Russia & Ukraine: reflections on a year of war

Russia & Ukraine: reflections on a year of war

Russia specialist Yaroslava Kiryukhina (L) and Ukraine specialist Yana Lyushnevskaya (R) share their reflections on the war in Ukraine.

Russia’s misjudged expectations

Yaroslava

Russian state TV had for years instilled in its audience the notion of Ukraine as a weak Western puppet state

Russia’s initial hopes for a lightning speed defeat of Ukraine soon unravelled as misjudged expectations, and experts in Russia blame poor intelligence as the main reason for this ambitious failed plan. The Federal Security Service (FSB) expected Russian troops to be welcomed with flowers but that simply did not happen – not even in cities considered pro-Russian. In cities like Kherson, there were protests against the occupation – and occupation officials were killed in Berdyansk and elsewhere.

For years, Russian state TV has been instilling in its audience the notion that Ukraine is a weak “nationalist” state headed by a Western “puppet”, while boasting about Russia’s “unrivalled” weapons. With this groundwork already in place, favourable public opinion was taken for granted and state media’s one-side coverage of the war was assumed adequate.

Today there are banners in the streets of Moscow and other major cities showing the “glorious” servicemen who lost their lives in Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine.

The banners replaced Western ads after major companies quit Russia after the invasion. However, the main symbol of the Russian invasion – the letter Z – is becoming a rare sight.

Apart from its appearance mainly on municipal vehicles, there is a lack of nationwide support for it, although a state pollster put support for the war at about 70% of those polled throughout the year.

Yana

Ukraine was no longer the state it was in 2014 when it lost Crimea

Before the invasion, Russia was seen as the stronger military power, but it was also evident that Ukrainians were not going to give up their country without a fight.

By 2022, Ukraine was no longer the state it was in 2014, when it lost Crimea with barely a shot fired. Now it had a bigger, better trained and more experienced army, a strong civil society and, even more importantly, a much-needed ability to unite when facing an existential threat. While the Russian army's failures and setbacks were somewhat unexpected, the skill and motivation displayed by the Ukrainian troops were not.

The level of hostility towards Ukraine in the Russian media did not come as a surprise to Ukrainians – after all, the "propaganda war" had been going on since 2014.

But what did shock most people was how many Russians would rather believe their state media than their own relatives and friends in Ukraine – including the ideas that Russia was there to "liberate" or "protect" Ukrainians, that it was not bombing civilians or that the destruction of Ukrainian cities was the work of Ukrainian troops. It cannot all be blamed on Russian propaganda, however. The ideas that Ukraine was not a proper independent state or that the Ukrainian language was somehow inferior to Russian have long been rooted in the minds of many Russians.

A Ukrainian soldier stands guard as civilians place sandbags to protect Odessa’s opera and ballet theatre

SCOTT PETERSON/GETTY IMAGES

A mural in Moscow says: “There is such a profession – to defend the homeland”

YURI KADOBNOV/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

Raising public support

Yaroslava

Unlike Zelensky, Putin never visited the war zone in the first year of the conflict

State TV has taken pains to promote campaigns – often run by public sector employees or parties – in support of the Russian forces in Ukraine. They show people from all over Russia knitting socks for the troops and children making cards to boost morale.

But in fact, what I saw in Moscow recently cannot be compared to the mass volunteering effort that I witnessed in Kyiv during my visit there. The war was happening as if in parallel reality on pro-Kremlin channels.

Things partly changed after the unexpected military draft which led to a sharp spike in anxiety among Russians. Many Russian women spared no money, often borrowing money to better equip their mobilised loved ones. State media is making some efforts to alleviate those fears, insisting that those mobilised will not be rushed to the frontline.

Unlike his Ukrainian counterpart, President Putin never visited the war zone in the first year of the conflict, despite some officials attempting to present his visit to a military headquarters in southern Russia as such. For most of last year, Putin appeared to distance himself from the detail of military campaign, addressing the public only on major topics like the launch of the invasion and the mobilisation drive.

Yana

What shocked Ukrainians was how many Russians would rather believe their state media than their own relatives and friends in Ukraine

The success of Ukrainian resistance lies in its grassroots nature. In today's Ukraine, the war is not just a matter for the military – it is a collective effort. Virtually every aspect of life – from art to sports – has become a front, not to mention the so-called information front where many Ukrainians use social media to raise awareness of their fight against Russia.

There is a multitude of fundraising campaigns. Ordinary Ukrainians donate money to buy drones for the military, support refugees or even buy food for stray animals in the conflict zone.

Images of Zelensky’s interactions with frontline troops in the war zone and visits to hospitals with wounded troops feature on the presidential website for all Ukrainians to see. He was in Bakhmut, a recent epicentre of fierce fighting, in December and has recently visited liberated places, most notably Kherson. The website also features his nightly video addresses to Ukrainians, updating them on developments and keeping them motivated.

Unity at home

Yaroslava

Russia’s political elites are even more united

The war in Ukraine made Russia’s political elites even more united, with all parliamentary parties – already staunchly pro-Kremlin – rallying around Putin and passing increasingly conservative and anti-Western laws.

It even raised the prominence of warlords who were previously considered marginal. The Chechen leader, Ramzan Kadyrov and the Wagner private military company boss, Yevgeny Prigozhin, are now among the few figures daring to criticise the Russian military command.

As for the opposition, it has almost been eradicated inside the country. One of the last prominent politicians, Ilya Yashin, was jailed for “discrediting” the army and others are operating from exile.

Yana

Ukrainians quickly brushed aside political differences as Russia invaded

Ukrainians have longstanding political differences and are known to struggle with unity during peacetime. However, crisis situations tend to bring them together, and old grievances were quickly brushed aside as Russia invaded.

The long-standing consensus has been that the current state of unity should continue as any internal squabbling will only play into Russia's hands. More recently, however, the consensus seems to be faltering as corruption scandals rock Ukraine. But while the authorities are facing much more criticism now than they were in the early stages of the invasion, the country's general course of action in the war is almost never publicly challenged.

Zelensky signed a decree declaring 16 February Unity Day in 2022. It was the date that Russia’s potential invasion was expected to begin.

Former Ukraine President Petro Poroshenko, who faced "high treason" charges at the start of the invasion, backs the government’s approach to the war

MAXYM MARUSENKO/NURPHOTO VIA GETTY IMAGES

Chechen warlord Ramzan Kadyrov is one of the biggest supporters of the Russian invasion, and has sent thousands of men to the front

MIKHAIL SVETLOV/GETTY IMAGES

International allies

Yaroslava

Former Soviet states are becoming less sycophantic; some have openly confronted Putin

Russia’s stalled war effort and subsequent nuclear threats made the country’s official allies take an increasingly wary attitude towards bilateral cooperation. China and India, for instance, benefit from cheap Russian export goods but are in no hurry to provide desperately needed equipment.

Those who dared to come to Russia’s rescue are other heavily sanctioned states. Iran and North Korea, for instance, are believed to be providing Russia with weapons, among other things, and Belarus has been used by Russia as a training ground and springboard for the invasion.

With Belarus being a rare exception, Russia appears to be losing its influence even among former Soviet states, whose leaders are becoming less sycophantic and are openly confronting Putin. The Tajik leader has openly told him that his country wants to be “respected”.

Yana

Ukrainians are reluctant to present themselves as victims; they tend to demand, rather than ask for support

At the start of the war, Ukrainians pinned high hopes on the Western response to Russia's aggression. There were calls for sanctions, military aid and even a no-fly zone over Ukraine, which would effectively see Nato shooting down Russian aircraft. Ukrainians are reluctant to present themselves as victims and they tend to demand, rather than ask, to be supported.

But there were also worries that the response would not go beyond expressions of "deep concern" and symbolic sanctions, such as those that failed to deter Russia after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. So the extent of Western support – including arms supplies that enabled Kyiv to stage successful counteroffensives – turned out to be somewhat unexpected, although there is always appetite for more, such as aircraft or long-range missiles that would make it possible for Ukraine to strike Russian territory.

President Zelensky's addresses to foreign parliaments –always perfectly tailored to the audience – have helped to mobilise public opinion internationally, at least in the West, and foreign media reporting helped shape the narrative of Ukrainians as brave fighters for freedom and democracy. Remarkably for someone in need of help, Zelensky not only appeals for help, he even criticises countries that are seen not to be doing enough, such as Hungary.

Western support enabled Kyiv to stage successful counteroffensives

Pierre Crom/Getty Images

The information war

Yaroslava

Russia is making overtures to the global south

Clearly losing the information war in the West, Russia has increasingly been befriending the global south. It has been amplifying its “decolonisation” narrative in its official rhetoric and increasingly blaming the West for the food security crisis. In one of the latest moves, Russia’s main foreign propaganda asset RT has decided to open a media centre in South Africa. Also, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov undertook a tour of Africa which apparently aimed to portray Russia as a partner for the continent’s development and security.

Russia rejects the notion that it is responsible for the global food crisis. It says the situation has been provoked by the West and its sanctions on Russia.

Yana

Beyond the West, support from elsewhere has turned out to be harder

While Ukraine has effectively won the information war in the West, getting support from other parts of the world turned out to be harder. Take Israel, for example. From the start, it refused to supply weapons to Ukraine, citing its own peculiar geopolitical position. Even Iran's supply of kamikaze drones to Russia – which it has widely used against Ukraine – did not change this stance. Iran itself is now described in Ukraine as part of a new "axis of evil", alongside Russia and Belarus.

Ukraine’s narrative on global food shortages depicts Russia as the “cause of global famine” and Ukraine as the “guarantor” of food security.

Russia increasingly portrays itself as Africa’s partner in its development and security needs

PHILL MAGAKOE/AFP via Getty Images

Media adjustments

Yaroslava

The only platform that still carries independent Russian media outlets is Telegram, whose audience in Russia has doubled since the invasion began

The one clearly measurable success Putin can boast of is the almost complete clean-up of independent media. Targeting this section of the media was well underway before the invasion, with draconian laws on “foreign agent” media – but it accelerated soon after.

Websites are being blocked for presenting the Ukrainian account of events or describing the hostilities as “war”, while Russia insists on calling it the “special military operation”. This was the case with the Siberian publication Tayga.Info, which reportedly received a letter from the Russian media censor asking it to remove the word “war” from a story.

The only platform that still carries independent Russian media outlets is Telegram, whose audience in Russia has doubled since the start of the invasion, reaching 40m people in June. The remaining unblocked media are either pro-Kremlin to varying degrees or do their best to avoid any war-linked reports.

Yana

The monopoly the authorities have over Ukraine's once pluralistic broadcast environment is causing concern

Ukraine's media responded to the invasion with unity and defiance. The best example is the United News TV marathon – the pooled TV news service launched by leading channels in the early days of the war. The telethon unites broadcasters speaking in one voice, with strong emotive language, and promoting patriotic – and generally pro-government – narratives.

The effective monopoly that the authorities now have over Ukraine's once pluralistic broadcast environment has raised some questions: What will it look like after the war is over? Will the government be ready to relinquish the control it has gained due to the security situation?

Beyond TV, Ukraine can still boast media outlets that maintain editorial independence and raise topics that are awkward for the government. For example, there are popular websites that publish high-profile corruption investigations, including the one by the influential publication ZN.ua which shocked the public by suggesting that the Defence Ministry was procuring food for the troops at inflated prices.

Dissent in Russia has occasionally leaked through onto television

Channel One / BBC Monitoring

Ukraine launched a pooled TV news service, broadcast on several channels

BBC Monitoring

Yaroslava Kiryukhina is an editorial lead in our Russia team. Yana Lyushnevskaya is a senior journalist in our Ukraine team.