Pre-departure border controls may minimise post-arrival COVID risk

The political focus on perceived security gaps in Managed Isolation Facilities, writes chief editor Nicholas Dynon, distracts from the critical task of implementing more proactive border management measures.

In a 19 August media release, Minister of Housing, Hon Dr Megan Wood, announced that the security of the Managed Isolation and Quarantine System and maritime border would be bolstered by an additional 500 NZDF personnel.

“We are reducing our reliance on private security guards by scaling up Defence Force personnel, especially in the highest risk facilities,” explained the Minister. “They will staff the higher risk security areas such as entry and exit points and public areas.”

On 26 August, the Director General of Health authorised members of the Armed Forces at MIQFs with enforcement officer powers under the COVID-19 Public Health Response Act 2020 to be able to give legally enforceable directions, and to request a person to provide identifying information.

Under section 18 of the Act the Director-General may authorise “a suitably qualified and trained person who is employed or engaged by the Crown or a Crown entity” to carry out any functions and powers of an enforcement officer under the Act.

Some legal experts have since questioned the legality of authorising military personnel under section 18 given that servicemen and women are not employed by the Crown or by a Crown entity, which is generally taken to refer to Executive Government, but rather by the Governor General on behalf of the sovereign in accordance with section 5 of the Defence Act 1990.

Beyond such legal arguments, some commentators have had more to say. Dr Simon Ewing-Jarvie, in a blog post titled “The NZDF Aren’t Handbag Checkers”, wrote “given that we know the ‘War on Covid-19’ is a long game, it would be madness to lock down our Defence Force into a cycle of running hotels, manning roadside barriers, ‘handbag checking’ and ‘drain-sniffing’.”

Head of Managed Isolation and Quarantine Air Commodore Darryn Webb.

Image: NZDF.

There are no doubt strong arguments to be made on either side of that debate. But, ultimately, no one is doubting the ability of NZDF personnel deployed at MIQFs to acquit themselves admirably in their unexpected role.

What’s concerning about the Housing Minister’s announcement is its implication that private security is to blame for gaps in the COVID border control regime. As part of her announcement, Dr Woods stated that the government would “be moving to a model of direct employment of security guards with the appropriate training and paying the living wage.”

Unsurprisingly, the private security industry’s peak body, the New Zealand Security Association (NZSA), hit back.

“The announcement raises a number of concerns with regards to how the plans will be enacted and the resulting impact on security providers and their staff,” stated NZSA CEO Gary Morrison in a 20 August update to his members. “It also fails to recognise that many of the staff working on these sites are already being paid the living wage and are engaged in industry [NZQA Certificate] Level 3 training.”

Morrison also acknowledged the controversies surrounding the highly criticised role of private security providers in securing Melbourne’s isolation facilities, but pointed out that the making of any trans-Tasman parallels is misleading.

To be sure, there have been disappointing lapses by private security personnel at the MIFs, but these have been overstated by a media that has allegedly been offering bounties for images of dozing isolation facility security guards.

“When things go wrong, the tendency is to blame operational mistakes,” Keith Woodford, Honorary Professor of Agri-Food Systems at Lincoln University wrote recently in relation to the issue. “The reality is that such mistakes always occur in large scale operations. The New Zealand border operation, with between 400 and 500 people entering on most days, is very large scale. Yes, mistakes will happen.”

Meanwhile, with hundreds of travellers entering New Zealand daily under a COVID airline quota, there nevertheless remains the continued risk of the virus infiltrating the border undetected. As COVID cases continue to rise in the Northern Hemisphere, our air and sea ports are the virus’ most likely avenues of attack.

Prof Woodford recommends a nuanced risk-based approach to entry at the border. “It is very clear that the risks associated with people from some parts of the world are many times greater than those coming from some other regions such as Australia and most of the Pacific Islands,” he wrote. “Restrictions on people entering New Zealand have to be proportional to the specific risk.”

Immigration New Zealand (INZ) has long deployed risk-based policy and processing models to its assessment of visa applicants and persons seeking entry upon arrival. Via pre-flight processes and systems, such as offshore visa applications, Electronic Travel Authorities (NZeTA), the collection of biometric information and Advanced Passenger Processing (APP), INZ effectively pushes our border controls out beyond our shores and at least as far back as the last port of embarkation.

It’s a ‘security in depth’ approach that seeks to assess risk, flag issues and make decisions well before a passenger checks into a New Zealand-bound plane – and well before they pass through the New Zealand border.

Apart from closing the border to all but ‘exempt’ persons, this ‘predeparture’ border control approach isn’t being used by our border authorities in relation to COVID. Rather, New Zealand has implemented a range of ‘post-arrival’ controls.

COVID border measures, for example, compel those entering the country to spend a minimum of 14 days in managed isolation or quarantine, and to be wearing a face mask from the airport to the facility. These measures make sense, but they all happen once an untested person is already here.

Requiring travellers overseas to produce a clear COVID test prior to departing for New Zealand is one example of a pre-departure border control. But New Zealand doesn’t require it.

Among FAQs on its website, in answer to the question “Why don’t we require exit testing for those coming into New Zealand?”, the Ministry of Health states that it “doesn’t believe pre-departure testing is effective on its own. You could still have COVID-19, even if you test negative for it.”

It’s an answer. But it doesn’t answer the question. Of course pre-departure testing is not effective on its own, but used in combination with the range of other controls already in place it would provide better security in depth.

Many airlines require their passengers to undertake temperature screening and/or produce a clear COVID test prior to their flight, and some even offer pre-flight testing services. Some countries require a clear test prior to a passenger departing their border to travel elsewhere.

Several other countries’ border authorities require travellers to provide extensive health and contact information prior to entry.

There are a range of pre-departure border control options available to Government that, if imposed, would deliver safer travel and reduce the risk of COVID entering the country in the first place.

Managed isolation and quarantine makes sense, but a blinkered focus on fixing holes in managed isolation security in the absence of robust predeparture border controls doesn’t.