2022_Why does Perth stand alone by audrc

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Why does Perth stand alone? Interviews with subject matter experts about the drivers of settlement in Western Australia

George S. Wilkinson III, Fiona Haslam McKenzie & Julian Bolleter

To cite this article: George S. Wilkinson III, Fiona Haslam McKenzie & Julian Bolleter (2022): Why does Perth stand alone? Interviews with subject matter experts about the drivers of settlement in Western Australia, Australian Geographer, DOI: 10.1080/00049182.2022.2076578

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2022.2076578

Published online: 23 May 2022.

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AUSTRALIANGEOGRAPHER

https://doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2022.2076578

WhydoesPerthstandalone?Interviewswithsubjectmatter expertsaboutthedriversofsettlementinWesternAustralia

GeorgeS.WilkinsonIIIa,FionaHaslamMcKenzie b andJulianBolleter c

aAustralianUrbanDesignResearchCentre,Geography,TheUniversityofWesternAustralia,Perth,Australia; bDepartmentofGeographyandPlanningandAustralianUrbanDesignResearchCentre,TheUniversityof WesternAustralia,Perth,Australia; cAustralianUrbanDesignResearchCentre,TheUniversityofWestern Australia,Perth,Australia

ABSTRACT

Australiannon-capitalcitiesareovershadowedbytheirstate capitals.Highstate-levelurbanprimacyisespeciallytrueof WesternAustralia.Varioustheoriesineconomicgeographymight explainthewestAustraliansettlementpattern.Fewaregrounded intheexperienceofthosewithpoweroverand/orknowledgeof development.Tostudythisexperienceandcompareitwiththeory weconducted37in-depthinterviewswithdecision-makersand subjectmatterexpertstounderstandtheirexplanationsofWestern Australia’ssettlementpattern.Inadditiontowell-known determinantsofsettlement,suchasenvironmentalconstraintand ﬁrst-moveradvantages,amajorityofparticipantsattributedPerth’s dominancetocentralisedpoliticalinstitutions,poorinfrastructure provisiontonon-capitalcityregions,fewbottom-upgrowth avenues,andanunmetneedtodevolvepower.Mostparticipants believedcentralisationinPerthwarrantsintervention.Themost reoccurringideasarepresentedanddiscussed.

Introduction

KEYWORDS

Urbanprimacy;Western Australia;regional development;Perth; institutionaleconomics; economicgeography

AccordingtotheAustralianBureauofStatistics(ABS 2019),sincethe1990sWestern AustraliahasbeenoneofAustralia’sfastestgrowingstates.Providedpopulation growthresumespre-COVID-19momentum,growthisanticipatedfordecadeswithestimatesprojectingstatepopulationsashighas5.9millionby2066,upfrom1.9millionin 2001(ABS 2017).Anticipatinggrowth,federalreportsdetailaimstodecentralisepopulationthroughregionalinvestment(AustralianGovernment 2015, 2019).Thisinterventionisrequiredbecause,todate,developmentisconcentratedincapitals,asettlement patternknownasurbanprimacy(ShortandPinet-Peralta 2009).

UrbanprimacyinAustralia

Urbanprimacysigniﬁescentralisedurbanisation,apolitycharacterisedbyonedominant, largecityandascarcityofsecondcities(Jeﬀerson 1939).Tocontextualiseprimacy,

CONTACT GeorgeS.WilkinsonIII george.wilkinsoniii@research.uwa.edu.au AustralianUrbanDesignResearch Centre,Geography,TheUniversityofWesternAustralia,L2,1002HayStreet,Perth,WA,Australia

Figure1 comparesmeasuresforAustralianstateswithasampleofCanadianprovinces andAmericanstates,allbeingsubsidiariesofwealthy,largefederationssometimes subjecttocomparison(e.g.Brunet-JaillyandMartin 2010;Wilkinson,McKenzie,and Bolleter 2023).AlsoincludedarenationalexamplesofhighprimacyasperShortand Pinet-Peralta(2009).Twomeasuresarepresented:(i)Primacy1expressestheratio betweenthelargestcity’spopulationandthenexttwocitiescombined,indicatingthe extenttowhichthelargestcitystandsabove(ShortandPinet-Peralta 2009);(ii) Primacy2expressesthelargestcitypopulationasaproportionoftotalurbanpopulation, ameasureofurbanconcentrationindicatingtheextenttowhichthelargestcitystands alone(Mutlu 1989).Measuresabove2.0and50%respectivelyindicatesubstantial concentrations.

ForbothmeasuresAustralianstatesexhibitveryhighprimacy,exceptTasmaniaand recognisingthevariationtherein.Generally,thestatecapitalsaremuchlargerthannoncapitalcitiesandareamongfewcities,arealitydatingtothecolonialperiod,contrasted bylowprimacynationally(Wilkinson,McKenzie,andBolleter 2023).WesternAustralia,

Figure1. Comparativemeasuresofurbanprimacy.

astatecomprisingone-thirdofAustralia,isaparticularlyextremecase,withitscapital Perthaccountingfor85%ofurbanpopulation(ABS 2019).Highmeasuresareremarkableingeographicallylarge,wealthyterritorieswithurbanpopulationsabovetwomillion whereprimacyisassociatedwithopportunitycosts,featuresapplicabletoNewSouth Wales,Victoria,Queensland,andWesternAustralia(DavisandHenderson 2003;Henderson 2003).

Theoriesofprimacyinstates

Toexplainprimacy,theoriesofsettlementinAustraliaevokeenvironmentaldeterminism(LonsdaleandHolmes 1981;Rowland 1977)and ﬁrst-moveradvantages(Neutze 1977)giventhestatecapitalswereamongstthefewoasescitedbycolonistsandserved aslogicalhubs(Statham 1990).Stilwell(1974a)attributed ‘metropolitandominance’ to marketforces – internationalcapitalismfavouringportcapitals,exportsfavouringthin ruralpopulations,moderntechnologyenablingcapitalstoservevastgeographies,and urbanisationinAustraliaprecedingruraldevelopment.Colonialadministrativeseaports, establishedinaneraofmodernityandurbanisation,centraliseddevelopment,minimisingthequantityofurbancentres,thecapitalsprosperingduetoheadstarts(Brennan 1963;Robinson 1962).AccordingtoGlynn(1975)andNeutze(1977)theseforcesalso sparkedinter-colonialcompetition,resultinginstatesprioritisingtheircapitals.

Relatedtotheaboveexplanationsareagglomerationeconomies,theregion-speciﬁc competitiveadvantagesthatindividualenterprisesdevelopthroughtheirjuxtaposition withcomplementaryactivities(Knox,Agnew,andMcCarthy 2014),thenotionthat ‘proximitymatters’ (MalmbergandMaskell 1997).Thatis,citiesaretheproductsof spatiallyclustered,accumulatedresources,knowledge,inputs/capabilities,andother economicactivitiesfromwhichcosts-savingsderive(Coe,Kelly,andYeung 2019; MacLachlan 2013).Theoretically,thegravityofagglomerationinexistingcitieshas increasedinthewakeoftheknowledgeeconomygiventhelargerequisitescaleof citiescapableofcreatingjobs,exacerbatingthegapbetweenprimateandsecondcities (MacKinnonandCumbers 2019).Thus,inWesternAustraliaaneconomicexplanation purportsthatmodernityexpandedPerth’smagnetismtoencompassthestate,necessitatingonecityandclosingthecity-formationwindowwhennocentrecouldcompete.

Agglomerationeconomiesmayexplainthesuccessofindividualcities,buttheydonot necessarilyexplainaprimatecity’sdeﬁningsolitude.Whycitiesgrowisdistinctfrom whyonlyonecitygrows.Furthermore,weretheseeconomicexplanationsnotmediated byinstitutionstheywouldapplyglobally,withnewcityformationbeingrare.However, cityformationcontinues.Forexample,the2020UnitedStatescensusillustratedthat Texas,Florida,andNorthCarolinaarehighlypopulated,developedstatescapableof birthing ‘ new ’ agglomerationswithpopulationsoveronemillion(e.g.McAllen,TX; CapeCoralandMelbourne,FL;Greensboro,NC)(Brinkhoﬀ 2022).City-birthinrelativelywealthyeconomiesunderminestheideathatprimacyisaproductofagglomeration,drawingintoquestionthedeterminantsofscaleuponwhichonecentre’ s agglomerationexcludesanother’ s.

Ininstitutionaleconomics,agglomerationeconomiesaremediatedbyinstitutions, evincedbythepoliticallycentralisedproﬁleofurbanprimacyinternationally(Ades andGlaeser 1995;Anthony 2014;HendersonandVenables 2009). Thatis,political

factorssculptsettlement(ArocaandAtienza 2016;Henderson 2003).Contrarytoneoclassicalperspectives,whichassumeeconomicgeographycorrespondswithproductivity, institutionalistsemphasise ‘therulesofthegame’ (North 1990,3),theformalandinformalconstraintsoncapitalaccumulationthatconditioneconomicgeography(Acemoglu andRobinson 2005;Glaeseretal. 2004).Primacyisassociatedwiththecapitalsofcentralisedpolities,exhibitingatop-heavybalanceofintergovernmentalpower(e.g.weak localism)whilstdecentralisedsettlementisconcomitantwithdevolvedpolitical,administrative,and ﬁscalpowers(KimandLaw 2012, 2016).Theunderlyinghypothesisof institutionaleconomicsmightbetakentosuggestthatthegrowthofcitiesisafunction ofgovernmentstimulationratherthanlocation-speciﬁcattributes.Onthecontrary, metaphoricallyratherthanbeingseedsofagglomeration,institutionsarethesoil/ water,determiningthepoliticalarenawithinwhicheconomicopportunitiesagglomerate.

Inkeepingwithinternationalstudies,somescholarsofAustraliansettlementconsideredinstitutions.Brown(2003,200)explainedthatitis ‘widelybutinaccurately assumed’ thatAustralianstateurbanprimacywastheresultofnaturaleconomic factors,counteringthatthecapitals’ dominancewasandremainspolitical. ‘Onceestablished,eachcentreuseditspoliticalleveragetoaugmentitsowncontroloverassociated territory,oftenagainstlocationaldisadvantagesandattheexpenseofotherwould-be centres’ (Brown 2003,17–18).SimilarlyEversoleandWalo(2020)contendthatcolonial centralisationcatalysedAustralia’sdeepcity–countrydivide.Decadesearlier,Bird(1965, 299)pointedtoinlandandresource-poorCanberratoexemplifythepowerofinstitutionstofosteragglomeration-thefoundersweren’t ‘infallible’ inchoosingoases capableofholdingmillions,they ‘wereinfallibleinobtainingoﬃcialrecognitionfor theirchoices.’ Similarly,scholarsattributed ‘metropolitanisation’ toinstitutionsand capital-centricpolicymaking(e.g.uniformwagepolicies,weaklocalgovernment,centralisedinfrastructureprovision)(Glynn 1975;Lonsdale 1971;Stilwell 1974b).

Indeed,earlyAustraliansettlementwasremarkableforitsgovernmentcenteredness (ErgasandPincus 2015).Aharshnaturalenvironmentcompelledthestatetoleadreluctantprivateenterprise(Coleman 2016).Inturn,settlerstoAustraliaexpectedservices, looking ‘upontheStateasavastpublicutility’ (Hancock 1930, 72).AccordingtoWilkinson,McKenzie,andBolleter(2023)thesenascentproclivitiescolourfederalism. Specifically,Wilkinson,McKenzie,andBolleter(2022, 2021b, 2023)testedtheinstitutionalthesisinAustraliaandidentifiedattributesofAustralianfederalismcommon toprimacyinternationally,includingstatecentricity,weaklocalism/regionalism,and fiscalcentralisation.Whilstexplanationsofprimacysometimesattributeagencyto non-capitalcities,citingtheir ‘failure’ tocatchuporachieveapopulationthreshold capableoftriggeringagglomeration(Stilwell 1974b,39),Wilkinson,McKenzie,andBolleter(2022)concludedthatnon-capitalcitiesdonotpossesstherequisitepowerstobe accountableforsuchoutcomes.TheyattributedAustralia’sscarcityoflargenoncapitalcitiestolocal/regionalgovernmentsaspoliticalunitslackingthe ‘bottom-up’ abilitiestospearheaddevelopment,beingreliantupontop-downinitiativesforwhichthereis competition,renderingsupportshort-termandsporadic.

InarelatedstudyofAustralianfederalism,Wilkinson,McKenzie,andBolleter(2023) linkedprimacyinstatestoacontentiousbalanceofinter-governmentalpowerthat favourshighertiers(alsosee:Fenna 2019).Despitedevolutionbeing ‘acentral element’ offederaltheory,in ‘Australiaweapplytheoppositetheory. … [It’s]absurd

thatacountryofAustralia’svastsizeismanagedsointensivelyfromCanberra’ (Jones 1993,7–8).Coleman(2016,1)similarlyderidedAustraliancentralisationas ‘façadefederalism.’ Scathingcritiquesofcentralisationextendtostates.Jones(1993,13)likened Australianlocalgovernmentstostandingpeacetimearmies, ‘overmanaged,restless … waitingforachallenge,’ statespractice ‘divideandrule’ ratherthansubsidiarity. Despitethepromisesoffederation,federalismresultedinlittleengagementwithlocalism/regionalism,(Brown 2007,235).Thus,therearefewelasticorspeculativesources ofcapitalinlocalandregionalsectors(AustralianProductivityCommission 2008); raisingrevenueislargelythepurviewoftheCommonwealthwhilstexpenditurelargely resideswithstates.AsStilwellandTroy(StilwellandTroy 2000,928)conclude, ‘itis diﬃculttoescapetheconclusionthatthefederalsystemhaseﬀectivelylocked-inthe existingbroadcontoursofAustralia’sspatialstructure.’

Institutionalaccountsofsettlementmightbecontrasted,perhapsrefuted,withreferencetothedecentralisedAmericanexperience,wheredevelopmentisattributedto privatesectorleadershipasopposedtostate-centricity(ErgasandPincus 2015). Indeed,theprivatesectorplayedanintegralroletofundingAmericansettlement. However,thisrolewasmediatedbythemunicipalbondmarket,referringtoissuinggovernmentsresponsiblefortwo-thirdsofAmericaninfrastructure finance(MunicipalSecuritiesRulemakingBoard 2020;Young 2012).TheideathatAmericansettlementwas privatelyledcouldbetakentosuggestfrontiercapitalistswereunscrupulous,speculativelyinvestinguponlandsthatmightlaterbeconfiscatedbythestate.Instead,American institutionswerepresentatearlystages,albeitassuminglesscontrol/risk,permitting capitalmarketstofulfilanexpansionistagenda.

Theresearchgap

NumeroustheoriespurporttoexplainurbanprimacyinAustralianstates,however,few consultthoseinvolvedindevelopment.Towhatextentaretheaboveunderstandings sharedbyindividualswhoareinformedabout(andpotentiallyabletoinﬂuence)the driversofsettlementinWesternAustralia?Furthermore,givenWesternAustraliaexhibitssomeofthehighestlevelsofprimacy,inmagnitudeandscale,intheworld,itconstitutesaninterestingcontextforon-the-groundanalyses.Toexplorethis,weconducted interviewswithsubjectmatterexpertspossessingprofessionalexperienceasleaders withintheAustralianpublicandprivatesectors.Theresearchquestionswere:

1.WhatfactorsdoexpertsthinkdriveurbanprimacyinWesternAustralia?

2.WhatstrategiesdoexpertsthinkcoulddeliverpopulationdecentralisationinWestern Australia?

3.Howdoexpertopinionsalign/misalignwithexistingtheory?

Interviewmethodology

Toaddresstheresearchquestionsweconductedsemi-structured,in-depth,one-on-one interviewswithsubjectmatterexperts,enablingguided, ﬂexible,activeconversationsthat invitedsharing(BrinkmannandKvale 2018;Liamputtong 2020).Interviewsprovidedan

opportunitytogetclosertothemechanismsofurbanprimacy, ‘reconstructingevents’ by connectingwiththeexperienceofthosewhohavedealtdirectlywitheconomicdevelopment(RubinandRubin 2011).Welimitedourscopetoanextremeexample,Western Australia.

Toidentifyexpertsoursamplingmethod employedtwonon-randomsamplingtechniques,purposivesamplingandsnowballing(Kelleyetal. 2003).Purposivereferstothe identificationofthreespecificpopulations.First,wesoughtelectedofficialsandpublic sectorleaderswithnational,state,regionaland/orlocalexperience,manyofwhomhave directlyengagedwiththeissueofdecentralisation.Thesecondgroupincludedscholarsof economicgeography,history,regionaldevelopment,andfederalism,identifiedthrough theirscientificcontributionspertainingtosettlementand/orpublicpolicy.Third,we soughttheparticipationofprivatesectorleadersexperiencedinpublicsectorinfrastructure. Relativetosnowballing,weleveragedparticipantreferrals(AtkinsonandFlint 2001).We soughtaminimumof25–30interviews ‘toreachsaturationandredundancy’– when additionalparticipantsareunlikelytoprovidenewinsights(Dworkin 2012,1319).In total,37acceptedandcompletedinterviewswhichlastedonaverage40min.

Figure2 describesouranonymisedsample.Twenty-sixparticipantswerebasedin WesternAustralia,usuallygovernmentrepresentatives.Eastcoastparticipantswere mostlyscholars(7)andnationalexperts.Theparticipantrolemaybecurrentor former.Thesamplewassplitbetweencapitalcityandregionallybasedparticipants. Locationreﬂectsthegeographyoftherole.

Allinterviewswerestructuredsimilarly:Afterintroductionstheconversationrevolved aroundthreequestionsprovidedinadvance:

(1)WhydoesWesternAustraliaexhibiturbanprimacy?

(2)AretheregrowthconstraintsinregionalWesternAustralia?Ifso,whatarethey?

(3)DoyouthinkweshouldaddressurbanprimacyinWesternAustralia?Ifso,how?If not,whynot?

Interviewsweresometimesadaptedtorespondtoexperienceanddeviations.Each interviewwasrecordedwithpermission,transcribedverbatim,andsubjectedtotextual andinterpretativeanalysistoidentifythemes(Liamputtong 2020).Weemployed word/phrasesearchesandclosereadingto ﬁndsimilaritiesanddiﬀerencesinperspectivestoachievethis.Allidentifyinginformationwasremoved.Responseswereedited forclarity.

Participantsusuallyprovidedmultifacetedanswers,resultinginsomeresponsesbeing conveyedacrossmultiplethemes.Initialcategorisationswereconsolidatedtominimise overlap.Aswillbeexplained,eachcategoryconveysauniqueideanotexclusiveto others.Thequantityindicatedisthenumberofinterviewsinwhichtheparticipantintroducedtheanswer.Forbrevity,thetop ﬁvemostcommonanswersarepresented.

Results

Question1:WhydoesWesternAustraliaexhibiturbanprimacy?

Table1 featurestheresultsforthe ﬁrstquestion.Twoanswersweredominant.First,23of 37expertsdescribedinstitutions,speciﬁcallycentralisedinfrastructureprovision,usually

Figure2. SubjectMatterExpertData.

Table1. Question1Results. WhydoesWesternAustraliaexhibiturbanprimacy?

Answer Quantity

onrationalgroundsofpercapitaequity,investinglimitedresourcesinexistingpopulationcentres.Astateministercommented,

Populationbecomesself-fulﬁllingbecausethat’swheretheneedisandiseasilyproved There’sonlyacouplepoliticiansthataregoingtoadvocateforriskierinvestmentstotry andattractpopulationandthere’sanopportunitycostforthem(sic)todothat … speak tosomeoftheLiberalpartyministers[whopushedfor]RoyaltiesforRegions1 itwas despisedbyPerthbasedpoliticiansandveryquickly,eventhoughthelegislationisstill there,it’sprettymuchbeenwounddown.’

ThisinstitutionaldynamicwasusuallyattributedtoPerthhavingbeenthecolonialseat. AStateMinistercommented, ‘There’ssomethingthatcomesoutofbeingthe firstcentre ofgovernment anunequalsnowballingofamenity,anurgency[todeliver]amenity wherethecapitalis … metropolitanPerthhasamegaphonethatisheardinsidethe CabinetRoom.’ Inadditiontobeing first,someattributedPerth’sdominancetocentralisedpoliticalideologies.Accordingtoafederalismscholar, ‘theoverridingreasonwhy thingsdidn’tdevelopdifferentlyistheroleofgovernmentandtheroleofthestatein eachcolony … therewasanassumption[whichpersists]thatitwasbetterforthestate tocontrolthedistributionofresourcesanddecisionmaking.’ Expertsdescribed decision-makingasconcentratedinPerth.Themayorofalocalgovernmentin WesternAustralia’sPilbararegionsharedthestoryofahigh-rankingleaderinthePremier’ soffice, ‘Professional,smartasawhip,travelledtheworld.YetwhenIspoketohim threeyearsago[Ilearned]thathe’dnevertravellednorthofKalbarri. … hasneverbeen tothePilbara,doesn’tknowwhatitlookslike.Thesearethepeoplewhomakedecisions aboutthefutureofregionalWesternAustralia … [it’s]deeplydamagingtotheprospects ofthecountry.’

Inequalmeasure,23intervieweesexplainedthatprimacyistheresultofeconomic history,withPerthbeingtheearly/initialpointofsettlement,accumulatingnumerous competitiveadvantagesthankstoitsheadstart.Aneconomicgeographerreasoned that, ‘oncethatinitialpointofsettlementanddevelopmentbeginstooccuritjustcontinuestosoldieron.There’sastrongdegreeofpathdependenceinmuchofwhathas followed.’

Thethirdmostcommonanswerfocuseduponlifestyle.14intervieweesattributed primacytoPerth’sabundantpublicamenities.Participantsconnectedtheseassetswith capitalcitystatusandsawamenitiesasforcesofagglomeration.Fourth,12experts suggestedaharshclimateselectedforprimacy,Perthbeingasingularoasis. ‘Perthis justinthatcellthat’sprettycomfortable,’ speculatedone.AmayorfromthePilbara admitted, ‘someofitispeoplewanttoliveinplaceswheretheclimateismilder.You

can ’ttotallydiscountthosegeographicfactors … it’sbeenanissueinthePilbaraforapercentageofthepopulation.’ The ﬁfthmostcommonexplanationdiscussedthetimingof development.Almostonethirdofexpertsbelievedmodernisationandurbanisation, whichcharacterisedWesternAustralia’searlydevelopment,necessitatedonecity.

Question2:AretheregrowthconstraintsinregionalWesternAustralia?Ifso, whatarethey?

Table2 summarisesquestiontworesponses.31participantsanswered ‘ yes. ’ Poorservices andamenityweremostmentioned(17interviews),withregionalparticipantssharing storiesofcolleaguesleavingforthecapitaltoprovidetheirfamilieswithbetterresources. Oneexpertputthecapital-regionaldisconnectbluntly, ‘Clearlyregionsaren’tequal. Thereisclearlyalackofservicefacilities.Educationlevelsarediﬀerentinthecountry. Wealthlevelsarediﬀerentinthecountry.Healthoutcomesarelowerinthecountry.’ Thisviewwassharedwidely.Oneregionallybasedurbanplannercommented, ‘I assumeyou ’retalkingtosomeoftheotherregionalcentres.They’llallsaythatwefeel thatweneedadditionalservicesandinfrastructureprovidedbythestate.Youseemto havetogocapinhandtotryandjustifywhy[regions]needitwhereasthefeelingis youdon’tneedtodothejustifyinginPerth.’

Intervieweesalsocitedhighcostsofdevelopmentandliving,withoneexplaininga ‘Kimberleyfactor,’ apremiumofapproximately70%attachedtoinfrastructurein WesternAustralia’snorthernmostregioncomparedtoprojectsinPerth(Department ofPrimaryIndustriesandRegionalDevelopment 2019).Aregionaldevelopment leaderinthePilbaraexplained, ‘it’scheaperandmoreconvenientforalotof[mining] jobstobedoneby[fly-in fly-out] … thecostofa flightpluslivingintemporaryaccommodationischeaperformanycompaniesthansupportingahouseandmovingafamily.’ Thesameintervieweelaterdescribedprohibitivelandprices,

Wehavealotofland,anabsolutewhackofit.Thestateownsmostofit … [thesaleofwhich is]verycontrolled … parcelledoutprimarilythroughDevelopmentWA.Theypackageitup andcontroltheprice.Wethinkwehaveanaturaladvantagearoundhavinglotsofland.This isconstrainedandthepriceverymuchcontrolled … Whenyougotobuildahouse[inthe Pilbara],you’llpay60%more.

AregionaldevelopmentleaderfromtheKimberleyechoedthesesentiments, ‘Thecostof livinguphereisquitehigh.Thecostofdoingbusinessisveryhigh.It’saviciouscycle

Table2. Question2Results. AretheregrowthconstraintsinregionalWesternAustralia?

Ifyes,whatdoyouthinktheyare?

whereyoudon’thavethatcriticalmassofpopulationwhichcanleadtoreducing[costs] … Toinvestinthesetownsyou’vegottocomeprepared.’

Thethirdanswer,lagginginfrastructure,whilstsimilartopoorservices,referredtothe sentimentofinequityasregardsresourceprovisiontoregions.Afederalismscholar explained,

Outside[thecapital]is[also]theresponsibilityofstategovernmentbuttheydon’thavethe ﬁnancialclouttodo[much].So,ifyouwanttorebuildtheM1[amajorhighway],which they’vedonenearmyhome … Thatwasfundedbythefederalgovernment … They’rethe onlypeoplethatcandothingsproperlyinthenon-capitalcityareas.

Finally,12intervieweesmentionedisolationand/orpoorperceptionassigniﬁcantbarriers.AlocalmayorintheKimberleydescribedhowremotenessnegativelyimpacts businesses, ‘Tocomehereitwillbe daysoftravelling,plustimetodobusinessand that’sjusttoobigastep … formanyofthebusinesseswedealwith.’ Alocalgovernment expertsharedastoryofanisolated,inlandtowninWesternAustraliathatsoughta plumberbyoﬀeringincentives. ‘I’veneverseenabetterdeal.It’snotthatwegotbad applicants wegotnone So,itkindofsays,there’ssomethingouttherethat’ s morethanjustthelureofanincomethatgoestowhypeoplewouldrelocate.’

Finally,inresultsnotshown,sevenparticipantsemphasisedsigniﬁcantuntapped economicopportunitiesintheregions.Boosterishcommentsrangedfromlocalgovernmentmayors/CEOsrecitingopportunities,toaregionaldevelopmentleadercommenting, ‘OnethingIdoknowthatwehavelotsof,whichisn’tabarrier,whichmightcomeup inreasonswhyregionsdon’tdevelop,andthatisjobs.Wehavelotsofjobs.’

Question3:ShouldweaddressurbanprimacyinWesternAustralia?Ifso,how? Ifnot,whynot?

Table3 presentsdatapertainingtotheresponsestothethirdquestion.27interviewees feltthaturbanprimacyshouldbeaddressed.Justiﬁcationsrevolvedaroundthreecosts – congestion,social,andopportunity.First,14expertsexpressedconcernaboutdeclining liveabilityinPerth.Aregionaldevelopmentnot-for-proﬁtCEOcautioned,

Weneedtothinkaboutwhatthatlookslikeifwekeeppushingmorepeopleintothecity whocan’taﬀordit,whoarespendingthreequartersoftheirsalaryontheirmortgage they’renotliving[well] … thegreatestdiseases[rightnoware]mentalhealthandanxiety becauseeveryone’ssostressedandindebted.

Socialcostswereofcomparableconcern.Expertslinkedincreasingcostsoflivingwith risinginequality.Aneconomistproblematisedprimacy:

Theproblemofhousingaffordabilityinlargecitiesisaddingtoinequality Thecapacityof existinglandownerstobenefitfromfurthermetropolitangrowthiscompoundingthat inequalityandrupturingwhat … werethegoodfeaturesaboutAustralia … Itwasasuperficialegalitarianismbutonethatisincreasinglyoutofkilterwithgrossinequalities,whichare partlyattributableto allowingmetropolitanprimacytocontinue unchecked.

Opportunitycostswerementionedbyoverathirdofexpertswhobelievedredressing primacywouldunlockregionalpotential.Accordingtoafederalismscholar, ‘Wewill misslargeeconomicopportunities … thereiseconomicdevelopmenttobehadinthe regionswhichwearemissingouton.’ AlocalgovernmentCEOintheKimberleywas

Table3. Question3Results.

comparablyassertive, ‘Absolutelysomethingneedstobedone … it’slikehavingallyour eggsinonebasket. … Wehaveenoughgoingforusintheregions … fromdownsouthall thewayup[tothe]Kimberley,anumberofcentrescangrow.’ Withthatgrowth,aneconomistsuggestedcomeadvantages, ‘Theremightbefouror five[largecentresinstates] givingpeoplechoice … boostingtheeconomybecausetherearemultiplehubsofinnovation,productivity,growth.’ Lastly, fiveintervieweesdidnotthink,orwereunsure,anythingneedstobedone.Theseexpertsreasonedthatgrowthisnotnecessarilygood, changewouldnotmakeeconomicsense,and/or ‘ifitain’tbroke,don’t fixit.’

RelativetohowurbanprimacyshouldbeaddressedinAustralianstates, Table3 summarisescommonanswers.First,12expertsbelievedthestategovernmentshoulddevolve decision-makingintoregional/localarenas.Aregionaldevelopmentleaderexplainedthe potentialifthePilbarahadgreatercontrol, ‘Ifthestategaveup[landdevelopment powers]tothecityofKarratha,andtheFedsgaveupmigration,likethecitycould controlwhocameinandout,particularlyfromoverseas there’snodoubtinmy mindwewouldseeavastdifferenceingrowthtrajectoriesaroundourcommunity.’ A federalismscholarreasoned, ‘It’slessamatterofpopulationdistributionandmorea matterofdevolutionofpoliticalcontrol,whichcouldthenfosterdifferentandmoresustainableeconomicdevelopmentin lessurbanisedregions [With]politicaldevolution,basicallyhavingtheauthoritytomake[legallyenforceable]decisions … andalso havingmorecontrolovertheresourcesthatgowithpoliticalcontrolthroughtaxes andrights … youwouldendupwithmoreefficientdecisionmaking.’ Devolutionwassupportedinprinciplebypoliticianswhomightlosepowerthrough theprocess.OneStateMinisteradmitted, ‘I’mintrigued … certainlytheissueofdecentralisationandhowweachieveit[hascomeup],butIhaven’tencounteredtheideathat politicalinfrastructurecouldbeadriver[ofprimacy].’ Theministercontinued, ‘Isthisan argumentforlocalgovernmentreform? Havewebeenlookingatalltherightleversto expandregionaldevelopment?’ Others, whilstsupportive,hadencounteredproblems. AnotherStateMinisterrecounted, ‘[Devolutionhasbeen]ahighpriorityofmine, [however]localleadershipquiteliked[blamingthestatefortheirproblems].Thatwas easierthanhavingtheresponsibility.Iusedtosay, ‘

whyareyoublamingmeforyourdecision?’’ AformerStatePremieragreed, ‘Iwould ratherseestrongerlocalgovernments … Iwouldhavelovedtohandout[fundsfora newroadtoalocalgovernment,forexample] … Butlocalgovernmentswere[frequently] incapableofdoing[it].’

Thesecondanswercontainedasimilarviewoflocalempowerment,excepteight expertsputtheimpetusonlocalgovernmentsto ‘stepup.’ AFederalMinisterbelieved localgovernmentshadmorepowerthantheyrealised, ‘Regionsneedanewwayof expressingthemselves.Toooftenthey’vereliedongoingto[federalorstate]government andsayinggiveusmoney.Partofthesolution … liesintheregionsowningtheiragenda andbuildingsupportaroundit Localgovernmentintheregionstalkaboutthemselves inaweakerpositionthanintruththeycouldbe. … partoftheissueisconvincing[them] thatiftheybelieveinit,they’vegotto ﬁghtforit.’

Third,sevenrespondentsdescribedstatedrivenregionalsupportprogrammes,that thestateneedstoactivelydevelopregions.AstatedepartmentCEOexplained, ‘Ithink attimestheplaying ﬁeldistiltedagainstregionalsettlement … weshouldbetiltingin favourofkeyregionalcentres.’ Thesameexpertalsodiscussedthefourthmost commonanswer,theneedforbetterintergovernmentalcooperation, ‘itonlyworks whenyou’vegotmaturity,capability,andawillingnesstoactuallycollaborate I don’tthinkwe’vegotthatineitherthestatebureaucracyortheregions.’

The ﬁfthmostcommonanswerincluded,(i)concertedregionalrebranding;(ii)states ‘pickingwinners,’ selectingregionalcentresforinvestment;(iii)increasedfederalleadershiptohelplocalgovernmentsovercomestateomnipotenceand;(iv)thecreationofnew statesand/orcapitals.

Discussion

Expertopinionsoftenalignedwithinstitutionaltheoriesofsettlement.Speciﬁcally,there wasastrongrelianceuponcolonialhistoryandtheconﬂuenceofpoliticalandeconomic factorstoexplainsettlement.TheideathatPerthoccupiesasingularoasiswasaminority view.Mostattributedprimacytoelementsderivedfromcapitalcitystatus – Perthbeinga decision-makingcentre,luckytobechosennotnecessarilypossessingexclusiveadvantages.Institutionswereaprominenttheme,withexpertsexplainingWesternAustralia’ s scarcityoflargenon-capitalcitiesintermsofcitiesaspoliticalentitieshavinglimited autonomytodrivedevelopment,echoingtheliterature(Wilkinson,McKenzie,andBolleter 2022).

Therewerealsoresponsesthatlackedinstitutionalcomponents(14/37interviews), suggestingpolicymakingbaseduponexpertopinionbecriticallyexaminedagainstthe scientiﬁcliterature.Wediscussthreetopics:

Environmentaldeterminism

Athirdofexpertsbelievedthenaturalenvironmentwasthecoredeterminantofprimacy. Werethistrue,weshouldexpectprimacytocorrelatewithariditygenerally.However, lowprimacyisapparentinharshnaturalsettingsincludingSaudiArabia,Israel, UnitedArabEmirates,Morocco,Kazakhstan,andsub-nationallyinCanada(e.g. Alberta,Quebec),theUnitedStates(e.g.Texas,California),andMexico(e.g.Chihuahua,

BajaCalifornia)(Brinkhoﬀ 2022).Inrecentquantitativeanalysesoftherelationship betweencitypopulationsandlocation-speciﬁcnatural,economic,andpoliticalattributes, Wilkinson,McKenzie,andBolleter(2023)determinedthattheAustraliannatural environmentposesrecognisedlimitationstosettlement,howeverthepresumptionthat theselimitationsexplainthepatternofurbanprimacywasnotsupported.Instead, capitalcitystatuswasthestrongestpredictorofcitysize.Theseresultsdidnotrefute theimportanceofnaturalfactorsbutindicatedtherearenon-capitalcentresinAustralia withnaturalendowmentscomparabletothecapitals.

Economicdeterminism

Someexpertsattributedprimacytopurelyeconomicfactors,seeinglittleconnection betweeninstitutionsandagglomeration.Perth ‘ won ’ becauseitwas ﬁrst,progressing suchthatnoothercentrecouldcompete.AsdiscussedintheIntroduction,explanations ofprimacymustexplainaprimatecity’ssolitude,somethingaddressedbyinstitutional perspectives.Furthermore,thecontinuedemergenceofdecentralisedurbansystemsin theMiddleEastandtheAmericas,forexample,suggestsmodernity,likeclimate,is notpredictiveofasettlementpattern.Instead,decentralisedpatternsareassociated withdevolvedpowerstructures,whereregionsandlocalgovernmentspossesslegally bindingpowersthatenabledtheretentionanddevelopmentoflocation-speciﬁcinnovationsandcompetitiveadvantages(AdesandGlaeser 1995;ArocaandAtienza 2016; Glaeseretal. 2004;KimandLaw 2012).Thisisnottosuggestthatdevolutionresults inany/alllocations ‘winning’ regardlessofnaturalandeconomicendowment,however devolutionisobservedtoenable/permit multiple winners.

Lowpopulation

Afewrespondentsattributedprimacytolowpopulation,aconsiderationthatmaybe validinSouthAustraliaandTasmaniagiventheirlowpopulations.Pre-institutionaltheoriesofprimacyposedthathighprimacyinearlystagesofdevelopmentsupportsmodernisationthroughtheconcentrationofscarceresources,followedbydecliningprimacy aswealthandpopulationaccumulate(El-Shakhs 1972).However,highpopulation examplesofprimacy(e.g.Nigeria,Thailand)demonstratedthatprimacydoesnotnecessarilydeclinewithgrowth.Suchexamplesilluminatedinstitutionalcommonalitiesacross diverseinstancesofprimacy.Studiessuggestprimacyinpopulous(urbanpopulation greaterthantwomillion),wealthy,geographicallylargepolitiescanbeindicativeofinstitutionalbarrierstodecentralisation(AdesandGlaeser 1995;DavisandHenderson 2003; Henderson 2003).

Conceptualcontradictions

Inadditiontotheoreticalmisalignments,contradictoryviewsemergedaboutdevolution. Eightrespondentssuggestedlocalgovernments ‘stepup,’ believingtheypossessthe powertoadvocatefortheirneedsandthatitisnotthestate’sroletoproactively empower.Thiscontrastswithlocal/regionalcallsformoreresourcesgiventheirexperiencestrugglingtodeliverbasicservicesletalonelarger-scaleprojects,projectstheycould

espousebutbelievedtobebeyondtheircontrol.AnexperiencerelatingtoCityDeals illustratesthisperception.2 Despitearegionalisationethos,theCityDeals federalprogrammetendstoconcentrateoncapitalcities(Pilletal. 2020).LGAexperts sharedanexperience,derivedfromtheirmembershipintheRegionalCapitalsAlliance ofWesternAustralia(RCAWA),alobbygroupincludingtenlocalgovernments,alleging CityDealswasappropriatedbyPerth.Inaremarkablecollaboration,RCAWAmembers unanimouslyagreedtosupportAlbany’sbidforadeal,howeverthisbidwaspromptly, indeﬁnitelydismissedbythestate,whichearmarkedthecapital.

Contradictionwasalsoapparentwithexpertswhoagreedwithdevolutioninprinciple followedbyscepticismofitspracticality,evokingstoriesofindividuallocalgovernment dysfunctiontotarthesector.However,notallrespondentsheldthisview.Somewere waryofpoliticalreality,believingreformsthatreducestatepowertobeimpossible, theassumptionbeingthatadecentralisedstateisweakenedbyintergovernmentalcompetition.Theseviewpointsoverlookedpowerfulcounterexamples,suchasthestategovernmentsofCalifornia,Texas,andFlorida,politiesconceivedinfederalismwithlarge decentralisedurbansystems,somewhatobscurestatecapitals,andempoweredlocal andregional(county)governments.Whilstpartofdevolutionisgivingpoweraway,in sodoingthecapabilitiesoflowertiersincrease,requiringhighertierstoorchestrate maturingsubsidiaries.

Finally,regionalcallsforadditionalresourcesshouldbereconciledwithrecentprogrammeslikeRoyaltiesforRegions(RfR)andtheexistenceofWesternAustralia’ s RegionalDevelopmentCommissions(RDC)orthefederalgovernment’sRegionalDevelopmentAustralia(RDA)organisations,allarguablyconstitutingdevolutions.Some experts,particularlyinthenorth,expressedregretwithwhattheydescribedasthedisassemblyofRfRbeforeitcouldsucceed.OneStateMinisterexplainedthatsomeregions wereill-preparedtotakeadvantageoftheopportunityascomparedwithacentrelike Karratha,wheretheyforcefullyconveyedRfR’sgenerativeimpact.Still,mattersof scaleandsourceremainsalient.RfRisatop-downinitiativethatimpartsnorevenue raisingpower.Furthermore,RfRmayprovidefundscapableofconstructinglocalamenities,butexpertsbelieveditwasnotdesignedtosupportorexpeditelarge-scaleinfrastructure(e.g.airportexpansion,irrigation).Relativetostate/federalregional organisations,byownadmissiontheirpowersarelargelysymbolicanddecision makingoftenassumedtoresidethereininrealityoccursinPerthandCanberrarespectively.AsoneRegionalGovernmentleaderexplained, ‘[central]governmentdecision makersdon’tlikediversity,or ﬂexibility … diﬀerencecreatesmorework.’

Conclusion

Inthisstudy,weinterviewed37expertstoascertaintheirexplanationsofsettlementin WesternAustraliaandhowtheysuggesturbanprimacybeaddressed,ifatall.In additiontowell-knownnaturalandeconomicdeterminantsofsettlement,mostexplanationsincludedinstitutions.Urbanprimacywasattributedtocentralisedpolitical institutionsandattitudes,poorinfrastructureprovisioninregionalAustralia,andan unmetneedtodevolvepower,particularlyfromstatestoregionalandlocalgovernments.Expertsoverwhelminglybelievedurbanprimacyshouldbeaddressed,with themostcommonsuggestedsolutionsfocusingondevolutionandsubsidiarity,such

asstatesproactivelybuildingsub-statecapabilitiesand/orlocalgovernmentscollectively demandingasmuch.

Expertinsightsilluminatetheopinionsunderlyingpoliticaldecision-making,sometimesdemonstratingthatmisconceptionandexperiencearenotmutuallyexclusive. Whilstamajorityofexpertsprovidedanswersofaninstitutionalnatureand,inadiscussionfollowingtheinterview,29of37agreedthataninstitutionaltheoryofprimacyis relevantinWesternAustralia,thecausalconnectionbetweeninstitutionsandsettlement wasnotonecommonlymadepriortotheinterview.Thissuggeststhereisadisconnect betweencontemporaneous,scientificallybasedunderstandingsofurbanprimacyin WesternAustraliaandinfluentialperceptions.Ifgovernmenteffortstoachievedecentralisationareresoluteandprimacyisindeedtheproblemexpertsbelieveittobe,thenitis criticalthatsolutiondevelopmentbeinformedbyandtestedagainstinternationally applicabletheoryandexperience.

Notes

1.(vanStadenandHaslamMcKenzie 2019)

2.CityDealsarefederallysponsoredpartnershipsbetweenalltiersofgovernmentdesignedto devolvedecisionmakingandcoordinateregionaldevelopment,entailingsigniﬁcanttargetedinvestment(AustralianGovernment 2020)

Disclosurestatement

GeorgeShoemakerWilkinsonIII’stuitioniscoveredbytheAustralianGovernmentResearch TrainingProgram(RTP)FeesOﬀset(Domestic).

Notesoncontributors

GeorgeS.WilkinsonIII isaPhDcandidateattheUniversityofWesternAustralia.HisPhD,titled ‘AScarcityofLargeNon-CapitalCities:AnationalanalysisofthedriversofurbanprimacyinAustralia, ’ examinesthedriversofurbanprimacyinAustralianStatesunderthesupervisionofProfessorFionaHaslamMcKenzieandDrJulianBolleter.Georgeworksasamanagementconsultant withexpertiseinstrategy,organisationaldesign,andchangemanagement.

Prof.FionaHaslamMcKenzie hasextensiveexperienceinpopulationandsocio-economicchange, housing,regionaleconomicdevelopmentandanalysisofremote,regionalandurbansocio-economicindicators.Shehaspublishedwidelyandundertakenworkforthecorporateandsmall businesssectorsbothnationallyandinWesternAustraliaaswellconductingworkforallthree tiersofgovernment.Sheiscurrentlyresearchingthesocio-economicimpactofdiﬀerentworkforce arrangementsfortheminingindustryanduneveneconomicdevelopmentinWesternAustralia, focusingonthekeyissuesofcompetitiveness,resilience,andspatialintegration.

Dr.JulianBolleter isaresearcherandteacheratUWA ’sSchoolofDesign,tacklingissuesfacing Australiancitiesinthe21stcentury.OriginallyfromPerth,hehasworkedinternationallyasa landscapearchitectinSydney,Dubai,Boston,andLondon.DrBolleterisCo-DirectoroftheAustralianUrbanDesignResearchCentre(AUDRC),wherehedeliverscommissionedresearchfor stategovernmentplanningdepartments,writingurbandesign/city-relatedbooks,conducting urbandesignprojects,andteachinganurbandesigncourse.

ORCID

FionaHaslamMcKenzie http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7223-7731

JulianBolleter http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1514-2007

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