social media has predominately been used by the Americans to enhance dialogue with the public in the Middle East. A concrete example of this strategy is a blog called ‘DipNote’, that allows participants from around the world to discuss important foreign policy issues with senior diplomatic officials.28 US ambassador Robert Ford is a further example of this approach. He has maintained social media contact with the Syrian public to explain US policy, receive feedback and provide live updates throughout the Syrian civil war.29 Recently, Israel developed a strategy empowering its citizens as both information consumers and producers. Israel’s Ministry of Public Diplomacy launched ‘Presenting Israel 2010,’ a project that used citizens to highlight non-militarist aspects of Israel and explore potential peace agreements.30 This “peer to peer” model of diplomacy consists of the public not only carrying the message, but more importantly, shaping it. This reduces the perceived government propaganda and interest-based diplomacy that was common in the past.31 Civilian engagement with state diplomacy through social media increases peaceful and productive dialogue.

Following the Arab Spring, greater numbers of Arabs commented upon, and “liked” Israeli Foreign Ministry Facebook pages.32 The case study of the 2012 conflict in Gaza sheds light on how states can misuse social media. Social networks can quickly become mechanisms for governments to spread rumor and falsehood. While its peer-to-peer program is positive, Israel also uses the “Persona Soft26 Joseph, “Social Media, Political Change and Human Rights,” 170.

27 Juyan Zhang, “A Strategic Issue Management (SIM) Approach to Social Media Use in Public Diplomacy,” American Behavioral Scientist 57, no. 9 (2013): 1313.

28 Ibid.

29 Seib, Real-Time Diplomacy, 108.

30 Shay Attias, “Israel’s New Peer-to-Peer Diplomacy,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7, no. 4 (January 1, 2012): 478.

31 Ibid, 481.

32 Rebecca L. Stein, “StateTube: Anthropological Reflections on Social Media and the Israeli State,” Anthropological Quarterly 85, no. 3 (2012): 905.

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Sebastian Dutz ware” to manage fake social media accounts and blogs, with these fake accounts being used to promote the strategic values and views of the Israeli government.33 More worryingly, they are also used to track suspected terrorists and criminals. Social media can also be used as a weapon of information conflict. The Israeli Defence Force used Twitter to break the news of the 2012 Gaza “Operation Pillar of Defence” offensive. Israel touted the elimination of Ahmed Jabari by tweeting “@Alqassam Brigade, We killed your leader.”34 The IDF continued to use social media to celebrate Hamas casualties, and attempted to invoke support for their operation using the discussion hash-tag #IsraelUnderFire to rally support.35 This is evidence of the militarization of social media. Though not strictly a state, Hamas responded in a similar manner, by also tweeting casualties of “Zionists” and creating a hashtag, #GazaUnderAttack.36 During the conflict, Palestinian youth groups launched a campaign on Facebook on pages such as ‘Qudspress.news,’ to support the resistance in the Gaza Strip by posting information and coordinates of strategic Israeli targets.37 Social media, if used too often in this manner, can begin to lose legitimacy, and may be seen as a “Trojan Horse” for strategic state interests. The Gaza case demonstrates how social media can be used to perpetuate, rather than resolve conflict.

Social media gives rise to two central tensions in official diplomacy, a tension between the official and casual, and one between speed and diplomacy. Traditional diplomacy required repeated personal interactions among parties, and was based on careful response and comprehensive analysis of issues.38 A 24-hour information cycle has removed the cushion of time diplomats used to benefit from. The digital age means that the time between events and a response has 33 Van Niekerk and Maharaj, “Social Media and Information Conflict,” 1170.

34 “The IDF’s Bolstered Social Media Presence Comes Into the Spotlight for the First Tiem in Operation Pillar of Defense,” The Jerusalem Post, November 16, 2012.

35 Robert Beckhusen and Noah Shachtman, “Hamas Shoots Rockets at Tel Aviv, Tweeting Every Barrage | Danger Room | Wired.com,” Wired, accessed March 22, 2014, http://www.wired.com/ dangerroom/2012/11/gaza-social-media-war/.

36 Robert Beckhusen and Noah Shachtman, “Hamas Shoots Rockets at Tel Aviv, Tweeting Every Barrage | Danger Room | Wired.com,” Wired, accessed March 22, 2014, http://www.wired.com/ dangerroom/2012/11/gaza-social-media-war/.

37 “Palestinians Use Social Media to Follow Up and Comment on Gaza Operation,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2012.

38 Seib, Real-Time Diplomacy, 5.

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs become very short, with social media allowing for immediate discussion and response. Traditional diplomacy is a closed, hierarchical system couched in formal language. The informal nature of social media presents a challenge for diplomats, and provides an impetus for reinvention. Diplomats now use Twitter almost as much as email.

They must maintain a balance between formal pronouncements and casual interaction. The state-learning curve is steep and uneven, and the margin of error is high. Like semi-trucks, governments “turn” exceptionally slowly, yet they are evolving to address social media.

Social media imposes brevity on diplomats, forcing discussions to get to the root of the issue at hand. If the issue is conflict, it can be seen to implicitly favour discussion of key interests and grievances at hand. Increased transparency in diplomacy is now also a necessity.

In 2010, Wikileaks shattered the fundamental expectation of secrecy in diplomacy, by releasing a vast store of confidential diplomatic cables. Hypocrisy and subterfuge have resultantly become much more costly. These appear to be fundamental and beneficial changes. The Industrial Revolution led to the bureaucratization of diplomacy, and the new Digital Revolution may in turn lead to the destruction of this closed bureaucracy. There has been a fundamental shift from “club diplomacy” to “network diplomacy.”39 In contrast, some academics like James Pamment claim that social media has had a minimal impact on diplomacy and characterize social media’s role in diplomacy as banal. For example, Twitter simply restates traditional official announcements.40 Certain diplomats argue that in this age of peer-to-peer connectivity, official diplomacy is still boxed in the world of diplomatic cables and slow government-to-government negotiations.41 These critics make some valid points. Social media has not transformed diplomacy overnight; it merely adds a new, sophisticated tool and challenge. However, changing demographics and technological advances mean that the importance of traditional media will continue to erode. Traditional Track I diplomacy is becoming more rapid, transparent, and informal due to social media.

39 Diplomacy in the Digital Age: Essays in Honour of Ambassador Allan Gottlieb (Toronto: Signal, 2011), 240.

40 James Pamment, New Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century: A Comparative Study of Policy and Practice (New York: Routledge, 2013).

41 “Virtual Relations,” The Economist, September 22, 2012.

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Sebastian Dutz Track II diplomacy is defined as mediating between conflicting parties one step removed from official channels.42 Interaction through social media can be seen as “everyday” Track II. The impact of social media on Track II is subject to certain limitations. For instance, Track II talks tend to work best with a small circle of participants engaged in direct emotional contact, but Social media includes a broader audience and is somewhat impersonal. While recognizing that nothing surpasses the human element of face-to-face contact, social media provides an important alternative for Track II discussions. Social media provides new venues for unofficial discussions between communities, civil society actors and non-governmental organizations.

Discussions through social media “help to overcome the isolation of societies from each other caused by closed borders and the high costs of meetings in third countries.”43 Platforms such as Skype allow for regular communication between Track II participants, which could eventually lead to joint planning of policy formation and negotiated settlements. Even if not employed during the official Track II negotiation, social media outreach can be used to spread the results of a negotiation to wider constituencies, expanding the reach of Track II to segments of the population such as civil society and youth. Social media thus provides a venue for contact between hostile parties beyond the conventional Track II elite level reconciliation meetings.

• From the analysis above, this paper recommends the following policy actions: • Databases and software designed to analyze social media trends are needed to discover the most effective strategies for resolving conflict through social media.

• Online tools for managing and monitoring social media campaigns such as HootSuite should be used for further research.44 • Corporations such as Starbucks have generated improved products using the ideas of their consumers. This open policy development model should be applied to the world of diplomacy.45 • Regular educational sessions for state employees and Track II participants covering social media engagement are necessary.

42 John Bell, Lecture Notes, Lecture #3.

43 Geybullayeva, “Nagorno Karabakh 2.0,” 182.

44 Van Niekerk and Maharaj, “Social Media and Information Conflict,” 1170.

45 Diplomacy in the Digital Age, 264.

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs • Increase linkages between non-governmental and governmental diplomacy.

• Decentralize the conduct of diplomacy.

• Pressure corporations such as Twitter and Facebook to cut down on hate speech and isolate terrorists groups that are active on their platforms.

• Design social media contests targeting youth premised on proposing innovative solutions to regional conflict.

The power to administer information is being captured by the citizens of the world. The Internet has drastically increased connectivity and undermined the power of physical borders. Government to public, and more radically, public to public linkages are emerging, remaining a broader challenge to the primacy of states in the international framework. While states retain authority and remain the most important actor, social media presents a potent new challenge, giving a global voice to small groups and empowering the minority. If the minority wants peace, the use of social media should be encouraged. However, social media is no panacea. The effect social media has on diplomacy is limited due to material constraints, and the easy misuse of social media.

Given the current impasse in cooperation in the Middle East, illustrated most vividly by the Israel-Palestine conflict, fresh solutions need to be experimented with. Bolstering Track I and Track II diplomacy by using social media is one such experiment. In a region where demographics are skewed towards youth, the value of social media is enhanced, as youth are the most passionate users of social media.

Approximately 54% percent of the population in the Middle East is under the age of 30, indicating that a youth bulge has coincided with a social media bulge. Given these circumstances, social media would be a worthwhile experiment. As an investment in the present and the future, diplomats should acknowledge and promote social media as a tool for engagement and mutual understanding.

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs

The Evolution of Diplomatic Immunity and Corporate Liability in International Law Derakhshan Qurban-Ali

Derakhshan Qurban-Ali completed her Joint Specialist in International Relations and Peace, Conflict and Justice Studies at the University of Toronto. She is a Lead Analyst with the G8 Research Group, Senior Editor at Rapoport Journal for Peace, Conflict and Justice, a Studio Y Fellow at MaRS Discovery District, and former Chair of Amnesty International at the University of Toronto. She is interested in exploring the relationships between international law, human rights and development. Her current research focuses on irregular migration trends in the European Union, refugee integration in Hungary/Germany, and challenges to development in Afghanistan.

A

s multinationals and private military contractors become increasingly visible on the global stage, new problems emerge to meet them. In post-conflict environments such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, the use of private military corporations has led to an array of legal challenges and jurisdictional complications as foreign nationals commit crimes while being protected by the defence of diplomatic immunity.

Leading state actors, like the US, are responding to these challenges though analogous adjustments in international law; however, they are faced with structural and political impediments. This paper seeks to assess the present state of diplomatic immunity and corporate liability as they pertain to international law in order to gauge the culpability of the actions of DynCorp, a US based defence-contracting firm, in Bosnia. Based on the human trafficking case involving DynCorp employees and United Nations (UN) personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina—as outlined in Kathryn Bolkovac’s book, The Whistleblower— this paper will examine the limitations of diplomatic immunity and corporate liability. Finally, this paper will prescribe remedies for the aforementioned challenges, particularly the “regulatory vacuum” that exists between national and international law.

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Derakhshan Qurban-Ali Kathryn Bolkovac’s case—as described in The Whistleblower—depicts significant problems within international law pertaining to diplomatic immunity and corporate liability. Bolkovac, a police officer from the US, joined the UN’s International Police Task Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1998. She was placed in charge of a project designed to combat violence against women. Bolkovac came across a battered woman from Moldova who led her to a local nightclub called the “Florida.” Inside were several girls being held captive, with their passports and a box full of American dollars behind the bar. Bolkovac had begun to uncover a sex-trafficking ring operated by the Serbian mafia that trafficked girls from Ukraine, Moldova and Romania.1 Further investigation uncovered that her American and international colleagues were buying and having sex with the underage victims of victims. As she reported up the chain of command, she was met with legal challenges and death threats.2 The international police corps were immune from prosecution, and she contends that UN personnel and superiors attempted to cover up the scandal. Bolkovac continued to investigate and, as a result, was demoted and then fired for gross misconduct. Forced to flee the country to protect her life, she went public with the scandal through her book and film.3 It is important to note that the US Administration declared that they would not take part in UN peacekeeping missions unless Americans were given immunity from the International Criminal Court (ICC).4 Even if the ICC could prosecute these cases, it is unlikely it would be able to do so, as the limited resources of the ICC are focused on larger-scale crimes. The Dayton Peace Accords gave the UN “complete and unimpeded movement” and “no liability for damage to property,”5 while North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) personnel had legal immunity for their actions “under all circumstances and at all times,” making them subject to the “exclusive jurisdiction of their respective national elements”6 regarding any criminal or disciplinary 1 Daisy Sindelar. “In New Book, Whistle-Blower Alleges U.S., UN Involvement In Bosnian Sex Trafficking.” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. N.p., 29 Feb. 2011. Web. 08 Feb 2014. <http://www. rferl.org/content/the_whistleblower_sex_trafficking_bosnia_un_kathryn_bolkovac/2302334.html>.

2 Sindelar, 3 Sindelar.

4 Sindelar.

5 Office of the High Representative, Dayton Peace Agreement, General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovinia, 21 November 1995, available at: http://www.refworld.org/ docid/3de495c34.html [accessed 06 February 2014] 6 B. G. Ramcharan. The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia: Official Papers.

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs offences in Bosnia.

Accountability is the most pressing issue involving private military contractors working abroad because they are seldom held accountable to any local or international standard for conduct, particularly when matters of human trafficking are concerned. US military contractors were involved in sex trafficking in Bosnia, but they were immune from legal prosecution because of bureaucratic, systemic, and legal loopholes.7 Furthermore, misconduct by management reinforced the culture of impunity. Ben Johnson maintains that Dyncorp fired him after he exposed the involvement of his co-workers in the sex trade in Bosnia. He asserts that many Dyncorp employees purchased underage girls as young as twelve.8 Madeleine Rees, former gender expert for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, explains the motivating idea behind The Whistleblower:

“It’s not enough for the UN to say, ‘There are a few rotten apples that need to be got rid of.’ They have to understand that this outrageous practice is endemic in the male hegemony of a militarised environment – it’s part of locker-room bravado and the high levels of testosterone in fighting armies…These crimes are perpetrated by individual men who rape and torture girls on mission, then go home to their wives. And it’ll carry on until there’s a knock at the door and they find themselves getting arrested in front of the wife and kids.”9 This idea is key to understanding why the issue of immunity and accountability is of the utmost importance to the field of international law and regulating bodies. The United States has clear laws against human trafficking,10 and this ought to be reflected while citizens are abroad regardless of their corporate or diplomatic links. It is clear Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997. 362.

7 U.S. military contractors involved in sex trafficking in Bosnia. Off Our Backs , Vol. 32, No. 11/12 (november-december 2002).

8 U.S. military contractors involved in sex trafficking in Bosnia. Off Our Backs , Vol. 32, No. 11/12 (november-december 2002).

9 Ed Vulliamy. “Has the UN Learned Lessons of Bosnian Sex Slavery Revealed in Rachel Weisz Film?” The Observer. N.p., 15 Jan. 2012. Web. 08 Feb. 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2012/jan/15/bosnia-sex-trafficking-whistleblower>.

10 “U.S. Laws on Trafficking in Persons.” U.S. Department of State. n.d. Web. 02 Feb. 2014. <http://www.state.gov/j/tip/laws/>.

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Derakhshan Qurban-Ali that the crimes committed in Bosnia by international personnel are part of a greater trend and are widespread across many international missions. Immunity and its continued abuse, in this regard, is highly damaging not only to the UN’s image, but also to the integrity of its values. Without legal consequences, this misbehaviour will continue.

Within the context of an increasing globalized world, it is crucial that international law keeps pace with global development and challenges.

Thus, the limitations of immunity need to be reviewed and corporate liability scrutinized.

Diplomatic immunity was codified into international law by the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; it is a principle of international law that offers foreign diplomats protection from domestic legal action within the country where they work.11 This allows them to work effectively in a country without being fully aware of the country’s laws and customs. Some argue this immunity is absolutely vital to the core of international relations and should be inviolable except in the most extreme cases.12 To an extent, this is true; diplomatic immunity will always remain an integral part of international relations.

However, this is not to say that the limitations and prescriptions of diplomatic immunity should not be regularly reviewed and adapted to varying circumstances, particularly as the political landscape of international relations is rapidly expanding. Based on the recurring problem of UN diplomats trafficking housing staff from their home countries into the US without facing prosecution, Kathryn Bolkovac expands on this idea. She notes, “Status Forces Agreements, and a policy of allowing home countries to discipline or prosecute their nationals for criminal behaviour or misconduct, are two things that need continued review on these immunity issues.”13This issue goes beyond the trafficking of housing staff, as seen from the case in Bosnia. There have been ample citations of the misuse of diplomatic immunity in recent years, with diplomats disregarding the laws of the host state 11 United Nations, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 24 April 1963, available at: http:// www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3648.html [accessed 02 February 2014] 12 Hazel Fox. “The Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: A Necessary Evil? By J. Craig Barker. [Aldershot: Dartmouth. 1996. Xii 283 Pp. ISBN 1-85521-723-6. 42·50].” International & Comparative Law Quarterly 46.03 (1997).

13 Lia Petridis Maiello. “When Peacemakers Become Perpetrators: Kathryn Bolkovac Introduces The Whistleblower at the UN.” The Huffington Post. N.p., 19 Feb. 2013. Web. 04 Feb. 2014. <http:// www.huffingtonpost.com/lia-petridis/the-whistleblower-author-interview_b_2663231.html>.

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs and invoking their diplomatic immunity to escape liability.14 Leslie Farhangi notes that while there are powerful reasons for diplomatic immunity, these should be balanced out against the need to prevent crime and protect victims.15 A high profile case of diplomatic immunity being inappropriately used was that of the Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium Case (2002), in which the foreign minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo used immunity as a defence in order to escape extradition to Belgium where he would face charges of war crimes.16 André Nollkaemper, Professor of Public International Law at the Faculty of Law of the University of Amsterdam, evaluates the responsibility of private authority under international law and the regulation of different types of private authority that operate between international and national law. He examines the responses of national and international tribunals to claims regarding the aforementioned conflict of jurisdiction and discusses how each aligns within the greater international objectives of justice and law. Article 1 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts assumes that the state is legally responsible for an internationally wrongful act.17 However, Nollkaemper notes inconsistencies in legal jurisdiction pertaining to international law and non-state actors. For example, corporations are exempt from the jurisdiction of the ICC.18 Thus, the privatization of fundamental state obligations, such as the maintenance of peace in post-conflict Bosnia, presents a multitude of legal issues when internationally wrongful acts are committed.

The state is ultimately legally responsible under international law for the fulfillment of its international legal obligations and compliance with international humanitarian law.19 Complications arise when private bodies commit crimes on foreign territory because of the “regu14 Leslie Farhangi. “Insuring against Abuse of Diplomatic Immunity.” Stanford Law Review 38 (1986): 1517.

15 Farhangi, “Insuring against Abuse,” 1517.

16 John H. Currie, Valerie Oosterveld, and Craig Forcese. International Law: Doctrine, Practice, and Theory. Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007. 467.

17 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, November 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1, available at: http://www. refworld.org/docid/3ddb8f804.html [accessed 09 February 2014] 18 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 1998, Art 25. ISBN No. 92-9227-227-6, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a84.html [accessed 09 February 2014] 19 André Nollkaemper, and Janne Elisabeth Nijman. New Perspectives on the Divide between National and International Law. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007. 152.

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Derakhshan Qurban-Ali latory vacuum”20 created between national and international law. This problem is exacerbated in the Bosnian-DynCorp case study because the international DynCorp personnel were employed from national military and civilian police forces with widely varying standards and qualifications. There were few regulating codes of conduct, which is a serious drawback when considering the increasing use of private military companies in post-war environments. Thus when DynCorp personnel worked alongside UN peacekeepers, local populations viewed them as one entity, thereby tarnishing the image of the United Nations although it was the DynCorp employees who committed the egregious crimes.

DynCorp employees were granted immunity from local courts, similar to the immunity military personnel enjoy. The difference, however, is that military personnel remain accountable to the jurisdiction of their respective state military courts.21 Private civilian personnel do not have a comparable court; thus, they remain unaccountable for their crimes. This is key when considering the limitations of legal immunity within an increasingly interconnected world. A comparable case study pertains to the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in Iraq which involved US military personnel torturing captured Iraqi soldiers. 22 After, the international community demanded repercussions for the perpetrators.

Eleven US soldiers were tried in military court, sentenced to military prison, and dishonourably discharged from service.23 However, the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq renewed Order 17 in 2004, which made contractors, official personnel, and international consultants immune from the Iraqi legal process ‘in matters relating to the terms and conditions of their contracts.’24 This enables private contractors to misuse their immunity and remain legally unaccountable for crimes.

This relates directly to the Bosnian-DynCorp case involving an American citizen, Kathryn Bolkovac, who was hired by DynCorp as part of the international peacekeeping task force in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

When she reported to her DynCorp superiors that UN personnel 20 21 22 23 24

Nollkaemper and Nijman, “New Perspectives,” 152.

Nollkaemper and Nijman, “New Perspectives,” 153.

Diane Amann. “Abu Ghraib.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 153 (2005): 2085-2091.

Diane Amann. “Abu Ghraib.” 153.

Nollkaemper and Nijman, “New Perspectives,” 154.

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs were involved in human trafficking in Bosnia, she was fired. She pursued a lawsuit before a UK tribunal and won her case.25 However, not a single employee or superior faced disciplinary action as a result and sexual abuse continued. There was no legal recourse for Bolkovac to take beyond this because of the “regulatory vacuum” between national and international law. Despite the strong parallels of the severity of the crimes committed in Bosnia by UN personnel/DynCorp employees and in Abu Ghraib by US soldiers, no legal action could be undertaken in the former. In both cases, crimes against humanity— such as murder, torture, and rape—were committed; however, private military personnel could hide behind their legal immunity to escape persecution.

Bolkovac recommends ample recourse to address this “regulatory vacuum.” Namely, she implores the US government to employ a federal agency responsible for overseeing and recruiting law enforcement officers for work overseas, pursuant to the goal of increased accountability.26 Furthermore, she notes that the provisions of the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act from 2010 were never passed. As an expansion of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), this legislation would have allowed the government to prosecute government contractors and employees for certain serious crimes.27 This would allow rapid and effective reporting mechanisms, investigative jurisdiction, and arrest with probable cause.28 Currently, MEJA provides criminal jurisdiction over Department of Defence employees and contractors but does not apply to U.S. contractors working overseas for other federal agencies.29 This is vital legislation because it incentivizes compliance with international law and balances out the conflict of interest that occurs when private contractors place their jobs and profits as top priority. Currently, DynCorp continues to procure multi-billion dollar overseas contracts despite their implication in crimes within Bosnia.30 25 Nollkaemper and Nijman, “New Perspectives,” 154.

26 Lia Petridis Maiello. “When Peacemakers Become Perpetrators: Kathryn Bolkovac Introduces The Whistleblower at the UN.” The Huffington Post. N.p., 19 Feb. 2013. Web. 04 Feb. 2014. <http:// www.huffingtonpost.com/lia-petridis/the-whistleblower-author-interview_b_2663231.html>.

27 Maiello.

28 Maiello.

29 Maiello.

30 Maiello.

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Derakhshan Qurban-Ali Detractors against increased corporate liability argue that the United States’ courts cannot hold private corporations liable for torts in violation of international law; that there are a vast amount of such cases that would impose liability on corporations simply for doing business in a difficult country; that statutory amendment or doctrinal reversal is necessary to stem this flood of litigation; and that domestic litigation is a bad way to promote higher corporate standards.31 However, former Legal Adviser of the US Department of State Harold Koh succinctly points out why these kinds of arguments are based on faulty logic.

He notes that if states and individuals can be held liable under international law, then corporations should be too, not only because they are legal ‘persons,’ but also because both states and individuals act through corporations.32 The fact that corporations have rights would tacitly imply they have responsibilities as well. Precedent makes clear that corporations can be held liable, particularly when they are involved in jus cogens violations.33 Currently, there are two statutes in the US that provide remedies for international law violations: the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act. These acts form a “domestic legislative internalization of an international norm.”34 The Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Case (2013) is a great example of the limitations of this legislation. Nigerian citizens claimed that Dutch, British, and Nigerian oil corporations committed violations of customary international law by brutally crushing peaceful resistance to aggressive oil development in the Ogoni Niger River Delta. Royal Dutch Petroleum, an Anglo-Dutch multinational corporation, clearly aided in human rights abuses, but the fact they were not held liable aptly reflects the need for more comprehensive legislation.35 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia illustrated in the Tadić case that to constitute a ‘complicity offense,’the corporate conduct must be “direct and substantial.”36 In the case of 31 Koh, H. H. “Separating Myth From Reality About Corporate Responsibility Litigation.” Journal of International Economic Law 7.2 (2004): 263.

32 Koh, “Separating Myth From Reality,” 264.

33 Koh, “Separating Myth From Reality,” 265.

34 Koh, “Separating Myth From Reality,” 267.

35 John H. Currie, Valerie Oosterveld, and Craig Forcese. International Law: Doctrine, Practice, and Theory. Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007. 467.

36 Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-T, para 674 (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs DynCorp in Bosnia, it is clear that superiors were well aware of the misconduct of their employees and were complicit with these activities. Furthermore, DynCorp’s dismissal of Bolkovac’s claims indicates that they were not only passively complicit with the human trafficking and crimes, but they were actively engaged in their preservation and perpetuation. When presented with evidence of wrongdoing, they attempted to silence the whistle-blower and continue on with the illicit activities. What is disquieting is that the implication of UN personnel and of international forces in these crimes goes farther than just passive participation. Bolkovac explained in an interview, The thing that stood out about these cases in Bosnia, and cases that have been reported in other UN mission areas, is … that police and humanitarian workers were frequently involved in not only the facilitation of forced sexual abuse, and the use of children and young women in brothels, but in many instances became involved in the trade by racketeering, bribery and outright falsifying of documents as part of a broader criminal syndicate.37 Along with the actus reus of trafficking, buying and having sex with underage women, there was the mens rea of complicity.

States need to come together and collaborate, in the form of a treaty, in order to develop common standards to identify when a corporation aids human rights abuses around the world. As Nollkaemper reflects,

“International law is about boundaries; some visible, others invisible and all constructed to achieve particular goals…boundaries provide clarity, precision and autonomy while piercing or collapsing boundaries causes anxiety, confusion, and chaos… There is little certainty about the definition, scope, and effect of private authority within the international legal system.” 38 Certainly, international law has failed to develop jurisdictional boundaries and rules that are as comprehensive and precise as the domestic Yugoslavia Trial Chamber II, 7 May 1997), http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/judgement/index. htm: 37 Ed Vulliamy. “Has the UN Learned Lessons of Bosnian Sex Slavery Revealed in Rachel Weisz Film?” The Observer. N.p., 15 Jan. 2012. Web. 08 Feb. 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2012/jan/15/bosnia-sex-trafficking-whistleblower>.

38 Nollkaemper and Nijman, “New Perspectives,” 161.

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Derakhshan Qurban-Ali jurisdictional laws of individual states.39 The resulting chaos can be seen throughout all of the aforementioned examples regarding immunity and corporate liability. However, through this chaos, it is clear that DynCorp was culpable in the trafficking crime scandal and legal immunity was inappropriately used. The next steps in the development of applicable international law would be to set clear standards pertaining to corporate liability and the circumstances under which legal immunity can be used.

As Madeleine Rees observed, many human rights abuses are endemic and systematic in nature; the most practical way to combat them is through international legislation and consequently, an internalization of standards of conduct for corporations. Moreover, current facets of already existing international law need to be re-examined in order to adapt to transnational problems. The limitations of diplomatic immunity need to be re-visited and amended according to the aforementioned criticisms mentioned by Kathryn Bolkovac. The changes proposed may seem extreme to those accustomed to acting with impunity, but it is judicious to remember that the concept of international law itself seemed like a radical idea not too long ago.

It is important to look forward and prepare for the challenges ahead within the discipline. As multinationals and private military contractors become pervasive on the global front, leading state actors such as the US should pave the way for corresponding and proportionate adjustments in international law.

39 Blakely, Christopher L. â&#x20AC;&#x153;United States Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crime.â&#x20AC;? Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 73.3 (1982): n. pag.

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Minah AhN

The Third Force: Amnesty International’s Role in the Creation of the UN Convention Against Torture Minah AhN

Born in Seoul, South Korea and raised in Vancouver, British Columbia, Minah Ahn moved to Toronto to pursue her studies in International Relations and Political Science at the University of Toronto, St. Michael’s College. Her research interests include human rights, international law and nongovernmental organizations. This paper, written for POL380H1- Special Topics in International Relations: Non-State Actors in the International System, intersects these research interests. Minah will be attending the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London to pursue a Masters in Understanding and Securing Human Rights.

She is the receiver of the Routledge (the Round Table) Studentship for 2015/16.”

T

his paper examines Amnesty International’s role as an international nongovernmental organization (INGO). By asking how INGOs are exerting influence in the discourse of human rights politics, I discuss Amnesty’s efforts in the creation of the United Nations (UN) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Amnesty had a significant role in mobilizing the international community to initiate a movement to outlaw torture worldwide. The strategies that Amnesty utilized in order to centralize its objectives, the conditions to which Amnesty’s actions matter in international politics, and the way Amnesty’s activities impact political authority in the framework of international relations is the focus of this paper. I argue that while Amnesty is important in the development and promotion of human rights norms, often impinging on state sovereignty, Amnesty is limited as an INGO in its ability to achieve all its goals, as it has to work through existing international structures to advocate its campaigns. Amnesty’s actions in the Campaign Against Torture (CAT) leading to the creation of the UN Convention against Torture exemplified its authority in international relations, but it also highlighted the reality that it was a non-state actor who’s objectives

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The Attaché Journal of International AFFAIRS were limited by the role of states, and other international institutions.

Amnesty International (Amnesty) is a human rights nongovernmental organization (NGO) that has power within the international community. As a non-state actor, Amnesty’s campaigns have allowed it to become a “politically salient NGO” in the field of human rights.1 By playing a “role in the emergence, formulation, and monitoring of international [human rights] norms,” Amnesty has expanded its capacity to influence the decision making processes of international global governance and to emerge as a legitimate actor amongst other international players.2 The Campaign Against Torture (CAT) that Amnesty launched in 1972 is an example of how the organization has exercised its influence as a non-state actor.3 The CAT ultimately “resulted in the signing of the [United Nations] Convention against Torture in 1985.” 4 This represents an important event where Amnesty contributed to consolidating international human rights norms.5 Essentially, Amnesty’s leadership in the CAT translated into the formulation of an internationally recognized standard-setting document against the practice of torture, and this attests to the changing dynamics of political authority within the international community outside the state system. While traditionally the creation of human rights norms would be spearheaded by United Nations (UN) human rights bodies,6 in the case of the Convention against Torture, an NGO had a significant role 1 Wendy H. Wong, Internal Affairs: How the Structure of NGOs transforms human rights (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2012), 107.

2 Marie Törnquist-Chesnier, “NGOs and international law,” Journal of Human Rights 3 (2004): 253.

3 Wendy H. Wong, Internal Affairs: How the Structure of NGOs transforms human rights (2012), 103.

4 The UN Convention against Torture in this essay is a shorter title for the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment, which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The full Convention can be found on http://www.ohchr. org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CAT.aspx ,

Ibid.

5 Anne Marie Clark, Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001), 125.

6 These bodies are international institutions that have been given authority by member states to lead the development of human rights monitoring mechanisms. The United Nations human rights system includes the Human Rights Provisions of the U.N. Charter, the International Bill of Human Rights, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and charter-based and treaty-based human rights bodies that promote and enforce international human rights laws. The full list of important UN human rights instruments can be accessed: Susan Barker, “International Human Rights Law Research Guide” (Research Guide, University of Toronto Faculty of Law, 2013)

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Minah AhN in mobilizing the international community (the UN, states, and other non-state actors) to initiate a movement to outlaw torture worldwide.

The strategies that Amnesty utilized in order to centralize its objectives, the conditions to which Amnesty’s actions matter in international politics, and the way Amnesty’s activities impact political authority in the framework of international relations will be the focus of this paper.

While the CAT movement succeeded, as evidenced through the creation of the UN Convention against Torture, the process of reaching this event is crucial to examine while assessing Amnesty’s influence.

By exploring the internal organizational decisions Amnesty made in approaching the CAT, I argue that their strategic campaigning mechanisms enabled Amnesty to become authoritative. Amnesty lobbied the UN for the creation of a legal document that would help to enforce the illegality of torture in international law. Furthermore, by disseminating information about torture practices around the world, Amnesty added international pressure on governments who were engaging in torture practices to stop. In addition, by being independent in its actions, Amnesty adhered to its primary principles as a nongovernmental transnational advocacy organization in approaching the course of the torture movement. This allowed Amnesty to maintain its discursive power without marginalizing any actors in the international community. Finally, Amnesty’s smaller action plans and initiatives throughout the CAT helped it to build credibility and to promote its objectives. While highlighting Amnesty’s efforts in the CAT, it is evident that state-centric international relations theory cannot account for the political exchanges between states and non-state actors in the anti-torture movement. This paper will argue that while Amnesty matters significantly in the development and promotion of human rights norms, often impinging on state sovereignty, it is limited as a nonstate actor in the ways it can exert its influence in that it has to work through existing international structures to advocate its campaigns.7 An important priority of the CAT was aimed at strengthening international laws to both ensure the success of eliminating torture practices 7 Helena Cook, “Amnesty International at the United Nations.” In“The Conscience of the World”; the Influence of Non-Governmental Organizations in the UN System, edited by Peter Willetts (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 1996), 205.

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The Attaché Journal of International AFFAIRS and create standards in treating human rights violations of torture.8 Although Article 5 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) outlined the fundamental right that no person should be tortured or be subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment, the international arena still lacked a legal document that clearly outlined the illegality of torture practices in detail, and that could be carefully enforced to regulate state practices.9 Amnesty believed that by having strong legal instruments to outline unlawful torture crimes, torture could be eradicated more efficiently.

As a non-state actor, Amnesty could act judiciously and impartially to suggest a legal monitoring mechanism as a possible solution.

Since the existing structure of the international system is based on powerful states and influential international institutions, Amnesty knew that in order for the CAT to have a tangible impact, having the support of international bodies on eradicating torture was vital.10 In order to work towards the creation of an international document that would prohibit torture, Amnesty disseminated information about torture practices that were occurring around the world.

By “revealing torture as a worldwide practice–from the increased use of torture in Latin America to the torture following the military coup in Greece in 1967, to the torture and death of South African black consciousness leader Steve Biko,” Amnesty found it “could [extend the] push for international norms through a UN Convention that would address the very violations that such prisoners suffered.”11 By vouching for the hardships political prisoners faced, and using moral suasion to call upon the UN in pushing for a torture convention, Amnesty exerted its influence by spreading knowledge of torture practices to a wide audience and attempting to use 8 Jayne Huckerby and Sir Nigel Rodley, “Outlawing Torture: The Story of Amnesty International’s Efforts to Shape the UN Convention against Torture.” In Human Rights Advocacy Stories, edited by Douglas Ford, Deena Hurwitz and Margaret Satterhwaite (New York: Foundation Press, 2008), 15.

9 Wendy H. Wong, Internal Affairs: How the Structure of NGOs transforms human rights (2012), 103.

10 Helena Cook, “Amnesty International at the United Nations.” In“The Conscience of the World”; the Influence of Non-Governmental Organizations in the UN System, edited by Peter Willetts (1996), 205.

11 Jayne Huckerby and Sir Nigel Rodley, “Outlawing Torture: The Story of Amnesty International’s Efforts to Shape the UN Convention against Torture.” In Human Rights Advocacy Stories, edited

by Douglas Ford, Deena Hurwitz and Margaret Satterhwaite (2008), 15.

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Minah AhN the stories to gain attention from the international community.

One of the main goals of the CAT was to hold states that were committing torture crimes accountable for their actions. Amnesty aimed to achieve this in the two ways mentioned above: first, by pushing for the development of a torture convention so it could officially hold states accountable for their crimes, and second, by publicizing stories where governments were torturing their citizens. By reminding states of “the principles to which they had all agreed [to] in article 5 of the UDHR,” 12 Amnesty exercised its influence by “their command of information, to expose the distance between discourse and practice” on torture.13 By using accountability politics14 “to hold powerful actors to their previously stated policies of principles,” Amnesty gained an authoritative voice in the international political community.15 The ability of Amnesty as a non-state actor to hold stakeholders responsible for their commitments speaks to its organizational capacity to succeed in carrying out its campaigns. Amnesty’s influence in the CAT exerted a level of power because it encroached on the sovereignty of many states, and these interactions between states and nonstate actors “[challenged] the instinctive authoritarianism of states and the power of international capital.”16 As Morgenthau outlines, the theory of international politics should “not [be judged] by some preconceived abstract principle or concept unrelated to reality, but by its purpose: to bring order and meaning to as mass of phenomena that 12 Wendy H. Wong, Internal Affairs: How the Structure of NGOs transforms human rights (2012), 103.

13 Margaret E Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1998), 24.

14 In Activists Beyond Borders, Keck and Sikkink discuss accountability politics: “Networks devote considerable energy to convincing governments and other actors to publicly change their position on issues. This is often dismissed as inconsequential change, since talk is cheap and governments sometimes change discursive position hoping to divert network and public attention. Network activists, however, try to make such statements into opportunities for accountability politics. Once a government has publicly committed itself to a principle–for example, in favor of human rights or democracy–networks can use those positions, and their command of information, to expose the distance between discourse and practice. This is embarrassing to many governments, which may try to save face by closing that distance.” For further discussion, see book. Margaret E Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. (1998), 24.

15 Wendy H. Wong, Internal Affairs: How the Structure of NGOs transforms human rights (2012), 103.

16 Daphne Josselin and William Wallace, “Non-state Actors in World Politics: a Framework.” In Non-State Actors in World Politics (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 1.

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The Attaché Journal of International AFFAIRS without it would remain disconnected and unintelligible.”17 Morgenthau confirms that in practice, the nature of international relations cannot reflect a set of principles that are idealistic. Rather, he acknowledges that state-centric international relations theory will not be able to hold, and that the influence of non-state actors must be recognized as well. In the case of the torture movement, Amnesty was the fundamental driving force in setting the agenda for developing and promoting human rights norms against torture, and this recognizes Amnesty as a leading human rights NGO that also has political authority.

In order to drive the push for a legal document, Amnesty had a U.K. barrister “[prepare] a Draft Convention on Torture and the Treatment of Prisoners for Amnesty’s International Executive Committee.”18 This in turn caused “some governments to bring the question of torture before the UN General Assembly; [and on] November 2, 1973, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 3059 (XXVIII), which ‘[r] ejects any form of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.’”19 Resolution 3059 was “[m]indful of article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, [and decided] to examine the question of torture...as an item at a future session.”20 The fact that Amnesty’s lobbying mechanisms and drafting of the torture convention brought about a legitimate source of attention, as it prompted the UN General Assembly to adopt a resolution authenticating torture as an important international agenda, confirms Amnesty’s political authority in orienting issues and in calling upon the international community to respond accordingly to torture atrocities.21 Further, Amnesty’s release of the Report on Torture created “a dramatic impact,” and the attention on Amnesty’s campaign grew.22 After the General Assembly adopted 17 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1948), 3.

18 Jayne Huckerby and Sir Nigel Rodley, “Outlawing Torture: The Story of Amnesty International’s Efforts to Shape the UN Convention against Torture.” In Human Rights Advocacy Stories, edited

by Douglas Ford, Deena Hurwitz and Margaret Satterhwaite (2008), 17.

19 Ibid.

20 “General Assembly–Twenty-eighth Session, 3059 (XXVIII) Question of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” United Nations General Assembly, accessed July 23, 2014, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/281/31/IMG/NR028131. pdf?OpenElement.

21 Margaret E Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. (1998), 25.

22 Jayne Huckerby and Sir Nigel Rodley, “Outlawing Torture: The Story of Amnesty International’s Efforts to Shape the UN Convention against Torture.” In Human Rights Advocacy Stories, edited

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Minah AhN Resolution 3059, “Amnesty published its first comprehensive Report on Torture[, which] survey[ed] practices in more than sixty-five countries and assesse[d] the arguments being advanced both for and against the use of torture.”23 The response to the release of this report was monumental; both the international community and the press looked forward to Amnesty’s plans to follow up on the report during the Paris Conference for the Abolition of Torture, which was to be held in December of 1973.24 Again, Amnesty strategically generated compelling information on torture practices in a wide range of countries in order to frame these issues around targeting the attention of states, the UN, and other international actors. Through Amnesty’s creation of the Report on Torture, it is again very clear that the NGO had a big role in creating awareness of torture practices, and using these stories as a campaigning mechanism to push for the advancement of human rights norms. Amnesty’s “campaigning built consensus in the minds of the ‘public and [among] elites’ that new norms were necessary.”25 In the beginning, Amnesty’s work around torture was focused on a “case-based methodology by which it would ‘adopt’ cases of prisoners of conscience (those imprisoned for expressing their beliefs without advocating violence).”26 However, “Amnesty knew that to maximize its work at the international level,” it would need to transition its organizational plans and objectives.27 Seeking the authority to impact international human rights politics, Amnesty “faced a transition from being a case-driven lobbying group to becoming a norm-oriented human rights organization that looked beyond situations of political imprisonment.”28 A significant aspect to how Amnesty succeeded in gaining traction and political influence resulted from its internal organizational decisions. As with the focus of this paper, the CAT prompted the development and promotion of international human rights norms on torture. However, what is vital to understand while grasping Amnesty’s authoritative power as a nonstate actor in influencing human rights politics, is that its underlying

by Douglas Ford, Deena Hurwitz and Margaret Satterhwaite (2008), 18.

23 Ibid, 17.

24 Ibid, 18.

25 Huckerby and Rodley, 19-20.

26 Ibid, 19.

27 Ibid, 20.

28 Ibid, 19.

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The Attaché Journal of International AFFAIRS capacity to have a global reach on the torture movement would not have resulted without their ability to understand how the existing international system (UN, states) that they had to interact with functioned, and without their ability to structurally organize themselves internally in order to legitimize the CAT. These attributes account for Amnesty’s position as arguably “the NGO that made human rights important.”29 It is also why Amnesty was able to gain power and exert influence. In Activists Beyond Borders, Keck and Sikkink explain “what is novel in these networks [of advocacy organizations] is the ability of nontraditional international actors to mobilize…strategically to help create new issues and categories and to persuade, pressure, and gain leverage over much more powerful organizations and governments.”30 Amnesty is definitely an example of a transnational advocacy organization that exerted this type of political authority.

Amnesty’s power as an NGO was also expanded when it’s “request to be granted formal ‘consultative relations’ with the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization was agreed” upon.31 Following the release of the Report on Torture, “Amnesty had gained UN Economic and Social Council consultative status–the official means by which the [NGO] [could] provide input to UN bodies.”32 Being given this ability to engage diplomatically with the UN gave Amnesty an international platform to assert its positions. It also meant that international actors paid attention to Amnesty and gave it a level of respect while working to develop human rights norms. This exemplifies an instance where the UN and Amnesty were working together and supplementing each other’s political roles. While Amnesty was challenging state-based governance by pressuring states to be transparent and accountable for torture practices, the welcoming of the UN to grant Amnesty ‘consultative status’ signified their partnership and their commitment to work cohesively with each other in building human rights norms on torture.

29 Wendy H. Wong, Internal Affairs: How the Structure of NGOs transforms human rights (2012), 84.

30 Margaret E Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. (1998), 2.

31 Jayne Huckerby and Sir Nigel Rodley, “Outlawing Torture: The Story of Amnesty International’s Efforts to Shape the UN Convention against Torture.” In Human Rights Advocacy Stories, edited

by Douglas Ford, Deena Hurwitz and Margaret Satterhwaite (New York: Foundation Press, 2008), 18.

32 Ibid, 20.

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Minah AhN Amnesty’s contribution to “the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment” which was “adopted at the Fifth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders” in 1975 illustrates the continuing impact it had in developing norms to eradicate torture.33 “Amnesty’s role included submitting a sixteen-page document containing recommendations; circulating that document, accompanied by a personal message, to fifty governments in advance of the Congress; mobilizing national sections [of Amnesty] to press their governments to support the recommendations; and sponsoring two events at the Congress on the torture issue.”34 These campaigning steps that Amnesty took part in attest to the argument outlined in this paper. Amnesty’s influence through the CAT demonstrated the ability of an NGO to encourage practices and advocate awareness for initiatives that could help to end torture atrocities. However, it lacked the enforcement mechanism to ensure that states would adhere to the international standards. While an international institution like the UN can hold states legally responsible for breaking international agreements through charters and treaties, Amnesty’s efforts remain directly relevant to enforcement matters only in the extent of campaigning for the creation of norms.

Nonetheless, Amnesty’s influence has strong implications for political authority in the international community because it can reveal torture practices that governments partake in, and become authoritative actors in developing issues and setting agendas that undermine the sovereignty of states.“By the time the draft torture convention was on the table…other organizations were also working toward an international instrument prohibiting torture.”35 This complicated the drafting process of the torture convention because multiple NGOs and international actors were trying to promote their appeal of approaching the creation of these human rights norms. Groups such as the Geneva-headquartered International Commission of Jurists, International Committee of the Red Cross, the World Council of the Churches on International Affairs, the Swiss Committee Against Torture, and the International Association of Penal Law, as well as 33 Huckerby and Rodley, 21.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

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The Attaché Journal of International AFFAIRS the Swedish government were all interested in partaking in the development and promotion of human rights norms.36 While Amnesty’s approach to working with “other groups was to … participate in larger informal multilateral NGO collaborations as necessary,” Amnesty diverted itself from being closely aligned with certain organizations.37 Particularly, Amnesty withdrew its support for the Swiss Committee’s draft Convention concerning the Treatment of Persons Deprived of their Liberty.38 It stuck to its original objective, which was to focus on an “international convention through the highest inter-governmental body, the United Nations, allowing the widest participation.”39 Furthermore, Amnesty wanted not to “be so closely identified with the text that non-cooperative governments would become intractable in their opposition to the draft.”40 Amnesty’s ability to recognize that working too closely with certain government organizations, and on the detailed text of the Convention, could marginalize its authoritative wide-spread reputation, actually allowed Amnesty to remain unbiased to specific states. This decision by Amnesty to be independent has continued to be the reason why it is such a highly regarded human rights advocacy NGO. In Cook’s discussion of “Amnesty International at the United Nations,” she confirms this belief as she explains, “What is perhaps most important for Amnesty is always to maintain its independence and never compromise its capacity to criticize and to insist on the highest standards of human rights protection at the UN.”41 Amnesty announced that it “has taken no stand, and will take no stand, on the various drafts or texts produced for this convention”42 by the UN Commission on Human Rights.43 Amnesty’s inaction in the creation of the convention did not 36 Huckerby and Rodley, 21-22.

37 Ibid, 21.

38 Ibid 22.

39 Ibid, 23.

40 Ibid, 27.

41 Helena Cook, “Amnesty International at the United Nations.” In“The Conscience of the World”; the Influence of Non-Governmental Organizations in the UN System, edited by Peter Willetts (1996), 209.

42 Jayne Huckerby and Sir Nigel Rodley, “Outlawing Torture: The Story of Amnesty International’s Efforts to Shape the UN Convention against Torture.” In Human Rights Advocacy Stories, edited

by Douglas Ford, Deena Hurwitz and Margaret Satterhwaite (New York: Foundation Press, 2008), 25.

43 Ibid, 24.

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Minah AhN mean its inaction in advocating the torture principles it believed in. It released a statement that expressed Amnesty’s core principles that it hoped would be adopted in the convention:

“ a. Every state should be obliged to either extradite, or itself to try, alleged torturers within its jurisdiction. b. There should be universality of jurisdiction in respect of alleged torturers. c. There should be an effective implementation mechanism to deal with allegations of torture. d. The question of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment should be addressed.”44 This statement alludes to Amnesty’s dedicated efforts at pushing for the inclusion of the core standards on torture that the CAT advocated.

The progress of CAT’s creation proved that trying to lead the international community to undergo the creation of a legal document on torture was not an easy task. Amnesty experienced hardships and had to maneuver strategically in interacting with other international bodies so that it could remain politically authoritative and legitimate. When the Convention against Torture was officially signed in 1985, it symbolized Amnesty’s continuous effort in pushing for the creation of these norms since the launch of the CAT. Furthermore, it represented to the global community that as a non-state actor, it had a significant role in the development and promotion of torture norms. Amnesty exemplifies what powerful NGO practice looks like in the sector of human rights NGOs. Other human rights NGOs seek to have the authoritative voice Amnesty has in international politics, and this reinforces Amnesty’s power status in the international community.

The effectiveness of legal documents such as the UN Convention on Torture in ensuring that states respect and follow international law was not explored in this paper. The Convention on Torture as a legal mechanism has its limitations. There will always be the challenge in making sure that practices in reality regarding torture 44 Ibid, 25.

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The Attaché Journal of International AFFAIRS conform to the guidelines manifested in conventions. However, the purpose of this paper has been to demonstrate an instance where a non-state actor had a vast influence in the precedents leading up to the creation of a convention. This purpose, which reflects the conditions under which Amnesty matters in international politics, has been to prove that while Amnesty was able to campaign and set an agenda for the development and promotion of torture norms, it lacked the institutional capacity to actually create these norms. (It is interesting to note that an IGO, the UN, has this capacity, while an NGO, does not.) This challenged state-centric international relations theory, and exposed the truth about the changing environment of international politics that are oriented around human rights issues.

Amnesty’s actions in the CAT indicated its legitimacy as an international actor through the ability to impact states. NGOs continue to be “the primary way in which most people experience human rights,” and Amnesty’s campaigning was integral in the torture movement.45

45 Wendy H. Wong, Internal Affairs: How the Structure of NGOs transforms human rights (2012), 187.

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs

Revolution, Non-Recognition, Intervention: The Great War as the Ideological Foundation to the Cold War Haley O’Shaughnessy

Haley O’Shaughnessy is a fourth year student studying History, American Studies, and Sexual Diversity Studies. Their academic interests include indigenous history, the intellectual history of the Cold War, urban geography, American militarism, and queer theory. Haley has previously worked for the Canadian Lesbian and Gay Archives, the U.S. Consulate-Toronto, and Infrastructure Ontario.

W

hen scholars contemplate the origins of the Cold War, it is typically seen within the context of the postwar peace conferences. With an economically devastated Europe, changing administrations, the fall of the British and French Empires, and the United States’ nuclear monopoly, it is quite logical to periodize the Cold War as an era post-1945. Undoubtedly, the territorial contentions of the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences created the bipolar spheres of influence that sparked conflicts throughout the twentieth century.

Nonetheless, this interpretation of the Cold War often assumes that the Soviet Union and the United States were allies beyond the necessity of World War Two. By analyzing the Wilson administration’s evolving Russian policy during the February Revolution, the shortlived tenure of the Provisional Government and then the October Revolution, one can contend that the ideological tensions between Russia and the United States started with the Great War. This essay will examine the Russian Revolution and assess how the tensions it created led to the 1918 Allied intervention in Siberia. It will also investigate how the revolution instigated the Red Scare across the United States. This essay will conclude that the early foundations of the Cold War began with the First World War.

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs The February Revolution enabled the United States to join the war effort under the banner of democracy, self-determination, and peace without victory. The three-century-old Romanov dynasty that fended off national protests in 1905 suddenly succumbed to a week of protests centred in one city, Petrograd. Although historian Norman Saul contends that this was mostly due to the hunger and rising inflation in many cities. Such suffering was directly correlated to the low morale of the Russian military, a grievance publicly attributed to the corruption of the Czarist government.1 Nonetheless, as Christopher Reed has noted, for the elite and public alike, the basis of the revolt was to end the Czardom and not the war.2 Following the abdication of the Czar Nicholas II, Paul Miliukov, the new foreign minister who led the government alongside Prince Georgi Lvov, wrote in his memoirs:

“It was thought that the liberation of Russia from the tsarist yoke would, by itself, evoke enthusiasm in the country and would be expressed in an increase in the fighting capabilities of the army. In the first few moments, this hope was even shared by our allies.” 3 With high prospects for the new democratic government, Russian Ambassador David Francis urged the United States to recognize the government before Britain and France, as it would have a “stupendous moral effect” in the promotion of democracy. He added that Miliukov had assured him of Russia’s continued involvement in the war.4 The next day, Secretary of State Robert Lansing framed the First World War to the president as a fight for democracy: “for the welfare of mankind and for the establishment of peace in the world...

Democracy should succeed.” 5 By connecting Russian democracy to 1 Norman Saul, War and Revolution: The United States and Russia, 1917-1921, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 59.

2 Christopher Reed, War and Revolution in Russia, 1914-1922, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 59.

3 Paul Miliukov, ed. Arthur P. Mendel, Political Memoirs, 1905-1917, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967), 428.

4 The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to Secretary of State, March 18, 1917, US Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relation of the United States, 1918., Russia (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1918), I, 5-6, http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/ FRUS/FRUS-idx?id=FRUS.FRUS1918v1.

5 Quoted in ibid, 30.

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Haley O’Shaughnessy America’s entrance into the war, Lansing emphasized that any delay could mean, “the opportune moment when our friendship would be useful may be lost.”6 With compelling parallels to the American Revolution, Wilson agreed to recognize the new government. Within a month Wilson requested a Congressional declaration of war against Germany.7 In his call for a partnership of democratic nations against autocracies, he discussed the “wonderful and heartening things” happening in Russia since its overthrow of alien autocracy:

“Russia was known by those who knew it best to have been always in fact democratic at heart...The autocracy that crowned the summit of her political structure, long as it had stood and terrible as was the reality of its power, was not in fact Russian in origin, character, or purpose; and now it has been shaken off and the great, generous Russian people have been added in all their naive majesty and might to the forces that are fighting for freedom in the world, for justice, and for peace. Here is a fit partner for a league of honour.” 8 As a democratic government replaced the last sole autocratic regime among the Allies, the war effort became unified under democratic liberal values. Although the United States would have most likely entered the war regardless of the events in Russia, it enabled Wilson to use self-determination as a war aim.

Not surprisingly, the extent of Russia’s war exhaustion was not understood fully by the Allies. Indeed, only a month prior to the revolution in February, an Inter-Allied conference was held in Petrograd to encourage Russian militarization across the Eastern front. With the opportunity available to assess Russia’s war capacity, French and 6 Ibid.

7 Norman Saul, War and Revolution, 86.

8 Woodrow Wilson, “Address of the President of the United States,” 02 April 1917, Library of Congress, (New York: American Exchange National Bank, 1917), http://www.archive.org/details/ presidentwoodrow00unit

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs British officials paid little attention to the increasing conflict between Russian internal affairs and their war strategy.9 With regards to Wilson, George Kennan wrote:

“Wilson was a man who had never had any particular interest, or knowledge of, Russian affairs...he felt a distaste and antipathy for Tsarist autocracy as he knew it, and a sympathy for the revolutionary movement in Russia.” 10 Consequently, Wilson and the Allies’ ignorance of Russian affairs made the democratic element of this rather fragile revolution a cause for celebration and not trepidation. Furthermore, the Wilson administration also failed to see the internal chaos over the war. As Norman E. Saul noted, Miliukov was handicapped as leader because he had to work within the confines of the Petrograd Soviet lobby efforts, whose pretense was that of a similar “council” from 1905.11 With the Petrograd Soviet Order Number 1 established on March 1, which demanded Russian armies to not obey commanding officers if it was not in accordance to Soviet degrees, tensions between the Soviets and the Provisional Government embroiled. As exiles began to return to Russia, namely Vladimir Lenin, Julius Martov, and Leon Trotsky, the prospects of liberalism dimmed.

It is important to note that although the country was still in support of the war, the Menshevik and other Socialist Revolutionary parties’ “revolutionary defencism” differed from the Czarist reasoning for war.

While the Czar under the London Treaty of 1914 secretly sought to secure control of Constantinople and the Straits, many Mensheviks saw the war as a means of maintaining the post-revolutionary democratic government.12 Although many Bolsheviks already speculated such a treaty existed, when a leaked message between Miliukov to Francis confirmed such imperialist motives, large protests in Petro9 Carl J. Richard, When the United States Invaded Russia: Woodrow Wilson’s Siberian Disaster, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013), 10.

10 George Kennan, Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920: Russia Leaves the War, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), 28.

11 Norman Saul, War and Revolution, 99.

12 Reed, War and Revolution in Russia, 74.

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Haley O’Shaughnessy grad demanded his resignation. Amid the controversy, Miliukov resigned, as did right-wing War Minister Alexander Guchkov. On May 5, a new coalition formed the Provisional Government of socialists and non-socialists with Mikhail Tereshchenko acting as foreign minister and Alexander Kerensky as war minister. 13 With administration shuffles and growing resentment for the war, the United States’ diplomatic and humanitarian missions into Russia failed to address the ongoing internal disputes, as evidenced by the summer of 1917 with the Kerensky Offensive. Named after the War Minister who became Prime Minister following Prince Lvov’s resignation over Ukrainian separatism, the attack occurred in Galicia against Austrian-Hungarian forces. Within a few weeks, the offensive failed, resulting in 60,000 Russian causalities.14 Anti-Provisional Government protests occurred from July 16 to July 20 in what became known as the July Days. Although the government was able to suppress the rebellion by falsifying information to say that the Bolsheviks were German spies in charge of the revolt, the July Days significantly polarized Russia into pro-war and anti-war factions. It was also a rebellion that gave the United States at least some pause about the prospects of survival of the Provisional Government, if not a total loss of faith in Alexander Kerensky. By August, Lansing wrote in memoirs about his skepticism with Kerensky and compared Russia’s internal affairs to the three stages of the French Revolution: “First, Moderation; second, Terrorism; third, Revolt against the New Tyranny and restoration of order by arbitrary military power.”15 Although Lansing’s prediction of a “dominant personality” to end the chaos would actually be a Bolshevik and not a moderate, it was clear that by the July Days, the United States resented the Bolsheviks. On August 15, with his “no fight, no loans” diplomacy with the Provisional Government deemed a failure, former Secretary of State Elihu Root expressed his anti-Bolshevism in New York City:

“[The Russians] had never been taught to govern...

13 Davis and Trani, The First Cold War, 41.

14 Norman Saul, War and Revolution, 141.

15 Robert Lansing, War Memoir of Robert Lansing, 08 August 1917, (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1935), 337-338.

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs

They had no institutions of national self-government...

Then came the propaganda of the extreme socialists and anarchists, of the internationals, the analogue in Russia to the I.W.W. of this country; the men whose motto is that the worst is the best; the men who seek to destroy the industrial organization of the world, to destroy the nationalism of the world with a far-off dream in its place...And they had power in Petrograd.”16 By end of the summer, with an unsuccessful coup by conservative General Lavr Kornilov and German counteroffensives taking Eastern Galicia and Riga, the authority of the Kerensky Provisional Government and their revolutionary defencism strategy effectively collapsed.17 On November 7 when Red Guards captured the White Palace, the Russian liberal experiment ended with Bolshevism overtaking the country.

Their demand for an immediate peace shocked their Allies.

As the Bolsheviks solidified control over Russia, their own animosity towards the Allies was used to propagandize an armistice on all fronts.

On November 22, the day Trotsky’s invitation to the Allies and the United States to consider an immediate peace was made public, Izvestia and Pravda began to publish secret treaties found in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.18 Given its contents, including territorial compensation to Italy for joining the Allies, the partition of Turkey, and Franco-Russian agreements on Alsace-Lorraine, the publication of these secret treaties became a major diplomatic embarrassment for the Allies.19 As Trotsky wrote in Izvestia:

“Imperialism, with its world-wide plans of annexation, its rapacious alliances and machinations, has devel16 Elihu Root, “Address at a Reception by the City of New York, City Hall, August 15, 1917,” in America’s Message to the Russian People: Addresses by the Members of the Special Diplomatic Mission of the United States to Russia in the Year 1917, (Boston: Marshall Jones Company, 1918), 68-69. It is interesting to note how Root compared the Wobblies to the Bolsheviks, giving evidence to the early fears of Bolshevism spreading to the United States.

17 Carl J. Richard, When the United States Invaded Russia, 13.

18 Foglesong, America’s Secret War Against Bolshevism, 84.

19 Quoted from James Bunyan, ed., The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918; Documents and Materials, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 241.

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Haley O’Shaughnessy

oped the system of secret diplomacy to the highest degree...Abolition of secret diplomacy is first essential of an honorable, popular, and really democratic foreign policy...We desire a speedy abolition of the supremacy of capital...we offer to the workers the slogan which will always form the basis of our foreign policy: “Proletarians of all countries, unite!”” 20 With such an ideology threatening the nationalist foundations of the Allies, the next day France and Britain protested the separate negotiations as a violation of the London Treaty. Trotsky responded even more fiercely, telling the Russian peasantry, workers, and soldiers to not be afraid of the Allies, as “Your Soviet Government will not allow the foreign bourgeoisie to wield a club over your head and drive you into slaughter again.”21 Immediately, the Wilson administration suspended financial credit and military supplies to the Russians while Francis and Lansing agreed that the United States would not recognize the Bolshevik government.22 The U.S. reacted the way it did not only because of Russia’s threat to leave the war, but also because Wilson believed Lenin’s government would be overthrown within a matter of days. Indeed, Lansing stated by early December that there was little evidence the Bolsheviks were “real agents of the sovereignty of Russia,” making it impossible to recognize and have direct communications with the de facto government.23 When Lenin did not get overthrown, Wilson conceded his watch-and-wait policy and approved covert support to the Cossack rebels.24 Nonetheless, Wilson still feared that anything more than propaganda could force the Bolsheviks into an agreement with the Germans. As Trotsky continued his propaganda stating that the Allies’ war aims were only for imperialist greed, Wilson’s Fourteen Points, which included self-determination, the triumph of democracy, and peace without victory, proved to be tailored for Russia. In his famous message to Congress on 8 January 1918, Wilson articulated his position on Russia. He am20 Quoted from ibid, 244.

21 Ibid, 246.

22 Foglesong, America’s Secret War Against Bolshevism, 57.

23 Robert Lansing, War Memoir of Robert Lansing, 04 December 1917, (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1935), 343-345.

24 Foglesong, America’s Secret War Against Bolshevism, 89.

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs biguously promised to help Russia obtain “an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy.” He concluded that the assistance Russia receives and the “treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of the good will.”25 Although Lenin telegrammed the message to Trotsky with delight, a deeper analysis of the Fourteen Points suggests Wilson expressed a more complicated tone.

Given his aversion to recognizing the Bolshevik government and his accordance with Lansing’s anti-Bolshevism, Wilson did not see the Bolsheviks as representatives of an independent Russian nation. Instead of embracing the Soviet regime, Wilson positioned the United States as an international trustee of Russian territorial integrity with the authority to help Russia from its revolutionary turmoil. His address also distinguished the Bolshevik leaders from the Russian people stating that the people “are prostrate and all but helpless, it would seem, from the grim power Germany,” and that “Whether their present leaders believe it or not, it is our heartfelt desire and hope that some way be opened whereby we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace.” 26 Although this Point was intended to garner support for the war, its underlining foundations were fiercely anti-Bolshevik.

When Lenin dissolved the Russian Constituent Assembly on January 19, after it elected only a minority of Bolsheviks, the outlook of a Russian-led Eastern Front dwindled. Even with the renewed German advance in February following the rejection of Trotsky’s “no peace, no war” initiative, the Brest-Litovsk treaty was signed on March 3.

Two weeks later, Germany opened a spring offensive in the West.27 Wilson’s propaganda initiatives with his Fourteen Points were failing and Allied pressure to recreate the Eastern Front and prevent German exploitation of Russian resources in Archangel and Vladivostok intensified. In turn, the Supreme War Allied Council seriously be25 Woodrow Wilson, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress on the Conditions of Peace,” 8 January 1918, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65405 26 Wilson.

27 Norman Saul, War and Revolution, 195.

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Haley Oâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;Shaughnessy gan to investigate the prospects of intervention. Japan volunteered to lead the intervention over fears of German dominance.28 With 70,000 Czechoslovak forces stranded in Siberia after the armistice, Wilson began to reconsider his fear that such an intervention would be viewed by the Russian people as imperialist, as the Czechs and Russian anti-Bolsheviks had the potential to overthrow the Soviet Government. Nonetheless, historians have proposed several theories to explain the U.S. intervention into Siberia in 1918. The first theory, advanced by George Kennan, maintains that Wilson intervened over the fear that armed German and Austro-Hungarian war prisoners were gaining control in Siberia.29 Kennanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s theory remains improbable at best as he ignored the fact that the Germans were upset that the Bolsheviks armed the prisoners.30 Another theory, advanced

by Betty Unterberger, stipulates that Wilson decided to intervene in order to prevent a unilateral Japanese acquisition of the territory.31 Although some American policymakers were suspicious of the Japanese before August 1918, Wilson was arguably no more suspicious of the Japanese than he was of the British and French. Moreover, this theory problematically uses the legitimate Japanese threat after the intervention in the American calculus over whether or not to intervene.

The third theory, moved by Eugene Trani and Donald Davis, maintains that Wilson intervened as a result of a tremendous campaign by the British and French.32 Although it is evident that Allied pressure on Wilson to intervene was strong and continuous, such a theory underestimates Wilsonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s concern for Russian affairs and was certainly not a decisive factor. It is therefore more likely that the United States intervened to help the Czechs and anti-Bolsheviks overthrow the Soviet government in recreating of the Eastern Front. Made a part of the Russian Army by the Provisional Government in 1917, the corps consisted mostly of prisoners of war and deserters from the Austro-Hungarian Empire.33 Their motive was to join the Russian 28 Melton, Between War and Peace, 57.

29 George Kennan, Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961), 95-96.

30 Richard, When the United States Invaded Russia, 34.

31 Betty Unterberger, The United States, Revolutionary Russia, and the Rise of Czechoslovakia, 2nd ed. (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2000), 263-264.

32 Davis and Trani, The First Cold War, 121-122.

33 Richard, When the United States Invaded Russia, 39.

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs Army in order to create an independent Czechoslovakia, a sympathetic one for Wilson. As Soviet Commissar of Nationalities Josef Stalin initially ordered the Czech Corps in Vladivostok to move to the western front by seas, the Supreme War Council and Bolsheviks later agreed in May to move the latter forces in Archangel.34 With this division of the corps, the Czechs worried about the prospects of some of the forces being returned to the Austrian-Hungarian forces. On May 20, as tensions between the Czechs and Bolsheviks grew following the brief Czech occupation of Chelyabinsk, the Bolsheviks arrested leaders from the Russian branch of the Czech National Council in Moscow, and ordered the immediate disarmament of the corps. On May 25, Trotsky ordered the Red Army to shoot an armed Czech on the spot or face treason.35 The result was an eruption of fighting on the western portion of the Trans-Siberian Railway and the subsequent Czech occupation of much of Western Siberia by early June, harbouring anti-Bolshevik forces along the way.36 As the Central Powers in spring and early summer of 1918 gained momentum, and Czechs gained a startling success in Siberia, Wilson accepted that the removal of Czech troops from Siberia would be a mistake. Most importantly, Wilson corresponded with the anti-Bolshevik All-Russian Union of Cooperative Societies, making him believe that Russians viewed such an intervention sympathetically.37 As stressed by the Supreme War Council on July 2:

“The recent action of the Czech-Slovak troops has transformed the Siberian situation...Provided intervention takes place in time, there will be a Slav army in western Siberia on which Russian patriots could rally, which eliminates the risk of the Russian public opinion being thrown into the arms of Germany, as might have been the case if intervention were effected by forces almost entirely Japanese.” 38

34 35 36 37 38

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Richard, When the United States Invaded Russia, 46.

Melton, Between War and Peace, 142.

Ibid, 148.

Davis and Trani, The First Cold War, 133-134.

Norman Saul, War and Revolution, 313.

Haley O’Shaughnessy Given Russia’s humiliating defeat in the Russo-Japanese of 1905, such a perspective was certainly not without its merit. By July 5, the French command, which had official responsibility for the Czechs, cancelled all efforts to transport them.39 Wilson’s emphasis on rallying Russian support was intended to overthrow the Bolsheviks and have the Russians, not the Japanese or Americans, reconstitute the Front.

Evidently, his aide-mémoire emphasized his desire to mobilize anti-Bolshevik forces:

“Military action is admissible in Russia, as the Government of the United States sees the circumstances, only to help the Czecho-Slovak consolidate their forces and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen and to steady any efforts at self-government and self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance themselves.” 40

Wilson maintained that the American and Japanese forces were acting in a supporting role to guard the Czech corps, even though that also meant the protection of anti-Bolshevik forces stationed there. While the “self-government” referred to the democratic institutions absent under the Bolsheviks, the anti-Bolshevik “Slavic kinsmen” would have time to organize a government and promote “self-defense” in a resistance against the Germans.41 Although the intervention was within the context of eliminating the German forces, the Bolshevik menace was now at the forefront, both at home and abroad.

As World War I was drawing to a close, Wilson told his cabinet in October about the “spirit of the Bolsheviki,” and noted that it “is lurking everywhere.”42 Lansing went further, proclaiming Bolshevism is “the most hideous and monstrous thing that the human mind has ever conceived,” as it is a “monster which seeks to devour civilized so39 Richard, When the United States Invaded Russia, 85.

40 The Secretary of State to the Allied Ambassadors, “Aide-Mémoire,” July 17, 1918, FRUS, I, 287. http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?id=FRUS.FRUS1918v1.

41 Ibid.

42 Quoted in Michael Jabara Carley, Silent Conflict: A Hidden History of Early Soviet-Western Relations, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 17.

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs ciety and reduces mankind to the states of beasts.” 43 The rhetoric of a Bolshevik plague was not lost to Lenin, who denounced the Western imperialists and taunted that the western nations “are making ready to build a Chinese wall to protect themselves from Bolshevism,” yet “the bacillus of Bolshevism will pass through a wall and infect the workers of all countries.”44 As the Red Scare was growing in momentum in France, Britain, and the United States, a Red Terror was making its way across Siberia, with the Bolsheviks arresting and executing dissenters.45 With the declining use of the Czechs and the rising distrust of the Japanese following the intervention, Allied forces remained in Russia well after the armistice, escalating tensions on both sides.

No sooner than the intervention consolidated in September, however, World War I ended in November and their prolonged stay did not go unnoticed by the Bolsheviks and the American public alike.

Although unions often were regarded as criminal conspirators and anarchists well throughout the late nineteenth century, the rapid postwar demobilization and return of thousands of veterans led to growing unemployment and rapid inflation, and fears of radicalism.46 Red propaganda spread nation-wide, beginning with the syndicalist radical union, the Industrial Workers of World (IWW) known commonly as “the Wobblies.” On September 5, 1917, the U.S. Department of Justice agents conducted a series of coordinated raids on IWW meeting halls across the country, seizing many of their materials to seek future prosecutions under the Espionage Act of 1917.47 Furthermore, following the Department of Justice seizure of well over five tons of material from their Chicago General Office alone, one hundred and sixty-six IWW leaders were indicted by a Federal Grand Jury for conspiring to dismantle the draft, embolden desertion, and terrorize others in connection with labor disputes.48All the while, the United States was deep in the Red Scare as the prospects of a White Victory grew slimmer and the possibility of further Congressional approval 43 Ibid.

44 Carley.

45 Foglesong, America’s Secret War Against Bolshevism, 202.

46 Regin Schmidt, Red Scare: FBI and Origins of Anticommunism in the United States, (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2000), 24-25.

47 Charles H. McCormick, Seeing Reds: Federal Surveillance of Radicals in the Pittsburgh Mill District, 1917-1921, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), 47.

48 McCormick, 54.

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Haley O’Shaughnessy became near impossible. In late December 1918, Lansing agreed to evacuate American troops from Siberia. In February, he resigned as Secretary of State. However, the failure to create a common Allied policy towards Russia and the subsequent evacuation from Siberia were both indicative of Wilson’s overall struggle to create his postwar international order. Following the Red Summer of 1919, a period marked by race riots, union suppression, and the spread of revolution throughout Europe, Wilson utilized anti-Bolshevism to garner support for the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations. As a staunch segregationist and avid fan of the Pro-Ku Klux Klan film, “The Birth of a Nation,” Wilson firmly believed the KKK would “protect the southern country from some of the ugliest hazards of a time of revolution,” but grew concerned about the North and Middle America.49 Throughout his fall nation-wide tour, organized labour mobilized and demanded their collective bargaining rights. A wave of strikes swept the country with well over four million workers protesting over the course of 1919. When anarchists began to send letter bombs to government officials in April and June of 1919, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer intensified his efforts with the Radical Division, headed by none other than future first director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover.50 With this context in mind, Wilson argued that Bolshevism would spread if the League of Nations concept was not adopted. At Des Moines, Iowa, Wilson spoke:

“My fellow citizens, the world is not at peace...a little group of men just as selfish, just as ruthless, just as pitiless, as the agents of the Czar himself, assumed control and exercised their power by terror and not by right. And in other parts of Europe the poison spread--the poison of disorder, the poison of revolt, the poison of chaos. And do you honestly think, my fellow citizens, that none of that poison has got in the veins of this free people?” 51 49 Carley, Silent Conflict, 20.

50 Schmidt, Red Scare, 64.

51 Woodrow Wilson, “Address at Des Moines, Iowa, September 6, 1919,” in Addresses of Presi-

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The Attaché Journal of International Affairs It would not be long until the police raided unions and arrested suspected communists across the country. On November 7, 1919, the Bureau of Investigation collaborated with local police to execute well-coordinated raids against the Union of Russian Workers in twelve different cities. This would be the beginning of what became known as the Palmer Raids, cumulating in January 1920 when Palmer and Hoover instigated another series of arrests against the Communist Labor Party and Communist Party of America.52 Wilson’s anti-Bolshevism would soon become official American policy with the Colby Note, and it postured to not recognize and to “quarantine” the Soviet Union from the West. In response to the growing tensions between Russia and Poland on the Curzon line, the newly appointed Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby wrote this note, which was approved by Wilson on August 9. Although the United States believed the Russian people would overcome “anarchy, suffering, and destitution,” he recognized that the government would condone its use of “savage oppression to maintain themselves in power.” In turn, Colby wrote that the United States would uphold the independence of Finland, Poland, and Armenia against Bolshevik aggressors.53 With this note, Wilson, Colby, and his predecessor Lansing, helped lay the foundations for the Cold War and the policy of containment.

Spanish philosopher George Santayana famously wrote, “only the dead have seen the end of the war.”54 With at least ten million combatants killed, Santayana accurately reflected on the slaughter that was “The Great War.” European nations, who had taken pride in their scientific progress and civility, engaged in a killing campaign on scale unprecedented in human history. With the 1918 flu pandemic taking the lives of 100 million people, the death of the war undoubtedly shook Europe to its core.55 Russia was no exception. Wilson’s indent Wilson, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919), 59-60.

52 McCormick, Seeing Reds, 145-54.

53 Bainbridge Colby, “The Colby Note,” Colby to Wilson, August 9, 1920, with Wilson approval of the “excellent note”, Box 3, Colby Papers, 9http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/ episode-1/colby.htm 54 Quoted in Richard, When the United States Invaded Russia, 1.

55 The casualty rate in World War One is still debated. See Carl J. Richard, When the United States Invaded Russia, 2

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Haley Oâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;Shaughnessy creased animosity towards the Bolsheviks by 1920 had parallels with the U.S. Cold War mentality seen two decades later. The extension of Wilsonian principles seen in Atlantic Charter, Declaration on Liberated Europe, Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and so forth reflected the ideological hostility and diplomatic isolation between the United States and newly formed Bolshevik government. As Roosevelt unsuccessfully attempted to reconcile the relations in 1933, early tensions were to be rejuvenated in a post-1945 environment of nuclear warfare and bipolarity.

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