Russia’s neighbours on Ukraine

How do Russia’s neighbours see the war in Ukraine?

Six months after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we looked at how Russia’s neighbouring countries were viewing the conflict. Here are reports on eight key countries from our regional experts.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan is one of Russia's key allies, but since the invasion of Ukraine the government has maintained that while it remains a friend of Russia, it respects Ukraine's territorial integrity and does not support the war. The Kremlin has used economic levers against its southern neighbour, restricting or threatening Kazakh oil exports to Europe through the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk three times since March.

Russia has used its extensive media presence in the country to counter opposition to the invasion of Ukraine. Some surveys have shown strong Kazakh support for the war.

President Kasym-Zhomart Tokayev, who had Russian military assistance to deal with anti-government protests in January this year, now seeks a balance in ties with Moscow and the rest of the world in order to mitigate the fallout from the war and to avoid confrontation with Russia.

Kazakhstan is under pressure to reduce its dependence on Russian pipelines and ports and to seek new economic partners, given Russia’s expected economic decline due to sanctions.

The Kremlin has used economic levers against its southern neighbour

Georgia

Georgia was invaded by Russia in 2008 and as a result two of its regions host Moscow-backed separatist administrations and massive Russian military bases.

The public overwhelmingly supports Ukraine and feels a common desire to shake off the Russian imperial yoke and integrate with Europe.

The Georgian authorities must therefore strike a balance between reflecting popular sentiment and preventing Russian military aggression, which it is illprepared to fend off.

A man attends a rally in Tbilisi in support of Georgian EU membership in June 2022

ALEXANDER NEMENOV/POOL/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

While condemning the invasion and supporting Ukraine's territorial integrity, they have tried to avoid antagonising Russia and argued with their Ukrainian counterparts, who they see as in cahoots with Georgia's largest opposition party.

The government and its allies have accused Ukraine of pressing Georgia to open a "second front" against Russia and have amplified the narrative put forward by local far-right pro-Russian groups that the US ambassador is involved in efforts to "drag Georgia into war".

The ruling party claims to seek EU and Nato membership, so many find these attacks on Ukraine, and on Western institutions, baffling and outrageous.

Further complicating matters are the tens of thousands of Russians who have flooded into Georgia since the start of the war. Some are fleeing the increasingly repressive political atmosphere or sanctions, and some – many Georgians fear – could be spies or agents of influence.

Moldova

When Russia invaded Ukraine, Moldova's pro-Russian political parties sprang into action. The largest, the Party of Socialists, condemned Western sanctions and called for expanded economic ties with Moscow to help the Moldovan economy, which had been badly affected by Covid.

The government, which is proEuropean, said while it would not impose sanctions, it would not help Russia get around them.

Moldova turned to its Western partners for help in the face of a possible attack by two Russian military contingents deployed in the rebel Dniester region.

Russia and the pro-Russian forces in Moldova accused the West of attempts to "militarise" the country despite its neutral status. The pro-Russia media said the government was spending on weapons instead of tackling poverty.

Some clergy of the Moldovan Orthodox Church, an arm of the Russian Orthodox Church and Moldova's largest denomination, repeated Kremlin narratives in sermons.

In May and July, with energy prices rising, the pro-Russian parties staged protests, blaming the government for the deteriorating economy.

The Socialists and their supporters were particularly active in autonomous region Gagauzia, which they said was "Russian land", with rallies every weekend since May. Meanwhile, the Gagauzia parliament called for "direct ties with Russia".

The Dniester region’s leadership, with business interests in Ukraine, has not condemned the Russian war, but said preserving peace was its goal.

Georgia was invaded by Russia in 2008

Armenia

Armenia's view on the Ukraine war is coloured by its own highly dependent, yet complicated, relationship with Russia.

Armenia is flanked by two hostile, more powerful states: Turkey and Azerbaijan.

Russia has been its one vital strategic ally – its main trading partner and provider of energy resources.

Russia has a massive military base in Armenia and is building another. It also controls strategic infrastructure such as the gas distribution system. Armenia is a member of Russian-dominated economic and military blocs.

There are 2,000 Russian peacekeepers in the part of the disputed NagornoKarabakh region that has remained under Armenian control since Armenia’s defeat in its 2020 war against Azerbaijan.

There is substantial sympathy for Ukraine in Armenia and few people support Russia's invasion.

However, Armenia’s room for manoeuvre is limited by its dependency on Russia, its own problems in Karabakh and its wish to normalise relations with historical rival Turkey.

As in Georgia, tens of thousands of Russians moved to Armenia after the invasion. They have largely been welcomed and many in Armenia see opportunity in Russian capital, particularly IT businesses.

Regional leaders prior to a meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member states in the Kremlin in May 2022

Russia has a massive military base in Armenia and is building another

Uzbekistan

Since the war in Ukraine began, Uzbekistan has been under great pressure both politically and economically due to its close ties with Moscow.

In April President Mirziyoyev dismissed his long-serving foreign minister, Abdulaziz Kamilov, after he said in parliament that Tashkent did not recognise the independence of the self-proclaimed Luhansk and Donetsk people's republics – the boldest statement yet from the Uzbek authorities about the conflict. Local observers say Uzbek elites’ interests are "closely intertwined" with those of Putin's Russia and pose a threat to Uzbek independence. Other analysts, however, say antiRussian sanctions give Uzbekistan and its neighbours "unprecedented opportunities" to achieve geopolitical self-rule.

Economist Otabek Bakirov said regional countries might become "vassal nations of Russia such as Chechnya and Belarus" if they failed to resist Russia's "Force and Subordination" model of statehood – a model that remains attractive to most of the region's population who were raised in the Soviet era.

There are large audiences for Russian media in Uzbekistan. Russia-based TV channels are increasingly popular and many Uzbeks get their news from Channel One and NTV, two of Russia's main channels, although there have been calls among local experts and bloggers to halt the rebroadcast of Russian TV, especially after Rossiya 24 TV's criticism of independent Uzbek journalists and media outlets after they condemned the Kremlin's "special operation" in Ukraine.

Tajikistan

Tajikistan is yet to take an official position on the Russia-Ukraine conflict although it has led to price rises and currency fluctuations in the country, as in all Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries.

The Tajik government is now paying for imports of staple goods and some raw materials increasingly in the Russian rouble and China’s yuan rather than the US dollar, and the value of the rouble is rising in the country. While Tajikistan imports most of its goods from Russia, China is also a major trading partner.

There are many Tajik economic migrants in Russia and Tajikistan depends on remittances from migrants. According to the Russian Interior Ministry, there were around 2 million Tajik migrants in Russia in the first six months of 2022. Their remittances make up around half of Tajikistan’s GDP. A decade ago they made up around a third of the country’s GDP.

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan, one of the poorest countries in Central Asia, is trying to maintain a balance in relations with Russia and Ukraine, its economic partners. In April, President Sadyr Japarov said the country was taking a neutral position on the war.

The state-owned media toe the government's line and avoid the topic of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, although they report the war’s impact on the economy and the measures taken by the authorities.

Many Kyrgyz citizens living in large cities receive their news on the war from the large number of Russian media outlets available in Kyrgyzstan.

Privately-owned media, including the leading independent online news agencies AKIpress and 24.kg, also carry news on the latest developments in Ukraine from Russian and Ukrainian sources and carry statements by leaders and senior officials of both countries. The independent investigative website Kloop calls the Russian invasion of Ukraine a "war".

There are a few independent news outlets in Kyrgyzstan which are critical of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. They include the YouTube-based channels Media Hub, Shaman TV and Archa Media channel.

Russian President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev at a meeting in Ashgabat in June 2022

MIKHAIL KLIMENTYEV/SPUTNIK/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan views the Ukraine war through the lens of its efforts to regain control over the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh.

A wealthy petrostate, Azerbaijan is governed by the strongman Ilham Aliyev.

Aliyev and his fellow authoritarian, Vladimir Putin, understand each other and often exchange words of praise. They signed a "declaration of allied cooperation" in February as the invasion of Ukraine began.

But Azerbaijan is much more closely allied with another regional power, Turkey, and its interests do not often coincide with Russia's.

The public, as well as the media, overwhelmingly support Ukraine.

Access to several Azerbaijani progovernment Russian-language websites was blocked in Russia due to their coverage of the Ukraine war; in response Azerbaijan blocked access to the Russian state-run RIA news agency.

Pro-government media in Azerbaijan frequently criticise the Russian peacekeepers whose mandate in Karabakh ends in 2025. They stress the temporary nature of the deployment and the state's aim of retaking full control over its territory.

With Russia distracted in Ukraine, Baku has pressed its advantage in Karabakh, seizing several villages and strategic heights. The Russian peacekeepers took little action against this, ahead of a ceasefire agreed in September.

Dilmurad Avalbaev (Kazakhstan), Akbarjon Musaev (Uzbekistan), Mutalib Khalikov (Kyrgyzstan) and Marufjon Ismatov (Tajikistan) are based in our Tashkent office; Natasha Matyukhina (Moldova) is based in our Kyiv office; and John Horan (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) is head of our Tbilisi office