AudioLearn’s Legal Case Briefs presents The Top 100 Cases in Criminal Procedure. Written by our team of legal content developers and narrated by Terry Rose.
Written by distinguished Law professors and professionally narrated for easy listening, this audiobook provides case briefs for the top 100 cases that have formed the foundation of Criminal Procedure in the United States.
Each case brief will cover the Facts, Procedural History, Issue, Holding, Rule, Reasoning, Disposition, Dissents or Concurrences and notes.
Also included is our Criminal Procedure course outline This outline is detailed and comprehensive, covering everything you might expect to learn in a typical law school Criminal Procedure course. Including capsule and detailed explanations of critical issues and topics you need to know.
Introduction
Criminal law is not just the dramatic outbursts in court or the investigative process that is so often dramatized on television. It is full of rules, procedures, and limitations on the state that makes it ripe for defendants to use as they prepare their cases. The Constitution limits the ability of the State to abuse individual rights, which has developed into a significant body of law. This lecture will go through the top 100 cases that have made the law of the land as it concerns criminal procedure.
First, we will hit on the Fourth Amendment, which deals with illegal searches and seizures both of someone’s body and their property. We will also talk about the need for probable cause, when it’s appropriate to stop and frisk a suspect, searches incident to arrest, and warrants. We will discuss exceptions to the requirement of probable cause, and wiretapping. These Fourth Amendment cases will make up the bulk of modern-day criminal procedure, with many cases originating in the 60s and 70s, when the court fully examined the limits of the state dealing with suspects. Segueing to the Fifth Amendment, we will touch the Exclusionary Rule (or colloquially, the fruit of a poisonous tree). The Fifth Amendment cases will deal with self incrimination, confessions and due process including the famous Miranda case. We will also discuss cases determining when a defendant has the right to a lawyer, and what it means to have effective assistance of counsel. We will touch briefly on discovery and proof requirements, as well as the right to a speedy trial. With this comes the requirements, rights and duties of a grand jury, leading ultimately into the series of cases dealing with trial by jury. These cases will cover how to select a jury, challenge members therein, and the fundamental right to a jury trial. The Confrontation Clause comes next, dealing with what is sufficient (or not) for defendants to question witnesses and their accusers. After the trial aspect is, of course, sentencing, and therefore, this series of cases will discuss punishment, and
sentencing guidelines. After 9/11, criminal procedure formed new law, dealing with the rights of those accused of terrorism, so there will be a small set of cases concerning their rights under the law. And finally, we will discuss the most controversial aspect of America’s criminal justice system: the death penalty.
First, one of the biggest players in the Constitution when it comes to criminal defense is the Fourth Amendment.
Facts: The case of Mapp v. Ohio is significant. Dollree Mapp was part of the illegal gambling rackets in Cleveland. On May 23, 1957, police got a tip that Virgil Ogletree, a person of interest in multiple criminal enterprises, was potentially at Mapp’s residence. The officers went to her house, but clever Mapp called her attorney who advised her not to allow them to enter without a search warrant. The officers left, but one remained to watch the house from across the street. Of course, not cowed, four cars full of police arrived three hours later and when Mapp did not answer the door, they forced their way inside. When she and her lawyer requested a warrant, a piece of paper was handed to her, which she attempted to hide. The officers wrestled it away from her, and no one herself, nor her lawyers, nor any member of the court saw what was on the document. Ogletree was found during the search, as well as other gambling paraphernalia, pornography, and a pistol.
Issue: Did the police have probable cause to suspect her of owning the pornographic books, and therefore, were the books the product of an illegal search?
Held: The state was bound to exclude evidence which was seized in excess of probable cause and in violation of the 4 th Amendment, officially applying the exclusionary rule to the states through the 14 th AAmendment.
Rationale: Without applying the law to states through the 14th AAmendment, then assurances against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be merely a form of words. States must be bound by the same limitations as that of the federal government, otherwise, the 4 th Amendment and entire concept of Due Process would be whittled away, in contravention of the intent of the Bill of Rights.
The Schmerber v California case came about five years after the Mapp matter, extending the law as it applied into warrantless searches of the human body.
Facts: In 1964, Armando Schmerber and a friend were driving home after a night of drinking when they skidded off the road and hit a tree. He and his friend were both injured and transported to the hospital, when police officers asked him to submit to a blood test. Schmerber refused, and even though the officers did not have a search warrant, they instructed doctors to take a blood sample from him. The test revealed he was drunk, and he was arrested. The evidence went before the court, and he was subsequently convicted of drunk driving.
Issue: Was the evidence from his blood test legally obtained, or was it a violation of his 4th Amendment right against illegal search and seizure and 5 th Amendment right against self-incrimination?
Held: Schmerber’s Constitutional rights were not violated upon the blood test occurring without his consent.
Rationale: Extraction and chemical analysis of blood does not involve ‘testimonial compulsion,’ in violation of the 5 th Amendment. As to the 4 th Amendment, this was also not a violation. Although Justice Brennan agreed that searching involving intrusions into the human body require a search warrant, there are some exceptions under exigent circumstances. In this case, there were such circumstances, because had the officers waited, evidence of intoxication would have dissipated as the body metabolized it. Because there was a significant possibility of the destruction of evidence, the officers were within their limits to withdraw blood from Schmerber without his consent.
Dissent: The 4 remaining justices argued that an intrusion into someone’s physical body was a violation of the constitution of the highest sort, violating due process.
In Katz v United States, the court examined another application of the 4th Amendment in the criminal process. The court discussed what the ‘right to privacy’ meant in the context of a legal ‘search.’
Facts: Mr. Katz used a public payphone to send gambling wagers which were illegal between Los Angeles and Miami and Boston. The FBI was recording these conversations through a device outside the phone booth (unbeknownst to Katz of course). He was subsequently convicted based on these recordings. He appealed, challenging his conviction claiming the recordings were a violation of his 4 th Amendment rights, although the FBI argued that there was no physical intrusion into the phone booth itself.
Issue: Does the right to privacy extend to telephone booths and other public places, and is a physical intrusion required to constitute a search under the Constitution?
Held: Regardless of the location, a conversation is protected under the 4 th Amendment if carried out with a reasonable expectation of privacy, and wiretapping, even if no physical intrusion, counts as an invasion of privacy.
Rationale: The purpose of a phone booth in public is to assure a degree of privacy in carrying out a conversation, particularly if the speaker shuts the door behind him. Electronic wiretapping is akin to a physical intrusion, and is therefore unreasonable without a search warrant. The court left it open to obtain a warrant to carry out such a search; however, in this case, there was no warrant and the point was moot. The Katz case made all government wiretapping subject to warrant requirements within the 4th Amendment. In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan developed the ‘reasonable expectation’ test for privacy, which is frequently cited to this day in invasion of privacy suits.
Dissent: Justice Black argued that the 4th Amendment was only designed to protect ‘things’, rather than personal privacy. Using a literal interpretation, he argued that had the founders intended to protect against eavesdropping, they would have explicitly said so.
The next case, Te r r y v O h i o , is one of the seminal 4 unreasonable searches and seizures. th Amendment cases concerning
Facts: A Cleveland Police officer, who had been patrolling the same beat for many years, saw two men standing on a street corner and acting suspiciously. The officer had a reputation for stopping pickpockets and petty thieves, and he observed the two
men pass back and forth on the same route, with each stopping to look into the same store window. Each time they passed the window, they stopped on the corner to converse. A third man joined briefly, who, after speaking with them, left quickly. The officer suspected the men were ‘casing the joint’ for an impending robbery, and he continued to follow them. He was in plainclothes, and he approached the men. He asked them their names, then spun the defendant around, patted him down and felt a pistol. He was not able to remove the gun, but ordered the three men into the store, whereupon he removed the pistol and ordered the three men to face the wall with their hands raised. He patted down the two other men, grabbing another pistol. He did not search under any of the men’s outer layers until he found their weapons.
Issue: Was a stop of this nature, and subsequent pat-down search, (a so-called stop and frisk) a violation of the 4 seizure? th Amendment in that it was an unreasonable search and
Held: While this was indeed a search and seizure, it was not unreasonable.
Rationale: First, the court had to determine the definition of a ‘seizure’ and a ‘search’ under the Constitution. The Court agreed that police action short of arrest could be a seizure, essentially whenever an officer restrains his freedom to walk away. Further, they agreed that feeling someone’s outer clothing is a search, and therefore, in this case, the defendant was indeed subjected to a search and seizure within the contemplation of the 4 th Amendment. However, the issue is whether the search and seizure was unreasonable.
To determine whether an act is reasonable requires the court to examine the nature and extent of government interests involved. The search may start out as reasonable, but it could exceed the scope and intensity the situation demands, and therefore become unreasonable. In this case, the court found that, based upon the totality of the circumstances, the search was reasonable. The officer was experienced, had a lengthy period to observe the defendant and his companions, and the defendants were behaving in a suspicious manner. The search was limited to the outer surfaces of clothing until the weapons were found. The court emphasized that the sole justification of a search of this kind is the protection of the police and others, and it should be limited in scope to discover weapons like guns, knives or other instruments that could be used to assault the police officer or another.
Te r r y has been used subsequently in various attempts to widen law enforcement’s ability to conduct searches and seizures under the auspices of ‘protection.’
The next case Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, exposes the opportunity for individuals to bring their own cause of action against the government when agents of the state violate their constitutional rights.
Facts: The Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) searched the house of plaintiff, Bivens, arresting him without a warrant. Bivens filed a civil suit alleging that his 4 Amendment rights were violated. th
Issue: Does the 4th Amendment allow a private cause of action against states who violate the Constitution?
Held: Ye s . T h e r e i s a p r e s u m p t i o n o f a p r i v a t e c a u s e o f a c t i o n t o p r o t e c t a n individual’s Constitutional rights.
Rationale: The Court will infer a right to a private cause of action for monetary damages if there is no other remedy available in order to vindicate a constitutional right. The Court relied on the principle of ‘for every wrong, there is a remedy.’ If there is a violation of a right, there is thus a presumption that the plaintiff may recover what is available under a civil action unless there are some express limitations to that right from Congress.
Dissent: The dissent cautioned that such a decision should be left for Congress to decide.
In the case titled the United States versus the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, commonly known as the Keith case, the Supreme Court was unanimous about acknowledging the limitations from the Fourth Amendment in cases of domestic surveillance where a domestic threat is known.
Facts: Three defendants were charged with conspiracy to destroy government property, and one of them had been the suspect in the bombing of a CIA office in Michigan. The defendants were leaders of the White Panther Party. The defense requested various evidence from the state, who stated that evidence obtained via use of a wiretap was done through statutory authority, and he was not required to disclose any sources. The statute in question allowed electronic eavesdropping to prevent any coups attempting to overthrow the government without requiring the acquisition of a warrant.
Issue: Does the 4th Amendment have any exceptions to obtaining a warrant for searches when there is a question of a group attempting to subvert the U.S. government?
Held: No, wiretaps are an unconstitutional violation of the 4 th Amendment unless obtained via a search warrant, and they must be disclosed to the defense.
Rationale: There would be too much unfettered discretion if this law were allowed to proceed. The President could, under the auspices of ‘protection,’ order wiretaps on draft dodgers, civil rights activists, Black Panthers, the KKK, and any other group that sowed dissension, in violation of the very freedoms the Founding Fathers contemplated. The government is too powerful to be allowed to run surveillance operations without any court supervision.
Note: this case applies only to domestic threats. Foreign intelligence operations are not bound by the same limitations.
The Illinois v. Gates case introduced the ‘totality of the circumstances’ test that most students are familiar with when it comes to the Fourth Amendment.
Facts: The Bloomingdale Illinois Police department got an anonymous letter which informed them that there was a couple in town that made a living by selling drugs. The letter named the couple, gave a general address, and indicated how the couple sold drugs in specific detail, ending it with “I guarantee, if you watch them carefully, you will make a big catch.” One of the detectives bit and found out that someone with a similar name to the man in the couple had bought a ticket from Chicago to Florida, from where they were allegedly trafficking drugs. The detective (Mader) worked with the DEA and surveilled the defendant, finding out that he was to be back in Chicago within 24 hours. Mader signed an affidavit and submitted that with the
anonymous letter to a judge, who issued a warrant. Upon return of the suspects, the police searched his vehicle, finding over 350 lbs. of marijuana. The Illinois Supreme Court held that this search was unlawful based on the prior test of Spinelli, stating that the affidavit did not provide enough evidence for probable cause.
Facts: May a judge issue a search warrant based on a partially corroborated, anonymous informant’s tip?
Holding: Yes, and they overturned the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision.
Rationale: An informant’s veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge are closely intertwined issues in determining probable cause thus developing a ‘totality of the circumstances’ test. While the informant’s letter by itself would not have been enough to get a warrant. The ‘reliability’ prong of the previous Spinelli test would rarely be met from an anonymous tip, so this test was abandoned.
Dissent: The dissenting justices argued that the Spinelli test was more protective of the rights of the citizens, lowering the chances that a dishonest informant’s claims would be used to obtain a warrant against a suspect. The dissenting justices felt that the ‘totality of the circumstances’ was not specific enough, leaving open room for abuse against the country’s citizens.
The Supreme Court examined the 4 th Amendment in the context of a high school student in the New Jersey v. TLO case.
Facts: A high school girl was searched on school grounds after she was caught smoking in the bathroom. She was sent to the Assistant Vice Principal’s office, who demanded to search her purse after she lied about smoking cigarettes in the bathroom. During the search by the AVP, drug paraphernalia, marijuana, and evidence that she had been selling drugs was found, along with an opened pack of cigarettes. She was later convicted of dealing and using drugs and was subsequently expelled from school and fined $1,000.
Issue: Was this a reasonable search under the 4 right to privacy?
Holding: Ye s , t h i s s e a r c h w a s r e a s o n a b l e .
th Amendment, keeping in mind her
Rationale: There is reasonable suspicion to perform a search, even in a school. However, the student’s possession of cigarettes had to do with whether she was being truthful when the AVP asked her about smoking. She lied, and therefore, it was reasonable to assume she had the cigarettes in her purse and that a school rule had been broken. This was deemed by the court to be more than a mere hunch. So, the initial search was reasonable. During the search, the extra paraphernalia was in plain view, and therefore, was an exception to the requirement of a warrant being needed under the 4th Amendment.
Concurrence: While the justices agreed, two of the justices felt that students in educational settings are not necessarily entitled to the same level of protection as citizens in non school settings.
Nearly a decade later, the Supreme Court dealt with another search and seizure issue in the context of a public-school student in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton.
Facts: The Vernonia school district was in the midst of combating drug use among its students by offering special classes, speakers and presentations to deter the use of
drugs by students. There was also a drug dog, but the problem persisted. The district then adopted a random drug testing plan, which required that all student athletes submit to the program as part of participating in the athletics program. Ten percent of all athletes would be randomly selected each week to give a urine sample, and if positive, the student could either submit to six weekly drug tests and get counseling, or sit out the current and following seasons.
Issue: Is it reasonable for a school to have a drug testing regimen place under the 4 Amendment?
Holding: In this case, yes. th
Rationale: The 4th Amendment protects against legitimate expectations of privacy, and the schools must act in place of the parents. Public schools require vaccinations, vision and hearing tests and other exams, and therefore, they have a lowered expectation of privacy as compared to others in a non-public school setting. Athletes enjoy even less they take communal showers in a shared locker room. They sit for medical exams and submit to various regulations to participate. Urinalysis and drug testing certainly invades an individual’s privacy interest. However, the school was testing only for drugs not for whether the student had other issues, such as diabetes or pregnancy. The disclosures of the results were limited to school officials and not law enforcement. Combined with the importance of the purpose of testing drugs (protecting their students), the Vernonia policy was held to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Dissent: The Court’s decision here did not use the requirement of individualized suspicion, as required in other cases, and it did not explain why it dispensed with such a requirement. The Court typically will not approve of blanket searches, and there was already a discipline system in place to combat the problem.
In the same vein of drug testing students, a more recent Supreme Court case called Board of Education v. Earls continued to uphold and expanded the ability of schools to drug test their students.
Facts: A Tecumseh, Oklahoma school district instituted a drug test policy affecting their middle and high school students before they could participate in any extracurricular activity. Two students, with their parents, sued, asserting their rights under the 4th Amendment. The district court granted the school summary judgment, and on appeal, the Court of Appeals determined that the policy was in violation of the 4th Amendment. They reasoned that a school should demonstrate that there is a drug abuse problem to the point that drug testing will actually help the problem.
Issue: Does a district wide drug test policy of all students engaged in extracurricular activities violate the 4 Amendment?
Held: No it does not.
Rationale: The court referred to the Ve r n o n i a case, holding that students participating in extracurricular activities have a diminished expectation of privacy, and the policy was furthering an important interest of the school. Thus, there was no violation. th
Moving onto warrants, the Supreme Court clarified the law on the legality and scope of warrants in the case Georgia v. Randolph.
Facts: Scott Randolph separated from his wife, Janet, when she left the marital home in Georgia and moved in with her parents. She eventually returned to the house, and one morning, complained to the police that her son had been taken by her husband (after a domestic dispute). When the police arrived, she also told them that her husband abused cocaine, citing it as the cause for their marital issues and informed them that she had only recently returned to Georgia after their separation. When Scott Randolph returned to the house, the police asked him if they could search the house for drug paraphernalia. He refused. The police then asked Janet, who quickly allowed it. After the officer found cocaine, Janet withdrew her consent. The police retuned to the station with the drugs and obtained a search warrant. At trial, Scott tried to suppress the evidence, which was denied.
Issue: Without a search warrant, do police have a right to search a house if one resident consents to the search while another resident objects?
Held: No, they do not. Police cannot conduct a search if a co-occupant who is physically present objects to said search.
Rationale: Even though other cases in the past allowed a co resident to consent without the presence of the other occupant, in this case, it was different because the co-resident actually refused to consent to the search.
Concurrence: One of the justices cautioned against taking an ‘originalist’ attitude that the man is the master of his household, and therefore his decision controls. He reminded the court that, constitutionally speaking, male and female are equal partners under the law. Breyer emphasized the circumstances of the particular case, and that based on the totality of the circumstances, the search was unreasonable. Dissent: The result has the potential of limiting police in their ability to fight domestic violence, and that by living with another person, there should be some anticipation that the other person sharing access to their belongings might turn them over to law enforcement.
The next case, called Fernandez v California, and was heard several years later, explored the limits of the Georgia v Randolph case.
Facts: The police showed up to the defendant’s apartment because they believed a suspect in a gang related assault had just entered it. As they approached, they heard screaming, and the defendant’s girlfriend opened the door, appearing bloodied. The police believed the defendant had assaulted her, and so tried to separate them. The defendant told them to get out of the house;however, he was eventually arrested on suspicion of the gang activity. After he was arrested and taken away, the police returned to the apartment to request a search from the girlfriend, who consented. At trial, the defendant challenged the lawfulness of this search based upon third party consent over his objection.
Issue: May consent be given by a co occupant when the other party has been removed from the premises for objectively reasonable purposes (such as lawful arrest), even if the co occupant has objected?
Holding: Ye s .
Rationale: Fernandez was no longer there and had been removed from the apartments for fair reasons. The law must respect the girlfriend’s independent voluntary consent, and so the police could honor it. In the dissent, the justices
believed the girlfriend had been pressured by police into consenting, and once they knew the co occupant had objected, the police should have obtained a search warrant.
This case significantly expands the state’s rights under the 4 th Amendment to search.
As technology progresses, the court has had to grapple with the new ways the State might be able to use such technology to further their aims and balance it with the protections of the Constitution. Such was the case in United States v. Jones.
Facts: Mr. Jones owned a nightclub in D.C., and a Mr. Maynard managed it. The FBI and local police began investigating them for drugs and used a GPS device on Jones’s vehicle without a warrant. The vehicle was tracked for 24 hours a day for a month. When Jones was eventually arrested, his defense attorney filed multiple motions, including one to suppress the data learned from the GPS. He was convicted at trial and sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, he argued that GPS data violated his 4 Amendment rights. The court agreed, holding that the police action violated his reasonable expectation of privacy. The Supreme Court agreed to answer two questions: th
Issues: 1) Whether the warrantless use of a tracking device on respondent’s vehicle to monitor its movements on public streets violated the 4 th Amendment; and 2) whether the government violated respondent’s 4 Amendment rights by installing the GPS tracking device on his car without a valid warrant and without his consent.
Held: The installation of the GPS device in this case constituted a search under the 4 Amendment, and the actions of the police were unconstitutional and in violation of th th the 4th Amendment.
Rationale: The court used the well-established concept that venturing onto someone’s property was a trespass and was a violation of the 4 th Amendment. The government’s installation of the GPS onto the car was a trespass to get information, and therefore it was a search. It neglected to determine whether any exception exists if there was GPS data without a physical intrusion.
Concurrence: Justice Scalia agreed that there was both a trespassory element, and a violation of the expectation of privacy regarding long-term surveillance. She also reasoned that short term GPS surveillance could be just as intrusive. Scalia agreed with the result but argued that GPS monitoring does not impinge on expectations of privacy. The other justices argued that constant surveillance was at one point, costly, time consuming and demanding of resources. Therefore, most people today would not expect to be monitored so closely for so long, and their expectations of privacy still exist.
Another case dealing with the changing technological landscape was that of a search and seizure of the contents of a cell phone in Riley v California.
Facts: Previous case precedent stated that police can search the body of someone without a warrant upon arrest if it is in the area where the defendant could reach to protect evidence or an officers’ safety. This case explores two cases that involved similar issues regarding warrantless cell phone searches incident to arrest. In case 1, the defendant was pulled over for expired registration tags, and it was discovered he
had a suspended driver’s license. After a standard inventory search, two handguns were revealed under the hood. Turns out these guns were used in a gang murder, and the defendant had been a suspect. He was placed under arrest and his cell phone was searched without a warrant, which yielded a treasure trove of information, including information about other crimes and gangs.
In case,the thesecond defendant afterwas policearrested watched him participate in what appeared to be a drug sale. He was arrested, and his phone was taken. During the interview, multiple calls came in, and the officer opened the call history. The number from ‘home’ in the phone was from the defendant’s apartment, and using this information, the police obtained a warrant and found a huge supply of drugs, guns and cash. Both defendants sought review in the Supreme Court.
Issue: Can a cell phone’s contents be searched without a legally obtained warrant?
Held: No, a warrant is required to search a mobile phone.
Rationale: Digital data on a phone may not be used as a weapon, and therefore, may not be obtained for the officer’s protection. While evidence might be destroyed, this is standard operation of a phone or computer, and a warrantless search probably wouldn’t matter. Data is vulnerable to being wiped away, and the phone could also become encrypted after too many failed attempts at logging-in. Modern cell phones hold many private details of an individual’s life, and they are entitled to an expectation of privacy.
The next series of cases explores the exclusionary rule when it comes to the 4 th Amendment. In the case of Franks v Delaware, the court explored the right to challenge evidence gather on the basis of a false statement.
Facts: A woman, Cynthia Bailey, told police in Delaware that she had been confronted by a man with a knife in her home and was sexually assaulted. She gave a specific physical description, including details of his clothing. On the same day, defendant Franks was arrested stemming from an assault involving a 15 year old girl, Brenda, which occurred nearly a week before. When waiting for a bail hearing, he told the accompanying officer that he was surprised the hearing was about Brenda. “I know her. I thought you said Bailey. I don’t know her.” At the time of this statement, he had not been given his Miranda rights. This statement was reported to a detective on the Bailey case. The same detective confirmed with defendant’s employees his typical manner of dress, which matched the description by Ms. Bailey. This evidence was set forth in an affidavit, whereupon a warrant to search was issued. Defense counsel moved to suppress the evidence gathered from the warrant search, stating that the conversation by the witnesses to the detective was ‘somewhat different’ from the information in the affidavit. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and the appellate court agreed, stating that no attack upon the truthfulness of a warrant affidavit should be made.
Issue: Does a defendant in a criminal proceeding have the right, subsequent to the ex parte issuance of a search warrant, to challenge the truthfulness of factual statements made in an affidavit supporting the warrant?
Held: If the defendant can make a substantial preliminary showing that the affidavit included a false statement made knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard
for the truth, and that statement is necessary to create probably cause, a hearing must be held at the defendant’s request.
Rationale: An outright ban on determining the truth of the affidavit would nullify any meaning of the requirement of ‘probable cause’. Essentially, a police officer could use falsified allegations to create probable cause and mislead the magistrate. There must be some way to impeach the veracity of an affidavit, but it cannot be done easily. Therefore, this holding was limited, with a heavy burden upon the defendant to show the misrepresentation in the affidavit upon which the warrant is based.
The Rakas v. Illinois case explored another situation in which evidence obtained unlawfully and in violation of the 4 th Amendment may be excluded.
Facts: Police officers stopped a car which matched the description of a getaway car used in a recent robbery. The owner was driving the car. The defendants here were passengers in the vehicle and did not own it. In the car was a shotgun and ammunition. The passengers were subsequently arrested and convicted as participants of an armed robbery. They moved to suppress the evidence, which was denied for lack of standing.
Issue: Can standing be established in the absence of ownership of the property in question which was seized?
Held: No
Rationale: Fourth Amendment rights are personal and may not be vicariously asserted. The ‘target’ theory, where any defendant at whom a search is directed and thus has standing does not apply to the Fourth Amendment. The passengers had no proprietary or possessory interest in the vehicle and were unable to show they had an expectation of privacy, and so could not challenge the decision to allow the evidence based upon the 4th Amendment. The dissent felt that this decision strayed from prior jurisprudence, and therefore should not stand. Instead, there was an expectation of privacy, even in property which someone does not own.
The case U.S. v Calandra deals with grand jury witnesses and their ability to testify if evidence was procured based on an illegal search and seizure.
Facts: The defendant’s workplace was searched by federal agents based on a warrant which had been issued in connection with a gambling investigation. The warrant specified that the purpose of the search was to find bookmaking records or gambling paraphernalia. One agent knew of an ongoing federal investigation on the same company for loansharking activities. During the search, he found and seized a suspected record connected to loansharking. A grand jury subpoenaed the defendant to question him on the evidence seized, but he refused to testify, asserting his 5 Amendment rights. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress, finding the affidavit supporting the warrant was insufficient and the search exceeded the scope of the warrant. The court of appeals agreed.
Issue: May a witness who is summoned to appear and testify before a grand jury refuse to answer questions based on the fact that the evidence in question was obtained from an unlawful search and seizure?
Held: No, the witness may not refuse to answer questions. th
Rationale: The exclusionary rule is a remedy to protect Fourth Amendment rights by deterring future unlawful police conduct, rather than protecting a personal constitutional right of the party who has been aggrieved. Allowing a grand jury witness to use this rule would interfere with the grand jury’s duties, and would not sufficiently deter police misconduct, but would rather substantially impeded the grand jury’s role. The dissent felt that the exclusionary rule was not solely to act as a deterrent for illegal police action, but rather should protect the individual rights of citizens, too.
The case of U.S. v. Havens deals with the waiver of the exclusionary rule, when defendants testify in their own defense.
Facts: The defendants were attorneys who had been caught bringing in cocaine to Miami from Peru. After a search of the first attorney, cocaine was found in the pockets of his t shirt. This defendant implicated Havens, who was arrested, and his luggage searched. A t shirt with holes matching the pockets of the shirt on the other defendant was found in his luggage but was excluded as evidence before trial upon a finding that it was discovered through an unlawful search. At trial, Havens testified in his own defense. He denied any involvement in importing or possessing cocaine and denied any knowledge of the t shirt in his luggage. The prosecution offered the t shirt into evidence, along with testimony from an agent, to impeach Havens. The court of appeals reversed the trial court, finding the t shirt was improperly allowed.
Issue: Was the t shirt, previously excluded evidence, properly allowed to impeach the defendant, even though it was procured through an unlawful search?
Held: Ye s , t h e t s h i r t w a s p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e .
Rationale: A defendant can be impeached on a lawful cross examination by evidence, even if it was obtained illegally. Impeachment should be allowed to prevent a defendant from lying when they choose to testify on their behalf. The dissent argued that this allows too much freedom, giving the prosecution a chance to draw out testimony on cross examination and impeach it with illegally seized evidence. This ‘backdooring’ of evidence was otherwise excluded. Let this case be a note to future practitioners never ever let your client testify in his own defense!
An exception to the exclusionary rule was created in the U.S. v Leon case.
Facts: California police got a tip which identified Patsy Stewart and Armando Sanchez as drug dealers. Surveillance of their homes commenced, and from there, police were able to identify the defendant, Alberto Leon, as being involved as well. A search warrant based on this surveillance and information from an informant was issued. A search was conducted, but the warrant was later found to be invalid the police failed to assert probable cause for a warrant in the first place. However, the police performed the search in reliance on the warrant and in good faith.
Issue: If law enforcement executes a search based upon a search warrant in good faith, even though it is later found to be invalid, may evidence obtained from said search still be used?
Held: Ye s .
Rationale: The exclusionary rule was designed to deter police misconduct rather than punish magistrates for their errors. Usually, only when a warrant is grounded upon an
affidavit which was made knowingly or recklessly false and misleading will evidence be suppressed. An officer acting in good faith and within the scope of the warrant should not be punished by the exclusionary rule, provided the officer’s reliance is objectively reasonable.
There has been much discussion so far about evidence being excluded as the result of an illegal search. Two cases are largely responsible for the following body of jurisprudence and are a central keystone upon the criminal justice system in America is based.
First, the seminal case which created the ‘fruits of an illegal search’ theory is the Wong Sun case.
Facts: Way had been under surveillance by federal drug agents for over a month and was found with heroin in his possession. Upon questioning, he revealed that he bought the heroin from a man named ‘Blackie Toy’. The Agents went to the location where the drugs were bought, which happened to be a laundromat run by a man named James Wah Toy. The agent went to the door, announced he was a drug agent, and then Toy slammed the door and ran away. The agents followed Toy into his bedroom, where he reached into a nightstand drawer. Toy was arrested. There was nothing in the drawer and no drugs were on the premises. During interrogation, the officers told Toy that they knew he sold drugs. Toy mentioned that he didn’t sell drugs, but knew a guy named Johnny who did, and described Johnny’s house. The agents went to said house and found a Johnny Yee in the bedroom, who eventually gave the officers several packages of heroin. Johnny was arrested and interrogated. He identified a man called ‘Sea Dog’ that had brought the heroin to him. Sea Dog was actually Wong Sun. The agents went to Wong Sun’s apartment, arrested him, but found no drugs. All three were eventually released, then later interrogated by another agent. Toy refused to sign his statement. Wong Sun did not sign but admitted the accuracy of his statement. The evidence presented at trial, (and at issue on appeal), was a statement orally made by Toy at the time of his arrest, heroin given to agents by Yee, Toy’s unsigned statement, and Wong Sun’s statement. The trial court admitted all the evidence. The court of Appeals held the arrests were illegal because there were not based on probable clause, but that the evidence was not a fruit of the illegal arrest, and so were properly admitted.
Issue: Whether, if a primary illegality existed, the evidence was found as a result of the illegality, can it be purged of the primary taint of the initial illegality?
Held: It depends it’s a case by case, factual analysis. The verbal evidence was the fruit of a poisonous tree. The heroin was also from an exploitation of an initial illegality and could not be used against Toy. Wong Sun’s confession was properly admitted, because the connection between the arrest and the statement was attenuated.
Rationale: Ve r b a l e v i d e n c e f r o m a n u n l a w f u l e n t r y a n d a r r e s t i s c e r t a i n l y f r u i t o f a n official illegality. Wong Sun’s statement was attenuated because it had been several days since his initial arrest, and he voluntarily returned to make the statement. Therefore, it depends on how attenuated the connection between the initial illegal act is, to determine if the taint of illegality has been removed.
Probably the most famous case, which most people can recognize, depending on how much television you watch, is the Miranda v. Arizona matter.
Facts: Ernesto Miranda was arrested by the Phoenix police department. His arrest was based on circumstantial evidence, connecting him to the rape and kidnapping of a young woman over a week earlier. He was interrogated for 2 hours by police officers, and then signed a confession to the charge on forms. The form stated, “I do hereby swear that I make this statement voluntarily and of my own free will, with no threats, coercion or promises of immunity, and with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me.” Miranda was never informed of his write to counsel, his right to remain silent, or that any statement he made during the interrogation could be used against him. At trial, his defense counsel argued that because of this, his statement could not truly be voluntarily, and should be excluded. The trial court overruled the objection, and Miranda was convicted. The Arizona Supreme Court agreed, noting that Miranda had never specifically requested an attorney.
Issue: If a defendant is not notified of all of his rights, may his confession be given voluntarily?
Held: No
Rationale: A custodial police interrogation is inherently coercive. No confession couldbe admissible under the 5 and 6th th Amendments unless a suspect had been made explicitly aware of his rights, and knowingly waived them. Miranda’s conviction was thus overturned. The dissent felt this was a reactionary holding, fearing that once warned, suspects would always demand attorneys and police would be unable to get any confessions.
Since this case, all police departments are required to ‘Mirandize’ their suspects, advising them of their rights before interrogation. Despite the dissents fears, there has been little, if any effect, on the police’s ability to solve crimes.
The case New York v. Harris dealt with what happens when a suspect makes incriminating statements after Miranda.
Facts: Police found the body of a murder victim in an apartment and had probably cause to believe that Harris had killed the victim. Officers went to his house to arrest him, despite not having an arrest warrant. When they arrive, Harris let them in, and the officers read him his Miranda rights. Harris admitted to killing the victim, and he was arrested. He was Mirandized again, and then signed a confession. He was Mirandized again, and interviewed on camera by the district attorney, despite Harris saying he wanted to end the interrogation. The trial court suppressed the first and second statements, which went unchallenged by the State. The last statement was admitted, and Harris was convicted. The appellate division affirmed, and the New Yo r k C o u r t o f A p p e a l s r e v e r s e d .
Issue: Whether Harris’s second statement should have been suppressed because the police violated the rule which forbids police from effecting warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home to make a routine felony arrest?