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Director,
Welcome to the Winter edition of Monitor magazine.
Initially, our plan for this edition had been to look back at the year of elections, but then the dramatic events in Syria shifted our focus. In our cover story, BBC Monitoring’s Jihadist Media Specialist Mina Al-Lami describes how Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani) has evolved from jihadist leader to rebel statesman while fighting to overthrow Bashar al-Assad.
We also take time to reflect on the bumper election year –reporting on the polls in Uzbekistan, Moldova, Georgia, Tunisia and, of course, the USA. Our story on how the US election campaign was viewed around the world was a collaboration between our regional teams and BBC Monitoring’s newest team, the Data Hub. Data journalism is becoming increasingly vital for BBC Monitoring and in this edition’s “Living the Story” feature, the Data Hub shares insights into their daily work.
We also have a fascinating report about the changing world of satellite TV from our Broadcast Reception team. Who would have thought the autumn equinox could disrupt satellite TV signals?
Finally, BBC Monitoring’s customer Siemens AG discusses how they use our service to help ensure security in their international operations.
Enjoy the read!
Liz Howell
Featured Stories
Mina Al-Lami tells us how HTS leader Jolani evolved from jihadist leader to rebel politician.
8 US elections
Our regional teams and our Data Hub tell us how the US presidential election campaign was viewed internationally.
17 Moldova election and referendum
Dave Keeler tells us about changes in satellite TV signal reception.
Natasha Matyukhina brings us up to date with Moldova’s elections and EU referendum.
12 Election in Uzbekistan
Dilmurad Avalbaev reports on the lack of choice for voters in the Uzbek elections.
20 Tunisia votes
Sumaya Bakhsh reports on fading hopes for democracy in the north African country. 22 Outside Monitoring
Matthew Kish writes about how Siemens uses BBCM to help protect its personnel around the world. 24 Georgian elections
Maka Dzneladze on the “parallel realities” presented on the country’s main TV channels after the elections. 26 Living the story
Our newest team, the Data Hub, tells us what it is like working for BBC Monitoring.
From Syrian jihadist leader to rebel politician: how Abu Mohammed al-Jolani reinvented himself
Syrian rebel leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani dropped the nom de guerre associated with his jihadist past and began to use his real name, Ahmed al-Sharaa, in official communiques issued just ahead of the fall of President Bashar al-Assad. Jihadist specialist Mina Al-Lami reports.
This move was part of Jolani’s effort to bolster his legitimacy in a new context, as his Islamist militant group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), leading other rebel factions, announced the capture of the Syrian capital, Damascus, solidifying its control over much of the country.
Jolani’s transformation was not recent, but had been carefully cultivated over the years, evident not only in his public statements and interviews with international outlets but also in his evolving appearance.
Once clad in traditional jihadist militant attire, he has adopted a more Westernstyle wardrobe in the past years. Now, as he leads the offensive, he has donned military fatigues, symbolising his role as the commander of the operations room.
But who is Jolani – or Ahmed al-Sharaa –and why and how has he changed?
Jolani’s journey as a jihadist began in Iraq
Jolani addresses a crowd at Damascus’s landmark Umayyad Mosque
The IS-Iraq link
A 2021 PBS interview with Jolani revealed that he was born in 1982 in Saudi Arabia, where his father worked as an oil engineer until 1989.
In that year, the Jolani family returned to Syria, where he grew up and lived in the Mezzeh neighbourhood of Damascus.
Jolani’s journey as a jihadist began in Iraq, linked to al-Qaeda through the Islamic State (IS) group’s precursor –al-Qaeda in Iraq and, later, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).
After the 2003 US-led invasion, he joined other foreign fighters in Iraq and, in 2005, was imprisoned at Camp Bucca, where he enhanced his jihadist affiliations and later on was introduced to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the quiet scholar who would later go on to lead IS.
In 2011, Baghdadi sent Jolani to Syria with funding to establish al-Nusra Front, a covert faction tied to ISI. By 2012, Nusra had become a prominent Syrian fighting force, hiding its IS and al-Qaeda ties.
Tensions arose in 2013 when Baghdadi’s group in Iraq unilaterally declared the merger of the two groups (ISI and Nusra), declaring the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS), and publicly revealing for the first time the links between them.
Jolani resisted, as he wanted to distance his group from ISI’s violent tactics, leading to a split.
To get out of that sticky situation, Jolani pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, making Nusra Front its Syrian branch.
From the start, he prioritised winning Syrian support, distancing himself from IS’s brutality and emphasising a more pragmatic approach to jihad.
Joining al-Qaeda
In April 2013, al-Nusra Front became al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, putting it at odds with IS.
While Jolani’s move was partly an attempt to maintain local support and avoid alienating Syrians and rebel factions, the al-Qaeda affiliation ultimately did little to benefit this effort.
It became a pressing challenge in 2015 when Nusra and other factions captured Idlib province, forcing them to co-operate in its administration.
In 2016, Jolani severed ties with al-Qaeda, rebranding the group as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and later as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in 2017.
While initially appearing superficial, the split revealed deeper divisions. Al-Qaeda accused Jolani of betrayal, leading to defections and the formation of Hurras al-Din, a new al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, which HTS later crushed in 2020. Members of Hurras al-Din, however, have remained cautiously present in the region.
HTS also targeted IS operatives and foreign fighters in Idlib, dismantling their networks and forcing some to undergo “deradicalisation” programmes.
These moves, justified as efforts to unify militant forces and reduce infighting, signalled Jolani’s strategy to position HTS as a dominant and politically viable force in Syria.
Despite the public split from al-Qaeda and name changes, HTS continued to be designated by the UN, US, UK and other countries as a terrorist organisation, and the US maintained a $10m reward for information about Jolani’s whereabouts. Western powers considered the breakup to be a façade.
Prioritising stability, public services and reconstruction
Forming a ‘government’ in Idlib
Under Jolani, HTS became the dominant force in Idlib, north-west Syria’s largest rebel stronghold and home to about four million people, many of whom were displaced from other Syrian provinces.
To address concerns about a militant group governing the area, HTS established a civilian front, the so-called “Syrian Salvation Government” (SG) in 2017 as its political and administrative arm.
The SG functioned like a state, with a prime minister, ministries and local departments overseeing sectors such as education, health and reconstruction, while maintaining a religious council guided by Sharia, or Islamic law.
To reshape his image, Jolani actively engaged with the public, visiting displacement camps, attending events, and overseeing aid efforts, particularly during crises like the 2023 earthquakes.
HTS highlighted achievements in governance and infrastructure to legitimise its rule and demonstrate its ability to provide stability and services.
It has previously praised the Taliban, upon their return to power in 2021, lauding them as an inspiration and a model for effectively balancing jihadist efforts with political aspirations, including making tactical compromises to achieve their goals.
Jolani’s efforts in Idlib reflected his broader strategy to demonstrate HTS’s ability not only to wage jihad but also to govern effectively.
By prioritising stability, public services and reconstruction, he aimed to showcase Idlib as a model of success under HTS rule, enhancing both his group’s legitimacy and his own political aspirations.
But under his leadership, HTS crushed and marginalised other militant factions, both jihadists and rebel ones, in its effort to consolidate its power and dominate the scene.
Anti-HTS protests
For over a year leading up to the HTS-led rebel offensive on 27 November, Jolani faced protests in Idlib from hardline Islamists as well as Syrian activists.
Critics compared his rule to Assad’s, accusing HTS of authoritarianism, suppressing dissent and silencing critics. Protesters labelled HTS’s security forces as “Shabbiha”, a term used to describe Assad’s loyalist henchmen.
They further alleged that HTS deliberately avoided meaningful combat against government forces and marginalised jihadists and foreign fighters in Idlib to prevent them from engaging in such actions, all to appease international actors.
Even during the latest offensive, activists have persistently urged HTS to release individuals imprisoned in Idlib allegedly for expressing dissent.
In response to these criticisms, HTS initiated several reforms over the past year. It disbanded or rebranded a controversial security force accused of human rights violations and established a “Department of Grievances” to allow citizens to lodge complaints against the group. Its critics said these measures were just a show to contain dissent.
Leading a new path?
To justify its consolidation of power in Idlib and the suppression of plurality among militant groups, HTS argued that unifying under a single leadership was crucial for making progress and ultimately overthrowing the Syrian government.
HTS and its civilian arm, the SG, walked a tightrope, striving to project a modern, moderate image to win over both the local population and the international community, while simultaneously maintaining their Islamist identity to satisfy hardliners within rebel-held areas and HTS’s own ranks.
For instance, in December 2023, HTS and the SG faced a backlash after a “festival” held at a glossy new shopping mall was criticised by hardliners as “immoral”.
And in August, a Paralympic Gamesinspired ceremony drew sharp criticism from hardliners, prompting the SG to review the organisation of such events.
These incidents illustrate the challenges HTS faces in reconciling the expectations of its Islamist base with the broader demands of the Syrian population, who are seeking freedom and coexistence after years of authoritarian rule under Assad.
As the latest offensive unfolded, global media focused on Jolani’s jihadist past, prompting some rebel supporters to call for him to step back, viewing him as a liability.
Although he previously expressed willingness to dissolve his group and step aside, his recent actions and public appearances tell a different story.
HTS’s success in uniting rebels and nearly capturing the whole country in under two weeks has strengthened Jolani’s position, quieting hardline critics and accusations of opportunism.
Jolani and the SG have since reassured domestic and international audiences.
To Syrians, including minorities, they promised safety; to neighbours and powers like Russia, they pledged peaceful relations. Jolani even assured Russia its Syrian bases would remain unharmed if attacks ceased.
A more pragmatic approach to jihad
This shift reflects HTS’s “moderate jihad” strategy since 2017, emphasising pragmatism over rigid ideology.
Jolani’s approach could signal the decline of global jihad movements like IS and al-Qaeda, whose inflexibility is increasingly seen as ineffective and unsustainable.
His trajectory might inspire other groups to adapt, marking either a new era of localised, politically flexible “jihadism” or just a temporary divergence from the traditional path in order to make political and territorial gains.
Mina Al-Lami specialises in jihadist media, communications and online networks, with two decades of experience in the field.
Global coverage of US election campaign echoed regional priorities
Donald Trump’s victory in the November elections was the culmination of a lengthy, tight campaign which was watched closely around the world. Here we take an in-depth look at how the international media viewed the final two months of the campaign. While reporting varied in scale and thematic focus, it largely reflected regional priorities and concerns. Over to our regional teams…
Latin America: Focus on immigration, economic policies
Latin America – a region that has a long history of turbulent election campaigns, contested vote results and sometimes violent election aftermaths – was mesmerised by the hard-fought campaign between Donald Trump and Kamala Harris. The closeness of the race was a theme in itself.
From Mexico and Cuba to Peru and Argentina, news outlets provided almost daily, often blow-by-blow coverage, as countries that for years had put relations with the US, whether friendly or hostile, at the top of their foreign policy priority list tried to decipher the implications for them of a Trump or Harris victory on 5 November.
In Latin America’s media in general, but especially in that of America’s immediate southern neighbour Mexico , the US candidates’ respective plans for immigration and trade garnered most scrutiny, with regional commentators seeking to gauge what this might mean for their countries, their economies and their citizens. In many Central American and Caribbean nations, remittances sent home by migrants in the US are a mainstay of the national economies, and so US immigration policy is an issue.
Almost every Trump statement attacking or insulting migrants, or pledging “mass deportations”, gained attention in the Latin American media, as did Harris’s campaign assurances that she would seek to maintain secure US borders and not decriminalise illegal immigration.
Mexican media in particular also keenly noted Trump’s vows to apply ultranationalist, protectionist trade policies, including threats to slap high tariffs on US imports of vehicles from Mexico and to “re-negotiate” the existing US-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) free trade agreement. The media also fretted over both candidates’ pledges to get tough with the Mexican drug cartels smuggling the deadly drug fentanyl over the border.
With commentators across the region noting unprecedented levels of acrimony, animosity, polarisation and even latent violence in the US election – the reported “assassination” bids against Trump were headline news –many Latin American observers also questioned what this electoral battle, and its outcome, would mean for US democracy.
Harris’s portrayal of Trump as a “threat to democracy” was widely reported in Latin America, but at the same time Trump’s casting of Harris as a “socialist”, or even “communist”, found resonance among right-wing social media cheerleaders who equated their own crusades against “communism” in Latin America with this US election battle.
This means that countries and their media south of the US border were closely watching to see whether the much-vaunted US model of democracy –preached for decades by Washington as a model to follow in the region – would emerge strengthened or weakened by the bruising test of the Harris vs Trump choice offered to US voters.
Assassination attempts played into the narrative of the US as violent
China: Criticism of US policies at home and abroad
China’s chief geopolitical rival, the US, loomed large in Beijing’s media coverage, although the election itself was not a major theme.
This reticence mirrored Beijing’s official stance that it does not comment on foreign countries’ “internal affairs”, and expects others to reciprocate.
Instead, most election mentions came within broader criticisms of Washington’s foreign policy – particularly through painting the US as stoking conflict in the Middle East and Ukraine.
Other articles took aim at the US domestic situation, portraying it as a divided and violent society with a failing political system unable to cope with challenges such as the recent hurricanes. This contrasted with the implicit message that China is harmonious and peaceloving, and benefits from the stable rule of the Communist Party.
Chinese state media sent reporters to key US battleground states, who often highlighted voters’ political disaffection and division.
Bloggers on one state-affiliated platform – the news and blog site Guancha, which operates on a slightly looser leash, though with a predominantly nationalist tone – were evenly split on the outcome. While Trump received heavier coverage, both candidates were widely criticised.
Assassination attempts played into the narrative of the US as violent, while Trump’s mooted 60% tariffs on Chinese imports went down badly. Elon Musk’s backing of Trump also generated headlines, with the US billionaire’s financial giveaways to voters met with derision.
Russia: Focus on Ukraine
The presidential candidates’ perceived stances on the Ukraine war and geopolitics more broadly were the main theme of US election coverage by Russian TV and pro-Kremlin commentators.
Analysis of the quotes from television hosts, correspondents, talk show pundits and social media commentators showed that apart from the two candidates’ names, the words most used in the coverage were “Ukraine”, “Kyiv” and “Zelensky”.
Mentions of Ukraine surged in the wake of the second assassination attempt against Trump, in which the suspect was said to have been an “active supporter” of Kyiv. Ukraine was invoked in commentaries on the candidates’ perceived views on RussiaWest relations and on whether Trump was “sincere” in his stated intention to end the Ukraine war. Closer to the election date, some Russian observers noted that the subject of the Ukraine war had become “toxic” for the Democrats.
Similarly, the word “Kyiv” surged in the immediate aftermath of the second apparent attempt on Trump’s life, with Russian reporting mooting an interpretation of some of Trump’s pronouncements as questioning Ukrainian statehood. Mentions of Kyiv also appeared in Russian reporting of claims alleging Ukrainian interference in the US election.
There was a discernible pro-Trump (or anti-Harris) bias in Russian TV and social media commentators’ coverage of the two candidates, with criticism of Harris featuring primarily in Russian TV’s monitoring of US media.
Some commentators, however, maintained that, as far as Russia is concerned, the two candidates were as bad as each other.
Iran: Election outcome makes “no difference”
Iranian media extensively covered the US presidential race, analysing polling predictions and the campaign dynamics. They criticised some of Trump’s “populist” tactics and focused on the tight race, highlighting the role of swing states.
A recurring narrative was that the election outcome would make “no difference” to Iran, as both candidates were seen as supporting Israel and opposing Tehran. Several reports noted that Benjamin Netanyahu appeared to favour Trump over Harris, with some accusing the Israeli prime minister of attempting to sway the election – a view echoed by Iran’s Foreign Ministry.
Some reports focused on the “dilemma” faced by US Muslim voters regarding whether to support Harris or a thirdparty candidate.
The Iranian media dismissed accusations of Iranian assassination plots and cyber-attacks against Trump as “imaginary”, echoing official denials.
Towards the end of the campaign there was increasing speculation about how Middle East tensions might influence the election. Some reports suggested that the alleged leak of classified US intelligence on Israel’s plans of a retaliatory attack against Iran signalled a US attempt to dissuade Israel from acting before the election.
Saudi Arabia: Middle East tensions dominate coverage
Saudi media coverage of the US elections centred on how the conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon had shaped US voter sentiment.
Trump was widely seen as benefiting from dissatisfaction over the Biden administration’s policies in the region, with some analysts suggesting this could bolster the Republican candidate’s chances with undecided voters.
The importance of the Arab-American vote, especially in key states such as Michigan, was also a focus, particularly their dissatisfaction over US policy on Gaza.
Security concerns and foreign interference in the elections received extensive attention, focusing on threats from Iran and Russia and assassination attempts against Trump.
Meanwhile, the influence of celebrities such as Elon Musk and Taylor Swift on voters was widely noted, in particular Musk’s financial backing of Trump.
There was limited commentary on Saudi-US relations, but when discussed, columnists suggested that ties would remain stable, regardless of who won the election.
Israel: Election seen as decisive for war direction
While US elections are of significant interest to Israel, the domestic media continued to be dominated by developments in the war in the Gaza Strip and fighting with Hezbollah in Lebanon, giving much less attention to the US presidential race.
War-related developments were also linked to the US election in both the timing and scale of attacks, including media speculation on when Israel would launch its ground offensive in southern Lebanon and Israeli airstrikes on Iran during tit-for-tat exchanges.
Many Israelis had long preferred Trump for his favourable policies towards Israel and Netanyahu had often touted his relationship with Trump while refraining from explicitly endorsing him.
A poll published by Israel’s Channel 12 in September found that 58% of Israelis said they would vote for Trump, while only 25% opted for Harris.
Israeli media see Trump’s return to the White House as a green light for Israel to continue its military campaigns with fewer constraints regarding the humanitarian situation.
Reports also indicated that Netanyahu is waiting for the US election before committing to a “diplomatic route” in efforts to reach a ceasefire deal and secure the release of Israeli hostages who remain in Gaza.
In an unprecedented move, leading ultra-Orthodox right-wing rabbis issued a letter calling on Israelis with American citizenship to go out and vote. The letter was reported by an ultra-Orthodox newspaper that cited the rabbis as saying that “while it is understood they are not calling for a vote for Kamala Harris, they do not explicitly state who to vote for, for obvious reasons”.
Domestic outlets highlighted what they said was Harris siding with protesters in favour of Palestinian rights and against the war in Gaza. They reported displeasure with Harris after she pressed for an end to the war in the Gaza Strip and for Israel to allow more aid to enter the enclave. The rightwing Channel 14 News, known for its support of Netanyahu, referred to Harris as a “terror supporter”.
India: Bilateral ties
Major Indian news media outlets provided extensive coverage of the US election over the last two months of the campaign, with key campaign issues, the contest between Harris and Trump and poll predictions, featuring prominently in daily mainstream coverage.
One key theme was the possible impact of the election result on ties with India, although analysts generally appeared optimistic about the future of bilateral ties regardless of who won the election.
There was media apprehension over what was described as Trump’s “unpredictable” nature and policies. Trump criticised Delhi’s trade tariffs but praised Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his poll campaign.
Meanwhile, Harris’s Indian heritage remained a prominent theme, with the Indian media largely portraying her in a positive light, particularly after the first presidential debate on 10 September.
Some commentators highlighted Harris’s “progressive” reform agenda, predicting that her leadership would have a more structural approach.
The candidates’ stances on tensions in the Middle East and their impact on the election outcome was another major theme in Indian media coverage.
This story was produced with the help of our Data Hub, profiled in this edition’s Living the Story feature on page 26.
Uzbek elections lacked real opposition
Uzbekistan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party cruised to victory in the October elections, retaining its place as the largest party in the bicameral parliament of the Central Asian nation. Uzbek specialist Dilmurad Avalbaev reports.
The election authorities announced that the Liberal Democratic Party won 64 of the 150 seats in the new parliament, up on the 53 it held previously. The rest went to Milliy Tiklanish (29 seats), Adolat (21), the National Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (20) and the Ecological Party (16).
For the first time, the voting followed a majoritarian-proportional system introduced by a law adopted in December last year.
President Shavkat Mirziyoyev said the change would lead to more competitive polls and a democratic parliament. But the elections were no different to previous ones, with only government-controlled parties allowed to run.
While the Russia-led Commonwealth of Independent States praised the polls as “transparent and fair”, OSCE observers noted a lack of competition and real choice for voters.
Opposition parties banned
The new voting system is part of the cosmetic political reforms carried out by President Mirziyoyev. In power since 2016, the Uzbek leader has kept his opponents out of the race despite promising to allow “constructive opposition” in the country.
Opposition parties such as Erk and Birlik have long been banned in the country and remain in exile. Khidirnazar Olloqulov, the first opposition leader to emerge during Mirziyoyev’s time in power, has since 2021 failed to have his Truth, Progress and Unity party registered with the Justice Ministry. Olloqulov and his supporters have said they had repeatedly been detained and interrogated by law enforcement bodies.
OSCE observers noted a lack of competition
The voting followed a majoritarianproportional system
Pro-government parties
The leaders of the pro-government parties engaged in highly-orchestrated televised election debates, which were described by many independent journalists and bloggers as “boring”. Former diplomat and political analyst Alisher Taksanov noted that the debates avoided important issues like the war in Ukraine and Uzbekistan’s growing external debt. “Moscow is threatening to use nuclear weapons; what is the position of the Uzbeks? What will Tashkent say about the threats of using nuclear weapons? What is the political parties’ attitude towards the Collective Security Treaty Organisation?” Taksanov wrote on Facebook on 28 September.
All five parties’ election platforms were built around promises to support, not challenge, the authorities’ policies in various spheres.
Pressure on the media
Privately-owned Uzbek media outlets have also complained about increased pressure from the authorities ahead of the polls. Among them was Qalampir. uz, which was forced to remove an investigative video looking at corruption and nepotism in the government after a complaint from the presidential administration, Radio Liberty’s Uzbek service reported on 29 August. It also said dozens of critical articles posted on popular news and analytical websites were removed within several days, with the authorities “recommending” them not to publish any negative content ahead of the polls.
Will deputies challenge the government?
One big question after the elections is if the new parliament will have at least some deputies who dare to speak out on issues that actually matter to voters. For all its rubber-stamp nature, the previous Uzbek legislature had a small number of MPs, most notably Rasul Kusherbayev and Doniyor Ganiyev, who openly challenged the government’s policies. They were able to break the mould at the otherwise tame and mundane parliament sessions by attacking corruption and incompetence in the government, state monopolies and restriction of human rights. Videos of their speeches made waves on social media, turning them into prolific newsmakers.
But both Kusherbayev and Ganiyev eventually became frustrated by the lack of support, with the former giving up his seat in late 2022 and the latter opting not to seek another term. Only time will tell if future MPs will draw inspiration from the social media impact of Kusherbayev and Ganiyev –or be disheartened by their struggles.
Dilmurad Avalbaev is a journalist in our Tashkent office
Inside Monitoring
ESSENTIAL MEDIA INSIGHT
You’ve seen the What, this is the How. Inside Monitoring is a blog written by our staff – journalists, linguists and analysts from around the world. With access to local sources and a nuanced understanding of language and context, they truly live the stories and are able to identify what other news organisations may miss. In this column, they talk about their experiences, initiatives and challenges.
Bringing you the world’s TV and radio
One of BBC Monitoring’s major offerings to its customers is reporting from a large number of broadcast outlets in dozens of countries. Our Broadcast Reception (BR) team works with colleagues in BBC Engineering to provide this service by exploiting our unique reception infrastructure. Dave Keeler reports.
The arrival of autumn in the northern hemisphere brought a reminder that satellite broadcasting is truly remarkable. Many channels lost signal for a few minutes each morning in the weeks after the autumn equinox. At that time of year, solar radiation overwhelms the signals of satellites orbiting 22,000 miles above the equator as they pass in front of the sun. The last time we saw these “sun outages” was in March, just before the spring equinox.
Aside from those regular but natural interruptions, the past year saw the BR team regularly updating the channel line-up available to Monitoring staff to keep across news events, while maintaining constant coverage of vital sources. Those with the highest priority are received in diverse locations to mitigate sudden signal losses.
More satellite dishes at Crowsley Park
Our unique reception infrastructure
Palestinian channels
Various Palestinian channels were already in our channel list when Hamas attacked Israel on 7 October 2023. We then kept a close eye on them in case they went off air or changed content.
Hamas’s Al-Aqsa TV did both, firstly being dropped from a Eutelsat satellite on the orders of the French media regulator Arcom in October 2023. It then went through some rebranding before being replaced by a channel bearing the logo of the defunct Hamas-affiliated Shihab News website, then reappearing on a Qatariowned satellite, Es’hailSat2, until that stopped in June 2024. In August, Al-Aqsa re-appeared on Eutelsat’s 8 West B satellite.
Satellite broadcasting is truly remarkable
Jamming and hacking
BR also tracks deliberate signal interference. Last spring, we saw evidence that Russia had renewed its campaign of jamming and hacking against Ukrainian channels. On one occasion, in April, Ukrainian programmes were replaced with Tucker Carlson’s interview with Putin.
On 9 May, Russia and Ukraine hacked each other’s TV broadcasts. Russia interrupted Ukrainian TV to show that day’s Victory Day parade in Moscow, while Ukraine cut into Russian TV’s coverage of the parade to play out a video comparing Putin’s Russia to Nazi Germany.
Dish farm in Cyprus
Alongside antennas in the UK, our dish farm in Cyprus is an increasingly useful asset. We use it to receive more than 45 television and radio channels from 12 countries, many on satellites that are not visible in the UK, and feed them back to London.
Cyprus is currently our main reception site for Iranian state TV and radio, with resilience provided by signals picked up in the Georgian capital, Tbilisi. It also allows us to receive Russian-controlled channels that broadcast to occupied parts of Ukraine, while avoiding disruption from Ukrainian jamming.
Those are just a few examples of how the BR team has been flexible and responsive in its provision of channels.
In the past year we have also taken extra Arabic, Chinese and Indonesian outlets to produce bespoke work for BBCM customers.
Dave Keeler is a Systems Engineer in our Broadcast Reception team
Moldovan polls marred by Russian “hybrid war”
In October, Moldovans voted to amend their country’s constitution to include their aspiration to EU membership. On 3 November, they re-elected proEuropean President Maia Sandu and entrusted her with working towards joining the EU over the next four years. Moldova specialist Natasha Matyukhina reports.
Moldova’s determination to move away from Russia’s sphere of influence
Both votes highlighted Moldova’s determination to move away from Russia’s sphere of influence and to join the EU, where this former Soviet republic, and one of Europe’s poorest countries, hopes to find a peaceful and prosperous future. Russia, however, has no plans to let this happen.
Russia used significant financial resources to support pro-Russian parties and politicians, loyal media and pro-Russian clergy in Moldova to unleash what many commentators described as an unprecedented propaganda and disinformation campaign. The aim was to discourage Moldovans from supporting the move for EU membership and to prevent the re-election of Sandu, who managed to secure EU candidate status for her country and opened EU membership talks with Brussels during her first term.
Russia used significant financial resources to support pro-Russian parties and politicians
Hybrid war
“This was a real hybrid war. We have seen what Russia is capable of and what it can do to influence the electoral process,” said Andrei Curararu, a security expert from Moldovan NGO WatchDog.
He said Russia employed Moscowbased Moldovan oligarch Ilan Sor –who was given a prison sentence for his involvement in the theft of $1bn from three Moldovan banks in 2014 – to use his ties in Moldova to create “networks” of vulnerable citizens. These were mainly pensioners and residents of poor rural districts who were willing to accept “financial assistance” from Russia in exchange for voting “No” in the EU referendum – and supporting a presidential candidate who supported close ties with Moscow.
Moldovan police chief Viorel Cernauteanu said that in SeptemberOctober alone a bank in Moscow linked to the Russian military-industrial complex transferred $39m to Sor’s “networks”, a huge amount for a country with a population of under 3 million people.
Investigative journalists who joined the networks, while pretending to be willing recipients of the “assistance”, obtained a wealth of photographic, video and material evidence, which was handed over to the police. This exposed the scale of Russia’s efforts to bribe Moldovans. According to the police, by October the “networks” had at least 130,000 members.
As the police were taking measures to stop the bank transfers, Sor, with the cooperation of the Russian Orthodox Church, flew hundreds of clerics from its Moldovan arm, the Moldovan Orthodox Church, to Moscow and used them as “cash mules”: for a small fee, each of them brought back to Moldova 10,000 euros in cash, which did not require declaration at customs. Those clerics who openly campaigned for pro-Russian presidential candidates and against EU membership in their sermons were also issued with bank cards to receive payments for their activities.
These efforts were coupled with a large-scale propaganda and disinformation campaign.
“This is a triumph of democracy over the hybrid war.”
Propaganda and disinformation
For months, Moldova’s pro-Russian TV channels, websites, newspapers and social media groups had spread false information about the EU, claiming that, as an EU member, Moldova would lose its national identity, agree to accept values which went against its Orthodox Christian beliefs and sell its land – the agricultural country’s main asset – to foreigners.
They also skilfully exploited Moldovans’ fear of a Russian military attack and invasion, alleging that neighbouring Ukraine had brought this on itself by declaring it planned to join the EU and Nato.
The “hottest autumn ever”
One of Moldova’s leading proEuropean weekly publications, Ziarul de Garda, saw September and October 2024 as the “hottest autumn ever”, marred by Russia’s “most slanderous, most violent and disruptive destabilisation campaign since the country’s independence” in 1991.
The Kremlin said it “does not interfere in other people’s affairs” and accused Moldova’s pro-European authorities of “denying many citizens a right to say that they support having good relations with Russia”.
Andrei Curararu welcomed Moldovans’ support for European integration in the referendum and the re-election of Sandu: “This is a triumph of democracy over the hybrid war. But this triumph taught us many lessons which we have to learn,” he said.
He warned that Russia would not stop its efforts to interfere in Moldova’s domestic affairs and would seek to install a pro-Russian government in Moldova following next year’s parliamentary election. This is particularly important because Moldova is a parliamentary republic.
Addressing European leaders shortly after her re-election, Maia Sandu called for “help for Moldova to defend its democracy”.
“Our people displayed amazing resilience in the face of huge challenges and foreign meddling... We need additional support to strengthen our institutions so they can better defend Moldovan democracy. We want to ensure that Moldovans, not Russian money, make decisions in Moldova. And naturally, Moldova’s path to the EU is important not only for Moldova, but also for the stability and security of the entire continent,” she said.
Natasha Matyukhina is a senior journalist in our Kyiv office
Tunisians fear for democracy after presidential election
Tunisia’s president has won another term, sparking fears for democracy in the country. North Africa specialist Sumaya Bakhsh reports.
Tunisian President Kais Saied’s landslide win in October’s presidential elections came as no surprise.
With a turnout of just 28.8%, the incumbent president won over 90% of the vote. He faced only two challengers after the electoral commission disqualified several candidates in the run-up to the 6 October polls, citing their failure to gather sufficient endorsement signatures and other technicalities.
Saeid, who took office in 2019, has been accused of mounting a power grab and crushing dissent since seizing sweeping powers in 2021, when he dismissed the government and suspended parliament.
At the time of the elections, many of his critics and political opponents were in prison or facing prosecution. They included prominent figures such as former parliamentary Speaker and head of the Islamist Ennahda party, Rached Ghannouchi, who is accused of “planning regime change”.
Mounting a power grab and crushing dissent
The North African country was held up as a rare example of democratic success in the region
Criticism
The imprisonment of another senior Ennahda member in July prompted criticism from a coalition of parties opposing President Saied’s 2021 measures. The National Salvation Front stressed its rejection of what it said were “escalating malicious political trials” coinciding with the start of the period leading up to the presidential polls.
Presidential hopefuls who were prohibited from running included prominent opposition politician Abir Moussi, leader of the Free Destourian Party (PDL), who was sentenced to two years in prison in early August on charges of “insulting the electoral body”.
Cabinet reshuffle
Meanwhile, a major cabinet reshuffle in the months leading up to the polls saw Saied replace 19 ministers, after he had appointed a new prime minister weeks earlier. At the swearing-in ceremony, the president reminded ministers of his overriding authority and launched fresh criticism at his opponents, accusing them of corruption.
Saied has frequently railed against individuals and groups he has accused of corruption and of plotting conspiracies. His rhetoric concerning the key issue of irregular migrants in Tunisia – most of whom are from sub-Saharan Africa – has focused on suggestions of a conspiracy to alter the nation’s demographic structure and identity, triggering growing hostility towards migrants.
Fears for democracy
In the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring protests – which in Tunisia saw the ouster of long-time ruler Zine El Abidine Ben Ali – the North African country was held up as a rare example of democratic success in the region.
However, a commentary in Tunisia’s Realites magazine in the run-up to the election described an “annihilated” opposition, a weakened civil society and an electorate “indifferent” to politics. As Tunisians face a further five years under Saied’s rule, many fear that the country will lose any trace of its post2011 hopes for democracy.
Siemens
Siemens is one of Germany’s largest and best-known companies. A BBCM customer, it is present in various sectors including industrial automation, energy resources, transport and healthcare. But how does it use BBCM? Matthew Kish writes.
BBC Monitoring’s coverage of tensions in the Middle East… has been excellent
Siemens’ Situation and Intelligence Analysis team has a very demanding role. The company operates in over 190 countries and creates technology solutions for industry, infrastructure and healthcare. The team works to ensure that the business has the correct intelligence picture and understanding to protect a very diverse range of business operations, from high-speed rail in Egypt, to smart cities in Southeast-Asia or AI-powered industrial control systems in Brazil. Our goal is to empower our customers to accelerate their digital and sustainability transformations.
We use BBC Monitoring to provide us with a sense of the security atmospherics across a range of situations. Our attention might be focussed on a specific country where we have some critical business activities. Or we might need quickly to check on the security prospects for a country where we are asked to start a new project. The huge depth of information on the BBC Monitoring portal means that we find useful information for our security assessments.
We particularly find the clarity in BBC Monitoring’s reporting to be very helpful
Ukraine
Our first user case for BBC Monitoring’s services came at the start of Russia’s full-scale 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Critically we held two main responsibilities: to help evacuate non-combatant status employees or employee family members and to evaluate the direction of the conflict, given that Siemens is responsible for numerous infrastructure projects within Ukraine.
This was and remains a very challenging time for any of our employees working in Ukraine, and for us within the corporate security department in keeping them safe. Two members of our Siemens team had used BBC Monitoring during service with the British Army’s Intelligence Corps and knew of the quality and depth of insights that it could provide.
Our ability to rely upon BBC Monitoring’s regular Ukraine updates and insights has been hugely beneficial, not just in keeping track of the situation, but also in evaluating issues beyond the headlines. As our focus will hopefully shift from crisis to reconstruction, we will continue to use BBC Monitoring to get insight into the atmospherics in Ukraine.
Middle East
More recently, we have found that BBC Monitoring’s coverage of tensions in the Middle East, following the 7 October 2023 attack by Hamas, has been excellent. We especially rely upon the speed at which BBC Monitoring’s team compiles updates and insight reports on key events. Given that global media outlets and commentators naturally focus on breaking news, we particularly find the clarity in BBC Monitoring’s reporting to be very helpful. This is especially so in the analysis of key speeches by regional leaders, which we use to help us evaluate whether the situation is liable to escalate and if we need to withdraw our engineers from the critical infrastructure project work that they are working on in the region.
Given the nature of our business and its role in critical national infrastructure projects, we do not have the luxury of evacuating our staff from their project work prematurely. This means that the onus is on us to use quality sources of information to give objective, timely analysis to make critical security risk decisions.
Going forward, we are keen to spend more time speaking with the BBC Monitoring team to get a deeper level of benefit from their huge level of experience, and also the nuanced insights that the service can provide.
Intelligence Analysis team
Georgian TV: parallel realities after disputed election
Georgians are no strangers to divergent narratives on their TV screens, given the polarised nature of the country’s media. Since the 26 October parliamentary election, the two top-rated TV stations – governmentfriendly Imedi and pro-opposition Mtavari – have been presenting what appear to be parallel realities to their viewers. Georgia specialist Maka Dzneladze reports.
The governing Georgian Dream (GD) party was declared the winner of the parliamentary election with 53.93% of the vote, but the four opposition groups that won seats – Coalition for Change, Unity-National Movement, Strong Georgia and Gakharia for Georgia – plus President Salome Zourabichvili have all rejected the official result and launched street protests demanding a repeat election.
GD says it won the election fairly and rejects reports of voter fraud. Imedi has labelled the fraud allegations “the death throes of losers”. Mtavari TV, meanwhile, has said GD “stole” the election in a Russian-style “special operation”, and openly encouraged participation in the protests.
Television is the most popular medium in Georgia, followed by social and online media, according to a September-October 2023 survey by the US International Republican Institute.
Imedi’s declared mission is not to allow the opposition United National Movement (UNM) party – which ruled from 2004 to 2012 – to return to power. Mtavari TV is a die-hard critic of the government, and its former director is a leading opposition figure.
Pro-government Imedi TV said losers in the parliamentary vote were “in agony”
A “shadowy global network” is seeking to replace Georgia’s government
What are the key narratives on opposition TV?
Mtavari TV has pushed the following narratives:
• GD “stole” the election, and its official result is “illegitimate”.
• Billionaire GD founder Bidzina Ivanishvili “carried out a Russian special operation” through the electoral administration.
• Multiple methods of rigging included fraudulent use of people’s state ID cards and government supporters voting multiple times at different precincts, as well as ballot-stuffing.
• “Armed people” were aggressively campaigning for the ruling party outside polling stations.
As the host of Mtavari TV’s weekly current affairs magazine, Post Factum, put it on 3 November: “The pro-Russian oligarch’s regime simply stole the choice of the citizens of this country on 26 October and rigged the election results. Irregularities were on an unprecedented scale. Alongside GD supporters, the scheme also involved the Central Electoral Administration, law enforcement system and even the criminal underworld and the State Security Service. The 26 October election cannot be assessed as free and fair and no international observers have described it as such.”
What are the key narratives on progovernment TV?
Imedi TV has pushed the following narratives:
• The opposition and the proopposition president are bad losers.
• The opposition has no proof of voter fraud, and spread “disinformation” through their affiliated media.
• The opposition are “radicals” ready to propel the country into war at the behest of shadowy forces outside the country, and have no popular support inside Georgia.
In assessing the situation, the host of Imedi’s weekly current affairs magazine, Imedis Kvira, on 3 November recalled a police raid on the station’s headquarters back in 2007 when it was cheering on protests against the government of President Mikheil Saakashvili’s UNM.
“Those who seized Imedi, terrorised the Georgian media, severely beat and tortured people on 7 November [2007], those who cracked down on people expressing their dissent in the most peaceful way by holding a hunger strike, are now crying that they did not lose the 26 October vote, and that the election was stolen.”
What are the narratives on the protests?
Imedi said that the opposition was following instructions by the McCain Institute, a US pro-democracy think tank, and had yet to deliver on the main task – to “radicalise the process”, stage street protests, and attempt to change the government against the will of the people.
Imedi also rehashed a well-established narrative that a shadowy global network is seeking to replace Georgia’s government with one that will impose sanctions on Russia and open a second front against it in the Ukraine war –resulting in Georgia’s economic and physical devastation. But, according to Imedi, the opposition’s “coup plan” is doomed, as are its alleged attempts to destroy Georgia.
In contrast, Mtavari TV has framed the street protest as “the national choice to defend” Georgia and its future from the “illegitimate authorities” headed by an oligarch who sought to “buy everyone and everything”.
TV narratives on voting day?
Polarisation reached its height on election night, when, as soon as the polls closed, Imedi and opposition channels released vastly different exit polls effectively declaring victory for their preferred side. The one commissioned by Imedi showed the ruling party on 56%, while Mtavari’s gave them just 42%.
For roughly an hour and half, before the official results were announced, viewers of Mtavari and other opposition channels believed they had won. At one point, Mtavari ran a large caption reading “Georgia wins” and, at another, a presenter declared that Ivanishvili’s “oligarchic regime is over”.
Living the story: BBC Monitoring’s Data Hub
BBC Monitoring’s Data Hub was launched in June 2024, bringing together a small team with a broad range of multidisciplinary skills and experience spanning data journalism, programming, writing and editing, TV production, consultancy and academic research in computer science and AI. The Data Hub’s Sarah Coop, Hicham Yezza and Marc Ellison tell us more.
What brought you to BBC Monitoring?
With a history dating back to the eve of the Second World War, BBC Monitoring has seen remarkable change in its first eight decades, and we wanted to be a part of its latest transformational chapter towards being a data-led organisation.
We share not only a passion for data and analytical insights, but also for news, current affairs and geopolitics. As a central editorial hub we work with specialist teams around the world on a daily basis, which keeps us on our toes.
We are all excited about this new career challenge and being part of a team straddling editorial, technical, training and strategic remits has allowed us to leverage a wide range of techniques and tools, such as data wrangling, Python and R coding, thematic topic modelling, Machine Learning for Natural Language Processing (NLP), and visualisation and mapping tools.
What does a typical day look like?
Our day is a mix of technical work, training and support sessions and editorial meetings where we look for ways in which data-led insights and approaches can enhance Monitoring’s core output. We work with BBCM teams across our international offices, so a typical day can involve working on data projects tracking climate coverage in Afghanistan, mpox case rates in Africa, Jihadist activity in the Sahel and thematic narratives in China or Latin America around the US elections.
We are involved at every stage of the editorial and data processes: from initial project design and scoping to data collection, processing and analysis, write-up and visualisation.
One of the core – and most rewarding – remits of our work is to drive data awareness and upskilling across BBC Monitoring.
As such, not only do we deploy tools and techniques but we also train and support colleagues and teams to incorporate them into their daily workflow. The reaction so far has been incredible and it has been fantastic to see colleagues who previously dreaded the sight of an Excel spreadsheet now effortlessly navigating pivot tables and data validation.
We work with a wide range of data sources, from primary data collection to textual analysis of TV, online and social media output, to quantitative analysis of media activity, popularity and reach. In line with Monitoring’s tradition and editorial priorities, our projects typically involve multilingual and crossregional expertise, so strong working relationships with our teams of regional experts have been essential.
In short, while our days are extremely varied, they share a common, core vision: to drive the data-led transformation of BBC Monitoring’s output, processes and culture.
What is the most interesting story you have worked on?
Some of the most exciting and valuable aspects of BBCM’s output are stories involving cross-team collaboration, examining regional thematic angles and narratives. As a central editorial hub, we are perfectly positioned to coordinate these and provide a robust data analytical underpinning.
It has been fascinating to work with teams on their weekly round-ups of global coverage of the US elections in key regions including Russia, China, Latin America and the Middle East. This has involved designing and building dashboards tracking the volume as well as the thematic focus of the coverage, while helping teams identify, surface, validate and visualise analytical insights about the coverage.
The explainers we produced on TikTok and Meta banning Russian state media outlets showcased BBC Monitoring’s ability to provide distinctive insight into Russia’s global media activities. Our team provided charts of social media followers and the posting activity of banned accounts, showcasing the lost reach and influence of these accounts in different regions.
Our team has also had the opportunity to commission new products. Working closely with the Nairobi team, we have co-produced a bi-monthly mpox roundup which includes charts on key epidemiological and demographic metrics, including, case, death and mortality rates.
What are the challenges in coordinating our data-driven coverage?
Our team is brimming with ideas for transforming data-driven coverage across BBC Monitoring. One main challenge is finding the time to do it all! Alongside our editorial focus, one of the most important aspects of our job has been designing and building the infrastructure for collecting, processing, analysing, organising and visualising our data, including a range of pipelines and dashboards. The aim is to help our journalists react quickly to key news stories, as well as to inform or validate their analytical insights.
What have you learnt while working at BBC Monitoring?
Our BBCM Data Hub journey so far has illustrated some of the key drivers of successful digital transformation: A clear vision, systemic thinking and cross-team, multi-disciplinary collaboration. Above all, however, it has highlighted that while data-led tools can help us collect and process vast amounts of data, they can never replace the depth, richness and nuance of the insights of our colleagues.
It has been a fascinating education learning from BBCM subject matter experts. No day is ever the same, and for this we are very grateful.
Sarah Coop is a senior data analyst and Hicham Yezza and Marc Ellison are senior journalists in our Data Hub team