Global Policy and Order

Global Power and Order Global Policy Council Berlin, March 12-13, 2009

1

Global Power and Order

A dialogue between Henry Kissinger and Helmut Schmidt at the occasion of the Global Policy Council of the Bertelsmann Stiftung in Berlin on March 13, 2009 Linguistic editing and translation by Gudrun Staedel-Schneider

3

Contents

Introduction Henry Kissinger and Helmut Schmidt Global Power and Order - the dialogue About the Global Policy Council The Project “Shaping a Globalized World�

About the Bertelsmann Stiftung

5

6 7 8 27 28 30

Introduction

The Global Policy Council (GPC) created by the Bertelsmann Stiftung in 2006 is a brainstorming meeting of leading thinkers from all parts of the globalized world. The GPC aims to identify and discuss the components of a truly inclusive political agenda and to develop a new approach to global governance that is more holistic than previous efforts.

The most recent session of the GPC held in Berlin on March 12-13, 2009 opened with a dialogue between former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and former United States Secretary of State and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Henry Kissinger who discussed the implications of the global economic crisis, the long-standing challenge of nuclear proliferation as well as other global challenges. Having borne responsibility during a period in history in which global political structures also faced fundamental change, the two experienced, elder statesmen offered their insights on the management of global structural challenges and called for a far-reaching reform of the international political system. This document contains the transcript of their dialogue.

The complete video of the dialogue can be viewed at the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s YouTube-channel.

6

Henry Kissinger and Helmut Schmidt

Henry A. Kissinger Chairman, Kissinger Associates Inc., New York; former Secretary of State of the United States of America; Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Henry A. Kissinger was born in F端rth, Germany, in 1923. He immigrated together with his family to the USA to escape the persecution of Jews in Germany in 1938. In 1943 he joined the US Army.

After the war he studied at Harvard University and received his PhD in 1954. He stayed in Harvard for an academic career and was first Director of the Harvard International Seminar, then from 1957 until 1960 Associate Director of the Harvard Center for International Affairs and, finally, from 1958 to 1969 Director of the Harvard Defence Studies Program.

In 1968 Dr. Kissinger became Foreign and Security Policy Advisor to President Nixon and served as US Secretary of State from 1973 to1977. Before he founded Kissinger Associates Inc. in 1982 he lectured International Diplomacy at Georgetown University and worked as a commentator for NBC. Dr. Kissinger won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973.

Helmut Schmidt Publisher and Co-Editor of the weekly DIE ZEIT; former Chancellor, Federal Republic of Germany Helmut Schmidt was born in Hamburg in 1918 and received his degree in Economics from Hamburg University in 1949. Prior to becoming Chancellor in 1974 he became chairman of the SPD Parliamentary Party in 1967. From 1968 to 1984 he served as deputy chairman of the Federal executive of the SPD. He was Federal Minister of Defense (1969-72) and Federal Minister of Economics and Finance (1972-74). He began his eight-year term as Federal Chancellor in 1974.

During his chancellorship, he championed the goal of political unification of Europe. He was also one of the founders of the Economic Summits, which began in 1975 with the aim of coordinating policies of the major western states. He was the only statesman who took part in all eight summits from 1975-82. At present he is honorary chairman of the InterAction Council and of the Deutsche Nationalstiftung. He is Co-Editor and publisher of the weekly DIE ZEIT. Helmut Schmidt has received honorary doctorate degrees from numerous institutions of higher learning around the world, including the universities of Oxford, Harvard, Leuven, Cambridge, Johns Hopkins, Sorbonne, Keio, Hamburg and Potsdam.

7

Global Power and Order - the dialogue

A dialogue between Henry Kissinger and Helmut Schmidt at the occasion of the Global Policy Council of the Bertelsmann Stiftung in Berlin on March 13, 2009 Janning: How can we, how should we shape globalization? How can and how should this globalized world be governed? What quality of cooperation would be required? What are the instruments and what are the institutions we need?

We have gathered at the Global Policy Council of the Bertelsmann Stiftung here in Berlin to address these pivotal questions. These are questions people from all parts of the world have come here to discuss. No doubt, we will not be able to answer these constitutive questions of the globalized world unless we are able to see the world through the eyes of others. Without fora for the exchange and synergisation of the respective perceptions, no answers will be forthcoming.

In my opinion some lessons learned from philosophy may be helpful at the start of such a debate. A lesson from epistemology that I particularly like is that dwarfs are able to see more, when standing on the shoulders of giants. With this lesson in mind, we have asked two giants to let us stand on their shoulders, to share their insights and their views with us and to offer guidance for the subsequent debates.

8

Neither Henry Kissinger nor Helmut Schmidt requires an introduction here. They have known each other for over 50 years. We as readers, as contemporaries and as political actors have known them for almost as long a time. Therefore, I will refrain from introducing them and listing their many achievements and instead emphasize three points. Both of you were in office at a time when the world went through a major upheaval that changed its structure. Policy of détente and oil crisis mark a period that witnessed many changes, including many changes in power relations that had partly other reasons but which had to be managed. Both of you never left world politics ever since. Both of you continued to be involved in world politics, as analysts and advisors, as publicists and policy shapers and both of you – which is a big advantage for us today – are not running for any public office at the moment so that you are able to speak your mind.

I think that this will be a good basis for our debate today which will address some of the basic definitions and basic problems of this globalized world. In this discussion both of you are asked – and I hope that you will let me have one or two words in between – to reflect in a dialogue the definitions and problems from the point of view of your experiences. As a beginning I would like to ask first Henry Kissinger and then Helmut Schmidt about the present situation followed by an analysis of its causes. President Obama has said that the United

Global Power and Order

States will emerge stronger from this crisis. One is probably stronger when one has lost some illusions in this crisis. How do you assess the current situation of the United States in this crisis and how will they emerge from it?

Kissinger: The economic crisis obviously has many causes but one of the fundamental causes is that there was a big gap between the economic organization of the world and the political organization of the world. The economic organization of the world was at least theoretically global and it operated on the principle that the markets should be as unrestrained as possible and that the markets would have their own momentum.

The political organization of the Kissinger: »The political organi- world was national or regional but zation of the world was national did not take into full account some of or regional but did not take the consequences of the economic into full account some of the globalization. One: by the definition consequences of the economic of the market: Somebody wins and globalization.« somebody looses. This is inherent in a market economy. The losers – if the law is too severe – will ask for relief from their national government or from whatever political organization they represent. If the political organization to which they look is not able to help them then you have a crisis of legitimacy.

Secondly: Since the political people on the whole did not believe there would be a big crisis that was institutional and because it was believed that the 9

markets would be self-regulating when a global crisis emerged there were not the institutions nor the concepts on how to deal with them and we are now in the paradoxical situation that a world that was described as global is dealing with the consequences on a largely national basis.

Since we have now recognized the economic aspects of the problem I do not believe the political aspects of the problem have yet been fully recognized. Since we have recognized the economic aspects and since they are dealt with with great energy one would hope that at the end of the day America will recover economically and secondly I think we will be forced – and we should anyway – to think about a new international system. For one thing I do not believe the concentration of financial power in Wall Street and in London to some extent will continue to be accepted by the rest of the world and so we will be driven into a change of approach. So if the statesmen are farsighted I think this period could be marked as a great transitional period of history.

Janning: I would like to ask Chancellor Schmidt to react to one of the points you made. You just said that we tend to look for national answers to the present global crisis. I cannot help thinking that, when large amounts of taxpayers’ money are involved, politicians tend to behave similar to a situation in which they have to decide on a combat

Global Power and Order

mission: These decisions are almost always national ones. If my observation is correct, do you think it will ever be feasible to have an international alliance act resolutely and be decisive in response to the present and similar crises?

Schmidt: Let me start by saying that I agree with most of what Henry has just said. Next, I would like to point your attention to the fact that some 20 years ago the term “globalization” was largely unknown. Even by 1990, 1991 or 1992, at the time when the Soviet Union disintegrated, literally no one realized that we were about to witness a fundamental change in world order. Up until 1990, the world had been divided in West and East plus the so-called “Third World” of the so-called “developing countries.” At the turn of the 1990s, we witnessed not only the fall of the Soviet Union, but at the very same time also the astonishing reemergence of China. We experienced the political globalization of the world without Schmidt: »We experienced really knowing it. The well-known the political globalization of the antagonism between the Soviet world without really knowing it.« Union, now Russian Federation, and the United States of America, for instance, continued. The old enmity between America and China was continued, seemingly oblivious to the fact that the old order had ended.

Add the change in the international economic stances of China and Russia as global powers.

They opened up to the world, to world markets.

10

Russia became a major exporter of oil and gas, China a weighty exporter of industrially manufactured goods. In no time global markets became reality. Previously, a world market had existed for oil, for iron ore or for steel, maybe for grain, but nothing else. During the past two decades – the 1990s of last century and the first decade of the present century – almost every state became part of an integrated world economic system of markets, including most certainly Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, many Asian states and even states in sub-Saharan Africa. This process proceeded quite well prior to the first decade of this century, but now we face a global economic crisis of a magnitude larger than anything we witnessed in the 20th century. The crisis of 1929/1930 and the following years, for instance, did not affect China nor the Soviet Union nor today’s OPEC states in the Middle East. The question which instruments and which institutions are adequate is a valid question. Let me give you one example: One year ago, the so-called G-8 Summit took place in Germany, bringing together the seven old leading powers of the industrial age plus Russia. This gathering had already become an anachronism by then. China had come to play a major role in the global economy. The same applied for the OPEC countries in the Middle East.

Yet, they were not invited. Last autumn the 20 most powerful economies got together for the first time. The resulting consensus was extremely

Global Power and Order

vague and verbose, but it is a start, albeit belated.

Some of the older institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund might have been used to coordinate economic policies at a much earlier stage, but that chance was passed up. I would still insist that the International Monetary Fund as an institution has exceptional expertise, a competent staff and tremendous judgment in economic matters. I would still insist that the International Monetary Fund has an extremely important role to play. The current global economic crisis is the result of a crisis of American financial capitalism. In other words, it is the consequence of a crisis of the banking system in Wall Street, as Henry noted, and in London.

Restored trust in the readiness of the banks to provide credit will depend on the recovery of the banks themselves. The banks must be healthy again and that actually constitutes a major problem. At the moment, each and every country is trying hard to resuscitate economic demand by means of its own economic stimulus package. In sum, a conference of the 20 economic powers does exist – they are scheduled to meet again on April 2, [2009], but thus far there is no apparent meaningful joint strategy. Your question is the right question to ask and the answer is admittedly that these institutions do not exist, yet.

Janning: Henry Kissinger, to what extent is a degree of consensus and shared readiness to act a prerequisite 11

for the strategy Helmut Schmidt referred to? When Schmidt and Giscard d’Estaing gave the impulse for these meetings in the 1970ies they had a basis of mutual convictions, not in every single question but well in the overall understanding that there was a need for cooperation. Does the Group of 20 that met in Washington under President Bush for the first time already have this basic framework of mutual interests or is it nothing but the group of just the biggest countries?

Kissinger: At this moment it does not have the structure to address the institutional issues. But it is a logical organization because it covers the most important countries from an economic point of view in every area of the world. How will they be able to create first a common analysis of the problem and second a common solution? At the moment that is very difficult to say.

Janning: Will the United States be able to lead this process?

Kissinger: In the United States at this moment I do not believe that it is a conviction that the technical problems for the solution of this crisis are best done on a multilateral basis. And part of the reason for that is that every country faces urgent issues of unemployment, banking systems and the resulting difficulties so that you cannot help in the political process as to stop while some international group

Global Power and Order

is defining an institutional framework. But what you can expect and what I believe the administration will try to do is to put before that G-20 some overriding concept. I hope they will overcome the American temptation of saying that this is the only feasible project and all of you will be judged by the adequacy of your understanding of our profundity.

But I hope they will put forward and I expect them to put forward the idea of the nature of the problem, then an institutional framework has to be created and then I think some study groups will have to be created so I believe that the G-20 will not yet solve the immediate problems, but may be able to deal with the results that emerge out of the immediate problems and institutioKissinger: »It will not work nalize them on a global basis. But it to continue national political will not work to continue national policies and global economic political policies and global economic policies.« policies without having constant crisis because it will enable speculators to maneuver between the various groups without restraints.

Janning: Chancellor Schmidt, will the EU be able to lead this process? I would like to add the question whether one can speak of leadership in this classical sense in this globalized world.

Schmidt: Real world leadership in the classical sense referred to has actually never existed. Admittedly, some leaders may have considered themselves 12

leaders of the world. Hitler and Stalin were among them, maybe Mao Zedong too, I am not sure. In actual fact, no ruler of the world has ever existed.

Presently, the EU is hardly capable to act and often fails to keep its Schmidt: »Presently, the EU is own house in hardly capable to act and often order. Since 1990 fails to keep its own house in or – to be precise order.« – since the 1991/1992 Intergovernmental Conference in Maastricht, the Europeans have made a major mistake. They have admitted a large number of countries from the eastern, but also from the southern part of Central Europe and rightly so. Yet, they have failed to adjust the rules of the game simultaneously, taking into account the doubling of the total number of member states. For 20 years, EU enlargement used to be an incremental process, starting of with the six founding members of France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg. Next, it took another decade before three more countries had joined: England, Ireland and Denmark.

Eventually, after yet another decade, three new members had joined: Greece, Spain and Portugal.

Today, numbers have suddenly jumped to 27 – and probably 28 soon – but the rules of the game have remained unchanged, i.e. geared towards unanimity. Consequently, the Commission in Brussels has 27 members, too. Just imagine the

Global Power and Order

Bertelsmann group to have 27 equal board members. Obviously, such a board would not be able to act and take decisions. It is also obvious – at least from my point of view, although the media generally tend to disagree – that the 27 members of the European Council are really not able of managing their affairs, let alone world affairs. My observation is no doomsaying, it is pure realism.

Janning: There is one issue that I would like to raise once again, with Henry Kissinger’s permission, as it is essentially an inner-European debate. Since Maastricht, Europeans have set out more than once to find a solution for the problem you just identified.

The core of the problem seems to be that European leaders find it hard to communicate the need for the enhanced institutional efficacy you championed a minute ago to the public. To find majority for such an institutional reform seems to have been extremely difficult in several member states of the European Union, all the more so as some of them have organized a referendum.

Schmidt: The problem is not one of communication but rather one of judgment and understanding on the part of the foreign ministers.

Janning: So, you remain convinced that the general public in the European polities would be willing to go along, if only convincing solutions were presented to them?

13

Schmidt: I am inclined to answer that question affirmatively.

Janning: I would like to return to the issue of leadership we discussed before. Henry Kissinger himself has been preoccupied with Europe and the challenges for Europe. Revisiting Helmut Schmidt’s contentions for the world at large and for Europe from an American perspective raises the question whether or not the globalized world is meanwhile beyond the reach of any leadership. Have the classical resources of leadership – economic and/ or political power or influence and the scope of an alliance – lost their impact in international politics of today?

Kissinger: No. In order to think about it in international systems one has to ask oneself what its components will be and what its tasks will be.

Immanuel Kant wrote 200 years ago that some day there will be world peace either thorough human insight or through catastrophes of a magnitude that imposed that necessity and every international system is one way or another before that necessity because if you say it cannot be guided and it cannot be organized that means that its individual tendencies will run wild until they produce a dilemma that absolutely requires a solution. We live in a world of globalized communications and to some extent of globalized economy where events in a bank in Singapore ten

Global Power and Order

years ago brought down a major European institution so there is a necessity for some globalization. At the same time, of course, countries of the magnitude of the United States will have a considerable impact. The art of leadership for the United States consists of correctly estimating its capabilities and bringing about an international system or contributing to an international system that others will want to participate in, not because they are forced to do it but because they come to the same conviction.

We will not be able do that alone Kissinger: »The art of leadership anymore. China will play an infor the United States consists creasing role, India will play a role, of correctly estimating its capaEurope could play a role so that you bilities and contributing to an would have four or five centers of international system that others authority. And then the question is: will want to participate in.« Can four or five centers do it? They have to do it and they will do it eventually. The United States’ contribution must be to change. We were so dominant that we tended to believe that international order is the understanding by others of our designs. We will have to be more modest about our designs but we have to be determined about the direction in which we think the world should go. What would be catastrophic in the long run is if you had an Asian unit led by China, a European unit and then some American counter-unit. That would lead to 19th century-type diplomacy conducted by regional blocks that have huge weapons and enormous resources and that 14

must be avoided, but we are not yet fully on the way to do that.

Janning: Helmut Schmidt, do you concur with this role?

Henry Kissinger has referred to five centers of power and to worldwide power, including Russia, China and India. Do you see …

Kissinger: Japan.

Janning: … including Japan as well. Do you see involvement along those lines on the part of these actors? What is the calculus of these new powers that actually are re-emerging actors rather than new powers? What is the rationale behind their interests and their role in international politics?

Schmidt: In principle, I would concur with Henry and his multilateral concept. Having said that, I would like to add that I expect that in the next decades we will have to acknowledge that there will be some kind of coalition of the Islamic world and the Islamic states. About a quarter out of the approximately 200 states in this world is ruled by an Islamic regime. This amounts to more or less a quarter of humanity and it happens to be that way that, for instance, Saudi Arabia, the other Gulf states and Iran hold the lion’s share of the global reserves in oil and gas – a key asset in the global economy for the next 20 or 30 years. Yet, Saudi Arabia is the only Islamic country represented

Global Power and Order

at the so-called G-20 Summit, with Indonesia somewhere in the margins. Indonesia, by the way, is the largest Islamic state in the world. It is of minor importance in economic policy and of marginal importance in geopolitical terms for the time being. It has, however, the potential for tremendous growth on both accounts.

In this context I would like to point to another issue. During my term of office, Germany’s exports amounted to less than 25 per cent of GDP. These figures have doubled today. In the year 2007/2008, exports amounted to 47 per cent of GDP, indicative of our dependence on demand trends on the global markets. Other states’ dependence is far less pronounced. The United States are a case in point. The volume of US exports is similar to Germany’s, although the US population is close to 300 million, Germany’s only 80 million.

Other, smaller states such as the Netherlands, Luxemburg or Singapore depend on world markets to an even larger degree. To give you one example; Singapore has six or seven million inhabitants, but exports twice its GDP. The same ratio applies for its imports. Consequently, its dependency on global economic trends is far more pronounced than Germany’s. And to come back to the United States: As America’s dependence on the global economic developments is relatively modest, I see a high probability that the efforts of the new administration in Washington to stimulate 15

economic activity will tend to be more successful at an earlier stage than similar efforts by the French and German governments or the Chinese leadership, precisely because they are focused on domestic economics.

However, it would seem to me that Henry has made an important observation by noting in passing that the Americans are always tempted to consider themselves the leader of the world.

Whether or not they will be able to resist the temptation this time will be a pivotal question for many others in this world. It has been a major mistake on our part over the past decade and a half to accept the so-called “Washington Consensus”; all, including we as Germans, are responsible for that mistake. Thank God, we did create some kind of a counterweight by creating a common European currency. Without the Euro, the French Francs, the Deutschmarks and the Dutch Guilders would have fallen victim to speculation by investment bankers and hedge-fond managers at Wall Street long time ago. It is at least a beginning.

The creation of the common European currency is irreversible, thank God! And so is the common market of Europe. Not even the British would be able to withdraw without seriously damaging their own economy. That is an advantage, but not a sufficient one. I hope that the activities of the G-20 will develop completely new additional responsibilities for the International Monetary

Global Power and Order

Fund. Firstly, its role in monetary-policy assistance for individual countries in troubles in its foreign trade and payments should be continued. Secondly, we do need an Schmidt: ÂťWe do need an institution to institution to work towards a work towards degree of uniformity in banking a degree of supervision, financial supervision uniformity in and financial instruments banking worldwide.ÂŤ supervision, financial supervision and financial instruments worldwide.

The Americans will find it really hard to accept such a regime, and the British too. The French and the Germans are more inclined to think in terms of regulations than the Anglo-Saxons. I expect that the European view will prevail to a large extend in the next two or three years. At the same time, they will have to compromise with Washington, Wall Street and the City of London on other important issues.

Janning: Henry Kissinger, I would like to return to the starting point of Helmut Schmidt’s line of argument: What are the objectives of the other major actors? What does the world look like from their perspective? It was you who opened up new perspectives in American politics with respect to a redefinition of relations with China. Is there at least a minimum of shared strategic culture in the concert of global powers, i.e. a basic understanding of being 16

part of this selective circle of actors with special responsibilities? If this is the case: Would these powers make the perceptions of others and their impact on the interests of the others in the concert part of their calculus?

Kissinger: We should not conduct this discussion from the point of view that you are dealing with 20 rational actors who have sat down and worked out their national interests in a consistent manner. Whenever I travel I am asked if there is an American policy on this or that issue. In my experience policy is usually made in reaction to circumstance, much more frequently in reaction to circumstance than on the basis of a long-range plan. In our government anyway and perhaps in others the so-called planning staffs are used to write speeches for the leaders or write papers that are sort of semi-academic exercises so that the first thing that every government has to do for itself is to analyze where it finds itself. One of the benefits of the current crisis is that the key countries have to ask themselves how they got into this position, what they could have avoided in order not to get into this position, what the consequences will be. Again, as an American it is painful to say but it is true that almost every country that analyzes the situation will blame the United States to one extent or another and therefore on the one hand it will try to free itself from the impetus of having to act but on the other

Global Power and Order

hand when they study their problems they will come to the conclusion that they cannot solve them without the United States. And we will find and we are finding that we need the cooperation of key countries. When Hillary Clinton publicly asks the Chinese to continue to buy American products we will all know that the Chinese conduct a very rational and careful sort of foreign policy and that they will not do this without some long-range benefit for themselves. So I am saying that a correct analysis of the situation will produce some definition of the need for common action. Now the leaders have the obligation to make sure that they are not so obsessed with the urgent problems that they cannot address the important long-range problems. And at this point the fact that we have a new administration enables this administration to give a new impetus and from what I have seen of some countries I think the Chinese are certainly undergoing a profound soul-searching. I cannot judge what is happening in other countries. So I do not think one can expect that leaders will arrive at the G-20 meeting with a formulated plan and it is probably better if they don’t. They have to define their necessities first. But they will be driven by reality to come up with some common action over the years.

Janning: May I rephrase another statement by Helmut Schmidt, who mentioned the Islamic world as one of the actors in this process? He referred to Saudi 17

Arabia and Indonesia. Apparently, there is no evident single center of the Islamic world, but more likely several competing centers. Do you share Helmut Schmidt’s perspective of an Islamic factor at this highest level of global politics?

Kissinger: The problem of the future of Islam will be one of the huge global problems of the next decades. Will Islam organize itself or as Islam organizes itself either into larger states or one unit, but as Islam organizes itself will it do so from the point of view of representing a universal theology that others have to follow in order to permit Islam to fulfill its historic mission? Or will they adopt a more secular Kissinger: »The problem of the approach in future of Islam will be one of which Islam the huge global problems of the becomes the next decades.« religion of its population but not an obligation of other countries to deal with them? If they take the first approach then we are going to go through a prolonged period of confrontation. If it becomes an issue of conversion

by Islam of the rest of the world then other regions will be drawn into a confrontation. If Islam operates on a basis however it is internally but where towards the outside world it recognizes a multilateral and pluralistic approach then it would be an important component of the international system.

Global Power and Order

Janning: Helmut Schmidt, would you concur with such a perspective? Do you see chances for the prevalence of a secular mood in the Islamic world?

Kissinger: Secular in relation to the outside world, not necessarily to its internal world.

Janning: ... secular in relation to the outside world, the international environment.

Schmidt: If I understood Henry correctly, he has identified two distinct and contrasting trajectories for the development of the Islamic world. I fully agree – both are feasible. I would like to add, as I have said before, that the others as Americans, Europeans, Chinese, Indians or Russians have to realize that these two possibilities exist. It would be unforgivable to treat each one of these 50 Islamic states rather badly, with the possible exception of Saudi Arabia and to some extent Egypt, but most certainly not Iraq or Afghanistan.

No one is concerned with Bangladesh, Pakistan or Indonesia, sizable countries with a rapidly growing population. By the end of this century, Iran will have a population of one 100 million.

Turkey will have a population of 100 million, too. It is a major mistake on the part of most of the West to treat these countries as a quantitĂŠ nĂŠgligeable.

I sincerely hope that the approach of integrating these countries will eventually come to the fore at the G-20. By not integrating them, the West 18

basically replicates its flawed attitudes towards the Soviet Union and China.

Janning: In the past, we got used to a relatively simple division of the world in those powers that pursue a status-quo policy and those oriented towards changing the status quo, a change of the current situation. In retrospect these simple perceptions have tended to determine the relations among states. I think it is fair to say that the United States never considered themselves a status-quo power and always pointed to the Europeans as pursuing statusquo policies. What do you think of India and China in this respect? What is the domestic perspective of the elites of these two major powers?

Kissinger: It seems to me that the historical background of China is that they perceive themselves as a common culture more than a European national state in the 19th-century sense. Their historical experience has been that they have never lived in an international system similar to the European system because China has never had a comparable neighbor. So the foreign policy problem of China historically was twofold.

One: How to manage the relation of the almost tribally organized neighbors that were capable of threatening its security in which the operating principle was to deal with the distant barbarian against the close-in barbarian and secondly how to deal with the rest of the universe. Unlike the

Global Power and Order

diplomacy that I learnt in college that was not done by “Balance of Power” but it was done by a Confucian system in which every country was categorized as some kind of a vassal state of China that had an obligation to China and was treated with great respect when its representatives came to China. But it was a different kind of foreign policy. When the British sent an ambassador at the end of the 18th century the Chinese refused to accept him on the principle that it was inconceivable that foreign ambassadors would live in Beijing and they put him into an elevated vassal status. That is background now. China has to come to grips with the world in which this conceptual system obviously is not working and it is not attempting to make it work. But the history of China is not one of military expansion it is a history of economic and cultural expansion. When one deals with the Chinese and I am sure that Helmut will agree with me in their conduct with foreigners it is a demonstration of their majesty and a demonstration of their pure power. Of course power is best. So when westerners come to China and lecture them about their own internal organization since they believe that they have managed to survive 4,000 years without foreign advice which no outsider has yet managed to do so that makes for a difficult dialogue. China is no status-quo power in the sense that its impact will radiate outside no matter what they do. But it is 19

not a militarily aggressive power either. India – well if we go through every country …

Janning: Let us listen to Helmut Schmidt’s opinion, whether he agrees to your perception of China and after that we will return to India. At that point I would be interested to find out whether you see these two powers in harmony or rather in contrast to each other.

Schmidt: A conflict or contrast between China and India cannot be dismissed off-hands. Yet, from my point of view, it is not a very likely scenario. They are separated by one of the highest mountain ranges in the world and these mountains were quite successful for thousands of years to keep the gigantic masses of Chinese apart from the many peoples of India. India will have a population of 1.5 billion inhabitants by the mid-21st century and the same holds true for China, maybe even a bit more.

There is, however, a big difference: All Chinese do read the same alphabet, whereas India has 18 or 19 official Schmidt: »Never in its history languages. China has China been an expansionist lacks a religion and aggressive power. The Chithat integrates nese have rather demonstrated the whole people an admirable degree of caution and the entire and composure in their foreign society. India policy.« has two major religions,

Global Power and Order

Hinduism and Islam, in addition to the important philosophy of Buddhism. India is far more heterogeneous than China. I would adhere to Henry’s analysis of the past 5,000 years of Chinese history. Never in its history – and not even under Mao and later under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao – has China been an expansionist and aggressive power. The Chinese have rather demonstrated an admirable degree of caution and composure in their foreign policy, far more so than the Europeans in the past and far more than the Americans until rather recently.

Janning: Apparently, both states value their own understanding of integrity highly. For China territorial integrity has absolute priority and India is also in the somewhat odd position that the moment of its emancipation at the same time marks the division of the continent. From India’s perspective, however, that situation does not have to be permanent.

Kissinger: The strategic centre of gravity of China is Northeast Asia, with some interests in Southeast Asia, so that I agree with Helmut that the probability of a military attack by China on India seems very low. The strategic center of gravity of Indian foreign polity reaches from Singapore to Aden or Cairo, it is East and West. Within its own center of gravity India has conducted a foreign policy that is very similar to what British foreign 20

policy would be under similar circumstances. They would try to prevent the emergence of a dominant country in the Indian Ocean and therefore their strategic objectives in that region are very parallel to those of the United States at this particular moment. For any new state territorial integrity is very important. China is not a new state but the traumatic event in Chinese history has been the alienation of Chinese territory in the 19th century as a result of foreign intervention and under various pretexts. This is what transformed China from its perception of being the center of the universe to almost an object of Western policy. So China is neuralgic on any issue – Taiwan, Tibet, anything – that involves alienation of territory.

India is not under any pressure to loose territory but there are many unsolved problems along its borders or in related countries but as part of the growing assertion of these countries they will be brought more and more into the international system. I think China understands this. I believe India is on the way to understanding this but the perception of both countries is that of much larger empires because they are much larger units than the European experience has been.

Janning: I would like to raise yet another question that has played a role in the work of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Global Policy Council thus far, a question that was actually put forward by Henry Kissinger himself once, that is the security issue of the

Global Power and Order

proliferation of nuclear weapons. Two sessions ago, Henry Kissinger insisted that we should give the consequences of a world order with 25 or 30 nuclear powers some thought. What would be the inherent risks and what should be kept in mind while considering the consequences and developing strategies to cope with such a situation? I would like to ask Helmut Schmidt to address this question first, as he has referred to this topic repeatedly in the past.

If I remember correctly, in your most recent book you stressed the importance of renewed efforts at disarmament and arms control in a globalized world.

Schmidt: That is a large topic, indeed. Let me address the so-called conventional weapons first, non-nuclear weapons or, to be more precise, small arms such as machine guns, Kalashnikovs, hand grenades and the like. Presently there are at least 200, maybe 250 factories producing these small arms and selling them worldwide. A general ban on exporting such small arms would be a blessing for sub-Saharan Africa as well as for the Middle East. Thus far no one has even dare suggest such a ban in earnest.

But let us return to your question concerning nuclear weapons. There is a clear divide between states that possess nuclear arms and those that do not. 40 years ago, the United States and the Soviet Union jointly developed a so-called nuclear “NonProliferation Treaty” (NPT) and invited all other 21

states of the world and compelled them to take part in this agreement. In short, the treaty amounts to the agreement that those states that do not possess nuclear weapons now, should not be permitted to possess them in the future and should accept international monitoring and inspection.

Germany, for instance, has accepted this treaty and the international controls it entailed. The same goes for Austria and Luxemburg. In the same treaty, the other states, i.e., those in possession of nuclear arms committed themselves to open negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Fact is: They never did, with one single exception, the 1987 agreement between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev for the elimination of the “Intermediate Nuclear Weapons,” the “Euromissiles.”

That is the only powers have made no significant exception and efforts for the sake of nuclear those weapons disarmament and the rest of the were really world has acquiesced to it.« eliminated on both sides at that time – well, not really eliminated, but at least removed from the European theatre. Apart from that agreement, the existing nuclear powers have made no significant efforts for the sake of nuclear disarmament and the rest of the world has acquiesced to it. A number of states have refused Schmidt: »The existing nuclear

Global Power and Order

to sign this Non-Proliferation Treaty. Israel is one of them, and so are Pakistan and India. All three of them now possess nuclear arms. It is unclear what progress the Koreans have been able to make.

They had signed the treaty and had thus accepted the obligation not to acquire nuclear arms. Then they left the treaty, which is possible in legal terms. It is equally unknown what the Iranians are up to. Iran is a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and no one has been able to prove thus far that they have acted in violation of the treaty. It is, however, undeniable that Russia, America, France, England and China have failed to live up to their obligations. Considering this fact, it is a welcome sign that four Americans – Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Sam Nunn and William Perry – have joined forces and insist on the initiation of first steps towards nuclear disarmament. This really is a first for America. You will be better placed than me to estimate the chances of success, Henry. Frankly, I am not overly optimistic.

Kissinger: The dilemma is this. Helmut has accurately described the structure of the "NonProliferation Treaty". On the other hand, if we make the structure of the nonproliferation treaty the guiding principle of future discussions then we will not be able to move fast enough in the denuclearization of the world to fulfill what I would almost call the necessity of preventing the further diffusion of nuclear weapons. And there is an 22

additional problem of how you would define the denuclearization of the world.

Janning: Will it be possible to stop the diffusion?

Kissinger: My concern is this: If the proliferation of nuclear weapons continues and if they fall into more and more hands that may not be technically qualified in exercise and control and in which the principles by Kissinger: »If the proliferation which foreign of nuclear weapons continues policy is then some use of nuclear conducted are weapons somewhere is likely.« less restrained than has been the case up to now then some use of nuclear weapons somewhere is likely. And then we are in a situation where the world may have seen a hundred thousand people killed in 10 minutes which is something which I do not think that the international system can stand and after that the public will demand of its representatives to bring in some international regimen. So the four of us in America – all of whom have been committed of a strong American defense, we do not belong to the antidefense side of the American establishment – have believed America must take certain steps itself to show that this is a project. But on the other hand the other countries cannot wait until this process that we describe is completed before they do something. It is from this point of view that I

Global Power and Order

believe no matter what government is in power in Iran that this is not a question. It is important to stop the proliferation in Iran and Korea. From some points of view you can say this is unjust. But the challenge is how to bring the two processes into some degree of harmony. I confess I do not know how one would denuclearize the world and how you suppress the knowledge, but I am very convinced that nuclear weapons should never be used. And one of the preconditions of that is to prevent the proliferation of these weapons into very dangerous areas where the restraints are thin and the pressure is great. This is what I consider a challenge in the next four or five years to which we must pay enormous attention or we are going to face some catastrophe somewhere down the road.

The problem I must tell you that bothered me most when I was in government was what I would say if the President of the United States asked me whether the point had been reached where diplomacy had reached its end and whether we should use our nuclear weapons. I remember a conversation with Helmut at one point where he told me his concerns in this direction. And we must avoid a situation where this can arise.

Janning: Helmut Schmidt, while you were in office you experienced not a similar but a likewise challenging situation when you demanded a response on the part of the Alliance to the deployment of SS-20 missiles of the Soviet Union. Part of this response by NATO 23

was the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles. You just mentioned the agreement between Reagan and Gorbachev eliminating those missiles.

In this crucial time for security the international community went through a period of armament before arriving at disarmament. Is there a possibility that with the multitude of actors in the world this could be a model for today? Or are those experiences that have basically lost their value due the globalization of the world?

Schmidt: No, it is not a model for our world of today.

Because at the time there were two nuclear powers facing each other, the Soviet Union and the United States of America. No, it cannot be a model. But I must repeat: At this moment there are approximately 20,000 deployable nuclear weapons and their majority is in American and Russians hands. Another few hundred are in the possession of the Chinese, the French, the Israelis, the British, the Indians, and the Pakistanis. These 20,000 deployable nuclear weapons are a complete nuisance. In addition there are another 20,000 to 30,000 inactive nuclear weapons that have to be guarded so that they do not fall into the hands of terrorists. It is sheer lunacy! And here I see a task for the American leadership: to get started with nuclear disarmament. I am not talking about complete elimination – I am no dreamer. But looking at the development of new technologies in order to shoot down other people’s orbital

Global Power and Order

satellites, in order to shoot down other people’s missiles which are carrying nuclear weapons themselves I see a new round of preparing nuclear warfare approaching.

Kissinger: But the dilemma, Helmut, is: Of these 20.000 weapons the ones most likely to be used are not the ones in the Soviet or American control.

The Strategic Arms Agreement between the United States and Russia is running out this year. I am quite confident that a negotiation will start to renew it and I would be surprised if as a result of that negotiation we would not see a significant reduction of the strategic weapons on both sides from the present I think 2,200 on both sides to some lower number. So it will take place. The only issue is: Will it move fast enough to enable us to solve the issue of Iran but also the issue of North Korea? Because if the North Korean negotiation ends where it is now it would mean that they have eight nuclear weapons and have given up a plutonium plant for it but the process would then look as if it legitimized the possession of nuclear weapons. So even North Korea is a problem.

Janning: Henry Kissinger, please let me add another question. Do you see the possibility that in relation with the new steps of the Obama administration that the big issue of the last years – the missile umbrella of the Americans partly being deployed to Poland 24

and the Czech Republic – that this could be a future common American-Russian-European project?

Kissinger: Russia offered but two years ago a common defense based on some installations they had in Southern Russia and not much progress was made in the discussions. I advocated publicly that we should pick up this idea and I still favor it because the political symbolism of Russia, Europe and the United States working together on this issue is important. I will also say because of our Polish friend here that in going in that direction we should not treat Poland as if it were an object which sometimes we use, sometimes we do not use so that we keep in mind we respect the history that has taken place with respect to that negotiation but the principle that respects this defense should be based on a common approach I think is a creative way of avoiding the conflict over it.

Janning: Please let me refer to this issue from a different point of view. During our discussions we have mentioned the global constellations, economic globalization, power and strategies, authority in international politics, and security. Lots of people are on the one hand affected by what happens and what goes on in those spheres of international politics, on the other hand they are quite far from the action.

Are there any intermediary institutions that can operate as mediators? Can an instrument – also with a glance on our own work here – like the Global

Global Power and Order

Policy Council be a useful instrument in order to connect the realities of our world and the perceptions of people in our countries? And what else should we do to get in closer touch with people?

Schmidt: Well, I cannot judge this particular Council.

Generally speaking I would say that all efforts directed at bringing together people of different cultural backgrounds, of different national backgrounds, of different continental affiliation, of different education are always worthwhile. It is – always – important that they listen to each other and that they discuss with each other.

Over the years, also during the Cold War, that means the second half of the 20th century there have been quite a number of such institutions. I remember the Bilderberg conferences to which Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands invited once a year. This was a wonderful institution. There have been more and we will need them also in the future. But even more important will be that we start in the universities. It is important that young people are encouraged to continue their studies for at least one year abroad, that 23-year old German students will go for one year to the universities in Krakow or in Warsaw, that 23-year old Polish students continue their studies in Paris or in Oxford or in Cambridge or if you prefer in Harvard or in Stanford. It is important that students from India study for some time in Beijing or in Shanghai or in Bandung. It is important that young people 25

experience early enough in life an intellectual contact which they will hopefully keep up for the rest of their life. It is grotesque, an absolute aberration that we still see presidents or prime ministers who as political leaders need a passport for the first time because until that moment they have known only their own country. That people who have seen until yesterday only their own courtyard will be tomorrow the foreign minister of a major country is an absolute aberration, an aberration of the educational system in our countries.

Janning: In this case it is a good thing that you both are an exception. If Helmut Schmidt …

Schmidt: Otherwise I would not have been allowed to say that.

Janning: ... reports correctly in his book it was on the occasion of one of his first trips as member of parliament to the United States that he met you while you were Assistant Professor at Harvard University …

Kissinger: In Cambridge.

Schmidt: That was in 1958.

Janning: ... when exactly that happened what you petition today. Henry Kissinger, it is your turn to close our discussions on this issue.

Global Power and Order

Kissinger: I agree with what Helmut has said. I would add that study groups like yours or others that are set up have a special function because sometimes people are assembled on these groups in order to express an emotion. But what is needed is to find the road from where one is to where one wants to go which depends on the ability to accumulate nuances and to understand the essence of the problem and so one has to be willing not only to assemble the groups but to work on the implementation.

Janning: I would like to thank you, Helmut Schmidt and Henry Kissinger, very much on behalf of all participants of the Global Policy Council. You gave us an impressive example of your political presence in the world and I think it will give our further discussions a fruitful and inspiring boost. Thank you very much!

26

About the Global Policy Council

The Global Policy Council (GPC) started in June 2006 in Berlin with a stock taking exercise on key issues of power and order. Reflecting on the breathtaking speed with which the geopolitical landscape had changed within only 15 years, special attention was dedicated to the new ambiguity which exists in today’s international order. Firstly, growing interconnectedness drives up the interests of all stakeholders in maintaining the system, because disruptions will be felt by every member. Secondly, it is precisely this interconnectedness that amplifies the impact of potential disruptions to the system.

During the discussions of the first meeting, it was Henry Kissinger who suggested reflecting more systematically on a world with 30 or more nuclear states. Though the spread of nuclear weapons poses not a complete new security threat, in light of the developments in North Korea and Iran it was found crucial to ground further deliberations of the GPC with a thorough analysis of the current proliferation dynamics and their implications for world order.

Accordingly, the second meeting of the GPC in October 2007 dealt with scenarios of the proliferation risks in East Asia. The other focal point of the session was the impact of China and Japan on regional and global order.

The third GPC was held in March 2009 and focused on the issues and priorities of the emerging global

27

agenda. The discussions made clear that finding a common global agenda evidently is a difficult task, as it is more than just an exercise which consists of defining a number of items. Rather, a truly global agenda must be concerned with reconciling interests, understanding all actors as having an equal footing and pursuing the global good.

For more information please see our website. www.shaping-a-globalized-world.org ďƒŹ

ďƒŹ

The Project “Shaping a Globalized World”

The forces of globalization are driving change worldwide. Economic globalization, modern communication technology and growing mobility are creating an increasingly interconnected world.

This world is characterized by growing interdependence and new forms of cooperation that transcend national and cultural borders. At the same time, challenges in areas such as climate change, terrorism, energy insecurity and social inequalities – as well as global financial turmoil – undermine stability, peace and global development. This shows that the current system of global governance is insufficiently prepared to deal with such challenges.

Against this background, the “Shaping a Globalized World” project seeks to develop ideas and suggestions on how globalization can be managed politically, and to incorporate those ideas and suggestions into an international debate. The project is meant to be a pathfinder and an advisor to policymakers and the public. Its purpose is to spur participants to think more deeply about the political agenda of a globalized world, about strategies for action and modes of governance.

28

Josef Janning Senior Director Bertelsmann Stiftung Phone +49 5241 81 81128 josef.janning@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

The Project “Shaping a Globalized World”

The project “Shaping a Globalized World” attempts to examine global-governance issues inclusively and equitably. The project aims to do this by gathering minds, experiences and viewpoints from people, governments and non-state actors from various parts of the globalized world. Participants reflect the diversity of societal actors; they will consult, be consulted and cooperate on the project. They will develop options for political action on globalgovernance issues and make them available to the general public. By generating ideas and outlining opportunities for political actors and the public, the project hopes to contribute to the discussion on creating a fairer and juster globalized world.

The project, launched in fall 2008, combines the Bertelsmann Stiftung‘s in-house expertise and wide-ranging program experience with appropriate resources, initiatives and programs of other internationally active institutions, think tanks and foundations. The project is coordinated by an international project team based in Gütersloh (Germany), Brussels (Belgium) and Washington, D.C. (USA).

For more information, see www.shaping-a-globalizedworld.org .

29

Contact Us

Dr. Peter Walkenhorst Gütersloh Headquarters Phone +49 5241 81 81172 peter.walkenhorst@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

Stefani Weiss Brussels Office Phone +32 2233 3891 stefani.weiss@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

Ting Xu Washington Office Phone +1 202 621 1721 ting.xu@bertelsmann-foundation.org

About the Bertelsmann Stiftung

Impressum

Š 2009 Bertelsmann Stiftung Carl-Bertelsmann-StraĂ&#x;e 256 33311 GĂźtersloh www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de Executive Dr. Peter Walkenhorst Phone +49 5241 81 81172 peter.walkenhorst@bertelsmann-stiftung.de Graphic Design Andreas Recek, Bielefeld The Bertelsmann Stiftung, founded by Reinhard Mohn in 1977, is a nonprofit organization that functions exclusively as a private operating foundation. Its goal is to promote social change. The foundation focuses on people and strives to expand their opportunities.

This is the vision of the founder, and it remains the basic principle underlying our work. The foundation is independent and politically nonpartisan. The foundation sees itself as an integral part of society. It is committed to the values of freedom, solidarity and humanity and beliefs in competition.

30

Photocredits Marc Darchinger

Contact Bertelsmann Stiftung Carl-Bertelsmann-StraĂ&#x;e 256 33311 GĂźtersloh

www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de