The IAEA and the Interim Deal; Funding Challenges

THE IAEA AND THE INTERIM DEAL:

FUNDING CHALLENGES U.S. Contributes Nearly Half of IAEA Budget

IAEA Spends $164 Million on Inspections

IAEA’s 2014 Budget: $471,069,846

Other Member States Contributions

$198M

$273M

Dedicated to Iran $19.7M

$144M

U.S. Contributions

CURRENT IAEA INSPECTIONS IN IRAN: 16 nuclear facilities and 9 locations outside facilities inspected

IAEA INSPECTION UNDER INTERIM DEAL: + More Frequent Inspections (now daily at Natanz, Fordow) + 5 Additional Facilities (Centrifuge Facilities and Uranium Mines)

=50% Increase in inspections workload

=$9.8 MILLION

additional annual cost to IAEA THE IAEA AND THE INTERIM DEAL: FUNDING CHALLENGES

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) operates a budget of $164 million for its Nuclear Verification program, which is responsible for ensuring nuclear facilities around the world are used for peaceful purposes in line with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran has historically taken up over 12% of this budget, with two to four staff in Iran virtually every day of the year and 20 dedicated to inspection activity in Iran. Prior to the deal, inspectors were believed to visit Natanz and Fordow about once a week and other sites less often. The deal reached on November 24, however, has expanded access for inspectors, allowing for daily access to Natanz and Fordow.

Tehran also granted the IAEA “managed access” to the Arak heavy water facility, which could be used to produce weapons-grade plutonium. Also under the interim agreement, the IAEA will have access to uranium mines and mills as well as centrifuge facilities, many of which the IAEA has not had access to since 2006, when Iran stopped its implementation of the Additional Protocol.

Naturally, increased access to nuclear facilities will demand more resources from the IAEA’s nuclear verification budget. Implementation of the proposals laid out in the Geneva interim accord, expected to start in January, is going to be “extremely complex and difficult” with “significant extra work,” according to a Western envoy. IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano said that his staff could handle a bigger workload if needed, but also stressed, “The IAEA’s budget is very, very tight… I don’t think we can cover everything by our own budget.”

As IAEA inspections are likely to increase by 50% or more as a result of the interim deal, BPC recommends a corresponding increase of $10 million in U.S. funding to the IAEA to support the increased efforts of IAEA inspectors to ensure Iran’s adherence to the terms of the interim agreement.

FACILITIES CURRENTLY SAFEGUARDED NAME

LOCATION PURPOSE

Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX Facility)

Tehran

Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) Tehran

Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL)

Tehran

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The largest light-water research reactor in Iran that is used to produce polonium-201, which is needed as a neutron initiatior for a nuclear weapon, although Iran claims that this is for use in radio-isotope thermoelectric generators.

This facility is used for the production of radioisotopes of molybdenum, iodine and xenon from natural uranium oxide irradiated in a research reactor. Small-scale plutonium separation activities can also be undertaken as the facility has “hot cells.”

Many nuclear research and development activities are undertaken at JHL, including using shielded glove boxes/hot cells; a uranium metal purification and casting laboratory; mass spectrometer and laser laboratories; and facilities to test the uranium purification and conversion processes.

Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR)

Esfahan

Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor (HWZPR)

Esfahan

Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor (LWSCR)

Esfahan

Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF)

Esfahan

Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP)

Esfahan

Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP)

Esfahan

Enriched UO Powder Plant (EUPP)

Esfahan

Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)

Natanz

Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP)

Natanz

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A small research reactor operation since the mid-1990s with a lifetime supply of one kg of 90.2% enriched uranium.

A zero-power reactor that runs on uranium metal fuel used for training purposes.

Has been used to gain experience in controlling heavy water reactors. In April 2013, the HWZPR started to test the prototype Arak fuel, suggesting a start to the process of quality control for uranium fuel used at Arak and starting the fission chain reaction.

This facility converts yellowcake, a uranium concentrate powder, into uranium oxide, uranium metal and uranium hexafluoride.

The uranium hexafluoride is used in the enrichment process at Natanz, and the uranium oxide for heavy water reactors.

The uranium metal is claimed to be used for research reactors but is suspected of being used to produce highly-enriched metal for use in a nuclear weapon.

This produces finished fuel elements, including fuel rods and fuel pellets, for use at the Arak heavy water facility.

Produces small amounts of fuel pellets, some of which are irradiated at the Tehran Research Reactor for plutonium separation research. The IAEA has noted the limited production capability of the FPFP however.

This makes the uranium powder Uranium Tetrafluoride that is the precursor to Uranium Hexafluoride used in centrifuges for enrichment This is an underground uranium centrifuge enrichment plant, which holds 50,000 centrifuges, although construction is still on-going.

An above-ground, test, research, development and pilot enrichment facility with around 1000 centrifuges. The PFEP has enriching Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6) to 20%, as of May 2013 producing 177.8kg of up to 20% U-235.

Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant Fordow (FFEP) Karaj Waste Storage

Karaj

360 MW Nuclear Power Plant

Darkhovin

Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP)

Bushehr

Iran’s secondary enrichment facility with around 3000 centrifuges, producing both 5% and 20% enriched U-235. It has estimated to have produced up to 166.6kg of 20% U-235.

Radioactive waste storage facility for leaked enriched uranium and spent fuel.

This is Iran’s first commercial, light-water reactor that produces 1000MWe.

Light-water, 360MWe commercial reactor, that is aiming to run on domestically produced fuel.

Additional locations: Nine locations outside the above facilities where nuclear material is customarily used, all within hospitals.

JOINT PLAN OF ACTION PROVISIONS

The JPA provides for IAEA inspector managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities, and uranium mines and mills as well as committing Iran to take steps to agree with the IAEA on conclusion of the Safeguards Approach for the reactor at Arak.

Information about Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing and testing was largely gathered between 2004 and 2006, when Iran suspended enrichment and centrifuge activities while implementing the IAEA Additional Protocol on a voluntary basis. After resuming enrichment in 2006, IAEA inspectors have not had access to information about centrifuge manufacturing in Iran nor have they inspected centrifuge facilities. As such, most of the information about Iran’s centrifuge facilities is out of date or incomplete, making assessing Iran’s compliance with the interim deal regarding centrifuge facilities a difficult task for the IAEA and P5+1 nations.

NAME

Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40 Reactor)

LOCATION PURPOSE Arak

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This is a large heavy water facility that is designed to produce 40-megawatts thermal of power. However, weapons-grade plutonium could also be produced, and without the need for enriched uranium, as it uses uranium fuel instead. It is estimated that if worked efficiently at full capacity, the IR-40 reactor could produce enough plutonium for around 1.5 nuclear weapons per year. However, this also requires the separation of the weapons-grade plutonium from its spent fuel in a fuel reprocessing facility. There is no known evidence of this in Iran.

Gachin Mine and Mill

Bandar Abbas

Saghand Mine and Ardakan Yellowcake Production Plant

Yazd/Ardakan

Centrifuge Facilities in Tehran (TABA; Kalaye Electric; Pars Trash, once a subsidiary of Kalaye Electric, now believed to be controlled by TSA/ Iran Centrifuge Technology Company)

Tehran

Centrifuge Facilities in Esfahan Esfahan (7th of Tir Industries; the former Farayand Technique, now controlled by TSA/ Iran Centrifuge Technology Company)

Centrifuge Facilities in Mashhad Mashhad (Khorasan Metallurgy Industries and its subsidiary, Kaveh Cutting Tools)

Contains surface desposits of low but variable grade uranium ore that are openpit mined. Estimated Production capacity of the mine and mill is 21 tons of uranium per year.

The Saghand mine extracts low grade hard rock ore through conventional underground mining techniques, with an estimated production output of 50 tons of uranium per year. The associated production plant processes the uranium ore from Saghand into yellowcake, matching the mine’s capacity of 50 tons per year.

Kalaye Electric, in particular, was an important site for Iranian centrifuge development, serving as the primary site for developing, testing and assembling IR-1 centrifuges. TABA is believed to make centrifuge casing, magnets, molecular pumps, composite tubes, bellows and bases for current and next-generation machines.

7th of Tir manufactured several P1 centrifuge components, including the bellows and other rotating parts. Farayand Technique was used for quality control and testing of centrifuge components, as well as manufacturing and assembling parts of the centrifuge bottom bearing.

Khorasan Metallurgy and Kaveh Cutting Tools were used to manufacture nonrotating centrifuge parts: scoops, molecular pumps and top flanges.

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