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Iran moves in as Russian influence declines in South Caucasus
from BBC MONITOR 29
As Russia's financial, economic and military resources dwindle due to its war in Ukraine, its leverage in the South Caucasus is also declining, Sevinj Mahdavi and Gayane Aleksanyan report
Russia’s focus elsewhere has encouraged Armenia, its traditional ally, to look for friends in the West, while Azerbaijan, Armenia’s foe, is disregarding Moscow's interests in the region.
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At this point, Iran has moved in –perhaps in coordination with Russia – in a bid to prevent forces from outside the region from filling the emerging gap.
Tehran has on several occasions warned outside players not to make inroads into the South Caucasus.
It has pledged support to Armenia, held a large-scale military exercise on the border with Azerbaijan and Armenia, and intensified its anti-Azerbaijan rhetoric.
The other main regional player, Turkey, has strong positions in Georgia, and especially Azerbaijan, so Iran has a golden opportunity to bring Armenia into its orbit.
Tehran's recent attempts to influence Baku’s policies – in particular Azerbaijan's military cooperation with Israel – have increased longstanding tensions between the two countries.
Iran, Russia acting in tandem
Some observers in Azerbaijan believe the "hasty" opening of an Iranian consulate in Kapan, in Armenia's southern Syunik Region, and the largescale Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) exercise near the Azerbaijani border, were meant to put pressure on Baku ahead of the talks hosted by Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi on 31 October 2022.
At that Armenia-Azerbaijan-Russia meeting, Putin failed to convince Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to sign a document that would give special status to the breakaway Karabakh region and extend the Russian peacekeeping mission there.
Iran fears the Zangazur corridor might strengthen Azerbaijan-Turkey ties and unite Turkic countries
BBC MONITORING
Aliyev confirmed concerns over Iran when calling on Yerevan on 8 November to expedite the signing of the peace treaty with Baku. He said Armenia should not be relying on Iran, which he said held military exercises "in support of Armenia".
Azeri state TV said Tehran was crossing a “red line” for Azerbaijan by supporting Yerevan and preventing it from reaching a peace agreement with Baku.
When Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visited Tehran immediately after the Sochi meeting, some Armenian media sources commented that Russia and Iran were coordinating their efforts to prevent the involvement of third countries in the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Iran opened a consulate in a small Armenian town on the Azerbaijan border
Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images
Armenia's military policy shifts
Following its defeat in the 2020 Second Karabakh War, Armenia realised the ineffectiveness of its old Soviet-era military operations and equipment and took steps to shift to modern standards. The war in Ukraine and logistical problems have also significantly limited Moscow's ability to supply weapons to Yerevan.
Calls have also been growing in Armenia for quitting the Russia-led military alliance – the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), which could lead to the US agreeing to sell arms to Armenia. In the meantime, Yerevan has signed contracts with Indian companies for the purchase of artillery gun systems, rocket launchers, anti-tank missiles and ammunition.
In May, Armenia signed military cooperation agreements with Greece and Cyprus.
It is also stepping up defence cooperation with France. In September, the leader of the pro-Russian opposition Hayastan (Armenia) bloc, Robert Kocharyan, suggested that Iran could substitute Russia’s role in ensuring Armenia's security.
The idea was echoed by Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian who said at the opening of the Iran consulate in Kapan in October that "we view the security of Armenia as the security of Iran".
Iran-Azerbaijan tensions
Amir-Abdollahian also said Tehran would make efforts to strengthen the north-south transport route that links the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea via Armenia and Georgia.
In the meantime, Iran has strongly opposed the opening of a transport link between mainland Azerbaijan and its Naxcivan exclave and further west to Turkey via Armenia – a stipulation of the 2020 armistice agreement signed between Baku and Yerevan with Moscow's mediation.
Tehran's recent aggressive rhetoric towards Azerbaijan appears to be driven by concern that this planned route (the Zangazur corridor) could strengthen the Azerbaijan-Turkey alliance and unite Turkic countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
In March 2022, Iran and Azerbaijan agreed to build a similar link between western Azerbaijan to Naxcivan via Iran. Tehran fears it could be sidelined and Turkey could have greater influence in the region if the borders between Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey were opened.
Iran's perspective
Iran considers the Zangazur corridor to be an expansion of Israel and Nato towards its borders. It fears this could block its connection with Armenia, and cause it to lose easy access to the region while having to deal with Azerbaijan, backed by Iran's enemy –Israel.
While Baku insists that friendship between Israel and Azerbaijan is not directed at any third party, Iran always feels threatened by any Israeli activity in the region.
Iran calls the Zangazur corridor "Nato's Turan corridor", designed by the US, the UK and Israel and intended to bring Nato troops onto Iran’s northern border with geopolitical consequences for Iran, Russia and China.
The corridor “will complete the plan to encircle these countries and lay the groundwork for their partition," the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, an advisory body to the Iranian Supreme Leader, said in September.
Another concern regarding the corridor on the border with Iran is that it could help Ankara and Baku foment ethnic unrest in the northern areas of Iran where ethnic Azeris live. This could result in Baku laying territorial claims on Iran.
Iran-Azerbaijan war unlikely
Azerbaijan's president, MPs and state media have spoken extensively about the rights of ethnic Azeris in Iran and even revived the old discourse about the unification of the Azerbaijani Republic with Iranian Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijani media have discussed the possibility of Iran unleashing a war against Azerbaijan. This is however unlikely for several reasons: Azerbaijan's military alliance with Turkey and Pakistan, Azerbaijan's strong army, its energy partnership with the West, and Iran's large ethnic Azeri population, which is significantly larger than the entire population of Azerbaijan.
Some commentators believe that Israel, which supported Azerbaijan militarily in the 2020 Karabakh war, could join an anti-Iran coalition in case of war.
The Azerbaijani flag flying on the border with Iran
STRINGER/AFP via Getty Images
Gayane Aleksanyan and Sevinj Mahdavi work for our Tbilisi office, specialising in Iran and the South Caucasus region
