How to Defend New Zealand

In a recent Wellington public lecture, Professor Hugh White discussed the historic challenges facing Australia and New Zealand in the way they each approach their security in the face of major-power rivalries in Asia. Dr Wayne Mapp offers his views.

Hugh White, in a recent lecture at the Centre of Strategic Studies at Victoria University, argued that the long-standing commitment of the United States to its Pacific allies was coming to an end. That in the face of growing Chinese power, not just in Asia but also in the western Pacific, the United States would withdraw, if not into full isolationism, at least to the point of abandoning the alliances it has built in world war two and in the years immediately thereafter. The deepest alliance guarantees, specifically to Australia, Japan and South Korea would count for nothing.

To be fair, this might be overstating White’s proposition, but he was certainly of the view that the bedrock of the alliances will slowly crumble to shifting sands.

Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO was New Zealand’s Minister of Defence and Minister of Science and Innovation from 2008 to 2011.

White’s lecture was derived from his latest book, How to Defend Australia. In this book White argues that Australia has to adopt a maritime denial strategy. That means that Australia has currently over-invested in its surface fleet, whereas a better defensive approach would be to invest more heavily in submarines and airpower, especially maritime patrol and strike.

He has made the same point previously in lectures and in private discussion, including with myself. Australia already intends to build twelve new submarines, so this could only mean that twenty-four would be more appropriate. This would make Australia the fourth in the world in terms of submarine power, behind the United States, Russia and China. Quite an ambition for a middle-ranked power.

The reasoning behind this strategy is that the United States cannot be absolutely relied upon to fulfil its alliance commitments. Therefore, Australia has to be more capable in defending itself. In his lecture at Victoria, White extended the concept to New Zealand on the basis that both countries are effectively one strategic unit.

White has real influence in Australian defence circles. While it is unlikely everything he says will be picked up by the Australian government, it is quite possible that some of it will be. Australia may well buy more F35 aircraft than it currently intends, along with more air tanker support and new basing arrangements. I would not be surprised if the ultimate F35 buy extends up to 150 aircraft.

Although the decision to buy the F35 binds Australia into the wider western industrial military complex, there really is no practical alternative aircraft. In any event the same could be said of all the twenty or so countries that will ultimately operate the F35. One hundred and fifty F35 aircraft would not be out of line for a country of 35 million people, which will be the likely Australian population in 2035.

Despite White’s influence and reputation, does his overall strategic view have any real merit, in a way that should influence New Zealand policy makers?

The essence of White’s thesis is that China will become the predominant power in Asia. From there he argues that the United States commitment to Australia will wane because the risk of war with China will be too great.

This does rather conflate Asia with the Pacific. Although it might seem that Australia is a geographical extension of Asia, in truth Australia, along with New Zealand, is actually in the South West Pacific. Even the northern reaches of Australia are thousands of miles from continental Asia.

White is probably right that China will supplant the United States in Asia, although it is hard to see that Japan, for instance, will become a Chinese lackey anytime soon. However, that is quite different to China supplanting the United States in the Pacific, even the western Pacific.

Unlike China, the United States has sovereign territory right across the Pacific, from Guam and the Northern Marianas to American Samoa, and of course the fiftieth state of Hawaii. America will defend its sovereign interests in the Pacific to the utmost, in the same way that Britain, in much less auspicious circumstances, was prepared to defend the Falklands. More compellingly, it is hard to imagine the United States forgetting the lesson of Pearl Harbor anytime soon.

Part of White’s thesis is that Australia should have more strategic independence. This is not just a response to an increasingly powerful China, or a potentially weaker United States. It is a benefit in its own right in that it gives Australia more choices and more autonomy. So even if the United States alliance still holds, there is an advantage in being more independent. In White’s view this requires Australia to have more military power.

This is quite a different calculation to that of New Zealand policy makers. We think we can have more independence because we are more remote. And because we are small. In contrast, Australian decision makers think that New Zealand can make that choice because we automatically gain from a powerful Australia.

So, what does all this thinking actually mean for New Zealand? Should New Zealand embark upon a serious expansion of our defence forces, especially in the air and maritime domains?

Apart from the fact it would be hard to convince the New Zealand public to substantially increase defence expenditure, say all the way to 2 percent of GDP, it is not obvious there is a compelling case to do so.

It is not obvious that our strategic position, along with that of Australia, has so weakened that we have little choice in the matter. Notwithstanding that there is broad recognition that the international order is coming under challenge, it has not, and will not change beyond recognition. In particular the United States is not going to cease to be the most powerful nation in the Pacific.

However, White’s defence prescription and, in fact, the decisions by New Zealand’s policy makers, do point in a certain direction. The acquisition of the four P8 Poseidon aircraft is the most significant defence decision of the last two decades. They will provide a serious upgrade in maritime surveillance and given that all Poseidon aircraft come in one configuration, they will have much greater maritime attack capabilities than the existing P3 Orions.

In large measure the acquisition of the P8 fits within White’s prescription.

Maybe New Zealand should have bought six, on the basis of a one-forone replacement of the Orions. This is a theoretical possibility for a few more years, but the possibility will soon pass as the production line for the P8 will shutdown within the next five years.

The replacement of the two ANZAC frigates is the next big strategic decision. It is inconceivable that New Zealand would replace the ANZAC frigates with submarines. The last person to seriously argue the case for submarines was Admiral Saull, Chief of Navy in the early 1980s.

Submarines are far too specialised for New Zealand; their only practical use being in an all-out war. With such a small fleet, New Zealand will always want a general purpose naval combat ship that can be used in a wide variety of roles, from general patrol and protection duties through to actual combat roles. The choice is simply between which type of frigate, and the numbers.

Right at the moment it has been shown that two is too few. Both ANZAC frigates are out of service in the middle of their midlife upgrade. This situation is likely to last for more than a year. If international conditions were more difficult than the present, that is not a risk that New Zealand would want to take.

The choice of ship to replace the frigates will need to be made within the next five years at the outside. Clearly New Zealand can afford two modern frigates such as the Type 26 frigate that have been ordered by the Australian and Canadian Navies. When defence expenditure is around 1 percent of GDP, if such a decision required an increase to 1.1 or 1.2 percent of GDP then that would be a decision that is well within New Zealand’s financial capability.

A better choice might be lighter frigates such as British Type 31 frigate. These are a serious ship and are in fact slightly larger than the ANZAC frigates. They are costing 300 million pounds per ship, although that does not include all the combat equipment. The final price is more likely to be 500 million pounds or $1 billion. New Zealand could readily afford three Type 31 frigates from within the existing defence budget, or for a little more.

In summary, New Zealand does not need to radically alter its defence planning. The strategic situation has not altered to a degree requiring any different. However, prudence would indicate that New Zealand does need to make serious decisions about defending the maritime domain. This can be accomplished with the existing defence framework.

The decision to buy the P8 Poseidon was a major part of this thinking. The same clear thought will be required for the next serious decision about replacing the two ANZAC frigates.