Counterintelligence field manual 1

ORGANIC HUMINT SETUP FOR PARAMILITARY FORCES COMBATING ASSYMETRIC ENEMY

Keshav Mazumdar CMAS ATO Sr. VP Antiterrorism Accreditation Board USA

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REFRESHER FOR SECURITY FORCES COMBATING INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM.

CI & CI/HUMINT

PROJECT ARMY XXII

Topics Covered in 2 volumes 

Doctrinal Evolution



Intelligence/CI in COIN

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ES2/Population Centric Ops

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Intelligence-Ops Dynamic

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Clandestine Ops

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Altered Int Architecture

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Special CI tactics

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HUMINT

HUMINT Recommendations CI Recommendations

HUMINT collection management 

Tactical HUMINT

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD MANUAL - 1

Now the reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge. What is called "foreknowledge" cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation. Now there are five sorts of secret agents...: native, inside, doubled, expendable and living. When these five types of agents are all working simultaneously and none knows their method of operation, they are the treasure of a sovereign.... He, who is not sage and wise, humane and just, cannot use secret agents.

And he who is not delicate and subtle cannot get the truth out of them.... It is essential to seek out enemy agents who have come to conduct espionage against you and to bribe them to serve you.... And therefore only the enlightened sovereign and the worthy general who are able to use the most intelligent people as agents are certain to achieve great things. Secret agents are essential in war; upon them the army relies to make its every move.

Sun Tzu, The Art of War

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

The purpose of Intelligence is two fold.It acts as an early warning system by attempting to provide accurate and timely information about the adversary’s intention,and the surrounding environment.It also provides a counterintelligence tool to deny the adversary valuable information and also to combat terrorism,subversion and espionage.Thus intelligence is protective , exploitative and positive in that it supplies us with positive intelligence about the adversary and protects our own infrastructure.Intelligence thus renders our actions either offensive or defensive.

The CI effort focuses on the overall hostile intelligence collection, sabotage, terrorist, and subversive threat. The CI effort is also sufficiently flexible to adapt to the geographical environment, attitudes of the indigenous population, mission of the supported command, and changing emphasis by hostile intelligence, sabotage, terrorist, and subversive organizations.

What Are We Protecting?

In protecting an installation and its information systems,operations and general security from enemy multidisciplinary intelligence threat we must identify the vulnerable and critical areas to be given more weightage during security review.Not all assets and activities warrant the same level of protection.To this end a careful and thorough vulnerability analysis needs to be conducted resorting to red teaming methodology.

It should be noted at trhis juncture that it is always the attempts of the enemy intelligence service to subvert our knowledgable personnel.In a military production unit , say ordnance factory , the senior engineers and quality control scientists have access to sensitive designs and information related to weaponry systems.Similarly classified and top secret documents/information are in the hands of cleared senior personnel.These people are oftenb the target of aggressive enemy counterintelligence agents.

The five basic categories include the following: People Military personnel Activities/Operations Intelligence collection/analysis Sensitive movement of operations/personnel Conduct of sensitive training Communications/networking RDT&E and sensitive technology Production of sensitive technology Protection of nuclear/chemical/biological materials Protection of weapons, explosives, and equipment Information Classified Sensitive Compartmented Information

Top Secret Secret Confidential Unclassified System designs System capabilities/vulnerabilities Sensitive methods Facilities Headquarters Field offices/administrative buildings Training facilities Storage facilities Production facilities R&D laboratories Power plants Parking facilities Aircraft hangars Residences Equipment/Materials Transportation equipment/vehicles Maintenance equipment Operational equipment Communications equipment Security equipment Weapons Automated information systems equipment Now that the CI agent is knowledgeable about these assets and activities that need protection, he can execute a vulnerability and criticality analysis and recommend suitable protective measures as well as countermeasures to the Commander. He can recommend which critical units need protection first and what resources to allocate and how and where to implement general security and countermeasures.

CI and COIN:

Why does counterintelligence factor so much in COIN missions? Firstly insurgents place a very high emphasis on the usage of informants, double agents, reconnaissance, surveillance, open source collection of media and imagery.

Thus it could well be that we have sources who have switched loyalties or who may be working for both the parties with little or no loyalty to the government. We must locate these individuals who are a threat to operational security.

Secondly insurgents resort to countersurveillance.They hide among the local populace , use couriers to transfer money , intelligence and orders to run their ops.

Finally and very important is the need for counterintelligence for Force protection.

Another definition is CI both ‘information gathered’ and ‘activities conducted’ in order to ‘protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage or assassination conducted on behalf of foreign powers, organisations or persons, or international insurgent activities but not including personnel, physical documents or communications security’.In order to neutralize hostile intent CI conducts various activities such as acquiring information about plans , operations and capabilities of those organizations whose intent is subversion.CI informs policy.It aids military commanders and allied agency heads to take effective decisions.We don’t have a clear doctrine on CI.It is the most misunderstood , most sensitive arcane intelligence discipline.But it performs the very important function of protecting the intelligence cycle.

Counterintelligence is both an activity and its product. The product is reliable timely information about enemy/foreign intelligence organizational structure , the personnel profile , the operations of the enemy/foreign intelligence service and how they recruit personnel both from outside and insiders.To this end ‘’counterintelligence intelligence collection’’ activities are conducted.It is an organization too as it consists of personnel with specialized skills to whom are allocated various functions , which after proper execution an information database is created which provides knowledge to decision makers.Summing up CI is in a way different from all other intelligence disciplines.Intelligence seeks to aquire information through collection methods wherein the result is not the objective but in CI collection activities enemy intent is always in the horizon..and activities..both offensive and defensive are conducted to neutralize this intent or to exploit the enemy itself to our advantage.Counterintelligence interacts with other intelligence disciplines such as SIGINT and IMINT to locate hostile entities and also to acquire knowledge about the capabilities and targeting of hostile SIGINT/IMINT.CI is multidisciplinary.It is different from security in that like security it does not only seek to implement defensive measures but also to aggressively target hostile intent.One of these offensive CI operations is Deception.Deception ops are designed at senior echeleon levels such as Command.The CI body/unit executes the deception operation.Just as tactical military intelligence supports combat ops , similarly CI must support deception ops.CI is not policing.Once a crime is commited the law enforcement authorities resort to arrest of the perpetrator so as to prosecute him as per law.But a CI agent has no arrest authorities.All these doctrinal differences make it more difficult to promulgate a clear CI doctrine.

The CI functions include collection of all information about the activities and the organization itself of the enemy intelligence service.To this end source operations and clandestine methods are resorted to.The analytical component of CI holds significant importance because accurate analysis predicates CI operations designed to defeat hostile intent and also conduct exploitation ops to our advantage .Infiltration/penetration and deception operations , to name a few are the offensive operations resorted to by the CI body.A specialized function is the evaluation of defectors and debriefing of returned defectors.

There are also defensive operations designed to protect installations/personnel/information and formal security programmes.

Protecting secrets High up on its priority list CI has information protection.CI attempts to ensure that classified information doesn’t fall into the hands of unauthorized users such as foreign agents /foreign intelligence service (physical security part of CI) and also making certain that all those people who do have access to sensitive information , say due to ‘’need to know’’ authority or by virtue of portfolio in the intelligence deptt.—these people are protecting that information from being accessed.Here I used the term “CI attempts to ensure’’ as no amount of security controls can ever guarantee that the employee will observe the rules.Lapses will and do happen.Lapses which may be involuntary or voluntary with multiple intent scenarios ..ranging from yearning for self sufficiency in terms of wealth etc to disgruntled officials.If an official has the authorization to access sensitive information we must accept the fact that the information can also be compromised.To prevent this from happening and thus protect the intelligence information (or in a larger context the intelligence cycle itself) the intelligence organization resorts to psychological/behavioural evaluation/monitoring and profiling those personnel who have a propensity for betrayal.But the former evaluation techniques are below 100% accuracy thus leading to the recruitment of personnel who have intent to do harm.As for the latter profiling method those personnel who are adept in evading detection remain out of scrutiny and more resources are wastefully allocated in profiling the wrong person.Hence I had earlier stated that no amount of security control or vetting can ensure 100% information protection. We have to live with this risk and CI primary function is to resort to all available means so as to minimize this risk.

Counterintelligence force protection source operations Attacks against military and related facilities are a very real threat, as demonstrated by the Naxalite attack against CRPF personnel in Chattisgarh's Dantewada district and many others. On April 6, Naxalites had killed 75 CRPF personnel and a police officer also succumbed in the massacre.We must have a doctrine for protecting our facilities and conserving the potential of our forces.Insurgents deliberately attack the forces ..for example in the rear to destroy camps,housing,support units and ammunition dumps with the intent to undermine the fighting potential and morale of the troops and loot and destroy its ordnance and weapons simultaneously.This is a grave threat and needs to be addressed.

Counterintelligence , like it protects the intelligence services it also provides the necessary intelligence to combatant commanders for force protection.Standard intelligence disciplines all provide relevant intelligence but very less or no HUMINT relevant to counterintelligence.

Yes we incorporate standard physical security measures but that is not sufficient for force protection.It is never a substitute for protection gained through intelligence.Moreover physical security can never override the value of counterintelligence.It is only HUMINT collected by intelligence and counterintelligence agencies that function as the indications and warning provider with respect to insurgent and other force protection threats.

As such Source Operations are conducted by the counterintelligence units and casual or incidental sources such as listed below are screened and debriefed/interrogated: walk-ins and write-ins (individuals who volunteer information) unwitting sources (any individual providing useful information to counterintelligence, who in the process of divulging such information may not know they are aiding an investigation) defectors and enemy prisoners of war (EPW) interviewees (individuals contacted in the course of an investigation) official liaison sources.

NEED FOR CI DOCTRINE & CI ARCHITECTURE AT TACTICAL/OPERATIONAL LEVELS

Doctrine guides the employment of military forces, and shapes how military professionals “think about the use of the military instrument of national power”. Army doctrine details a basic understanding of the tactics , techniques and procedures to be employed to support combat requirements.Air Force doctrine provides commanders and their staffs a basic understanding of how various Air Force organizations can be used to meet or support combat requirements.

INDIA historically lacked comprehensive CI doctrine.This lack of doctrine has resulted in confusion, and hampered the ability of Force commanders to use CI to improve force protection efforts.

Force protection efforts must be threat driven.Vulnerabilities should be identified , the corresponding threats identified and then protective measures are put in place.To this end MI and CI play a very important role.This should be the basis for the creation of a comprehensive CI doctrine. .

“CI is the systematic acquisition of information concerning espionage, sabotage, insurgency, and related foreign activities conducted for or on behalf of foreign nations, entities, organizations, or persons and that are directed against or threaten our military interests.” To this end a variety of HUMINT sources , like walk ins , casual sources , defectors , official sources , liaison contacts , recruited sources are employed by CI elements. CI collections and investigations lead to a repository of information on threats.Thereafter by cueing other intelligence disciplines and using all source analysis a complete picture of the threat is obtained.Thus we reach our main objective—the precise warning of hostile attack and we also identify the probable targets of the attack and the time of attack.In a nutshell CI usage of HUMINT is the first line of defence.

We can categorize the threats based on intent. This can be incorporated in the force protection doctrine. Hence we can allocate HUMINT resources in an appropriate manner without any duplication or wastage. Type 1 can be criminal activity geared towards army bases ,Type 2 can be penetrative reconnaissance and sabotage operations , and Type 3 can be major land , amphibious , air and missile attacks. Thus commanders can tailor defensive actions compatible with the type of attack.

Mission of CI can be clearly defined , objectives stated and qualitative/quantitative protocols in collection efforts underscored. Keeping each type of attack in perspective and with the notion of CI as ‘’looking inwards’’ in mind we can identify the critical areas of installations, and implement security measures. At the same time we can launch aggressive CI operations to frustrate enemy intelligence collection efforts.

It is true that a multidisciplinary intelligence approach is effective to thwart enemy collection efforts but CI and force security measures play key roles.+To neutralize/destroy enemy intent we need CI to the fullest capacity.Other intelligence disciplines can be cued but CI is top priority.To identify our vulnerabilities we must resort to counterintelligence.Intelligence is looking outward but CI is looking inward.Intelligence collection is not concerned with the end result but counterintelligence is concerned with the ‘’intent’’ of collection.CI should always be on an aggressive footing.We need a comprehensive CI doctrine detailing all of these and more.

We should bear in mind that this era is not exclusively the era of conventional combat.Asymmetric warfare is the order of the day.Insurgents take years to plan an operation.They conduct extensive preoperation surveillance , they have their own counterintelligence networks and this long period justifies the employment of intelligence and CI .

The CI department should tackle the type 1 , 2 and 3 threats.CI cells should come into existence and should be staffed with HUMINT , SIGINT and IMINT elements.Priority should be on analysis of threat intelligence.MI should be particularly in charge of analysis of Type 3 threats.Elements from Special task forces , explosive ordnance disposal,medical , operations and communications should also staff the CI cells.The CI elements should fortify their collection and investigation capabilities.They should maintain a threat database which will include the structure and capabilities of foreign intelligence services , details of insurgent organizations and timeline of attacks perpetrated by them and also criminal enterprises because it is well established that insurgents and criminals share information and resources. This database should be continually updated.The intelligence information contained in this database should be readily available on request.Included in this database should be latest physical security measures , details of explosive ordnance effects—all contributed by specialists.All source intelligence should be further fused in with the intelligence contained in the database.

The CI analytical cell should not only produce daily threat summaries but also act as an I&W system.It should receive worldwide inputs of insurgent developments as well as national cases.It should interface with civil intelligence agencies through liaison methodology thus updating threat information.The unit CI cells should be extrapolated to the creation of similar cells at all major commands which will focus on the respective area of responsibilities.These cells would produce threat and vulnerability assessments.

In addition to these functions these CI cells should be ready to be deployed to support major exercise and contingency deployments.

These CI cells will facilitate the formulation of the commanders information requirements as the dissemination of intelligence products to the latter will heighten his perception of the situation , also these cells can communicate two way with the collectors on the ground from parallel intelligence units thus achieving coordination between different intelligence disciplines.Investigative leads and operational opportunities result from all these efforts.

The Army Head Office (AHO) exercises technical control, review, coordination and oversight of CI

We need to have a force protection intelligence doctrine,strengthen it,define the role of MI in force protection efforts and priotize collection and analysis of intelligence on force protection threats.We need a robust HUMINT capability supported by CI—the optimum integration of both is the need of the hour.We have the LU , CI and IFSU but still we lack a viable HUMINT mission.Whatever HUMINT we have is afforded by these units directly or indirectly and we must use this to the fullest potential to counter force protection threats.To improve the HUMINT capabilities MI should assign additional resources.Duplication resulting from the efforts of the MI constituents need to be removed and the respective roles clarified.Duplication creates confusion and wastage of resources.We must have a comprehensive CI doctrine.The CI units should be staffed with more personnel , both in major cities/foreign areas and in collection activities.Analysis of force protection intelligence should be properly delegated to CI cells and to this end CI Analytical cells should be dispersed at Army Headquarters and major commands

controlled activities. a. Will execute a system of review of CI activities , ensure compliance and proper accounting. Will have direct control over an investigation,task the CI elements , provide guidance to operational and investigative CI activities and if necessary refer the CI activity to a suboffice.But the Head office assumes full and direct control.Monitor the management of case files and other records storage and retrieval system , processing of these and transfer to the repository , maintaining the quality assurance of of investigative reports,monitor source ops and CE projects,ensure laision activities with other agencies are properly conducted with optimum exchange of information and dissemination of information falling under their purview in a timely manner and approve or disapprove CI case summaries.

In summary the AHO Provides technical support to all CI assets and coordinates and deconflicts CI activities in the deployed AO Coordinates and supervises CI investigations and collection activities conducted by all services and components in the AOIR. Establishes and maintains the theater CI source database.

Coordinates with the HOC (see HUMINT section) for CI support to detention, interrogation, refugee, and other facilities.

Manages requirements and taskings for CI collectors in the AO in coordination with the HOC. Expedites preparation of .CI reports and their distribution to consumers at all levels.

Coordinates CI activities with senior CI officers from all CI organizations on the battlefield.

Performs liaison with national level CI organizations.

The Sub offices will coordinate technical direction and tasking from the head office , monitor all CI activities withing its area of operation and provide feedback to the head office , conduct CI investigations tasked to it by the head office , and also those that it assumes worth taking up , excepting those investigations directly controlled by the head office , ensure proper dissemination to end users as well as the head officeand ensure the accuracy , compliance with CI policy of all CI reporting.Briefing commanders and intelligence officials.Liasing with external agencies and disseminating information to them that falls under their purview.

CI and Force Protection

The foreign intelligence service conducts intelligence collection about our forces and hostile attack.Herein comes the very important concept of force protection.They target defence personnel , resources , activities and critical information.CI support to force protection involves actions to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against these entities.It should be noted that the military police functions are not adequate to cover the security of these entities –CI support is a must.In a deployable situation the enemy targets the vulnerable rear positions and the support elementsHence security is beefed up where troops are housed , dependendants and other personnel are made aware of the threat—this is where the CI elements are active..

The military police and allied elements take stock of the situation in the army area but are less aware of the ground situation ‘’outside the fence’’.Hence recourse is made to establish contact with civil intelligence agencies and local police for updates on any threat intelligence in the proximity of the base. Moreover the military police have no jurisdiction outside the base.Strengthening the physical defences is one way to prevent the application of hostile intent but what is more important is enemy pre-operational surveillance activities.But the difficulty is that these activities are innocuous.

Lets take an example to illustrate the point.A vehicle approaches the gate of a military camp.On being questioned by the guard on duty the driver says he had no intention to turn up there—he had made a wrong turn.Now this is an acceptabvle excuse and further interrogation may not help.The driver is instructed to leave the area.Fine.It is equally possible he is saying the truth.But consider the situation where the the threat index in the area is high and hence from the force protection perspective the driver who can equally well be a insurgent has just conducted successfully a preoperational surveillance.From the moment of approaching the perimeter , conversation with the guard and exiting the area he has quietly observed the perimeter security setup , the weapons the guards are using , how many guards are manning the gate , the manner in which the guard accosts a stranger , and what obstacles there can be in case the car is equipped with a bomb and has to force in through the gates.Hence from the force protection perspective the vehicle and the driver constitute a potential threat.Now the problem is the guard has no means to determine if this case is innocuous or not.

There are options.The license details of the driver can be jotted down.The car details and license plate number can be taken. Offhand queries can be made.A listing can be made of all ‘’lost motorists’’.The information can be shared with the local police.If it is found out the same driver has turned up at other installations with the same story , well we have a case of pre-operational surveillance and with the jotted information in hand steps can be taken. But still the case is rare as there are several instances of genuine lost motorists.

Whatever any installation together with its constituent personnel , their dependants , operations and information is susceptible to hostile attack and intelligence collection.CI elements must shield the installation from such intent by guarding the rear and vulnerable areas.CI should lend support to mobilization security , major records repositories , anti and counterinsurgency operations , rear operations , psychological operations , battlefield deception , operations security and CSIGINT.

Counterintelligence Planning Planning of tactical operations includes CI planning. This is an extremely important component of the overall planning. As CI/HUMINT operations require much more time than other intelligence disciplines these are looked into at the very beginning of tactical operations planning by the Commander.,It isd the CI staff officer who assists in the planning.He may further be joined by the Human exploitation team officer in charge and the CI second in command.

Requirement:CI planning is required as it aids the Commander in situation development.The commander can asses security vulnerabilities, get an estimate of the threat intelligence and force protection factors.It also helps in the overall formulation of intelligence and force protection operations.During planning overall intelligence effort certain intelligence disciplines lkike HUMINT have close ties with CI—hence the need for clear CI planning.CI activities and HUMINT operations need to be integrated and deconflicted as both have similar methodology , CI focusing on threat intelligence and countering it while HUMINT focusing on collecting information about the enemy.Effective human exploitation (such as sources,refugees,EPW etc) such as using interrogation/translation to extract information of intelligence value from EPWs. During the planning phase of tactical operations CI information is made available to the Commander and countermeasures suggested. The commanders benefit from CI information given at this phase because it helps to formulate tactical plans and because CI/HUMINT operations, by their very nature, generally require more time than other intelligence disciplines to yield substantive results.CI looks outside-in and hence the CI staff officer participating in the planning phase advises the Commander on the vulnerabilities which enemy intelligence may target.

The commander formulates an all-source intelligence collection plan to which the CI staff officer contributes by: a)Assisting in giving direction to the planning intelligence,subversion,terrorism and sabotage capabilities..

by

focusing

on

the

enemys

b)Making it sure by coordinating with the intelligence operations officer and collection manager who are also present in the planning thst the collection requirements levied on the CI/HUMINT operatives are in tune with the Commanders intelligence requirements and that the CI elements have the capability to pursue the activities thus helping the overall collection plan by inserting such realistic factors, c)

Planning the Activity. The CI Staff officer alongwith the help of the CI/HUMINT Company commander directs the collection effort—collection of intelligence pertaining to the enemys intelligence,terrorist,subversive,and sabotage capabilities,oversees the production of the said intelligence,ensures the timely dissemination to higher-ups and the units on the ground and finally recommends and monitors CI measures throughout the Command.Throughout he is assisted by the Officer in charge of the Collection Deptt and the Operations Staff.

CI Planning Considerations. Key considerations in planning CI operations include: (a) ??????

Determine clearly the Area of Ops and the Area of Interest.The concept of operations,the command/support relationships between HUMINT,CI and Reconnaissance units.,What are the intelligence requirements which the supporting CI units have been tasked with?What are the priority intelligence requirements,whether it’s the enemy ground/air ops,target battle damage assessment or future intentions of the enemy?

(b) Enemy Considerations. Intelligence operations are designed to know as much as possible about the enemy.Key points are: What are the threat forces characteristics?Are they guerilla type or do they belong to terrorist,insurgent organizations?Is there anyt sabotage group involved?Are there any enemy HUMINT/CI personnel?Are we handling an enemy with the forces structured on conventional lines or is it they are loose asymmetric cells?What are their centers of gravity and vulnerable nodes?Their sizes,composition,TTPs?

Who are their Commanders and key leaders?Theit C2 nodes and associated vulnerabilities?What are the TTPs of its C2 and CIS systems?What is the CI structure and what are their CI measures to prevent CI exploitation?

Who are the known enemy personnel engaged in intelligence,terrorist,sabotage,insurgency , CI or security activities?Who supports them /sympathizes with them from among the political/administration or population domains?

What are the key physical facilities,including installations used by the enemy? What are the key communications, media, chemical, biological, utilities, and political installations and facilities?

Which political parties,student groups,political/national figures and student leaders support the cause of the enemy and are hostile to our country?

CI planning and execution is conducted in concert with the six phases of the standard intelligence cycle. The first phase is planning and direction. It consists of those activities that identify pertinent intelligence requirements (IR) and provide the means for satisfying those requirements (see figure 64).2 Intelligence planning and direction is a continuous function and a command responsibility. The commander directs the intelligence effort; the intelligence officer manages this effort for the commander based on the intent, designation of priority intelligence requirements (PIR),and specific guidance provided during the planning process.

Planning and Direction Functions Requirements development Requirements management Collection management Production management (2) Counterintelligence planning is composed of two iterations of the intelligence cycle‌Decision planning and execution planning.In the first phase the battlespace and threat is determined by processing basic intelligence and counterintelligence procedures (collection,collation,analysis of information of intelligence and counterintelligence value) resulting in the production of intelligence and CI estimates and the intelligence preparation of the battlefield.Using these end products the Commander now goes forth to develop and select the various COAs.Now the second iteration , viz execution planning takes place.For every COA selected the resulting scenario is studied and the concept of operations determined.Keeping the mission in perspective,and based on the concept of operations,refinement of the intelligence and counterintelligence variables occur together with a review of the IPB,implementation of the final intelligence and counterintelligence collection,production and dissemination plan,the end products of which are mission-specific intelligence products and CI measures for the Commander to integrate with the concept of operations and conduct mission execution.As execution proceeds fresh intelligence requirements surface and each requirement is given unique attention,satisfied so as to ensure smooth mission execution.

Information Operations are the key to win a war by establishing information domination.To this end intelligence assumes prime importance and like it counterintelligence is a force enabler by responding very aggressively and effectively against enemy ISR operations.CI is particularly suited for enemy assymetrical threat.Thus counterintelligence lends credible support to information operations. The enemy ISR capability ranges from traditional HUMINT operations to highly sophisticated computer penetration operations. CI operations provide multi-discipline CI analytical support to planning, security, and targeting. CI agents conduct threat assessments,vulnerability analysis,investigate intelligence security violations,detect and counter threat ISR operations/capabilities and recommend possible countermeasures to the commander—all in all intelligence and counterintelligence shape the battlespace in the most optimum manner to accomplish the force mission.

Tactical CI Tasks Source operations.The top priority for any force is the protection of its personnel,installations.Source operations are conducted for force protection.(elaborate).

CI Planning and the Intelligence Cycle

The commanders BOS at his disposal are fire support and maneuver and here is where intelligence and counterintelligence act as force multipliers –the Intelligence and CI BOS must be successfully integrated in the Commanders BOS so that his PIRs are successfully answered giving him ideally a perfect situational awareness about the battlespace so as to conduct operations successfully. The commander focuses on the intelligence system by clearly designating his priority intelligence requirements (PIR), targeting requirements and priorities. Intelligence is a continuous process which keeps IEW operations tied to the commander's critical decisions and concept of operations. CI collection, analysis, and dissemination, like other intelligence, have to meet the commander's time requirements to be of any use other than historical.

(1) Operations drives intelligence.Intelligence drives operations.This dynamic is the essence of mission-based intelligence support and is carried out by flexible and not rigid application of the intelligence cycle.The intelligence cycle is not an end in itself.Every intelligence requirement undergoes processing separately.Planning is continuous.As the operations proceed further intelligence requirements surface and older ones are modified.

Screening and interrogation of persons possessing information of CI value.Instead of always conducting rear operations(interrogation centers are usually located at the rear) which entails poor performance as on several occasions intelligence is time sensitive and perishable,CI/HUMINT teams are deployed at the front wherein if HUMINT agents find someone with information of CI value,he can be rapidly interrogated there and then.The HUMINT and CI components can both conduct screening to determine appropriate individuals.Thus mobile interrogation teams make matters much manageable.

Interrogation of EPWs.Debriefing of recce patrols turned EPWs and detainees.

CI investigations.CI Review.

Document exploitation DOCEX. Conduct evaluation and analysis of seized equipment/hardware.

Conduct CI surveys and act in advisory capacity to the Commander on vulnerability issues by resorting to red teaming Conduct TSCM operations Analyze CI and terrorism threats and assist in the preparation of plans, estimates and orders Take control of the interrogation and documents/material exploitation centre and supervise the proceedings and intelligence activities Assist in the identification and recovery of missing and captured personnel

Authorities set up—Management committee for managing CI and HUMINT.

 Director –CI and HUMINT  CI cell with a CI coordinator in charge  HUMINT Ops cell 

Tasks of all three:

Coordinating, managing, deconflicting technical control and proper dissemination/reporting of:

      

Interrogation and debriefing activities, Mobile Interrogation activities, HUMINT source operations, CI operations pertaining to Force Protection, CI investigations, Other overt HUMINT operations, All covert and/or special compartmented HUMINT operations.

Three types of measures employed in CI operations are denial, detection, and deception of threat intelligence collection efforts.

Denying the enemy and its intelligence apparatus any information about our installations,personnel,information and operations is vital and cannot be overemphasized.Similarly we must resort to deceptive measures to present before the enemy intelligence a fabricated version of our actual intentions and operations so that the enemy is misled and is forced to utilize and deploy its resources in the most disadvantageous manner and be suspectible and vulnerable to our targeting,whether lethal and kinetic or psychological.Detection is all important and facilitates the proper usage of denial and deception operations.

We must detect the enemy’s intelligence efforts at the earliest.Here is where I&W plays a very important part.In addition offensive counterintelligence such as infiltration and penetration coupled with enemy agent exploitation can give us an inside view of the enemys organization,its operations,its key intelligence personnel,our turned-personnel and its intentions.Detection examples include checkpoints and roadblocks thus creating choke points to to enable screening and to control the vehicles and personnel in the area of operations.Such checkpoints enables our agents to detect enemy agents ,false identification papers and caches of arms,ammunition and equipment.

Denial measures include document security,physical security communication security,counter-reconnaisance and censorship.

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installations,signals

Deception consists of feints,ruses and fabricated information leaked to the enemy—all of these can have several objectives,like depleting the enemys resources wastefully thus reducing his combat effectiveness-example being forcing him to direct its firepower in a massive operation on fake weaponry systems,hangars,ammo dumps ,defence facilities etc.The intention is to mislead the enemy about the status of our combat strength,logistics,dispositions,firepower,and other activities.

Deception operations are normally planned,approved and directed by higher HQ’s.

CI measures can be either offensive or defensive in nature.

Offensive CI measures are aggressive in nature.They are intended to prevent the enemy to gain information by employing sabotage or subversive activities.On the other hand Defensive CI operations are directed at conducting security reviews,vulnerability analyses,secrecy discipline,security of documents and materials which are of sensitive nature,signals security and overall security of the installation.CI Defensive measures constitute a portion of the units SOP. The primary mission of CI focuses on force protection.OPSEC,Deception and rear area operations like interrogation/debriefing at interrogation centers and securing rear area facilities and base camps/headquarters are used to this effect.CI resorts to aggressive measures to degrade the enemys multidisciplinary threat intelligence and targeting capabilities.Here in intelligence parlance,targeting does not only mean physical or behavioural degradation but also intelligence collection products.CI is multidisciplinary , involving all three—C-HUMINT,C-IMINT and C-SIGINT. Force protection is a command responsibility to protect personnel, equipment, and facilities. To carry out his force protection responsibilities, a commander requires support from several sources, one of which is the intelligence community. CI support to force protection must be tailored to the sensitivity of the supported organization and its vulnerability to foreign intelligence service (FIS) and hostile attack. CI support can be tailored from a combination of activities to include: Mobilization security, including ports and major records repositories.

Combating terrorism.

Rear operations.

Civil-military affairs.

Psychological operations (PSYOP).

Battlefield deception.

OPSEC. Friendly Communications-Electronics (C-E) (C-SIGINT).

CI force protection source operations (CFSO).

Army CI is not limited to the activities of a small force of CI agents and technicians; rather, it is the responsibility of all Army personnel to follow common sense security measures to minimize any foreign intelligence threat.

Although a major part of the CI mission is to counter or neutralize FIS efforts, this does not mean that only CI personnel take part in these actions. They may require: Other intelligence specialists such as interrogators.

Military police (MP).

Civilian counterparts and authorities.

Combat forces.

Civil-military affairs and PSYOP. Criminal Investigation Command (CIDC) agents.

CI is that phase of intelligence activity aimed at destroying the effectiveness of enemy foreign intelligence activities, and at protecting information against espionage, personnel against subversion, and installations or materiel against sabotage.

CI MISSION

CI MISSION: The mission of the Divn CI is to counter threat ISR efforts , act as a support to other intelligence disciplines especially HUMINT,support targeting,FP,and advise the Commander and recommend security measures.

. CI agents are usually task organized with the intelligence platoons HUMINT collectors when they conduct counterHUMINT operations. ((DOD) The act of designing an operating force, support staff, or logistic package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission. Characteristics to examine when task-organizing the force include, but are not limited to: training, experience, equipage, sustainability, operating environment, enemy threat, and mobility.

CI personnel are engaged in three basic operations: CI Investigations CI Assessments C-HUMINT Ops.

COUNTER-HUMINT OPS-TACTICAL HUMINT TEAM.

Counter-HUMINT OPS has as its Primary mission to report on enemy ISR activities,the information being collected by exploitation of human sources and documents.These reportings are done by the HUMINT portion of the tactical HUMINT team.As for its Secondary mission,the assessment and neutralization of threat ISR activity is conducted by the CI element of the tactical-HUMINT team.

The tactical-HUMINT team or also called the HUMINT Platoon consists of a headquarters element, a HUMINT Control team, three HUMINT Teams and one CI Team(normally 4 soldiers further subdivided into two-soldier groups) The CI team performs three basic operations: CI investigations, CI assessments and Counter-HUMINT operations.

CI OPERATIONS

Support to Force Protection and Information Ops Planning is the domain of CI operations.CI ops identify the vulnerabilities of the military force to enemy multidimensional ISR threats and recommend suitable countermeasures.CI ops include CI Security investigations, I analysis and C-HUMINT operations conducted by the Tactical HUMINT team.

CI INVESTIGATIONS.

Counterespionage investigations and Personnel Security investigations are the two types of investigations conducted by CI agents.The former deals with cases subversion,espionage,treason,spying,sedition,sabotage and CI aspects of terrorism/assassination whereas the latter is conducted to determine suitability of personnel for security clearances and also to assist the commander to grant limited access authorization to foreign nationals and indigenous personnel.

CI support to vulnerability assessments.

The enemy conducts MDIC (multidiscipline intelligence collection) activities to ascertain the vulnerabilities of our installations,bases,facilities and other locations/assets including semipermanent ones.The CI team conducts these vulnerability assessments by red-teaming and other methods and recommends suitable countermeasures to the Commander.Military police,engineers deptt and other units assist in ascertaining these vulnerabilities.On-going ops are also scanned for vulnerabilities so as to maintain operational security.

COUNTER-HUMINT OPERATIONS.

Counter-HUMINT operations are operations to determine adversarial intelligence threat by identifying the enemy’s HUMINT collectors and either neutralizing them or exploiting them by using deception techniques or by recommending security or targeting steps.CI operations are either Special ops or General ops , the former being aggressive in nature with direct or indirect engagement with the enemys intelligence service using human agents or technical measures. Infiltration and penetration operations are two of the various Special ops countermeasures.

General operations.

General operations are defensive in nature and support force protection programs and formal security programs of commanders at all echelons.

CI Screening.

CI/HUMINT teams conduct screening operations to make available knowledgable individuals for CI questioning,interrogation and debriefing.As mentioned earlier in this book CI screening is of primary importance,otherwise a lot of time and effort/resources are wasted in handling a large number of unscreened individuals comprising of detaineees,EPWs,refugees, and civilian internees at checkpoints and and collection points.CI Screening operations identify enemy intelligence agents, saboteurs, and subversives; enemy intelligence collection operations and capabilities; and Category II and III threat to operations areas. These CI activities are not conducted in isolation and are coordinated with Military Police, Civil Affairs, interrogation of EPW and related HUMINT collection activities, or other ongoing operations.

Force Protection Source Operations (FSO).

Force Protection Source Operations are different from the collection operations by HUMINT agents to answer commanders primary and other intelligence requirements through tactical questioning.The objective of FPSO is not a sudden intelligence requirement or intelligence gap but is something which should be a continuous consistent endeavour , totally defensive in nature and conducted by developing and employing human-source-networks throughout the area of operations and also beyond.Developing,exploiting and maintaining these human-source-networks is a very time sensitive process and therefore are best executed in static situations or sustainment areas.Note further in the pre-deployment phase,before the boots hit the ground,HUMINT-CI teams should be dispatched with sufficient time in hand to make a preliminary but near-thorough assessment of force protection conditions satisfying FPSO objectives and also acquire all intelligence information about the area of operations from the departing force intelligence element.

Liaison.

CI personnel coordinate with adjacent units and staffs, key Army agencies such as the Military Police and Civil Affairs and maintain liaison contact with local national counterparts to obtain operational, threat and source lead information.

SCREENING OF SOURCES TO DETERMINE USABILITY

The TACHUMINT team will place the sources under the scanner to determine their usefulness. The HUMINT collector will basically place the source within one of four categories.

Persons who have information of immediate intelligence interest.They are interrogated or debriefed as the case may be on the spot.The mobile interrogation teams come in handy at this juncture.

Persons who may be of interest to other intelligence disciplines.For example the source may have information of TECHINT value.In that case the HUMINT collector can take the services of a technical savvy operative to interrogate or debrief the source.Again HUMINT collectors are presented with the ‘’profile of interest’’ by CI agents.If the source matches these requirements the HUMINT collector first extracts all what he can relevant to his domain and then transfers the source to the CI team for questioning.All this is coordinated by the OMT. Persons who may provide good intelligence in the future by virtue of their placement and access to the enemy intelligence services or organization.The HUMINT collector after careful assessment comes to the conclusion that this individual has the potential to be a good source.As such his name is entered in the database in the folder of potential sources.

Persons who can provide no information of any intelligence value.

CI PROFILES OF INTEREST WHILE SCREENING The HUMINT elements in the TACHUMINT team liaise with the CI elements so as to know their requirements before conducting screening.This profile of interest is of two types.Persons of the enemy’s intelligence service conducting collection operations fall in the first category.Persons who can provide details (identifications,locations or activities)about the persons in the first category constitute the second profile of interest.Generally CI operatives are interested in persons who :

Have no identification documents.

Have excessive or modified identification documents.

Possess unexplainable large amounts of cash or valuables.

Are illegal border-crossers.

Attempt to avoid checkpoints.

Are on the CI personalities list, which includes members of an intelligence service.

Request to see CI personnel.

Have family in the denied area.

Speak a different language or dialect than is spoken in the area.

Examples of the two specific interest profiles are but not limited to: Identified or suspected elements of the enemys intelligence services and their supporters.We must also include elements of criminal gangs ,terrorists or drug dealers who have liaison with these enemy intelligence personnel or supporters.

Identified or suspected espionage agents,saboteurs,subversives Hostile political figures Identified or suspected enemy collaborators/sympathizers from within the local community

RECOMMENDATIONS IN CI

Deconfliction. Deconfliction in intelligence operations is a very big problem, especially in times of war. Both active and passive HUMINT collectors should be taken into account when deconflicting HUMINT and CI operations. The following need to be taken into account: Registries and Rosters Meeting venues. Meeting times.

Source Placement and Access Management.

Deconfliction is a very serious issue and should be addressed with the aim of managing working relationships very very effectively and very clearly outlining mutual objectives.Deconflictioin is proper source administration between active/passive HUMINT collectors and CI collectors.The same source should not land up supplying the same information to different agencies requiring that information for different purposes(with the source getting paid multiple times).This also results in underutilization of the source with the latter dividing his time between tasks of the various agencies.

As the span of operations goes beyond the standard chain of command (that is, national collectors, special operations forces, sister services, and security forces),, deconfliction becomes even more difficult.

The source registries and rosters in the repositories of national level agencies , tactical organizations (Army, Navy and Air force) and others should all be pulled during say a theater-level operation and deconflicted , thus creating a theater source registry(deconflicted that is) at the tactical-collectors level and inputting deconflicted source data from national level and other civilian agencies—thus updating the tactical-source registry database.Deconfliction should start from the most internal elements and progress outwardly eventually dealing with theater levels.Information levels,tactical and strategic are the two domains requiring source deployment.Coupled with this the attributes of access and placement gives us a framework to manage wherein the right sources are selected in keeping with these three factors , source rosters are maintained meticulously and operational schedules are constantly updated.(keeping all the three factors in proper balanced perspective.)(ELABORATE).

The main point is creating deconflicted source registries right from the lowest and internal levels right upto theater levels. [Note: There is an order merit or precedence (often first come, first serve) that aids in deciding the fate of sources when there is a conflict.] Once completed, we could be certain that no source was being seen, paid, or supported by multiple organizations.

Screening Cell Operations. During conflict or ongoing operations the tendency is to screen and interrogate/debrief elements from outside the wire first.For force protection reasons and for source operations local or civilian hires should be immediately screened so as to determine their placement and access to useful information.This is often overlooked.In COIN operations locals can both be a good source of information and an indirect threat.

Screening Released Detainees. Detainees who have been released can be exploited when under detention using monetary or other inducements (after they have been subjected to CI screening so as to determine their potential in supplying future information of intelligence value)so that upon release they serve as continued intelligence sources and help to develop leads.

Interrogation Facility Operations. Manage and coordinate interrogation facility operations.

Effective Use of Mobile Interrogation Teams (MITs). At the forward areas,on or near the battlefield where enemy personnel or other human elements are taken prisnors or detained,there are chances of capturing personnel who posses little or no information of intelligence value and hence detention and interrogation centers become overcrowded with associate costs going high and administrative and intelligence assessments getting affected and delays in decision making result.Moreover these people with no or less information of intelligence or target value may have to be unnecessarily transported to interrogation centers in the rear area if not screened and interrogated properly which exactly why we require mobile interrogation teams MITs composed of CI personnel.These agents , when handed over captured or detained personnel by the HUMINT agents of tactical humint teams when they doubt the former may have information of intelligence value worthy of being exploited , conduct screening and interrogation on the spot in forward areas.Hence this screening results in the selection of persons having information of tactical,operational or strategic value.It is important to note that the CI agents must be very trained interrogators and linguists or supported by a trained efficient linguist team as screening and interrogation at forward areas cannot be compromised with time—time is of essence.We cannot afford to employ young untrained agents and neither the battlefield tactical situation warrants their traing there.

Counterintelligence :Denial and Deception.Two powerful techniques of the enemy

Deception, denial, and other counterintelligence (CI) practices in 4th Generation Warfare 4th generation warfare is highly irregular, unconventional and decentralized in approach.

Asymmetrical operations are employed to bypass the superior military power of nation-states to attack and exploit vulnerable political, economic, population, and symbolic targets, thus demoralizing both government and its populace.

Both organization and operation are masked by deception, denial, stealth, and related techniques of intelligence and counterintelligence tradecraft. Enemy agents wear no uniforms and infiltrate into the populations of the nation-states they seek to attack.

Information age technologies profoundly influence terrorist organizations and operations. The development of network-based terrorist organizations with transnational connections through cell phones, fax machines, e-mail, and websites provide these non-state armed groups with global reach.

Modern communications and transportation technologies greatly complicate this new battlefield. Not only are there no fronts, but also the old distinctions between civilian and military targets become generally irrelevant.

Laws and conventions of war applied to nation-states do not constrain terrorists (and their state sponsors) as they seek new and innovative means, including the use of weapons of mass destruction, to attack civilians and nonmilitary targets and inflict terrible carnage.

4th generation warriors, frequently in the name of religious-based millenarian ideologies, are remorseless enemies. Their operations are marked by unlimited violence, unencumbered by compassion or constraints.

Deception Techniques used by enemy forces One of the first steps in training terrorists is the assignment of a new identity. So significant use of false identities and proper documentation of it is very important.

There are specific sections that “specialize in obtaining travel documents for members deployed to foreign countries�.

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Terrorists are also trained on how to use various covers that allowe them to blend into the location to which they were deployed.

Sleeper cells were used extensively to establish the operational infrastructure necessary for future surprise attacks.

Terrorists created business and other fronts that make it possible to raise funds to cover the terrorists’ living expenses and for the purchase of weapons and bomb-making materials needed for a future operation.

Terrorists create covert cells and overt fronts for operations.

Terrorists were also obligated to perform duties they knew to be haram, forbidden by the laws and customs of Islam.Such as drinking liquor and resorting to lying.

Terrorist cells are compartmentalized. An operation is broken into two separate cells, the first performing infrastructure development, logistics, and operational planning. This cell conducts surveillance, tests target security, gathers intelligence, acquires the explosives, and constructs the bombs. Ideally, much of this transpires before the second cell is completely organized.

Terrorist operatives also encrypted files on computer systems in many different places.

There is speculation that, based on terrorist training manuals, operatives were instructed not to travel in groups and to use “secondary stations” to avoid detection.

Terrorists create a complex network of financial transactions by which they move hundreds of thousands of dollars.

The terrorists also mislead authorities by minimizing their associations with mosques known for their radical tendencies, though there are accounts of several hijackers visiting mosques during their U.S. stay.They also read namaz once instead of 5 times.

Terrorists sometimes use the mosques as places to communicate with other terrorist members and to exchange information as they believe that houses of worship were off limits to government agents.

A significant problem with many of the visas stemmed to terrorists is that not only from the hijackers’ deception on the applications–including false or missing information–but also the negligence of the officials approving the visas.

Some checklists for CI agents to follow Intelligence analysts must be able to distinguish between real signals indicating an attack, and “noise” which refers to irrelevant messages or those sent intentionally to deceive.

“Noise” never comes alone nor is irrelevant. True signals are “always embedded in the noise and irrelevance of false ones.

Preconceptions can lead to self-deception and also play a role in strategic surprise.

Tactical or technological innovation may impede an accurate assessment of intelligence.

Secrecy and trickery are core strategies followed by the enemy groups “to avoid detection at all costs when infiltrating any state.”

The enemy members are rarely conspicuous and well blend into society Communications and transportation should not be overlooked as they can be highly deceptive.

When any enemy command is certain that a particular telephone [line] is being monitored, it can exploit it by providing information that misleads the CI department and benefits the work plan.

Enemy groups always have a security plan which is defined as “a set of coordinated, cohesive, and integrated measures that are related to a certain activity and designed to confuse and surprise the CI forces.” ” For the plan to succeed, they make it -1) “realistic and based on fact so it would be credible before and after the work,” and, 2) “coordinated, integrated, cohesive, and accurate, without any gaps, to provide [the impression of] a continuous and linked chain of events.

If the enemy is easily providing information about their commander as the mastermind that conceived, planned, trained, and executed the operation; they are certainly deceiving.

The operatives charged with executing an assassination, assault, kidnapping, or bombing are certainly trained in 1)Cleverness, canniness, and deception; 2) keeping secrets; and, 3) remaining unknown to the enemy.

GUERILLA/INSURGENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND THE GOVERNMENT COUNTER-EFFORTS

INSURGENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE The leaders of an insurgent movement must constantly anticipate and be prepared to thwart efforts by established authority to acquire information about their organization and activities. It is known that the success of the Irish revolutionists was in direct relation to the operational achievements of their security chief, Michael Collins, who made it his job to know in advance what the British were going to do. His strategy relied on gaining direct, personal access to metropolitan police records.

He was so highly skilled and successful in his strategy that he was able toget the original of a report from the police of the districts. The thoroughness with which Collins worked his intelligence system enabled the I. R. A. to know what its enemy was thinking and often what the enemy proposed to do andon what information they based their action, and the identity of their sources.

This is counterintelligence activity. The importance of a sterling counterintelligence strategy is highlighted in a handbook prepared by an instructor of Castro's Sierra Maestra guerrillas, General Alberto Bayo. In his handbook, counterintelligence activity is thoroughlyassessedin the questions and answers he devised for guerrillas. In his opinion a counterintelligence agent was of greater value than 50 machineguns asan agent could work among the security forces while providing feedback on their intelligence and plans.

The insurgent organization's counterintelligence and security program must be able to withstand the threats posed by established governmental authority as well as that represented by other multiple factors. The insurgent organization has many real and potential foes such as competitive dissident groups, the unilateral interests of third-country sponsors, sympathizers, and foes, and even disaffected members of its own organization. Information is vital and is the armour of the organization. It gains valuable information of those that seek to penetrate or compromise it. It must concern itself not only with an enemy's deliberate efforts but with contingencies of all kinds—some weak or careless act of an insurgent, an unannounced curfew or document check, the compromise of a courier, or a natural disaster.

Public recognition is most desired by the leaders of an insurgency as they believe this would strengthen their cause and objectives. They use propaganda to promote themselves in large communities and hold public rallies. They prepare for and expect the backlash that accompanies these rallies as the urban police and security forces are usually out in their numbers and get copies of their flysheets and pamphlets. They do not hide in the shadows as they are eager to be heard and talked about in the market place. They further their “popularity” by claiming the achievements of competitive groups when these earn public approval. They turn failure to advantage if it can serve to arouse the sympathy of the people, and promoting their martyrs to the cause of freedom.

This is the insurgents’ way of building its future and legacy by establishing abroad popular base. But there is a contradiction between the importance of security and this need for popularity aspopularity would lead to infiltration of the ranks. Segmentation is practiced by separating overt from clandestine activities and minimizing the possibility of compromise for the secret cadres.

Because of the sensitive organizational knowledge held by an area coordinator, the fewer people who know his identity or even home address, the better his security and that of the groups for which he is responsible. "Street" and secret cells are established in both the city and the countryside but they are unaware of the identity of any

member. Identities may be learnt only of those whose overt duties get their names into the papers.

The identity of the secret coordinator is similarly unknown to the leader of a street cell; each is required to report separately to a central committee.

As protection against possible compromises among the secret cadres,cells have a limited number of persons in them which would enhance their mobility, reduce possible detection and strengthen the chain of command.

The recruits most time lack discipline and sometimes can be disruptive to the goals of the organization. Assessment of the suitability of the recruit is necessary and instructors are brought to the training camps to work with them.

The urgent task of a training cell coordinator is to satisfy himself about the reliability and resilience of a volunteer. He tries to learn as much as possible about the man during the few hours he has him under observation. Might he really be working for the government? In any case can one trust him with secrets? With money? Or the lives of others? What is his motivation? The assessment acts as a defence against penetration by any would-be police recruit.

Volunteers are thoroughly investigatedand background checks are done to ensure theirauthenticity.

The organization selects skilled individuals who use a variety of methods when conducting their investigations. Small talk, gossip would provide the investigator with good leads and indicators of the character of the recruit.Then the investigator will report to his superiors and intensify his inquiry.

His search for information is no less thorough than that of government investigators and more comprehensive. The insurgent organization has more at stake.

Communication is the key element in any secret activity. If intercepted the adversary could successfully cripple the organization. For this reason an insurgent organization must have arrangements whereby the movements of funds, material, instructions, and reports are highly protected. Numerous methods, such as personal contact, mail, newspaper advertisements, and couriersare used to ensure that communication is protected and sent safely. The organization is vigilant in its safeguarding of its communication channels.

The use of codes and cover names are also used and these are frequently changed in order to reduce the chance of any penetration. These precautions serve the insurgents in keeping a step ahead of the police or any hostile force.

Insurgents generally avoid the use of mail for sensitive communications. They may send trivial messages by telephone or telegraph to signal the safe arrival of a member or to request a personal contact, but they prefer to keep in touch by courier. A courier can give reliable first-hand information as to the condition of his contact and can relay detailed instructions.

The insurgents often use drops for the transmission of funds, instructions, or material. These drops may not be sophisticated, they may be as innocent as using a hole in a tree. As long as it serves to conceal the act of communication, any method which both parties will have normal access will be suitable.

Controls

over

Cadres

Names and Identities The insurgent organization, for its part, makes every effort to identify individual police officers, police informants, and hostile groups. It prepares lists of such individuals and informs its couriers and action units to avoid them.The organization prepares havens that are far away from areas that have security establishments. When there is a threat to one of its unit it would be instructed to move to that safe area. A courier is given the physical description of a security official operating on his route so that if he is caught he knows whether he is in the hands of security personnel or less dangerous adversaries.

Strict travel restrictions are usually imposed on the cadres and couriers.They are warned against carrying documents which conflict with agreed cover stories. Prior planning involves getting receipts of food or items bought in a particular area as confirmation that the courier had been there or belongs to that region. Avoiding detection and detention is critical so couriers must at all times look and act the part that they play.

Each member must know the movements and whereabouts of any other member of his unit. Any absence that cannot be explained or is considered suspicious is reported to the leader. Because it is known that each member is being watched and possibly reported on, members would tend to be more loyal and the unit is made secure.

The insurgent leaders have a constant concern that their members could be recruited by the police.

They cannot object to a suspect covering his movements and engaging in evasive practices that they themselves taught him as good security.They must therefore refine their controls and devise tests to continuously assess his reliability.

The all-important thing is reliability and honesty. The insurgent organization thrives on suspicion which then causes discontent among members. This vicious cycle would generate the expected traitor and the leaders would establish new levels of severity which further disgruntle the membership. At the same time, however, these restrictions and controls do make the life of an agent who manages to penetrate the group both difficult and hazardous, and his case officer must have a thorough knowledge of the protective tactics used by the dissident leaders.

The insurgent takes measures to guard his camp or cell against those who come uninvited to the door.

He extends a cautious welcome to any newcomer and examines the man's credentials with care. In the world of counterintelligence no one assumes he knows whom he is dealing with.

When camp sentries intercept a newcomer they follow a prearranged reception plan. They usually take him to a site removed from the main camp and thoroughly question him about his background, reason for coming there and any connections that he may have to any member in the camp.

Quick background checks are made with members of the command who might know the man.

Clothing is given to the newcomer in exchange for what he wore. His clothes are checked for any evidence that can support who he says he is. The guards who live with him at the processing camp make every effort to get him to talk freely. They talk about the area he came from, question him concerning his likes and dislikes, and comment on true and fictional personalities in his home village.

Conversely, the guards avoid divulging anything that may provide valuable information about the organization to the man. They use their war names in conversation. They do not discuss other members of the group, their comings and goings, or their problems.The stranger is sent to another site while investigations continue into his background. As added precaution the camp is moved to a different location as it is considered compromised.

Should investigations reveal that the man should not be trusted the camp chief will use his discretion in deciding the treatment of the suspect.

A camp chief must always be alert and aware of his surroundings –are there neighbouring dissidentswho may be under surveillance. He cannot afford to be caught in a counterinsurgency sweep even though he may not be the target. If there are scientists or researchers in the area they may report his presence to the authority. The locals can cause him some amount of inconvenience as they may gossip and the authority gets valuable information.

In anticipation of the eventualities alternative camp sites are prepared and ready for immediate disbanding of the group.

The Counterintelligence Organization Prime responsibility for the success of the counterintelligence effort rests in the hands of the guerrilla chief and the area coordinator. The counterintelligence organization is responsible for the security of its personnel, assets, and activities. It has the resources to observe and report on hostile security organizations and competitive groups. It maintains appropriate records and isolates and interrogates hostile agents. Ordinary members of the organizationare aware that there is a counterintelligence core but do not know the details of its make-up. The counterintelligence personnel are concealed from the rank and file.

The counterintelligence program usually includes lectures on security discipline, spot surveillance of personnel, and challenging tests of loyalty. Each cell appoints one of its members to the group who is then made responsible for enforcing the rules and reports violations to the cell chief.

It is of no surprise that the insurgent organization would be suspicious of members who have been recently released from prison. It immediately implements various security measures to protect itself from any likely threat that these members may cause.

Many changes are made in the organization that would invalidate any knowledge that the imprisoned member might have. Connections to colleagues are severed, his family may be sent to another location and there are internal investigations to analyse the details of his arrest.

There are established procedures that the newly released member must obey, such as he should not write or try to contact his group but proceed to a designated point at a time set for this purpose. He faces further interrogation from the counterintelligence specialists who try to determine if he has “turned” or should be trusted.

Knowledge of one’s enemy is power and the insurgency gathers this knowledge by placing its informants as servants in the homes of police officers, in police clubs, or with other hostile personalities. The value of such plants is obvious. They can get useful information from dinner conversations or by answering the telephone in the absence of their master or by monitoring his mail.

Money is another tool that is used by the insurgent to acquire informants. The insurgent organization does everything in its powers to counter espionage and disruptive efforts of opposing forces. All its efforts are designed to conceal and protect itself from hostile penetration. The strategy of counterintelligence - learning about the plans, personnel, operations, assets, and organization of its adversaries –is what is used to prepare itself to conquer its opponents.

THWARTING INSURGENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE Information is always vital to the counterintelligence officer as he seeks to identify insurgents. He exhausts all channels and clues that would generate even the slightest bit of information. The telephone directories, military files, surveillance and investigators' reports, even testimony from priests and professors, prove to be gold mines of information to the counterintelligence officer. Both hard facts and potentially useful bits of gossip, speculation and even criticism, help to form at least a sketch of the kind of person who may be an insurgent. The counterintelligence officer would be able to glean an understanding of what motivates this kind of person and what role and function he has in the organization.

The counterintelligence officer focuses his attention on the movements of the couriers of the insurgent organization. Couriers are usually in contact with persons who are at varying levels within the organization. Keen observation of the courier could provide insight into the insurgent’s immediate plans. An even more important target for the counterintelligence officer are the area coordinators, because their knowledge of the organization’s operation is accurate and at a high level.

In-depth knowledge of the insurgent organization's physical and personnel assets can give some indication of its scope and operational prospects.

From interrogation reports the counterintelligence officer may get the location of safe sites abroad and the identities of foreign sympathizers. The counterintelligence officer is able to “connect the dots” within the insurgent’s organization. Funding channels are discovered and political connections and influence are made more obvious to the counterintelligence officer.

With more solid information he can see clear patterns in incidents of bombing, kidnapping, assassination, and intimidation of police and private citizens. What are the results that the insurgent is trying to gain from such mayhem and confusion?Such incidents can provide indications of the imminence of larger, organized action.

The counterintelligence officer must securely, routinely and methodically record all the data and intelligence that he has uncovered. The information must be clearly constructed and stored so that it is easily understood and readily available when needed. All the details of persons who have come to his attention: their full name, alias if known, date and place of birth, address, occupation, and data pertinent to their dissident role, must be recorded in the file. His notes and cross-references must also be recorded in the file.

More expansive personality files, including the subject's military and educational history, strength and weaknesses of character, position in the insurgent organization, and relationships with comrades and associates, are also created. No detail should be omitted or considered irrelevant. These records are the counterintelligence officers working file, his tool for operations.

The established authority exercises its powers to control, restrain, or harass members of the insurgent organization. Without notice, the government can declare martial law and suspend constitutional guarantees. Such action would effectively deny the insurgents any opportunity to vent their views and draw attention to their movement.

Counterintelligence can also put added pressure on the insurgent organization by exploiting the arrest of individual members. Misleading press releases could be made to the public about the cooperation of some of the individuals with the police. This would immediately raise suspicion about the individuals and upon their release their friends will interrogate them—perhaps to the government's ultimate advantage.

By maligning the characters of individual leaders of the insurgency, further suspicion and discontent is generated within the lower levels of the insurgent organization. This can lead to a disruptive force within the organization that can potentially distract it as it tries to maintain its own control and focus.

Suspicion can be intensified by counterintelligence if, for example, a police officer warmly greets this member in full view of his fellow dissidents. The target is then left to quell his friends' suspicions, to protest his ignorance of the reason for the greeting. And the target knows, even as he tries to protest his innocence, that a guerrilla can never explain having a friend who is the police.

The counterintelligence officer needs useful, accurate information that can only be gained from within the insurgent’s ranks. Daring plans are made to gain entry into the enemy’s ranks. The counterintelligence officer would arrange to get arrested with the insurgents so that he would be accepted as one of them. While in lock-up he would make suggestions about how to escape, tries to protect them and guide them in how they should conduct themselves during interrogation.

The other ways to gain inside sources would be to buy information from the hungriest member of the meanest cell. This person may rank very low on the information hierarchy but the counterintelligence officer must begin somewhere.

Another way would be to sponsor articles in the press which describe the destructive, harmful activities, and constant threat posed by the insurgent organization and incidentally point out gaps in what is known about it. Readers having knowledge in these particular areas are urged to write the author. This action might not produce immediate results of great value but it is a seed planted that can bear future fruits. For someday an insurgent, leafing through old newspapers may discover the article, if he ever finds himself in a situation which gives him little hope for the future, he may remember this invitation and act.

The counterintelligence effort can be considered successful when it gains willing defectors. In taking these steps a defector commits himself of his own volition as he takes time to develop or organize the information requested. A defector may not necessarily be a great prize in terms of what he can give – he may have resigned himself to recovering what he can by selling the past. But unexpected rewards can be gained from a public plea for information.

By constantly provoking and riling up discontent within the insurgent’s organization, the counterintelligence officer can be hailed as the initiator of dissidence in the dissident organization.

The counterintelligence officer’s tactics cause the young guerrilla to second-guess his decision to join the insurgent. He is gradually discouraged by the constant denigration of its leadership, provocations against its members, publicity for its noxious activities, offers of rewards for information about it, and the ever-increasing controls and suspicion it promotes. In time the young guerrilla will want to leave -and counterintelligence would have won.

The value of a guerrilla who voluntarily offers his cooperation far outweighs that of the bought or seduced defector. Successful penetration of the dissidents' organization is dependent on the quality and trustworthiness of the agents that counterintelligence uses. The motivation of the agent must be understood and correctly aligned.

Selection of a potential agent is determined by such factors as their talents, employment location say a customs official, or a passport office employee. Such agents have to be briefed, prepared, and directed with the greatest care.

In a longer-term process, agents are selected to just hang around in the known areas where dissidents gather without making any positive approach to join them. The agents should frequent the coffee shops they patronize and act sympathetic to their beliefs. In the course of time, an agent would be approached and is offered to join their organization. The agent should neither jump at the first offer they make nor delay his assent too long.

Due to the fact that the insurgent organization is very diligent in screening uninvited persons who join their movement, the counterintelligence officer may choose to recruit a person already in place and avoid the hazards of trying to introduce an outsider.

The counterintelligence officer must choose wisely and carefully as his success will depend on how accurately he selects and assesses the candidate. Extensive and exhaustive study must be made of a candidate's dossier in order to assess his strengths and weaknesses, his desires and needs. Does the candidate have access to the desired information and, most importantly, can he be persuaded to cooperate.

Likely candidates can be found among dissidents who are under arrest. These candidates are most promising while still suffering from the trauma of arrest and before news of it reaches the public. The counterintelligence officer presents reasonable arguments and inducements to win the man's cooperation. He promises him freedom, immunity from prosecution for past offenses, and the prospect of a bright future. He can assure him that no one will know of his arrest or cooperation.

Usually, the prisoner is disoriented, in shock and distress while under arrest. This makes him a ready target for a sympathetic and understanding approach. He is more susceptible and easier to be persuaded to become an agent and assist the government.

Another method of defeating the insurgent is to create a phony guerrilla group in the mountains or the city. This would weaken the insurgent’s organization as its members would defect in droves. The decoy group would now be engineered and manipulated to be the new popular movement, while all its members in fact are being contained by the counterintelligence officer.

The counterintelligence officer has effectively created competition to the real insurgency, which cannot tolerate rival heroes, others' victories, and competitors for public favour. It must divertits effort and penetrate the new threat and bring all forces into its fold. This diversion can only weaken its real struggle against the government.

The counterintelligence officer is constantly doing battle against the insurgents with his provocations, harassments and infiltrations. All aimed to distract and keep the insurgents off-balance and fighting amongst themselves. He initiates action against it to disrupt a particular undertaking, exploit information received from agents, or unnerve his opponents.

These are the tools that are available to the counterintelligence officer. Violence is futile as the insurgent organization survives on it. And so the counterintelligence officer must use mental tactics, secrets and valuable information to control, exploit and hopefully eradicate the insurgent.

A carefully worked-out counterintelligence program is mundane and requires a lot of work. It produces no miracles but if given proper authority and power, it can yield great results in providing a harmonious society.

NOTE: The following points are the opinions of criminal (insurgents) regarding the security forces and the measures they undertake to escape detection and arrest These involve those who have been employed from opposing groups. These groups cause maximum threat to the armed resistance movement.

Friendly (republican militant) intelligence needs to be constituted in a better manner and be more prepared as compared to the rivals. They need to be arranged into cells, where each party has restricted knowledge about the other, so that they are adequately protected.

Friendly agents and informers with good contacts should be situated at all communication and transportation channels and other organizational (trade union) and infrastructure administrative areas.

An analysis of enemy intelligence should be carried out to understand them from every aspect. This will enable them to secure their personal resources and exploit the weaknesses of the rivals.

As a key guiding principle, it was pointed that even though it was very easy to replace the fatalities from the enemy soldiers, the intelligence agents and spies who backed British efforts were very valuable resources and it would be very difficult or impossible to substitute them.

The IRA intelligence should give priority to recognizing important intelligence personnel at both the individual and group level whose loss would prove to be very damaging for them.

After enemy intelligence agents have been identified, they should be pressurized and forced to suspend their activities.

The police agents should be executed if they do not give in.

Those police and paramilitaries who indulge in criminal activities against the IRA personnel or support harsh measures should be eradicated even when the incident occurred a long time back.

Prior to the assassination, layouts, plans, timing and personal characteristics of the target should be thoroughly studied. This kind of extreme secretive assassination section also provided ways for getting rid of the weapons used.

To facilitate movement and reduce suspicion, individual members should encourage visual or other recognition with British or non-republican point of view.

It needs to be made certain that utmost confidentiality is maintained while enlisting.

Prevent individual guerrillas from becoming aware of the identities of more than a certain number of compatriots. Also, the knowledge about planning and organization, which is “an essential A-B-C of urban guerrilla security�, should be restricted.

It should be ensured that there is no negligence, indiscipline and lack of vigilance.

Documents, marginal notes addresses, telephone books biographical information, maps and planning materials should not be carried at any cost.

All the required information should be instilled in memory.

Those allies who infringe rules once should be corrected, however if they make these mistakes again, they should be punished.

Always be on the move and stay cautious so that police cannot identify the location.

Obtain information about police and security movement, activity and strength on a daily basis.

In the event of detention, security and silence needs to prevail, especially with respect to the identities or locations of the insurgents.

By and large, the most crucial lesson for guerrilla security regarding the prevailing threat is to never permit any violations in security measures nor show any negligence in their implementation.

Several CI reflections, in addition to particular treatments of the subjects that directly fall under the CI domain are interlinked through instructions and fundamental tradecraft. Some of these reflections have been discussed below, being essentially derived from Military Studies but also widely dealt with in other sources. These considerations are meant to determine the scope of the CI functions taken into account.Keeping Secrets and Concealing

a. Information: The significance and challenges faced when protection information is considered, as well as using codes and ciphers. Through this practice, those who know operational details are prevented from sharing this knowledge, even with their spouse and closest colleagues.

b. Surveillance. Friends and foes are both considered as well as the different kinds and means employed. Several tradecraft topics which are linked to surveillance practices in different situations are also taken into account, for instance, becoming familiar with the area and target, flow of traffic, and the places where police stations and security centres are situated.

c. Recruiting, Evaluating and Training. This is a process that consists of several CI sensitivities; hence it receives the same amount of importance as several other insurgent groups. The jihadist recruit should possess the following characteristics: intelligence and vision, watchfulness and prudence, ability to survey, analyze, take action, change locations, and stay hidden, maturity, and the capacity to keep secrets. The different ways in which recruits can be “tested� for trustworthiness and competence are also considered, as well as the specific procedures through which agents who will be working for the sake of the movement will be enlisted.

d. Financial Security Precautions. The issues regarding handling and management of operational funds are also considered which include the requirement of keeping the location secret and preventing the safeguarding of money in a single location.

e. Protecting Documents, Forged and Real. This dimension pertains to the security of all documents and being completely familiar with them in case one encounters interrogation about the relevant documentations. In addition, there needs to be tradecraft-like strictures with respect to travelling to a country which allegedly issues the forged passport being used.

f. Care with Aliases. In those areas where operation is generally carried out, one should prevent having multiple identities. Also, the names of group members should be compatible.

g. Arrest and Interrogations. This pertains to the different kinds of interrogations as well as physical and psychological oppression which a mujahid might have to face. It also considers the different ways in which he should act in order to make the charge that he was tortured and demand that this fact be included in official records of his interrogation and imprisonment.

h. Security for Facilities from Infidel Surveillance and Actions. Safe houses and other facilities, mainly in urban localities, need to be carefully chosen. The selection entails appropriateness, entry and exit routes, as well as emergency escape routes and hidden places within these facilities which provide areas for hiding documents or other sensitive things.

i. Communications Security. This element pertains to giving attention to the means and risks associated with maintaining telephonic contact, conducting personal meetings, delivering information through messengers, letters, facsimile machine, wireless communications, TV and radio.

Defensive CI Practice Insurgent forces make significant attempts in preventing the enemy [POLICE] from obtaining knowledge about its leadership, organization, support system, planning and location.

Cases: Many important defensive CI concerns were presented by Carlos Revilla Arango in his significant article “Insurgent Counterintelligence”. Amongst these was the prevalent need to have compartmentalization, vigilance in enlistment, communications, and protection of identities, implementation of control over cadres and other important areas and creating identification with others.

Establishing agent networks, guarding information, (especially the recognition of guerrillas and attainment of rosters that the Japanese diligently looked for), securing different means of communication and short-listing of recruits.

Permitting the development of some kind of unexpected and unanticipated action which would have a negative impact on the operations.

Recognizing the spies and informants and handling them appropriately.

For example The Tupamaros Insurgent group were divided into cells which had two to six members, and each member in the group was not aware of the real identities of the other member (they referred to each other using “war names” or aliases). The leaders of each cell reported to a hierarchical leadership and they either had combatant/commando duties or support duties of different kinds. If a single member or leader was arrested and successfully questioned, there were little chances of the whole cell or even most of the members being detained. Cells of the “support” kind mainly dealt with intelligence matters, however, all constituents formed their personal contacts and sources, whatever their orientations were. This is also known a Compartmentation.

Recruiters depended on the personal contacts of the recruits, extensive application information and background checks with neighbours, friends and others. This would reduce chances of compromise by allowing informants to enter the structure.

The main objective of the intelligence organization of (Ex:Michael Collins IRA UK) was to gather important information using its vast network of well-located typists, clerks, businessmen, policemen, waiters, desk clerks, transportation workers and others who managed to obtain the most sensitive internal information from the British security along with other external information that was important too. There were limited technical ways of achieving this objective; however, they were all employed. Using this information, the Volunteers (IRA) operational force could attack and eradicate the intelligence forces as well as those personnel who played a vital role in the British intelligencecollecting process.

Every Volunteer organization had a devoted intelligence official who was managed by a brigade intelligence counterpart, an arrangement which made it possible to achieve this objective. The latter was headed by the official who was responsible for managing the daily activities at the Volunteer intelligence headquarters, which was supervised by Michael Collins. The intelligence HQ was also referred to as the “Brain Centre” and the main staff members were called the “Inner Circle”. The subordinate officials were responsible for hiring agents and informants who would provide information to the HQ which would be used in the targeted operations of important intelligence officials. The intelligence officials at the HQ were assigned particular business domains regarding which they had to collect information and analyze and also combine and analyze disjointed information.

Conclusions There are variations in the guerrilla movements discussed here with respect to historical background, objectives, ideology, religion, race, resourcing and sophistication. However, majority of the groups have to work in an environment characterized by hostility and violence which means that the insurgent, regardless of his background, “lives in a world of security arrangements and survives by observing them” The insurgency is compelled by government intelligence and security measures to “carry out rigorous security examinations, rearrange components, relocate assets, alter its communications or re-educate its membership”. These are in addition to other actions which need constant supervision to ensure safety from any kind of disaster.

Even though the groups are distinct from each other in their nature and places of operation, when they face similar problems, they come up with analogous counterintelligence responses, as has been seen from the earliest of times. Such common ideas are executed because of the widely accessible information pertaining to the techniques, common sponsors and instructors from past and present and the examinations of the CI requirements by guerrilla groups.

There are both offensive and defensive elements of the counterintelligence responses of the guerrillas. Either of the elements is not perceived to be sufficient for granting the operational autonomy and security which is needed for engaging in active plans. With respect to the defensive element, extensive guidelines which address general conduct in addition to particular operational security requirements are sometimes formulated and added in recruitment and training sessions.

Background and character assessment methods may be employed by the more experienced groups.

These approaches might be as rigorous as the government security inspection or even more than that, provided the outcomes. Insurgent and terrorist groups are quite vigilant in securing their locations, abilities, methods of planning and objectives from existing and prospective opponents. In fact, some groups have become quite systemized in the practice of deception, cover story forgeries, forged papers, fake identities and several other tradecraft practices and use them proficiently.

Majority of the guerrilla organizations are constantly feeling the serious and sensitive threat of infiltration and treachery. In order to survive, these organizations need to conduct loyalty tests from time to time and also have vigilance approaching paranoia. European, Latin American, Asian, Middle Eastern and African groups provide rich examples, however, once informants or agents are identified, they are almost always executed during the process. In some groups, the punishment for treachery is very severe with the disloyal member being subjected to extreme torture and violence.

These provide strong examples to others who might think about betraying. The security guidelines and processes are often kept as written documents. These guidelines serve as a means of training and reference for the guerrillas. At times, these serve as the norms of normal fraternal or social organizations which have incorporated huge doses of violence, fraud and uncompromising hate.

Guerrilla counterintelligence, in its most extreme form, seems to infiltrate susceptible areas of the government, military and police intelligence organizations, all of which are the offensive elements.

They also include buying, blackmailing or forcing members, and sometimes targeting certain individuals or any other member and murdering them. The historical approaches like the ones employed by Michael Collins eight decades ago appear to be ancient history, however, the approaches employed by Israeli Mossad against certain Islamic terrorist heads and those that are used by the terrorist groups themselves prominently exhibit similarity with respect to the process and method used.The jihadist literature especially stresses focused study and evaluation of military, government and police intelligence. However, guerrilla and terrorist groups, as well as organizations like criminal motorcycle gangs and animal rights supporters have made attempts to study and anticipate the methods employed by their opponents.

Targets on state intelligence and security agencies by the guerrillas may turn out to be a greater portion of insurgent activities. The safety of the terrorist and insurgent groups has become vulnerable and operational liberty is becoming more restricted because of the analytical tools, surveillance, interceptions abilities and, more broadly, the technological development of the government. Michael Collins supported with some success that eradicating an enemy intelligence official by force or assassination not only discourages the security forces, but it also develops greater disinclination amongst the population to oblige with the state agencies. When viewed from this angle, what the state or its residents rightly label as a terrorist act or coldblooded execution may, in the guerrilla insurgent’s view, actually be a “rational” counterespionage approach. An understanding of this perspective is important in addition to a complete comprehension of the objectives of guerrilla and the CI planning.

An evaluation of intelligence in war was carried out by Keegan more than 200 years ago. In his study, he found that the dispersed, networked insurgent/terrorist groups faced a lot of threat which made him believe that it would be productive to revert to the techniques “which have come to appear outdated, even ancient, in the age of satellite surveillance and computer description” for carrying out intelligence/counterintelligence missions. He found that there were benefits which could be obtained “only by returning to the oldest of all intelligence techniques, direct and personal counter-espionage” However, it is easier to support these ideas rather than execute them in a CI sense. These ideas are all excellent in a variety of ways and are reflected to some extent in the existing US military’s stress on language and regional studies, culture intelligence programs, red-teaming methods, “human terrain system” development, and other attempts to encourage skills pertinent to human intelligence

These issues increase the intricacy of the CI “shadow battles”, as has been referred to by a particular specialist. Those insurgents and terrorists, who are recruited in counterintelligence areas, as well as all others, are aware of this and also understand it to some extent. Majority of the governments place a lot of importance on the technology gaps for intelligence and information management, however, in certain cases, there is a decrease in this gap, particularly for those groups who have access to hardware and software resources. Insurgent counterintelligence has successfully integrated the latest developments in time-based frameworks in the past few decades.

Even though “CI wisdom” has a long history of thousands of years, and has incorporated most of the modern developments, insurgents still face several drawbacks due to the continuous pressure. Most of the times, these are huge blunders because of which influential leaders are lost, as well as places of operations, important information, and other psychological setbacks. The insurgent CI mechanisms are deemed to be weak due to indiscipline and negligence, unpredictable morale, internal conflicts, worsening objectives, motivation (including criminalization) and pure bad luck as had been warned

by Alberto Bayo almost 60 years back.

These blunders can be exploited by the counterinsurgent governments and spies, who can also develop them if they are well prepared and show perseverance, as is apparent from the history.

Arango, a CIA officer, studied both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent CI issues and found out the approach which is most successful: active CI officers who possess carefully generated information and have constantly investigated their guerrilla opponents. They officers are aware of their ideology and tradecraft and carefully develop a CI plan of action, analytical drudgery and other hostile actions so that they can increase chances of insurgent failure. However, there is continual threat of those insurgent and terrorist CI plans that are based on analogous methods, have the same objectives and may be executed with a lot of effectiveness.

APPENDIX 1 CASE STUDIES

“Insurgency”, a word often confused as well as used with a near synonym “terrorism”. Although not very clear there exists a thin line of difference between the two. Often we see that the basic goals of both terrorists and insurgents are similar; yet if we examine insurgency and terrorism, specific differences emerge. The main base difference is that insurgency is a movement- an effort with a very specific aim and course of action. Another difference is the intent of the component activities and operations of insurgencies versus terrorism.

Although there are places where terrorism, guerilla warfare, and criminal behavior all overlap, groups that are exclusively terrorist, or subordinate "wings" of insurgencies formed to specifically employ terror tactics, demonstrate clear differences in their objectives and operations.

The ultimate goal of an insurgency is to politically amputate the working power for control of all or a portion of a desired territory, or force political concessions in sharing political power. Insurgencies greatly require the active or tacit support of some portion of the population involved. External support, recognition or approval from other countries or political entities can be useful to insurgents, but is not generally aimed at. Whereas, a terror group does not require and rarely has the active support or even the sympathy of a large fraction of the population. While insurgents will frequently describe themselves as "insurgents" or "guerillas", terrorists will not refer to themselves as "terrorists" but describe them using military or political terminology as “freedom fighters”, “soldiers” or “activists”.

What can we guess the reason behind such risky moves? Obviously, there has to be a trigger factor for choosing such a path. If we look behind in world history, the most radical portions of the population are mostly engaged in such activities. Why so? Why would they leave the homely security and live lives of most wanted nomads? Yes, the answer lays in the brute fact that they have been denied justice time and again. They were made to bear injustice that cannot be, has not been or will not be addressed by the so called governing power of varied countries. This very situation has mostly led the minority to take up arms in order to make the supreme power hear their pleas. But as times changed, the way and acuteness of their action changed. Starting from bow and arrow today they have successfully managed to outset violence with armed resistance. The core belief that led to these movements is that their cause is righteous (whether or not). In this era the belief has made such a strong foundation that based upon it they fuel the passions of general public. This sorry state could have been well avoided if the reason would be uprooted at the initial stage. Only if the existing situations would be resolved one could argue that no word called insurgency would ever exist. But sadly this was not done and the seeds have now sprouted to produce one of the greatest threats to not only general public, the government, a nation but the world peace at large.

Now if we examine the passion leading to insurgent movements in a deeper ground, we shall see that unlike conventional warfronts, they have the freedom of action. It becomes nearly impossible to predict their upcoming actions. They can make their own plan of action, at their own chosen times and places disregarding the conventional formulae. The upper hand they get is because of their geographic shelling and also some political organizations aiding them for transferring power from central to local control. Further, they need not wait for permissions to be granted, rules to be passed, conventions to be maintained and other restrictions of statehood which may inhibit their adversary.

Most importantly, their targets are specific, plan of action with unmatched convention and they have near-perfect intelligence which helps them to successfully prove their vulnerability.

Thus it is very well understood that the insurgency problems are not the branches of the terror tree that can be cleaned up by using brute force but it lies at the grass root level. Then what should be the way of approach to search and hit them? The answer lies in the question itself- i.e. handling the problem right from the base. Here comes into action the sensitive part of approach- counterinsurgency campaigns. These campaigns must be conducted with utmost discipline and vigor; and must incorporate all elements of national power into its strategy to have any hope of success. The methods used earlier had very little if not null effect in eradicating the problem. Although military operations are an essential component in counterinsurgency operations previous experiences have proved that political, economic and informational/diplomatic efforts ultimately lead to successful quelling an insurgency. One indispensible component of counterinsurgency warfare, which cuts across the entire spectrum of operations, is the requirement for actionable intelligence. Keeping in view the grounds of their action, only way to curb their encroachment is possession of a good intelligence, without which there is very little or no hope to defeat them. The successful management of counterinsurgency warfare depends on the well-organized intelligence architecture that is experienced, managed and carried upon. Given this fact, it is paramount that counterinsurgency forces gain this essential intelligence. Unlike the primitive conventions of war, counterintelligence does and does not at large depend on the data derivations from technical means (e.g. signal intelligence-SIGINT, imagery intelligence-IMINT and measurement intelligence- MASINT, respectively); but is dependent on collection of relevant information from human interface. This intelligence is harvested from the human intelligence (HUMINT), investigations and analytic capabilities of organic military intelligence and police forces in the area of operations.

Now let us have a deeper look at some case histories:

French Indochina: 1945-1954 Algeria: 1954-1962 Malaya: 1948-1960 French Indochina: 1945-1954

Overview: During World War II, “The Pacific War” by the Japanese, Vietnam was occupied by the Japanese, who took it from the French colonial government already there. After taking over Vietnam, the Japanese brutally enslaved the populace. This led to the resistance movement against the Japanese aided by the US on promise that Vietnam would be an independent country. Gradually the Japanese withdrew due to the A- Bomb; but the US went back on its promise and allowed France to retake its colony. The resistance movement then was called “Viet Minh” rebelled against French masters and the leader of the rebels Ho Chi Minh looked for new suppliers and adopted a more communist way of thinking and fought on, while his forces grew.

Analysis: As mentioned earlier there is always a catalyzing factor to these kinds of movements. Here too, the catalyst was the brutal torture firstly by the French and later on by the Japanese. But interestingly enough, both the French and the Japanese were defeated and colonies evacuated in spite of possession of much lesser freedom of action and development than their masters. Than what brought their success? What could have been the weakness of French and Japanese that were exploited for gaining freedom? Here lies the answer-

The French clearly lacked sufficient intelligence on the basic capabilities and intentions of the Viet Minh forces.

The underestimation of the Viet Minh power to fight back led to easy handling of their operational plans and troop disposition. Thus their mapping of plans could not be safeguarded from the enemy.

The prevailing historical accord of this war is that the French definitely lacked proper intelligence thereby trying to turn tables based on conventional style in counterinsurgency environment. By doing so they not only overextended their limited resources in an attempt to become supreme again but also found themselves chasing the wild goose ultimately gaining absolute nothingness.

Along with their failure to obtain actionable intelligence they also failed to maintain operational security the French dug their own graves and sealed their fate.

Conclusion: Definitely from the above analysis it becomes quite clear that the enemy possessed what the French did not. They had an edge in combat intelligence and hardly could the French ever guess what they were up to. The French had arms and power; Viet Minh forces had vast unbreakable underground intelligence collection network. For the French it resulted in expending their manpower and material loss thereby gaining nothing. Arrogance, inability to measure the depth of enemies, inexperience and lack of operational security and counterintelligence is what French forces possessed mainly. The intelligence web that Viet Minh forces created, aided them to be aware of even the slightest movement form their enemy side. Thus every time for a successful movement the speed of movement became necessary rather than its shelling. The Communist High Command therefore almost knew every little movement of the French troops in any sector and how many of those troops would be made available for those mobile operations. Thus is becomes quite clear that the visible lack of intelligence and their inability to safeguard their operational intelligence caused the downfall of the French in “French Indochina� war.

Algeria: 1954-1962

Overview: The Algerian War was a conflict between the French and Algerian. These were independence movements from 1954 to 1962 which led to Algeria gaining its independence from France after an important decolonization war. It was a complex conflict enveloping guerrilla warfare, maquis fighting, terrorism against civilians, the use of torture on both sides, and counterterrorism operations by the French. Members of the National Liberation Front (FLN) on November 1, 1954 initiated this movement, the conflict shook the brass tacks of the French Fourth Republic (1946– 58) and led to its ultimate collapse. The French Army initiated a battle of "pacification" of what was considered at the time to be a full part of France. The "public-order operation" rapidly turned to real war. Algerians, who had at first largely favored a peaceful resolution, turned increasingly toward the goal of independence, supported by Arab countries and, more generally, by worldwide opinion fueled by anti-colonialist ideas; but because of the volatility in France, the French Fourth Republic was dissolved. Even today this war has provided an important tactic casing for counter-insurgency thinkers, while the use of torture by the French Army has provoked a moral and political debate quite never to be resolved, on the legality and efficacy of such methods.

Analysis: At the initial stages the French were quite unfamiliar as well as unprepared for facing any insurgency movements. It was out of the box movement for the French and thereby they failed to face the enemy successfully. Hardly could they estimate the enemy power, path of action and available resources etc due to the lack of their own intelligence network. Whereas, the FLN intensely developed its intelligence network by then and the developed web constituted of maximum number of civilians.

As a result of which working right under the noses of the French, they could be successful in slaughtering the enemy. Every movement made by the French was noticed by the guerilla columns infiltrating the colonized villages and unknown to the French information steadily flowed down to FLN leaders. Even when the French tried to develop their network, initially it was a hard nut to crack.

They could not manage to collect reliable intelligence as the insurgents constituted of the rural population who enjoyed local terrain, complete freedom of action to strike back and withdraw unmolested.

French method of hitting the bull’s eye: Jacques Émile Massu, a French general who fought in World War II, the First Indochina War, the Algerian War and the Suez crisis introduced an idea that would successfully stifle the growth and movement of FLN activists. The method constituted of constant patrolling and searching house to house and checkpoints in order to gather information as well as develop French intelligence network. Although Massu’s method was worth it but most impressive was Roger Trinquier’s-- a French Army officer during World War II, the First Indochina War and the Algerian War, serving mainly in airborne and Special forces units and also a Counter-insurgency theorist. He established a gridding system that divided the entire geographical area of action into symmetric blocks or grids. Then each large grid was again subdivided into smaller grids going down to the individual buildings and the families of French military units were assigned responsibilities for monitoring all the activities within the assigned grid. As a result of which surveillance became easier and successful to a great extent and information flow hiked up to a rapid pace. This method of gridding facilitated to build strong foothold within the community and build stronger relationships and as mentioned earlier the French army initiated the battle of “pacification”; this method was an important aspect for the effort. At the core level a small unit of Infantry Company who controlled a few villages developed sustained relationships with the inhabitants, developed trust and managed to include villagers who would work with the French in choking the rebels. These self defense units were called “harkas” who greatly helped the French to sort and destroy the rapidly popping heads of rebellions. Not only villages also the urban areas were included in the grid method where a “chief” was appointed to keep a close watch in his respective unit. To enhance the monitor identity cards were issued to each inhabitant. His job was to identify every living individual of the area and monitor the activities of each of them. Any unexpected, fowl activity was to be taken care of by him; and if he failed to do so he would be accused of helping the NLF. Although fruitful these methods visibly strangled the basic human rights and liberties. Yet for the good or bad the French managed to create forbidden zones, deploy Sections Administrative Specialists (SAS) and cleared some units resulting in nomadization. They organized effective police forces that shared the burden of the French officials and helped in penetration to hostile areas. Finally, by September 1957 FLN could be broken in Algiers.

Conclusion: Now if we consider both the cases in Vietnam and Algeria we clearly see that French used a method in Algeria that they failed to do so in Vietnam resulting in their downfall Without effective intelligence even in Algeria it would be quite impossible for the French to continue their foothold. As diamond cuts diamond, here too without trickling down to the insurgency bed it would be impossible to create a loophole in the web of insurgency. To clear dirt away one has to get into it was the only effective policy that worked then and works till date. Since insurgents follow no formulae and convention direct interaction with the insurgents is the only way to know their plans and action. They have a well-knit family of activists who strongly believe to be fighting for their liberty, against suppression and for the good of their community; so they hardly betray their group under emotional floods or pressure. Gaining as well as keeping trust, changing their mindset to make them believe the authority can only help in checking their advancement. Thus finally quoting Colonel Roger Trinquier’s view in order to enhance the fact discussed above, “intelligence was one of several crucial enablers for defeating an insurgent. Others include a secure area to operate from, sources in the general population and government, maintaining the initiative, and careful management of propaganda”.

Malaya: 1948-1960

Overview: During 1940s the European community was well settled in Malaya. But by February 1948, communist guerillas attacked European settlers in the Malaya peninsula quite unaware of the British counter insurgency tactics of search and destroy. The insurgent units were nearly destroyed but the sudden death of the British High Commissioner again made a way for the communists to reinforce their activities. They applied every possible means to eradicate British settlement in their countryfrom convincing to killing the populace in order to achieve their target. But the British, very tactfully instituted the first helicopter in the “hearts-and-minds” campaign wherein they used helicopters to aid wounded civilians and military to the hospitals and provided necessary supplies and transport facilities. This “hearts-and minds” campaign was magically successful in contrast to the American method of using military power alone in Vietnam. Finally the Malayan communists fell apart after twelve years of campaign in 1960.

Analysis: Similar to the other two previous cases of Vietnam and Algeria, here too the insurgents maintained quite a similar base of approach. They kept themselves as isolated as possible from the government forces and kept creating menace time and again from different places and absurd times which followed no convention. T.E Lawrence’s prescription “the first principle of guerrilla warfare is one of detachment from the enemy” was followed to the backbone by the insurgents even this time.

Not only detachment, they also kept up with their second basic necessity of insurgency- “they acquired perfect intelligence of the enemy’s movement and strength” though the means to acquire was both friendly and brutal. Here MPABA’s political wing the Min Yuen developed an extreme network of informants and gathered relevant information about their enemy all the time. By doing so they always had a steady flow of information which allowed them to hideously develop their network and achieve success. But interestingly enough, the tables had turned this time. Insurgents were tackled with counter insurgency campaigns from the government’s side. Now along with the military the local police forces were involved in handling the miscreants. Brigg’s successor, General Sir Gerald Templer was the one to follow this method by early 1952 upon his assumption of directorship. It followed that the intelligence structure would be build around the local police forces mainly rather than the army as it would allow the intelligence net to penetrate deeper into the populace. As expected, this method enabled a more reliable and steady flow of information unlike the discrete flow faced earlier. With the development of this technique counter-insurgency began to flourish rapidly and the British undertook another effective decision of creating a well organized branch that would extensively deal with counter insurgency. It was a Special Branch of Police that dealt with the insurgents with a heavier hand than before. This group was responsible for proper collection and accumulation of the information which resulted in a beginning successful defeat of the insurgents. In order to assure services they began to mix need with patriotism; informers were being paid and some were even trained to act as double agents. This led to acute operations on insurgents resulting in capture cells after cells. With the improvement of this Special Branch even a school was developed which could train informers with the techniques to handle and derive information from and about the insurgents without leaving any trace of doubt to them.