Avicenna - The Stanford Journal on Muslim Affairs 3.2 by Avicenna - Stanford Journal on Muslim Affairs

spring 2013 vol 3 no 2

avicenna THE STANFORD JOURNALtheON MUSLIM AFFAIRS stanford journal on muslim affairs 1

avicenna THE STANFORD JOURNAL ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS

SPRING 2013 VOL 3 NO 2

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Irteza Binte-Farid ’13 ASSOCIATE EDITORS Sahar Khan ’13 Hana Al-Henaid ’14 Ayesha Rasheed ’14 Jessica Ward ’13 Afia Khan ’16 DESIGNER Justin Calles ’13

Avicenna—The Stanford Journal on Muslim Affairs would like to thank the ASSU Publications Board for their support. All images in this journal are in the public domain with Creative Commons copyright licenses unless otherwise noted. More information about these licences can be found at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/. Front cover image by Samra Adeni ’14 Back cover image by Flickr user Quinn Dombrowski

avicenna

CONTENTS Editorial Note IRTEZA BINTE-FARID

Anti-Islam Sentiments and America’s History of Religious Intolerance NICK AHAMED

Help Wanted: Freedom of Religion RABBI PATRICIA KARLIN-NEUMANN

Land of the pure in heart Poem by DOMINIC PARVIZ BROOKSHAW

Islam in China Photos by SAMRA ADENI

Understanding Hong Kong’s Muslims RAVI PATEL and HON LUN AU-YEUNG

No Exit: The Bush Doctrine and Continuity in U.S. Middle East Policy ALYSSA ELRIDGE There’s Nothing “Islamic” About “Islamism” Op-Ed by SHARIA MAYFIELD

26 32

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

Editorial Note “Our liberation consists in refusing to be “the Other” and asserting instead, “I am” — without making another “the Other,” said feminist theologian, Mary Daly. Rabbi Patricia, Senior Associate Dean at the Memorial Church in Stanford, elaborates upon this quote by explaining that “the way to not make another ‘the Other’ is to remember what it feels like to be so marginalized. The way not to make another ‘the Other’ is to listen, to learn, to communicate, to honor the stories in which we find our common humanity.” Avicenna attempts to honor these stories through the various perspectives presented in the featured articles. In this issue, we have attempted to highlight the experience of Muslims in America and the importance of religious freedom within our society, especially in a post 9/11 era. Having witnessed two wars, a changing worldwide political climate, and recent events, such as the Boston bombing, enlightened debates about religious freedom in America and around the world remain extremely crucial. Professor Parviz Brookshaw, for example, writes about the political events in Tehran and Egypt through his poem “Land of the Pure in Heart,” and points out how debates about religion and politics remain intertwined in many parts of the world. Ravi Patel writes about the contours of religious freedom enshrined in Hong Kong’s constitution and compares it to the relative lack of religious freedom in China. Jessica Eldridge also addresses political issues, as she traces the evolution of the Bush Doctrine following 9/11 and how it has impacted America’s interaction with the world. While Professor Brookshaw, Ravi Patel, and Alyssa Eldridge address the worldwide debates about religious freedom, authors such as Rabbi Patricia, Nick Ahamed, and Sharia Mayfield address the internal experience of Americans as they grapple with issues of religious freedom and religious understanding. Nick Ahamed traces the evolution of religious freedom within America by juxtaposing the experience of religiously persecuted groups in America to the recent discrimination against American Muslims. Sharia Mayfield builds upon Ahamed’s argument by highlighting the recent events in Boston, and analyzing the way in which Islamophobia continues through negative media constructions. Mayfield emphasizes how important it to be aware of the language in which we describe events such as the Boston bombing. Though many socially conscious media outlets have resorted to the adjective ‘Islamic’ instead of ‘Islam’ to describe acts of terrorism, even this seemingly innocuous terminology nonetheless associates Islam with deviancy and violence. Avicenna attempts to use the written word to provide a counterargument against the specter of the ‘so-called violent Islam’ fresh in our communal dialogue. Islam, as the newest major religion in America, has yet to undergo decades of dialogue, permutation, and integration before it becomes an entrenched part of the 4

avicenna

American religious landscape. Rabbi Patricia, however, emphatically argues in her article “Help Wanted: Freedom of Religion” that Islam is a part of the American fabric, just as much as Judaism and Christianity. While some Americans vehemently state that Islam is not compatible with American values, Rabbi Patricia articulates the belief that Muslims are vibrant members of the American landscape. Only by truly embracing the values of religious freedom and interfaith understanding can we affirm the American ideals of freedom and equality that this nation is based upon. Yours sincerely, Irteza Binte-Farid ’13 Editor-in-Chief

Photo by Flickr user twocentsworth

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

Anti-Islam Sentiments and America’s History of Religious Intolerance Nick Ahamed B.A. Political Science ’14

For the ninth anniversary of the September 11th terrorist attacks, Terry Jones, pastor of a church in Gainesville, Florida, announced he would burn two hundred Qur’ans. Though he later pledged to never burn a Qur’an, on March 20, 2011, Jones held a trial of Islam dubbed “International Judge the Qur’an Day,” after which a fellow pastor burned a Qur’an, “executing” it.1 This is not simply an anomaly. Protest erupted across the nation after a Muslim group intended to build a mosque in Manhattan.2 Indeed, Muslims are victims in fourteen percent of all religious discrimination cases in the United States.3 Yet, only one percent of the population is Muslim. In a country that prides itself on religious freedom and religious tolerance, why are Muslims the subject of so much prejudice? Many simply assume that this prejudice is the result of the shared experience of the terrorist attacks of September 11th. A 2010 Newsweek poll found that fifty-four percent of Americans are worried or very worried about “radicals within the U.S. Muslim community.”4 Paul Blair, a pastor from Oklahoma, told a New York Times reporter that “there are only two possibili-

ties in Islam — ‘the house of Islam or the house of war.’”5 Another, Nonie Darwish of Former Muslims United, said, “[A mosque is] a place where war is started, where commandments to do jihad start, where incitements against non-Muslims occur. It’s a place where ammunition was stored.”6 These and others clearly indicate that their prejudice against Muslims is because of a perceived threat borne out of experiencing terrorism. However, this is not the whole story. Affect towards Muslims has remained relatively stable before and after September 11th.7 The stereotypes were present before as well. As Brigitte Nacos and Oscar Torres-Reyna, political scientists at Columbia University, point out, the media quickly identified Middle Easterners with dark hair and beards as the 1995 Oklahoma City bombers, when in reality it was an American with European ancestors.8 Nacos and Torres-Reyna also find that more news articles, while less frequent in nature, offered a negative depiction of Muslims in the year before September 11th — thirtyone percent — than in the six months after Cohen, Roger. “Religion Does Its Worst.” Goodstein. “Around Country, Mosque Projects Meet Opposition.” 7 Kalkan, Kerem Ozan, Geoffrey C. Layman, and Eric M. Uslaner. ““Bands of Others”? Attitudes toward Muslims in Contemporary American Society.” The Journal of Politics 71.03 (2009): 847–63. Pg. 860. 8 Nacos, Brigitte L., and Oscar Torres-Reyna. “Muslim Americans in the News before and after 9-11.” Harvard Symposium Restless Searchlight: The Media and Terrorism (2002). <http://www.apsanet. org/~polcomm/news/2003/terrorism/papers/ nacos.pdf>. P. 1. 5

Cohen, Roger. “Religion Does Its Worst.” OP-ED. The New York Times, 05 Apr. 2011. <http://query. nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B07E5D811 3CF936A35757C0A9679D8B63>. 2 Goodstein, Laurie. “Around Country, Mosque Projects Meet Opposition.” The New York Times. The New York Times, 08 Aug. 2010. <http:// www.nytimes.com/2010/08/08/us/08mosque. html?pagewanted=all>. 3 Cohen, Roger. “Religion Does Its Worst.” 4 Newsweek. “Obama/Muslims.” Poll Data. Newsweek, 27 Aug. 2010. <http://nw-assets. s3.amazonaws.com/pdf/1004-ftop.pdf>. 1

avicenna

— twenty-two percent.9 Not only has fear of Muslims existed since the rise of fundamentalist tactics in the 1990s, it has existed throughout American history. In fact, an 1845 letter to the editor of the Cleveland Herald proclaimed: “Can men, owing to their weakness, utter more atrocious and blood-thirsty language than that of the Koran?”10 Thus, while the physical backlash against Muslims may have increased since September 11th, it is also clear that there has always been anti-Muslim sentiment in the United States. Anti-Muslim prejudice today and historically is simply the latest case of intolerance borne out of political fear. This tradition began before this country was founded, with anti-Catholic fervor. The next victims were Mormons and third were Jehovah’s Witnesses. Current Muslims are the newest installation. Each of the religions was seen to promote undemocratic political system and none used populist appeals to gain followers. In other words, these religions appeared to violate the American ethos of individualism. Individualism has always existed as an important aspect of American culture. Indeed, writing about democracy in the 1830’s, Alexis de Tocqueville identified individualism in American as: “a calm and considered feeling which disposes each citizen to isolate himself from the mass of his fellows and withdraw into the circle of family and friends.”11 Others identify individualism’s roots in Puritan culture.12 Regardless, individualism has played a Nacos and Torres-Reyna. “Muslim Americans in the News before and after 9-11.” P. 9. 10 Qtd. In Corrigan, John, and Lynn S. Neal. Religious Intolerance in America: A Documentary History. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 2010. P. 10. 11 Tocqueville, Alexis De, and J. P. Mayer. Democracy in America. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969. P. 506. 12 Johnson, Ellwood. “Individualism and the Puritan Imagination.” American Quarterly 1st ser. 22.2 (1970): 230–37. 9

significant role in politics throughout America’s history and shaped attitudes toward Catholics, others, and now, Muslims. Catholics were often the subject of religious intolerance before the founding of the United States; that dynamic changed after the Revolutionary Period, but it remained intolerant. After the Glorious Revolution in England, its colonies passed severe laws that stripped Catholics of their rights.13 At first, it was the French in the Seven Years war; Philanthropos, Benjamin Franklin’s pseudonym during the war, warned his Pennsylvanian denizens that their entire Protestant system would be lost if they did not stand and fight against the Catholic threat.14 Chris Beneke, professor of History at Bentley University, writes: “Catholicism threatened the independence of the nation as a whole and the independence of every citizen individually.”15 Thus, while there were few Catholics, they were nevertheless the first subjects of religious intolerance in America. The two rhetorical strategies — individualism and patriotism — used by the contemporaries Beneke references, begin to explain how the contemporaries justified that intolerance. For example, what was at stake was to Philanthropos’ cohort was their individual autonomy — their democratic and individualist way of life. Beneke highlights this: “Catholicism threatened…the independence of every citizen individually” (emphasis added). In his “Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,” James Madison identified this threat to individualism as well, stating: “[ecclesiastical establishments] have been seen to erect a spiritual tyranny on the ruins of the Civil authority; in many instances they have Corrigan and Neal. Religious Intolerance in America. P. 50. 14 Beneke. Beyond Toleration. P. 111. 15 Ibid, 180. 13

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

Reading the Quran (photo by Flickr user modenadude)

been seen upholding the thrones of political tyranny: in no instance have they been seen the guardians of the liberties of the people.”16 Quite clearly, religions combined with government, can be tyrannical and suffocate individual autonomy. Yet, in another aspect, the rhetoric used against Catholics was not solely individualistic. Philanthropos called on his fellow citizens to defend their country from a foreign power. This appeal is because of the threat to “the independence of the nation as a whole.” Here, the anti-Catholic rhetoric relies on patriotism. Moreover, this patriotic language is evidenced in the derogatory term papist, which refers to Madison, James. Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments. <http:// religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/ madison_m&r_1785.html>. 16

avicenna

those loyal to the pope, and is given under the assumption that loyalty to the country is submersed to loyalty to the pope. However, even appeals to patriotism can be appeals to individualism, because it is part of the American ethos. Politicians often draw on patriotism, especially to fight communism in the mid-twentieth century. In doing so, they relied on a commonly understood patriotism which “meant adhering to mainstream American values in which individualism [was] celebrated.”17 Essentially, a patriotic appeal was based on an appeal to support the foundations of the country, one of which was individualism. Once again, intolerance of Catholics in early America was based on depicting Parker, Christopher. “Symbolic versus Blind Patriotism: Distinction without Difference?” Political Research Quarterly 63.1 (2010): 97–114. <http:// www.jstor.org/stable/27759889>. P. 100. 17

Catholics as subservient to a foreign power, as unpatriotic citizens, and thus against the core political values of the country. The nativist construct became particularly important in the debate over public schools in the late nineteenth century. Republicanism demanded that Americans “possessed the intelligence and moral virtue to exercise their political rights.”18 Thus, when Catholics attempted to establish their own sectarian schools, nativists saw this as “resistance to [public schooling’s] assimilating practices, as efforts to subvert republican society.”19 Nonetheless, Catholics set up their own system of sectarian schools; these schools had an attendance of between 12,000–15,000 pupils compared to the public school’s 19,000 in 1869 and represented a clear threat to antiCatholic forces within the community.20 At the time, an important community leader, Reverend Amory Mayo, articulated that “a ‘black brigade of the Catholic priesthood’ (Jesuits) was behind the resolutions and was seeking nothing less than ‘to knock out [the Republic’s] underpinning, to poison the very wells of its water of life … and [to] darken the very light by which it lives and breathes.’”21 He relied on nativist appeals to suggest, rather explicitly, that the Catholic negotiating position was un-American. Moreover, Protestants insisted that “it was the Catholic clergy that interfered with the ability of rank-and-file Catholics to develop that independence of thought necessary to participate in republican governance.”22 Here more explicitly is the belief that Catholicism does not fit within the American ethos of individualism. To Protestants at the time, true individualism consisted of being able to read Green. The Bible, the School, and the Constitution. P. 74. 19 Ibid. 75. 20 Ibid. 97. 21 Ibid. 99. 22 Ibid. 77. 18

the Bible on their own, rather than Catholicism’s hierarchical structure, which did not allow for unmediated Bible reading without guidance from Catholic religious figures. Just like in the previous century, opposition to Catholics stemmed from political values, not religious hatred because Catholicism was seen as too hierarchical and anti-democratic in its teachings, doctrine, and dogma. With Catholics, a tradition was started in America to be intolerant toward religions that seem to defy the American ethos. Islam is the last in that line of religions. Like the earlier fear of Catholics, Americans fear Islam because they believe it is undermining the American republican tradition. Diana Serafin, quoted in the New York Times, said “As a mother and a grandmother, I worry. I learned that in 20 years with the rate of the birth population, we will be overtaken by Islam, and their goal is to get people in Congress and the Supreme Court to see that Shariah is implemented. My children and grandchildren will have to live under that.”23 In response to a mosque being built in a neighborhood in Brooklyn, one resident said “They want to create a caliphate. They want to push people out of this neighborhood.”24 These two, at least, believe Muslims in this country are undermining the American ethos. While ninety-three percent of Muslims report being loyal to the United States, only fifty-six percent of Protestants thinks Muslims are loyal.25 Sixty percent of Muslims are also foreign-born, so many Americans believe Goodstein. “Around Country, Mosque Projects Meet Opposition.” 24 Otterman, Sharon. “A Planned Mosque Inches Along, but Critics Remain.” The New York Times. The New York Times, 8 Sept. 2012. <http://www. nytimes.com/2012/09/08/nyregion/mosque-being-built-in-brooklyn-continues-to-face-opposition. html?pagewanted=all>. 25 Gallup. Islamaphobia: Understanding Anti-Muslim Sentiment in the West. Polling Report. 23

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

they are accountable to outside powers.26 Political Scientist Samuel Huntington wrote about Muslims: “Their primary attachment is to their religion, not to their nation-state. Their culture is inhospitable to certain liberal ideals, like pluralism, individualism and democracy.”27 Americans see Islam as hostile to the American ethos. Simply put, political fear, rather than substantive religious criticism, forms the basis of prejudice against Islam; this fear was present long before September 11th. Catholicism seems to have moved past their discrimination. Muslims, as they grow both in the world and in the United States, have a special responsibility. They must prove to Americans that their commitment to the American ethos, to core

Skerry, Peter. “The Muslim-American Muddle.” The Brookings Institution. 2011. <http://www. brookings.edu/research/articles/2011/09/muslim-americans-skerry>. 27 Brooks, David. “Huntington’s Clash Revisited.” The Opinion Pages. The New York Times, 3 Mar. 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/ opinion/04brooks.html>.

political values like individualism, and to the republican tradition, is deep. Muslims must do more to integrate. Only seventy percent of foreign-born Muslims are citizens.28 They continually support law enforcement authorities: Muslim Americans help stop two of every five Al-Qaeda attacks; they are the also the largest single source of tips to authorities.29 Yet, Muslims do not regularly participate in American politics; only sixty-five percent are registered to vote, compared to ninety-one percent of Protestants.30 Muslims, can, should and must do more. By showing that their political dedication is to the United States, opponents will hopefully drop their “religious” intolerance and move America toward the pluralistic and accepting society that it boasts to be.

10 avicenna

Skerry. “The Muslim-American Muddle.” Gallup. Islamaphobia: Understanding Anti-Muslim Sentiment in the West. Polling Report. P. 4. 30 Ibid. 4. 28 29

Help Wanted: Freedom of Religion Sermon Delivered by Rabbi Patricia Karlin-Neumann Stanford University Memorial Church University Public Worship November 14, 2010

In Fall of 2010, Stanford students performed The Hijabi Monologues, a dramatic rendering of the stories and experiences of American Muslim women. The playwright, Sahar Ullah, introduced the evening by paying tribute to The Vagina Monologues, the well-known work of secular, Jewish feminist, Eve Ensler. Yet even as Ullah acknowledged Ensler’s work, she reflected on how this performance differed. “The Vagina Monologues took something private and gave it a voice.” Ullah said. “The Hijabi Monologues takes something public and gives the whole woman a voice.” The Stanford production came about because students listened to one another’s voices. A Jewish woman and a Muslim woman discussed the play they attended together at the Kennedy Center while at Stanford in Washington. Another Muslim woman and a Christian woman, who became friends at the weekly gathering of the Fellowship for Religious Encounter joined forces to produce the play here. As that Christian woman, Heidi Thorsen, wrote in the playbill, “It is about Muslims — and Christians, Jews, Hindus and people of other diverse beliefs — coming together to present and confront these important stories.”

For the first eight decades of Stanford’s existence, this could not have happened. The Founding Grant of the University permitted only one place for prayers at Stanford University — here, in the ornate and iconographic Memorial Church. It wasn’t that Jane and Leland Stanford aimed to be inhospitable to those who weren’t Protestant Christians. It was an unintended consequence of another deeply held value. When they established the university as a memorial to their 15 year-old son, Leland Jr., they insisted that no single religious dogma or authority would curtail freedom of inquiry. The charter states, “...the moral and religious development of the University will be better accomplished if entirely free from all denominational alliances, however slight the bond may be.”1 They may have resisted the idea of Presbyterians, Methodists or Episcopalians meddling in the affairs of the university, but the Stanfords nonetheless very much wanted their school to be religious. The founding faculty believed that a library should be in the geographic heart of the university; Jane Stanford insisted that the mile-long Palm The language of the Stanford Founding Grant, amended on October 3, 1902: “The University must be forever maintained upon a strictly nonpartisan and non-sectarian basis...the moral and religious development of the University will be better accomplished if entirely free from all denominational alliances, however slight the bond may be.” Stanford University, “The Founding Grant with Amendments, Legislation and Court Decrees, published by the University,” p. 21 <https://wasc. stanford.edu/files/FoundingGrant.pdf>. 1

At our weekly gathering of the Fellowship for Religious Encounter, students build on one another’s curiosity, understanding, questions and convictions. We pray in one another’s parlance. We reach out beyond our borders to offer our distinctiveness.

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

Interior of Memorial Church (photo by Flickr user kaiyen)

Drive lead instead to Memorial Church. While Mrs. Stanford was neither schooled in theology nor bound by religious authority, she poured into this academic monument her thwarted hopes for her own lost son. “Take away the moral and spiritual from higher education,” she said, “and I want nothing to do with this or any other university.”2 Leland Stanford Jr. University held out for her the promise of immortality. Is it any wonder why the soul of the university meant so much to her? But, sectarian or not, “the moral and spiritual” at Stanford had a decidedly Protestant inflection. Yes, a few leaders from minority religious communities spoke from this pulpit to the Christians in the pews of Memorial Church. But public worship outside Memorial Church, was strictly forbidden by Mrs. Stanford, in the Founding Grant. And so it was. John Casper Branner, “Founders’ Day Address,” March 10, 1917, pp. 5-6 (Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries). 2

12 avicenna

The wheels of change turned very slowly. In 1965, campus ministers, including the new Rabbi Charles Familant, who became Hillel’s first full time leader, argued that, contrary to the founders’ wishes, restricting denominational prayer had created a de facto Stanford State Religion. The medium became the message — harmonizing with the formal, Christian artistry we see around us, High Church Episcopalian worship was the sole religious option at Stanford.3 Richard Lyman, later to become Stanford’s seventh president, believed that the time had come, as he put it, to “open up” Memorial Church. He successfully convinced the Trustees to allow sectarian worship “on a trial basis” — but, in keeping with the Founding Grant, this worship could only occur inside the sandstone walls, amidst the New Testament mosaics and stained glass windows that we see here in Memorial Church. Rabbi Charles Familant, “How Jewish Worship Got on Campus” unpublished reflections, p. 2, and personal conversation July 19, 2010. 3

As you can imagine, this “breakthrough” did not exactly suit the needs of Jews, let alone Muslims, Buddhists or Hindus. In the 1960s at Stanford, civil disobedience met the struggle for religious freedom. Faculty, led by religion professor and theologian Robert McAfee Brown, supported proud and public Jewish prayer, in contrast to earlier reluctance by the University to sponsor Jewish public services. The Daily continued to report on the services, now packed with supportive students of all faiths — some holding prayerbooks upside down, flummoxed by the Hebrew pages. In solidarity, Christian campus ministers refused to lead their own denominational worship until Jews could pray, too. The Trustees found themselves in the unenviable position of upholding Jane Stanford’s outdated, unjust and unpopular mandate. Casting about for a solution, the administration turned their gaze eastward, to Yale’s Rev. B. Davie Napier, who by then, had been picked to become Stanford’s next Dean of Memorial Church. Napier, himself a principled activist, refused to uphold a policy that both disenfranchised Jews and privileged some religious students over others.4 The Rev. Napier was downright Talmudic in his interpretation of the Founding Grant. His solution? “Why don’t we think of “Memorial Church” as more than a mere physical place?” he proposed. Then, all worship at Stanford takes place “under the auspices of the person responsible for Memorial Church [emphasis added].”5 And so it was. Denominational worship was approved on an “interim” basis. “Interim” turned out to be seven years, until Ibid. “Flexibility Urged in Worship Sites,” The Stanford Daily, shown in DVD produced by Marie-Jo Mont Reynaud, “A History of Jewish Life at Stanford,” 2008 screening at the dedication of the Koret Pavilion of the Harold and Libby Ziff Center for Jewish Life, April 13, 2008. 4 5

President Lyman and the Trustees succeeded in legally modifying the Founding Grant. And so it came to be that in March of 1973, the right to worship freely was legally protected at Stanford University. For Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, freedom of religion was not easily won at Stanford. And Stanford’s recent chapter is but one episode in an ongoing American story. This story goes as far back as August, 1790, when George Washington visited the oldest synagogue in America, now known as the Touro Synagogue, in Newport, Rhode Island. There, a letter from Moshe Seixas, the warden of the synagogue greeted him. In florid prose, Seixas conveyed the Jewish community’s esteem and welcome for President Washington, but there were anxious questions underlying the letter: “Will America be safe for Jews?” “Will we, who have escaped from province to country to continent have to run once again?” “Can we plan to build a life in this new country, free to practice our religion?” President Washington’s response was unequivocal, inspiring and affirmative. “The Citizens of the United States of America ...All possess alike liberty of conscience and immunities of citizenship. It is now no more that toleration is spoken of, as if it was by the indulgence of one class of people that another enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural rights.” Washington wrote. “For happily the Government of the United States, which gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance, requires only that they who live under its protection, should demean themselves as good citizens.” Washington continued, “May the Children of the Stock of Abraham, who dwell in this land, continue to merit and enjoy the good will of the other Inhabitants; while every one shall sit under his own the stanford journal on muslim affairs

vine and fig tree, and there shall be none to make him afraid.”6 This letter, a ringing reassurance of the freedom to practice religion by our country’s first president is re-read every year in a public ritual at the Touro Synagogue. It was read again this past August, as the fiery debate raged over the building of a Muslim community center and mosque two blocks from Ground Zero. Amidst the roar of rhetoric beginning across the Long Island Sound in Manhattan, and spreading throughout the nation, in Newport, Rhode Island, the quiet strains of George Washington’s affirmation of religious inclusiveness filled a small synagogue sanctuary. “For happily the Government of the United States, which gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance...” As we look back on both the loud wrath and the quiet promise, we must recognize an admixture of fuel in the fires of outrage which burned in response to this particular cry for religious freedom. The concerns of some, kindling perhaps, began and ended with the sensitivity and rawness of the project’s proximity to Ground Zero. Holocaust survivors among them, their passions were ignited by a strong sympathy for the symbolism and sanctity in places where mass death has taken place. They truly would be comfortable with a mosque, ten blocks, rather than two blocks away from Ground Zero. Then there were those who poured gasoline on the flames — who do give bigotry sanction and persecution assistance, who see in every Muslim a terrorist and in every mosque a madrassa, no matter what the address. The Park51 community center and mosque project was the powder keg, which galvanized their public opposition to mosques anywhere in the United States, whether in <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/ US-Israel/bigotry.html>. 6

14 avicenna

Sheboygan, Wisconsin or Temecula, California. Then there is a third group — those who exploited this convenient controversy, stoking the flames of fear and hatred into a conflagration, dividing and inciting for their own cynical purposes. In the face of this recent history, what could we say to a modern day Muslim Moshe Sexias who asks, “Is America safe for Muslims?” Is it safe when demonstrators carry signs that say, “All I need to know about Islam I learned on 9/11” and “Mosques are monuments to terrorism”? Is America safe when a zoning and property issue becomes the catalyst to unleash bigotry and justify hatred? Is America safe when arsonists firebomb mosques and Christian ministers are poised to burn Qurans? Is America safe when we tune out research finding that contemporary American mosques deter terrorism and extremism, but we heed a virtual industry disseminating distortion, lies and religious bigotry?7 Every year, in a small sanctuary in Rhode Island, the words of George Washington proclaim freedom to practice religion without fear. Shouldn’t we, in all of our sanctuaries, proclaim it as well? Every year, during Passover, the holiday celebrating freedom and liberation, participants recite B’chol dor vador chayav adam lirot et atzmo ki’lu who yatza memitzrayim: “In each and every generation, we are obligated to see ourselves as if we went out of Egypt.” The Exodus from Egypt is our collective Biblical legacy, we Jews and Christians. The obligation to know the heart of the stranger is inscribed over and over again in the Bible. Religious Jews and Christians are taught that we must not allow people to be persecuted, degraded and humiliated simply for being “Other.” “Across the Nation, Mosque Projects Meet Opposition” New York Times, August 7, 2010 <http:// www.nytimes.com/2010/08/08/us/08mosque. html>. 7

Lectern at Memorial Church (photo by Flickr user kern.justin)

Muslims long to be at home in New York, at home in America. Yet, even when they are striving to be quintessential New Yorkers, they are branded as “Other”, foreign, fraudulent, frightening. This controversy not only pits fear against the fundamental rights enshrined in our civic DNA. It also prevents Muslims, proud of and desiring to be at home in this country, from assimilating as Americans, whether they were born in Indonesia or in Iowa, in Malaysia or in Michigan. Had you been at The Hijabi Monologues, you would have heard a hilarious story of Muslim women figuring out how to pray at a football game, a truly American moment. Feminist theologian Mary Daly says it well. “Our liberation consists in refusing to be “the Other” and asserting instead, “I am” — without making another “the Other.”8 The way to not make another “the Other” is to remember what it feels like to be so marginalized. The way not to make another “the Other” is to listen, to learn, 8

P. 34 “Beyond God the Father.”

to communicate, to honor the stories in which we find our common humanity. Similarly, at The Hijabi Monologues, we honor the stories of American Muslims, with whom we find a common Muslim. Particularly striking was the last monologue, a wrenching story of a mother mourning her son, a Muslim story which touched the hearts of everyone listening, whatever their religious orientation. Islam is a part of the American fabric, just as much as Judaism and Christianity, and may we, as heirs to that vision that George Washington expressed to Moshe Sexias at the Rhode Island synagogue uphold it: “May the father of all mercies scatter light and not darkness in our paths, and make us all in our several vocations useful here, and in his own due time and way everlastingly happy.” Let us be among the holders of the light. Ken yehi ratzon. So may this be God’s will. Amen.

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

Land of the pure in heart Here is by theancorrect versionbearing of thea Persian (I Inspired unseen tongue Shirazi lilt, I watch the screen and pray for light. Light upon light:

removed a small element that was causin

[It citycity of the Friends; the Land the Pure. [Itwas wasthethe of the Friends; theofLand of the Pure. When did kindness end? Whatever became of the Pure?] When did kindness end? Whatever became of the Pure?] Closer to home, a nobler voice calls out to Tehran. Born in ‘Udlajan, a stone’s throw from the Qajars’ palace, He names her “Land of the Pure”, comforts her with assurances of future glory and warns of impending convulsions. 1979, 2009, 2010, 2011: How many of us expected to be so many steps back three decades on? It’s tempting to see Iranian history as cyclical, but cycles were made to be broken. Strewn with rubble and burnt out bins, the streets look eerily familiar. Angry fists defy the onslaught of stinging vapor as black batons rain down on eager flesh. At work till eight editing submissions, transfixed by live streams of British Broadcasting, my heart, stranded with colleagues in an antique land -witnesses to the birth of a brighter dayis comforted by the wisdom that every Pharaoh has his Moses. Trying to relax in the pool on my way back home, my pale exterior and Oxford accent misinterpreted as evidence of empathy, the sexagenarian, his eyes blinded by terror, contaminated by Glenn Beck-itis, unleashes a predictable tirade against Muslims in grammatically correct variations on an EDL theme. “The Islamist owner of Google is spreading dissent through the web; That’s how it all kicked off in Egypt. Iran will be next!” My protestations fall on deafened ears; no patience for the rights of his fellow man. Sprayed in good old-fashioned bigotry, I retreat to the showers and furtively scrub at the slippery film of blind imitation. (One of the toxic hazards of an all-white neighbourhood). 16 avicenna

As Tunisian shoots burst into green revolution, my Persian sisters and brothers, their passion play reviving ‘Ashura, emboldened by Egyptian victory and spurred on by ancient rivalries, stride out valiantly, no longer fearful. When did kids from the north end of town get so bold? No kisses this Valentine’s Day. Only bruises.

Written in February 2011 when I was teaching at the University of Manchester, “Land of the pure in heart,” was initially triggered by events unfolding in Egypt (“an antique land”), as well as by a status update on Facebook by a friend in Tehran who had participated in a demonstration against the rigged elections of 2009 and the brutal government crackdown that ensued. In that particular demonstration, which was held on Valentine’s Day (a day now popular among young people in Iran), my friend was beaten by the riot police. The poem opens with an allusion to Hafiz (d. 1390), arguably Iran’s most celebrated pre-modern poet, and is followed by my reworking in Persian of a wellknown line from one of Hafiz’s most celebrated short lyric poems or ghazals. In the original poem, Hafiz laments a downturn in the patronage available to him; in my reworking, I lament the current climate in

Tehran. The next allusion is to Baha’u’llah (1817–1892), the prophet of the Baha’i Faith, and specifically to statements in which he praises the city of Tehran, and the purity of her inhabitants. Baha’u’llah also warned of calamities that would befall his hometown. From an allusion to those warnings, I turn to images from 2011 of popular demonstrations in Tehran, Cairo, and other metropolises in the Middle East. Live streaming news on the BBC connected me in Manchester to my Egyptian colleagues who had returned to Cairo over the mid-semester break and who, somewhat unwittingly, became accidental witnesses to a revolution. The phrase, “every Pharaoh has his Moses,” is taken from the Qur’an. It is a phrase that has been used in a number of contexts in the region in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries by those who believe they will see an end to oppressive rule in their lifetime.

Dominic Parviz Brookshaw Assistant Professor of Comparative Literature and Persian Literature Stanford University

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

Islam in China

P H OTO S B Y S A M R A A D E N I â&#x20AC;&#x2122; 1 4

18 avicenna

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

Photo by Samra Ademi â&#x20AC;&#x2122;14

20 avicenna

Photo by Samra Adeni â&#x20AC;&#x2122;14

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

Understanding Hong Kong’s Muslims Ravi Patel, B.S. Biology with CISAC Honors ’13 Hon Lun Au-Yeung, Law Student, Chinese University of Hong Kong

Today, Hong Kong stands as a testament to the People’s Republic of China’s rise as a global power. The city’s sleek skyscrapers house some of Asia’s most important financial institutions, while its massive ports serve as a major gateway to mainland China. Geographically, Hong Kong lies on the eastern edge of China, furthest away from the country’s only Muslim majority province, Xinjiang. The Silk Road was responsible for bringing Islam to Xinjiang in Western China. Despite its remoteness from the Silk Road, trade was also responsible for bringing Islam to Hong Kong. Prior to the arrival of the British, Hong Kong had been a small rural fishing village that was part of China’s Guangdong Province. The British trading ships that brought opium to China from the Indian Subcontinent also tended to recruit their crews from British India. As a result, the Muslims of South Asia came to Hong Kong as soon as the British took control of the territory after defeating the Qing during the First Opium War in 1842. The first mosque or masjid in Hong Kong was built in 1849 at No. 30 Shelly Street in the MidLevels Area of Hong Kong.1 This masjid still stands in Hong Kong today and represents the historical roots that Muslims have in this vibrant city. Although it operates according to the Sunni tradition, “Jamia Mosque.” Antiques and Monuments Office, Hong Kong Government. April 21, 2013 <http://www.amo.gov.hk/en/trails_sheungwan2. php?tid=5>. 1

22 avicenna

Muslims from any sect or background are welcome to attend the Masjid.2 Over time, Hong Kong became increasingly integrated with the British Empire. By the early 1900s, many South Asians, including Muslims, filled crucial jobs in the Police force and colonial administration. In recent years, the growth in Hong Kong’s economy has attracted thousands of guest workers largely from Southeast Asia. Today there are nearly 250,000 Muslims living in Hong Kong. About half of these Muslims consist specifically of guest workers from Indonesia. In March 2013, Hong Kong’s highest court denied these guest workers the right to permanently reside in Hong Kong.3 While not directed particularly towards Hong Kong’s Muslim community, this ruling impacts the nearly half of Hong Kong’s Muslim community. Furthermore, this ruling highlights the scale of challenges that Hong Kong’s Muslim community potentially faces as the former British Colony experiences greater integration with China. Understanding Hong Kong’s Status When it was handed back to the People’s Republic of China in 1997, Hong Kong Personal Interview with Muhammad Arshad, the Chief Imam of the Kowloon Masjid. April 20, 2013. 3 Bradsher, Keith. “Hong Kong Court Denies Residency to Domestics.” The New York Times. March 25, 2013 <http://www.nytimes. com/2013/03/26/world/asia/hong-kong-courtdenies-foreign-domestic-helpers-right-to-permanent-residency.html>. 2

Hong Kong’s oldest mosque (photo by Ravi Patel ’13)

had transformed into a populous cosmopolitan city where East meets West. The return of Chinese sovereignty also marked a new beginning for the political system in Hong Kong. Under the principle of “One Country, Two Systems,” Hong Kong enjoys a degree of political autonomy, meaning its laws and policies are significantly different from those of other Chinese cities and provinces. The Chinese government in Beijing has also promised that Hong Kong’s previous capitalist system and way of life shall

remain unchanged for 50 years after the 1997 handover.4 As a Special Administrative Region, Hong Kong’s political system is now laid out by the Basic Law, its current constitutional document. In recognizing religious freedom as one of man’s fundamental rights, the Basic Law specifies that all Hong Kong residents shall have “It’s not too early to discuss Hong Kong’s 2047 promise.” South China Morning Post. January 30, 2013 <http://www.scmp.com/comment/ insight-opinion/article/1138884/its-not-too-earlydiscuss-hong-kongs-2047-promise>. 4

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

freedom of religious belief and freedom to preach and to conduct and participate in religious activities in public. As a result, while the city is mostly made up of people of Chinese descent, Hong Kong is a unique and vibrant community made up of a large variety of religious and ethnic groups. Although cases of discriminations against ethnic minorities do exist, as in many other parts of the world, different religious groups and ethnic groups live side by side in the city peacefully and ethnic violence in Hong Kong is almost unheard of. This is contrasted with the situation in Mainland China, where religion is a more complicated matter. Despite the religious freedom promised by the country’s constitution, strict restrictions have curtailed many religious practices. Unlike Hong Kong, the communist regime in Mainland China tightly monitors religious organizations in its jurisdiction. It also has an infamous reputation for oppressing certain religious groups and ethnic minorities. Of special note, in the autonomous region of Xinjiang, where Uighurs (Turkish Muslims) made up almost half of the region’s population, it has been said that “Uighurs’ religious, commercial and cultural activities have been gradually curtailed by the Chinese state.”5 Protests, riots and unrests have occurred periodically in the region and are typically met with a heavy hand by the Chinese authorities.6 Perspectives on the Ground Although religious freedom is protected in Hong Kong, uncertainty remains as “China and the Uighurs.” British Broadcasting Corporation. July 8, 2009 <http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7540636.stm>. 6 “China Says No Foreign Link in Xinjiang Violence.” Associated Press. May 2, 2013 <http:// abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/ china-foreign-link-xinjiang-violence-19088575#. UYOrGLXI1Xw>. 5

24 avicenna

the city moves closer to 2047. We do not yet know if Hong Kong will eventually adopt similar policies on religion as Mainland China as the two grow closer and the 50 year period of political autonomy comes to a close.7 To get a better understanding of the future outlook of Hong Kong’s Muslim community, an interview was carried out with Mr. Muhammad Arshad, the Chief Imam of the Kowloon Masjid, which is the city’s largest mosque. According to Mr. Arshad, the Muslim population of Hong Kong will most likely grow in the coming years as the city continues to benefit from the economic rise of the People’s Republic of China. Although he found that as a whole there are no difficulties with practicing Islam in Hong Kong, he commented that Hong Kong is “indeed not a Muslim dominated place.”8 He felt the number of mosques is lacking to accommodate the needs of the growing Muslim community in Hong Kong.9 Also, he felt the territory’s legal system, which has inherited the British common law tradition, does not take into account Islamic laws in issues such as marriage and inheritance.10 Nevertheless, he found that many Muslims have managed to adapt to the living environment in Hong Kong because he said “Islam has the history to live with others in all period of times” and “a Muslim is always flexible to live in anywhere in the world.”11 Lastly, Mr. Arshad explained that the current support that he and his com“Is this the real Hong Kong handover?” Reuters. June 28, 2012 <http://blogs.reuters.com/breakingviews/2012/06/28/is-this-the-real-hong-konghandover/>. 8 Personal Interview with Muhammad Arshad, the Chief Imam of the Kowloon Masjid. April 20, 2013. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 7

Photo by Flickr user twocentsworth

Jamia Mosque Gate (photo by Ravi Patel ’13)

munity receive from the Hong Kong government suggests that the resumption of Chinese sovereignty in 1997 has, thus far, not adversely affected Muslims in Hong Kong. While it remains to be seen how increasing Chinese influence affects Hong Kong’s Muslim community,

the reality is that Hong Kong’s Muslims continue to enjoy the religious freedoms that they have experienced since 1842. Only time will tell if the People’s Republic of China’s policy towards religious freedom will evolve to better accommodate all of its citizens.

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

No Exit: The Bush Doctrine and Continuity in U.S. Middle East Policy Alyssa Elridge ’16

On the morning of September 11, 2001, as smoke billowed out of both World Trade Center towers, many felt that America was at a watershed moment, abruptly severed from its historical trajectory and launched forth into a new era of Middle East policy. That night, President George W. Bush addressed the nation. He warned that “we will make no distinction between those who committed these acts and those who harbor them,” infamously creating the foundation for the Bush Doctrine and a policy of preventive war.1 On the surface, this transition appears unprecedented, but the Bush Doctrine is deeply rooted in the history of U.S. Middle East policy. Since the early Cold War administrations, U.S. foreign policy has increasingly focused on the Middle East, following a trajectory of deepening military commitment in the region and setting a historical precedent for the post-Cold War administrations. The George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush administrations were similarly transversed by a continuous context of national interests and political players. But for George W. Bush, external events — namely, the gradual collapse of dual containment and the attacks on September 11th — evoked a change in the dominant factors within that context, producing the more radical “Bush Doctrine” and a preventive war in Iraq. Although Obama promised to “change” this trajectory of increasing military projection, under doPBS Frontline, “The War Behind Closed Doors,” Feb. 20, 2003 <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ frontline/shows/iraq/>, accessed April 15, 2013. 1

26 avicenna

mestic political pressure he only deepened U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, evidencing the entrenched continuity of U.S. Middle East policy. Underneath the flux of presidential administrations and their respective ideologies, a conglomeration of national interests, foreign policy ideologies, and political players provide a stable context for policy decisions. During the Cold War, several key interests developed as the cornerstones for U.S. policy: securing access to Middle East oil fields, stabilizing the region’s “political and economic order;”2 preserving the U.S.-Israel “special relationship,”3 projecting U.S. military power,4 and promoting democratization and humanitarianism to the extent that it aligns with other strategic goals. These interests continued to motivate post-Cold War paradigms of Middle East policy. The George H.W. Bush administration adopted a paradigm of mid-intensity conflict, exemplified by the 1991 Gulf War, which augmented military projection while still upholding other essential interests.5 The Clinton AdministraJoe Stork and Ann M. Lesch, “Background to the Crisis: Why War?” Middle East Report, no. 167 (Nov.-Dec. 1990): 6, <http://www.merip.org/mer/ mer167/why-war>, accessed April 15, 2013. 3 John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, “The Israel Lobby,” London Review of Books (March 23 2006): <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/mear01_. html>. Accessed April 15, 2013. 4 Andrew J. Bacevich, Washington Rules: America’s Path to Permanent War (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2010), 14. 5 Joe Stork, “New Enemies for a New World Order,” Middle East Report, no. 176 (MayJune 1992): 29. <http://www.jstor.org/sta2

tion instituted “dual containment,” striving “to preserve a balance of power” by pitting Iraq and Iran against each other.6 Stability, oil access, and Israel’s security were all therefore dependent on a precarious counterbalance of two hostile powers. Despite variations in the aura of Middle East policy paradigms, each was conceived within the continuous context of national interests that evolved during the Cold War. As each administration sought to uphold these interests through various policy schemes, the historical policy precedent deepened and laid the foundation for subsequent administrations. Just as policy does not originate without a continuous historical context, foreign policy ideologies do not arise spontaneously. As the neoconservative movement demonstrates, many ideologies coexist and compete within each administration, providing another facet of consistent context. George H.W. Bush frequently suppressed the neoconservative movement, preferring stability over the ideal of “vanquishing evil.”7 However, in 1992, neoconservative ideologue Paul Wolfowitz released a draft of the Defense Planning Guidance, advocating unilateral action “to protect our critical interests” and prevent “the emergence of ‘any potential future global competitor.’”8 The administration quickly revised the document to align with Bush’s more moderate “new world order,” but the forces of neoconservatism were evidently brewing below the public face of the adble/3012608>, accessed April 15, 2013. 6 Martin Indyk, “The Clinton Administration’s Approach to the Middle East,” Soref Symposium, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 18, 1993. 7 British Broadcasting Company (BBC), “Power of Nightmares: The Rise of the Politics of Fear,” 2004, <http://topdocumentaryfilms.com/thepower-of-nightmares/> accessed April 15, 2013. 8 Patrick E. Tyler, “Pentagon Drops Goal of Blocking New Superpowers,” New York Times, May 24, 1992, <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/24/ world/pentagon-drops-goal-of-blocking-new-superpowers.html>, accessed April 15, 2013.

ministration. Similarly, Clinton was not interested in neoconservative goals, but neoconservative Republicans aligned with the Iraqi National Congress and “pushed Clinton to sign the Iraq Liberation Act” in 1998, making “regime change official US policy.”9 Although this produced little change in the de facto policy, it demonstrated the growing strength of the neoconservative undercurrent. This movement is just one example in a broader context of coexisting ideologies, many of which lack clout at any one time, but which can rise to domination under certain conditions. Although the Bush Doctrine appears on one level to be a radical departure from prior Middle East policy, it is more accurately understood as an interaction between this continuous context and changing external events. As Clinton’s presidency waned and the second Bush Administration took office, dual containment was gradually falling apart. Many of Iraq’s neighbors engaged in smuggling, and France, Russia, and China were all getting around the sanctions as well.10 Despite this sanction evasion, Saddam Hussein did not significantly threaten regional stability, Israel, or other strategic interests — so why risk creating more instability and animosity with a regime change? To fill this undocumented logical gap, Juan Cole, a historian of the Middle East, advances a conjecture: growing concerns over U.S. dependence on the Saudi oil supply triggered an interest “in developing Iraqi and Iranian fields of gas and petroleum.”11 This, in turn, could not happen unless the U.S. lifted sanctions on Iraq and replaced hostile Saddam with a pro-American regime. Cole’s claim cannot Sarah Graham-Brown and Chris Toensing, “Why Another War? A Backgrounder on the Iraq Crisis”, Middle East Report (2003): 10-11, http://www. why-war.com/files/iraq_background2_merip.pdf, accessed April 15, 2013. 10 Graham-Brown and Toensing, 9. 11 Juan Cole, Engaging the Muslim World (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 138. 9

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

be substantiated with documents currently available, but regardless of the mechanism, it is evident that the slow collapse of dual containment reinvigorated the neoconservative effort and brought the conservative militarists, such as Cheney and Rumsfeld, on board. The second crucial event arrived in the September 11th attacks. The dual containment argument convinced militarists in the early days of the administration, but in the absence of a compelling threat, political moderates and the public would never have supported regime change in Iraq. Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, various political players suggested the possibility of an Al-Qaeda link to Iraq. Wolfowitz, a top level US diplomat, “argued that if there was even a 10 percent chance that Saddam Hussein was behind the 9/11 attack, maximum priority should be placed on eliminating that threat.”12 Though the U.S. would strike Afghanistan first, the Iraq option was now on the table. Coupled with the decline of dual containment, 9/11 created the opportunity for neoconservative and militarist ideologies to surface amongst other more moderate positions, dominating policymaking for the duration of the George W. Bush Administration. The neoconservative ideology behind the Bush Doctrine was especially potent because its focus on Iraq aligned with primary national interests. However, the actualization of these benefits for the U.S. was contingent on the success of Iraq’s democratization. Implanting a democratic regime would ostensibly open Iraqi oil fields, “reducing what influence the Saudis [could] exert on US policy.”13 While Israel feared the removal of sanctions on Iraq, it stood The 9/11 Commission Report: 335-336. <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/>, accessed April 15, 2013. 13 Graham-Brown and Toensing, 15. 12

28 avicenna

to benefit from a friendlier regime to buffer Iranian hostilities. Furthermore, many neoconservatives believed the U.S. could initiate a “domino effect,” by which democratizing Iraq would “unleash a wave of change,” transforming Iran and other fundamentalist nations.14 Although Rumsfeld’s Revolution in Military Affairs called for fewer troops and heavy machinery, it promised to use “the most technologically advanced military forces ever assembled.”15 Therefore, an implementation of the Revolution in Military Affairs principles in Iraq would not conflict with the interests of the military-industrial complex. Finally, Bush utilized democratic rhetoric to make his public case for war in Iraq, espousing war “for a just peace... that favors human liberty.”16 However, in reality, Bush exploited democracy as “a mechanism for creating compliant states.”17 Once Iraq was transformed into a democratic state, Bush presumed, the new regime would inherently desire the promotion of U.S. interests. Edward Rhodes argues that the entire case for regime change in Iraq hinged on the false assumption that free individuals will want what the U.S. thinks is “best.”18 Thus, although neoconservative goals dominated political thinking via an alignment of national interests and events, the entire argument rested on a fallacious premise. With the Bush Doctrine logic firmly implanted at the White House, a search for Bacevich, 167. Ibid, 180. George W. Bush. Speech, West Point, June 1, 2002, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives. gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>, accessed April 15, 2013. 17 Robert Blecher, “Free People Will Set the Course of History: Intellectuals, Democracy, and the American Empire,” Middle East Report (Mar. 2003), <http://www.merip.org/mero/interventions/free-people-will-set-course-history>, accessed April 15, 2013. 18 Edward Rhodes, “Onward Liberal Soldiers?”, in Lloyd Gardner & Marilyn Young (eds.), The New American Empire: A 21st Century Teach-In on U.S. Foreign Policy, 244. 14 15 16

Rear door gunner over the mountains of Uruzgan province, Afghanistan, May 2013 (photo by The U.S. Army on Flickr)

a justification to attack Iraq began via a hasty assembly of intelligence. Although messy intelligence did worsen the situation in Iraq, it did not cause the war in the first place. After 9/11, Dick Cheney articulated an approach, termed the “one percent doctrine” by Ron Suskind, a Pulitzer Prize winning American journalist: “even a one percent chance of terrorists getting weapons of mass destruction” warranted the U.S. acting “as if it were a certainty.”19 The hawks were therefore tasked with finding a “one percent chance” of an AlQaeda link with Iraq and of Iraq’s WMD Michiko Kakutani, “Personality, Ideology, and Bush’s Terror Wars,” New York Times, June 20, 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/20/ books/20kaku.html?pagewanted=all>. 19

possession. To circumvent the resistant CIA, Rumsfeld set up his own intelligence track based on Ahmad Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress (INC). This “falsehood factory” fed Rumsfeld “evidence” of Saddam’s WMD possession and AlQaeda links, motivated by the possibility that with this casus belli, “Bush would overthrow Saddam and install [the INC] in power.”20 Claims about WMDs and Al-Qaeda increased public support for the war and created a premise for UNSC approval. Resolution 1441 “found Iraq in ‘material breach’ of previous UN resolutions” and provided a “final opportunity to cooperate with inspectors,” but did not 20

Cole, 134.

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

authorize the use of force in the case of noncompliance.21 This last catch did not deter the Bush Administration — Resolution 1441 approved harsher enforcement on Saddam, sufficient to persuade the public of the necessity of regime change. Since neither claim was true, however, the Bush Administration waged war with a faulty cause and subsequently lacked purpose and coherent policy for the postwar. Rumsfeld’s failed intelligence by no means caused the war in Iraq — the INC would never have been asked for information, had the neoconservative impetus not arisen out of context/event interaction — but it certainly contributed to the messy, drawn-out, and largely failed postwar situation in Iraq. Obama inherited two wars from the George W. Bush era, and despite early promises to rectify the messy situations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, Obama deepened U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and exacerbated the problems there. Obama campaigned on a commitment to win in Afghanistan, but he initially expressed “deep skepticism” about the efficacy of a counterinsurgency strategy and even the necessity of defeating the Taliban at all. Such a stance defied not only the military’s desires, but also the Bush Doctrine ideology. General McChrystal and other military personnel sought to force compliance with Bush’s precedent. McChrystal wrote a dire report on the ground conditions in Afghanistan, warning of an impending “mission failure” unless Obama provided “a fresh infusion of troops.”22 Once the report was leaked to the public, withdrawing troops would have been politically disastrous for Obama. Truly Hahn, 124. Peter Baker, “How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan,” New York Times (Feb. 12, 2010), <http://www.nytimes. com/2010/02/13/world/asia/13kabul. html?ref=stanleyamcchrystal>. 21 22

30 avicenna

“winning” the war was impossible; the Bush Administration previously “failed to deliver a coherent policy in Afghanistan” for defeating Al-Qaeda while allocating enough resources to rebuild the war-torn nation, and Obama’s policy was no more comprehensive.23 Obama therefore needed a face-saving military option that upheld Bush Doctrine ideology, provided for the eventual withdrawal of U.S. troops, and avoided a blatant defeat. To fill these requirements, Obama selected the “surge” option, modeled on Bush’s 2007 “surge” in Iraq. Bush’s surge was a midcourse correction, shifting the fight away from “the cause of liberty” and instead toward “conditions that might enable” withdrawal from Iraq “without acknowledging explicit defeat.”24 It did temporarily stabilize the Iraqi government, but lacked the force to truly eradicate the insurgency. Similarly, though the Afghanistan Marjah campaign was meant to exemplify the surge counterinsurgency tactics, it became arduous, and “efforts to create a civilian government in Marjah were painfully slow.”25 Based on the comparable failure of Bush’s surge in Iraq, it seems that Obama should have opted for a different route to withdrawal — why pursue a military option that is contrary to the administration’s ideology, and is likely doomed to failure? Obama’s decisions make sense in light of the continuous and entrenched nature of U.S. Middle East policy: when Obama entered the Oval Office, neoconservative and militarist ideals espoused by the Bush Doctrine were already deeply ingrained in politics. Altering the entire context Crisis Group, “Afghanistan: Exit vs. Engagement”, Asia Briefing, no. 115 (Nov. 2010): 3-4, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/44234441/Afghanistan-Exit-vs-Engagement-Asia-Briefing-No-115>, accessed April 15, 2013. 24 Bacevich, 189. 25 Anne Flaherty, “U.S. General Richard Mills: Battle in Marjah is Over,” Huffington Post. Dec. 7, 2010). 23

and recent historical precedent for policy amounted to an impossibility, and Obama was left with little choice but to perpetuate the Bush Doctrine in practice, if not in outspoken ideology. The Bush Doctrine and subsequent preventive war in Iraq was in some ways more radical than previous administrations’ policy schemes, but it was deeply rooted in the internal context of Middle East policy. National interests and foreign policy ideologies provide a continuous context for policy decisions, evolving from the Cold War to the present; it is the interaction of events — such the collapse of dual containment and the 9/11 attacks — with the

factors in this context that create a shift in dominant political thought. Once new factors, such as the neoconservative ideology enshrined in the Bush Doctrine, come to dominate, they become part of the continuous context of U.S. policy. Despite his ideological opposition to the premise of Bush’s tactics in Afghanistan and Iraq, Obama was unable to alter the trajectory of the Bush Doctrine, evidencing the entrenched nature of Middle East policy. Until new and unprecedented external events arrive to shake up the contextual factors driving U.S. policy, it is likely that Obama and his successors will continue to perpetuate an ever-deepening U.S. involvement in the Middle East.

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

Op-Ed: There’s Nothing “Islamic” About “Islamism” Sharia Mayfield B.A. English ’13 In the wake of the Boston Marathon bombings, a slew of reports, data and information have inundated the public. On the one hand, it is overwhelming and taxing to keep up with; on the other, those with literary affinities are compelled to analyze every piece published, every word chosen and every title plastered across online news outlets. Authorial decisions by writers are deliberate and reflect not only public sentiment but general social trends. Take, for example, the use of the word “Islamist” and all its derivations. In the past few weeks, we have seen articles entitled “Who are the Boston Bombers? Islamist or Americanized Youth,” “U.S. Muslims Fear Backlash if Islamists Behind Boston,” and “Northern Caucasus is an Epicenter of Islamism,” as well as countless references to Islamist terrorism or Islamic radicalization.1 Consequently, the persistent references to “Islamism” have revolutionized the way we, as the American public, view Muslims and how we confront terrorist attacks perpetrated by them. Before analyzing the impact of terms such as “Islamism,” we must first define the word. To begin here is already a difficult task as it has a myriad of definitions, and no single authoritative voice as to which is correct. Renowned author Sheri Berman defines Islamism as a set of ideoloKubin, Jacquie. “Who are the Boston Bombers? Islamists or Americanized Youth?” (Video), Washington Times Communities. 19 Apr. 2013.; “US Muslims fear backlash if Islamists behind Boston bombings,” Alarabiya.net. 17 Apr. 2013.; “Northern Caucasus is an epicenter of Islamism,” DW.de 20 Apr. 2013. 1

32 avicenna

gies that suggest “Islam should guide social and political as well as personal life.”2 In a recent interview featured in National Geographic, anti-terrorism expert David Schanzer maintained that “Islamism is a political movement that seeks a strong or dominant role for Islamic principles in the governing of a society.”3 According to the Dutch General Intelligence, a similar term “radical Islam” is defined as the “politico-religious pursuit of establishing — if necessary by extreme means — a society which reflects the perceived values from the original sources of Islam as purely as possible.”4 Regardless as to what the exact definition is, there is a consistent socio-political component to this word. Additionally, there is an underlying fundamentalism guiding “Islamism” as illustrated by the emphasis on ideologies, principles, or values. However, when one hears “Islamism,” he/she does not just think of people with a mere desire to enact Islamic principles in society. For example, when was the last time we heard of a “peaceful Islamist” contingency? Because of the association with radicalism and extremism that the word “Islamism” carries — at least as portrayed in the media — “Islamism” necessarily Berman, Sheri, “Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society, Perspectives on Politics”, Vol. 1, No. 2, June 2003, American Political Science Association, p. 258. 3 Belt, Don. “Boston Bombing Suspects Raise New Terrorism Questions.” Daily Nature and Science News and Headlines | National Geographic News . N.p., 20 Apr. 2013. Web. 10 May 2013. 4 Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service, "From Dawa to Jihad," (2004), p. 7. 2

Photo by Flickr user charliep74

carries a negative, often violent, connotation. This happens when an otherwise dormant word, “Islamist,” emerges in the spotlight at the same time we confront a terrorist act. News headlines such as “Why the Media Treats Right-Wing and Islamist Terrorism Differently” demonstrate the social trend in using “Islamist” as both an adjective and a qualifier to precede “terrorism.”5 This creates an overture in which “Islamism” and terrorism are nearly interchangeable. Moreover, the religious undertones of the word — both phonetically and linguistically — illustrate the imFriedersdorf, Conor. “Why the Media Treats Right-Wing and Islamist Terrorism Differently,” TheAtlantic.com. 18 Apr. 2013. 5

possibility of completely detaching Islam from its bastardized cousin “Islamism.” The result? A rhetorical junction between terrorism and Islam. But words are not the only means of creating this sort of junction. Even syntactical choices in reporting can lead to a further perpetuation of it. Here’s where the recent April 15th bombings in Boston fit in. The two suspects accused of perpetrating the crimes, Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, ethnic Chechen Muslims, allegedly used Islam as a justification for their behavior. There have been repeated references to the suspect Tamerlan, killed during a police shootout, as being a radical “Islamist” the stanford journal on muslim affairs

who frequented the mosque, read Quran, watched “Jihadi” YouTube videos and had a violent temper at times.6 Such characteristics, mentioned together, blur the line between acceptable expressions of religious activity and symptoms of unhealthy frustration and anger (i.e. “radicalization”). One need not look any further than the younger brother Dzhokhar for a full understanding of the extent to which religiosity affects lay opinion of a person’s perceived “extremism.” Prior to the bombings, Dzhokhar was less of a suspicious individual than his older brother because he was never outwardly “radical”. One defender of Dzhokhar’s innocence, a girl mentioned only by her first name as Jolly, purported the following: “There’s no evidence that Jahar was a radical Islamist. He barely even attended his local mosque. What reason does he have to hate the U.S.?”7 While her defense of his innocence (or at least mitigated guilt) is probably in good intention, the undertones of her statement are baffling and Islamophobic. She implies that merely attending a place of public worship substantiates some thread of religious “radicalism.” Is one more likely to be implicated in a terrorist attack because he attends a mosque regularly? Should he have to think twice about performing an act of worship and drawing closer to God spiritually? The ramifications of her statement, subtle as they are, are detrimental, recklessly ignorant and insulting. But what’s wrong with that? Why does it matter if we mix up religion and terrorism and espouse prejudiced beliefs or further their existence? It matters because we create a gray area where Islam and terrorism Carbonnel, Alissa de, and Stephanie Simon. “Special Report: The radicalization of Tamerlan Tsarnaev,” Reuters.com. 23 Apr. 2013. 7 Ross, Winston. “The Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Admiration Society,” TheDailyBeast.com. 22 Apr. 2013.

nebulously meet, where an innocent Muslim man praying is grounds for him being potentially radical. Additionally, by casually using the words “Islamist” or “Islamism” in reference to terrorism or extremism, we normalize the radicalization of Islam; we appropriate the terroristic claim to a new word whose definition is a morph between a peaceful religion and a potentially violent political agenda. This appropriation is dangerous, as it marginalizes an entire religious demographic and relegates them to a category as “other.” It is so dangerous, in fact, that the marginalization contributes to the very factors that increase the likelihood of terrorism occurring. In a study entitled “Experience of Discrimination, Social Marginalisation and Violence among Muslim and non-Muslim Youth,” conducted by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, the following was published: The main factors that can be associated with violent behaviour are: being male, being part of a delinquent youth group/gang, being discriminated against, and being socially marginalised. When these elements are taken into consideration, religious background/affiliation plays no part in explaining violent behaviour.8 The implications of this study are monumental and illuminating: not only is religion itself irrelevant in explaining violent behavior but the marginalization one feels as a Muslim becomes a more prominent explanation instead. That is to say that being guided by Islam is very different than being guided by frustrations as a result of being Muslim. To conflate Islam with one’s Muslim identity would be as foolish and ridiculous as claiming Eldridge Cleaver’s

34 avicenna

“Experience of discrimination, social marginalisation and violence: A comparative study of Muslim and non-Muslim youth in three EU Member States.” Belgium: FRA – European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2010, p. 10. 8

Photo by Flickr user charliep74

behavior emanated from his blackness when, in actuality, he had an identity crisis as a black-American. The AfricanAmerican Cleaver, who was convicted of rape in 1957, purported (in a controversial and racially charged statement) that he raped white women as "an insurrectionary act. It delighted me that I was defying and trampling upon the white man's law.”9 His despicable behavior and senseless rationale further fueled racism and segregation against blacks, allowing his individual actions to speak for a largely non-approving demographic. Although the plight of African-Americans differs from that of Muslims, there are parallels in the public’s response to the atrocities committed by a few misguided minorities. Even when race is invoked, even when religion is invoked by the psychotic few within each demographic, that does not imply that there is, in reality, endorsement in the race or religion. Essentially, Islam does not invoke terrorism, but terrorists may invoke Islam. Cleaver, Eldridge. Soul on Ice. 1st ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968. 9

With this in mind, we must be very careful in using words and terms that marginalize a minority group. We may be perpetuating a prejudice unknowingly by careless use of the word “Islamist” or else by conflating acceptable religious activities with unacceptable acts of violence and/or distorted religious principles. Perhaps the solution is to exercise more forthrightness in how we characterize criminals: by their characteristics and not directly in relation to their religion. Why should we use the word “Islamist” when what we really mean is a Muslim who resorts to terrorist or criminal acts, or at least espouses them? Why not own up to the impact of the words we choose and their role in marginalizing certain minority-groups? We can only hope that in the wake of yet another terror attack, the public will learn just how important words and mindsets can be. The way we speak and refer to a group is of paramount importance because it affects how the group is perceived in society. So remember: choose your words wisely.

the stanford journal on muslim affairs

A P E O P L E ’ S P U B L I C AT I O N

36 avicenna

STANFORD UNIVERSITY