Avicenna - The Stanford Journal on Muslim Affairs 7.1

fall 2016 vol 7 no 1

avicenna the stanford journal on muslim affairs

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THE STANFORD JOURNAL ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS

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avicenna THE STANFORD JOURNAL ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS

FALL 2016 VOL 7 NO 1

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Sevde Kaldiroglu ’17 ASSOCIATE EDITORS Ariana Qayumi ’18 Atussa Mohtasham ’18 DESIGNER Carolyn Oliver ’17 FINANCIAL OFFICER Marika Elise Buchholz ’19

Avicenna: The Stanford Journal on Muslim Affairs is a student-run journal founded in 2011 at Stanford University. As a non-sectarian, independent publication, Avicenna exists to portray Muslims not as silent objects but as knowing subjects, from the inside rather than the outside. Published in print and online, it aims to maintain a brave and academic agora where members of diverse communities, from different cultures, beliefs and ethnicities, can critically examine issues related to the Muslim world.

To contact Avicenna Editorial Board or to send text or image submissions, please email at avicenna.stanford@gmail.com.

Avicenna—The Stanford Journal on Muslim Affairs would like to thank the Associated Students of Stanford University (ASSU) for their support.

Front cover image: Photograph shot in Istanbul, Turkey by Rümeysa Kalın ’15, Bilkent University, Turkey.

Back cover image: Photograph by Abdullah Furkan Karabulut '17, Bilkent University, Turkey.

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CONTENTS Editor’s Note SEVDE KALDIROGLU Jihad Without Allah?: Propaganda and What It Tells Us About the Nature of ISIS MAX MORALES Made in Turkey: the Nostalgia of Time and the Search for Authenticity in Orhan Pamuk's The Museum of Innocence EVA GRANT Stray Cats of Istanbul RÜMEYSA KALIN The Refugee Crisis in Germany and the Politics of Identity: Discussions and Reflection ATUSSA H. MOHTASHAM A Lost Balloon MARIUM ABDUR RAHMAN Creating Narratives of Muslim Minorities: a Case Study of Norway MIRIAM NATVIG

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Editor’s Note “Language can be used to enlighten, and it can be used to manipulate. Its power comes from its subtlety.”

These compelling words belong to Atussa Mohtasham ’18 who, in our Fall 2016 edition, shares her discussion with Valentin Sauter, a German medical student that worked with Syrian and Afghan refugees as a volunteer. As Sauter relates his experience helping refugees settle into camps in Greece, he provides us with a unique perspective on how the language used to describe refugees is crucial in determining societal attitudes towards them, particularly in his homeland, Germany.

Actions speak louder than words. Nonetheless, words shape the rhetoric that leads to actions, and their subtlety allows them to operate beneath the surface before their impact comes to light. Their power is especially pertinent when it comes to the politics of identity, whether regarding Muslim refugees in Greece and Germany or Muslims in America. Calling a religion “cancer” or the refugees a “flood” invokes fear of an entire group of individuals by portraying them as a threatening “other.”

Fall 2016 has brought many challenges to the Muslim world. The most immediate one is the post-election attack on Muslim identities in the United States. In just a short time, the Muslims of America have seen an increase in hate crimes, from letters of threat to mosques around the nation to explicitly hateful and Islamophobic language and attitudes. Given the fear plaguing Muslim communities in the US, we would like to emphasize that Avicenna is here and dedicated to its mission of creating honest and meaningful dialogue, which Muslim communities here and everywhere deserve.

We see you, we stand with you, and we are here to tell your story.

Within the framework of our mission, our Fall edition brings together a variety of academic and artistic pieces. In his essay, Max Morales ’17 explores the propaganda of ISIS and its influence on their supporters. In another article, Miriam Natvig ’16 takes us to Norway, discussing the media representations of Norwegian Muslims and the false narratives surrounding this minority group.

The Fall edition also offers an artistic perspective into the Muslim world. In her literary analysis, Eva Grant ’19 delves into Orhan Pamuk’s The Museum of Innocence, an iconic novel in contemporary Turkish literature, and examines the dynamics between the past and the present in modern Turkey. Through her lyrical poetry, Marium Abdur Rahman ’12 takes us back to the Mughal Empire and reflects upon her Pakistani-American Muslim identity in connection with her cultural heritage.

Lastly, Rumeysa Kalin ’15, a law student from Ankara, Turkey, shares with us her heartwarming photographs of stray cats in Istanbul and illustrates the collective effort of Istanbullites to care for these furry city-dwellers.

As the Editorial Board, we have enjoyed putting these diverse narratives together, and we truly hope you enjoy reading them as much as we did.

Always here, Sevde Kaldiroglu ’17 Editor-in-Chief the stanford journal on muslim affairs

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Jihad Without Allah?

Propaganda and What It Tells Us About the Nature of ISIS Max Morales B.A. International Relations ’17, Stanford University

Far from the ruins of Syria and the battered cities of Iraq, a different sort of war rages in Western thought. This war of words focuses on the nature of the organization that calls itself the Islamic State. Some claim that it is a largely secular entity based more on ruthless pragmatism than religion. They argue that “groups like al Qaeda and ISIS promote a twisted interpretation of religion that is rejected by the overwhelming majority of the world's Muslims… the world must continue to lift up the voices of Muslim clerics and scholars who 1 teach the true peaceful nature of Islam.”

Afraid that people around the world will judge all Muslims from the actions of ISIS, President Obama and others see no option but to deny that ISIS adherents are true Muslims at all. Other scholars and journalists, in contrast, claim that ISIS is based upon Islam and that to deny this would be dangerous: “The reality is that ISIS is Islamic… the religion preached by its followers derives from coherent and even learned interpretations of Islam… pretending that it isn’t… has already led the United States to underestimate it and to 2 back foolish schemes to counter it.”

This discussion is not about ISIS. It is a continuation of the debate that has plagued the West since 9/11: is Islam an inherently violent faith, or an inherently peaceful one 1 Obama, Barack. "President Obama: Our Fight Against Violent Extremism." Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles Times, 17 Feb. 2015. Web. 13 Mar. 2015.

2 Wood, Graeme. "What ISIS Really Wants." The Atlantic.

Atlantic Media Company, 15 Feb. 2015. Web. 16 Feb. 2015.

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abused by those hungry for power? Often unheard in this debate is the perspective of scholars of religion: that one cannot make claims about the inherent nature of a religion, for to do so implies access to the central authority within that religion— in this case, to God. Viewed through this lens, Islam is composed of a variety of competing interpretations. Characteristics of these individual interpretations have no bearing on the nature of Islam itself, for that nature is something that we cannot know. If we wish to understand ISIS using this framework, we cannot begin by asking if Islam is violent or peaceful. Instead, we must ask, “Why does a small but significant number of Muslims, many of whom live thousands of miles away from Syria and Iraq, choose to interpret Islam in the same way as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi?”

This framework and the question it provides offers useful insight into understanding the nature of ISIS. Through its propaganda, ISIS argues that its violent interpretation of Islam is the only way of empowering the oppressed, worldwide Muslim community.

Propaganda supports this claim by highlighting how ISIS unites the worldwide Muslim community against its enemies and creating an apocalyptic narrative in which, through virtue of its battlefield successes and extreme violence, ISIS represents the only way of survival.

The propaganda we will examine are issues of Dabiq, the ISIS propaganda magazine,

and the film Flames of War: Fighting Has Just Begun, both produced by alHayat Media Center, ISIS’s propaganda machine. A monthly magazine, Dabiq offers opinion pieces written by various officials within ISIS, describing the duty of Muslims everywhere to the Islamic State, and articles chronicling the wars in Iraq and Syria. The issues of Dabiq usually end with news from around the Islamic State, describing how militants break up drug rings, stone adulteresses and distribute money to orphans. Flames of War is a documentary that chronicles the wars as seen from the front lines, focusing on the militants themselves. It is highly stylized, showing scenes of war filmed in slow motion and set to devotional music.

Before ISIS can portray itself and its interpretation of Islam as the only way of saving the worldwide Muslim community, or umma, it must first remind Muslims that, despite differences in language and ethnicity, they are one people, united by the teachings of Allah. ISIS claims that, in Islam, all peoples, “the Arab and the nonArab, the white man and the black man, the easterner and the westerner, are… brothers.”3 But ISIS’s military struggle is the only way that the umma can be fulfilled: “you would find the soldiers and commanders [of ISIS] to be of different colors, languages, and lands: the Najdi, the Jordanian, the Tunisian, the Egyptian, the Somali, the Turk, the Albanian, the Chechen, the Indonesian, the Russian, the European, the American and so on.”4 Ethnic and cultural identities are subsumed into the categories of “soldier” and “commander”, becoming one only in armed struggle. Violent resistance, what al-Baghdadi himself calls, “the basis of our 3 The Return of Khilafah. Dabiq Vol. 1. Al-Kuwayt: AlHayat Media Center. Web. 14 Feb. 2015, p.7.

4 A Call to Hijrah. Dabiq Vol 3. Al-Kuwayt: Al-Hayat Media Center. Wed 14 Feb 2015, p. 6.

religion”, is the only way that Muslims can overcome their differences and fulfill the 5 promise of umma. It is only by fighting for ISIS and its interpretation of Islam that the umma can unite under “one call, one banner, one leader.”6 Portraying itself as the successor to Khilafah, ISIS portrays its project as a return to the days when Islam was a single, unified empire that conquered its neighbors with startling ease. The Khilafah, a place where all people can become one through Islam, was first instituted by the Prophet at the inception of Islam. This portrayal can be appealing to Sunni Muslims around the world. To these Muslims, who suffer under the rule of Bashar al-Assad and other authoritarians in the Middle East, who are sidelined by the Shia-dominated regime in Iraq, who lived through the US invasion of Iraq and the chaos that ensued, who dwell in poverty and crime in urban France or Germany, having the power to strike at the enemy and win is extremely attractive. The return of Khilafah, also the title of Dabiq’s first issue, promises a return to the days when Muslims were not downtrodden but were leaders in a single, powerful nation.

Formulating its narrative as a return to past glory, which will liberate the umma from oppressors, allows ISIS to claim that they are the one entity with the power to unite all Muslims.

But who are the oppressors of umma?

ISIS portrays their struggle as a war between monolithic fronts: “the camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of kufr 7 and hypocrisy.” They seek to contrast a unified umma with a unified enemy, but the many enemies of Islam that ISIS 5 Flames of War: Fighting Has Just Begun. Al-Hayat Media Center. Web. 19 Feb. 2015.

6 Ibid.

7 The Return of Khilafah. Dabiq Vol. 1. Al-Kuwayt: AlHayat Media Center. Web. 14 Feb. 2015, p.10.

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names are not obviously linked to one another: Iran, Iraq, Shia Muslims, the United States, the Assad regime in Syria, Israel and the Kurdish military forces. ISIS even characterizes some of these entities as ideological opposites working in league with one another, such as the “communist Peshmerga” and American “capitalist 8 gluttony.” What, then, is the umbrella that ISIS uses to unify these forces in their hatred of Islam?

The answer is Israel, which ISIS equates with Jews everywhere. The prelude to the third issue of Dabiq claims the Obama administration has demonstrated that “the number one interest of the American government is the sanctity of Israel and its allies… these are more important than 9 the lives of its own citizenry.” These words suggest that the US is merely a pawn in the grip of Zionist forces. A few pages later, Dabiq #3 takes these claims a bit further, featuring a full-page image of Obama wearing a Yakama with his head bowed at the Wailing Wall.10 The implication is that Obama is secretly Jewish, or at the very least intimately connected and subservient to Jews and Zionism. These anti-Semitic conspiratorial claims portray Muslims everywhere as victims of Jews: “while genocide is committed by the Maliki, Asadi, and Israeli forces against the Muslims via systematic massacres, chemical warfare, rape, and starvation by siege, Obama 11 watches with euphoria.” Anti-Semitism is central to ISIS’s oppression narrative, and it unites the US and the “Zionist Peshmerga forces”, as well as other enemies, under one 12 banner: Israel and the Jews.

8 A Call to Hijrah. Dabiq Vol 3. Al-Kuwayt: Al-Hayat Media Center. Wed 14 Feb 2015, p. 35.

9 Ibid, p.4 10 Ibid, p.35 11 Ibid, p.35 12 Ibid, p.35

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Unifying enemies is just as critical as unifying allies for ISIS to justify its violent interpretation of Islam. Doing so simplifies the world’s problems in a strict, easilydigestible dualism. The final conflict will be a clash of two civilizations, and everyone will be involved. Dabiq #1 proclaims, “the world has divided into two camps… the camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of kufr and hypocrisy… mobilized by the 13 Jews.” Dividing the world into these two camps is central to ISIS’s program. Indeed, it has named its propaganda magazine after Dabiq, Syria where, according to hadith, the final battle between Islam and Shaytan will occur, and Islam will 14 emerge victorious. Each issue of Dabiq begins and ends with the quotation “the spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify –by Allah’s permission—until it burns the crusader 15 armies in Dabiq.” ISIS invokes this hadith to lend credibility to its violent Islam: this is the final hour that Muhammad foretold, the hour when Muslims rise up and fight against the unbelievers, the hour when violence is not only permissible but required to defeat Islam’s ultimate foe.

Both apocalyptic rhetoric and the strict division of civilizations lend credibility to ISIS’s call to violence. It is true that many of the world’s nations are uniting against ISIS. Even the US and Iran are, to some degree, working together against ISIS. It is also true that the US supports Israel to a degree it rarely affords other allies. This creates the image of a clash of civilizations, with ISIS on one side and the rest of the world on the other. ISIS’s narrative is thus legitimized for many people angered by the policies of Israel, the US, Iran, and other nations.

13 Ibid, p.10 14 Ibid, p.50 15 Ibid. p. 4

ISIS faces the monumental task of supporting its bold claims by proving that Allah stands behind them and their interpretation of Islam. ISIS propaganda claims that the proof of Allah’s favor lies in the strength in its fighters, which has led them to victory after victory. Through the grace of Allah, they are more than ordinary men: they are the mujahidin, warriors of Allah, the martyrs. The documentary Flames of War is the most obvious example of this portrayal. Its narrator says that ISIS militants are “a breed of men unmatched 16 in their fearlessness.” The bravery of 17 the “tank hunter units” is singled out.

Its members are displayed battling Iraqi and Syrian tanks, blowing them up with rocket-propelled grenades. Flames of War portrays militants as more than mere mortals. They are the instruments of God: “It is Allah…who punishes the enemy with 18 the hands of the mujahidin.”

Being the instruments of a divine force makes ISIS militants inherently superior to the enemies they fight. While ISIS is unified by unshakeable faith, their enemies are weak because they fight for nonreligious ideals. The narrator of Flames of War says of the PKK, or Kurdistan Worker’s Party: “they fought with a secular ideal, for the sake of land, for a secular state… their very foundation was weak.” Marxism or nationalism are false idols that distract 19 from worship of the one true God. Even enemies who fight for religious ideals, such as Israel, do so because they are blinded by 20 kufr and “the idol of democracy.” Unlike its enemies, ISIS fights not for one nation but for the general umma. Those who fight 16 Flames of War: Fighting Has Just Begun. Al-Hayat Media Center. Web. 19 Feb. 2015.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 The Return of Khilafah. Dabiq Vol. 1. Al-Kuwayt: AlHayat Media Center. Web. 14 Feb. 2015, p.8 20 Ibid, p.8.

for the Islamic State are stronger than all others, for, as the narrator of Flames of War informs us over a backdrop of exploding buildings, they “are the martyrs, the most effective weapon of war ever known… nothing can stand against the weapon 21 of unshakeable faith.” Even against the superior technology of enemies like the US, Syria, and Iraq, ISIS still prevails because Allah stands behind it: “we fear not the swarms of planes, nor ballistic missiles, nor drones, nor satellites, nor battleships, nor weapons of mass destruction… how could we fear them, while Allah the Exalted has said, ‘If Allah should aid you, no one can overcome you…you will be superior if you 22 are believers.”

The tangible proof of Allah’s support is found in the success of the very acts of violence ISIS militants commit. ISIS’s extreme violence serves many functions, but perhaps the most important of these is to bolster its image as the Islamic State as allpowerful and unstoppable. This brutality, in the words of one commentator, says to the enemies of the Islamic State: “Get 23 out of the way or you will be crushed.”

To its followers, the same violence says, “join our caravan and make history.”24 Killing and mutilating other individuals, especially soldiers or citizens of powerful enemies like the US, and still surviving portrays ISIS as a powerful force that can do whatever it wants without suffering the consequences. This is an invocation of the original caliphate, which had the ability to harm the enemy with impunity because the enemy was too afraid to strike back.

21Flames of War: Fighting Has Just Begun.

22 The Failed Crusade. Dabiq Vol 4. Al-Kuwayt: Al-Hayat Media Center Web. 2 Mar. 2015, p.6.

23 Gerges, Fawaz. "Islamic State: Can Its Savagery Be Explained?" BBC News. British Broadcasting Corporation, 9 Sept. 2014. Web. 13 Feb. 2015.

24 Ibid.

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Flames of War features numerous acts of brutality in graphic detail to portray the authority of ISIS over completely powerless enemies. The captured enemies are dehumanized to such a degree that ISIS takes the place of God, dictating the exact time, place and manner in which they will die. The film captures militants executing Syrian soldiers, continuing to shoot them even after they are dead. A militant is shown clad in fatigues, his face hidden by a black balaclava. Behind him the ISIS flag flaps in the breeze. Behind the flag a line of men dig in the ground. The barren fields of northern Syria stretch for miles into the distance. The line of men, the masked militant says, “are the soldiers of Bashar 25 [al-Assad].” They are “digging their own graves in the very place where they were stationed…this is the end of every… kafir [unbeliever] that we get ahold of. This is 26 the end that they face.” Later, one of the soldiers pauses in his work to blame Assad for his impending death, saying “Bashar has abandoned us…the officers fled and left the soldiers here…to dig their graves 27 with their own hands.” The masked militant in this scene is a figure of absolute power. He stands above the soldiers as he proclaims their death sentence, voice deep and commanding. He tells the dictator’s soldiers just how and when they are going to die, and there is nothing they can do. The captured soldiers are in the employment of Assad, one of ISIS’s most hated enemies.

Committing limitless atrocities against Assad’s soldiers attests to the absolute, godlike power of ISIS over an apparently powerless Assad.

For ISIS, brutal violence is just another stimulant that speeds up the unfolding of events already foretold in the Dabiq 25 Flames of War: Fighting Has Just Begun.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

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hadith. Extreme violence will help polarize the world, dividing it into the two camps necessary for the coming apocalyptic clash of civilizations. In 2004, a man named Abu Bakr Naji wrote a book called “The Management of Savagery”, which details a strategy necessary for militant groups like ISIS (then called Al-Qaida in Iraq) to 28 prevail. He wrote:

“[Drag] the masses into the battle such that polarization is created between all of the people. Thus, one group of them will go to the side of the people of truth, another group will go the side of the people of falsehood, and a third group will remain neutral…we must attract the sympathy of this latter group, and make it hope for the victory of the people of faith… We must make this battle very violent, such that death is a heartbeat away, so that the two groups will realize that entering this battle will frequently lead to death. That will be a powerful motive for the individual to choose to fight in the ranks of the people of truth in order to die well, which is better than dying for falsehood29and losing both this world and the next.”

Naji emphasizes the need to split the world into two camps with no middle ground between them. There is a strict and irreconcilable division between Islam and kufr, or hypocrisy.”30 All those in between must be converted. Invoking the afterlife, Naji calls upon militants to die as martyrs.

Their fight should be “very violent” and display all the more the militant’s fervor for the cause of Islam, which is synonymous with faith itself.

28 Wright, Lawrence. "ISIS’s Savage Strategy in Iraq." The New Yorker. 16 June 2014. Web. 15 Mar. 2015.

29 Naji, Abu Bakr. "The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Shall Pass." Web. 4 Mar. 2015.

30 The Return of Khilafah.

The vast majority of Muslims want nothing to do with ISIS, not only because they find its violence repulsive, but also because it has declared so many of them to be apostates and thus targets of that violence. Hundreds of Muslim scholars around the world have signed onto a letter condemning al-Baghdadi and his organization, but they stopped short of 31 claiming that he was not a Muslim. Thus, in this essay, I have detailed the various ways in which ISIS uses propaganda to support its cause without trying to argue whether ISIS is or is not ultimately Islamic. Such a judgment cannot be made.

31 Sa'ad Ababakar, Muhammad et al. "Open Letter to Dr. Ibrahim Awwad Al-Badri, Alias "Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, and to the Fighters and Followers of the Self-declared "Islamic State"" Lettertobaghdadi.com. N.p., n.d. Web. 3 Mar. 2015.

Religious adherents interpret faith to give their own lives meaning, a process that creates radically different versions of the same religion for different people. Those who label Islam as either a religion of peace or of war portray Islam as something static that possesses a given set of qualities.

The reality of Islam, like all belief systems, is fluid and changes in nature from person to person. It is not inherently violent or peaceful but instead, varies according to individual interpretations. We therefore cannot claim that Allah is or is not with ISIS. We can only attempt to understand the violence inherent to one particular take on Islam.

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MADE IN TU®KEY The Nostalgia of Time and the Search for Authenticity in Orhan Pamuk's The Museum of Innocence Eva Grant B.A. Comparative Literature and Philosophy ’19, Stanford University

“Real museums are those places where Time is transformed into Space.” ~ Kemal, The Museum of Innocence

The search for the authentic self in Turkey has become largely international, as the country navigates a unique space between EU bids, refugee crises and the remnants of its own past. This globalization has been linked to changing conceptions of time and place. As Leyla Neyzi points out in “Object or Subject?: The Paradox of "youth" in Turkey,” the “future-oriented modernist concept of time,” (which I refer to as the “time of the nation”) is being replaced by a dualistic “orientation in the present” and an orientation to the past through memory (which I refer to as the “time of the self ”).1 Operating out of this post-modern “time of the self,” we are allowed a glimpse into the polarizing views on and of some of Turkey’s most well-known thinkers. The “time of the self ” is more focused on individual opinions and viewpoints than on a sweeping, commoditized praise for public figures.

1 Neyzi, Leyla. "Object or Subject?: The Paradox of "youth" in Turkey." Cairo, A.R. Egypt: Population Council, 2000.

Print.

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Pondering the relationship between representations of citizens by an author, and similarly, how those writers are represented by their citizenship, my mind immediately turned to Turkish Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk. Pamuk is as well known for his obsession with identity and memory as for his much-contested status in Turkey as an Orientalist and an insult to “Turkishness.”2 One of Pamuk’s most recent novels is The Museum of Innocence (2008), which deals extensively with the clash between East and West and the pathos we ascribe to objects because of memory. In 2012, four years after the publication of the novel, he inaugurated an eponymous museum, with every chapter from the novel having its own exhibit filled with relevant objects that document both the fictional protagonist Kemal’s obsessive love for his young cousin, and the life sequences of the rich urbane of the 1970s.

In the foyer of the museum, the elevenpoint “A Modest Manifesto for Museums,” penned by Pamuk himself, presents the 2 In a May 2009 Guardian article, Alison Flood describes how, after a 2005 interview with a Swiss magazine, Pamuk was charged and subsequently put on trial for "public denigration of Turkish identity" under Article 301 of the Turkish penal code. While the case was dropped, widespread contempt towards Pamuk in Turkey lingers.

(Flood, Alison. “Pamuk ‘insult to Turkishness’ Claims Return to Court.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 15 May 2009. Web. 22 Sept. 2016.)

key tenets for a post-modern vision of the way in which a contemporary citizenship should view the past along the axes of time and place. The last, and possibly most pithy point of Pamuk’s Museum Manifesto forms the basis of my argument: “the future of museums is inside our own homes.”3

finds its legitimacy across the ages. Pamuk, through his narrative and meta-narrative of the Zeitgeist of the Turkish nation-state, presents a vision that recognizes that in the novelization of Turkish history, and in the subjectivity of memory, there can exist many versions.

Operating outside of an intersubjective framework that seeks to establish a common truth,4 Pamuk’s ethnographic oeuvre and its objects offer an individualist view that suggests two concurrent planes of existence operating beyond the framework of the reimagined history.5 This essay is going to focus on one of these: the extratextual sphere, where the author, writing out of the 21st century, displays a literary style indicative of a globalized cherishing of the Ottoman past. It is not a merging or a repudiation of, but simply a recognition of identities, which leads to true authenticity: a “time of the self ” that

Pamuk, through his meta-narrative, declares the collapse of the idea of the infinite momentum of national progress.

By means of multiple points of view, ironic depictions of Republican history, pastiche, and “injection of doubt” into realism,6 he criticizes the authoritarian turn nationalism has taken in his country, while subverting the binaries that seem to construct Turkish national identity.

3 The entire manifesto (copyright Pamuk, 2012) is available here: Pamuk, Orhan. “A Modest Manifesto for Museums | American Craft Council.” American Craft Council. N.p., 21 May 2013. Web. 22 Sept. 2016.

4 Hyslop, Alec. "Other Minds" (2010). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall Edition), Edward N. Zalta (Ed.). Stanford University, 6 Oct. 2005. Web. 22 Sept. 2016.

5 Author Aparajita Nanda suggests this phrase came from French colonial writer Martinican Edouard Glissant, on the subjectivity of history within Western discourse. (Nanda, Aparajita. Ethnic Literatures and Transnationalism: Critical Imaginaries for a Global Age. New York: Routledge, 2014.

Print. 152.)

As a case study, a Turkish student at Stanford University who is an ardent fan of Pamuk, described to me in detail the fad of Turkish melodramas of the 1970s, which to him quite accurately reflected the unique brand of existential and realist Turkish literature coming out of an Ottoman tradition. These “Yeşilçam movies”7 used to fill theaters to the last seat, 6 Seyhan, Azade. Writing Outside the Nation. Princeton and Oxford, Princeton UP, 2001. Print. 184-196.

7 A term he did not use, but which I found later in the following book: Devi, Gayatri, Najat Rahman, Perin Gürel, Cyrus Ali Zargar, Elise Burton, Somy Kim, Mara Matta, and Robert Lang. “Chapter 12” Humor in Middle Eastern

Photo by Rümeysa Kalın.

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and patrons often left the establishment in tears. But then, after the military coup of 1980, and the subsequent socioeconomic transformation of the 80s and 90s, fueled by globalism, a new generation grew up mocking those arabesque films. Such disdain ignores the collective subconscious of the post-Ottoman Turkish generation, forced to give up the cultural modes of their ancestors. The Museum of Innocence, written in the mid 2000s, comments on such a development, on the “innocence” of that age which was lost by society. This facet of society, which echoes Pamuk’s characterization of 1970s Turkey, at once presents the stereotypes of the collective sincerity of the Republican Era, and of the arabesque reimagining of the Ottoman cultural tradition.

Of course, this sentimental sincerity is tempered; irony abounds in such representation of the self in The Museum of Innocence. In what can be construed as a stylistic critique of both the legacy of secular modernity and the rising tide of Islamism, the author-figure, “the voice and expression of post-Kemalism”8 becomes a cataloguist for symbols of a reimagined Ottoman (and Islamic) past.

In this true post-modernist fashion, Pamuk challenges currents of empirical history by setting out a paradox and then developing dialogue. In both the novel and the museum, as stated by writer Presca Ahn in “Review: Orhan Pamuk and the Innocence of Objects,” “Pamuk’s admitted yearning for the Turkey of his childhood fuels his portrayal of Kemal’s monumental obsession with the past.”9 Pamuk, as a Cinema. Michigan, Wayne State UP, 2014. Print.

8 Göknar, Erdağ M. Orhan Pamuk, Secularism and Blasphemy: The Politics of the Turkish Novel. New York: Routledge, 2013. Print. 239.

9 Ahn, Presca. “Review: Orhan Pamuk’s ‘The Innocence of Objects’”. The American Reader. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Sept

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character in the novel, is much younger than his friend, the protagonist Kemal, who is in his seventies, in the present, when he asks Pamuk to help him curate the Museum. This positions them not as contemporaries but as commentators on one another’s eras. Thus, Pamuk’s observations are colored by nostalgia.

Kemal complains to Pamuk that Pamuk only takes such an interest in the museum because they remind him of the beloved Istanbul of his childhood.

Pamuk’s self-awareness thus humanizes him by recognizing that, since identity is constructed out of a fictional past, its very existence is liminal, subject to revisions, divisions, and transformations. What makes Pamuk’s argument unique is that he does not impose a new identity within the void he creates; to Pamuk, Turkey’s “unifying current” of identity should be its lack of one. It is true that the diversity and paradox of this nation-state undermine truth, but they also underscore the individual.

The implicit assertion that “Western modernity” is only one facet in time and place is important in the context of Turkish self-hood. Whereas the Republican era advocated a displacement of linear chronology in favor of a sort of expedited history indicative of a country “racing to catch up with” the modern world,10 Pamuk allows for an authentic self which sees culture as “a synthesis of national culture and international civilization.”11 Much of Pamuk’s self-hood derives from his hyper-awareness of his position as a writer in Turkish society. In the second 2016.

10 Göknar, 127.

11 Davison, Andrew. Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey: A Hermeneutic Reconsideration. New Haven: Yale UP, 1998.

Print. 90.

point of his Manifesto, he references the shift from epics to novels:

“We can see that the transitions from palaces to national museums and from epics to novels are parallel processes. Epics are like palaces and speak of the heroic exploits of the old kings who lived in them.

National museums, then, should be like novels; but they are not.” 12 In a TED talk on the intersection of fiction and identity politics,13 Turkish novelist Elif Şafak corroborates the idea of the epicto-novel transition as being important to the power of the state, presenting the historically-based idea that culture became the foundation upon which the modern nation-state of Turkey was built, and that literature was a cornerstone of that shift in Turkish society.14 Şafak declares that in an attempt by the Republic’s new elite both to distance themselves from the state’s Ottoman past and to bolster support for the “progress” engendered by such a regime change, it was imperative to depict that a fundamental shift had taken place from “east” to “west” through novelization.

This shift, while concerned with the common life of the Turkish people, does not, as Pamuk points out, accurately reflect the way life changed for them.

This unambiguous and expedited version of history has been generally forsaken in favor of focusing on the “messiness and complexity of social transformation”15 that has characterized Turkey from 1920 to present. Pamuk recognizes this, and incorporates it into his literary sphere.

12 Pamuk, 2012.

13 Şafak, Elif. “The Politics of Fiction” TED. July 2010.

Lecture.

14 Şafak, 2010.

15 Gökberk, Ülker. “Beyond Secularism: Orhan Pamuk’s Snow, and the Contestation of ‘Turkish Identity’ in the Borderland.” Konturen [Online], 1.1. (2008). Web. 3 May 2012 .

His nostalgia for the single-party state epoch is what Özyürek has called “a new kind of relationship citizens have established with the founding principles of the Turkish Republic.” Pamuk as an author—a career that prizes the sort of aesthetic-affective communication often relegated to the fringes of the public sphere in favor of dispassionate political discourse—mediates between disparate realities by firmly grounding his work in a present space “governed by ambivalence and fluctuations of meaning.”16 In the novel, which embraces a postmodern state of ambivalence, it is the pathos of “things” which offer a window into Turkish self-hood. Nationalist marching songs of industrial progress and devotion to the leader are remixed in popular discos, competing with the calls to prayer from the mosque next door.

Glamorous advertisements for Efes Beer display modern, happy families in a lavish European setting, while outside the bay windows the ultra-nationalists struggle with the Islamists, the urban bourgeois struggle with the rural peasants, and the leftists struggle against the military. For Pamuk, this paradoxical identity is key to his narrative, as he seeks not to reimagine the national, but to display fully the cultural diversity and confusion that made up, in one form or another, every human in Turkey at the time. A signal quote from The Museum of Innocence concerns itself greatly with the pathos of objects. The protagonist deems the power of things to lie in “the memories they gather up inside them, and also in the vicissitudes of our imagination, and our memory.”17

16 Gürses, Hande. Fictional Displacements: An Analysis of Three Texts by Orhan Pamuk. 2013. Print. 36.

17 Pamuk, Orhan, and Maureen Freely. The Museum of Innocence. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009. Print.

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Pamuk, whose body of work arguably draws the most influence from Turkish author Ahmet Tanpınar,18 displays a metaphysical understanding of the binaries of EastWest, Old-New, Modern-Traditional, Public-Private and Legitimate-Contrived, without prioritizing “the authentic self.” As regards a national text or ethos, the search for a “pure” Turkish identity removed from the machinations of the Ottoman Empire is inherently fallacious, and, as Venkat Mani points out, constitutes a “manifest omission of the […] cultural diversity” of the Empire.19 Moving from Republic-era modernity and its ideological constraints, Pamuk’s oeuvre closely observes the Kemalist program’s repudiation of the Ottoman past, associated with religious obscurantism, vacuous cosmopolitanism, and a “corruption” of the “Turkish essence.”20 As Şener Aktürk points out, “[The Kemalist vanguard] turned to pre-Islamic Central Asia and Anatolian History” to find, or rather create, its roots.21 Through his character’s individualistic obsession with the careful collection of objects (produced by the state as an even more careful attempt to construct a perfect national identity), Pamuk parodies the selectiveness of memory and meaningmaking of the Turkish state. He posits that large national museums, “with their wide doors,” play into this monopoly on truth by narrowing the view of Turkish society and self-concept, as leaders are prioritized over humanity. Pamuk articulates in his Manifesto that “we don’t need more museums that try to construct 18 Jaggi, Maya. “Orhan Pamuk Puts Tanpinar’s Tale of Two Continents Back on the Map.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 01 Dec. 2009. Web. 23 Sept. 2016.

19 Gürses, 143.

20 Aktürk, Şener. Redefining Ethnicity and Belonging: Persistence and Transformation in Regimes of Ethnicity in Germany, Turkey, Soviet Union, and the Russian Federation.

N.p.: n.p., 2009. Print.

21 Aktürk, 357.

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the historical narratives of a society, community, team, nation, state, tribe, company, or species. We all know that the ordinary, everyday stories of individuals are richer, more humane, and much more joyful.”22 This focus on the humane is a repudiation on the part of Pamuk of the homogenous definition of Turkish identity constructed by the state, and which is indicative of a fantasy of “presence” as symbolized by Western modernity. Pamuk’s goal in The Museum of Innocence—especially in choosing a setting almost “out of time,” in that it is so focused on a past built out of a fictional past and a pre-conceived future—is to deconstruct the ideal image of Turkish identity that can be distilled into three words: singular, homogenous, and sharply-delineated.

This blanket identity, fueled by the state’s attempt at modernization through discontinuity with its own legacy, could not possibly have appealed to every Turkish citizen. The dislocation, born of the attempt to construct a single national identity upon the grounds of a panoply of ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural variables, can still be felt in the way today’s diverse Turks interact with yesterday’s stories, particularly those of the Ottoman past. This can, in the context of Pamuk, most clearly be seen in the way his readership has reacted to his body of work.

Accusations of “Orientalist,” “Western sympathizer” and “fake Turk,” fly freely23 when Turkish audiences interact with Pamuk. What Pamuk may not be getting across is his dedication to resurrecting the dichotomies of East and West, parodying them with an Ottoman flair, only to knock 22 Pamuk, 2012.

23 Almond, Ian. The New Orientalists: Postmodern Representations of Islam from Foucault to Baudrillard.

London: I.B. Tauris, 2007. Print.

them down in a display suggestive of the grey space in which modern Turkey finds itself, unable to turn to opposing stereotypes to construct a vision of selfhood.

Pamuk creates multiple “presents,” erecting an expansive duality in Museum.

This duality combines a protagonist living in the 1970s—an era characterized as suffering from an intense nostalgia for the early Republican period—with a strong authorial presence writing from the 21st century, but with Ottomanist literary predilections. Pamuk’s literary reconstruction and critique borrow heavily from this “Ottoman archive,” and are made up of odds and ends, including “mystic romance, Qur’anic-style parables, philosophy of Islamic text and image […] and allegories of the modern Middle Eastern nation-state.”24 Taking into account setting and style (the time in which it is set and the cultural place in which it is oriented) Pamuk presents, through himself and his protagonist, a vision of the self that “vacillates between the profane first-person everyday and the sacred omniscience of the divine.”25

Conclusion

To conclude, Pamuk is able, in The Museum of Innocence, to explore the grey area between historical settings and sphere to demonstrate the importance of personal narratives in constructing a national identity that is humanistic, rather than idealistic.

While their differing viewpoints are never reconciled, both the protagonist and the author-figure of Pamuk, stalwart 24 Göknar, 134.

25 Ibid.

patriots in the most elemental sense, chronicle, detail, deconstruct, reimagine and reconfigure their national history and place in the world. Just as an authentic selfconcept requires representation by every facet of Turkish identity, together these characters are able to create dialogue that delivers a complex deconstruction of the dichotomies which Turks have tried for decades to harmonize: those of East and West; Modern and Traditional; Secular and Islamic; Turkish and Other; Individual and Collective.26 Pamuk’s Derrida-like philosophy of history, in dialogue with, rather than in diametrical opposition to, a globalized definition of modernity and Turkish collective self-hood,27 conceives of a world not in terms of oppositions proliferating inexorably, but of a humanity which finds reconciliation and self-hood because of, rather than in spite of, the paradox.

To Pamuk, the novel acts as preserved culture, but it is not an artifact; it is a dynamic, synthesizing, lived experience.

It is informed, much like critical augmentation in the Habermasian public sphere, by discourse, questioning, and change. In the world of multiple modernities, Pamuk’s focus rests in the humanization of a nation, and with it an acknowledgment of both the Ottoman and Kemalist influences that constitute its reality.

a

26 Gürses, 39.

27 See the Gökalp quote: “[A]nd if international civilization, that is modernity was irreducibly Christian/Western, then Muslim Turkey, no matter how secularized, categorically could not participate.” (Bechev, Dimitar, and Kalypso Nicolaildis. Mediterranean Frontiers Borders, Conflict and Memory in a Transnational World. London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2010. Print. 68.)

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Stray Cats of Istanbul Rümeysa Kalın B.A. Law ’15, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey

T

here are many things Istanbul is known for—its rich history reaching back to the Ottoman and the Byzantine Empire, its beautiful location on the Bosphorus bridging Europe and Asia, and its cultural mosaic reflecting an intricate blend of the East and the West, to name a few. But the average passerby often overlooks the one thing about Istanbul that truly stole my heart: the stray cats of the city.

Istanbul is home to a myriad of stray cats. It is practically impossible for you to spend a day wandering in Istanbul without bumping into a few of these furry inhabitants. You are sure to meet a friendly cat while, say, sitting at a park waiting for the bus, visiting a mosque or enjoying a cup of Turkish tea at an outdoor café.

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Many of the cats are eager for a good petting, while others simply can’t be bothered. A few even become online celebrities—just last summer a chubby cat named Tombili became the mascot of Istanbul’s Ziverbey neighborhood after a photo of him reclining went viral.

When he passed away, a statue of him in his famous pose was sculpted and placed on his favorite spot in honor of his memory.1 Cats are an inseparable part of the experience of Istanbul, and the community greets them with open arms. Wooden cat houses can be found all around the city and especially on university campuses. Stray animals are treated by Istanbul municipality vets free of charge. Animal protection associations work with volunteers to find homes for abandoned kittens and cats with disabilities. A collective effort ensures that cats remain welcome to roam the land as they please.

1 Read more about the incident in this article: McKernan, Bethan. "Tombili: Istanbul Cat and Worldwide Meme Honoured with Statue." The Independent. Independent Digital News and Media, 4 Oct. 2016. Web. 6 Nov. 2016.

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Perhaps Istanbullites’ hospitality toward cats has its roots in the affection for cats in Islamic history. One of the Prophet Muhammad’s companions was named Abu Hurairah (literally meaning “Father of the Kitten”) because he would take care of a small cat and carry it on his shoulder everywhere.2 Tale tells that one day the Prophet was preparing to attend prayer but did not want to disturb his cat who was sleeping on the sleeve of his robe. He cut the robe around where the cat was resting and wore what was left of the garment to the mosque.3 This principle of caring for stray animals in the practice of Islam is brought to life on the streets of many Muslim cities.

So if you are ever in the vicinity of Istanbul, look a bit more carefully into the architecture, the parks and the shops. Chances are you will spot a pair of large, round and curious eyes looking up at you in the midst of the commotion of the city it calls home.

a

2 Ali, Muhammad Sajad. “The Sunnah and Blessings in Healing Effects of Cats.” Deenislam.co.uk. N.p., 20 Mar. 2010. Web. 6 Nov. 2016.

3 Geyer, Georgie Anne. When Cats Reigned like Kings: On the Trail of the Sacred Cats. Kansis City: Andrews McMeel Pub., 2004. Print. 4.

All photos by Rümeysa Kalın.

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The Refugee Crisis in Germany and the Politics of Identity Discussions and Reflection Atussa H. Mohtasham B.A. Comparative Literature ’18, Stanford University

Introduction

During my year abroad in Germany from September 2015 to August 2016, I found myself in heated discussions both in and out of the classroom on the refugee crisis.

Millions of refugees from the Middle East have entered Europe in the past few years in order to escape violence and unrest in their home countries. Asylum seekers from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq find their way to Turkey, then travel by boat to the Greek Aegean Islands. In Greece, refugees wait indefinitely for a verdict on their asylum claims. Once approved, many of them go to Germany, which welcomed more than one million refugees in 2015.

The migrant influx has challenged the notion of identity for many Germans.

A fraught battle emerges between those who argue for cultural assimilation those who believe in the importance of cultural preservation. On the one hand, the crisis has brought out the best in people, as many strive to create a welcoming atmosphere for the refugees. In the face of the refugee crisis, Germany promotes a Willkommenskultur, or “Welcome Culture.” Many volunteers have dedicated time and energy directly aiding the refugees entering Europe, starting a new life in Germany and raising awareness about their plight among Germans. On the other hand, far-right, anti-immigration parties have gained popularity. In Germany,

PEGIDA, or Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West, protest immigration for fear that cultural values, rooted in a Judeo-Christian tradition, will be destroyed by an influx of Muslims.

Anti-immigration parties also fear that migrant communities in Europe will give rise to terrorist groups that will destroy Europe from within.

Amid muddled social and cultural values, many feel the need to define a new identity. Those who seek to hold onto a “German way of life,” however, have difficulty articulating what this is. Political discussion on German national identity focuses on articulating a set of ideals that may transcend religious and cultural differences in the concept of Leitkultur, or “leading culture.” As expected, the golden set of shared ideals remains a topic of debate.

Through an interview with my German friend, Valentin Sauter, who has had direct experience with refugees, I have tried to gain an inside perspective on the refugee crisis. In our discussion, we focus on Valentin’s direct experience with refugees as a volunteer. We also reflect upon the implications of cultural assimilation and cultural preservation as two opposing ideological stances that have come to the fore in discussions regarding the refugee crisis in Germany. the stanford journal on muslim affairs

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Valentin Sauter

Medical Student, Universität Heidelberg Valentin Sauter is a medical student at the University of Heidelberg, Germany. In March, 2016, Valentin went as a volunteer to the Greek island Chios to help mostly Syrian and Afghan refugees land after crossing over in boats from Turkey and settle into camps.

Volunteer Experience in Greece Basic information What: The organizations I worked with are the small Norwegian NGO “A Drop in the Ocean,” and “Chios Eastern Shore Response Team,” a colorful and everchanging group of young Europeans founded by a local activist. Generally, volunteers come through a variety of organizations, such as large and wellknown NGOs, smaller NGOs like mine and grassroots organizations run by locals, groups of friends—independent and hired people.

Where: I was in Chios, Greece.

When: I volunteered in Chios the first 20 days of March, just after the border to Macedonia, the entry point to the route to Germany through the Balkans, was closed for refugees and people started getting stuck in Greece.

A day as a volunteer At night, we patrolled in cars along the coastline to help refugees land in their rubber boats. As patrols on the Greek island, we tried to see as far as we could with moonlight or listen for engines and shouts to guess where the boats would land or had already arrived. Upon landing, we provided food, water, emergency first aid where necessary and dry clothes because people would often get soaking wet in the overloaded dinghies and regularly suffered from hypothermia due to wind-chill.

Subsequently, buses were called to take 22 avicenna

new arrivals to the registration center on the island.

It takes about two to four hours for refugees to cross from mainland Turkey to one of the Greek islands in rubber boats. Numerous accounts of sinking boats resulting in large numbers of casualties among refugees— more than 400 dead or missing in 2015— highlight the dangers involved in crossing that stretch of the Mediterranean Sea at night in overloaded dinghies.

The Refugees in Chios Afghans and Syrians were the two largest refugee groups. To my understanding, Afghans were often escaping the Taliban and the terror they spread. They leave in search for safety and opportunities for their families as prospects are dire in large parts of the country. Because I spent most of my time by the side of an Afghan volunteer and translator, I was working more closely with Afghans and could hear some of their stories. There were people with wounds from the Taliban—anyone who does not comply with their rules in areas they control faces the risk of torture and death.

For instance, the Taliban abducted the son of one man and kept the boy as a sex slave for several days. I saw a video on someone’s phone of a woman put in a bag and clubbed to death for not wearing a head scarf. Upon returning home one day, another man found all of his brothers beheaded, lying on the floor of his own house. He only escaped with his life because he happened to be absent at the time of the assault by chance, and he immediately left the country.

Syrians are also escaping violence within their country. Attacks, bombings, raids, etc. from all parties involved in the war have forced more than eleven million people to flee their homes (UNHCR). Of those, just under five million people escaped from the country, mostly to neighboring Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey or to Europe.

Issues faced One problem was the lack of strong, organized support from the government(s) and from well-known and powerful NGOs. The UNHCR supplied tents, mats, blankets, basic sanitary things and water. But there was never a time when food was supplied by the government.

This was down to volunteers and small NGOs, entirely running on donations. An impressive example is the Peoples' Street Kitchen founded by Ifty Patel, a volunteer from the UK, which relies on individual people dropping in and handing over smaller or larger amounts of cash for the days to come. When I was there, savings were just about enough to buy stocks for a week's supply of food for the up to 2,500 meals they provided twice a day.

Naturally, the language barrier among volunteers and refugees was a problem.

Syrians speak Arabic while Afghans speak Dari or Pashto. There were nowhere near enough translators to mediate communication.

Miscommunication sometimes led to tension among groups of refugees and could even result in fights.

Unaccompanied minors among refugees are a very vulnerable group and need special protection from human trafficking and abuse. There are now thousands of disappearing underage refugees, lost on their way to and through Europe, potentially kidnapped and sold into slavery.

Unaccompanied minors are therefore supposed to be taken in by the police and given special protection to prevent abuse.

Now that there are more refugees and not enough officials, many are not receiving the protection they need.

Reflections It is shocking how much the government(s) seems to rely on volunteers developing and sustaining their own structure of

support, not only in Greece. The harsh irony of the situation is that the better volunteer measures and programs work, the less incentive there is for the state(s) and their institutions to live up to their responsibilities.

The way politicians discuss and represent the issue is disturbing. The way the situation is represented in the media is oriented towards quantitative data, focusing on different numbers and rates. This makes it hard for people to understand that the hundreds of thousands of people entering Europe—and Germany in particular—are all individual human beings. The questions politicians pose is, how do we organize a mass, a number?—thus distancing Europeans from the human reality of this situation.

The language of politicians is filled with connotations that actively hinder productive discourse among people. For example, the arrival of immigrants is often described as a flood, as if the people are mere matter and something dangerous, threatening to suffocate us. How can we have rational public discussion with such weighted terms? Due to the representation of the issue, people often do indeed imagine the refugee crisis as some sort of abstract, natural catastrophe that is out of their hands. It then becomes impossible to understand how we, Europeans and the Western world, have contributed to this crisis—how its cause and solution is directly connected to us and our way of life. The very word for refugee, Flüchtling, (“one who is fleeing”) is problematic. For me, the word implies that the subject is still in the process of fleeing, that he still does not have a place here, that he is a transient and displaceable being. How can we talk of the integration of Flüchtlinge, of people who are transient? I think Geflüchtete (“one who has fled”) is a better term when the stanford journal on muslim affairs

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discussing refugees and their place in Europe. This word connotes a person who has escaped and is here. Their presence is recognized. We can only begin to accept a subject that is recognized as a part of our life.

After my volunteer experience in Chios, I found it difficult to return to ordinary life, to return to Europe, the “other side,� where people talk rationally and analytically about an issue that is so emotionally fraught from the side of the refugees.

Back in Germany After returning to Germany, I continued working with refugees. All new arrivals who enter Baden-WĂźrttemberg first arrive in Karlsruhe, then Heidelberg, where they have a medical checkup. The Patrick Henry Village (PHV), a former US-American military base, is the relocation camp in Heidelberg. After a couple of weeks in PHV, people are redistributed to communities throughout the state where they move into government-provided housing.

The first difficulty immigrants face in Germany is dealing with the bureaucratic obstacles as they apply for asylum. It takes months during which individuals and families face various insecurities.

Relocation to another district within the

state can happen from one day to the next in the waiting period. Language courses often start very late and are not always adequate for all participants. Without a residence permit, people are not allowed to look for jobs. A lot of time goes by before refugees can start their new lives.

By that time, much of the initial energy might already have dissipated and hopes have turned into frustration: the perfect breeding ground for crime and extremism, which undeniably are an issue.

After they have obtained their residence permits, refugees face a multitude of problems adjusting to life in Germany. A huge difficulty is language. In Heidelberg, and many other cities in Germany, there are plenty of organizations to help refugees adjust to this often completely foreign culture. Once settled, immigrants and Germans alike must reflect upon difficult questions regarding cultural identity, history, nationalism and the struggle between the need to adapt and the desire to maintain autonomy.

Discussion: Q & A

Q: The rise of conservative, nationalist movements and parties in Germany (i.e.

PEGIDA, AFD) can be viewed as a backlash against unchecked globalism. Oftentimes, when people feel that their cultural identity

Valentin Sauter with a young refugee in Chios, Greece. Photo by Naheed Ahmedzada.

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Photo by Maxi Pannicke.

is threatened, they react with hostility.

Liberals push for globalization and cultural exchange with all good intentions, but the result of mass globalization has often been violence and fear, not the intended harmony among diverse cultures. What are your thoughts on the pros and cons of globalization?

A: There is sufficient data to show that xenophobia is a very abstract fear of the unknown. The Mittestudie is a survey on Germans’ reception of immigrants. Most people in Germany who vote right-wing come from places with few immigrants.

Xenophobic tendencies are lower in places with more mixing. I think the more exposed people are to foreigners, the more accepting they become. More abstractly speaking, I believe that globalization for the West has mostly been about exploiting and controlling vast parts of the planet with its resources and peoples rather than striving for cultural exchange. These exploitations are not only an issue of the colonial past but still exist today: the most obvious in the destabilization of the entire Middle East in various ways over decades. Other cultures are—in fact—portrayed as alien and dangerous so that we merrily continue with our lives without questioning how unsustainable our lifestyles are and who must pay for it all in the end.

Q: Is it possible for Germany to promote cultural diversity without losing cultural autonomy? How legitimate is it for Germans to argue for cultural autonomy?

A: Ideologically speaking, I believe that the development of one's culture and Weltanschauung can only happen in exchange with people who think differently.

This is not necessarily an easy process. Many people, in Germany as well as everywhere else in the world, do not want their views challenged and would thus prefer not too much of this exchange to be forced upon them. With hundreds of thousands of refugees and other immigrants arriving in Germany within a short period, many here feel subject to this confrontation and try to find a Leitkultur (literally “leading culture”), a form of cultural autonomy they can hold on to.

Integration will take years, if not decades, spanning generations, and it will not work in all cases. There will be tension within the German society, and voices opposed to integration are growing louder. Incidents are blown up in the media and exploited by right-wing movements to create fear and form strange, extreme understandings of one's own culture. The consequence is segregation, be it right-wing extremism or fundamentalist Islam. To act against this, the stanford journal on muslim affairs

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an honest reflection on what culture is and education about one another is key.

In my opinion, the situation in Germany is special because it is still strangely difficult for many Germans, such as myself, to investigate German culture openly. Our dark history is always looming in the shadows. Honest discussion is hindered because many Germans still feel that they live in a post-traumatic, post-Holocaust German society. They hesitate to speak out on the issue of Muslim integration, for fear that their words could somehow be taken out of context and turned into something racist. Germans are conscious that everything they say can somehow be connected by others to their recent past.

Of course, a lot of the tension revolves around religion. A lot of care must be taken talking about religion because people get defensive very quickly. I believe that many Christian and nonChristian people in Germany—as far as I can say—consider religion and faith to be something private people choose to do or not to do that doesn't show so much in everyday life: you keep it to yourself. This is one reason why many are intimidated, annoyed or offended by a strong and often visibly present Islam. Once again, the main problem I see here is the lack of knowledge about and communication with one another. In public debates, “Islam” is often nothing more than an abstract concept, heavily charged ideologically with very little information. The demonization of Islam by the right makes rational discussion difficult as well.

Ultimately, how could cultural autonomy be achieved? By shutting ourselves off from the world? This is neither possible nor justifiable because so many of the people who have come to this country to escape from war and violence to build 26 avicenna

new lives here had to leave their homes, at least partly, as a consequence of “Western” consumption and greed.

Q: While Germans struggle with the question of identity, many Muslims also want to preserve their own culture.

Cultural autonomy should be respected, but having isolated Muslim communities could result in tension and the fragmentation of German society. How far should assimilation of Muslims into German society be taken?

A: Everybody should be able to live as they want within the secular laws of the state and should show respect for the people around them. But, of course, it is more difficult than that. An interesting controversy arose in Switzerland, for example, where two Syrian boys refused to shake hands with their female teacher.

This little incident carried a lot of weight and sparked a heated debate. Women’s rights are an especially sensitive subject.

Some Europeans go so far as to say that veils that cover the face (burkas and head scarves) should be completely banned because such tradition is not aligned with liberal, Western ideals. I consider this a destructive approach, which is sure to further segregation and not solve the actual issue.

Religious and cultural differences certainly force all of us to rethink our social institutions. Should a country’s laws not be changed to accommodate foreigners? Or should foreigners adapt to the existing structures in a country?

Is globalization leading to more cultural harmony or violence? Can a compromise be struck between two cultures fighting for autonomy? Perhaps, providing a secular education for the children is the best way to slowly integrate Muslims into Germany.

But then of course there is the likelihood

of generational conflict. Children raised in Germany will learn the language quickly and grow up to have more Western values or liberal views while parents are often unwilling to let go of old ways.

Conclusion

Several things come to the fore in Valentin’s story and in our subsequent discussion.

First, bigotry is not a result of ignorance but of fear. Plenty of Europeans are aware of the refugees’ plight and that Islam is not terrorism. The refugees are escaping terror, not spreading it. Despite clear information, many remain racist due to an underlying fear. They face a crisis of identity in the face of mass-immigration.

This fear is aggravated when “the other” is abstract. The Mittestudie showed that Germans least exposed to refugees were most against them. When one’s cultural identity becomes destabilized, the easiest way to define oneself is in opposition to an “other.” This desperate attempt to cling onto a fading identity often takes the form of racism.

If the underlying cause of bigotry is the fear of losing one’s identity, then the natural solution seems to be education.

Today, the word Muslim and Islam have become synonymous with “the other.”

What is culture? What is Islam? Abstract definitions like Leitkultur will not lead to mutual understanding. Abstractions are dangerous because they create absolute distinctions that do not exist. Neither a German nor a Muslim self can be articulated because the social realities of both groups are so diverse. Ultimately, it will take more than information to remove people’s fear. Demystifying the other can only take place through interpersonal contact. Our perceptions are framed by the people who surround us. Rather than engage in endless theoretical debates on

culture and identity, education should take the form of direct, interpersonal exchange.

Finally, the power of language is a recurring theme in our discussion. The way people speak about things has a profound impact on the way we think about them. The constant description by the media of the refugees as a flood turns a human reality into an abstraction. The constant reference of the refugees in vast numbers hinders us from conceptualizing the issue. Valentin made an important distinction between the words Flüchtling and Geflüchtete. It is different thinking about “the fleeing one” than “the one who has fled.” Clear and honest dialogue can occur if we have the right words to portray an issue and to reference one another. It is important to be aware of the ways our sources of information frame a subject. Language can be used to enlighten, and it can be used to manipulate. Its power comes from its subtlety.

The conflict in Germany with Muslim refugees is just one instance of many cultural conflicts today. A similar phenomenon can be observed in the States. The support for Donald Trump may be a desperate attempt among people to cling onto some vague notion of American identity. Trump promises to “make America great again,” but it is impossible to explain what “American” and “great” mean. Just as Germans may point to Muslim refugees as “the other” which defines them in their very opposition, Americans may point to Mexicans and Muslims as the threats that enable them to justify their “Americanness.” The fabric of identity is unravelling in a globalized world. It is an inevitable process. Yet, we see across the world, people clinging on to some vague notion of self, which harmfully necessitates an “other.”

a

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A Lost Balloon Marium Abdur Rahman B.A. English Language and Literature ’12, University of Michigan

I stood clutching the red balloon my father bought me from a balloon walla near Shah Faisal Masjid, in Islamabad, Pakistan. With a sudden gust of wind, my little hand lost its grip. This poem reflects on my inheritance from the Mughal Empire, as an American-born, Pakistani Muslim. The stories and Mushaira, or poetry, of my father and grandfather are warped into my identity, like the meandering pattern of a twill shawl. Still, I remember seeing my red balloon drifting up through the clouds lacing the Margalla Hills, never to return, just like the Mughal Empire that never will be again.

Filled tight with light air, lost on a draft over Badshahi Masjid to the Khyber Pass.

Questions of a legacy I never asked of the telescope and the magnifying glass.

Did you ever think we could climb up so high?

They say there is no real castle in the sky.

Did you ever think it might not be too late to let it all go and kiss it goodbye?

Trapped in a circle, blinded by light.

The free and innocent all take off in flight.

Who knows where they'll end up? It sure isn't here... for all we know, lost balloons disappear.

Blink. Sigh. Turn around. It's not coming back.

Rising like smoke, it's gone all too fast.

Grappling with the sands of the past that seem to slip through invisible cracks.

Who knows where we'll end up? It sure isn't here... for all we know, lost balloons disappear.

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Creating Narratives of Muslim Minorities A Case Study in Norway Miriam Natvig B.A. Philosophy ’16, Stanford University

Introduction Islam and Muslims are often represented in Western media as inherently violent, extremist and incompatible with Western values.1 The use of this simplified and false narrative in the media informs a society’s attitude on its Muslim population and prevents constructive dialogue around the actual issues of religious minorities. A public discourse characterized by mistrust and prejudice towards Muslims is unsurprisingly also damaging to Muslims themselves on an individual and a community level.2 How are such false narratives sustained, and with what consequences? This paper uses Norway as a case study to investigate the mechanisms that allow for the creation and reinforcement of false narratives around Islam and Muslims. Norway is a relatively unified and historically homogenous society in which the effects of a recent influx of Muslim immigrants can be investigated in what aspires to be a holistic manner. I pose the question of how traditional Norwegian news media supplies and sustains misrepresentative narratives of Islam and Muslims, and how this affects Muslims as individuals and as a religious minority community.

1 Amin-Khan, Tariq. “New Orientalism, Securitisation and the Western Media's Incendiary Racism.” Third World Quarterly, 33(9). 12 Oct. 2012. Web. 2 Gogrin, Naghmeh. “Unge muslimer kommer til ordet.

(Young Muslims make themselves heard).” 2008. Web.

How False Narratives are Created and Sustained in Norwegian News Media The media is instrumental both in expressing tendencies in a society and in directing the public discourse, thus shaping society’s perceptions of its problems and priorities. The balance between these two functions is particularly relevant when discussing the formation of minority narratives, as minority and marginalized groups have fewer means of influencing the public discourse, even as it pertains to their own communities. At the same time, they are also disadvantaged when it comes to the latter function of media, as they disproportionately have to bear the impact of prevalent misconceptions from the rest of society. In Norway, Muslims have limited means of contributing to or influencing the creation of narratives around their own communities,3 while the prevalence of skepticism towards Muslims as manifested by policies and in public discourse increases. How the stories of these communities are created and expressed, and by whom, is therefore a key question to pose when looking at the formation of narratives around religious minorities.

This paper will discuss the Norwegian news media, which can be said to hold 3 Bangstad, Sindre. “Inclusion and Exclusion in the Mediated Public Sphere: the case of Norway and its Muslims.” Social Anthropology, 21(3). 23 Aug. 2013. Web.

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primary responsibility for carrying out both of the identified functions of media.

In the code of conduct established by law to which all Norwegian media actors are expected to adhere, it is stipulated in the section that outlines the “role of the press in society”4 that the press is “especially responsible for ensuring that a diversity of opinions are expressed”5 in the mediated public sphere, and furthermore that it is responsible also for “critically examining”6 its own fulfillment of these obligations. 7 Three Norwegian broadcasters and three newspapers share the task of directing the public discourse, but there appears to be no great variation among these main news outlets. A survey of Norwegian journalists showed that more than 65 percent hold political views that place them left-of-center on the Norwegian political spectrum,8 indicating that liberal views may be a characteristic of a majority of those participating in creating the news stories presented in the media. At the same time, lack of ethnic diversity among journalism students, is a challenge, with 97 percent coming from an ethnically Norwegian background.9 Furthermore, gatekeepers in Norwegian news media such as editors and publishers are majority white, urban middle-class individuals.

10 With these strong trends among those who create the presentation and dictate the angle, ensuring a diversity of perspectives is a challenge. This is particularly a concern for issues such as Islam and its extremist and moderate expressions, which are not only unfamiliar to the liberal, urban 4 In original, ”pressens samfunnsrolle”, my translation.

5 In original, ”pressen har et spesielt ansvar for at ulike syn kommer til uttrykk”, my translation.

6 In original, ”sette et kritisk søkelys”, my translation.

7 Pressens Faglige Utvalg. Vær Varsom-plakaten. 2014. Web. 8 Rossavik, Frank. Venstrevridde journalister (Journalists geared to the left). 30 Aug. 2007. Web. 9 Bjørnsen, Gunn, Jan Fredrik Hovden, and Rune Ottosen.

“Journalists in the making.” Journalism Practice 1(3). 19 Sept. 2007. Web. 10 Ibid.

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middle class, but to the Norwegian society as a whole.

Traditional news media holds great responsibility in conveying and contextualizing information. This pertains to the latter of its two functions, namely the role of supplying perspectives and impressions to enable a collective point of reference in issues central to, or significant for, civil society. When concepts to be conveyed lie outside the common frame of reference, as is the case with religious extremism, the result is a discourse that simplifies issues of identity, ethnicity and religious identification into a narrative of “us” and “them.”11 The failure of the Norwegian media to distinguish between the use of the term “Muslim” as a marker of religious affiliation and the use of “Muslim” as a term applied to anyone of non-Western ethnic origin who might plausibly have a geographical association to Islam, a denominator analogous to “the other”, has contributed to such a tendency.12 This leads to a perception of Muslims as a homogenous group, subject to every prejudice and stereotype that applies to any one member of this postulated group.13 This, in turn, has allowed for vilification of Muslims and enabled the growth of Islamophobia in Norway, to the point where some regard it as the natural response to conflicts based on cultural, ethnic or religious discord.14 In an effort to explain acts of religiously motivated violence and extremism, the media creates negative connotations for the concepts of Islam and Muslims.

11 Amin-Khan, 2012.

12 Gogrin. 2008.

13 Ibid.

14 Khan, Fazal Rahim, Zafar Iqbal, Osman B. Gazzaz, and Sadollah Ahrari. “Global Media Image of Islam and the Problematics of a Response Strategy.” Islamic Studies, 51(1).

2012. Web.

The association between extremism based on religious rationales and Muslim communities is by no means a given.

Amin-Khan argues, however, that Muslim communities are estranged because there is a failure to distinguish, in media and consequently in the public mind, between extremists that claim religious motivation, and communities which claim a peaceful practice of the same religion.15 Thus, the treatment of Islam in the media, though it doesn’t necessarily explicitly describe Muslims as a violent group, still allows for prejudice and misconceptions to take root in society. Fetzer and Soper remark that such attitudes make minority groups respond by forming movements of defense among the same religious lines.16 This trend manifests itself in the Norwegian context as a tendency to associate whiteness with secularism, and non-white ethnicities with religious identities.17 The case of youth of non-western descent opting to selfidentify as “foreigner” (utlending) to signal distance from the majority is an example of the ways that this constructed religious divide reinforces the distancing between majority and minority communities.18 The shared characteristics of Muslims who express themselves in the mediated public sphere are also indications of the self-reinforcing trend of separation between the Muslim minority and the non-Muslim majority. Bangstad presents an account of prominent individuals 15 Amin-Khan.

16 Fetzer, Joel S., and J. Cristopher Soper. “The Roots of Public Attitudes toward State Accommodation of European Muslims' Religious Practices before and after September 11.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 42(2). 2003.

Web. 17 Vassenden, Anders, and Mette Andersson. “Whiteness, non-whiteness and 'faith information control': religion among young people in Gronland, Oslo.” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 34(4). 2011. Web. 18 Bangstad, Sindre. “The Morality Police are Coming!: Muslims in Norway’s Media Discourses.” Anthropology Today, 27(5). 2011. Web.

from a Muslim background that actively engage in the public debate.19 The findings were that the gatekeepers in traditional Norwegian news media tend to privilege a specific kind of individual; liberal, critical towards Islam and traditional practice, and often self-titled “secular Muslims.”

Bangstad argues that these characteristics that demonstrate a subscription to what he terms the “hegemonic values,” are the criteria for gaining entry to the mediated public sphere. In addition, Muslims who represent more conservative religious stances, yet who have not embraced the dominant narrative of Islam as a violent and potentially damaging presence in Norwegian society, are allowed a voice in public discourse only to reinforce these stereotypes.20 The Norwegian society takes pride in its commitment to liberal values, and this works as a compounding factor of the various reinforcing mechanisms that create and maintain a perception of Muslim communities as fundamentally different and inevitably separate from the majority.21 Perceiving itself as a society strongly committed to gender equality and freedom of expression, the concept of a religion limiting the freedom of women and objecting to depictions of its holy figures is easily construed as a potentially destructive opposing force to the Norwegian culture. This strong identification with specific ideals and the imagined incompatibility of certain minorities with this identity renders these minorities unable to become a part of the in-group. In fact, some contributors to the public discourse around Islam, among 19 Bangstad, Sindre. ”Inclusion and exlusion in the mediated public sphere: the case of Norway and its Muslims”. European Association of Social Anthropologists.

2013. Web. 20 Ibid.

21Bangstad, 2011.

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them two right wing political parties, the Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet) and the Christian Party’s Bergen division (Kristelig Folkeparti Bergen), were found to be purposely supplying skewed perspectives in order to mobilize antiIslamic sentiments and actions.22 The idea of minority cultures and religions being incompatible with the majority provides false justification for complacency with misconceptions and prejudice as the backdrop for any narrative involving Muslim communities.

Simplification is a recurring problem in the representation of Muslim communities in the media. Abrahamian suggests that the main appeal of these simplifications, conceptualized as inevitable by Huntington’s theory of “The Clash of Civilizations,” may be attributable to an attempt to avoid uncomfortable political dilemmas inevitably tied to the topic of extremism.23 Taking into consideration the relatively recent start of immigration to Norway, previously a homogenous society, Næss claims it is understandable that simplified narratives are still prevalent.24 Cultural accommodation takes time and is a slow process, seeing as input that conforms to previous beliefs is more likely to be incorporated into a person’s mindset.25 Thus, even if the media were to present positive narratives, the negative connotations are far more likely to remain fixed in the public mindset.

Traditional news media plays an important role in shaping the dynamic of 22 Berntzen, Lars Erik. “Den eksistensielle trusselen, en sosiologisk studie av politisk motstand mot islam, muslimsk kultur og innvandring til Norge”. 31 Aug. 2011. Web. 23 Abrahamian, Ervand. “The US Media, Huntington and September 11.” Third World Quarterly, 24(3). 2003. Web 24 Næss, Kjersti Rogde. “Myten om muslimer En analyse av medienes beskrivelser av muslimske innvandrere i Norge i lys av Roland Barthes' mytebegrep.” 2003. Web. 25 Ibid.

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majority-minority relations in Norwegian society. I have discussed the ways that media’s tendency to simplify issues leads to a construction of a narrative in which Muslims are regarded as “the other” and Islam is presented as ultimately incompatible with Norwegian society.

This false notion of incompatibility limits the possibility of Muslims to access the mediated public sphere and provide an alternative perspective. Furthermore, I have offered a set of thoughts as to why this picture is not becoming more nuanced as time goes on, despite Norwegian society becoming more multicultural.

The Impact of False Narratives on Norwegian Muslims I have argued that the mediated public sphere presents misconstrued narratives of Islam and Muslims, who are to a large extent prevented from correcting or informing the public through the same channels. The effects of this imposed narrative are many, and vary across the spectrum of ethnicities and cultures of those who identify as part of the Muslim community. In this section, I first discuss the ways that the prevalence of misconceptions and prejudices held about Islam and Muslims puts Muslims in uncomfortable positions, results in stronger identification with one of several religious communities, and finally, transforms expressed identification from a private to a public question As members of a minority group, Muslims in Norway often face prejudice and misconceptions from non-Muslim Norwegians.26 These misconceptions are characterized by large generalizations of a diverse Muslim population, reduced to the 26 Hæåk, Arne Reidar. “Muslimske elevar i vidaregåande skule. : korleis tolkar muslimske elevar i vidaregåande skule erfaringer frå skulen sett i høve til deira muslimske identitet?” 2008. Web.

negative traits that would set them apart from any regular Norwegian citizen. This can result in an expectation that a Muslim individual will educate the non-Muslim or justify themselves. Some Muslims appreciate this opportunity to inform nonMuslims and correct their misconceptions about Islam, and see this as part of what it means to be a good Muslim.27 Others, however, find that it’s a significant challenge in their day-to-day lives to have to prove themselves to be non-extremist, or “normal,” in the vast majority of their interactions with the wider non-Muslim community.

Being constantly prepared to answer questions about Islam and demystify the behavior of Muslims, Muslims often have a more conscious relationship with their religious identity than those Norwegians who identify with a majority religion or life philosophy.28 Having a well-developed rationale for one’s ethical and moral convictions as they relate to religion becomes important when the value system of Muslims continues to be questioned in the mediated public sphere and in personal interactions. Some interview subjects even reflected that this position made them better Muslims, not only for sharing correct information about their religion and giving it a better reputation, but also because it forced them to explore and critically evaluate their beliefs in ways that Muslims in a majority-Muslim society do not have to.29

27 Bolstad, Brita. “Å være flerkulturell, utenlandsk, norsk og muslim – alt på en gang. Etnisitet, religion og transnasjonal orientering som elementer i konstruksjonen av identitet.

(Being multicultural, foreign, Norwegian and Muslim— everything at once. Ethnicity, religion and transnational orientation as elements in the construction of identity.)”

Bergen Open Research Database, 2008. Web. 28 Ibid.

29 Hæåk. 2008.

As a consequence of Muslims being asked to explain, justify or defend Islam, the choices that identify one as a Muslim individual take on a public dimension. The decision to not drink alcohol or to wear a hijab are two such choices that make it clear that one identifies as Muslim. For someone who doesn’t openly identify as Muslim and whose ethnicity doesn’t automatically suggest an origin that is associated with Islam,30 one’s place in the discussion around Islam and Muslims might be unclear to non-Muslims.31 Aarset argues that this way of making choices enables Muslims to escape positions as limited agents in the creation, expression and discussion of their identities.32 Visible or notable markers of religious identification therefore in this way become a means of claiming a voice in matters that directly affect Muslims, and express a commitment to providing a counter-narrative to the one assumed in public discourse around Islam.

Taking a stance or making a statement with one’s religious practice can thus be both a liberating and a constraining choice. Muslim girls and their decision to cover their heads as an example of a decision that leverages different powers in the Norwegian context and at home or in their religious communities.33 In Norway, the difficulties related to markers of religious identity taking on public significance became the focus of attention in what is termed the hijab debate. Following a petition by a Muslim woman to use the hijab as part of her police uniform, the question of personal religious choices in public spaces was 30 Bolstad. 2008.

31 Aarset, Monica Five. “Å skape nye handlingsrom : konstituering av kvinnelig, norsk, muslimsk identitet.” 2006.

Web. 32 Ibid.

33 Nikolaisen, Maja Helene Solbakken. “Grenser for identitet? Unge muslimske kvinner i forhandling og samspill med det norske samfunnet.” 2013. Web.

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widely debated in politics and in the media. The proponents of allowing the hijab as part of the uniform argued that it would go against gender equality policies to prohibit the hijab, as it could potentially prevent Muslim women from joining the police force. Those against permitting the hijab for on-duty police officers offered a wide array of rationales, from the hijab being an oppressive garment, to the partiality or preference for some communities that this religious marker would supposedly indicate in on-duty officers.34 This debate, which culminated in a prohibition on all religious symbols as part of the police uniform, was indicative of the pressure that is placed on individual religious expression for minority groups.

Assumptions about motivations and opinions are inevitable, and reactions from the majority will consequently have great bearing on the viability of different forms of religious expression.

These trends of increased religious knowledge and increased religious expression might seem indicative of a change in the religiousness of Norwegian Muslims as a consequence of false narratives and complicated relations with the Norwegian culture. Elgvin and Tronstad argue, however, that the levels of commitment to one’s religion and religious identity tend to remain the same over time among Norwegian immigrants of nonWestern origin; secular immigrants stay secular and religious families stay religious, over time and throughout the process of integrating into Norwegian society.35 They find that the tendency of culture to affect changes in the role and significance of religion in people’s lives may not run along religious lines, but instead seems 34 Barli, Anne-Heidi. “Hijab I offentligheten: en diskursanalyse.” 2009. Web. 35 Elgvin, Olav, and Kristian Rose Tronstad. ”Nytt land, ny religiøsitet?” 2013. Web.

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to be tied to country of origin. This result supports the previous observation that although religious markers are frequently used to categorize minority groups, other sources of identity may be equally or more important and merit investigation.

While levels of religiosity in its spiritual meaning may not increase, identification with religious communities may increase as a product of feeling estranged and alienated by Norwegian non-Muslim communities.36 When Muslims find that their personal choices are not accepted, respected or understood by others, they seek out familiar or new spaces where these aspects of their identity are understood and affirmed as valuable and important. This contributes to the process of education itself. Ezzati points out that the feelings of rejection by the majority can also lead to resentment, which if processed in the wrong way could transform into animosity and potentially extremist thoughts and tendencies.37 That Muslim communities can serve as safe spaces and healing spaces for those who have faced and continue to face lack of understanding for their religious identity is excellent, and it represents a major contribution to Norwegian society, which hasn’t found a way to adequately address the needs of its religious minorities. At the same time, however, the potential of these communities to further distance Muslims from Norwegian society instead of contributing knowledge and experience to the struggle for greater understanding, is a serious issue.

Ignorance, prejudice and misconceptions result in Muslims having to educate others about Islam and make choices 36 Ezzati, Rojan. “Er du moderat, islamist eller terrorist?”

2009. Web. 37 Ibid.

about their religious expression based not only on personal faith but also on the public significance of markers of their religious identity. The question of what this means for the individual and for the Muslim community is not easily answered. While Muslims are brought together, and find spaces to collectively process these challenges, there is also the possibility of this resulting in destructive developments towards extremism and away from positive aspirations to foster understanding between non-Muslims and Muslims in Norway.

Conclusion The narrative of Muslims as violent and extremist is reinforced by Norwegian traditional news media, and has become ingrained in the public mindset. The simplification and generalization of

Muslims into a homogenous group whose primary source of identity is their religion creates a false notion of a Muslim identity incompatible with Norwegian values. It also reinforces itself by limiting the voices and the narratives that are given access to the mediated public sphere.

This false narrative has both positive and negative effects on Muslims and Muslim communities. The ignorance and misconceptions integral to the narrative provided by the media means that Muslims find themselves in a position to educate and inform non-Muslims about Islam, but also means that the default tone of these encounters is often one of skepticism and distrust. This collective experience can, however, have unifying effects on Muslim communities, who seek and find support from each other.

a

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