Line of Defence - Autumn 2020

Line of Defence Issue 15 • Autumn 2020

New Zealand’s Defence and National Security Magazine

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Leading The Situational Awareness Revolution

TRUSTEDPARTNER Rheinmetall is a proud industry partner to the New Zealand Defence Force.

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FORCE PROTECTION IS OUR MISSION.

CONTENTS Editor’s Note

Kia Ora and welcome to the Autumn 2020 – and 15th – issue of Line of Defence.

It’s hard to believe that we’re now entering our fifth year of publication – a long time since turning up at the 2015 NZDIA annual forum to drum up advertiser interest armed with just an idea and a cobbled together prospectus in hand.

It’s an opportunity to again acknowledge our friends and supporters, and in particular the NZDIA, NZDF, Defence Minister’s and Opposition Spokesperson’s offices, Massey University’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies, editorat-large Dr Peter Greener and regular contributors Dr Wayne Mapp and Dr John Battersby, and, importantly, our advertising sponsors.

Making this 15th issue of Line of Defence possible is the generous support of our sponsors Leonardo, GA-ASI, Tactical Solutions, Rheinmetall, and Legear (ADA). Without their sponsorship a quarterly New Zealand magazine delivering Defence and National Security news and analysis simply wouldn’t exist.

Headlining this edition of the magazine is Dr Peter Greener’s interview with Defence Secretary Andrew Bridgman. It’s the first time we’ve had a SECDEF talking with DEFSEC! In this interview, the Secretary outlines his priorities and talks First Principles Review, maritime helicopter replacement, international engagement and future challenges.

As the magazine goes to print we are two days out from the 1st anniversary of the Christchurch Mosque Attacks. As the nation stops to pay its respects to the 51 members of our community who were stolen from us by a cowardly, senseless, despicable attack, we take stock 12 months on.

Among our analysis, Dr John Battersby assesses the efficacy of the gun buy-back scheme, Dr Richard Shortt provides his perspectives on violent extremism and New Zealand’s changed threat landscape, and I explore the soon-to-be officially released document Protecting Our Crowded Places from attack: New Zealand’s Strategy.

The great black swan national security challenge so far in 2020 is the coronavirus pandemic. COVID-19 has – and will have – consequences for New Zealand and the world that extend well beyond its public health dimensions.

Our CO VID-19 coverage includes perspectives from Mark Mitchell on the role of Whangaparaoa and a modern defence estate in pandemic response, Dr Wayne Mapp reflects on the possible role of the Defence Force in a major pandemic emergency, and Laura Toplis offers timely business continuity planning advice.

Coronavirus aside, 2020 has already seen the NZDF, emergency services agencies and first responders deploying in the face of major natural disasters. Defence Minister Ron Mark provides his thoughts on the part the NZDF has played in the Australian bushfire response, the White Island/Whakaari recovery and the Southland flooding evacuation.

I commend the above articles to you, along with the many fine contributions inside that I’ve simply ran out of space to mention in this all too brief editor’s note.

CONTACT DETAILS Chief Editor: Nicholas Dynon M: +64 (0)22 366 3691 E: nick@defsec.net.nz

Publisher: Craig Flint T: +64 (07) 868 2703 E: craig@defsec.net.nz

Postal and delivery address 27 West Cresent Te Puru 3575, Thames RD5, New Zealand

www.linkedin.com/company/ defsec-media-limited www.facebook.com/defsecmedia/ www.twitter.com/DefsecNZ

CONTRIBUTORS & INTERVIEWEES Dr Peter Greener Jason Semple Frank Olsson Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO Andrew Ford Dr John Battersby Laura Toplis Dr Colin P. Clarke

Andrew Bridgman Hon Mark Mitchell Hon Ron Mark Jennie Vickers Nicholas Dynon Dr Richard Shortt Dr Daveed Gartenstein-Ross Samuel Hodgson

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Dr Peter Greener Dr Bridgette-Sullivan Taylor Dr John Battersby Debbie Howarth Jennie Vickers Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO Ruth Currie DSD

Prof Rouben Azizian Dr Reuben Steff Paul Howard John Deal Douglas Pauling John Campbell MNZM Pat Cullen

UPCOMING ISSUE

Winter - June Main themes: Regional and National Security Related events: NZ National Security Conference; Asia Pacific Security & Innovation Summit Deadline: 15th May 2020

ASSOCIATION

Nicholas Dynon Auckland

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ISSN 2463-5774 (Print) • ISSN 2463-6258 (Online)

DEFENCE

HOMELAND SECURITY

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ATR 72MP: Effective and affordable force multiplier

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A New Zealand strategy for protecting crowded places from attack

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Preparing for a Changing Future: An interview with the Secretary of Defence

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New Zealand’s Arms Act Reform: The Buy-Back is not an end in Itself

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LEGEAR gearing up for Auckland launch

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Mark Mitchell: New challenges emerge with coronavirus

Opinion: Violent extremism not limited to one flavour or colour

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Business Continuity: Planning for pandemic

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Frank Olsson: The importance of culture and community alignment

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Rheinmetall focuses on local growth working with New Zealand partner

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Defence Minister: Investment in defence capabilities critical to national resilience

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Tactical Solutions launch Innovation Hub in Wellington

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Wayne Mapp: COVID-19: Defence personnel, facilities provide national reserve

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MQ-9B SkyGuardian and SeaGuardian Increase Multi-Mission Superiority and Versatility

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Babcock NZ picks up HF radio contract

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A long game, but a rewarding one

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NZDIA Chair welcomes new Board

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

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How powerful is China? Comparing economic, military and soft power

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Foreign Terrorist Fighters from Southeast Asia: What Happens Next?

Defsec Media Limited publishes Line of Defence, FireNZ Magazine and New Zealand Security Magazine premier publications covering industry sectors that help keep Kiwis safe. Find us online www.defsec.net.nz Copyright: No article or part thereof may be reproduced without prior consent of the publisher.

Disclaimer: The information contained in this publication is given in good faith and has been derived from sources believed to be reliable and accurate.

However, neither the publishers nor any person involved in the preparation of this publication accept any form of liability whatsoever for its contents including advertisements, editorials, opinions, advice or information or for any consequences from its use.

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DEFENCE

ATR 72MP: Effective and affordable force multiplier Leonardo’s ATR 72MP aircraft, also ordered by the Turkish Navy, is already in service with the Italian Air Force and with the Italian Customs Police. It is the ideal platform for maritime patrol, providing outstanding capabilities in Surveillance / Reconnaissance, Exclusive Economic Zone Patrol and Search And Rescue tasks. Its features allow operators to perfom missions such as counter drug trafficking, piracy, smuggling and preventing any illegal action across territorial waters, missions which can typically last more than eight hours.

On November 2019 the first two out of four ATR 72MP (designated P-72B) ordered by Italy’s Guardia di Finanza (Customs Police) have been handed over during an official

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constant surveillance activities along the entirety of Italy’s coast and in international waters, carried out also thanks to the advanced technological equipment designed and integrated by Leonardo.

The ATR 72MP is also in service with the Italian Air Force in a military version designated P-72A, equipped with the modular Leonardo ATOS (Airborne Tactical Observation and Surveillance) mission system.

The ATOS manages a wide range of aircraft sensors, combining the information received in an overall tactical situation and presenting the results to the operators of the mission system in the most suitable format, ceremony held at Leonardo’s Caselle Torinese facility. Deliveries will be completed by 2022.

The ATR 72MP fully represents Leonardo’s technological capabilities and it inherits the reliability, comfort, low operating costs and logistic support system of the succesfull ATR 72-600 regional passenger transport aircraft of which a large fleet is already operational in New Zealand with Air New Zealand Link and Air Chathams.

The aircraft will be integrated into the aeronautical capabilities of Guardia di Finanza, within the framework of the multirole tasks assigned to the operator. The Guardia di Finanza is the only law enforcement agency with general jurisdiction capable of exercising incisive and providing a high level and constantly updated scenario.

The ATR72 MP will be the perfect fit to satisfy the broad range of requirements of the Enhanced Maritime Awareness Capability (EMAC) project of the New Zealand Government, assurinig civil maritime security strategy and enhancing maritime domain awareness in-country and in the Southern Pacific Ocean.

The flexibility of the ATR72MP platform will also allow it to perform non-surveillance activities that are part of the overall program, denoted as “response capabilities”, such as air drop, presence and on-scene coordination and Medical Evacuation.

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DEFENCE

Preparing for a Changing Future: An interview with the Secretary of Defence In this exclusive interview with Editor-at-large Dr Peter Greener, Secretary of Defence Andrew Bridgman talks priorities, First Principles Review, maritime helicopter replacement, international engagement and future challenges.

PG: Since taking up your post on 1 July 2019 what have you identified as the greatest challenges facing you in your role?

Dr Greener is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University Wellington, and an Honorary Professor – and previously Academic Dean – at the Command and Staff College of the New Zealand Defence Force. He is also an Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Health and Environmental Sciences at AUT University

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AB: There are three things in particular that I would note. The first is delivering on the Government’s priorities, which include a significant capability programme. Second is gaining a sense of the Ministry as part of the broader defence and security sector, and building a relationship with members of the Defence Force and others in the sector. Finally, developing a deeper appreciation of the Ministry of Defence and my role as Chief

Executive, and how strategic policy links in with defence capability and international engagement.

PG: What are your most important priorities?

AB: Delivering on the Government’s Defence policy; with the Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018 the Government were very clear about their concerns and priorities. These priorities were underscored with the subsequent release of The Climate Crisis: Defence Readiness and Response and the Advancing Pacific Partnerships 2019 assessments. The Defence Capability Plan 2019 provides the

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PG: Investment in space-based systems, including the use of satellite surveillance has been identified as a priority in the DCP 19. Given also the global developments in Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems, how challenging is it for the Ministry to recruit appropriate subject matter experts?

Government’s road map for how we will develop the capability to respond to future challenges.

My second priority is engaging with domestic and international stakeholders. I’ve already visited our counterparts in Australia; attended the Women Peace and Security Summit in Samoa in August, which New Zealand co-hosted; travelled to Singapore for the Singapore-New Zealand Defence Minister’s Meeting, and visited the United States at the end of December.

I have also visited NZDF deployments in the Middle East.

The purpose of these visits was to get the views of our close partners on defence issues, and understand how deployments operate. We can’t lose sight of the Ministry’s role in advising the Government on deployments. We need to understand how deployments are going, and be supportive of the personnel being deployed.

My final priority is focusing on the Ministry –our capability and culture, and how we enhance and deliver outputs.

PG: The Defence Capability Plan 2019 (DCP 19) did indeed signal that a significant range of new capabilities would be introduced in the near to medium term. In the Ministry Statement of Intent for 2019-2023, you identified that a range of improvements to the capability management system had been implemented to ensure the delivery of this expanded portfolio. Can you tell us about some of these changes?

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AB: As you know there have been a lot of changes within the Capability Management System. The system has now been reviewed by Sir Brian Roche and this provided a robust assessment.

The review found the procurement process to be robust, and that the Defence Capability Change Action Programme is making a big difference to the way Defence manages its capital projects.

It’s early days yet but there has been a huge investment in getting things right. A number of years ago we had an uplift in funding to invest in a specialist workforce, particularly those with commercial expertise.

The governance system is really important in this system. We now have a Capability Governance Board, co-chaired by the Secretary and the Chief of Defence Force, which ensures that both entities are on the same page. The Board provides strategic governance across the military capability life cycle, focused on portfolio-level risk management and decision-making.

We then have individual Project Boards which include independent members to ensure contestability and transparency. Within the Ministry we have integrated project teams led by the Ministry of Defence but with NZDF staff. This is to maximise the opportunity for quality and minimise risk. NZDF brings the military specialist skills, and the Ministry brings acquisition, finance, and public policy skills.

AB: An organisation the size of the Ministry of Defence can’t have experts that cover everything. We employ skilled generalists who can readily get up to speed. We may also look to bring in specialist skills through secondments from other government agencies, or hire specialist contractors. The rate of technological change is no different for Defence than for other industries.

We are fortunate that we get very, very good candidates applying for positions because of the intrinsic interest in the work, whether that be in policy or in acquisition. Capability work is attractive because of its scale, policy work because of the depth of challenge. The quality of our staff is really impressive.

PG: The DCP 19 Cabinet Documents noted that almost all Navy ships will come to the end of their life in the period out to 2035, and that this presented an opportunity to better manage block obsolescence. What might this mean in terms of future naval acquisitions?

AB: DCP 19 indicated the renewal of platforms by the mid-2030s. It includes the new tanker HMNZS Aotearoa, extending the life of the frigates and enhanced sealift vessels.

There is plenty of time to avoid block obsolescence. A new Defence White Paper has been signalled for 2022 and that will be a good point to look at the strategic outlook. It will provide a key opportunity to link the strategic environment to capability.

PG: In the Spring issue of Line of Defence the Commander Joint Forces noted that “quantity can have a quality all of its own”. For Navy the replacement of the maritime helicopters has been brought forward, with the current eight to be replaced 9

DEFENCE

PG: Alongside capability development and policy advice, the Ministry undertakes international defence engagement activities that support broader defence, security and foreign policy objectives. Can you tell us a little about the Ministry’s International Defence Engagement Strategy?

AB: We have a joint Ministry of Defence / New Zealand Defence Force engagement strategy which looks at how we can maximise our international engagement to further our defence interests and relations. We need to be very conscious about where we put our efforts and we have a focus on multilateral engagements. In the region these include the Shangri-La Dialogue and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting + (ADMM+). It is a heavy engagement programme, which bodes well for New Zealand. People want to engage with us and are interested in our views.

PG: What do you see as the major challenges for New Zealand’s defence and security for the future?

by nine in 2026. Although primarily a combat helicopter, how important is it that these new helicopters have a complementary capability to the RNZAF’s eight NH90s?

AB: Ultimately it boils down to what helicopters are needed to meet Government policy. Undoubtedly the specification will require a range of capabilities in the new maritime helicopters; a combination of sealift, patrol and combat capabilities. The question will be just what is the best combination of capabilities to complement the NH90?

PG: Given the increasing size of ships that Navy will be operating, how 10

involved is the Ministry in providing advice on future port and dock facilities?

AB: The First Principles Review of the Defence Estate Footprint, which the Minister announced in July, is already underway. It’s important to ensure that when we look at capability we also look at the infrastructure necessary to support it. It is a real strength of the Integrated Project Teams, and can be seen in the new infrastructure that is being built to bring the P-8s to Ohakea.

The Ministry is contributing to the First Principles Review. The Ministry’s focus is on what do we have now, and what do we need to support future capabilities.

AB: I think the central challenges have been well captured in the Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018. Quite rightly that document focuses on the Pacific and highlights the challenges of climate change, transnational crime, resource competition, and the increasing importance of spheres of influence. The international rules based order is under pressure, and it is in our interest to maintain it. The pace of change with these issues may be faster than we thought, and there is empirical data that supports this in regard to climate change.

I believe the strategic settings that have been identified are absolutely correct. The question is how do we respond to these challenges in a practical way?

PG: Any final comments?

AB: It is a real privilege to be in this role, and it is a fascinating job to be involved in. I’m hugely impressed with the staff that work in both the Ministry and the NZDF, particularly the work that Defence Force personnel undertake for long stretches of time far from home.

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TM

04.2020 LEGEAR AUCKLAND STORE OPENING MILITARY LAW ENFORCEMENT OUTDOOR TACTICAL GEAR 38c William Pickering Drive, Rosedale, Auckland 0632 Discover more at www.legear.com.au

Image: 5.11 Tactical

DEFENCE

LEGEAR gearing up for Auckland launch Line of Defence talks with Jason Semple, LEGEAR Division Manager at Australian Defence Apparel (ADA) about the imminent launch of LEGEAR’s new Auckland outlet and how equipping first responders with the right gear can save lives.

LEGEAR will open the doors to its new Auckland multi-brand tactical gear store in mid to late April. The Flagship store will be located at 38c William Pickering Drive, Rosedale, Auckland and is set to be the first of many scheduled to open across New Zealand.

To celebrate the Grand Opening, LEGEAR plans to display exclusive products to the New Zealand customer with live entertainment and LEGEAR branded giveaways at the launch event.

Already servicing a long list of online customers in New Zealand, LEGEAR’s decision to expand into Auckland was a vital move to develop its service offering. “The idea behind opening the store is to be in a position to better support our NZ customer base. Having the products on the ground locally helps us provide an improved tactile experience to our second largest customer base.” said Jason.

LEGEAR in Canberra.

“We have access to all leading tierone tactical brands servicing military, law-enforcement and first-responder networks, and we are currently the premium 5.11 dealer in Australia,” said Jason. “The addition of the Auckland store will mean shorter waiting periods, reduced costs, and improved support.”

Jason Semple, LEGEAR Division Manager at Australian Defence Apparel

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Lifetime of preparation Jason knows something about the specific needs of LEGEAR’s customers. His professional life has been spent in specialist police tactical operations in two Australian police organisations – the NSW Tactical Operations Unit (TOU) and the AFP’s Operational Response Group (ORG). Added to this is several private contracting roles for companies representing the US Department of Defence in various international trouble spots.

He is described in an article appearing in the New Zealand Herald as a “mountain of a man - of a size that if he told you to get stuffed, you’d probably start making arrangements.”

And he is widely regarded as an authority on tactical and special operations.

“During my operational career, I had a lot of interactions with Australian Defence Apparel (ADA).

I was part of the early adopters’ team that utilised uniform and body armour systems from ADA and Line of Defence

provided feedback from real-world on the field product testings and trials.

At that time, I found that the ADA team were excellent at collaborating with personnel out in the field to ensure that the products going into the hands of military and police was examined, specialised and of high quality.”

“As someone who has worn and tested the equipment, it felt like a natural transition to my current role where I can interact with the end users to explain the importance of specific systems and their various design aspects. It’s about trust– and trust is only extended once.”

“Ethics for me is really important, so I employ what was successful in my special operations role over the years and bring that to the

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commercial world. For me, business is about delivering the best products with transparency and ensuring we meet the expectations of our customers whether at an individual or government level.”

Protecting the protectors The thing that excites Jason most about his current job description is his role in “protecting the protectors” and getting the latest equipment out to them. It’s a motivation that can be traced back to his first days as a New South Wales Police officer.

On 28 February 1998, Jason, along with NSWPOL officers Peter Forsyth and Brian Neville, went out for a few quiet Friday night beers in inner-city Sydney. Jason, a freshly minted police officer, had been in the uniform for

only a fortnight. Unarmed and off duty, they were offered a drug deal by a group of teenagers, and they proceeded to make an arrest.

Attempting to apprehend the offenders, both Jason and Peter Forsyth received multiple stab wounds.

Jason was critically injured, and Peter died on the scene, but not after doing what he could to save his mate. Jason lost 4.9 litres of blood but somehow managed to pull through.

“My passion, coming from a special operational background – is seeing the police and first responders having access to the same level of equipment, comfort, dexterity and capability that’s been offered to me in special operations over the years.

“It’s one of those things where budgets often restrict the greater numbers having access to high quality gear, but the appropriate training and equipment should be making it to the frontline, to people who are responding on behalf of the community, the true first responders– because they deserve it. If they don’t have access to top-end gear, over time it will be damaging to their bodies.

“You need to employ high quality equipment that will enhance your survivability. Inferior quality equipment and poor choices when it comes to capability has a very real chance of getting people killed.

Every second counts when it comes to surviving an attack, and your equipment should give you an edge, not slow you down” Along with the new store, LEGEAR will be supporting their NZ customers like never before says Jason.

“We want to ensure that the products our customers purchase through us are used to their greatest potential.

“We’ll be supplying new content in terms of specification sheets, videos, data and content that people can access so they can understand the gear. There will be an online library discussing every piece of tactical equipment we have, and they will also have direct access to some of our experienced subject matter experts.”

The Legear Auckland store opens in April. For more information, visit www.legear.com.au and @ legearaustralia on Instagram.

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DEFENCE

New challenges emerge with coronavirus With Whangaparoa facility featuring in New Zealand’s COVID-19 response, Opposition defence spokesperson Hon Mark Mitchell argues that now is a good time for the government to be investing in a modern defence estate.

Hon Mark Mitchell is the Opposition Spokesperson for Defence, the previous Minister of Defence, and a former Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee.

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As a developed nation, New Zealand has a duty to provide assistance to our friends and allies when they need support. In a constantly changing global environment, this duty is becoming even more important.

Threats to international stability are taking new forms and are having global application.

Much like the rest of the word, one of the biggest challenges New Zealand will face this year will be the outbreak of COVID-19. We are still in the early stages of this challenge, but we’ve already seen how important the NZDF has been in the containment phase.

Last month, the NZDF military training base in Whangaparaoa was used by the Government to house 70 New Zealanders who were evacuated from the city of Wuhan in China.

The facility was chosen for its secure nature, location and medical facilities.

While being kept in isolation at the military base, evacuees could be given daily medical checks and where possible, kept with their families and isolated from other returnees.

The use of the Whangaparaoa facility in the fight against COVID-19 demonstrates the importance of a modern defence estate. We need to invest in estate regeneration not only for the health, safety and effectiveness of our personnel, but for the security and best interests of New Zealand.

It is crucial our Defence Force has world class facilities and infrastructure in order to maintain military capability.

That’s why it’s concerning to see the Government ask the Defence Force where they could make cuts in spending, particularly at this time of

heightened global instability.

Our Defence Force have a critical role to play, especially in the Pacific, but also in improving the lives of New Zealanders by promoting global security and helping people get back on their feet in the aftermath of environmental disasters. Cuts in military spending will impact on our ability to deliver on our security obligations.

The Government should think twice before asking NZDF to identify spending cuts. I will continue to hold the Minister to account on defence spending.

Any threats to international stability will have a direct impact on New Zealand. So it’s pleasing to hear that after more than a year of discussions, a deal has been signed between the US and the Taliban in an attempt to bring an end to the conflict in Afghanistan.

If this important agreement is upheld, 5000 US troops will return home by May and NATO allies have indicated that all troops will be withdrawn within 14 months. This of course is completely contingent on the Taliban upholding their end of their bargain.

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The importance of culture and community alignment Frank Olsson, former international banking leader and current NZ Europe Business Council President and Auckland-based Swedish Honorary Consul, writes that when you create real value for real people profitability follows.

I recently wrote a book called Learning to dance – Corporate style about how to humanise business and get more out of life. It is the sum of my work experience as a senior manager in different organisations in five countries.

In the book I present 52 chapters/ ideas on how to create a winning culture. It is not very complicated.

To a large extent it comes down to understanding that small human acts and signs of appreciation to those around you can work magic.

A winning dish is not only about good product and cooking, it requires the right condiments to reach Michelin star status. To go beyond satisfaction and functionality, we need to find new combinations between qualities of the heart and of the mind. Looking ahead, progress will be much about new combinations and seeing work as satisfying and fulfilling rather than a means for generating income to pay bills.

Frank Olsson, NZ Europe Business Council President.

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For at least 30 years there has been a discussion about whether corporate purpose is about generating shareholder wealth only or whether it should also incorporate stakeholder value. This, I believe, is a false dichotomy.

Just as shareholder wealth and customer service are not opposites or trade-offs, similarly shareholder focus and good stakeholder relations are not opposites. It is not rocket science to grasp that they are mutually enhancing.

Corporate activity often allows too much influence for CFOs and financial reporting. Getting the numbers in order is not a purpose but rather an indication that things are progressing well.

The real lift of any human activity requires vision, optimism, stamina and enthusiasm. And these qualities are not subdivisions of accounting! Neither are they the domain of finance or CFOs but of enlightened, enthusiastic and community-inclusive leadership.

Much of my professional background is in banking and finance.

It is now obvious to all that pursuing too narrow a goal of profitability is not the way to secure long term success.

In aggregate, banks globally have now paid in the order of a trillion dollars in fines for wrong doing and perhaps as much again in market cap losses due to sub-optimising their actions and resources.

Staying on side in terms of the general public and the community at large is absolutely vital for retaining your licence to operate and make money. There is room for improvement in this context with

our major banks, both regionally and also globally. Anyone who does not contextualise high profitability with generating value for customers and the general public is very vulnerable, as we have seen.

Perhaps Australian big banks are now worth up to 25 percent less than they could have been with a different mix of focus on financial returns and community alignment. That represents a huge potential gap and a depletion of share-holder value in the quest of narrow and short-term profitability.

Corporate culture, purpose and community alignment will not on their own achieve corporate success. But I am convinced that getting these things right will enhance both profitability and sustainability.

Research presented in Harvard Business Review suggests that people working in companies with a good culture are better paid and generate more profits for owners than other companies with lesser quality cultures. Having read all HBR issues for the past 16 years, I conclude that a major theme for its articles is about creating meaning and a good corporate culture.

A starting point for this cultural uplift is to focus on adding value to staff, to customers, to partners and to the general public. Just as happiness will ensue when you do the right thing to others, profitability will be enhanced when you create real value for real people without too much focus on shareholders. The healthy way to generate sustainable success is the winwin formula realised by passionately helping others succeed.

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DEFENCE

Rheinmetall focuses on local growth working with New Zealand partners Rheinmetall has been an active partner to the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) and a member of the nation’s defence industry since 2013.

From its offices at Upper Hutt, the company is now growing its New Zealand footprint by establishing a new regional capability for a range of vehicle platforms, electronic solutions and weapons & munitions on the back of its recent contract awards in the Australian defence sector.

This local growth mirrors Rheinmetall’s global activities as an integrated technology group expanding into new regions and markets in the areas of environmentally friendly mobility and threat-appropriate security technology.

Rheinmetall Group’s operating activities are split in two corporate sectors - Rheinmetall Defence and Rheinmetall Automotive. In 2018, its 23,000-strong staff generated annual sales of more than $NZD8 billion.

Today, the 130-year-old Dusseldorfbased company is growing its New Zealand footprint by delivering capability where the key requirements are mobility, lethality, reconnaissance, protection and sustainment.

Recognising the significance of the high mobility logistics vehicle and combat vehicle programs now being delivered to regional users like the Australian Defence Force, Rheinmetall has established its newest global business unit – Vehicle Systems Asia Pacific – to be headquartered in Brisbane and focused on delivering and sustaining military vehicles for the Australian and New Zealand defence forces, and in key nations across the region.

Under the leadership of Managing Director Gary Stewart and New Zealand Regional Manager Marty 16

Roelofs, Rheinmetall Defence Australia and New Zealand oversees the activities of all company entities and manages operations in Wellington and Upper Hutt.

“Rheinmetall has built a successful export industry for defence products and services from its German base and we are now working towards the same ambition at our Asia Pacific hub in Australia and New Zealand,” Mr Stewart said.

“Our focus is on creating sustainable design, development and manufacturing facilities that deliver world leading products and services to the NZDF, as well as partnering with local New Zealand companies to ensure their products and services are available globally through our company’s Global Supply Chain.”

The New Zealand Government’s historic capital investment in the NZDF provides the foundation

Rheinmetall Group

International Partner for Security and Mobility 23,044 employees at 38 German and 75 sites in 29 countries 20,000 defence systems in use with more than 80 Armed Forces u 70 million pistons, 5 million engine blocks, 27 million pumps, 6 million exhaust gas recirculation systems per year u Biggest German Defence Company and one of the Top 15 Automotive Suppliers in Germany u Driver of innovation with more than 250 million EUR in R&D investment plus CAPEX of 250 million EUR per year u u

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for Rheinmetall’s local focus. The company’s footprint in New Zealand has long been associated with its fleet of high mobility logistics vehicles currently in service with the NZDF. In March 2013, Rheinmetall MAN Military Vehicles – a joint venture between Rheinmetall and MAN Trucks - was awarded a contract to supply the New Zealand Defence Force with 194 new Logistic trucks as well as 6 training vehicles.

The order encompassed trucks based on HX chassis in three basic sizes: the 6-tonne 4x4, the 9-tonne 6x6 and the 15-tonne 8x8, in ten variants. Some of the trucks are fitted with winches and cranes to allow completely independent operation. They include dump trucks

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for combat engineers, trucks fitted with specialized pallet and container handling equipment, and tractor/semitrailer combinations to carry heavy vehicles and equipment.

The contract included vehicles, armour protection kits, weapons mounts, personnel modules and an extensive range of specialised military equipment. It also covers spares, logistic support arrangements, project management and extensive training packages, including six additional vehicles specifically for training purposes. All 200 trucks were successfully delivered between October 2013 and September 2014.

The NZDF deployed a fleet of the trucks to bring much-needed supplies

to quake-damaged Kaikoura in the days immediately after the 2016 Kaikoura earthquake. A convoy of Rheinmetall MAN trucks ferried 7320 litres of diesel and 1540 litres of petrol to Kaikoura’s petrol stations and emergency services.

It also brought 10,000 litres of potable water for distribution and nine Army chefs who were to cater for emergency workers and volunteers as well as about 250 patients at Kaikoura Hospital.

An In-Service Support agreement was signed for a 10 year period with the New Zealand Defence Force expanding the company’s operating footprint to include a warehouse facility and spares parts supply, the establishment of the RMMVA New Zealand Dealer Network which undertakes repair activities as part of the Heavy Grade Repair obligation, and the establishment of the New Zealand Office based in Trentham, Upper Hutt.

Over the last three years, Rheinmetall has been the principal sponsor for the Royal New Zealand Army Logistics Regiment Trade competition. The Combat Driver trade also competes for the Rheinmetall Cup which is the top prize that we present each year.

The company is also a member of the New Zealand Defence Industry Association, the main outlet for the NZDF Industry Engagement Program.

RDA has been a member for the last 4 years and attends bi-monthly meetings and the NZDIA Forum each year.

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Investment in defence capabilities critical to national resilience It’s been a high tempo summer for the NZDF, writes Defence Minister Hon Ron Mark.

White Island/Whakaari recovery, Southland flooding evacuation and Australian bushfire assistance underline need for resource availability.

Hon Ron Mark is Minister of Defence.

He served as mayor of Carterton from 2010 to 2014, and previously served as an officer in the New Zealand Army and in the Sultan of Oman’s Armed Forces.

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Last year the New Zealand Defence Force were involved in 58 operations.

The summer period was a particularly busy time, as on top of our usual deployments we responded to consecutive humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

The women and men in our Defence Force are our greatest asset and were there to support our community and our neighbours when it mattered most. There was little respite as we went from one key operation to the next, starting with the recovery operation at White Island/Whakaari.

The HMNZS Wellington set off and at the request of NZ Police we planned the operation. Eight of our brave women and men ventured onto White Island/Whakaari, demonstrating the professionalism and high capabilities of our personnel.

On top of this, the Australian bush fires kept NZDF busy as 118 personnel were deployed to Australia to assist our neighbours. This support was being provided in addition to the NZDF firefighters deployed to bolster numbers of emergency responders on the ground.

These NZDF personnel, many who had cut their holidays short, included New Zealand Army engineers, plant operators as well as medical and environmental health teams. Three NH90 helicopters were in the air for over 180 hours and our C-130 Hercules transported 60 Australian Defence personnel, 14,600lbs of equipment and 45,000lbs of firefighting foam between regions.

A Boeing 757 also completed a quick stopover to uplift 54 Republic of Fiji Military engineers from Nadi to

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Australia – an example of our pacific partnerships in action.

We were proud NZDF was part of the response but there was no time to rest. NZDF assistance continued back home as we travelled straight down to Invercargill with a NH90 helicopter and two Unimog vehicles, each with four personnel, to assist in the evacuation of people trapped by flooding in Southland. NZDF liaison officers worked with Civil Defence Emergency Management to coordinate tasks and resources as part of the civil defence emergency response in the region.

The past three months have also been a busy time for one of our biggest deployments, as every summer our Defence Force provides support to Antarctica NZ and the US Antarctic Programme.

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This year, 212 Royal New Zealand Navy, New Zealand Army and Royal New Zealand Air Force personnel were deployed in support of Antarctica missions. This deployment includes up to six C-130 Hercules flights and four Boeing 757 flights as well as support to Terminal Operations at Christchurch International Airport.

Our McMurdo assistance included load and passenger processing, fuel delivery, and ship off-load teams.

Scott Base support included light engineering teams, plant operators, cargo handlers, communications and administration staff.

The NZDF’s new ice-strengthened naval tanker is due to be commissioned later this year and will provide further support activities to Antarctica.

Looking ahead, it is clear we will continue to face an increasing

likelihood of concurrent HADR operations. The impacts of climate change will have enduring implications for our Defence Force and close partners, especially in the pacific.

While our Defence Force continues to demonstrate its ability to lean in and support other lead agencies, both at home and in our region, the summer period highlighted challenges which stressed the urgency of further capability spending.

Challenges arose for the C-130 crews on the mission to support the Australian bush fire response.

Unfortunately one of the C-130s first on the ground broke down. A second C-130 had to be sent over, along with a new engine, before joining the firefighting response.

If this summer period has shown us anything, it’s that our Defence Force

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needs to have the resources available to meet our operational and strategic priorities - we need to be resilient and we need to be able to respond to incidents that occur concurrently.

Investment in defence capabilities is critical to our national resilience and has been deferred for too long.

As I’ve previously said, progressing the procurement of the C-130J Super Hercules continues to be my highest capability priority as Minister of Defence. This upcoming purchase will be integral in avoiding and responding to future challenges.

I am proud of the Coalition Government for making the decision to select the highly capable Super Hercules as the replacement for our aging 1960s era C-130s. We are on track to deliver and I look forward to making an announcement in the coming months.

It’s been a good year for the Defence Force, due to the support from the Coalition Government. The last two budgets have seen the greatest injection in defence capital funding in decades. We’re also seeing a political consensus on defence spending which we haven’t seen before.

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Last month I also announced another Defence Capability Plan 2019 investment, following the signing of a contract to replace the NZDF’s aging fixed high frequency radio capability with modern equipment. Our service women and men rely on this capability when operating in some of the most remote regions on the planet, from deep in the Southern Ocean to the vastness of the Pacific.

High frequency (HF) radio provides communications coverage in places that satellites cannot reach and is an essential back-up system if satellite communications fail. HF radio is also more resilient to cyber-attacks.

It will boost national resilience, by helping emergency services maintain communications during a crisis.

The project, which will be delivered

by Babcock NZ, has a capital budget of $26.6 million and is expected to be fully operational by August 2023.

Looking at the year ahead, the Ministry of Defence has also released a request for tender and is currently seeking proposals on a range of domestic response vehicles, with delivery expected before the end of 2022. These include, domestic and

rural fire engines, airfield response appliances, aircraft refuelling tankers and NZ military ambulances.

There’s more good news in that further planned investment has also gone to market seeking proposals to upgrade the external communications systems of HMNZS Canterbury and the Offshore Patrol Vessels, HMNZS Otago and Wellington. Delivery is also expected before the end of 2022.

These ships conduct fisheries patrols, protect our borders, and support our disaster relief operations.

Communications at sea is critical, for safety of crews, and to ensure New Zealand vessels are able to operate effectively together and with our partners.

The Coalition Government’s Defence Capability Plan 2019 has set out our programme for addressing previous neglect, and we are delivering it. Significant work is also underway on our other high priority – delivering an improved defence estate, and implementing the infrastructure pipeline of the expanded $2.1 billion Defence Estate Regeneration Programme.

We are not finished yet - watch this space.

Line of Defence

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DEFENCE

Tactical Solutions launch Innovation Hub in Wellington New Zealand operational equipment provider Tactical Solutions announces the opening of its new Tactical Innovation Hub in Trentham featuring cutting-edge Measure and Fit facility and specialist detection equipment showroom.

Tactical Solutions is proud to announce that they will be extending their physical reach within New Zealand by adding a Tactical Innovation Hub into Wellington in May. The Hub will be located next to the Trentham Military Camp at Level 1, B Block, 20 Somme Road, Trentham, Upper Hutt.

This will mark the fourth major facility in New Zealand, the second in Wellington with their head office and main service centre situated in Auckland and supported by Christchurch.

Tactical Solutions is a proudly New Zealand owned and operated company that was incorporated in 1999 to offer Government, Defence, Law Enforcement, Correctional, Security and EMS organisations convenient and knowledgeable access to the world’s best operational equipment (www. tactical.co.nz).

Since 1999 Tactical Solutions have become the leading supplier of equipment and expertise to all of New Zealand’s government agencies as well as securing significant contracts with private clients and government departments in Australia and the Pacific Islands.

“We pride ourselves in that the majority of our team have had years of active service within the New Zealand Defence Force, Law Enforcement, Department of Corrections, Fire and Emergency Services as well as St Johns. Each has a deep understanding of how New Zealand governmental institutions work and what their needs are.” said Rob Hodge, the Managing Director of Tactical Solutions.

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The company has focused on building their service capabilities and have acquired some of the best technicians and uniform specialists in the industry. Some of the skills that their technicians have acquired are unique to the Southern Hemisphere and with the additional full-service centre opening at the Innovation Hub it will greatly enhance their service capabilities to the Wellington region.

“For us it’s so much more than just pushing products onto customers and we believe that offering on-the-ground through-life-support is our strong point,” says Hodge. “We offer single source solutions to our clients and offer support through all the stages of the product life cycle including asset management services (with IOT tracking and integration capabilities) as well as custom IT solutions.”

Tactical Solutions stock a wide variety of brands that are synonymous with every day load-outs used by our New Zealand front-line personnel.

Our portfolio backs brands like 5.11, ASP, SureFire, Trijicon, Camelbak, ESS, Oakley, Ceia and L3 Harris to name a few. A full list of brands can be found at www.tactical.co.nz/brands “We stand behind our core brands and have made large investments into finding the best gear that has been extensively front-line tried and tested.” said Hodge.

Tactical Solutions are the exclusive 5.11 Tactical dealer in New Zealand and are proud to say that they have a special guest from the 5.11 head-office who will be attending the opening of the Innovation Hub. The centre will boast two separate showrooms.

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The first will be accessible to the public and showcases a wide variety of capabilities ranging from innovative detection gear, uniform TDU/PDU/ BDU/Fire/EMS/Custom solutions, PPE focused solutions and an optics centre.

Retail customers can purchase directly from the hub or can order items online at their e-commerce store at https://store.tactical.co.nz. Items will be dispatched from the Wellington warehousing facility backed by support

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from the Auckland and Christchurch warehouses.

The Hub has a separate showroom which displays the latest in specialised operational tactical and detection equipment. Also included are conferencing facilities that will enable face-to-face communications to additional specialists around the country, when needed.

A highlight of the Innovation Hub will be a cutting-edge Measure and Fit facility which is an expansion of the

already growing network of Measure and Fit centres around New Zealand.

The centre will host various Measure and Fit teams that provide custom individual fitting solutions of body armour and specialised uniform deployments. This will add to the continued success of the rollout of the new New Zealand Police Body Armour Systems and will further extend the company’s capability for future projects in this area.

The facility will play host to customised international and local training programs that will be facilitated by our in-house qualified and certified training teams, as well as international experts.

The main celebrations for the official opening of the Innovation Hub will take place on 5.11 Day (2020/5/11, or May 5th) and to celebrate the opening there will be an official 5.11 door breaching ceremony.

There will be door prizes and giveaways and a chance to meet our special 5.11 guest as well as the Tactical Solutions team.

Tactical Solutions would like to invite you and your team to be part of a pre-launch viewing during the weeks preceding the main launch. If you are interested in receiving an invitation, please register your interest by email: wopen@tactical.co.nz 23

DEFENCE

COVID-19: Defence personnel, facilities provide national reserve Hon Dr Wayne Mapp explores the possible roles of the Defence Force in responding to a pandemic, arguing that its pool of well-trained people, its large estate and its fit-forpurpose equipment form a valuable national reserve.

Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO was New Zealand’s Minister of Defence and Minister of Science and Innovation from 2008 to 2011.

COVID-19 is the biggest medical emergency since the SARS flu of 2002.

Except the COVID-19 is worse, much worse. It will be months before we are past the peak.

The COVID-19 pandemic is a good time to reflect on the possible role of the Defence Force in such an emergency. Already they have been involved. The Whangaparoa Camp provided an ideal isolation facility. It would be suitable for up to around 100 people. But that is just the tip of the possible role the Defence Force could play if things were to get a lot worse.

Defence policy of the last two decades has placed a lot of emphasis on the role of defence in civil emergencies.

In recent times capabilities have been developed with that in mind.

In particular the navy has been equipped with ships that have civil roles as much as traditional defence roles. The majority of the Airforce aircraft have substantial civil roles. The NH90 helicopters have much more

lifting power than their predecessors.

This makes them ideal in civilian emergencies. The continuing reequipment plan of the Defence Force will have the civil role as an essential consideration.

The last decade has seen a number of serious civil emergencies that have demonstrated the importance of these new capabilities, as well as showing the inherent importance of having a well-trained, disciplined force.

These emergencies have included the Samoan tsunami and the Christchurch earthquake.

On both occasions HMNZS Canterbury was deployed. This ship was acquired with its use in civilian emergencies being a critical requirement. Both these disasters also used defence capabilities that have been available for decades, the C130 transport aircraft and the helicopters.

Much more important than the equipment are the people in the Defence Force. The unique virtue of

HMNZS Canterbury, Royal New Zealand Navy Amphibious Multi-role Vessel (MRV).

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the Defence Force is that it has over 14,000 well trained people able to act as a disciplined force.

The military tasks of the Defence Force during peacetime rarely use more than a small fraction of the people and their equipment. Therefore, Defence Force people, and their equipment and facilities, including camps, are almost invariably readily available for civil tasks. Increasingly these tasks are seen as a central role for Defence Force people.

The protection of the nation is not just an issue of defending New Zealand and its interests from those who may wish it harm. Protecting the nation also means defending New Zealand from natural disasters. In turn that has meant that the training of the Defence Force includes the civil role as an essential component of the tool kit of all Defence Force people.

In Christchurch one of the important tasks was to secure the CBD, which had almost been completely destroyed, and to provide specialised transport and communications. This took hundreds of people, freeing up police and others to deal with their particular tasks.

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Christchurch also showed how Defence could provide secure communications, independent of the telephone network and independent of grid electricity. This was essential for part of the civil defence communications from Christchurch to Wellington Civil Defence headquarters, particularly in the early stages. Burnham Camp became the base for victim identification.

So, what does this mean for the government response to COVID-19?

Probably the greatest requirement will potentially be isolation facilities.

At present most of those who are suspected of having contracted COVID-19 are self-isolating, with the serious cases being admitted to hospital. This will work if COVID-19 proves to be not so serious.

But if the disease is more contagious and the effects more serious, self-isolation will not be enough. Nor is it likely that Whangaparoa Camp will be sufficient if the numbers who require isolation build.

Waiouru Camp, in the middle of the North Island, has the capacity to house over a thousand people. To a

large extent, it is empty. No longer do 800 young men and women undertake basic training as one huge group. If necessary, the camp with its extensive accommodation and related facilities, could be used to isolate people who are potentially carrying COVID-19.

There are a large number of people in Defence who have been trained in emergency medicine, including hundreds of people in the medical branches of the three services. If necessary, they will all be available.

COVID-19 and other emergencies demonstrate how important it is for the nation to have a substantial body of well-trained people, working within a well-tested command structure, along with substantial reserve camps and equipment.

The Defence Force constitutes this national reserve. They have enough flexibility in civil emergency training, especially in recent times, to be deployed as the government of the day decides.

Hopefully the current COVID-19 emergency won’t require the Defence Force to a significant extent. But if it does, then we know the Defence Force will be able to step up and do the job.

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MQ-9B SkyGuardian and SeaGuardian Increase Multi-Mission Superiority and Versatility General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc. (GA-ASI) manufactures, supports, and operates a variety of operationally proven, highly reliable Remotely Pilots Aircraft (RPA) systems, as well as cutting-edge radars, and electro-optic and related mission systems for military and commercial applications worldwide.

The most recent GA-ASI RPA development is the MQ-9B SkyGuardian and SeaGuardian – the SeaGuardian includes maritime surveillance capabilities. When combined with the unmatched range (over 6,000 nmi) and endurance (over 40 hours), its ability to operate in adverse weather through use of antiice, de-ice, lightening protection and reinforced aircraft structure, the MQ9B is the most capable and versatile RPA in the world.

The MQ-9B builds on the trusted and proven capabilities of current MQ9A aircraft which are used for a variety

Certifiable Ground Control Station

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SeaGuardian over maritime environment

of military, security and humanitarian and disaster relief roles by operators across the world.

MQ-9B sales are now growing with Australia joining the United Kingdom in selecting this advanced system. The Government of Belgium has approved Belgian Defense to negotiate for the acquisition of MQ-9B to meet the nation’s RPA requirements. Further operators are expected to select this system shortly. The growing list of customers reflects the versatile and future-focused capabilities of the MQ9B, and the cost-effective, through-life performance it offers.

GA-ASI’s MQ-9 series aircraft are utilized every day in non-military roles, such as border protection, support to law enforcement, and in response to civil emergencies such as floods, forest fires, hurricanes/ typhoons/cyclones, earthquakes and tsunamis. The kinds of support these RPA provide to non-military missions encompasses not only Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Line of Defence

XC2 in front of an aircraft

(ISR) using electro-optical and radar, but also communications relay and support, including the provision of broadband communications services in affected areas. GA-ASI’s customers seek multi-role, multi-domain capabilities that often see military forces providing support to civilian agencies, and even civilian/security agencies acquiring the capabilities for their own use. GA-ASI expects this trend to continue.

In parallel with the MQ-9B development, GA-ASI has placed a priority on reducing workforce demands for customers. The P3E (Portable Pre/Post-Flight Equipment) and XC2 (Expeditionary Command & Control) capability enables the SATCOM launch and recovery of

MQ-9B SeaGaurdian ASW graphic

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deployed aircraft utilizing a small number of personnel equipped with a ruggedized laptop for control of the aircraft. P3E and XC2 are now being rolled out to customers.

GA-ASI is also working on a range of automated functions that enable the tasking and control of multiple aircraft, as well as automated processing, exploitation and dissemination of collected data.

GA-ASI believes that these areas of automation offer the greatest potential to improve RPA utility and cost-effectiveness, and multiply the benefits they produce.

GA-ASI efforts to achieve the seamless integration of RPA into controlled airspace and with manned aircraft has been underway for more than five years. GA-ASI has worked with the FAA and NASA, and European, UK, Australian and other nations’ airspace regulators to jointly develop systems, regulations and procedures to achieve this goal. While some development work remains to be completed, GA-ASI leads the world in this endeavor and continues to invest considerable internal research and development resources on this task.

Almost all of GA-ASI’s customers are demanding these capabilities and the company is well along the way to deliver a fully certifiable solution.

GA-ASI has recently conducted a range of flight trials in Greece and, in 2020-21, GA-ASI will conduct demonstration flights in the Asia-

Pacific region. These trials continue to demonstrate a range of maritime, littoral and overland capabilities including operations in controlled and uncontrolled airspace. Future trials will build increased confidence with various regulators and pave the way for more widespread, unrestricted operations.

Two other noteworthy GA-ASI RPA developments, focused towards the MQ-9B in particular, are the AntiSubmarine Warfare (ASW) capability and Laser Communications.

There is a growing realization amongst military users is that they are unable to acquire or afford sufficient, capable, manned fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft with ASW capabilities (like the P-8A) which can meet their requirements. ASW is characterized by lengthy and often unrewarding periods searching large areas of ocean, with short periods of localization, tracking and attack. Long endurance surveillance is a sweet spot for capable, ruggedized RPA and, as such, GA-ASI has developed a MQ-9 focused ASW capability which includes sonobuoy deployment, monitoring, signal processing including automated target detection, and data transmission capabilities.

This RPA system is being designed to work in conjunction with manned platforms including ASW aircraft and helicopters, and surface vessels.

Recently, GA ASI successfully ground tested its Airborne Laser Communication System (ALCoS) by establishing a link with a satellite in Geo-synchronous Earth Orbit.

The test successfully demonstrated acquisition and tracking, with sufficient power available to reliably establish and maintain the link. GAASI conducted this trial to support future MQ-9 RPA employment of high-bandwidth communication systems that cannot be jammed or detected by an adversary, while enabling the employment of a new generation of high-performance sensors by breaking the data bottleneck of current RF SATCOM technology. With 300 times the data carrying capacity of conventional RF SATCOM systems, ALCoS will be able to operate as a communications gateway for other forces.

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Babcock NZ picks up HF radio contract As Babcock celebrates HF comms win, Defence looks to replace fire and airfield response appliances, while upgrades to HMNZS Canterbury and OPV external communications systems have gone to market.

Defence Minister Ron Mark announced on 03 March that Defence had signed a contract with Babcock NZ Ltd to replace the NZDF’s fixed high frequency (HF) radio capability.

“This is one of a number of planned investments from the Defence Capability Plan 2019 that will strengthen our national resilience,” Ron Mark said.

“High frequency radio provides communications coverage in places that satellites cannot reach and where ordinary radio communications will not work. It is also a back-up system if satellite communications fail, are disrupted or are unavailable.

“Our service women and men rely on communications to undertake the tasks required of them, whether it be humanitarian, constabulary or military operations. In undertaking these tasks, they operate in some of the most remote regions on the planet, from deep in the Southern Ocean to the vastness of the Pacific.”

“This is an investment in our communities. Defence’s HF radio system will support emergency services, enabling them to maintain communications during crises.”

“The current HF radio infrastructure was installed in the 1980s and has reached the end of its life,” Ron Mark said.

The investment has a capital cost of $26.6 million, which is being funded from existing Defence budgets. A support contract for $2 million per annum was also signed by the NZDF. The new HF system is expected to be fully operational by August 2023.

Babcock Australasia CEO, David Ruff, said the contract represents a major milestone for Babcock as 28

a world-leading, trusted provider of High Frequency communication technology.

“This contract leverages our long-standing, 18 year track record in the UK, where Babcock has been providing a Defence High Frequency Communications Service to the UK Ministry of Defence,” Ruff says.

“Babcock will now provide its specialist technology and know-how to New Zealand as a key Five Eyes partner.”

“The contract reinforces Babcock’s long-standing commitment in New Zealand, building upon its role as the nation’s strategic maritime partner, sustaining the Royal New Zealand Navy, as well as its strategic partnership managing the ground assets of the national flag-carrier, Air New Zealand.”

The Ministry of Defence also has a project underway to modernise and replace the Defence Force’s domestic fire appliances, rural fire appliances, airfield response appliances, aircraft bulk refuelling vehicles and domestic medical response vehicles.

“Our domestic fire appliances at Waiouru respond to traffic incidents on the Desert Road, our rural fire appliances support Fire and Emergency New Zealand, and our aircraft bulk refuelling and domestic medical response vehicles ensure that

we can continue to operate at home in the air and on the ground,” said the minister.

“Investment in these capabilities is critical to our national resilience and has been deferred for too long.

The Coalition Government’s Defence Capability Plan set outs a programme for addressing this neglect and we are implementing it. This project has released a request for tender and is currently seeking proposals.”

A further planned investment has gone to market seeking proposals to upgrade the external communications systems of HMNZS Canterbury and the Offshore Patrol Vessels, HMNZS’ Otago and Wellington.

“These ships conduct patrols and protect fisheries in areas of strategic importance to New Zealand, including in the South Pacific. They also protect our borders. HMNZS Canterbury is the mainstay of our response to humanitarian and disaster relief operations at home and in the South Pacific.”

“Ensuring that these ships have modern and effective communications systems is critical if they are to continue to deliver for New Zealanders and our neighbours,” Ron Mark said.

Investments in both of these capabilities are expected to be implemented before the end of 2022.

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DEFENCE

A long game, but a rewarding one New Zealand Defence Industry CEO Jennie Vickers chatted informally at the ASIS New Zealand Chapter Women in Security event about the Defence Industry, the challenges of supplying Defence, and the potential rewards.

Jennie Vickers is the CEO of the New Zealand Defence Industry Association (NZDIA). A lawyer, she was previously ANZ Director for the International Association of Contract and Commercial Management (IACCM).

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The New Zealand Defence Force is called in its strategy ‘the force for good for New Zealand’. I work very closely with the NZDF head of industry engagement Debbie Howarth, and she came up with this idea of describing industry as being ‘the force behind the force’.

Christopher Pyne, who was Australia’s Defence Industry Minister, adopted the phrase for Australia but we all know that Debbie came up with it first!

It’s a fantastic sector to work with, and the NZDF and Ministry of Defence people are committed to improving the participation of NZ industry. They have a very committed minister in Ron Mark and have had an impressive amount of funding over the past couple of years. It’s a great pond for industry to play in, but it can also be quite a difficult pond to play in.

Ten to fifteen years ago the industry that looked after Defence Force work were probably almost all ex-Defence, so the trust that existed between Defence and Industry was exceptionally strong on an individualto-individual basis. What we’re seeing now is that in a world of heightened security awareness, there is a need for a massive cultural transformation around all the aspects of how to build trust when you’re not an ex-Defence person and start from scratch.

The New Zealand Defence Industry Association (NZDIA) has been around for over 20 years now.

We were established specifically to find answers to the question of how to build a local industry that supports

Defence without having to constantly go overseas to buy what it needs.

We were set up by the government to bring industry together with the Defence Force at the time the ANZAC frigates were being procured. I arrived in New Zealand in 1997 about the time that project was happening, blissfully unaware that it was all going on but delighted to be seeing the benefits of that policy.

It’s about 23 years later and what we now have is a government policy around procurement and delivering on the ‘broader outcomes’. It actually means we’re back at that same mindset of how do we make sure we encourage New Zealand industry to have a bigger part to play and then create jobs, support communities, and get them to be all the things they need to be?

And so that’s my job – connecting, collaborating, joining people together, arranging for Defence people to come and speak and therefore for industry to come and engage.

We work very closely with Gary [Morrison, CEO of the New Zealand Security Association] and other associations. We’ll play nicely with anybody. If we can deliver for New Zealand and make jobs, then we’re all heading in the right direction.

Doing business with Defence is exciting and financially rewarding. In the near future an announcement is to be made about the winner of the alliance project for Defence camps and bases. That will open the door to a massive amount of work right the way across the Defence Force.

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Alongside that there’s a whole bunch of work going on in the security, cyber and information zone.

The Defence Capability Plan now has a section on the ‘information domain’. There’s always been air, sea and land, and now they’ve said you can’t not have information as a domain. There are a lot of opportunities here that range from everything from basic computing to security to comms on vehicles and ships, and space.

A recurring challenge, however, is getting the authorisation and the ‘right to work’ in the defence sector… it’s a never-ending circle.

If you’re on an all-of-government panel that’s great, but then the next question is “have you got a security clearance” – and there’s too few people on the panel who have the right clearance.

It could be that there’s a whole bunch of work available for which the requirement for a security clearance seems irrelevant, in that you could do all the work outside and never need to go on base or touch a Defence computer, but somebody insists that the role requires a security clearance.

They are working on it. There’s a lot of focus in the sector around the fact that there are not enough people processing security clearances, but I think that if we all work together on this we stand a chance.

One of the things I see as my role is constantly reminding – a bit like a broken record – about the fact that Line of Defence

government people can’t just keep giving all the work to a high profile multinational IT company because “no one ever got fired for buying from xxx….”. That approach doesn’t cut it anymore because it’s inconsistent with broader outcomes under the Procurement Rules.

The challenge that industry has in working in this sector is that there is a big prize but that it’s a tough prize to get.

When I talk to new members coming into our association, I tell them that it’s a long game, and that their best bet is to be a supplier into a prime rather than being the prime itself. Next step is to introduce them to a prime, the primes ask to be introduced to the New Zealand SMEs, but we are constantly reminded that, for those who need help being great in NZ to supply in NZ, there is no clear source of help.

MBIE is working on this challenge, they now have a small business team that’s been set up. They’ve appointed a general manager for the policy side, and we should see a team building.

I’ll be chipping away on the side talking to them about things we think they should do to help New Zealand business.

Talking to my colleagues in Australia at Goal Group, their approach to how industry should go about becoming Defence ready follows a process of taking SMEs through a process where they need to become an ‘explorer’, then an ‘exponent’,

and ultimately an ‘expert’. We’ll keep talking to them and look to introduce them to New Zealand agencies to help them understand how to make New Zealand businesses ‘Defence ready’ using the Australian model.

If SMEs can survive all of this then they may gain the ability to supply into Australia and be part of a budget of $200 billion over 20 years.

If you can get sharpened up to sub into a prime on one of the big Defence projects, then you’ll be much better placed. Australia has more money to spend than they have manufacturing capability.

The Australians have a 15 percent quota for local work for any project worth over $15 million and the good thing is that under our free trade agreement New Zealand counts as an Australian SME. It took us a long time to get one footnote in one Australian Defence paper reminding Australian Defence and Industry that New Zealand counted under the agreement, but it was the best footnote ever.

What we are seeing now is that the companies in New Zealand that are doing really well and performing are being pushed onto the international stage as exemplars. And that is a great result.

The balance between risk and reward for industry has never been more apparent than in this sector.

Everything we can do to help will pay dividends in jobs and community strength in years to come.

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DEFENCE

NZDIA Chair welcomes new Board New Zealand Defence Industry Association Chair Andrew Ford announces the new NZDIA board, with one resignation, one new appointed member, one reappointed member, and one big year ahead.

To our members, welcome back to 2020 and I look forward to networking with you all at future members meetings and events in the course of the year. The strength of our association is in the continued commitment and participation of our members, and your Board is interested in hearing from you.

In the year ahead we will need to focus on setting a new strategic horizon for the Association, to address the public profile of Defence and Industry, and to look at initiatives to better reflect and include the diversity of our membership. More will follow on our future strategic direction and how you can participate.

Board Director resignation I received a letter of resignation from Ross Browne as a Director of the NZDIA in January and the Board has accepted that resignation. Ross and his wife Sarah are expecting their first

Andrew Ford is a Director and Chair of the NZDIA Board.

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child in May and with an increasingly busy consulting practice. Ross has revisited his priorities for 2020 and does not have the time available to devote to the Association that he believes the role deserves. The Board thanks Ross for his time as a Director.

Appointed Directors Our association rules allow the appointment of up to two additional directors to our Board for a fixed term to help provide balance of experience, diversity of thought and to contribute to particular strategic initiatives in the governance of the NZDIA. I advertised for volunteers from our membership to join the Board in a newsletter late last year following the AGM. We had an excellent response with eight experienced members putting up their hands. The elected members of the Board followed a process to select preferred candidates, focussed primarily on the three aspects of experience, diversity and strategic initiatives.

Firstly, I’d like to thank all of those who volunteered, it puts me in good heart that there is clearly interest from our members in the future of our Association, and I would like to encourage all to consider putting yourselves up for the three vacancies that will be available for elected positions at the next AGM. Secondly, Ross’ resignation has created a vacancy for the remainder of his term and therefore we have the opportunity to appoint two directors now or over the coming months and co-opt a third director.

Therefore, finally, I’d like to introduce you to our two new directors appointed/co-opted to our Board: • Josie Fitzgerald of Aurecon, will rejoin the Board in a co-opted role for the vacancy created with Ross’ resignation. Josie will bring some good continuity, having previously been involved in an Appointed role on the Board.

Josie has a keen interest in Women in Defence and STEM initiatives.

• Kerry Griffiths of AECOM, will join the Board for the first time as an Appointed Director. Kerry has a key interest in diversity, inclusion and sustainability all of which are focus areas for our Defence and National Security stakeholders.

I look forward to our returning and new director joining the remaining elected members of the board and engaging around the next strategic horizon for NZDIA. The Board will make a decision about the remaining Appointed Director role over the next few months.

My thanks to the Board and Executive. As a general note, your board and executive continue to work hard in the interest of the NZDIA and I would like to extend personal thanks to the other existing elected members of your Board: Chris Saxby of Babcock, John Robson of Bridgewest (Provoke), and Jerry Szulinski of Lockheed Martin.

And, of course, my thanks to Jennie Vickers your hard working Chief Executive.

Line of Defence

2020

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Line of Defence New Zealand’s Defence and National Security Magazine

MAGAZINE

NZSM New Zealand Security Magazine

HOMELAND SECURITY A New Zealand strategy for protecting crowded places from attack

Chief Editor Nicholas Dynon breaks down the soon-to-be released ‘Protecting Our Crowded Places from attack: New Zealand’s Strategy’ It’s a strategy that will rely on unprecedented engagement between Police and businesses and community.

New Zealand’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy was published on 18 February, the same day it was green-lighted by Cabinet Decision ERS-19-SUB-0026: Looking Forward: Strengthening New Zealand Against Terrorism and Violent Extremism (September 2019). But most New Zealanders wouldn’t know it.

And that’s the way, it appears, the government wants it. For now, at least.

Timing is everything. The lack of a fanfare-filled hard launch the likely result of a decision to maintain status quo in the lead-up to the first anniversary of the attacks that prompted the Strategy in the first place.

One of the documents mentioned in the Strategy is Protecting Our Crowded Places from attack: New Zealand’s Strategy, which, Line of Defence understands, is likely to be publicly released by the end of March. Just how public that document’s release will be, however, remains for the time being unknown.

Benefitting from previous iterations As reported in the Spring 2017 issue of Line of Defence, Australia’s Strateg y for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism was launched on 20 August 2017 by the then Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull. Although released by the Australian Attorney General’s Department, it was published under the auspices of the Australia New Zealand Counter Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC).

This followed the release three years earlier of the UK Protecting crowded places from terrorism guidance on 14 November 2014, itself preceded over 34

several years by a raft of ‘counter terrorism protective security advice’ documents specific to certain categories of crowded places, including ‘places of worship, major events, health, higher and further education’, ‘stadia and shopping centres’, ‘visitor attractions and bars, public houses and clubs’, and ‘hotels and restaurants & commercial centres’.

A straw poll conducted among security sector attendees at the Safe and Secure Facilities and Public Spaces conference hosted by Conferenz in Wellington in August 2019 indicated that the Australian crowded places strategy was to some extent known among New Zealand security practitioners but by no means by a clear majority.

By contrast, in Australia the strategy, which provides guidance to owners and operators of crowded places on how to protect their patrons, visitors and employees, has become the vehicle for dynamic platforms of public-private engagement and information sharing both nationally and across states and territories, and also at the local level via Crowded Places forums.

A crowded places strategy for New Zealand We are yet to see the document, but it is anticipated that the New Zealand version will share strong commonalities with its Australian predecessor, but with some differences – starting with the title of the document itself.

‘Protecting Our Crowded Places from attack: New Zealand’s Strateg y’ replaces the terrorism-focused nomenclature of the Australian and UK versions with the less-specific ‘attack’. On one level this avoids a potentially undue and alarmist reference to terror, recognising that in New Zealand’s threat profile terrorism looms less large than it does in the UK and across the Tasman.

On another level, it also acknowledges that the ‘terrorism’ label – as applied to many attacks internationally – has proven to be somewhat contestable. Many ‘lone wolf’ and ‘fixated person’ attacks, for example, have attracted the terrorism label despite not necessarily meeting the various scholarly or policy definitions of terror.

The title of the New Zealand document also departs from the preceding versions by its use of the pronoun ‘Our’, which implies an inclusive identity, and the only nonpreposition within the title not to receive first-letter capitalisation is ‘attack’, semantically subordinating that term.

These are subtle yet powerful innovations that convey important New Zealand points of difference: inclusivity and a remit that broadens the utility of the document to the myriad threats – fixated person, armed offender, terrorist or otherwise – that such a Strategy should be able to collectively address.

Beyond the front cover, there are several further unique elements. At the Line of Defence

national level, the Australian strategy features a Business Advisory Group (BAG) made up of representatives of crowded places with a national presence, which reports to and is advised by the Crowded Places Advisory Group, which in turn reports to and advises the ANZCTC. The ANZCTC ultimately reports to the Council of Australian Governments (COAG).

In the New Zealand strategy, a hierarchy of crowded places groups will interface with the National Security System via the existing Counter Terrorism Coordination Committee. These include a Business Advisory Group (BAGNZ) and a Community Advisory Group (CAGNZ) that will both report to the DPMC Crowded Places Advisory Group (CPAGNZ). NZ Police is the lead government agency for this strategy.

While it is not clear what the likely membership of the BAGNZ and CAGNZ will be, the addition of the CAGNZ carves out a clear role for ‘community’ representatives – a delineation not made in the Australian version – and a clear elevation of the importance of community engagement in the process.

Line of Defence

Like the Australian version, Line of Defence understands that the New Zealand strategy will also include Crowded Places Forums to facilitate engagement and information sharing at the local level. These forums are envisaged as a vehicle for fostering local networks and partnerships to ensure all stakeholders are as well connected as possible.

The non-government security sector The ANZCTC strategy provides a suite of guidance documents relating to specific threats, such as vehicular attacks, chemical attacks, improvised explosive devices and active shooters.

Likewise, the New Zealand strategy will likely include guidelines, security audits and self-assessment tools, which are aimed at assisting owners and operators of crowded places to understand and implement protective security measures.

While the Australian strategy states that in many cases, owners and operators will need to seek further advice from private security professionals, presumably in relation to how they can make full sense of the self-assessment tools and implement appropriate security controls and safety

measures, it is unclear whether the New Zealand strategy will identify a similar role for private security practitioners.

Many of the physical and electronic security controls the strategy puts forward for deterring, detecting, delaying and responding to an attack – fencing, security lighting, CCTV cameras, intruder detection systems, vehicle barriers, environmental measures (CPTED), screening equipment, security response staff and security plans – are controls that professional security consultants and providers are generally best qualified to advise on.

As such, the non-government security sector has an important potential support role to play in the effective adoption and operationalisation of the strategy, and a failure of the document to acknowledge this would be an unfortunate omission.

New Zealand lags behind both the UK and Australia in terms of publicprivate partnerships and engagement in security. The Southern Response controversy and resulting 2018 State Services Commission Inquiry into the Use of External Security Consultants

by Government Agencies and the NZ Police Engagement of External Security Consultants report appear to have resulted in government agencies and law enforcement engaging even less with the non-government security sector.

Protecting Our Crowded Places from attack: New Zealand’s Strateg y brings with it the promise of unprecedented levels of engagement between government and society in the protection of soft, high impact targets, and by all accounts this is a promise that lead agency NZ Police is intent on delivering on. It’s an exciting prospect.

Police engagement with representative bodies within the nongovernment security sector, such as the New Zealand Security Sector Network (cross-sector), New Zealand Security Association (physical security) and ASIS New Zealand Chapter (security managers and consultants), would ensure that the strategy benefits from the input of relevant professionals. It would also avoid the potential conflict of interest pitfalls that direct provider engagement has caused in the past.

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HOMELAND SECURITY

New Zealand’s Arms Act Reform: The Buy-Back is not an end in Itself Dr John Battersby of Massey University’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies makes a sober assessment of the efficacy of the gun buy-back scheme, arguing that a starting point should have included identifying gun owners posing a risk to society.

Dr John Battersby is the New Zealand Police National Intelligence Centre Teaching Fellow at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University. He previously served in the NZ Police Wellington and Central Districts and at the School of Leadership, Management and Command at the Royal New Zealand Police College.

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Just before Christmas New Zealand’s gun buy-back and amnesty period formally ended with considerable media coverage. Assessing the success or failure of it amid the media scrum, appeared to be a matter of perspective. The government claimed it had achieved its goal, critics alleged otherwise – both have vested interests and a more detached view is required.

The ultimate question is - has the gun buy-back made New Zealand safer than it was before, and has it mitigated the risks that were starkly revealed in New Zealand on 15 March 2019? Has the buy-back solved problems, or has it generated more?

The government drove the changes to the Arms Act and has claimed success. It it has after all, only spent $100 million dollars compensating firearms owners and removed over 56,000 firearms in six months. The buy-back has received considerable publicity – Deputy Commissioner Mike Clement hit the nail on the head when he said - if gun owners did not

know what was expected of them “they would have had to have been living under a rock.”

Some of those giving up their weapons were unhappy, resigned to a course of action they didn’t choose, but some seemed relieved and all who attended the collection points cooperated.

The law is clear, the communications have been clear and the warnings have been clear. If anyone wasn’t sure if their firearm was legal or not, they had only to take them to a collection point and ask. Waiting times varied, but giving up a few hours – to ensure compliance over a six month period – seems both reasonable and achievable.

There have been calls for the amnesty to be extended. But why?

What is another six months going to achieve that the previous six months hasn’t, other than more cost, more demands on police resources, and signal perhaps that the government isn’t that serious?

Line of Defence

The Minister of Police made it clear as the amnesty ended, that the New Zealand Government was absolutely serious. If some people had endured six months underneath a rock, another six was easily manageable and wilfulness, not ignorance, would be at the heart of it.

On the other hand, the figure of 56,000 firearms is meaningless because New Zealanders do not know how many firearms are in circulation in their country. They do not know how many semi-automatic firearms are owned, and they have never known how many illegal firearms there are nor how many unlicensed individuals are in possession of them.

Import data and sales information has been suggestive – and the Council of Licensed Firearms Owners claim another 100,000 banned weapons are still in the community. They argue that an extension of the amnesty is necessary, and indeed, they could have a point.

If the objective is to get these weapons out of circulation – is another six months really too much to ask?

Does it matter if more money and resources are spent? Does it matter if the government signals a preparedness to compromise to get the ultimate end result it is looking for?

If police resources were strained getting 50,000 firearms from cooperative people, how are they going to bear the burden of finding and Line of Defence

seizing 100,000 more guns from those who aren’t?

While we balance the pros and cons of either side of this debate, we have to remind ourselves that the gun buy-back is not an end itself. On 15 March 2019 massive vulnerabilities in the administration and regulation of firearms in New Zealand were exposed. Fifty-one people paid with their lives for those vulnerabilities.

An overhaul of the Arms Act 1983 became inevitable that day - things simply could not remain as they were.

Regardless of what the Council of Licensed Firearms Owners say – it cannot reverse this incontrovertible reality.

But change must mitigate those vulnerabilities – change must make us safer. It is unclear if taking 50,000 firearms off people who are clearly responsible enough to comply with the law, has progressed that in way, shape or form.

The immediate banning of the sale and purchase of semi-automatics was a sound and decisive move, but pursuing all those who owned them for years prior to 15 March, stored and used them properly, and posed no risk to society - may not have been the best first move.

A thorough assessment of where the risks were, what steps would address them best and, critically, how to identify those who should not have them, would have provided a clear

foundation about how to proceed.

Illegally held firearms have been, and remain, a key firearms risk for New Zealand – not yet with any obvious solution.

If recent media coverage is anything to go by, it seems ‘the gun lobby’ and the government/police have divided themselves into opposing camps. This makes good media, but bad policy.

Experience in the UK with its PREVENT strategy should sound a clear warning for the New Zealand government not to start targeting large communities of people for vague similarities with a tiny proportion of extremists, and for all concerned not gravitate into camps of ‘them’ versus ‘us,’ each arguing passed the other.

If the media are encouraging these ‘camps’ they need to step back, shoulder some responsibility and explore if there is not some common ground between all concerned.

The ultimate goal for New Zealand is a safer community where the privilege of reasonable and legitimate use of appropriate firearms by responsible people can be facilitated, but at the same time there is an accountable system in place that militates against those who wish greater harm to society exploiting an Arms regime that previously placed too much trust in the enduring New Zealand adage that “She’ll be right”.

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HOMELAND SECURITY

Opinion: Violent extremism not limited to one flavour or colour Having been interviewed by Line of Defence in the days following the Christchurch Mosque Attacks, former DPMC National Security Policy Advisor Dr Richard Shortt provides his perspectives twelve months on.

Dr Richard Shortt is a former NZ Police Officer, and previously National Security Policy Advisor in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, and Manager of the Combined Threat Assessment Group (CTAG) NZSIS.

March 15, 2019, saw four issues collide and explode with horrific brutality into our collective consciousness. It was truly a stripping away of naivety and innocence for our country. Those four issues, which are central to my response to the questions I have been asked to address, are: 1. Decades long failure of New Zealand governments and agencies to protect citizens from Military Style Semi-Automatic (MSSA) firearms; 2. Terrorism as a reality for New Zealand, not an abstract concept or something happening elsewhere in the world; 3. Confirmation that yet another type of violent extremism poses a real threat to life, and 4. Reinforcement of the fact New Zealand authorities must now be able to respond to violent extremism on home-soil, or wherever they detect it, because the Internet connects us all.

The sad truth about the gun buy-back scheme, implemented with praiseworthy speed by the current government, is that it was 29 years too late. And, because of that delay 51 people died and 40 were seriously injured.

Ministers were warned following the Aromoana mass-shooting in November 1990 about the dangers of such firearms in private hands in New Zealand. Six years later they received further confirmation of that danger via the Port Arthur mass-shooting in

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Australia, yet our leaders still failed to take steps to better protect the public.

Successive governments of all political hues were reminded of the dangers over the following decades by officials and all failed to take any steps to outlaw such weapons.

Now, one year on from Christchurch we have seen laws change, guns purchased and hopefully a reduction of the risk to us all. Will the law changes and buy-back alone see MSSA weapons go out of circulation in New Zealand? No, unfortunately not.

Some owners have not surrendered their weapons, criminals have not surrendered theirs, and no amount of border controls and policing can guarantee that such weapons will not enter the country illegally.

That said, the law change was required and sensible, the buy-back offered a pathway out of ownership of the now banned weapons and those now found in possession of such firearms will be subject to penalties under the law. It’s the best we could hope for, I suggest.

My second point goes directly to the question “Has the threat landscape changed.” Absolutely it has, in New Zealand and globally. Terrorism is now a reality for New Zealand. It has names and locations attached; it is etched into our collective memory.

It is no longer a word that cannot be used in New Zealand, as I was advised many years ago as a national security policy advisor in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, and as the leader of Line of Defence

the country’s Combined Threat Assessment Group. It is no longer abstract or ‘over there’. It is here, it is bloody, it destroys lives and it must be effectively prevented and responded to.

What is more, we now have to add a further type of violent extremism to the landscape. The type supported by the shooter in Christchurch.

Recently in Australia, a government minister rebuked the Director-General of ASIO for publicly referring to this new type as ‘violent right-wing extremists’. I’m sure the rebuke was to placate her right-wing voters, who were, I am prepared to suggest, probably supporters of the calls a year or two ago to “call ‘violent religious extremism’ ‘Islamic extremism’ because that’s what it is”.

Unfortunately, for the minister and her voters this new type of extremism is inextricably linked to the far-right of politics and was described accurately.

For many years the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in their annual threat assessments described far-right domestic groups and individuals as the greatest violent extremism threat in the USA. Then, along came 9/11 and the focus shifted, but now, here in New Zealand and in the USA (and elsewhere), the focus is firmly on all types of violent extremism as they are all just as deadly and corrosive as each other.

As we know, a Royal Commission into the Christchurch shootings is underway. This is another praiseworthy response by government.

Line of Defence

I am confident the commission will present a variety of conclusions and recommendations that will guide this government and any future governments in their response to violent extremism.

While not wishing to second guess the Commission’s outcomes, my own thoughts on what may be discovered include: Firstly, that it is very challenging to identify an individual who is a threat to life if they are careful in keeping their thoughts and intentions off the ‘radar’.

Not all criminals (for this is what the person responsible for Christchurch is) ‘telegraph’ their intentions so intelligence or law enforcement agencies have a chance to interdict them; Secondly, that intelligence and law enforcement agencies are bound by the law. GCSB et al. were strongly criticised not so long ago for having stepped outside their legal boundaries.

If we – society – want greater surety of protection, we may need to adjust our laws to empower agencies to look more widely and deeper in their efforts to detect danger. In doing so strong protections need to be applied to those powers to ensure public confidence is maintained.

Finally, as someone who has worked in collaborative environments and researched interorganizational relationships, I will be interested to see what findings the Commission arrives at concerning the relationships between intelligence and law enforcement agencies in New Zealand.

I hope they are found to be robust, lawful and collaborative in nature, with effective oversight, leadership and legislative support. If any of those elements are not present or are determined to be ineffective, they must be fixed as a priority, and, I argue, can be without too much additional expense.

In conclusion, I was asked to consider the key takeaways from the attacks and their aftermath.

Firstly, governments should listen closely to their expert advisors – particularly when the advice is repeated and reinforced by events.

We may have avoided the horrors of March 15th, 2019, if New Zealand had effectively dealt with MSSA firearms nearly three decades ago. The alleged shooter came to New Zealand for a reason. He clearly had an intent but needed a capability, and his own country had acted decisively on the capability issue many years ago.

Secondly, violent extremism is not limited to one flavour or colour.

It cannot be ignored and must be watched for, identified, and called out for what it is. Let’s not get too hung-up on labels. If a person or group believes that killing another is a legitimate way of achieving their aims, then that’s violent extremism.

Finally, the way people interact and communicate has been irreversibly changed by the advent of the Internet.

Geographic isolation no longer means ideological isolation or inability to mix with, draw strength from or be motivated by like-minded individuals or groups in real time.

Individuals who carry out acts of violent extremism are most often not loners, disconnected from the world and acting purely on their own thoughts. They are often connected to others via the Internet, they are in fact part of a virtual community.

Our intelligence and law enforcement agencies need to be able to scan the Internet on all its levels to seek out and disrupt those who are disposed towards violent extremism.

It requires laws to enable it, resources to do it and coordination and collaboration to ensure a small country like New Zealand can add a strong link to the chain of global security, because violent extremism is now a local as well as a global issue.

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HOMELAND SECURITY Business Continuity: Planning for pandemic

International movements of people and goods have halted in the wake of COVID-19. With economic consequences of the outbreak presenting a potentially devastating ‘secondary infection’, business continuity specialist Laura Toplis has some timely advice.

Laura Toplis is Director of BCP Builder, an online Business Continuity Plan template service, and was previously Business Resilience and Continuity Coordinator for the New Zealand Ambulance Service.

COVID-19 is an infectious disease caused by the most recently discovered coronavirus. As of 10 March 2020, there were 113,603 confirmed cases of COVID-19 globally, with a death-rate of 3.5 percent. The border controls and drop in customer confidence have contributed to major downturns in the aviation and tourism industries.

The impacts of a global pandemic, however, are unlikely to stop at these industries. It is essential that all businesses look closely at their operations, organisational culture and planning to ensure their business survives this outbreak.

The New Zealand government has recently approved a ‘Business Continuity Package’ in response to COVID-19, which includes a variety of forms of financial help. This financial assistance will come as a relief to many businesses, but this package should work in conjunction with a comprehensive business continuity plan prepared by business operators.

Business threats The biggest threats a pandemic presents to businesses include: • Loss of staff – staff who are sick or required to self-isolate will need to remain at home. You will need to consider if it is possible for them to work from home (if they are well enough).

• Loss of supply chain – You may no longer be able to procure essential items to your supply chain, or your suppliers could go out of business.

• Loss of customers – travel

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restrictions and risk averse buying behaviour could result in a significant downturn for your business.

Why a Business Continuity Plan (BCP)?

There are many reasons that an organisation should have a Business Continuity Plan. The pressure to produce a plan may come internally or externally from the organisation, including such drivers as: • External threats such as COVID-19 • Desire to improve Organisational Resilience – this is likely to come from a manager who identifies gaps that need to be filled. These resilience gaps will be highlighted with a Business Continuity Plan and a process can begin to allocate the appropriate resources to the problem/s.

• Client request – more and more clients are being advised to check the resilience of their supply chain, which means that your larger clients may be asking you to produce a Business Continuity Plan.

• Audit – whether your organisation is being audited or a client is being audited (see above) it is very likely you will be asked to produce your Business Continuity Plan.

When it comes to Business Continuity it’s important to focus on the effect of any disruption rather than the cause. The goal is to effectively deal with any negative incidents that could impact your business.

Line of Defence

How to prepare a BCP One has two options in preparing a BCP: you can either take a do-ityourself approach or hire a consultant.

If you choose to write your own plan, then it makes sense to base it on one of the many freely available BCP templates. Identifying the right one is important because Business Continuity Management has its own ISO Standard – ISO 22301 Business Continuity Management Systems (BCMS).

There are therefore specific elements (plans and processes) required to produce a comprehensive BCP and these are easily confused or overlooked: • People (skills and knowledge) – their safety should be your top priority.

• Infrastructure – could damaged infrastructure restrict access to your premises?

• Premises (buildings and facilities) is all maintenance up to date?

• Supply Chain (third party products and services) - do you have any single-source suppliers? This means you choose to use a single supplier, even though you could spread your risk by using more than one.

Line of Defence

• Reputation - how much damage would an extended disruption cause to your organisation’s reputation?

• Resources (IT, information, equipment, materials) - consider the age and maintenance of your resources.

• Finances (payroll and organisational funds) - do you have sufficient finances and cash reserves to carry you through a business disruption?

• Business Impact Analysis - list the products, services and activities undertaken by your organisation in order of priority.

• Threat Analysis - are there any highlikelihood threats that are specific to your business or location?

• Incident Response Team - who would be the best people in your organisation to respond to a crisis?

• IT Backup – Is your information backed up off-premises/in the cloud on OneDrive or something similar? Have you tested its availability?

• Fallback Site – do you have an alternative location to work from?

One of my most recent clients was an ICT company who supplied services

to law firms. These firms asked to see their BCP and my client was concerned about how long it was going to take to produce one.

My advice was that if they used BCP Builder’s online business continuity plan template, which draws from the Business Continuity Institute Good Practice Guidelines and ISO requirements, and sat down with the top management in their organisation, they could produce a BCP within a week. They signed up, completed their plan and forwarded it to their clients with a cover letter stating that their plan was compliant with ISO 22301.

Why it’s important Having a robust Business Continuity Plan can be considered insurance for the uninsurable parts of your business.

Things that you can’t insure against are market-share, customer confidence and reputation.

Having a plan in place means you will recover faster following a disruption, because the event will have less impact on your business. If your business wasn’t badly impacted (particularly if others were), you will gain increased customer confidence.

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY How powerful is China?

Comparing economic, military and soft power

It’s one of the big questions of our time: just how powerful is China? Although 40 years of economic reform and growth may have set the country on a course towards achieving superpower status, the answer, writes Nicholas Dynon, is complicated.

Nicholas Dynon is Chief Editor of Defsec Media’s defence, security and safety publications. He has previously served diplomatic postings in Beijing and Shanghai, and his in-progress doctoral research explores China’s soft power.

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China’s rise to great power status is a subject that has gripped governments, foreign policy wonks and defence analysts. The rising power’s unprecedentedly rapid economic growth, its increasing international assertiveness, and the apparent challenge its state-led success poses to liberal democracies make it a compelling case study in the measurement of ‘national power’.

It doesn’t take an economist to comprehend how much of an economic superpower China has become, but where exactly does the Middle Kingdom sit as a military power?

And what about its ‘soft power’?

Does the one-party state’s level of international influence affect its overall power standing? Does Beijing’s domestic grip and ability to ‘get things done’ internally make it more powerful internationally or less so?

Measuring the power of countries Indexes of national power are used to measure the power of nation-states, and to understand historical trends, such as the nature of power transitions (the rise and fall of great powers), the international system and the nature and constituents of power itself.

Some indexes, such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), are simple enough and focused on just one aspect of a nation’s power. Others, such as the ‘Audit of Geopolitical Capability’ combine economic, military and other power attributes and are derived from complex formulas. While there is

much scholarly and policy interest in how composite power indexes are put together, these attempts at measuring the relative power of states are the subject of much criticism.

Critics highlight, for example, that aggregated power measurements are unable to account for the limited ‘fungibility’ of power. Military power, for example, may give a country little leverage in relation to particular economic issues, nor may it afford the diplomatic clout needed for coalition building.

Another major criticism is that these measures fail to provide insight into the ability of nation-states to convert their power capabilities into effective actions. Writing for RAND, Treverton and Jones comment that states “need to convert material resources, or economic prowess, into more usable instruments, such as combat proficiency,” and even then, outcomes are dependent “on power for what, and against whom”.

‘Hard’ dimensions of national power 1. Economic Power Whichever economic power index one uses, China ranks either in top place or second behind the US, and it’s arrived there quickly.

According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) October 2019 World Economic Outlook, China is ranked 2 nd behind the US in terms of nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

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Applying Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), which takes into account cost of living and inflation differences between countries, China is ranked 1st .

It’s a similar story in terms of Gross National Income (GNI), which is a measure defined by the OECD as “gross domestic product, plus net receipts from abroad of wages and salaries and of property income, plus net taxes and subsidies receivable from abroad”. China was ranked 2 nd in nominal GNI in 2015 and 1st in the PPP version.

Although not strictly a measure of overall economic power, standard of living indexes such as GDP per capita and the Social Progress Imperative’s Social Progress Index (SPI) provide insight into the capacity of a society to meet the basic material needs of its citizens. China is currently ranked 65th in GDP (nominal) per capita, 67th on the SPI, and 68th in GNI (PPP) per capita.

2. Military Power China is ranked a formidable 3rd behind the US and Russia in the Global Firepower 2020 Military Strength Rankings (MSR), which measures a nation’s potential warmaking capability across land, sea, and air fought by conventional means. The MSR utilises fifty factors across multiple categories relating to personnel, equipment, natural resources, finances, logistical capability and geography.

China is also ranked 3rd behind the US and Russia in the Military Watch Line of Defence

Magazine Force Index of Countries (FIC), which rates countries by their warfighting capabilities. While the FIC takes both conventional and nuclear capabilities into account it treats the latter as a limited asset due to the extreme caution with which potential deployment would be considered.

Another indicator of military power – or how much a state is investing in it – is military spending. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ 2020 Military Balance assessment of global military capabilities, China ranked 2nd behind the US in military spending – US$bn 181.1 compared to the US’ US$bn 684.6.

3. Geopolitical Power While the singular measurement of economic or military power is made relatively straightforward by an abundance of objective, quantifiable data and a degree of methodological unanimity, the same can’t be said of ‘geopolitical power’.

Geopolitics is often used as a loose synonym for international politics but more specifically refers to the analysis of geographic, economic and demographic influences on politics and international relations. It’s about the big influences and power shifts that shape the international order.

The various indexes that attempt to measure geopolitical power thus tend to focus on the hard power attributes of geography, economics and demography, such as territory, population, military personnel, natural

resources and industrial production.

They also account for attributes relating to political structures and diplomacy, albeit in a limited way.

Unsurprisingly, China ranks highly in geopolitical power indexes, scoring big points for its massive territory, population and standing army: Composite Index of National Capability (CINC): China is ranked 1st in the 2012 CINC, which is a ranking of national power developed in 1963 by the University of Michigan’s Correlates of War project. It uses an average of scores in six evenly weighted components: military expenditure, military personnel, iron and steel production, energy consumption, urban population, and total population.

Global Presence Index (GPI): China is ranked 2 nd behind the US in the 2016 GPI, a ranking of 80 countries’ ‘external projection’ developed by the Spanish Elcano Royal Institute of Strategic and International Studies. The index aggregates scores across economic presence (38.50%), military presence (15.52%) and soft presence (45.98%). ‘Economic presence’ accounts for 62.6% of China’s score, with ‘soft presence’ accounting for 25.3%, of which 19.7% came from the relatively ‘hard’ attributes of science and technology.

Audit of Geopolitical Capability (AGC): China is ranked 3rd in the 2019 iteration of this index produced by the UK-based Henry Jackson Society. The AGC employs a framework in which 43

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY economic attributes have a weighting of 27%, military 15%, technology 10%, diplomatic leverage 15% and cultural prestige 15%.

Comprehensive National Power (CNP): China is ranked 3rd in the 2015 CNP. Developed by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, CNP weighs national power in eight areas: natural resources (10%), domestic and foreign economics (35%), science and technology (20%), military affairs (10%), government (8%) and foreign affairs capability (7%), and social development (10%).

Formal Bilateral Influence Capacity Index (FBIC): China is ranked 4th behind the US, Germany and France in the 2016 FBIC. A collaboration between the Atlantic Council, University of Denver and Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, the FBIC Index measures bilateral influence across 42 economic, political, and security indicators, including total trade, percentage of total trade, total arms transfers, military alliances, arms imports, percentage of military spending, level of representation and intergovernmental membership.

National Power Index (NPI): China is ranked 4th in the 2012 NPI, which purports to measure a country’s relative percentage share of global power. Developed by academics from the University of Iowa and from South Korea and China, it is a composite of five sub-indexes: Economy (35%), military (35%), diplomacy (10%), technology (10%), and popularity (10%).

According to many scholars, the importance these indexes attribute to hard factors subordinates soft power factors and results in a skewing of power scores towards countries that have large populations, large resource bases and large economies. China’s rise has been widely measured on this basis, and thus the world’s second largest economy is also acknowledged as one of the world’s most powerful nation-states.

Hard factors have traditionally been viewed as the fundamental basis of a nation-state’s power, but the role of military hard power has arguably receded over time, and the importance of soft factors within an increasingly globalised and information-rich world is becoming more widely acknowledged.

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‘Soft’ dimensions of national power Since the 1990s, various disciplines have sought to understand, measure and manage what makes a country internationally influential or attractive to other countries and their publics.

Alongside the study of ‘soft power’, popularised by the work of Joseph Nye Jr, the burgeoning fields of ‘nation branding’ and ‘country reputation management’ have introduced new methods and metrics for the assessment of a state’s international image.

These approaches are often erroneously conflated due to a degree of overlap, but they are distinct, having their respective origins in separate disciplines. The neoliberal concept of soft power is a product of international relations, while nation branding has its apotheosis in brand management (a subdiscipline of marketing) and country reputation in reputation management (a sub-discipline of public relations).

1. Nation Branding Initially, nation branding efforts focused on attracting international tourism, but they have since branched out. National governments now hire marketing firms to develop sophisticated branding campaigns aimed at attracting foreign investment, facilitating trade, improving competitiveness and gaining geopolitical influence.

As a marketing concept, nation branding aims at maximising a country’s ‘relevance’ among global consumers, and several ranking systems have been developed by rival brand management consultancies to comparatively assess the power of nation brands: Brand Valuation Index (BVI): China ranked 2nd in London-based Brand Finance’s 2019 BVI, which is a ranking of the strength and value of 100 nation brands. It uses a method adapted from the global brand valuation standard ISO 10668 and based on the royalty-relief mechanism employed to value large companies, resulting in a dollar brand value.

Country Brand Ranking (CBR): China ranked 3rd in the 2019/20 CBR trade edition (there is also a tourism edition). Madrid-based Bloom Consulting first released the CBR

in 2011 as a means of evaluating the impact of 193 country brand strategies in primarily economic terms: economic performance, digital demand (search data), investment promotion agency performance, and online performance (website analytics, social media presence).

Best Countries Ranking (BCR): China is ranked 15th in the 2020 BCR, an index of 80 countries developed by Y&R’s BAV Consulting, US News & World Report and the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. It’s a big step down for China from the topfour positions it enjoys in the BSI and CBR, and there’s one key reason for it.

The BCR, unlike the preceding indexes, is survey-based, aggregating perceptions about a country rather than hard data. A survey of more than 21,000 international participants, it asks how closely respondents associate a nation with a set of 65 attributes, and each country is then scored on each of the attributes based on the responses.

Other survey-based nation branding indexes appear to follow suit, with China’s rankings falling in the 20-30 range: Nation Brands Index (NBI): China ranked 23rd in the 2013 Anholt– Gfk Roper NBI. Originally developed

by Simon Anholt who is often referred to as the father of nation branding, the index ranks 50 countries via surveys of approximately 20,000 adults in 20 countries. It examines six equally weighted dimensions of national competence: exports, governance, culture, people, tourism, immigration and investment.

FutureBrand Country Index (FCI): China ranked 29th in the 2019 FCI, having ranked 66th in 2012 and 28th in 2014. Developed

by FutureBrand, part of the IPG marketing group, FCI is an annual ranking of 75 countries in relation to their attractiveness as destinations for tourism, investment, education and trade. Its methodology involves interviews of a global sample of 2,500 respondents and analysis of social media conversations across ten countries.

2. Soft Power Soft power differs to nation brand in that it substitutes the investor and consumer focus of nation branding Line of Defence

with a broader set of considerations. As envisaged by Joseph Nye, it refers to the power wielded by a state through harnessing the resources of “its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)”.

Consistent with its performance in other hard and soft indexes of national power, China’s soft power rankings have improved since such measurements began, but its soft power performance lags far behind its hard power, particularly among its maritime East Asian neighbours and the West: Monocle Soft Power Survey (MSS): China ranked 20 th in the 2016/17 MSS developed jointly by the UKbased Institute for Government and Monocle Magazine. The index compares the relative strength of countries’ soft power infrastructure, political institutions, cultural appeal, diplomatic network, the global reputation of their higher education system and the attractiveness of their economic model. Quantitative data accounts for 70% of the total weighting of the index, with subjective elements comprising 30%.

Portland Soft Power 30 (SP30): China ranked 27th in the 2018 SP30.

Conducted by London-based PR company Portland Communications and the University of Southern California Centre on Public Diplomacy, the index scores countries against six objective data sub-indices (digital, Line of Defence

culture, enterprise, engagement, education and government) and subjective data involving polling of 10,500 respondents from 25 countries.

3. Reputation Management Reputation management is largely the domain of public relations consultancies, which extend the methodologies of corporate reputation management to the reputations of countries. According to the Reputation Institute, “Attracting FDI, tourists, high skilled workforce and being able to sell the products of the country abroad are facilitated by having a strong country reputation”.

What distinguishes country reputation from nation brand and soft power is that while nation brand is concerned with who you would prefer to buy from, and soft power with who you would prefer to be friends with, country reputation is about who you would trust.

It is also the one aspect of a nation’s power where size does not matter. It’s here that – despite improvements – China struggles: Country RepTrak (CRT): China ranked 45th in the Reputation Institute’s 2018 Country RepTrak (with a RepTrak pulse of 44.08, placing it at the ‘poor’ end of the scale). CRT measures the reputation of 55 countries based on levels of “trust, esteem, admiration and respect” via an online survey of 48,000 respondents in G8 countries.

Good Country Index (GCI): China ranked 61st in the 2018 GCI. Developed

by Simon Anholt (of aforementioned nation branding fame), the GCI

purports to measure what each country “contributes to the common good of humanity, and what it takes away, relative to its size”. The Index is a composite statistic of 35 data points which are mostly generated by the United Nations and other international agencies and a handful of NGOs. China’s rankings in the CRT and GCI represent a big step down from its nation brand and soft power rankings, and from here, arguably, it continues downhill.

China ranks 80th, for example, in Transparency International’s 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and 177th in Reporters without Borders’ 2019 Press Freedom Index (PFI). Although these are not aggregated measures of reputation, they nevertheless provide some clues as to China’s relatively poor reputation rankings.

Reflecting on our collective sample of national power indexes, we find that – with some exceptions – China’s rankings are generally higher in indexes that emphasise: • coercive over non-coercive power factors • economic, territorial and population size • objective as opposed to opinionbased data sources • ‘things’ as opposed to ‘ideas’ • brand value as opposed to political and cultural values No doubt China’s sheer size, economic progress and historical longevity give it a ‘wow’ factor among foreign publics, but its political values are not so highly regarded. International markets are therefore inclined to invest in and buy from China, but international publics are (with notable exceptions in certain geographies) less inclined to trust China, and they are thus wary of China’s diplomatic overtures and growing international assertiveness.

Ultimately, China’s high economic, military and geostrategic power rankings are undermined by its rankings among the soft dimensions of national power. This matters in an international system where the lines between war and peace are increasingly blurred, where consensus and coalition building matter, and where the cost of war far outweighs the cost of persuasion.

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY Foreign Terrorist Fighters from Southeast Asia: What Happens Next?

Dr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Dr. Colin P. Clarke and Samuel Hodgson write that the fight against ISIS is not over but merely entering a new phase, and that militants from the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia will play a role.

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is the chief executive officer of the private firm Valens Global. He is also an Associate Fellow at the International Centre for Counterterrorism (ICCT) – The Hague.

Colin P. Clarke is an Associate Fellow at the International Centre for Counterterrorism (ICCT) – The Hague and a Senior Research Fellow at The Soufan Center.

Samuel Hodgson is an analyst at Valens Global.

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The last stronghold of the Islamic State, the Syrian town of Baghouz, fell to a coalition of Kurdish and Arab soldiers (backed by American, French, and British commandos) in March 2019.

Following the collapse of ISIS’s ‘caliphate’, there are still significant questions about the hundreds of fighters from Southeast Asia who travelled to Iraq and Syria to fight alongside ISIS and other militant groups. Some of these fighters and their families are being detained in prison camps run by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), while others have fled, and are planning their next move.

In mid-February, the Indonesian government reversed a prior decision to repatriate nearly 700 Indonesian citizens who travelled abroad to join jihadist groups in the Middle East, citing the security and safety of the general public.

Though not all returnees will engage in threatening activities upon leaving the Middle East, some may radicalise others, plot attacks, and join or create extremist networks—even, perhaps, within prisons.

Radicalise others Southeast Asian jihadist networks could help facilitate returnees’ radicalisation activities. Established groups can provide returnees a platform from which they can indoctrinate others.

In Indonesia, joining a terrorist organisation was not criminalised until 2018, so it is possible that some extremist returnees were allowed to resettle in their hometowns.

Further, Southeast Asian ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria have sought to recruit new jihadists at home.

Malaysian fighter Muhammad Wanndy Mohamed Jedi has been responsible for or linked to recruiting at least a third of the individuals arrested in Malaysia in connection with ISIS between 2013 and 2016, including the person who conducted the first ISIS-linked terrorist attack in the country.

Even if they are captured, returnees may be able to continue to advance their cause from captivity. In the Indonesian and Malaysian penitentiary systems, terrorism convicts have radicalized fellow prisoners and guards.

Returnees are likely to engage in such activity as well.

Following a May 2018 prison riot in Indonesia involving over 150 detainees charged with terrorism, authorities transferred the prisoners to Nusakambangan, a prison island.

However, simply relocating prisoners will not halt their activities.

Plot attacks It is likely that Southeast Asian returnees will plot and conduct terrorist attacks, and a number of returnees have already been involved in plots and attacks in the region. In June 2017, Syawaludin Pakpahan, an Indonesian returnee, fatally stabbed a police officer. In Syria, he had fought with the Free Syrian Army rather than a jihadist faction.

However, Pakpahan reportedly held jihadist beliefs, and sometimes helped guard nearby ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra posts, resulting in his dismissal from the FSA and return to Line of Defence

Fighter Muhammad Wanndy Mohamed Jedi

Indonesia. He became an avowed ISIS supporter upon his return. Pakpahan’s actions demonstrate how Indonesia’s established jihadist networks can provide a pathway for returnees to plot attacks at home.

Malaysian and Indonesian returnees have been convicted in several foiled plots as well. In 2015, Malaysian authorities arrested Malaysian returnee Murad Halimmuddin, along with others who had discussed kidnapping politicians and attacking military installations. In May 2019, Indonesian authorities arrested seven returnees, including a high-ranking ISIS member who had been in Syria for years, while foiling a technologically advanced Wi-Fi bomb plot. While militants have used Wi-Fi signals to detonate bombs in the Middle East, this method is new to Southeast Asia.

In some recent plots and attacks, high-ranking Indonesian ISIS fighters acted as “virtual plotters,” recruiting members and coordinating operations in Southeast Asia via online communications from Syria. Bahrun Naim, confirmed dead by U.S. officials in 2018, was the most prominent Southeast Asian virtual planner. He allegedly organized the 2016 suicide bombings in Jakarta, among other attacks, and he published an online bomb-making instruction manual in Malay, which will likely continue to be used by Southeast Asian militants even after his death.

ISIS may seek to plot attacks in Southeast Asia with returning foreign fighters. While evidence suggesting that ISIS has had a direct role in terrorist Line of Defence

attacks in Southeast Asia since the death of Bahrun Naim has been mixed, despite ISIS claiming responsibility for numerous attacks, regional counterterrorism analysts suspect that they maintain connections to local jihadist networks such as the Jemmah Ansharut Daulah ( JAD) group.

Join established violent extremist networks or create new ones Returning Southeast Asian foreign fighters may join the region’s established jihadist networks. Returning Indonesian foreign fighters most commonly join JAD. However, the number of independent jihadist cells in Indonesia has expanded since authorities arrested hundreds of JAD members after the 2018 attacks in Surabaya.

Some returning fighters may bolster a resurgent Jemaah Islamiyah.

Following the July 2019 arrest of Jemaah Islamiyah leader Para Wijayanto, Indonesian police revealed that they suspect Jemaah Islamiyah of having sent six groups of recruits to fight in Syria.

Or—in lieu of joining existing networks—returning fighters may seek to create new cells. In addition to his participation in the initial stages of plotting small-scale attacks, returnee Murad Halimmuddin viewed himself as the “spiritual leader” of a small terrorist group that sought to recruit 20 members to commit attacks in Malaysia.

Foreign fighters from all three countries are likely to join militant groups operating in the Philippines.

Counterinsurgency efforts during and after the siege of Marawi have

weakened Philippine militant groups, particularly the Maute group, but they quickly began regrouping and recruiting new members.

The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters group continues to seek territorial control, while the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) has perpetrated suicide bombings, including the January 2019 Jolo Cathedral bombing claimed by ISIS. Of these groups, ASG is the most likely to attract foreign fighter returnees, as it is both accessible— through its activity in eastern Sabah and around the Sulu Sea—and has recently carried out several attacks.

ISIS has released propaganda videos encouraging Southeast Asians to join its affiliates in the Philippines, and ISIS recruitment networks in Southeast Asia have encouraged would-be jihadists to travel to the Philippines.

While estimates vary, between 40 and 100 fighters from Indonesia, Malaysia, and elsewhere have entered the southern Philippines.

Travel Elsewhere Not all Southeast Asian foreign fighters have returned home or will do so. Some will disperse to other countries, fearing prosecution or wishing to fight in another theatre.

From Syria and Iraq, Indonesian foreign fighters have travelled through Iran to join ISIS-Khorasan in Afghanistan. For example, Indonesian authorities believe that JAD member Saefullah (aka Daniel, aka Chaniago) is currently a part of ISIS-K. Whether foreign fighter returnees radicalise others, plot attacks, join established violent extremist networks or create new ones, or travel elsewhere outside the region, there is a palpable concern—indeed, a likelihood—that the fight against ISIS is not over, but is merely entering a new phase. While many debate what this new phase may look like, given the prominence of Southeast Asians in ISIS, there is little doubt that militants from the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia will play a role in ISIS’s unfolding story.

This article was originally published on the website of the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague on 17 February 2020.

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