3RD BAZE UNIVERSITY PROFESSORIAL INAUGURAL LECTURE (25th June 2024)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Dedication

Acknowledgements

Preamble

Section 1: Beyond the Visions of Youth

Section 2: Technology and International Relations

2.1: Extending Conceptualization

2.2: Theorizing Technology

2.3: Linking Theory to Power and Foreign Relations

2.4: Potentials of Technology and International Relations

Section 3: The Nigerian State, Technology and Steel Development

3.1: The Nigerian State and Technology Development

3.2: The Global Iron and Steel Industry

3.3: The Soviet Union and the Ajaokuta Project

3.4: Lessons from Other Countries

Section 4: Management of Domestic and External Linkages

4.1: Domestic Imperatives

4.2: Management and Organizational Shortfalls

4.3: External Linkages

4.4: Salvaging the Ajaokuta Project

Section 5: Conclusion and Way Forward

References

PREAMBLE

It is common knowledge that technology is said to be the bedrock of human civilization It is indeed, a major means of creating wealth. Technology is widely recognized as one of the key determinants of economic growth. In terms of foreign policy, respect and recognition in the international community are generally based on influence or affluence. And influence is often derived from having greater persuasive and coercive power, while affluence is generated by economic power, mainly trade. Throughout history, technology has played a significant role in international relations (IR). Technological development is an important factor underlying much of humanity’s social, economic, and political development, as well as interstate and interregional relationships. The presence or absence of equal access to technology has often determined the nature of relationships between societies and civilizations. Technology increases the options available to policymakers in their pursuit of the goals of the state, but also complicates their decision making. The question of whether and how much technological change has influenced International Relations has been the subject of considerable debate. Scholars are divided on the emphasis that should be placed on technological progress as an independent variable in the study of relations between states and as a factor in analyzing power configurations in the international system. Among the scientific and technological revolutions that are believed to have contributed to the changing nature of power and relations between states are transportation and communication, the industrial revolution, the nuclear revolution, and the contemporary information revolution.

The constructive power of science and technology (S&T) can propel humankind to new levels of global well-being, or engage their destructive power which could bring an era of darkness and suffering. Although decisions by governments and intergovernmental organizations are

fundamentally political processes; in a technology-driven world, S&T advice is needed for those political decisions.Technology is a critical input in foreign policy, especially in contemporary times. This is even more so at this period of competitive globalization, which sees technology playing a leading role in communication, transportation and industry. The ultimate impact of technology on mankind is the enhancement of the well-being and influence of man through the creation of wealth. Technology achieves this impact by making mankind more productive in his environment.In this process man gain better understanding of his environment and enjoy a higher standard of living and authority. Technologybasically is about the application of knowledge and skills, and over time we have come to see that certain skills become identifiable with certain societies, for example, the United States and France with the manufacture of air planes, Japan with the manufacture of durable automobiles, and China with prowess in manufactured products, especially electrical and electronic machinery.

It is therefore, regrettable that after over sixty years of political independence, Nigeria as a country still depend largely on foreign countries for her various technological and industrial needs. Its development is still grossly low in terms of productivity. Nigeria can be said to be technologically weak, as (i) it cannot produce capital goods such as tractors, lathe machines, drilling machines, cars, trains, and other earth moving equipment (ii) is unable to exploit her natural resources except with the help of foreigners who will normally provide the technology and expertise to undertake the exploitation of her natural resources (iii) it is unable to mechanize her agriculture i.e. crude implements are still used for agricultural production activities by a large percentage of those who are involved in agricultural production. (iv) itstill depends on other countries for the supply of its spare parts for industrial machinery (v) it exports raw materials to

other countries as against finished products (vi) it is unable to produce her own military hardware with which to defend herself if the need arises.

Drawing from the history of the industrial revolution, it is recorded that the first transformation from agrarian to industrial economy took place from the mid – 18th to early 19th Century in some European nations and North America (Panch, 1956). The revolution began in Great Britain, followed by Belgium, Germany and France. It is pertinent to mention here that the industrial revolution was aided by the discovery of iron and steel which made it possible to craft various implements and machines. The second revolution so to say, was in the mid-19th Century with the invention of the internal combustion engine, harnessing of electrical energy, construction of canals, railways etc. Within this period also, there arose in some countries a number of coal mines, steel works and textile factories. Although, its second phase (involving iron and steel development 1840-1900) also occurred in England, like its initial counterpart, it extended to Germany and France and was as noted founded on achievements in the nexus of the electric engine and steel industry. This is therefore, distinguished from the first industrial revolution that focused on the advent of the steam engine, textile industry or the industrial loom and mechanical engineering: all concentrated in the United Kingdom, between 1780- 1840 (Agbu, 2007: 8, citing Mudenda, 1995).The achievements of the third industrial revolution (1900-1950) included also the electric engine, but extended to manufacturing of goods such as heavy chemicals, automobiles, and durable consumption goods/services. From the middle to the end of the 20th century (1950-2000), the fourth industrial revolution arrived and is distinguished or characterized by advancement in manufacturing of synthetic – contrasted to naturally formed-fuels (petroleum) among other synthetically generated materials, information and communication technologies and

electronics within the Asia-Pacific Basin of South-East Asia including Japan, China, and Hong Kong (Mudenda, 1995).

This lectureas its contribution presents and advocates the embrace of the very important factor of technology in the development equation and its relationship to international relations, with focus on the development of the iron and steel industry. This means that technology as a variable has implications for a country’s foreign policy as it positions itself to attaining national interests, satisfying citizens and gaining respect of other countries. In presenting this, the focus isthe iron and steel industry in Nigeria, exemplified by the Ajaokuta Steel Project and the direct and reverse linkages and impact on foreign relations.

Going forward, we will therefore be examining the efforts of the Nigerian government towards the development of the iron and steel industry, and more specifically the Ajaokuta Steel Project conceived in the late 1970s to be the bedrock of Nigeria’s industrialization. A common opinion among many experts is that inspite of the immense human and material resources available to be deployed for development in Nigeria; the country has made little very littleprogress on steel development, necessary for industrialization. And that this could be cumulatively attributed to the dysfunctional nature of the Nigerian state, a colonial creation that has refused to transcend its primordial encumbrances. This dysfunctionality has often manifested in poor planning, policy somersaults and half-hazard implementation of budgets and approved projects. Corruption, a lack of accountability in public office, mismanagement of resources and deeply flawed elections, in short, poor leadership at various levels become the norm. Indeed, it is plausibleto opine, painfully, that Nigeria has not been blessed with good leadership, leadership in a transformational manner that can positively articulate her national objectives and elicit good followership from its citizenry. It is the case that those who found or forced themselves into key

leadership and decision making positions in the country, have simply been unable to elevate themselves to the status of change agents and statesmen weaned of selfishness and primordialism to be able to serve the generality of the Nigerian people. The result is that the abundant energy and innovation that abound in the country, especially among the youth, have remained largely untapped.

Ladies and Gentlemen, it is against this backdrop that I believe that with transformational leadership, science and technology properly articulated and anchored on the development of the steel industry will have immense impact on Nigeria’s effort at industrialization and the attendant dividends inimproving human security. But then we ask, what is this transformational leadership? This is simply that leadership that embodies integrity, accountability and ownership in a manner that inspires and encourages the followers and/or citizens to embrace a culture of rationality and sustainability. Transformational leaders are therefore change agents, able to interrogate and debunk unprogressive beliefs and practices and identify trends in technology that can help a society to achieve fundamental changes for the common good.

Beyond the visions of youth, of which many of us are guilty, Iintend to present in this discourse the interface between science, technology and international relations and also determine the impact of technology on foreign policy while exploring ways through which technology could be enhanced as the country engages in relations with other states. In doing this, the character of the Nigerian state and its efforts at steel development will be discussed, and related to the various linkages that have implications for governance, leadership, and foreign relations.

Section 1: Beyond the Visions of Youth

“Technology development is only possible through the organization of science and technology, and not banal pontifications about the importance of this sector.”

As a young and active student of the University of Nigeria, NsukkaI was indeed, a good example of the common saying that one should not just pass through the university, but also allow the universitypass through you. I was at different times,Secretary-General of the Reggae International Club ( I love good Reggae music), footballer, actor, Post-graduate Student Union official and Karateka; while at the same time tried to be serious with my studies, at least serious enough to gain qualification marks for higher degrees. At this period in my life, I felt I had a purpose and would seek to acquire knowledge for posterity and to impact my society.

Buoyed up by the adage by the historically revered philosopher Aristotle that Political Science is the Master Science, not in the sense that it includes or explains all other sciences, but in that, it gives others some priority (Crick 1982:23), and supported by the writings of Kwame Nkrumah, late President of Ghana that re-interpreted the Marxian fixation on economics as fundamental to understanding any society, when he opined that we should ‘seek ye first the political kingdom and all else will be added unto it”, I was politically conscious of the importance of leadership in any society. I was thereforea young man with a vision, but also knew that it required sacrifice. Not surprisingly, I came up with an inspiring quotation that I later inscribed on my doctoral thesis that read thus. “Our society is in chaos, we cannot afford the pleasure of normal sleep”. Those close to me found this amusing. This to all intents and purposes was my war cry then, and perhaps, still relevant to finding solutions to Africa’s developmental crises. I was also inspired by another quotation from the speech given by the Chinese leader Mao Tse Tung to Chinese youths in 1919 when he enjoined them to believe that – “the world is ours, the nation is ours,

society is ours; if we do not speak, who will speak, if we do not act, who will act’. Such was my expectation of how I could contribute to improving my society in the mold of the seminal Nigerian and African statesman, NnamdiAzikiwe, who incidentally hailedfrom my home town, Onitsha-Ado that I felt that the fastest way to achieving this goal was through transformational leadership offered by the military institution. In my mind, I had prepared myself for a career in the military, and rightly believed that a degree in Political Science will help put me in good stead to achieving this vision. I did not want to be a half-educated military officer. Rather unfortunately, and perhaps mercifully, I could not proceed with this vision as I suffered a debilitating injury during one of my karate trainings that prevented me from proceeding to the Nigerian Military Academy. With the benefit of hindsight, had I succeeded in becoming a military officer, I have absolutely little doubt that I would not have escaped one of the numerous coups d’état that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s in Nigeria.

Therefore, beyond the visions of youth of becoming an agent of transformational leadership against the backdrop of a troubled country and continent undergoing simultaneous developmental crises, I decided that I still had a lot to contribute to society I leaked my wounds and decided to proceed with my studies at the Post-graduate level by majoring in International Relations and ended up acquiring a Mastersdegree in 1988, and a Ph.D in Political Science with specialization in International Relations in 1993 from the University of Nigeria, having obtained a Bachelorsdegree in Political Science from the University of Ibadan in 1985. The higher academic journey of acquiring a doctorate degree was initially motivated by one Dr. D.D Tabansi, the then Dean of Student Affairs at the University of Nigeria, who happened to have been a bosom friend of my late father Isaac Nwakor Agbu, ofblessed memory. On this particular day, he met me on the main street of the university at a period the flowers on the street were in

bloom; and upon happily greeting him, I informed him that I had just completed my Masters in International Relations and will be leaving to look for a suitable job. He asked me how old I was, I said 26 years; he then asked me where I was rushing to and that it will be better for me to acquire a doctorate degree. And that he had just completed his Masters programmein Public Administration and about to register for doctoral studies in the same field, even though he was then in his late fifties. The rest is history as I stand before you.

In the pursuit of my post-graduate programmes, and much troubled by Africa’s underdevelopment, it did not take me long to realize the importance of the subject matter of science and technology (S&T) and its link to development, which I quickly discovered was rather understudied in the Social Sciences. As an aspiring scholar, I was immensely drawn to this area of study as key solution to the marginalization of Africa and addressing the developmental crises. Indeed, I was actually a science student at the secondary school level, obtaining a Grade 1 Certificate in the West African School Certificate (WASC) from St. Gregory’s College, Lagos before opting to switch to the social sciencesfor my tertiary education I just simply loved the epistemology embodied in the social sciences for societal leadership and growth. Upon the commencement of my Masters programme, I was assigned to an MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) trained supervisor in the person of Dr. OgbanOgban-Iyam, a stoic and meticulous scholar who further ingrained in me the appreciation of the importance of science and technology and its rather opaque link to international Relations. He was later, to also supervise my doctoral work in the same field.

Ladies and Gentlemen, thirty years down the line I discovered that I had written and published extensively on this subject matter, which I will attempt to summarize here. A key science and technology sub-sector that has consumed a significant amount of my time is the importance of

iron and steel industry and Nigeria’s efforts at steel development since her independence (Agbu 1995, 1997a, 1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2002a, 2007). I had examined the politics of the funding constraints, debt crisis and its implications for the Ajaokuta steel Project (Agbu, 1988) for my Masters project, and the international politics of technology acquisition and developmentfor my doctoral thesis (Agbu, 1993). Further, other aspects of this subject-matter that I consciously and unconsciously addressed included the state of science and technology in Nigeria (2010a), poverty alleviation and technology development (Agbu, 1997a), technological manpower and skills training (1998), the application of ICT in the political process (Agbu, 2004c, 2016), application of technology in the Agricultural sector (2005), application of technology in urbanization and security management (Agbu, 2020), the technology factor in Strategic Partnerships (2010b, 2012), generally examining the link between technology and industrialization (2004); and the link between technology and international relations and implications for foreign policy (Agbu, 2013). In all these academic exertions, mindful of the status of Nigeria as a developing country with basic technological needs, I sort to distil lessons of best practices from my case studies of countries like Russia (1997b), India (1999), and Japan (2002b, 2007) all of which I had visited. Furthermore, the importance and ramifications of the technology factor as desideratum for Africa’s development were also generally examined in some of my articles (2004a, 2004b). In all, while I have also contributed to the discourse on governance and democratization, as well as various aspects of Nigeria’s foreign policy and International Relations, it is to the under-studied and little understood field of technology and international relations that I devote this inaugural.

Section 2: Technology and International Relations

For long,scholars in the disciplines of Political Science and International Relations have wondered about the link or linkages between science and technology matters and the theory and practice of international Relations. There is the question of which one impacts the other or do they equally impact each other? It is only in recent times that this emergent area of inquiry has been examined against the backdrop of the immense knowledge existing in the science and technology sector, and the rising and increasingly complex discipline of international Relations. This situation has implications for the existing conceptualizations of technology and how it is understood in the realm of the social sciences. This interface will for long continue to unfold the multidisciplinary and cross-cutting character of both technology and International relations as subjects of enquiry.

Generally, technology refers to ways of making or doing things. It can also be seen as the systematic application of collective human rationality with a view to achieving greater control over nature and over human processes of all kinds. In a broader sense, it is the practical application of physical knowledge, whether for the production of artifacts, the manipulation of the environment, or the construction of a new facility. However, technology involves not just the systematic application of scientific and other organized knowledge to practical tasks; it also demands an essentially indigenous social, economic and organizational atmosphere within which such application can take place. Hence, technology can be defined from the humanities perspective as the practical application of specialized knowledge and processes in the production of materials of use-value for the society. These materials or needs may be general or specific, thereby necessitating the application of the appropriate technology.

Other related aspects of the technology architecture include the often bandied technology transfer, which is the circulation of tools, processes and techniques of production across national boundaries, while technology acquisition is the procurement of tools and processes of production across national boundaries Technology development and adaptation on the other hand, means the modification and fabrication of devices, tools and industrial arts for various specified ends.

2.1 Extending Conceptualization

In trying to clarify the conceptual and practical linkages between technology and International Relations, it immediately becomes obvious that the existing conceptual understanding may have to be reviewed or extended to fit into unfamiliar variables that will need to be taken into consideration in the humanities. However, we cannot discuss technology in the absence of science. And by ‘science’ (by which we mean natural science) we mean ‘knowledge obtained by the systematic study of the structure and behavior of the natural world’, and technology as ‘the practical application of technical knowledge’ (Merriam-Webster, 2002). Further, the definition of technology includes hardware, software and some aspects of management, and is hence, more general than those implicit in a number of common usages of the term already presented or that we are used to. It therefore also includes, but is much broader than information technology. Science and technology are therefore distinct, but interrelated concepts.

The mutual influences of science, technology and international relations are so important and pervasive that it has been recommended to be recognized as an independent sub-discipline (Weiss, 2005). Not only do science and technology have a critical influence on international affairs, science and technology are also influenced by international affairs, both directly and indirectly. The interdependence of science, technology and international affairs is expressed in different words in different disciplines. In the language of political science, science and

technology are both independent and dependent variables; in that of economics, they are ‘endogenous variables’; in that of science studies, they are often ‘socially constructed’; in that of biology, they ‘co-evolve’. A technology is said to be ‘socially constructed’ when the choice among alternative, technically possible trajectories is shaped by social preferences (Bijker, 1995). Co-evolution is defined as the evolution involving successive changes in two or more ecologically dependent species that affect their interactions (Merriam-Webster, 2002). Indeed, as technology is evolving in many different ways, the study of International Relations is also evolving. Technology can affect international relations in at least four ways. First, technological innovation enable people to do new things, a good example is when the development of nuclear weapons and inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM) changed the nature of warfare and of geopolitics. Second, international relations may be affected by the diffusion of a technology; a process exemplified both by the ‘off-shoring’ of manufacturing and service industries and by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Third, international relations are affected by direct technological competition among nation-states, as in the arms and space races. Fourth, international relations are affected by the development of the capacity to manage technology and to carry out technological innovation, whether in a firm, a region, or a nation (Weiss, 2015). This innovative capacity is an important determinant of economic and political power, and is itself affected by a broad range of economic, political, social and cultural variables, over and above the state of a country’s scientific and technological institutions and the policies explicitly affecting them (Nelson, 1993). Understanding the global dimension of the development of the steel industry for example, can be explained through this.

Conversely, the influence of international relations on science and technology cannot also be ignored. This influence may be direct or indirect. Direct effects manifest in four ways. First, the climate of public opinion affects the strength of public support to the financing of all kinds of scientific and technological advance, including basic and applied scientific research and the education of scientists and engineers (Smith, 1992). Second, foreign policy objectives directly affect national priorities, agendas and relative budget allocations for scientific and technological research, development, education and training in different fields. Third, the state of relations among countries affects the international migration of scientists and engineers, their freedom to communicate, to enroll and teach in schools and universities outside their home countries, to collaborate and to attend meetings outside of their home countries, and to gain access to areas and objects of research (Skolnikoff, 1993). It also affects their freedom to accept international awards, up to and including the Nobel Prize. Fourth, international agreements determine the strength of the global system for the protection of intellectual property, a prerequisite to most innovation (the widespread use of invention) based on research (Ryan, 1998).

The indirect effects of international relations on the development and evolution of science and technology operate through mechanisms of economics, law, politics and culture. Both technology and the applied science that supports it respond to the demands of the marketplace, and hence to anything that influences the domestic or global market for technologically based goods and services: economic conditions or policies, regulations, income levels and distribution, and cultural or religious preferences (Ruttan, 2001).

Further, Information technology revolution has had a major impact on the information, ideas, and perceptions on which the international system is based. For example, the application of remote sensing technology has facilitated the monitoring and enforcement of a variety of international treaty regimes, including environment, arms control and human rights. Satellites have photographed mass grave sites in the Balkans, nuclear facilities in North Korea, and pollution plumes in a variety of international bodies of water. Modern communications media, fed by improvements in technology, have provided a flow of information that has altered popular perceptions of international issues ranging from terrorism to environment to the wisdom of the United States intervention in Somalia or the Israeli war on Gaza. On the negative side, the media have also been used to spread messages of ethnic hatred in the former Yugoslavia and of genocide in Rwanda, and even ethnic profiling arising from the 2023 General Elections in Nigeria. All these show the impact of technology on global understanding and issues that have implications for the foreign relations of countries.

Another important point to note is that technology is not neutral, but value motivated; whether at the national or international levels (Eze, 1986:312). And this is what many of the scholars in the pure sciences often have difficulty understanding. However, those that understand this have turned out to be better policy makers and leaders. There are aspects of technology that involve acquisition and development, rather than just transfer. While technology acquisition embodies the procurement and movement of equipment and the appropriate knowledge and skills required for a country’s development, technological development means the ability to innovate by being able to modify and adapt aspects of technology. Development of technology has much to do with the possession of technological knowledge and tools needed to tame the environment. It

embodies the measures undertaken to improve upon the stock of knowledge and tools needed to produce further goods. This requires planning and organization, innovation and strategic relations at both the national and international levels. Therefore for the advanced industrialized societies like the United States, Japan, and China, the growth and application of technology to national development was not by happenstance, but through meticulous planning and implementation over time.

Although technology is a means of creating wealth, a country needs to have the capacity to use the technology. The capacity for the utilization of technology is determined by technologydevelopment or development in technology. Therefore the level- of- development in technology decides the quality, quantity and cost of wealth created (Adiele, 2009:5). The typical technology architecture has the basic cycles of research, development, demonstration, diffusion and transfer; and if technology is acquired without necessarily going through these cycles, sustainability may be jeopardized. In conceptualizing and operationalizing technology and its link to international relations, the intention is for us to be conversant with the ways through which technology impact matters of national interest and development that have international dimensions, and also how the dynamics of the international environment affects the ability to acquire and develop technology necessary for national growth and development However, the technology and its ramifications that is under scrutiny here, is that which is related to thedevelopment of the iron and steel industry in Nigeria. .

Aside issues of technology as severally observed, the human factor remains important but becoming increasingly more complex in international relations. Although technologies serve leaders across the world as new sources of both power and governance, they require an

increasingly complex formulation of regulations and rules of conduct, which can be difficult to structure, and enforce. Today, political leaders are constantly assessed by analysts and pundits on their responsiveness to new technologies. In particular, the prominence of public opinion in political domains is a significant point for discussion. New technologies add another dimension to the classical dilemma faced by politicians how to propose and implement effective policies while mitigating public popularity.Technology can therefore be appreciated as a driver for both power and legitimacy in the areas of foreign affairs and diplomacy (Kluz and Firtei, 2015). What is therefore, required today are leaders who not only understand the complexities of technology, but also use this technology to develop their societies and promote a global culture of human interaction that meets the legitimate needs of all peoples in a sustainable way.

2.2 Theorizing Technology

Several attempts have been made at theorizing technology with many focusing on issues of power, technology determinism, social construction of technology, systems of behavoiur and role of actors, change and innovation, character of the global political economy and the gender dimensions (White 1962; Winners 1962; Ellul 1964; Pinch and Bijker 1987; Bijker 1993; Kline and Pinch 1999;Ogban-Iyam 1988 and Amin 2000).

Theories of technological change and innovation attempt to explain the factors that shape technological innovation as well as the impact of technology on society and culture. Some of the most contemporary theories of technological change reject two of the previous views: the linear model of technological innovation and technological determinism. To challenge the linear model some of the theories of technological change and innovation point to the history of technology, where they find evidence that technological innovation often gives rise to new scientific fields,

and emphasizes the important role that social networks and cultural values play in creating and shaping technological artifacts. To challenge the so-called "technological determinism", today's theories of technological change emphasize the scope of the need of technical choice, which they find to be greater than most lay people can realize (Wikipedia, 2021) Technological determinism is anchored on two views, the first being that technology develops independently from society; while the second proffers that when a technology is embraced and used, it has powerful manifestations on the character of society. From the first view, technology development either follows scientific discoveries or follows a logic of its own with new inventions deriving directly from the previous ones, as technology development is considered separate from social forces. Therefore, it was not surprising that Winner (1986) asserted that technologies necessitate particular forms of political organization. Technological determinism maintains that technology determines society because when technologies are adopted and used, they change the character of society.

Sociological theories and researches of the society that arose as a counter to technological determinism focus on how human and technology actually interact and may even affect each other. Some theories are about how political decisions are made for both humans and technology. Here, humans and technology are seen as an equal field in political decision making, where humans also make, use, and even move ahead with innovations in technology.The Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) argues that technology may not determine human action, but human action may shape technological use (MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1985).It tries to show how a variety of social factors and forces shape technological development, technological change and the meanings associated with technology. SCOT is used to portray this theory as encapsulating notions of relevant social groups, interpretive flexibility, closure and stabilization

(Pinch and Bijker 1987; Kline and Pinch 1999). The most distinguishing feature of this perspective is interpretive flexibility implying that artifacts could be interpreted in different ways by different social groups. It is important to note that Social Constructivists do not wholly deny the technological determinist claim that technology shapes society; rather they argue that the forces may move in both directions. Technology shapes society and society shapes technology.

Embodied in the Constructivist sociological theories of technology is also the Actor-network theory (ANT) that takes as its unit of analysis the systems of behavior and social practices seen as intertwined with material objects. It posits that nothing exists outside of the relationships existing among the actors. All the actors involved in a social situation are all on the same level with no external social forces. Therefore objects, ideas, processes and other relevant factors are seen as important in the social situation as humans (Law and Hassard, 1999; Latour, 2005; Akich, 2023).This theory emphasizes the presence of many actors, human and non-human. For example, nature, just like artifacts play an important role in determining which technologies are adopted and become entrenched in the social world.

Further, we have the Critical theory which attempts to go beyond the descriptiveness of one account and tries to show how things are and why they have come to be that way and how they might otherwise be. Critical theory asks whose interests are being served by the status quo and assesses the potentials of a future that alternates, and propose "to better" both the technological service, and even social justice. The Critical theoryis a reflective theory which gives agents a kind of knowledge inherently productive of enlightenment and emancipation (Guess, 1964). Thus Marcuse (1988) argued that while technology matters and design are often presented as neutral technical choices, in fact, they manifest political or moral values.Critical theory is seen as a "form of archaeology" that attempts to get beneath common-sense understandings in order to

reveal the power relationships and interests determining particular technological configuration and use.

A modified theory of Marxist production analysis maintains that those who control the international production processes use various means to also control the dynamics of science and technological diffusion.To buttress this we find that today’s global economy is one of inequalities characterized by the globalization of trade, technology and finance, one in which the developed market economies have immense advantages, while others are largely passive subjects of globalization, unless they decide to do something about it. According to Samir Amin (2000), today’s globalized values are expressed in the following new monopolies – the control of technology, control of global financial flows (through the banks, insurance cartels, and pension funds of the center), access to the planet’s natural resources, media and communication and weapons of mass destruction. Overall, an embrace of this critical perspective typified in the use of the InternationalPolitical Economy framework on the one hand; and the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) provide goodunderstanding and appreciation of the sometimes opaque, but complex issues relating to causes, choices and manifestations of the interface between technology and international relations.Therefore, matters of science and technology and industrialization should be understood as part and parcel of the dynamics of the global production system and the global economy heavily influenced by the already developed market economies. From this perspective, every system of production consists of - (various artifacts, psychic and physical power of human beings), tools of production (various artifacts including technology), objects of labour (the land, sea, air and their contents which human beings fashion for their own needs), and the social relations of production (who determines what is produced, when and how it is consumed, that is, (the status and power relations of people within a certain

production system). Not surprisingly, those who control and direct the global production system set the agenda and the goals and greatly determine and influence the direction of development. This includes, if they are allowed, the determination of what goes into the acquisition, adaptation and development, which research and development is carried out and where; and the information, reward and punishment systems (Ogban-Iyam, 1988: 74). The politics of technological acquisition, development and industrialization invariably becomes apparent as the various actors - states, the multinationals and transnationals, NGOs and other amorphous actors jostle to wrest or have some control over a particular production process (Thorndike, 1978: 55). The question of who has control, and therefore, the power to define, appropriate and supervise production and distribution spaces become uppermost. The impact of this contest on many an unsuspecting developing country has often been most unpalatable

However, the pervasiveness of the impact of science and technology raises the possibility that it can serve as a bridge between the competing paradigms of international relations theory; namely, realism, liberalism, interdependence, liberal institutionalism, functionalism, social constructivism, marxism and post-modernism. While some treat the impact of science and technology on international system as an exogenous factor, with concepts like power, security and national interest as objective and real; others treat it as being endogenous, and as a dimension of international affairs, one that both influences and is influenced by the many actors in the system. While the first perspective is typical of the view of the Realist school of thought, the second is consistent with the methodology of the liberal internationalist school; and it is appropriate for the exploration of the impact of science and technology on the environment, health, arms control and other issues that requires international cooperation and regime formation. Further, it is also important to note that science and technology affects the flow of

information in a manner that it influences the discourse that are of major interest to social constructivists (Weiss, 2005).

The point is that while technology serves as one of the key factors in the attainment of foreign policy goals, foreign policy also serves to enhance technology development as has been previously stated. Both technology and international relations can therefore be said to be mutually interactive practically with respect to the dynamics of the relationship.Today, International relations embody the study of interactions among states and non-state actors in the international system. This is facilitated by a country’s foreign relations articulated in its national interests and foreign policy. In reality, foreign policy embodies the actions and reactions of states and other key actors to occurrences in the international system. It encapsulates the policies and actions targeted at the external aimed at attaining a country’s national interests. In this case, Nigeria’s national interests for example, will include the very important goal of technology development. This is a much desired, but often difficult goal to attain by many developing countries. Foreign policy here is therefore,all the efforts made through planning, policy and interactions with other countries and institutions at the bilateral and multilateral levels to protect the country’s national interests and project them. Objectively, Nigeria as an example of a developing country, not an underdeveloped country, should be able to explore and manage its natural and technological resources and foreign policy in a manner that it is able to develop its stock of scientists, engineers and technicians towards the acquisition of technologies in areas relevant to its social and national development.

2.3 Linking Theory toPower and Foreign Relations

In general, aside the more modern explanations of the interface between technology and International Relations, we can opine that international security, statehood, global governance as well as warfare and foreign relations are thoroughly permeated by and embedded in material artifacts, technical systems and infrastructure, and scientific practices. The two dominant theories of International Relations, Realism and Liberalism in their postulations show the intricate relationship of technology with power and politics, and generally relations among states. Realism uses states as key actors, and security and material power as main analytical categories. From this perspective, technology is traditionally regarded as a ‘force multiplier’, or more generally as belonging to the category of the ‘material capabilities of states’. They believe in the significance of technology in achieving superiority in terms of military power, surveillance and communication. This does not however, diminish the importance of the Realist concepts such as ‘state-centricity’, ‘ánarchy’, and ‘self-help’. For Realists, technology may change and indeed, impact International Relations, still the nature of politics remains essentially the same, and this is, who has the power to make important decisions, and authoritatively allocate values in the society or in the global system

Whereas Realists seldom attribute technology with negative or positive values, they do tend to claim that the distribution of technological capacity can have pivotal effects on the Balance of Power, and therefore, on whether there is stable peace or heightened risk of war. For some of them, the more there is increase in new technologies of warfare, the better for the international system as states can for example, equip themselves with nuclear weapons and use this capability to deter threats and preserve peace. We are reminded that military equipment and nuclear

weapons are significantly products of science and technology, and indeed, mainly of the iron and steel industry.

Liberalism on the other hand, emphasizes a much wider agenda than the military security focus of Realism, suggesting both a widened security concept, but that ‘non-security’ issues can have equal or greater priority on the political agenda. While Liberalism shares a rationalist epistemology with Realism, and recognizes ‘anarchy’ in the international system which is ameliorated by ‘cooperation’, it adopts an optimistic perspective on technology. For example, Liberals consider the emergence and diffusion of the Internet as a major liberalizing force, empowering Social Movements, enhancing democratization, and enabling agenda-setting beyond the machinations of the political and economic elite. Technology becomes a means of challenging, or even toppling autocratic governments as witnessed during the Arab Spring that began December 2010.

We therefore note that power is a key element in understanding the rise and fall of nations as they relate with each other. And as is often said, technology is power. However, while power is important, especially from the perspective of most Political Scientists, it is rarely the sole or overriding causal variable in any given International Relations theory as we have seen. A broad overview of the major theoretical debates, reveal the ubiquity of technological causality. For example, almost all Realists have a place for technology and power in their explanations of international politics between the South and North (Waltz, 1979:18). At the very least, they describe power as an essential part of the distribution of material capabilities across nations, or an indirect source of military doctrine. And for some, technology is the very cornerstone of great power domination, and its transfer the main vehicle by which war and change occur in world politics (Gilpin, 1981: 44). However, most Constructivists remind us that technology inevitably

drives nations to form a world state, arguing that new technology changes people’s identities within society, and sometimes even creates new cross-national constituencies, thereby affecting international politics (Wendt, 2003:4-9). Buzan& Little (1994)reminds us that without advances in the technologies of transportation, communication, production, and war, international systems would not exist in the first place.

For many countries of the developing world, especially in Africa technology and its uses have been serious issues of development, which many of these countries have been unable to significantly address. As the population of these countries increase and as the world increasingly becomes more technologically advanced and therefore, more complex, countries of the developing world are increasingly finding it difficult to adapt to the rapid changes associated with modern technological innovations and are therefore, much handicapped in the pursuit of their national interests in the international system. Still, there is this lingering suspicion that technology innovation, acquisition and development have something to do with a country’s ability to exercise power and be in a position to attain its foreign policy objectives that include economic and technological progress. A country’s projection of power no doubt has much to do with technology development, military capability and the state of its military-industrial complex, which often creates an industrial spin-off with implications for foreign policy. There is ample evidence that developments in Science and technology are not only important determinants of a country’s Level of Development (LOD), but also its international competitiveness and standing in the global economy. Nations that have made scientific R&D and the implementation of research-based decisions their fundamental cultural mode are today the developed countries of the world (National Academy of Science, 1999:1). Note the word cultural mode; this is

important to understanding the gap in technology development between the advanced and developing countries of the world.

Gilpin (1981:182) for example, had maintained that the economy that breaks through the apparent technological stagnation of the present will undoubtedly become the technological innovator and global power of the future. To him, technology and power are of central importance to every country and affect almost every aspect of life. For Anna-lee (1984:225-366), first and foremost, a nation’s technological capability and power has a significant effect on its economic growth, industrial might, and military prowess; therefore relative national technological capabilities necessarily influence the balance of power between states, and hence have a role in calculations of war and alliance formation. Second, technology and innovative capacity and also power determines a nation’s trade profile, affecting which products it will import and export, as well as where multinational corporations will base their production. According to Strange (1986:19-20), insofar as innovation-driven economic growth both attracts investment and produces surplus capital, a nation’s technological ability will also affect international financial flows and who has power over them.

Generally, technological change and power is important because of its overall implications for both the relative and absolute power of states. And if theory alone does not convince, then history also tells us that nations on the technological ascent generally experience a corresponding and dramatic change in their global stature and influence, such as Britain during the first industrial revolution, the United States and Germany during the second industrial revolution, and Japan during the twentieth century (Posen, 1986:39). Conversely, for Waltz (1979: 15), great

powers which fail to maintain their place at the technological frontier generally drift and fade from influence on the international scene. This is not to suggest that power and technological innovation alone determines international politics and clout, but rather that shifts in both relative and absolute technological capability have a major impact on international relations especially in the 21st century. Indeed, the importance of technological innovation as well as power to international relations in the 21st century has become a critical concern to both the North and South in global political and economic calculations.

More importantly, many scholars as indicated in the extant literature recognized the need for foreign technology, but stress the importance of receivers or purchasers being able to acquire, operate, maintain and innovate those technologies as applicable in their socio-cultural environments (Helleiner, 1975; Ogbudinkpa, 1983; Logan, 1987, Dahlman et.al, 1987). For Nigeria during colonial times all that the British colonists wanted was to sustain the supply of raw materials to their home industries and at the same time ensure a ready market for finished products (Olaoye, 2000:32). There was therefore, no interest in technology innovation or acquisition. The colonial policy of importing foreign materials meant in practical terms the creation of gap between technology and industry in the country, thereby, giving rise to Nigeria’s over-dependence on foreign-technology and a dependent industrial disposition. The country is yet to transcend this technological quagmire. In modern times, especially because of globalization, every nation needs resources or inputs from outside its domain depending on the nation’s LOD, in order to create wealth using modern technologies. And it does this through trade, which is an integral part of wealth creation, often initiated by technology but moderated by LOD (Adiele, 2006: 9). A high-LOD should therefore be uppermost in both the internal and external relations of countries. However, it is important to have the internal capacity to absorb

and domesticate foreign technology. Hence, foreign relations are a sine qua non, not a luxury in contemporary times in the effort at technology development.

In concluding, despite the clear influence of politics on technology and national power exercised in foreign relations, this phenomenon is only sparsely studied by political scientists, if at all; rather, the area has largely become the purview of small number of economists and sociologists who often ignore or misconjecture important political variables in their analysis. And as if in retaliation, most of the political scientists who discuss technology and power often neglect the enormous body of innovation research that has developed over the past years in the other social sciences.

2.4 Potentials of Technology and International Relations

Let us at this stage turn our attention to the potentials of technology and international relations in global politics and global economy There are ordinarily two broad types of technology namely; constructive, that is positive creation and destructive; or negative creation technology. High level of development in constructive technology generates affluence while high level of development in destructive technology equally confers some type of influence in global politics (Adiele, 2006:25). It is important to note that in the early stages of societal development, military might was used to achieve those objectives. Hence, much of international relations were conducted through wars. It is obvious that all through the ages, societies would like to influence and control or at least, manipulate other societies to improve their status, economic well-being or advantages. Higher level of development (destructive) technology conferred coercive power and greater international influence on countries in expropriating other countries’ wealth. In other words,

influence in the international community achieved through military technological superiority was used to acquire unearned affluence.

Examining the relationship between technology and the economy on the basis of recent innovation theories also reveal something interesting. The integrated innovation concept for example centered on the coherence between technological innovative breakthroughs and structural changes in the industrial, economic and socio-institutional contexts present an engaging explanation. Focusing on technology and power in the 21st century, the north and south divide, and issues of South development represent analytical instruments in dissecting this subject-matter. In short, we consider technological innovation, technology development and its manifestation in the differing power relations among countries as ingredients of foreign policy, in as much as foreign policy could also be used to develop technological capacity. The interplay of politics and economics also provide us a prism from which we can understand the issues embodied in the study of technology and foreign policy, which has a fulcrum on the ascendancy of power through access to superior technology and begs the question of how foreign policy could be used as an instrument to further the desire for acquisition of modern technology. In doing this, the primacy and character of the national and international contexts is germane to achieving the key objective of using technology to enhance international relations. The linkages are at once domestic and international, technical and social, covert and overt. It is to these that this inquiry attempts to problematize and address.

Further, contemporary technological transformation is focused on accelerating the development of communication and the technologies of collecting, processing and storing information. The information revolution is the basis of the “globalization infrastructure”, thus influencing the

dynamics of the processes which lead to modifications in the basic parameters of the international environment. Information technologies represent this unique type of technology which, unlike traditional industrial technologies, not only provide new methods of goods manufacturing, but also entails important system changes in the social, economic and political spheres, including those on the international scale. It is worth emphasizing that along with transformation of the international realities, triggered by technological development, the ontology of international relations as an academic discipline undergoes change, as well.

It is important also to notethat technological progress affects the transformation of power in the international system, including its character, distribution, sources and manifestations. Scientific and technological potential, resources of knowledge and information constituting the intellectual capital whose quality is reflected in the innovation level, become the key attributes of power.

Increasingly, these resources are owned by institutions other than states; this is why non-state players acquire the status of power holders in the international environment, breaking the monopoly of states in this sphere.

Technological power, based on the capacity to generate progress, and on application, transfer and the control of technology, is a specific type of power in the international environment. It is not only an independent vehicle of potential, but at the same time a catalyst for building other spheres of power, including its economic, political, ideological, cultural and social dimensions.

Technological progress therefore, generates new conditions in which states exercise their sovereign rights and pursue their interests, both in domestic and foreign policy. Technological advancement forces states to adjust to the logic of functioning in the international environment as characterized by a growing network of interconnections, increasing intensity and dynamics in international political relations, and their considerable complexity. The adjustment processes

include official operation of the state in order to fulfill its external functions in one of the oldest spheres of international relations, diplomacy.

Unquestionably, progress in science and technology has been conditioned by the significance of the military dimension of international relations. Although not as permissive as before, it is still important in inter-state relations. States continue their exertion on the development of new weapons systems. A noticeable tendency is the more widespread application of advanced information technologies, enabling precise military action intended to achieve a given goal with minimal casualties Future wars will not be fought only on land, sea, in air or outer space, but also in the so-called cyberspace as a theatre of cyber-warfare, i.e. planned and concentrated attacks of hackers against the enemy’s computers. Asymmetric warfare, including cyberterrorism, assumes various forms whose list is constantly growing (Braman, 2002).

The potentials of the application of technology to relations between states are immense, and often not recognized or appreciated. However, with the rapid expansion in globalization, new technologies, computer science and communication technologies such as Artificial Intelligence, Block Chain technology applied to various sectors of an economy,as well as other breakthroughs in laser technologies and stem cell research etc.,there is the need to move faster to understand the interconnections, and collectively work out relevant legal frameworks to regulate and forestall inter-state conflicts and global crisis all at the realm of international relations.

Section 3: The Nigerian State, Technology and Steel Development

3.1 The Nigerian State and Technology Development

It is common knowledge that the Nigerian state since its political independence as a post-colonial entity has been unable to attain its technological and developmental potentials due to a myriad of factors that have to do with the attitude of the dominant elite and poor leadership, and the resultant poor management of the human and material resources abundant in the country. Often, the Federal Government of Nigeria and the state governments are unable to sustain their short and long-term developmental plans. Although, a federal state by arrangement, it has often been run by subsequent governments like a unitary state as the 1999 constitution of the country as Amended still bestows a significant amount of powers to the Office of the President. Efforts to effect decentralization of these powers in a manner that supports good governance, enhanced security and economic growth have been slow and difficult.

The nature and the character of the Nigerian state in a way explainthe slow pace of technology growth in the country. Its rentier character has consciously and unconsciously undermined various efforts made at acquisition of technology and its development due to the external orientation of the leadership class. It is recognized that Nigeria has low technology and the dynamics of the domestic environment and the inability to follow-through with its development plans and technology policy have served to retard its technological growth. On the whole, the poor state of Nigeria’s technological development is worrisome. A situation in which Nigeria is unable to construct and efficiently run an iron and steel plant sixty years after, wholly construct a Nigerian made car or ship not to mention the acquisition of aircraft technology is worrisome In

1999, the country spent less than 0.5% of its Gross Domestic Product on Research and Development (R&D) (Agbu, 1999); whilst by 2020 it spent 0.13% only, and 0.14% in 2022 (Sesu, 2023).It is common knowledge that technology has much to do with a country’s level of industrialization in terms of its productive capacity as opposed to the importation and sale of products. The problem arises when we consider the impact of low productive capacity of the economy as a result of poor technology development, and the implications for Nigeria’s ability to effectively defend and project its national interests or pursue an effective foreign policy.

For Nigeria, it could be opined that right from the inception of the polity in 1960, science and technology was never really part of the agenda for development until about the 1990s. It was never part of Nigeria’s National Development Plans. Indeed, at the time, there were no institutions for the nurturing and coordination of science and technology. It was however, in 1986 that the first real S&T policy for Nigeria was designed, this was revised in 1997 and again in 2003 and a new policy – Science, Technology and Innovation Policy adopted in 2011(FMST 2011). Fundamentally, the 2011policy was designed and supposed to help drive the objectives of the then Vision 20 – 2020, which strove to make Nigeria one of twenty largest economies in the world by the year 2020. This is now history. The reasons why the country was unable to attain this goal are still largely the same reasons why it is still where it is, mainly the poor environment for S&T development, very low investment in the sector and poor management and coordination of available resources (Agbu and Momah, 2023: 1-21).

On basic and fabricated metal, like iron and steel, the Vision 20:2020 observed that the products from these form the basis of most material inputs for other industries including oil and gas, automobiles, building and construction, transportation, ship building etc.. And that this subsector has the capacity to revolutionize the industrial andreal sectors of the Nigerian

economy.The properties of steel, in particular, make it useful in the capital intensive oil and gas industry. It suggested that partnerships with high performing multinationals should be explored as a means of increasing FDI in this sector. And that continuous R&D efforts, effective legal and regulatory framework and the provision of adequate infrastructure are key imperatives for developing the metal, iron and steel industries and ensuring they are fully functional and competitive. Observing also that the secondary steel sector is also largely underdeveloped and that most secondary steel products are imported, it envisions the attainment of a target of 12.2 million tonnes of primary steel production by 2020. This target was never met for a myriad of reasons.

Nigeria’s colonial history isimportant in understanding the slow pace of technology development in the country. The raison d’tre for the British occupation of the territory called Nigeria was in the first instance, mainly economic (Boahen 1966). The British saw Nigeria as a ready market for their goods, such as spirits, dane guns, mirrors and other goods. Before the advent of colonialism, Nigerians were involved in many aspects of industrial and the practical arts. They made their own hoes and other implements for farming, were able to weave their own clothes, smelted bronze and were able to cast an object as intricate as the Second World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC) mask that was originally stolen by the British; and undertook the tanning of hides and skin amongst others. The colonialists discouraged further development of Nigerian technology as they reasoned that it was a threat to the smooth marketing of goods imported from Europe (Akaninwor, 2008). This does not however, remove the fact that S&T activities had been ongoing in Nigeria for over a century before the arrival of the British

Being a post-colonial political entity hurriedly crafted to serve as a source of natural resources, cheap labour and market for the commercial interests of the British aristocrats, the country was therefore already handicapped at birth, and unfortunately has not helped itself by its poor approach to the organization of science and technology. There was therefore never a time that the colonialists thought that the country will get on a path of autonomous development, not to mention the possession and growth of indigenous technology. From the beginning, British colonial government pursued an implicit extractive S&T policy supportive of crop production in Nigeria. This led to the early establishment of agricultural research institutions like the Moor plantation at Ibadan; at Umudike and Samaru, Zaria. In the 1940s, the colonial government also established several research institutions in West Africa with headquarters in Nigeria. They included the Yaba College of Technology, Federal Institute of Industrial Research (FIIRO), Oshodi; and the Medical Research Institute, Lagos. With the establishment of the first University College at Ibadan and several universities thereafter, university-based S&T picked up (Ekpere, 1999:29).

Nigeria’s low level of technology development was therefore the result of the character of the industrial policy that Nigeria inherited and embarked upon independence as colonialism receded, such as the Import-Substitution industrialization policy. The major thrust of this policy was to build Assembly Plants in Nigeria, which implied the importation of completely knocked down parts (CKDs) into Nigeria to be assembled in these plants. The policy also saw the establishment of steel plants, like the Delta Steel Company at Aladja and the Ajaokuta Steel Project, and associated foundries that were to produce automobile parts that would be assembled in already established assembly plants. It also entailed the establishment of machine tool companies like the Oshogbo Machine Tool Company that were supposed to produce capital goods. The import -

substitution industrialization strategy did not go beyond the stage of building the assembly plants, as the technical partners knew that if Nigeria stopped importing the spare parts, their companies in Europe would be in trouble, and may eventually fold up. It meant that Nigeria would no longer be a market for European cars. Indeed, while in Japan in 2006 on research fellowship, I paid a visit to the headquarters of the Nissan Motor Company, and while discussing with the Managing Director I informed him that in Nigeria Japanese cars are a first choice brand and it will be wise to set up spare parts manufacturing entities in Nigeria and the West African region to service this need. He was clearly not interested in this line of thought. He was of the opinion that the safety of the investment cannot be guaranteed. While this is plausible, I believe however, that it was just an excuse for not investing for strategic reasons. The difference between Chinese venture capital and that of the Japanese is that whereas the Chinese tend to be more adventurous and proactive with their investments in say Africa, the Japanese are unduly cautious.

In general, Nigeria’s technology development has also been constrained by the poor state of its educational and scientific infrastructure. Educational institutions, the universities, polytechnics and technical colleges that are supposed to train engineers, technologists, and technicians were more often than not, poorly equipped and poorly funded. This affected the quality and rate of technology development. There is also the inability to commercialize numerous research findings from the universities and research institutes. Indeed, Nigeria has a good number of research institutions, some of which include the Product Development Agency (PRODA) Enugu, Federal Institute of Industrial Research (FIIRO), Oshodi:, Nigerian Institute for Oil Palm Research (NIFOR), Benin City; and Rubber Research Institute of Nigeria, (RRIN) amongst others. These

institutions had produced a good number of prototypes or inventions that could not be commercialized for various reasons. The universities and polytechnics have also invented assorted scientific equipment that failed to reach the market. Some of the reasons include lack of funding and poor linkage between the institutions and industry. It is only in more recent times that the need for R&D to be synergized with the market has been taken more seriously.

Inspite of its overarching potentials in Science, engineering, Technology and Innovation (SETI) and the presence of over 70 Research and Development Institutes and Centres, 25 Colleges of Agriculture, 170 functional Universities with about 70 Faculties offering science, engineering and technology education; and 159 Polytechnics, the country has not attained any appreciable capacity to translate products of its R&D into desirable outcomes(Olugbile, 2010;Olarewaju, 2023). The country has over the last few decades, continued to witness a sharp decline in economic growth resulting in large scale unemployment, 33 per cent as at the Fourth Quarter of 2022 (NBS, 2022); excruciating poverty and a weak manufacturing sector. The industrial manufacturing sector contributes only 27.38% to the GDP at present(O’neill, 2023), inspite of the immense potentials available in the country. Table 1below for instance, shows a significant availability of several mineral resources, which could have been exploited to improve manufacturing and industrialization in the country were expertise and technology available.

Table

1: Estimated

Reserves of some Minerals in Nigeria

S/No. Mineral

1. Kaolin

2. Gypsum

3. Salt (brine & crude)

4. Limestone Above 1.2b

5. Iron ore 3.0b

6. Barytes 2.0m 7. Bentonite 1.5m 8. Ball clay

Talc

Source: RMRDC, MTF Report on Non-metallic Mineral Raw Material Sector, 1996

Most of the technologies that Nigeria requires to sustain her modern domestic economic activities are however, imported from the industrialized nations and other emergent countries such as China, Japan and India. The total reliance on imported foreign developed technologies and foreign consultants and contractors for executing Nigeria’s infrastructure projects such as road, power, water supply, transportation, etc, besides being extremely costly, is also responsible for its inability to maintain them. Hence, there is currently a widespread failure in the country’s ability to grow technology. It is generally agreed that at the root of Nigeria’s developmental woes and infrastructure deficit is the dearth of scientific and technological capacity and that if capacity could be increased in these areas Nigeria’s potentials will be unleashed nationally and globally. According to the late seminal Professor of Law and expert on Political Economy, Osita Eze, research is key to development; although it is intangible, it determines the tangible (Bakare, 2009).

According to the Sole Administrator of the Ajaokuta Steel Company Ltd, Sumaila Abdul-Akaba, it is regrettable that after several decades of the quest to develop steel in the county, and in spite of the submissions of various experts in steel technology that we have seen, Nigeria’s steel industry is yet to achieve the level where it can support industrial drive and growth on a sustainable basis (Abdul-Akaba, 2018). This is inspite of the significant natural and mineral resources that abound in the country. See Table 1 showing the estimated reserves of some minerals in Nigeria.

With all these minerals many of which are required in the production of iron and steel in Nigeria, it is sad that the country is still unable to produce steel necessary to power her industrialization.

The focus on Nigeria, a developing and potentially emergent country will enableus to concretely identify, analyze and enhance our understanding of the linkages between technology and foreign policy. Practically, we hope to ascertain the extent to which technology has impacted Nigeria’s foreign relations and vice-versa. This is because there is some correlation between the quality of foreign policy pursued and level of technological growth, which has a large dose of iron and steel as foundation. Nevertheless, foreign policy is equally instrumental in the facilitation of technological development (Agbu, 2008). For example, the facilitation of technology and trade missions from other countries to Nigeria for example, is in the purview of foreign policy and foreign relations.

3.2 The Global Iron and Steel Industry

The iron and steel industry is perhaps the most important element of a nation’s industrial economic infrastructure, and the consumption of steel per capita of population is an indicative index of industrialization and progress. This will be evident in the Tables 2, 3 and 4 presented below. Indeed, major European industrial powers of the nineteenth century and the first half of

the twentieth century owed their position to domination of reserves of iron ore and coal that are necessary to produce iron and steel. The industrial revolution in Europe started with coal mining in the United Kingdom, and the iron and steel industry prospered paralleling the growth of the coal industry; coking coal being an essential input to steel metallurgy. The superpowers of today, the USA, China, and Russia, have immense reserves of both iron ore and coal. Over 70% of global steel produced today from iron ore is largely dependent on coal.

Table 2: Top Steel Producing Countries 2022 M/Tns

Source: World Steel (2023), Available at worldstel.org/steel-topics/statistics

Table3: Apparent Steel Use per Capita 2017 to 2021 (KGs)

Table 4: Major Steel Producing Companies M/Tns

Source: Tables 2 & 3 from World Steel (2022), Available at worldsteel.org/steel-topics/statistics/world-steel-infigures,accessed 28 March 2023

In 2021, China had the largest production of steel with 1032.8 m/tns followed by India with 118.2m/tns and the United States with 85.8 m/tns. This in a way shows the industrial capacity of these countries. The Apparent Steel Use per Capita globally in 2021 has South Korea, Taiwan, China and Czech Republic leading with 1075.6kg, 885.6 kg and 775.5kg respectively. Three of the top steel producing companies in 2022 were China Baowu Group, ArcellorMittaland

AnsteelGroup from China, India and the United States producing 119.95 m/tns, 79.26 m/tns and 55.65m/tns respectively.

In Figure 2, find a diagramme of the traditional process of the Basic Oxygen steel making and Electric Arc steelmaking, two of the most common processes of producing steel. Steelmaking is a capital-intensive venture and therefore, requires careful planning and execution devoid of sentiments.The Ajaokuta Steel Company Limited (ASCL) in Ajaokuta, Nigeria is designed to use the Basic Oxygen Steel making process, but unfortunately became an example of poor planning and implementation underlined by other considerations that were not necessarily economic (Agbu and Momah, 2023).

Figure 2: The Steel making Process

Source: NSC (2017), Newsteel Construction in Projects and Features, September 17, from https://www.newsteelconstruction.com/wp/an-introduction-to-styeelmaking/

The Blast Furnace - Basic Oxygen Furnace (BF-BOF) is the dominant steel production route in the iron and steel industry, involving the reduction of iron ore to pig iron in the blast furnace. BF-BOF operation relies almost entirely on coal products, emitting ⁓ 70% of CO2 in the integrated plant (BF iron making). Hot iron is then charged to Basic Oxygen Furnace (BOF) to make steel. An integrated BF-BOF production plant will also have process plants for coking, pelletizing, sinter, finishing and associated power production.

The Electric Arc (EAF) Steelmaking process uses electric arc to heat charged materials such as pig iron, steel scraps, and DRI product (also referred to as sponge iron) with electricity as the only energy source. Today, EAF is the dominant approach for steel recycling (i.e. secondary steel production) and also contributes to primary steel production by upgrading or refining DRI sponge iron. EAF steel production operates in batch mode instead of continuous like a BF-BOF plant. The Delta Steel Company, Aladja in Warri, Nigeria also known as Premium Steel and Mines Limited uses the Electric Arc Furnace technology.

There is also the Direct Reduced Iron (DRI) process that reduces iron ore in solid-state with the reaction temperature below the melting point of iron. Reducing gases are produced from natural gas (gas-based DRI) or coal (coal-based DRI) called syngas, a mixture of H2 and CO. Although DRI production is more efficient than pig iron production from BF, additional processing (typically EAF) is needed to upgrade sponge iron for market. The different processes operate with different feedstocks (Center for Global Energy Policy, 2012). It is important to understand these processes in order to appreciate the value of the inputs needed to engage in sustainable production of steel. For example, it is said that once the Blast Furnace is fired, it is expected to

be in continuous production for at least 10 years, this implies that raw materials inputs must be stockpiled and ready for use.

The importance of steel for industrialization and development cannot therefore be overemphasized. Note that Steel needs energy and the energy system needs steel. The construction of homes, schools, hospitals, bridges, cars and trucks – to name just a few examples – rely heavily on steel. Steel will also be an integral ingredient for the energy transition, with solar panels, wind turbines, dams and electric vehicles all depending on it to varying degrees. Since 1970 global demand for steel has increased more than threefold and continues to rise as economies grow, urbanize, consume more goods and build up their infrastructure. Unfortunately, among the heavy industries, the iron and steel sector ranks first when it comes to CO2 emissions, and second when it comes energy consumption. Globally, the steel sector is currently the largest industrial consumer of coal, which provides around 75 per cent of its energy demand. Coal is the choice material used to generate heat and to make coke, which is fundamental in the chemical reactions necessary to produce steel from iron ore.

Therefore, the global steel infrastructure cannot be ignored by stakeholders if energy and climate goals are to be achieved. Global steel production and climate change is an issue that is currently engaging some of the experts in this industry. Global crude steel production capacity has more than doubled over the past two decades; three-quarters of the growth took place in China and around 85 per cent of total capacity today is located in emerging economies. This rapid growth has resulted in a young global blast furnace fleet of around 13 years of age on average, which is less than a third of the typical lifetime of these plants (NSC, 2017). This has implications for the future of the industry and Climate Action.

3.3 The Soviet Union and the Ajaokuta Steel Project

The conception of Nigeria’s iron and steel programme began on the eve of the her political independence in 1958 as a means of stimulating economic growth through industrial manufacturing for an African country beaming with potentials to lead Africa. Nigeria’s Second National Development Plan (1970-1975) envisaged the establishment of a 750,000 tonnes/year capacity steel plant. After Nigeria established an extra-ministerial agency, the Nigerian Steel Development Agency (NSDA) in 1971, this agency commissioned a USSR’s state-owned firm (TiajPromExport) to undertake a study focusing on identification of steel feedstock, quantity and quality of raw materials required for running the proposed integrated iron and steel plant (Mohammed, 2002). A prolonged and involving course of deliberations and consultations ensued between Nigeria’s team charged with programming iron and steel development and their public and private sector counterparts in the advanced nations concerning how Nigeria’s steel industry should be realized. Nigeria’s iron and steel plant was proposed to make use of good grade (not really high grade) iron ore deposits discovered through geological Surveys atItakpe, a community in Kogistate (formerly in old Kwara state). That the site of the plant is located in Ajaokuta is the result of the political preference of the military elite, who against the backdrop of the Nigerian Civil War (1967-70) were sensitive to the likely location of this project. Eventually, after considering Warri (a coastal city) in Nigeria’s delta region, and Onitshaalso on the River Niger, which was initially recommended as a possible locationbased purely on economic considerations, especially the movement of raw materials and products, Ajaokuta which wasthen a virgin land was chosen by the Federal Government. This eventually contributed to the high

infrastructure outlay of the Ajaokuta Steel Projectand its inability to efficiently source and move heavy raw materials inputs.

At Nigeria’s political independence in 1960 and under Prime Minister TafawaBalewa, there was little pretense that Nigeria was squarely in the orbit of western influence, mainly Britain. This was in spite of Nigeria’s professed policy of non-alignment. The Nigerian elite was reluctant to court friendship with the Soviet Union, and initially worked out an arrangement with Britain, whereby British embassies represented Nigerian interests in the socialist states. It was only in 1961 that the Balewa government, agreed, in principle, to exchange diplomatic missions with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and by December accepted the credentials of the first Soviet Ambassador (Legvold, 1970:107). A team of Soviet scientists and economists arrived in Nigeria at the end of January 1967 to explore the possibility of iron and steel development in the country. After the secession of Eastern Nigeria under Biafra from Nigeria in 1967, the Soviet Union declared support for Nigeria after an initial hesitation, and its supply of arms to the Federal Government provided the USSR a measure of foothold in Nigeria.Then Nigerian Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, General ShehuYar ‘Adua paid a Four-day official visit to the USSR in 1979. During the visit, the Nigerian delegation and Soviet officials examined all issues related to the construction of an iron and steel plant in Nigeria, within the context of SovietNigerian Economic and Technical Corporation. The two countries at this period expressed mutual interest in further strengthening and broadening Soviet-Nigerian relations in political, economic, trade, scientific, technical, cultural and other fields of cooperation (Ogunbadejo, 1986:260).

In 1970, the Nigerian government signed agreements with the Soviet Union for aeromagnetic and ground surveys of Nigeria’s potential iron and coal reserves. In June 1976, a formal cooperation agreement was finally signed between Lagos and Moscow for the establishment of an iron and steel complex. On its part, in order to streamline activities in the industry, the Nigerian government enacted the National Steel Council Act of 1979, which spelt out Nigeria’s steel development strategy. The Act which heralded the dissolution of the Nigerian Steel Development Authority (NSDA) gave birth to six companies. Five of the companies located at Ajaokuta, Aladja, Jos, Katsina and Oshogbo respectively, were directly charged with the responsibility of producing steel or its by–products. The sixth, the then Associated Ores Mining Company Limited (AOMCL), later Nigerian Iron Ore Mining Company Limited (NIOMCO) was mandated to explore and exploit the iron ore deposits at the Itakpe mines in present day Kogi state and other mines.Today, the country’s steel infrastructure include these in addition to the Nigerian Metallurgical Development Center in Jos, the National Steel Raw Materials Exploration Agency in Kaduna, and the Nigerian Metallurgical Training Institute at Onitsha (Agbu, 2002a). It was in 1979 that contracts were signed for the three rolling mills at Katsina, Jos and Oshogbo. While Kobe steel of Japan served as technical partners during the erection of the Katsina plant, the Oshogbo and Jos plants were constructed by German companies. Each of the plants was designed to produce bars and wire rods at a capacity of 2.1 x 105 tonnes/year. The rolling mills were to be fed with billets produced from the Delta Steel Company, Aladja. The Katsina Steel Rolling Mill for instance, was designed to also produce long products covering the product range from 6mm to 40mm (plain and ribbed). It was established primarily to produce reinforcing and general-purpose steel from billets for construction and wire associated industries. However, the poor capacity utilization of Delta Steel Company and the very long gestation

period of the Ajaokuta project meant that the rolling mills had problems of inadequate supply or lack of billets to operate optimally. This contributed significantly to the poor performance of the Nigerian steel sector. Subsequently, the government tried to incorporate the steel companies, rolling mills and the mining company as limited liability companies expected to be self-funding, while the research and training centers will remain funded by the government (BPE, 2005). This experiment did not work well as we later saw.

Therefore, a major area of scientific and technical cooperation between Nigeria and the then Soviet Union, now Russia was the development of Nigeria’s iron and steel industry. Cooperation was expected and extended to the construction of the Ajaokuta steel project. The first phase involved geological exploration by Soviet experts in 1971 with a view to appraising and developing the raw material base for the complex. The successful completion of the first phase led to the 1975 contract signed between Nigeria and the Soviet Union for the elaboration of the Detailed Project Report (DPR), and to the 1976 Moscow Agreement guaranteeing Soviet assistance to Nigeria in the area of industrial growth (NIIA, 1978:15). In 1979, a firm contract, the “Global Contract” was signed between Nigeria and the then Soviet Union represented by M/S V/O Tiajpromexport for the preparation of working drawings, supply and erection of equipment, structures and materials and the training of personnel for the Ajaokuta Steel project. Note that the training component is usually what is important in terms of scientific and technical cooperation. There was therefore a provision in the contract for the training of 1,500 Nigerian specialists at Soviet plants and enterprises (Nwani, 1984:98).During a field work at the Project site in 1991, I confirmed that the training programmes were actually carried out in different countries, and were quite successful; however, upon return to Nigeria, the relevant sections of

the steel project had not been completed making it impossible for the trained personnel to practice what they learned. A mix of idleness, non-payment of salaries and the lure of the private sector made many of the trained hands to leave.

According to Ogban-Iyam (1981:69) one of the foremost authorities on the history of the iron and steel industry in Nigeria, it was agreed in the contract “that in the course of the implementation, the Soviet erection organization will utilize Nigerian personnel in a manner to ensure maximum technology transfer”. As at 1982 as documented, 390 specialists had been trained and by 1985, about 767 out of this projected number had been trained (Dolgov, 1983:57). The last batch of 129 trainees returned after completion of training in March 1988. As part of the stipulations of the training contract, Nigerian personnel then were trainedin six major Soviet metallurgical enterprises, namely those in Cherepovets, Lipetsk, Krivoi Rog, Makeyevka, Novokuznetsk and Zaporozhye (Agbu 1988:74). Nigerian trainees stayed for periods from two to eighteen months in the Soviet Union depending on their specializations and the degree of trainees’ preparedness. Unfortunately, some of these places are today in the Ukraine like Krivoi Rog, Makeyevka and Zaporozhye,and have become battlegrounds with the Russian invasion of the countryon 24 February 2022

Further, in mydetailed study carried out in 1992 with respect to acquisition of technical skills at the Ajaokuta Steel Company, it was discovered that steel technology had indeed, been acquired by the Nigerian staff. Knowledge and skills were acquired with respect to construction and erection, translation of manuals, maintenance of mills and iron-making, forge and fabrication, operation of Boiler Turbine shop, spare parts production and design, foundry and pattern-making

and mechanical repairs (Agbu, 1992:128). The problemthat subsequently arose as earlier mentioned was the inadequate funding of the project, which led to the non-payment of workers’ salaries and lack of job satisfaction. Again, as indicated poor implementation presented a situation in which trained staff on returning home, had little or nothing to do, as the specific equipment they were supposed to work with or maintain had not been installed. The long gestation period of the project was also its undoing. To date, a solution has not been found.

Furthermore, apart from scientific and technical cooperation in the iron and steel industry, the Soviet Union also assisted Nigeria in the oil industry. In 1972, the two countries signed an agreement under which the Soviet Union assisted Nigeria in establishing a Petroleum Training Institute (PTI) at Effurun, near Warri in 1973 to be run by the Soviet Enterprise Technoexport. Soviet instructors and lecturers were deployed and teaching equipment supplied. The Institute was to turn out about 500 specialists at a time (Nwani, 1984:99). In 1975, classes started at the oil and gas institute and by 1978, there was the first turnout of students and Nigeria received its specialists in oil and gas extraction, refinery equipment maintenance and other specialties (NIIA, 1978). This Institute is still in existence and matriculated 1,718 students for its 2022/2023 session (Idowu, 2023).

Despite the defunct USSR’s discovery and verification of the viability of Nigeria’s steel industry, European governments, who were then also competitors and had earlier, advised Nigeria to downplay or ignore this sector and concentrate on agricultural development suddenly bombarded Nigeria’s federal government with myriad of proposals of various new-breed steel manufacturing technologies. This culminated in Nigeria’s government “turn-key” contracting of GermanAustrian consortium to undertake the “direct-reduction (DR) process” technology in Aladja Steel

Company, in Warri (Delta State) based on a guaranteed loan from Germany’s Deutsche Bank. Originally conceived to utilize low grade iron ore that was to be extracted on-site, German negotiators tricked their Nigerian counterparts into accepting to switch the plant’s philosophy towards an unnecessarily sophisticated one based on utilization of imported iron ore. Excluding the cost of importing the higher-grade iron ore, the steel plant’s cost alone based on the loan principal exceeded US$ 1 billion! At the time, this cost translated into approximately US$12 per Nigerian (about one-tenth of Nigerians’ average income). This cost exploded into a much greater figure by including other costs: interests, commissions, front-end fees, and refinancing fees (Adams, 1991). Aside the challenges posed by competitive bidding for contracts by European nations, these projects remained mired by executive-bureaucratic ineptitude as Nigeria’s government dissolution and replacement of the NSDA with politicians in 1979 threw away precious technically competent human-power who had earlier been trained in advanced nations on steel technologies. Moreover, Nigeria’s government defaulted severally in funding their part of the projects and paying Russian and other European contractors until the programme entered the quagmire that was the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) viciously implemented by the Ibrahim Babangida regime between 1986 and 1993 (Agbu, 2007: 46-52; Mohammed, 2002).

It is important to note that the Ajaokuta steel project sits on a vast complex site of 24,000 hectares and has so far cost Nigeria about an estimated $8 billion dollars to build, according to data in a documentary by Qatar-funded broadcast agency, Al Jazeera.The steel mill has a 68kilometer road network and another 24-kilometer road network underground, and known to be the country’s biggest mineral resource investment with the coke oven and byproducts plants, larger than all refineries in Nigeria combined. The project was situated in a location that

supposedly makes it almost independent of imports as 80 percent of the raw materials needed are within the factory’s 60 kilometer radius. In order to supply the Ajaokuta Steel Mill with raw materials and connect it with the world market, a contract was awarded in 1987 for the construction of Nigeria’s first standard gauge railway, from the iron mines at Itakpe to the steel mill at Ajaokuta. There was also the dredging of the River Niger and the establishment of an inland port at Lokoja and Baro, to facilitate movement of the materials.

The Ajaokuta Steel Project has the capacity to produce 10 million metric tons (MT) of steel per annum from its 43 different plants. This would have been a game changer for Nigeria to take the front seat among steel producers in the world. Unfortunately Nigeria’s cumulative steel production of 2.5 million tonnes per annum andpercapita consumption of 10kg remains abysmal!Data from the World Steel Association (WSA) on steel production by different countries show that South Africa produced about of 6.1 million tons of steel in 2016, while Egypt produced 5 million tons at the period. Nigeria’s production from this plant is non-existent, except when it produced long-products intermittently in 1983 and 1984 during a test-run.China, which is the world’s largest producer of steel, churned out 808.4 million MT, about 50 percent of the global steel output at the period, while Japan and India produced 104.8 and 95.6 million tonnes respectively within the same period, putting both nations as second and third respectively (Ani, 2020).

While the Ajaokuta project would directly employ about 10,000 staff at the first phase of commissioning if functional, the upstream and downstream industries were supposed to engage not fewer than 500,000 employees. We note that this project startedover 50 years ago, and as of

1994, was said to have attained up to 98 percent completion level is still uncompleted and has not produced a single sheet of steel since its inception. The OlusegunObasanjo administration in 1999 decided to spend US$1.3 million to have Messrs V/O Tiajpromexport TPE (of Russia) to undertake an evaluation of the plant pursuant to its revitalization. This culminated in the latter’s estimation that it could complete, rehabilitate and commission the plant at the cost of US$640 million (Federal Ministry of Power and Steel, 2002, Mohammed, 2002). As reported by BusinessDayNewspaperin 2019, some export grants were allocated to the Complex in 2018 inspite of the fact that it has not produced anything of significance (Ani, 2020). The Project was conceived to be developed in three phases of 1.3million tonnes, 2.6million tonnes and 5.2million tonnes of liquid Steel per annum. The execution of the worksfor the first phase commenced in the early 1980s. It is instructive to note that within the space of about four years, the plant was brought to a status of near completion of erection works on its 43 shop units.At conception, raw materials input was designated as follows for the Steel Plant.

In addition to the above were other materials required in different quantities such as Ferro –Alloys, Aluminum, Sulphur, Caustic Soda, Soda Ash, Tar and Solar Oil amounting to nearly 40, 000 MT/yr. It is important to note that the first major challenge of the Ajaokuta Steel Plant was that the development of the erection works was out of sync with the development of the essential infrastructure to haul materials in and out of the Steel Complex. This problem arose because of its location. The main Contractor (TPE) and the Consultants M/S PACSMECOM of India had always raised the issue but the Federal Government then could not accommodate the infrastructural projects involved perhaps due to the economic meltdown that arose in 1983.

However, a number of these infrastructural projects were actually begun. They include the following:

• 60km Ajaokuta – Itakpe Railway, which took long, but later was fully executed on standard gauge lines.

• The Rail Bridge across the River Niger for the proposed Railway line, the Ajaokuta –Otukpo – Onne Line was fully executed but no further work on the line proper.

• The dual carriage way between Okene and Ajaokuta was done but this road after many years of neglect requires complete rehabilitation

• The access roads to the nominated mineral deposits and rail sidings are still largely outstanding (Abdul-Akaba, 2018).

Although most sections of the Steel Plant were erected over four decades ago, an internal Technical Audit recently concluded by experts believe that the facilities erected in the Plant are still operable to a large extent (Abdul-Akaba, 2018). However, the rehabilitation and replacement of deteriorated parts, machines and facilities are necessary to get the project functional.

The Ajaokuta Steel Plant has a captive Power Plant of 110MW capacity. Internal consumption of electricity at the Company is not more than 8MW. The power plant has operated at different campaign periods generating different levels of electricity. The expectation is that with adequate

investment, the Plant can still be turned around to generate close to its original capacity of 110MW.The Steel Plant also has a Lime Plant of 91,000t/yr capacity. Since the Steel Making Shop is not ready, the Lime Plant can function independently to produce burnt lime for use by other industries. This plant has been run on one of its two lines and can be reactivated to produce lime needed by Paint Producers, Pulp and Paper Industries, Sugar Refining Industries, Water Treatment Plants, Tanneries and Pharmaceutical Companies.To add value, a hydration process could be added in order to produce hydrated lime for specific industries (Abdul-Akaba, 2018).

Figure 3: The Thermal Power Plant at the Ajaokuta Steel Company (2023)

The plant is designed to produce 400,000 tonnes of Light Sections such as rounds, squares, strip and angles of various specifications per annum. However, the challenge of running the mill presently is that billets need to be purchased from outside the plant. The company management still believes that operating the mill with imported billets will be profitable. The capacity of this mill alone is more than the combined capacities of the inland rolling mills in the country. The Wire Rod Mill is designed to produce Wire Rods of 5.5 to 12.5 mm and Rebars of 6.12mm. These products service the construction industries and are also used for nail, fencing wire, rope mesh, bolts, nuts, netting etc. production.Working on a two shift arrangement, it is believed that the mill can produce 130,000t/yr of the designed products. Again it requires imported billets to make this possible. The steel complex also has plants for the manufacture of refractory bricks. These bricks are used by industries operating furnaces, kilns, hot lines etc. The Steel Plant’s Alumino Silicate Refractory Plant has a capacity to produce 37,000 tonnes of fire clay products per annum. This section has been completed and can be rehabilitated to operate independently to provide the stated services.

The Steel Plant is also provided with expansive Engineering Workshops of the following capacities for machine parts, small machineries and industrial parts:

• Foundry Shop with a capacity to handle 7,000 tonnes of castings per annum.

• Forge & Fabrication Shop capable of doing 4,200 tonnes of forging and 4,200 tonnes of fabricated structures respectively per annum.

• Machine and Tools Shop with a capacity to produce 19,000 tonnes of machined products per annum. Over 400 lathe machines, boring and shaping machines are installed in one place.

• Power Equipment Repair Shop for the Repair of electric motors and generators up to 800KW, Power Transformers up to 1600 KVA

The present outputof the functional units of the Shops, are as indicated below:

• Casting and Machining of Spur Gears of diameters 406 x 182 and 344 x 182

• Fabrication of Ducting and Flanges for Cement Companies of Ranges diameter 150mm to diameter 1200mm

• Serration Jobs on flanges; diameters 250mm to 1400mm

• Repair of Cement Plant Kiln Main Drive Shafts

• Fabrication of Stone Crushers of Capacity 10 to 20 tonnes per hour for Small Scale Users

• Rewinding of 440KWA Electric Motor for NNPC

• Fabrication and Installation of Cupola Furnace capable of holding 1 tonne of Hot Metal at a time for foundry shops

• Casting of Dead Weights for Niger Dock Company

• Casting of Crusher Balls for Solid Mineral Processing

• Forging of eye-bolts for anchoring of ships

• Production of Masts for communication industries (Abdul-Akaba, 2018)

Figure 4: Sample Products from the Ajaokuta Steel Foundry

While the Ajaokuta Plant is yet to produce steel from start to finish, it does not necessarily mean that it has been completely useless. It is able to produce minor mechanical and industrial parts from companies on request. With the necessary political will based on a practical assessment of the state of the Plant as has been attempted, it is possible to redeem sections of the Plant in a manner to generate resources to offset running costs, pending the production of steel proper. The reluctance of the Federal Government of Nigeria to completely disengage from this project is due to the enormous resources already invested. To be able to gain from this investment, it is still important to review the scale and technology of this Plant, and injectfunds into the shops toenable repair of vital equipment. This has proven difficult against the backdrop of the cost outlay so far, and the difficulty in sourcing funds.

Nigeria is currently engaged in discussions with a Chinese Company, Luan Steel Holding Group for the building of a new steel plant in the country. New investments in the Ajaokuta Steel plant for the production of military hardware is also under consideration, while it is reported that the Minister of Steel Development,Mr. Shuaibu Abubakar Audu has approved a re-start of the Light Section Mill (LSM) section of the Ajaokuta Project for the production of iron rods, estimated to cost N35 Billion at the first stage to be funded from the local financial market (The Vanguard, 2024). In all, about 500,000 new jobs are expected to be generated for Nigerians if the new investments in the steel sector materialize.

3.4Lessons from Other Countries

Technologies relevant for industrialization cannot simply be transferred, they have to be developed. They can only be acquired through the development of indigenous broad-based scientific and technological infrastructure of which the iron and steel industry is critical. Underlying the non-performance of Nigeria’s manufacturing sector is the lip-service paid to R&D in the country. In contrast, China for example, enjoys a meteoric rise in its economy and leads the world as a scientific power house in respect of research and its applications.No wonder it is also the largest steel producing country in the world. Brazil and India are expanding their research frontiers, with Sao Paolo as one of the leading 20 cities for research output. India is increasingly a significant power in steel production, and also medical tourism (Daily Independent, 2011).

Further, against the experiences of Nigeria in steel development,North Koreafor example, because of its steel capacity has been able to launch Rockets into space. Pakistan using its steel sector has one of the largest military wares production capacity in existence China because of its steel has become the world largest growing economy and biggest exporter, largest consumer and producer of steel products. India has become one of the largest producers of steel and controls over 65% of the world’s steel industry and markets. Brazilalso because of its steel sector has taken a leadership position in the production of automobiles, and is at present supplying aircrafts to different countries. Iranis rounding up on its nuclear power production process and runs its 600,000 barrels per day crude oil refinery with Iranian steel and technology (Okengwu, 2018)

All these countries also produce military materials such as Rockets, Bombs, Tanks, Heavy and Light Guns, War Planes, Frigates, and agricultural equipment like Tractors, Harvesters,

construction and mining equipment like Bulldozers, Excavators, Drag lines and other industrial machinery and equipment which are presently exported to Nigeria. They have been able to do these because of the seriousness with which they approached the development of their steel industry. Resources were diverted from other sectors of their economies to invest in the steel sector, initially by the government because the steel industry has a very heavy capital outlay that is not expected to break-even until several years of operation. The steel sector requires careful planning and organization of the inputs necessary to ensure the continuous production of iron and steel.

The experience from Japan’s industrialization shows the importance of government intervention in this sector; in this case, the post-war Japanese economy. The intervention was to ensure that resources were properly allocated and utilized. The policy was one which supported the development of the domestic industries. For a few years the government directly controlled production, product distribution, price determination and the efficiency of resource allocation, and above all, gave priority to the production of coal and of iron and steel(Kuchiki, 2003:8)

During the period of early industrialization, the Japanese government tightly controlled the import of technologies; it usually presented the lists of desired industrial technologies to be acquired from abroad (Ozawa, 1973:667). The technology contracts were periodically reviewed; the scope of imported technology was frequently altered while royalties were also periodically reviewed. In terms of industrial linkages, sub-contracting become a very major feature of the Japanese economy (Adejugbe, 2004:334).

Most steel projects cannot easily be erected without cooperation from outside sources involving countries and sometimes financial institutions, many governments were and are now forced to seek financial and managerial assistance from firms and countries that are willing to assist.

Examples include India and Brazil during the construction of the Bokaro and Usiminas steel plants. This was also the case with the Nigerian state as we saw in its various efforts at equity and concessionary arrangements with investors for the Nigerian steel industry. However, it is still imperative to reiterate that the state is still very much instrumental in the planning and development of the steel industry. The Korean example clearly showed the necessity for a strong interventionist state at the early periods of the growth of this industry. In setting up its plants, foreign technical assistance was purchased in preference to depending wholly on foreigners to run the various plants in the country. This included even the shipyards and the automobile plants. The Pohang Iron and Steel Company Ltd. (POSCO) of Korea which was established by the government in 1968 at the cost of $3.6 billion began exporting technology just 20 years after its founding. Indeed, the Korean government invested around $42 million for POSCO’s infrastructure that included land, ports, and electricity subsidy, which amounted to one-fifth of the initial investment. The Korean government was very desirous of POSCO operating successfully as it was expected to form the basis for the pursuit of industrialization in South Korea. Hence, even though domestic demand continued to be excessive, POSCO continued to export technology and some amount of products to earn hard currency (Sato, 2005:649). The ‘Japan Group’ made up of staff of Nippon Steel and Nippon Kokkan then, acted as consultants.

As observed, right from its inception, POSCO’s profitability was ensured by the government subsidization of costs of capital and investments in infrastructure such as roads, habours and electricity generation (Amsden, 1989:297).

Experiences from other countries therefore, indicate that it is necessary for the state toengage in partnership with the private sector, both local and foreign, to develop this sector. This has implications technically, economically and socially, for the backward and forward

linkagesencapsulated in the domestic and foreign input requirements. The right environment and incentives must be provided to enable absorption of technology and encourageboth local and foreign investors to come in. For Nigeria and other developing countries, the object should not be to re-invent the wheel with respect to steelmaking technology, but rather, just like Japan, Taiwan and South Korea to diligently obtain, learn and apply the technologies in existence as a key step in developing this industry and enhancing industrialization and development. This is because there has been a significant change from the absorption of foreign technology through copying and self-teaching to the adoption of foreign technology through investing in foreign licenses and technical assistance (Amsden, 1989:20). There are therefore, several ways cooperation could be explored between technology givers and receivers like between Russia and Nigeria, or Japan and Nigeria, without this relationship being necessarily one-sided.

Experience also show that what determines the performance of steel industries is the type of management model adopted ab initio. There are generally two basic models; the market and bureaucratic models, and the market models have proven to be more efficient as seen in cases of China Steel, POSCO and Usiminas Steel of South Korea and Brazil respectively (Agbu, 2007: 58). Unfortunately, the efforts made by the Federal Government of Nigeria beginning with the concession agreement with SOLGAS Energy of the United States signed 13 October 2003, and by mid – 2004; with Ispat Industries of India under the Mittal Group represented by the Global Infrastructure Holdings Ltd. (GIHL) all fell through. So what really is the problem with the industry? The character of the Nigerian state and its political economy, which does not allow things to work as they should be or what is called the ‘Nigerian factor’may have been responsible. Mismanagement, corruption, a lack of patriotism and unethical practices at high and low levels did not allow the partnerships to work.

Section 4 Management of Domestic and External Linkages

4.1 Domestic Imperatives

Industrialization is impossible without manufacturing, and manufacturing is impossible without steel, and having steel is impossible without access to raw-materials input and good management.

Generally, every major product modern man usesare either made of steel, or the equipment from which the product is made is from steel. This is often the case for equipment and materials for infrastructural development which is important for economic growth. The management of the domestic environment and inputs from the country’s external relations toward the development of the steel industry and industrialization cannot be overemphasized. These generally speak to the state of the technology architecture in Nigeria, as well as its managerial capacity. The, managerial capacity speaks to organizational capacity that ideally is insulated from political encumbrances. This is important for technological acquisition and development. This is one of the key factors inhibiting the development of the steel sector in Nigeria after over fifty years of trying. From the socio-political and economic perspectives, the failure of the Ajaokuta steel project lends credence to the assertion that a prebendalist political and military elite is incapable of facilitating endogenous development as their interests often run counter to the reasoned imperative of planning for the future and ensuring self-sufficient industralization. As earlier stated, this is because their interests and tastes have been consciously or unconsciously aligned to that of the elite of the rich nations. They do not see the need for undue effort at technology

development since they can always purchase what they need, often with fraudulently acquired state money.

It is from this perspective that we can understand why national planning, innovation, and transparent implementation are often relegated to the background in favour of corruption, nepotism, poor implementation and a laissez faire attitude to national development. The Nigerian state can therefore be said to be chronically dysfunctional to the extent that the state does not allow its best minds – scientists, engineers, technicians and craftsmen to employ their skills in the relevant sectors to grow the economy as often, the right decisions based on reason are not made while implementation plans are not followed logically. As it is for the teacher, medical doctor, farmer and businessman, so it is with those in the science and technology R&D, as well the Foreign Service Officers.

What is the motivation for an Ambassador or a Foreign Service Officer in Nigeria to be proactive on the job in pursuit of national objectives, and be encouraged to seek for and attract technological inputs for the nationaldevelopment? While it is often easier to determine the technical inputs into a particular process of production, it is more difficult in modern times to ascertain the linkages between material resources, social, political and economic, towards the development of a particular technology, in this case steel. Therefore, being successful here, means appreciating the linkages, some of which are global. In the steel sector in Nigeriafor example, there is a need for appropriate technology for flat sheet production, foundry (establishment of component industries); and high strength structural steels and alloys. Generally, aside the products mentioned above, Nigeria needs adequate/modern mineral processing technology in the solid minerals sector to harness the extensive deposits of iron and

coal in Itakpe and Enugu respectively as well as zinc, lead and silver in the Benue trough. This will also support the aluminum industry, and boost the non-ferrous foundries.

The automotive industry in Nigeria has a potential for high growth due to the large and growing population of over 200 million people. At present, it virtually has little orno domestic production capacity. The development of this industry is linked to adequate technology for raw material growth (materials and plastic technology). Therefore, Nigeria needs adequate technology to develop the automotive industry. Steel is critical here. The country is facing challenges in the process of developing indigenous technology from available local R&D results and the acquisition of foreign technology through technology transfer systems or acquisition systems

Some of the challenges include the weak-articulation of a framework for wealth creation through human intellect, non-promotion of S&T and Engineering education, inability to deploy foreign technology towards the development of indigenous technology, the non-prioritization of science and technology; and non-commercialization of research findings thereby jeopardizing sustainability and re-investment.

Indeed, Nigeria recognizes that the metals sector is critical to the development of the Nigerian industrial sector; to this end, the metal policy sought to increase the per capita consumption of steel and aluminum from its current 10kg and 0.3kg respectively. Note that the global average for these two metals are 130kg and 5kg respectively, more so when juxtaposed against other developing economies like Algeria 42kg/capita, Egypt 38kg per capita and even Zimbabwe with 25kg per capita for steel.From the Nigerian Metal Policy, these targets are supposed to be driven by the creation of investment friendly environment, internationally accepted legal and regulatory

frameworks, maintenance of environmental best practices and industrial safety, and the development of manpower to meet the challenges of the Nigerian Metal industry (FGN, 2008).

The domestic environment for the acquisition of steel therefore entails having the political will to Subjugate the primordial forces, and ensuring that the steel industry is supported by international best practices. Being able to harness the relevant inputs and attract the right investments to this sector as well as managerial ability to be able to assess, re-position and revitalize the steel industry constitute part and parcel of the backward linkages necessary for national development.

4.2 Management and Organizational Shortfalls

A key factor very often neglected in the science and technology sector is the management of the policies and institutions responsible for science and technology acquisition and development. Without efficient management of the resources, men and machines, it is difficult to achieve national objectives. The organization and management of S&T is therefore imperative to attaining the goal of having a viable iron and steel industry. A National Steel Council (NSC) for the country that was muted at inception was never constituted in spite of the fact that all the six companies relating to the iron and steel industry that they were to superintend were all established, namely, Ajaokuta Steel Company Ltd (ASCL), Delta Steel Company Ltd. (DSC), Nigerian Iron Ore Mining Company Ltd. (NIOMCO), Oshogbo Steel Rolling Mill, Jos Steel Rolling Mill; Batagarawa, and Warri inland rolling mills. This would have ab initio provided the leadership needed to grow this industry.

The three technical support agencies created in 1992( National Steel Raw Materials Exploration Agency (NSRMEA) located in Kaduna, National Metallurgical Development Center( NMDC) located in Jos and the Metallurgical Training Institute (MTI) located in Onitsha haveall

performed sub-optimally due to paucity of funds and lack of adequate human capital.The Aluminum Smelting Company for example, which was conceived in 1981 and established after a lot of back and forth in 1989 has never really done any commercial production due to the lack of raw materials and funding The Makeri Smelting plant established in 1961which remains the biggest in Africa has been comatose for the past forty years;as a result practically all the metals that would have triggered the industrial growth of Nigeria like; Copper, Lead/Zinc, Cassiterite, Gold, Palladium, Platinum, Iridium and Silver which has been identified to occur with Galena have not contributed to the economy of Nigeria due to lack of resource definition and managerial action. Officially, there are 44 different minerals found in commercial quantities in 450 locations across the country that also include gold, iron ore, gemstones, columbite, topaz, limestone, uranium, laterite, gypsum and kaoline among others (Nwezeh, 2023).

In recent times, the Federal Government of Nigeria put in more effort to support the mining sector which is fundamental to re-positioning the iron and steel industry. Due to the lack of attention by successive administrations to reactivate the sector and the disproportionate attention on oil and gas, the mining sector with a huge capacity to contribute to gross domestic product (GDP) suffered neglect. We easily forget that is was mining that contributed to the development of a functional railway industry helping to transport mined coal from Enugu to the seaport in Port Harcourt and to a power plant in Oji River, in south east of the country. After several decades of inactivity, efforts at improving the regulatory and governance frameworks were put in place to revive the mining sector which is still grappling with a low policy perception index, a function of poor attention accorded the sector by government. Despite these efforts, Nigeria’s policy perception index still remained comparatively one of the lowest in the mining world with an index score of 30.54/10.63 far below Chile (70.86/72.23) and South Africa (39.78/69.08). The

policy perception index is the outcome of surveys of investors working in the market. As at 2016, the Mining Index for Nigeria was still comparatively low at 84.1 per cent, in comparison to say, South Africa at 98 per cent. Although Nigeria’s mining regulations have been extensively reviewed, the sector has still not attracted as many investors and patronage as expected to boost industrial growth as obtainable in Chile, Australia, United States of America (USA) and South Africa. This is inspite of the fact that Nigeria’s corporate income tax rate of between 20-30 per cent compares favourably with those of South Africa, Chile and Australia, and is much lower than that of the United States of America at 40 per cent (Nwezeh, 2023). The tax holiday incentive of an initial period of three years from the commencement of operations for investors is very attractive by global standards, in addition to the ease of doing business policy initiative. Still the sector remains largely under exploited, and leaves one wondering why investors are not too keen to come into this sector. The country therefore, needs to ensure that other domestic imperatives such as low-intensity conflicts and banditry that keep investors away are addressed.

The Muhammadu Buhari Administration sought to encourage artisanal miners in the mining sector with N30 billion mining intervention fund that was made available to enable the miners overcome the near impossible interest rate placed on loans by banks.The Minister of Mines and Steel Development then, Abubakar Bawa Bwari, noted that the Ministry had a mandate which was to create jobs, generate revenue and ensure that mining was done to the best standards. The ministry was allocated a budget of N1bn in 2015 but could hardly access N300 million of it. Overtime however, the Government made available N30 billion intervention fund from the Natural Resources Fund for the Ministry, while the World Bank also approved $150 million Mineral Support Fund for the development of this sector. There is also a N5 Billion naira facility

at the Bank of Industry to be made available as soft loans to miners at less than 5 per cent interest. The country also made some inroads in assembling a $600m investment fund for the sector, working with the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority, the Nigerian Stock Exchange and other financial institutions. Nigeria has a huge market and is yet to meet the demands for metallic products like iron, steel, copper, aluminium, tin, lead, and zinc, not to talk of the exploitation of noble metals like gold and silver (Bwari, 2018). According to estimates, the annual per capita consumption of Steel in Nigeria is still below 10kg while the corresponding world average stood at 232.8kg as at 2022 (World Steel, 2023).

With the financial resources coming in, the ministry was able to engage in the exploration and generation of data, which are fundamental in this sector; and had more interactions with investors, especially foreign investors at international mining conferences in South Africa, Canada, United Kingdom and China among others. Still these effortshave had little impact on the fortunes of iron and steel sector in respect of raw materials input and steel production. The result of this state of affairsconsciously and unconsciously affected industrialization in the country undermining research and innovation. There is the often cited example of what could have been of immense benefits to the country arising from the Nigeria-Biafra war of 1967 – 1970. The low interestof the Government to develop the military innovations and inventions made by Biafran scientists and engineers during the war is regrettable as this could have assisted Nigeria to leapfrog into the military scientific and technological age Under the fire power of the federal military government supported by external interests and foreign military equipment, Biafra was forced to produce several fighting machines, equipment, bombs and other sophisticated items using local technology that included crude armored personnel carriers like the Ogbunigwe (the mass killer), orange peel mosquito coil, bombs etc. (The African Guardian ,1997). The Biafrans

even extracted and refined their own petroleum products. However, these achievements were not capitalized upon by Nigeria, which because of pride, sentiments and non-visionary leadership failed to improve on these war time inventions. The exploits of the Biafran scientists and engineers have been well documented in the work of Oragwu (2010), who lamented the failure of the Nigerian state to take advantage of technology innovations and industrial related production activities that emerged from the Nigerian civil war.

The Nigerian Government’s attitude towards breaking the jinx of technological weakness is regrettable. Nigeria is probably the only country in the world where you can find all brands of cars without any one of them having been wholly designed or made by Nigerians. This trend may however, be changing gradually with the products from Innosin Motors, based in Nnewi, Anambra state, Nigeria. Often, policy makers in the public sector maketechnological decisions without consulting Nigerian engineers and technologists. And where sometimes good policies are made, the follow up and implementation become an uphill task as institutional constraints stifle the good intentions. We however, note that the situation is not totally hopeless. Nigeria, as a country, could leave the club of low technology countries when her policy makers begin to redirect their policies to encouraging the manufacture of locally made items in terms of processes and quality, to enable competition with imported ones.

Nigeria’s local steel production in 2014 was estimated at 2.5 million tonnes per annum, mainly light sections from the private sector (Maduaga, 2018), while the country imported 17 million tonnes of assorted steel and allied products annually according to the National Bureau of Statistics in 2011 The shortfall between local production and the estimated current requirements make Nigeria a fertile dumping ground for imported steel.This explains the huge amount of

foreign reserves that go into the nation’s steel imports.Nigeria is said to have imported over USD 3.3billon tonnes of processed steel and associated derivatives in 2013.Steel is still the most important raw material after the First and Second World Wars and most versatile technological material in use today cutting across industries and human endeavours as we have seen. World steel production was about 1.691 billion tonnes in 2017 having increased by 5.3% from 2016 figures.It exceeded 1.808 billion tons in 2018 with a 4.5% growth compared to the 2017 level (Worldsteel Association, 2019), and by 2021, it was about 1.951 billion tonnes as shown in Table 1. Therefore, to develop herbasic infrastructure as envisioned by the government in her various short and long-term developmental programmes, Nigeria will overwhelmingly depend on imported steel pending the resurrection of the dormant and poorly performing plants in the country.

4.3 External Linkages

International relations as a field of study still revolve around power politics, and the dynamics of state interactions that involve both the domestic and foreign imperatives. Power is still important, but not everything in contemporary times, as it is now increasingly moderated by diplomacy. Indeed, the criteriathat categorize nations as developed or underdeveloped are no more than the strength and capacity of S&T and innovation applications in the modern world. There is ample evidence that developments in S&T are not only important determinants of a country’s level of development, but also its competitiveness and position in the global economy. Science is today part and parcel of the regalia for national greatness. For countries aspiring to greatness and global respectability, the task of promulgating and effectively implementing a policy for the furtherance of research and training in S&T is a priority (Okon, 1999). Aparticular view has it that once a social surplus is produced, the urge and opportunity to alienate it from the actual

producers lead to wealth grabbing and accumulation, the acquisition and concentration of power over others, unequal classes, wars of conquest, the state and imperialism. Indeed, it will be myopic or deliberately misleading to analyse any society in which the state exists without analyzing the reality of power (Toyo, 1993:3). In Nigeria, the technologies in energy, oil and gas, health, education and manufacturing are still over eighty per cent foreign with little internal local content. No wonder then the country has failed in the execution of the very important Ajaokuta iron and steel plant project, the manufacture of car/ship (from start to finish), the development of aircraft technology, the improvement upon agricultural raw materials, and a host of other projects which have been dubbed white elephants. For the Ajaokuta Project, the Nigerian government was refused access to funding by the World Bank that would have hastened the speedy completion of the project, and the government was reluctant to allocate adequate funds to it in the budget for fear of attracting sanctions from the International Financial Institutions (IFIs)(Agbu, 2000c:9). This is one project that could have contributed immensely to Nigeria’s industrialization and national development, if it had been properly implemented.

The technologically advanced nations of the world strive not simply to remain rich, but to maintain their positions as leaders of the world. They also seek to maintain their independence, enhance their power and hegemony and preserve their way of life. They are able to do this because of the knowledge they have of technology and its applications to nature and production of items of use value. For the less developed countries, their inability to bridge the technological gap results in a structural disadvantage that is perpetuated as they increasingly lack capital and technology to improve their societies. Given the predatory character of capitalism, it is not possible for the technologically industrialized rich countries to relate to the weak from a benign

position. This is because the modern production system increasingly rely on minerals and natural resources from the underdeveloped parts of the world to fuel their industrialization and development. The only real path open to the developing countries seeking technology is to buy, innovate or steal such knowledge or technologies as are necessary for their strategic economic and industrial development. Related to this is the necessity to prepare a strategy for scientific cooperation; and for collective action by developing countries in the coordination of scientific and technological research and in the identification of areas of joint activity (South Centre, 1993:32). Countries like Nigeria must realise that they have a choice between only two paths –imitation which means dependence, de-culturation and submission; and innovation and invention, which is control of oneself and a revolt against domination. In modern times, foreign policy has a key role to play in the ability of a country to improve its knowledge and use of technology.

Technology acquisition and development could also entail the use of industrial espionage as highly technical and military technology is often closely guarded by their proprietors. These technologies could be obtained either through direct investments orthrough espionage. Under cover resources or spies could be used to collect top secrets and company documents required for developing certain technologies or products, which can then be used by the government as appropriate. What has often been overlooked by the developing countries including Nigeria is that students (many of whom are studying abroad) and lecturers (when funded) are veritable and easier assets that can be used to steal technology, rather than the officially designated services, many of whose personnel are already known before they even get into the country of operation.

There is also the issue of accessing funding for research that are globally available. A good number of research institutions in Nigeria are not adequately funded, whereas many of their staff are capable of attracting significant funding from abroad if allowed conducive environment and minimal financial help.Many countries get significant funding through this means, although it could sometimes be a case of the funder also trying to garner influence. If funding is not increased for R&D activities, it will be difficult to develop science and technology to a level that can lead to developing prototypes and commercialization. This is where the relevant agencies of government in collaboration with particular ministries like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can exploreher foreign relations to determine countries and financial institutions such as the World Bank and other financial organizations that can assist the country with funding to invest in research on science and technology.

4.4 Salvaging the Ajaokuta Steel Project

TheAjaokuta project was concessioned to Global Infrastructures of India in 2004, and the contract revoked in 2008. It is still touted as 98 per cent completed, produced in fits and starts in 1983 and 1984, and has since remained largely comatose. It is estimatedthat only about N650 million is required to complete the project. This apart, ensuring sustainability of the project entails the availability of raw materials on a regular basis, as well as the availability of power. The Nigerian government again approached Russia in 2019 with the hope that Russia could give a new lease of life to Nigeria’s biggest steel plant after decades of inactivity. The facility has consumed up to $8 billion of public money. Repeated attempts to revive the flagship project by transferring it to private investors all failed and the government terminated the concessions. The expectation was that Russian engineering and construction group, MetProm will undertake the necessary work to bring the facility into operation, financed by the state-owned Russian Export

Center JSC and the Cairo-based African Export-Import Bank according to Nigeria’s Minister for Mines & Steel Development, Olamilekan Adegbite ( Bloomberg News, 2019).

In April 2019, Nigeria’s President Muhammadu Buhari refused to disburse the $1 billion from the country’s oil savings, as voted for by lawmakers to complete the Ajaokuta Project. However, boosting steel-making and mineral production featured prominently in Buhari’s plans to diversify Nigeria’s economy and the aim was for mining to contribute about 3 per cent to the country’s GDP by 2025. While Nigeria has sizable untapped deposits of commodities including iron ore, gold, zinc and lead, the country does not have any large-scale industrial metal production sector, which accounts for less than 0.1% of GDP (Bloomberg News, 2019).

By 2022, the Buhari government confessed that it will no longer be possible to revive the Ajaokuta steelworks before the end of the administration, although eleven companies had indicated interest to take over Ajaokuta Steel Company on a concession basis. Three of the eleven bidders were Russian companies according to the Minister of Mines and Steel Development, Olamilekan Adegbite. The Nigerian government had agreed to pay $496 million to settle an Indian firm’s claim over the Ajaokuta Project. The dispute followed the Federal Government’s revocation in 2008 of an agreement that handed control of the steelworks and the National Iron Ore Mining Company (NIOMCO) to Global Steel Holdings Limited, an Indian firm. In cancelling the deal then, the President Umaru Yar’Adua administration was of the view that the terms of the concession at the time were unfavourable to the country. When the agreement fell through, Messers Global Steel Industries took Nigeria to court. The court case went on for about 12 years before its resolution. What a waste of time and resources! Global Steel Industries came to court with a demand of $7 billion as damages, but the Nigerian lawyer

was able to logically argue this down to a settlement of $496million in what may be seen as a favourable judgment. President Vladimir Putin and President Muhammadu Buhari had met on the sidelines of a bilateral meeting and Nigeria requested for Russia’s assistance to resuscitate the Ajaokuta Steel Plant. This request was then acceded to in principle, and is yet to be concretized for a number of reasons. Then Nigeria’s Minister of Mines and Steel however revealed that Nigeria is no longer talking only to the Russians, but also to eleven (11) other foreign interests. Of these eleven interests, three of them are still from Russia (Izuaka, 2022).

Section 5 Conclusion and Way Forward

Conclusion

As we can see discussing the linkages between technology and its various dimensions and international relations requires having a broad view of the interactions, both overt and covert. Doing this implies having a good understanding and appreciation of the historical, economic and technical matters involved, as well as the global ramifications. The role that technology can play in international relations is significant if only one looked deeper. Technology understood as a mix of ideas combined with specific methods of developing or implementing a creative conception in the form of a materialized product, is often regarded by many as an ethically neutral category. But is this really so, against the backdrop of the discussions we have engaged in here. What can more easily be evaluated is the way in which a product of technological progress is used by its owner. It can also be assumed that a creative idea, which is a necessary precondition of scientific and technological progress, is generally not negatively marked, i.e. the intention of technological change is not necessarily destruction, but also implies growth. This is confirmed by semantic analysis, as the word “progress” is synonymous with “development” that

also means improvement in standard of living. While examining the influence of the technological factor on international reality, we should however, not disregard the human dimension of international relations.

Today, we find that science and technology occupy a peripheral position in the curricula of most undergraduate and graduate schools of international relations. The underlying difficulty lies in the fact that the mutual influences of science, technology and international affairs are pervasive, and yet are largely ignored in the treatment of international relations, or at best are subsumed in larger topics like climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, globalization, the environment, or the social media. Science and technology thus become a sort of ubiquitous residual, a vast and sometimes forbidding collection of special topics without apparent structure. This has unfortunate effects on the discipline of political science as it underplays the imperative for cross-cutting analysis and understanding techno-relations. It is time that science, technology and international Relations be recognized as an independent subdiscipline, similar to the recognition given to political economy, which has firmly established its place within the discipline of international relations. After all, the impact of science and technology on international affairs is arguably more diverse and pervasive than the impact of economics or indeed of any single social science (Weiss, 2005). This is more so the case in this age of economic and political globalization.

As variously identified, prominent among the challenges of technology acquisition in Nigeria include theestablishment of a streamlined framework for wealth creation through human intellect.This is because nations are no longer assessed on the abundance of natural endowment but on the capability to create wealth and gain economic empowerment through human intellect. Nigeria is presently challenged by lack of streamlined institutional framework that can enhance

creation of wealth through the human intellectual capability, technology acquisition and development. What we have today are so many stakeholders doing so many things in diverse ways without synergy and organization.

Promoting Science, Technology and Engineering educationis another major challenge. High level education is the engine of modern technological innovations. More importantis science, technology and engineering education which opens the mind to limitless technological responsibilities. There is gradual decrease in interest of Nigerians going into higher institutions to study engineering and technological education. Many prospective students now prefer business and the Humanities. This is not healthy for Nigeria’s industrial and technological growth. The situation needs to be addressed as it has the potential of stunting Nigeria’s endogenous growth, making her permanently dependent on foreign technology.

Another challenge is how to use foreign technology to develop indigenous technological capability. Nigeria has been heavily dependent on foreign technology, and the trend is growing. Yet the experience of imports of foreign technology over the years should form a basis for learning and technological skills acquisition. Skills can only be acquired by learning and rapid learning brings about rapid development. At present, there is little conscious effort, both at policy and strategic levels to use foreign technology as a basis to build local capability. While it is not wise to reinvent the wheel, efforts should be made to understand the principles of mature technologies, so that they can be replicated. Technological capability acquisition is a learning function and climbing the learning curve requires that skills be acquired along the part. Most

countries that are regarded as newly industrializing used foreign technology as a basis for capability acquisition.

The prioritization of S&T sectorsis another major challenge that must be kept on the front burner. Theoretically, all economic sectors are important for any country that wants to attain a sustainable level of technological development. But for developing countries, it is important to partly privatize the S&T sectors because of limited resources. More efforts need to be paid to the sectors that have high potentials for mass technical skills acquisition and innovative and that address the technological problems of the community and are competitive. Such sectors should include the metal working industry, computer engineering, electronics, post-harvest technologies, and civil engineering among others.

Finally, there is the perennial challenge of commercialization of R&D results.The commercialization of R&D results should justify the resources and effort put into research. In Nigeria, many research findings in the nation’s various research institutions are not developed or commercialized for the benefit of the society. This makes it difficult to sustain research and learn from the experience of commercialization of the technology. There is need to evolve a national framework to promote the commercialization of R&D results and technologies that will address the society’s problems and offer opportunities for technological learning.

The international political economy of iron and steel is now visibly manifesting in the globalization of the industry, with many of the key players jostling for lucrative mergers and access to raw materials sources. Mittal Steel and Arcelor have been proactive in seeking to

expand their business activities. There is a possible effect of this on Africa and the South countries – this is that countries seeking to modernize or expand their steel industries will benefit from the competition for acquisitions at the global level as the major players scheme to outbid each other. It has been a long road to steel development in Nigeria without much progress (Agbu and Momah, 2023). The Ajaokuta and Delta Steel Plants were conceived to launch Nigeria into the steel club, unfortunately, this is yet to happen. The Delta Steel Plant was completed and commissioned, but today it is still struggling to stay afloat. The Ajaokuta Plant using the Blast Furnace Technology was designed to be able to utilize our natural solid minerals and low-grade iron ore which are in abundance. It is still wobbling or limping, victim of a lack of transformational leadership, political will, and foreign machinations, and perhaps misguided advice. Unfortunately, while the world has gone far in developing special steels, Nigeria is yet to satisfy the most basic steel needs for the construction industry. Going by the plans enunciated by the founding fathers, by now the country would not only have moved to the stage of flat steel production, but to the development of special steels for machine building and armaments.

For the future, research should focus on how technological changes influence the developments on global rules and regulations, globalization, climate change, power, deterrence, diplomacy, and other concepts of International Relations. Techno-internationalism, which is a concept that can help us understand the dimensions of technology in its relations with the global environment is therefore still emerging and will become even more important, especially in its application to the management of destructive military weapons that have dire consequences for the human race. An example is the Drone Swarm technology powered by Artificial Intelligence that can simultaneously be used for attack to eliminate hundreds of individuals with high precision. This

technology makes the use of nuclear weapons irrelevant depending on the strategic objectives of the user. The imperative for an effective global regime to anticipate and regulate such a technology cannot be underplayed.

Future research in the steel industry is also headed towards de-carbonization technologies that include hydrogen injection, solid biomass substitution, zero-carbon electricity substitution, and carbon capture and storage (CCS). This is necessary as the global steel industry is one of the major sources of pollution and global warming. At present, the Blast furnace – basic oxygen furnace (BF-BOF) dominates production, about 71 per cent globally; and is particularly stubborn to any de-carbonization technology. Direct reduced iron to electric arc furnace (DRI-EAF) production is 5 per cent and growing, and appears to have better de-carbonization potential to move towards net-zero. Secondary steel production using mainly steel scrap in electric arc furnace (EAF-scrap) is about 24 per cent of global production and has both the lowest energy consumption and is technically simplest to decarbonize through electrification, but is limited in market share to recycled steel capacity. Steel is an enormous source of greenhouse gases: today’s iron and steel industry generates roughly 6 per cent of global CO2 emissions (Worldsteel Association, 2019).

The Nigerian Government should continue its evaluation and repositioning of the iron and steel industry with a view to determine how best to achieve the objective of providing enough steel products for its industrialization.It is important that the Ajaokuta project be properly reevaluated, re-strategized and made functional as possible to play its pivotal role for the industrialization of the country. The Government’s Executive Order, No 5 of February, 2018 for promotion of Nigerian content in contracts has guaranteed market for the steel manufacturers and is a golden opportunity for the Nigerian Steel industry to re-strategize and take off.

Way Forward

• Government should create appropriate policies and develop necessary infrastructure to enable the sector satisfy the huge local demand, and compete favorably in the international market by intensifying the ease of doing business, and investing in the mining sector.

• The Government should also engage the new owners of the government owned privatized steel plants and rolling mills that are still moribund, with a view to reviving them. Foreign Investors should be encouraged to come into the sector through the implementation of the existing incentives.

• Capacity building in the steel industry should be encouraged in technical and vocational schools through institutional collaborations. There is a logical link between education, science, technology and development, including weapons development.This means that for the purposes of developing modern military technology for instance, greater emphasis should be placed on science and technology education.

• The Government should establish an intervention fund for the steel industry particularly the upstream where backward integration should be encouraged.The operators who produce steel through scrap melting should backwardly integrate their production through the establishment of modular direct reduced steel plants.

• For the effective implementation of the Executive Order No 5, a high level Interministerial Committee of the Ministry of Mines & Steel Development (MMSD), Ministry of Power, Works & Housing, Ministry of Transportation and Ministry of Budget & National Planning should be constituted to ensure that the 30% local content in contracts with respect to steel inputs is achieved.

• No one country or group of countries willingly give or divulge technological information that took immense resources, sacrifices and effort to develop. If you desire technology, you have to either innovate, acquire by developing yours, purchase or steal. Technology acquisition in general and for military uses in particular, requires discipline and long-term planning. Good examples are technology paths taken by Japan, China, India, North Korea, South Korea and Germany.

• There is an urgent need to strategically promote industrial and corporate linkages, especially as this relates to research and development activities. The various research institutes in Nigeria need to be more closely allied to the Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs), while the government should tilt the manufacturing industry more towards the capital goods’ market as a way of encouraging productive activities.

• Finally, the organization of science and technology infrastructure is imperative for the development of the society, just as the organization of the military institution is fundamental to the development of military technology. This requires discipline and political will,rather than pontificationabout the need for industrialization.

• Overall, The Federal Government should appreciate the ramifications of the backward and forward linkages, as well as the domestic and foreign imperatives to developing the iron and steel industry, and enhancing industrialization in Nigeria. Ensuring an attractive domestic environment for both local and foreign investors devoid of conflicts and corruption through strategic political and economic diplomacy is fundamental to growing this sector, and achieving national development.

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