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OCTOBER 29, 2015 | The Jewish Home
Taliban Takeover
Why the U.S. Withdrawal Spells Disaster for the World BY SHAMMAI SISKIND
THE BALTIMORE JEWISH HOME
AUGUST 19, 2021
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B A LT I M O R E J E W I S H H O M E . C O M
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N SEPTEMBER 21, 2001, Voice of America conducted an interview with the infamous Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar. It was a mere ten days since the attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., events that changed the world in unimaginable ways. During that short period, however, it became imminently clear who was responsible for the 9/11 assaults. The once obscure Osama bin Laden, who led what was thought to be a regionally focused, rag-tag team of former mujahideen known as Al-Qaeda, had orchestrated the most devastating terror attack in U.S. history. Bin Laden’s whereabouts, while yet to be pinpointed, were determined to be somewhere in the mountainous eastern border region of Afghanistan. The U.S. government quickly issued an ultimatum to the Taliban, the Islamist group that had ruled the country since its successful and bloody takeover five years earlier. Washington wanted bin Laden, and they wanted him immediately. The Voice of America interviewer put the question rather candidly to the Taliban commander: Do you intend to hand over bin Laden to the U.S.? “No,” replied Omar, “We cannot do that. If we did, it means we are not Muslims, that Islam is finished.” Omar went on to explain that his refusal was not an expression of support for Al-Qaeda’s actions but rather a point of principle. “Islam says that when a Muslim asks for shelter, give the shelter and never hand him over to enemy. And our Af-
ghan tradition says that, even if your enemy asks for shelter, forgive him and give him shelter. Osama has helped the jihad in Afghanistan, he was with us in bad days, and I am not going to give him to anyone.” Indeed, Omar was prepared to go all the way on the bin Laden issue. In a conversation around the same time with Pakistani journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai, Omar stated: “I don’t want to go down in history as someone who betrayed his guest. I am willing to give my life, my regime. Since we have given him refuge, I cannot throw him out now.” Despite Omar’s adamance, the question of whether or not to comply with the Americans’ demand was heavily contested within the Taliban leadership. Many of Omar’s own top aides were willing to acquiesce or at least be flexible on the issue. Several senior Taliban officials including the ambassador to Pakistan Abdul Salam Zaeef, the foreign minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, and Prime Minister Abdul Kabir were prepared to try bin Laden in an Islamic court or even hand him over to a third party. But it was not to be. In the end, Omar’s stance won the day. The decisive event came in late September when a special convention of nearly 1,000 clerics gathered in Kabul to debate the question. In an official statement, the assembly ruled they were forbidden to surrender bin Laden to the United States. The group concluded its statement expressing “sadness over American deaths” and expressed “hope America does not attack Afghanistan.” Fully aware of the potential consequences, the very same council urged bin Laden to leave Afghanistan of his own accord to avoid the potential “tumult” that might result. Omar reportedly abided by this advice and tried to convince bin Laden to flee the country. For his part, bin Laden refused to abandon the infrastructure of fighters and facilities he’d set up in Afghanistan. He understood that attempting to flee to a neighboring country would all but guarantee his capture. Shortly thereafter, American officials made the threat of war explicit. As then-Secretary of State Colin Powell put it, bin Laden will be in American custody “voluntarily, or involuntarily.” But Omar defiantly stuck to his ideo-
