BBC Monitor 31 by BBC Monitoring

Monitor E S S E N T I A L

I N S I G H T

ISSUE 31

BBCM

WINTER 2023/2024

M E D I A

Israel and Gaza: the media at war Russia and China: What divides them?

Occupied Ukraine: Pro-Russian TikTok users

Russia: Who will lead the Wagner group?

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Editorial

Who We Are At BBC Monitoring, we track, translate, summarise and analyse local media sources to make sense of what is happening on the ground around the world. Our international perspective means we keep across broadcast, press and social media sources in multiple languages, especially where reliable news and information are in short supply.

Dear all,

With BBC Monitoring, you are uniquely well-informed, wherever you are in the world.

Welcome to the winter edition of BBC Monitoring’s magazine. It is of course no surprise that this time our cover article focuses on the Israel-Gaza war. Our regional experts explore the narratives being played out on Israel and Hamas media outlets.

• Headquartered in London with 12 international bureaux in key locations • 220 staff, plus a global network of contributors • Working in more than 100 languages • Covering 150 countries • 300 stories added every day • Online database has over 7 million entries dating back to 1995 and our archive stretches back to 1939 2

Liz Howell Director, BBC Monitoring

Looking beyond the Middle East, our Russia and Ukraine specialist Vitaliy Shevchenko tells us how his role as a co-presenter on the BBC’s Ukrainecast podcast enables him to bring his in-depth knowledge of both Russia and Ukraine to a mass audience. And another of our Russian specialists describes the growth of pro-Kremlin TikTok influencers in Ukraine’s occupied Donetsk and Luhansk regions. This edition also zooms in on China’s influence around the world – including Beijing’s relationship with Moscow, as well as Chinese investment in Latin America. I hope you enjoy reading it as much as I have. Liz

Monitor magazine: editorial team MANAGING EDITOR: John Sutherland PICTURES AND DESIGN: Claudia Harding GUEST EDITOR: Nel Hodge

Contact Us BBC Monitoring London Broadcasting House Portland Place, London W1A 1AA United Kingdom monitoring@bbc.co.uk linkedin.com/company/bbcmonitoring

Front cover: Monitoring the Middle East: TV channels in the region Back cover: Israeli heavy armour and tanks in a staging area on 14 October near Sderot, Israel.

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Featured Stories 4

Hamas’s media operations Dana Doulah and Kaylan Geiger report on the development of Hamas’s media operations.

13 Chinese

investment in Latin America Luis Fajardo on the controversy around Chinese investment in Latin American infrastructure projects.

22 Who will lead Wagner?

Gleb Borshchevskii examines the potential candidates to lead the Russian private military company following the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin.

Hostage releases Joel Greenberg reports on how the Israeli media have reacted to Hamas’s videos of hostage releases.

16 Occupied Ukraine Sandro Gvindadze reports on pro-Russian TikTok users posting in occupied Ukraine.

26 Living the Story Vitaly Shevchenko writes about covering Ukraine from the newsroom.

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10 China and Russia What do China and Russia agree on? And what divides them? Our China and Russian teams tell us.

18 INSIDE

MONITORING Sevinj Mahdavi tells us how BBCM has monitored Nagorno Karabakh since the 1990s.

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The evolution of Hamas media operations The surprise attack by Hamas gunmen on southern Israel on 7 October highlighted a shift from traditional media to other platforms, especially the messaging app Telegram. The day before the attack, the Hamas Telegram channel had around 41,000 subscribers. That number had tripled to 120,000 by 11 October. BBC Monitoring’s Dana Doulah and Kaylan Geiger track developments in the media environment in the Gaza Strip. Here they describe Hamas’s carefully orchestrated media strategy.

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IDF soldiers in armoured personnel carriers ahead of ground operation in Gaza

Hamas uses propaganda videos of its fighters training to send a message to the “enemy” – Israel

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AL-AQSA TV

ASHRAF AMRA/ANADOLU AGENCY VIA GETTY IMAGES

Al-Aqsa TV trumpets Hamas’s claim to be a better alternative than West Bank authorities for leading the Palestinian “resistance” against Israel

Israeli air forces target shopping centre in Gaza Strip

Gaza media dominance Most media outlets in the Gaza Strip are affiliated with Hamas or the territory’s second most powerful group, Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The surprise attack by Hamas gunmen on southern Israel on 7 October was a gamechanger that revealed an evolution in the Palestinian militant group’s media strategy. The 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections created a protracted divide between the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, as the latter won more seats than its rival Fatah – the dominant party in the PA. The subsequent rift in governance of the Palestinian territories enabled Hamas to expand its media dominance in Gaza, where it has primarily relied on traditional forms of media, especially al-Aqsa TV, to augment its messaging. Hamas’s Al-Aqsa TV was established that year. The TV channel is instrumental in bolstering Hamas’s campaign by providing a platform for the group’s candidates and its agenda. It has been key in disseminating Hamas’s pro-Islamist messaging and regularly airs propaganda by the group and its armed wing, the Izz-al-Din al-Qassam Brigades.

Al-Aqsa TV has been a key channel for Hamas messaging and propaganda

Al-Aqsa TV serves as a platform for Hamas to trumpet the group’s ability to lead Palestinians in the “resistance” movement against Israel as an alternative to the West Bank authorities. Despite Israeli bombings of its headquarters during fighting in 2008, 2014, 2018 and 2021, al-Aqsa TV often found its way back on air by using mobile facilities and alternative locations. During the 2018-2019 protest movement along Gaza’s barrier with Israel, also known as the “Great March of Return”, al-Aqsa TV regularly broadcast footage of the demonstrations. It aired speeches by key Hamas figures, such as Gaza-based leader Yahya Sinwar, advocating that Palestinians stay the course. While the Qatar-funded Al Jazeera TV is the most-watched channel in the Palestinian territories, according to a 2022 study by the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research, al-Aqsa TV comes in second place.

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Palestinian Information Center A network of online media has also been key to disseminating Hamas’s messaging to Gaza and the wider Palestinian diaspora. This includes the Palestinian Information Center which was established in 1997 and is the oldest Hamas-affiliated outlet. Hamas also runs the Safa and Shehab news agencies and The Felesteen newspaper. The newspaper has the largest daily in circulation in Gaza, and its content amplifies Hamas’s messaging against Israel – described as “the occupier” – and its political adversaries in the West Bank. The official websites of Hamas and the al-Qassam Brigades – both of which have English versions – are the main sources for statements by the group and its armed wing. The websites are not accessible from some countries, including the UK and Egypt. In Egypt, the concern is likely to be the Islamist group’s origins in the Muslim Brotherhood.

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Subscriber figures for both the Hamas and al-Qassam Brigades channels skyrocketed after the 7 October attack on Israel The Al-Qassam Brigades’ spokesman, Abu Ubaida

Telegram – Hamas’s microphone

As the power of social media grew in the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, Hamas and its affiliated media established a foothold on the major platforms. The group used its official and social media accounts to promote its agenda, often focusing on its confrontations with Israel, but also its governance of Gaza.

The curtailing of Hamas’s social media presence has resulted in a new strategy that has seen the group pivot towards another platform: Telegram.

Hamas developed production skills in various media forms, including propaganda videos of its fighters training, to send a message to the “enemy”, meaning Israel. It also used social media to circulate videos and songs in Hebrew. In 2017, Hamas published an animated music video in Hebrew – titled “Zionists, you will perish in Gaza” – on YouTube, depicting threats of violence against the Israeli army.

Official Telegram channels for Hamas and the al-Qassam Brigades were created in 2015, a year after a weeks-long deadly conflict between Gaza-based groups and Israel. They disseminate propaganda videos and messaging, which are often picked up by Hamas’s media outlets.

Since Hamas launched its attack on southern Israel on 7 October, subscriber numbers for both the Hamas and al-Qassam Brigades channels have skyrocketed, according to data from the Telegram channels and groups catalogue TGStat. On 6 October, the Hamas Telegram channel had around 41,000 subscribers. That number tripled to 120,000 by 11 October. The al-Qassam Brigades Telegram channel saw its subscriber number more than double from 200,000 before the war to nearly 580,000 as of 11 October.

The al-Qassam Brigades Telegram channel shows fighters firing rockets

QASSAM BRIGADES/TELEGRAM

Social media foothold

But the video was taken down, and nearly all of the group’s official accounts and some belonging to its media have been removed from social media – namely Facebook, Twitter and Instagram – in recent years.

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The Al-Qassam Brigades shared videos of attack on Telegram

The al-Qassam Brigades Telegram channel has surpassed the popularity of those run by influential armed groups based in the West Bank, such as the Nablus-based Lions’ Den, which has around 253,000 subscribers on its Telegram channel. The rise of Hamas’s Telegram channels appears to result from a carefully orchestrated media strategy.

Increasing restrictions

As Hamas fighters began their assault, the al-Qassam Brigades began sharing heavily edited videos of a much higher quality than usual on its Telegram channel. Some of these appear to have been filmed with drones or GoPro cameras to document the attack as events unfolded. These videos have been widely shared across Hamas media, including during live broadcasts on al-Aqsa TV, as well as on social media.

Following criticism from Israel, Telegram’s founder initially suggested shutting down Hamas’s channels would only exacerbate the conflict. However, the channels of both Hamas and its armed wing began to see increasing restrictions until both became inaccessible on most mobile devices in late October.

The heavy reliance on Telegram illustrates an endeavour by Hamas to dominate the media narrative early on, in an attempt to counter perceptions of Israel’s invulnerability.

Nevertheless, both remain a key source of information from which Hamas’s traditional media platforms continue to disseminate its messaging as the war continues.

Dana Doulah is a journalist in our Jerusalem office; Kaylan Geiger is a senior journalist in our Cairo office

AL-AQSA TV

The Telegram channel of al-Qassam Brigades spokesman Abu Ubeida also boasts a high subscriber count, of nearly 395,000.

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Al-Aqsa TV has returned to air several times after Israeli strikes

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Israeli TV channels air and denounce Hamas hostage handover videos Israeli TV channels have broadcast Hamas’s footage of handovers of Israeli hostages to the Red Cross, calling them staged scenes meant to burnish the militant group’s image. Anchors and reporters have denounced the cheering crowds seen in the videos, saying the freed hostages were forced to wave back at militants who were seen bidding them farewell, Israel specialist Joel Greenberg reports.

Israeli television channels have aired Hamas footage of the handover of released Israeli hostages to the Red Cross in the Gaza Strip in recent days, calling the raucous scenes and friendly goodbye waves by militants staged events meant to boost the Palestinian group’s image.

HAMAS PRESS OFFICE / HANDOUT/ANADOLU VIA GETTY IMAGES

In their nightly news bulletins the channels have rebroadcast footage of handovers shown on the Al Jazeera satellite channel and video released by Hamas showing the Israeli women and children, flanked by masked gunmen cheered by crowds, walking to waiting Red Cross vehicles. The freed Israelis are seen taking water bottles offered by the militants and making their way, accompanied by shouts and whistles, to Red Cross jeeps, where some trade farewell waves and goodbyes with the gunmen before the vehicles move away, trailed by crowds of onlookers, some chanting support for the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s armed wing. Israeli television anchors and reporters have described the hostages as running a frightening gauntlet of jeering Palestinians in choreographed scenes orchestrated by Hamas to present its militants as humane captors generously handing over their prisoners.

crowds of onlookers, some chanting support for the Izz al-Din alQassam Brigades

Video screen grab shows Israeli hostages in Gaza handed to Red Cross MONITORING.BBC.CO.UK

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WAHAJ BANI MOUFLEH/MIDDLE EAST IMAGES/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

staged events meant to boost the Palestinian group’s image

Two Israeli-Russian hostages in a van after their release by Hamas

“Barbaric throng”

“Exploiting the stage”

Udi Segal, an anchor on Channel 13 News, said in an evening broadcast of a handover on 29 November that the freed hostages had shown resilience in the face of “this barbaric throng of people participating in the Hamas show, willingly and not only because they were compelled, and enjoying this humiliating scene.”

Commenting on the series of videoed handovers by Hamas since the start of the truce in the Gaza-Israel war on 24 November, Segal, the Channel 13 anchor, said the militant group was “exploiting the stage to create a show of a warm farewell and a surrealistic scene of masked men giving a friendly wave to frightened children.”

In a parallel broadcast on Channel 11 of the public broadcaster Kan, anchor Michal Rabinovich described “these pictures of the crowd storming the vehicles, jeering and roaring at our hostages who have to go through this threatening episode, surrounding them on all sides – undoubtedly more long minutes of fear that they are going through.” The channel’s military correspondent, Roy Sharon, added: “These are the so-called civilians in the Gaza Strip, happy as if it was their daily entertainment… subhumans, in these most difficult moments when [the hostages] pass before their eyes.”

In a voice-over of several handover scenes, Hezi Simantov, the channel’s Arab affairs reporter, said that Hamas was “staging a final show of psychological terrorism with the kidnapped.” Hamas was “staging every step” of the released hostages in the videos, Simantov said, showing a segment in which a masked Hamas militant bidding goodbye to hostages in a Red Cross jeep is heard saying, “Keep waving.” The audio was later deleted by Hamas, according to the report.

Michael Shemesh, the channel’s political reporter, added that the scene looked like “the moment before a lynching.” “Hamas is rearing its head,” he added. ”Hamas wants to demonstrate its power…these are the images that Hamas wants to broadcast.”

“The aim: an attempt to show ‘humanitarian’ treatment of the kidnapped,” Simantov added. “Some of them – at the demand of the terrorists, of course – wave goodbye to the monsters who murdered their relatives and neighbours and kidnapped them.” Many of the freed hostages lost relatives in the Hamas attack on their border communities on 7 October, and some were leaving relatives behind in captivity, news outlets have reported. According to the Israeli authorities, about 1,200 people, mostly civilians, were killed in the assault. “It is clear to the Israeli public that whoever kidnaps babies, women and elderly people cannot burnish their murderous image through video clips of children waving goodbye,” Simantov said. “The big question is whether the world, which has been flooded with antiIsraeli sentiment in recent weeks, buys these staged lies of Hamas.”

Joel Greenberg is a senior journalist in our Jerusalem office

Airing the same scene of the surging crowd on Channel 12, anchor Yonit Levi said it showed a “lack of control”, which the channel’s military reporter said was endangering the hostages. MONITORING.BBC.CO.UK

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Where Moscow and Beijing do not see eye-to-eye China and Russia are two of the world’s most powerful countries. They have both been critical of the current world order, which they see as dominated by the West. Despite appearances of a strong relationship, they do not always see eye to eye. Our Russia and China teams report: China rolled out the red carpet for world leaders at a summit to mark 10 years of its global infrastructure project, the Belt and Road Initiative.

Much was made of the seemingly strong relationship between the two powers but there are also areas where they do not always see eye-to-eye. This article examines four of those areas.

Defying an ICC arrest warrant against him for the war in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin travelled to Beijing for the event. China’s Xi, Russia’s Putin attend the opening of the third Belt and Road Forum

PEDRO PARDO/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

China and Russia have unique national interests MONITORING.BBC.CO.UK

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China’s peace plan viewed? China has positioned itself as a peace broker, publishing a 12-point proposal for a “political solution” to the Ukraine conflict in February 2023. China’s peace plan does not endorse Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territories, yet criticises Western sanctions. It also calls on Russia and Ukraine to stop fighting.

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China has also displayed open support for the Black Sea Grain Initiative even as Russia withdrew from it. The deal to safeguard the export of Ukrainian grain was brokered by the UN and Turkey in July 2022.

Putin hinted that China might fall prey to a Western quest for domination

And while many have speculated on whether China is providing military support to Russia, Beijing has repeatedly denied this. It is also worth noting that Moscow said in April the two countries planned to expand “military trade”, though this was not mentioned in Chinese media or official statements.

The Vice President of the People’s Republic of China Han Zheng speaks at UN General Assembly

World order: Fix it or break it?

Diplomacy: Pragmatism or assertiveness? The most recent face-to-face meeting between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin took place in Moscow in March 2023, a year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In a coordinated move, both leaders published articles in each other’s leading state media on the eve of Xi’s visit. The articles reiterated the usual narratives, praising personal friendship and their countries’ partnership. However, there were disparities in their views on bilateral ties and perceived common rivals, notably the US and the West. In his piece, Putin took a direct swipe at the US policy of “dual containment of Russia and China”. He hinted that China might soon fall prey to a Western quest for “domination” by asserting that Nato sought to “penetrate the Asia-Pacific region”.

Xi’s article was released a few hours after Putin’s and struck a notably milder note. Without explicitly naming any countries, Xi reaffirmed China’s foreign policy of non-alignment, nonconfrontation, and “not targeting third parties”. Over the past decade, Putin’s praise for the partnership has notably been more fervent. He has said the relationship reached the “highest level ever”, with “no boundaries or no-go zones”. In contrast, Xi summarised their cooperation as “having made great progress and entering a new era”. Nonetheless, Putin’s assertion that “there is no leader or follower” in their partnership was seen as an indirect rebuke to the perception that Russia had become China’s junior partner.

Ukraine war: How is

Both China and Russia have been critical of the current world order, which they see as dominated by the West, but there are differences. A comparison of their officials’ speeches at the UN General Assembly in September shows a variation in both tone and content. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov gave a fiery speech calling the West an “empire of lies” which had divided the world into “hostile blocs”. He also accused Nato of targeting Russia and China, and said the “failing” global order needed to accommodate new organisations like Brics. China’s Vice President Han Zheng talked more of respect, dialogue and “win-win outcomes”, as well as an “improvement in global governance”. He stressed China was a “staunch supporter of the international system with the United Nations at its core”. While Moscow complains about the world order, Beijing has been promoting three of Xi’s signature policies: the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative and Global Civilisation Initiative.

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China’s activities in the Arctic have raised concerns in Russia; Beijing downplayed any irritation over Kim Jongun trip to Russia Harbour area of Russian coal mining town Barentsburg

Regional influence: Competition in each other’s backyards Historical mistrust and tension between China and Russia have deep roots, primarily stemming from ideological differences and territorial disputes, including a split during the Cold War.

China has been actively expanding its economic and political sway in Central Asia, an area traditionally seen as Russia’s backyard. The region is crucial to China’s vast infrastructure project, the Belt and Road Initiative. By hosting the China-Central Asia Summit in Xi’an in May 2023 without inviting Moscow, Beijing aimed to depict itself as a generous and reliable partner for countries that were once part of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Russia had been expanding its influence in South East Asia, a region traditionally considered China’s domain, by boosting ties and diplomatic engagements. Much was also made of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un recent trip to Moscow, where military cooperation was in sharp focus. North Korea is China’s neighbour and communist ally, though Beijing downplayed any irritation over Kim’s trip. China has long declared itself a “nearArctic” country and has outlined its goals and plans for the development of a “Polar Silk Road”. It has also been investing in ports and infrastructure, and conducting military exercises in the Arctic, another region of strategic importance to Russia.

The bottom line: Looking after your own interests This raised concerns in Russia. With Russia’s national strength in “recession” due to the focus on Ukraine, there have been suggestions that its economic hegemony in the Arctic Circle is beginning to “melt like ice” and China “no longer needs to care about Russia’s official policy” on the issue. The South China Sea is another region of vital interest to China. There was strong reaction from Chinese bloggers, when a seminar called “Fostering Peaceful Development in the South China Sea through International Law”, organised by Russian think tanks in July 2023, extended invitations to nations like Vietnam, the Philippines and India, but excluded China.

KIM JAE-HWAN/SOPA IMAGES/LIGHTROCKET VIA GETTY IMAGES

In recent years, both countries have ventured into each other’s traditional spheres of influence, often driven by their own strategic interests.

MARTIN ZWICK/REDA&CO/UNIVERSAL IMAGES GROUP VIA GETTY IMAGES)

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China and Russia are two of the world’s most powerful countries, each with their unique national interests. China is now the world’s secondlargest economy, and its military is rapidly modernising, while Russia faces economic and military challenges, exacerbated by the Ukraine war. In common, they share an interest in dismantling US “hegemony” and profess to advocate a more multipolar world order.

North Korea’s Kim Jong Un with Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu watch military parade in Pyongyang

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LatAm soaks up China investment, but critics see dangers As a Chinese investment boom advances throughout Latin America, local media commentators have expressed concerns about its effects, Latin America specialist Luis Fajardo writes.

US influence falls as Chinese presence grows

Some even see these projects as Trojan horses for what they describe as Chinese plans for political and military domination. Other commentators say that, despite misgivings, Latin American governments continue to court Chinese capital. They argue that many of the problems faced by past projects in the region stem from local corruption, not from shortcomings particular to Chinese investment.

The USA, the traditionally dominant power in the region, is often described these days as “disengaged” in its relations with Latin America. China, on the other hand, has been heavily promoting economic “partnerships” to develop infrastructure in the Americas, either through its ambitious global Belt and Road Initiative, or through other major projects. A report by Mexico-based Chinesestudies academic network RedalcChina estimated that the value of Chinese investment in 192 Latin American infrastructure projects built up to 2021 totalled around 98bn US dollars.

CAMILO FREEDMAN/APHOTOGRAFIA/GETTY IMAGES

Projects funded by China are being singled out for their negative environmental consequences, flawed execution and corruption scandals associated with many of them.

The report estimated that, just in the 2020-21 period, Chinese companies had completed 57 projects worth 32 billion dollars, generating more than 170,000 jobs in Latin America and the Caribbean. Also, 21 countries in the region have formally joined the Belt and Road Initiative. According to a March 2023 report by the Financial Times, “Latin America was the recipient of 24% of the loans granted by Chinese official institutions worldwide between 2005 and the end of 2021, ranking behind Asia (29%) but ahead of Africa (23%).” However, as China’s economic footprint in the region grows, so does reaction to what many see as social, environmental, political and economic downsides to the Asian nation’s investment in their countries.

Construction of the port and tourist pier of La Libertad, El Salvador

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CHEPA BELTRAN/LONG VISUAL PRESS/UNIVERSAL IMAGES GROUP VIA GETTY IMAGES

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Chinese plans for political and military domination Bogota’s mayor Claudia Lopez steps out of Metro car as work starts on metro system

Concerns about China’s flagship infrastructure project in Colombia

Controversial projects

One example of this continent-wide backlash occurred with the release, in February 2023, of a report by a coalition of international and local NGOs presenting 14 cases of Chinese development projects in nine Latin American countries which, according to the report, resulted in human rights or environmental violations. The study, by the International Service for Human Rights (ISHR) and the Collective on Chinese Financing and Investments, Human Rights and Environment (CICDHA), was widely reported in local media.

It looked at ongoing China-funded projects as diverse as the Rucalhue hydroelectric dam in Chile, the Buritica gold mine in Colombia and the Maya Train in Mexico, to name a few. “In every case, these corporate abuses take place in fragile ecosystems that, on the whole, lack adequate environmental impact studies and result in significant environmental damage that affects people’s right to enjoy a healthy environment, water and access to food,” the report argued.

Many other major Chinese investments in the region also face criticism. On 23 September, the leading Colombian news site Semana published a story it headlined: “Corruption in the Bogota metro?” about a project to build a mass transit system in the Colombian capital. The report alleged that the Colombian authorities had been investigating unconfirmed reports of bribes involving at least one Chinese national and several leaders of the Bogota city administration. In 2019, the Colombian government selected a consortium led by Chinese companies China Harbour Engineering Company Limited and XI’AN Rail Transportation Group Company Limited to build the first line of the Bogota Metro. They were awarded a contract worth around 4bn US dollars for the largest infrastructure project currently under construction in the country and the largest-ever involving Chinese investment in Colombia.

China’s Cosco Shipping is building a port in Chancay, Peru

ERNESTO BENAVIDES/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

In May 2023, Bogota city authorities announced concern over the Chinese consortium’s delay in submitting technical studies needed for preliminary construction activities.

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Media reports insinuated the possibility of corruption, which was strenuously denied by the Chinese consortium on 25 September. Semana published a statement by the group saying that their project could show “the highest standards of ethics and business integrity in Colombia”.

CARLOS GARCIA GRANTHON/FOTOHOLICA PRESS/LIGHTROCKET VIA GETTY IMAGES

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social media interest in the metro spiralled upon publication of the report

As social media interest in the metro spiralled upon publication of the report, increasing from 558 mentions on 22 September to 12,285 on 23 September, some commentators focused on the allegations of corruption. Carlos Galan, who won October’s mayoral election in Bogota, published on 23 September a post on social media platform X saying the allegations of graft in the China-led project were “very serious” and he demanded a quick investigation by judiciary authorities. Another post on X by independent news site Bandalos, wrote about “#Corruption in the #metro of Bogota. More than 10 billion pesos [2.5 million US dollars] in bribes between a Chinese guy, mayor Claudia Lopez and the Colombian Green Party”. The post had been viewed more than 36,000 times.

Criticism of Chinese investment

One characteristic of criticism of Chinese investment in Latin America is that it often does not target one project by a particular Chinese company, but expresses concern about Chinese investments in general. Another frequent point of contention with Chinese participation in infrastructure projects is the argument that Chinese economic investments only act as cover for geopoliticalmilitarily inspired objectives.

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Finally, while there is abundant commentary in the region regarding the potential downsides of Chinese investment, Latin American voices are also quick to point out that local corruption and mismanagement, rather than just problems allegedly inherent to Chinese involvement in these projects, were also to blame in many instances of failed initiatives.

Luis Fajardo is a senior journalist in our Miami office

In Lima, the Chinese Charity Society’s performers mark the anniversary of People’s Republic of China MONITORING.BBC.CO.UK

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Pro-Russia TikTokers in occupied Ukraine hail invasion Sandro Gvindadze, a BBC Monitoring Russia specialist, has been examining the growth of pro-Kremlin TikTok influencers in Ukraine’s occupied Donetsk and Luhansk regions. He discusses how they use their accounts to spread pro-Russia narratives.

Glorifying Russia unification A new generation of pro-Kremlin TikTok influencers has emerged in Ukraine’s occupied Donetsk and Luhansk regions, large parts of which have been controlled by Russia-backed separatists since 2014.

The occupied regions, known collectively as Donbas, were declared annexed by Vladimir Putin on 30 September 2022, along with Kherson and Zaporizhzhya regions that are also partially occupied by Russia.

Despite having a relatively modest audience of between 10,000-30,000 followers, some of the videos published by pro-Russia TikTokers based in Donetsk and Luhansk regions have garnered hundreds of thousands, or even millions of views.

The TikTokers promote pro-Russia narratives, praise the construction work and renovations done by Russiainstalled administrations, and according to them, the whole of Ukraine’s Donbas region belongs to Russia.

TIKTOK

BBC Monitoring identified over 10 TikTok channels featuring stories from Donetsk and Luhansk, glorifying “reunification” with Russia.

“Videos about changes in Luhansk are provocative for Ukrainian users”

“Such a beautiful case”, Pavel Karbovsky boasts

Gift from Putin Kosmonavt_donbass channel (over 20,000 followers) mainly publishes videos from Donetsk and, more recently, Mariupol. It is run by Pavel Karbovsky, whose profile on the Russian social network VKontakte says he worked until 2022 for Molodaya Respublika (Young Republic) – a local organisation affiliated with the Russia-installed government of the region. Karbovsky’s debut video, posted on 4 October 2022, features a woman lamenting the damage caused by a rocket strike. That video had almost five million views at the time of reporting. Another video shows Karbovsky boasting of a “gift from Vladimir Putin” – a smartphone case adorned with Russia’s coat of arms and the president’s signature. A recent video shows a new school built in the Russia-occupied city of Mariupol. “I thought it was photoshopped until I visited this wonderful school myself,” he says over footage of a quote by the Russian president painted on a school wall.

City of patriots The same building features in a video by the lebedev_zhenya channel, which appears to have been active since 7 July 2022, with over 26,000 followers. In one video, Zhenya Lebedev celebrates the “liberation of Donbas”. In another, he describes Donetsk as a “patriotic city”.

One of the pro-Russian TikTok channels found by BBC Monitoring MONITORING.BBC.CO.UK

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Lebedev also addresses all “lovers of Europe and ‘greatest’ Nato” and says in a recent video: “Don’t take it out on Russia because you don’t have it any better”. This phrase echoes the Kremlin propaganda’s portrayal of a “decaying West”. Russian dailies Moskovsky Komsomolets and Argumenti i Fakti have referred to him as a “journalist” and “blogger” from Donetsk.

‘Full support’ for Russia

Justifying the invasion

The only TikToker who responded to BBC Monitoring’s request for comment was Viktor Borisenko, a taxi driver from Luhansk who runs a channel with over 22,000 followers.

Dr Olga Boichak of the University of Sydney told BBC Monitoring that such TikTok channels could be part of a broader Russian influence ecosystem.

He reviews fast food chains and car washes, and offers tips for drivers. Borisenko also publishes videos of reconstruction work in the city, often captioned as “what the ‘occupants’ are doing in Luhansk”. One such video gained over 100,000 views. “For the first time since 2014, my hometown is finally beginning to live a new life”, Borisenko told BBC Monitoring, adding that he “fully supports” Russia and the annexation of Luhansk and Donetsk, as they “have always been pro-Russia”. Borisenko, who has run his channel for two years, claims it is watched all over Ukraine.

TikTok’s response In March 2022, less than two weeks after invading Ukraine, Russia adopted a so-called “fake news” law, threatening those who spread what the Kremlin deems as “fake” information about Russia’s armed forces with up to 15 years in jail. In response, TikTok suspended around 36 million Russian users and made content posted by accounts based outside Russia unavailable in the country. The ban is still in effect. As of 29 September, none of the channels mentioned in this analysis was accessible in Moscow, BBC Monitoring verified.

LEBEDEV

_ZHENYA

“Videos about changes in Luhansk are quite provocative for Ukrainian users. They tend to incite strong reactions in the comments sections which attract recommendations, and gain views”, he said.

According to her, the Kremlin could be using pro-Russian Tiktokers in Donbas to justify the invasion by pushing the “business as usual” narrative and downplaying the extent of destruction caused by the Russian occupation.

JEKSON_DO

Lebedev shows pictures of “Terrible side of Germany”

‘Eight years of war’ The first video on the jekson_don TikTok account (over 64 thousand followers) dates back to 14 October 2020, but it began featuring patriotic messages in May 2022.

In February, TikTok took down two networks of pro-Russian influencers which it said aimed to deceive Europeans about the war in Ukraine. TikTok also removed several channels after BBC Monitoring flagged them up to the video-hosting service. Most, however, were still on the platform at the time of reporting.

Despite the channel’s description indicating “no politics”, many of its videos convey a narrative suggesting that since 2014, the West has been turning a blind eye to “Kyiv’s war” against Donbas. This is one of the justifications the Kremlin uses to explain its invasion of Ukraine.

Sandro Gvindadze is a journalist in our Russia team

TikTokers from the city of Luhansk echo similar narratives.

“Memorials dedicated to the defenders of Donbas were installed in Donetsk”

“With Russia forever”, says the caption of a video, echoing another Kremlin propaganda message.

In September, Borisenko was featured on Russian state TV MONITORING.BBC.CO.UK

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Channel deeeeniiiis (over 26,000 followers) mainly publishes video reviews of shops, cafes and restaurants but occasionally glorifies the region’s “reunification” with Russia.

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Inside Inside Monitoring Monitoring E SESSESNETNI T A ILA L M EMDEI D AI A I N ISNI S G IHGTH T

You’ve You’ve seen seen thethe What, What, thisthis is the is the How. How. Inside Inside Monitoring Monitoring is aisblog a blog written written by by ourour staff staff – journalists, journalists, linguists linguists andand analysts analysts from from around around thethe world. world. With With access access to local to local sources sources andand a nuanced a nuanced understanding understanding of language of language andand context, context, they they truly truly livelive thethe stories stories andand areare able able to identify to identify what what other other news news organisations organisations may may miss. miss. In this In this edition, column, we they talk about talk about our new, theirimproved experiences, formats initiatives for our and content. challenges. 18

For a view from the other side, turn to Outside Monitoring on page 28.

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ARMENIAN KENTRON TV, YOUTUBE .

monitoring of media sources from inside the region is in limbo

Armenians fleeing from Nagorno Karabakh in September

BBCM prepares for changed media landscape in Nagorno-Karabakh 19

In September, the separatist authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh surrendered to Azerbaijan and separatist media operations closed. Sevinj Mahdavi reflects on how this shift in the media landscape has left the monitoring of local sources in limbo. BBC Monitoring has been watching developments in Azerbaijan's breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh region since the early 1990s, initially basing the coverage on reports from Russian media sources and a few Armenian and Azerbaijani outlets.

Azerbaijan had in 1994 signed a ceasefire agreement in the Karabakh war with Armenia, and four months later Baku concluded the “contract of the century” with major global oil giants to develop its hydrocarbon reserves in the Caspian Sea.

By the time I joined in 1999, we had begun direct monitoring of media based in Armenia and Azerbaijan.

At the same time, intense peace negotiations started between Azerbaijan and Armenia. They were mediated by Russia, the USA and France – OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs.

BBC Monitoring’s Baku office was opened in 1997, at a time of increased activity in the region.

BBC Monitoring’s Baku Office had plenty of high profile news to monitor and report.

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First Karabakh recruits sent copy via email In 2001, the head of the bureau travelled to Karabakh to recruit our first freelancer. Our freelancers made us uniquely placed to monitor local media and sent their copy to us by email. Our first recruit was David Babayan, whose post-BBC career in politics saw him rise to the position of foreign minister of the breakaway Karabakh region and adviser to the Karabakh president. He is now in detention for separatist activities. As the Karabakh media became available digitally, the Armenianspeaking staff at BBCM’s offices in Yerevan and Baku took over the region's monitoring, producing a variety of products from Karabakh media.

KAREN MINASYAN/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

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the Azerbaijani authorities will prevent any Armenian media broadcasting to the region

Former BBCM freelancer David Babayan, spokesman of the Armenia-backed separatist presidency in Karabakh, giving press conference in 2016

Digitisation sustains 2020 war aftermath In 2020, Azerbaijan and Armenia fought a 44-day war over Karabakh which resulted in Azerbaijan regaining control of a larger part of the former breakaway republic. By this time, both the Yerevan and Baku offices of BBCM were closed, but we still had a small team of ICs and staff based in these cities and in Tbilisi who continued to monitor developments.

The public TV station – Artsakh TV – was available to monitor digitally, while official agencies had digital platforms, including the separatist government's online information centre which is still a useful source of news. Digitisation efforts over the years bore fruit and helped sustain coverage.

For Azerbaijan, the town of Shusha is the cradle of its culture

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Even after the war, local media in Karabakh continued operating in the part of the region still under Armenian control.

any media source operating in Karabakh will be managed from Baku MONITORING.BBC.CO.UK

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PRESIDENT.AZ WEBSITE.

Journalist Details: <2 lines centre plus 3> lines centre on first three

Azerbaijan regained territory around breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh

Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev in Khankendi after the fall of the separatist government

State of limbo after separatist exodus

Armenian language coverage

This all changed when the Karabakh separatist government surrendered on 20 September 2023, triggering the mass departure of the ethnic Armenian population to Armenia and the closure of media operations in the enclave.

So far, BBCM has identified only one online source (Baku TV International) that publishes news reports for the Armenian-speaking audience.

Now that media outlets run by the separatist authorities have ceased to exist, the monitoring of media sources from inside the region is in limbo. There is also a lack of clarity over what new media outlets Baku will establish.

Transmission towers built after the 2020 war ensure coverage of the area by national broadcasters. In October, Azerbaijan issued licences to Azerbaijani TV and radio stations to air their programmes in Karabakh, including those broadcasting in Armenian.

This means that any media source operating in Karabakh will be managed from Baku, and we can also assume the Azerbaijani authorities will prevent any Armenian media broadcasting to the region. 21

Sevinj Mahdavi is a journalist in our Tbilisi office

Online news source Baku TV International

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Who will lead the Wagner group after Prigozhin? Russian specialist Gleb Borshchevskii looks at what the future holds for the leadership of the Wagner group.

Portraits of warlords and Wagner Group founders Prigozhin and Utkin at street memorial for PMC Wagner Group in Moscow

In June, five days after PMC Wagner’s failed mutiny against the Russian military leadership, President Vladimir Putin met with 35 of the group’s commanders, including Wagner boss Yevgeny Prigozhin and, presumably, Dmitry “Wagner” Utkin. At the meeting, Putin offered Wagnerites the chance to serve under a new commander: Andrei Troshev – call sign Sedoi – a Wagner staff officer who defected around the time of the mutiny. Prigozhin refused the offer.

Wagnerites appeared to take Troshev’s “betrayal” close to heart

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CONTRIBUTOR/GETTY IMAGES

In September, just over a month after Prigozhin’s and Utkin’s death in a plane crash in Tver Region, Putin again met Troshev, who was put in charge of “volunteer units”, with Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov.

MIKHAIL METZEL/POOL/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

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pro-Kremlin commentators rushed to congratulate Troshev Russia’s Putin meets Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and chairman of the League for Protecting Interests of Veterans of Local Wars and Military Conflicts, Andrei Troshev

While pro-Kremlin commentators rushed to congratulate Troshev on “taking control of Wagner”, channels affiliated with the group were mostly silent. In October, however, Wagner mouthpiece Grey Zone announced that overall, the group would be led by Prigozhin’s son, Pavel Prigozhin, and an unspecified second person, presumably as head of military operations. Who is Andrei Troshev, what do the Wagnerites think of him, what force will he command, and could he be the “person who took over” Wagner?

Yevgeny Prigozhin, Andrei Troshev and war blogger Semyon Pegov

Colonel Sedoi According to a report by St Petersburgbased news website Fontanka, Andrei Troshev graduated from the Leningrad Artillery Command School in the 1980s. He served in the Armed Forces in the 1990s and the 2000s, and received several awards for his participation in the Second Chechen War (1999-2009). By 2015, he retired from the military and briefly served as a police colonel in St Petersburg. According to Fontanka, he met Prigozhin around that time and took part in the emerging Wagner group’s operations in Syria, its first major operation. In 2016, Troshev was awarded a Hero of Russia medal for his participation in the capture of Syria’s Palmyra. In 2017, he and several other Wagner commanders, including Utkin, were photographed alongside Vladimir Putin.

Wagner recruitment leaflet

Little is known of Troshev’s life between 2017 and 2023 but by early 2023, it was clear that he was a senior Wagner figure and his name – and signature – appeared on an official Wagner recruitment leaflet. He was interviewed by a prominent Russian war blogger alongside Prigozhin, Anton “Lotos” Yelizarov and other Wagner commanders. Troshev was Wagner’s liaison with the Defence Ministry, the acting head of the “League for protection of interests of veterans of local wars and military conflicts”, a Wagner front. Several public statements at the time were issued on behalf of both Wagner and the “League”. All featured Troshev’s signature – with many also signed by Prigozhin and Utkin. In June, six days after the Wagner mutiny and one day after Putin’s meeting with Wagner commanders, Grey Zone announced Troshev’s resignation, while appearing to be quite flattering of Troshev.

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‘Senile staff officer’ The tone of Grey Zone and other Wagner channels changed quickly. In July, a day after the Kremlin confirmed that Putin had offered Wagner commanders the chance to serve under Troshev, Grey Zone forwarded a message attributed to one of them, a man with the call sign Iceman, who dismissed Troshev as an “unremarkable” person who “took no part in planning” Wagner’s operations. In August, several Wagner channels, including Grey Zone, said both Troshev and Wagner’s former head of HR, Vadim V. (call sign Khrustal) had “defected” to the Russian Defence Ministry’s private military company (PMC) Redut. Wagnerites appeared to take Troshev’s “betrayal” close to heart. Commander Anton “Lotos” Yelizarov called him a “senile staff officer”.

Grey Zone described Troshev as a “sinful man with traits of character incompatible with his post”, a “chronic alcoholic without command experience, no experience of military planning, who is incapable of keeping service and state secrets, is prone to lies and treason, and is ready to cooperate with British intelligence MI6 to achieve his selfish goals”.

Russian Defence Ministry’s private military company (PMC) Redut

‘Fake’ Wagner

Who ‘took over’ Wagner?

In their condemnation of Troshev, Wagnerites said he was put in charge of the Defence Ministry’s PMC Redut, reportedly set up in 2018 under the aegis of the 45th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade.

Wagner-affiliated channels are yet to respond to Troshev’s alleged “takeover” of the company. But many appear to favour Anton “Lotos” Yelizarov as the group’s potential new commander.

“As expected, PMC Redut inherited all of the issues of the regular military,” Grey Zone said.

In October, 40 days after Prigozhin’s death, Grey Zone said that the company would be led by his son Pavel Prigozhin, as well as another as yet unspecified figure. The group was also negotiating to work alongside Rosgvardiya in Ukraine, Grey Zone added. The talks were, Grey Zone later said, expected to end in late November or December.

In September, Grey Zone said a “fake” Wagner-like unit was formed by Troshev and Khrustal out of Wagner’s “deserters... and those newly recruited on the promises of mountains of gold”. This unit, presumably operating as part of Redut, was “in no way related” to Wagner and would be deployed “to the Bakhmut front”.

In September, war blogger Anastasiya Kashevarova said the head of Rosgvardiya, Army Gen Viktor Zolotov, met Pavel Prigozhin and Anton Yelizarov to discuss Wagner’s future. Kashevarova did not disclose her source, and her post was disregarded by most commentators. However, in the light of reports on Pavel Prigozhin’s bid for the Wagner leadership, and its emerging cooperation with Rosgvardiya, Kashevarova’s post suggests that Lotos, not Troshev, is likely to command Wagner’s troops alongside Prigozhin Jr, with Troshev probably remaining in charge of Redut and REC.

Wagner’s Greyzone Telegram channel

Gleb Borshchevskii is a journalist in our Russia team

Far right outlet Tsargrad website reports on Wagner MONITORING.BBC.CO.UK

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the head of Rosgvardiya, Army Gen Viktor Zolotov, met Pavel Prigozhin and Anton Yelizarov to discuss Wagner’s future

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Russian National Guard Service Director Viktor Zolotov meets army and secret services officers after Wagner mutiny

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Living the story: Vitaly Shevchenko BBC

BBCM Russia and Ukraine specialist Vitaly Shevchenko reflects on how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has put Ukraine at the top of the news agenda – and highlighted the value of BBCM’s regional expertise in the newsroom. Vitaly recording Ukrainecast with Victoria Derbyshire

How times have changed. Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year, the whole world has been discussing places in my home country which seemed forever destined for peaceful obscurity: Orikhiv, Kostyantynivka, Nova Kakhovka… The reasons why these sleepy, leafy towns were thrust into the global spotlight are, of course, tragic: death, destruction and suffering caused by this brutal, senseless war.

These are also the reasons why after years of monitoring I have become heavily involved in broadcasting. I like to think that hailing from eastern Ukraine originally and after spending more than two decades monitoring Russia, I am equipped with the in-depth knowledge necessary to speak authoritatively and impartially about this war. Over the past year and eight months, I have had the honour of working alongside the BBC’s top reporters dedicated to telling the truth about the most important stories there are – stories of life and death. This has been an incredibly enriching, humbling and at times devastatingly emotional and inspirational experience.

A hospital in Orikhiv after Russian shelling

POLINA MELNYK/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

“Where on earth is that? Never heard of it!” was a frequent reaction in the street. Back in those days, pointing out that it was “right next to Russia” often helped.

Broadcasting

A market in Kostyantynivka after a missile strike MONITORING.BBC.CO.UK

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When I first arrived in the UK 20 years ago, I remember how puzzled some were when I said I was from Ukraine.

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the in-depth knowledge necessary to speak authoritatively and impartially about this war

Vitaly being interviewed by John Simpson on Unspun World

Vitaly recording Ukrainecast with Lyse Doucet

Ukrainecast Many of the stories we have covered on the Ukrainecast podcast will stay with me forever. A young mother from Chernihiv whose husband and daughter were killed right in front of her eyes. Women and children learning to walk again after losing their legs in a Russian missile attack on the Kramatorsk train station. A man breaking down in tears after describing how he evacuated civilians from besieged Mariupol. A brave Russian journalist describing how she was apparently poisoned after honestly reporting from Ukraine. An ex-marine from the US rescuing abandoned cats and dogs in eastern Ukraine.

Vitaly appearing on BBC News

This journey has also shown how much BBC Monitoring has to contribute to the BBC’s coverage and the world’s understanding of this war. Verification, context, local knowledge and experience, linguistic skills. Down to things like – is Bakhmut a town or a city? How important is the village of Robotyne? How do you pronounce “Polohy”? Will roads in deepest Zaporizhzhya region become impassable in winter?

This cruel war has put Ukraine firmly on the map even for those who were not aware of its existence 20 years ago. But the price paid for this has been high. Too high. Vitaly Shevchenko is a senior BBCM journalist. He is currently working on the BBC’s Ukrainecast podcast and broadcast news

BBC

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Vitaly with Red Cross worker Viktoria at refugee centre in Polish border town

Russia’s destruction of Kakhovka dam continued to affect environment in July MONITORING.BBC.CO.UK

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BBC Monitoring observes, understands and explains media throughout the world, providing deep insight and enabling organisations to make better, more informed decisions. Our teams monitor and analyse developments in areas including geopolitics, terrorism and other security-related issues for BBC News as well as our clients, who include governments, NGOs and major corporations worldwide.