Bioterrorism as a National Security Threat: A suggested model

COVID-19 has increased awareness of pandemics and biosecurity hazards as national security threats. Israel’s Ambassador to New Zealand, Dr Itzhak Gerberg, suggests it’s also time to counter the spectre of bioterrorism.

The concept of national security changed after 11 September 2001, transforming into something more comprehensive.

This broader ranging concept is reflected in the definition of national security adopted at this year’s Munich Security Conference “which encompasses not only traditional national or military security, but also takes into account the economic, environmental, and human dimensions of security.”

Possessing parallels with New Zealand’s “all hazards – all risks” approach to national security, such definitions include ‘non-traditional’ security issues, such as environmental and biological hazards.

Dr William Hoverd of Massey University’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies refers to biosecurity as a current major concern that looms large as a future non-traditional issue. Just last July, New Zealand Defence Minister Hon Ron Mark was quoted by the New Zealand Herald as commenting “defence has been considering the changing impact of biological hazards and threats on New Zealand’s security.”

Despite the resemblance, there are definitional distinctions between ‘biosecurity’, ‘biosafety’ and ‘biocrime’. In essence, biosecurity deals with bio-threats in general, including bioterrorism, whereas biosafety refers to pandemics, such as COVID-19. Biocrime refers to criminal action conducted using biological agents.

COVID-19 has certainly increased awareness of bioterrorism as a potential national security threat. In terms of non-conventional security threats, however, bioterror gets less attention in comparison to other types of terror; due probably to the complexity of producing biological weapons as well as the difficulty in using them.

Bioterrorism is defined by William C. Shiel Jr. as: “terrorism using biological agents that are harmful to humans”. It is characterized by the tactical surprise, strong initial impact and imposition of anxiety and fear usually associated with terrorism, but achieved via a pandemic, which is evasive in nature and causes massive disruption.

For the purposes of this article, I define bioterrorism as the intentional release or dissemination of biological agents (such as bacteria, viruses, insects, fungi or toxins) that can sicken or kill people, livestock and crops and/or biologically pollute the environment.

It was Bill Gates who commented at the 2017 Munich Security Conference that “bioterrorism could kill more than nuclear war – but no one is ready to deal with it.”

Bioterrorism is indeed in need of special attention as a threat to national security, partly because it is different to other types of terror in the following ways:

- First and foremost, bioterror is multivariant in terms of biological agents and is diverse in terms of its contagious capabilities.

- Unlike other types of terror, the unpredictability of bioterror and its consequences makes resilience against it difficult.

- Bioterror has borderless effects.

- Bioterror can be used without leaving a trail to its source.

- Bioterror can impose irrational fear, anxiety and high degree of uncertainty.

- Bioterror has a negative impact not only on health but also on other domains such as economy, ecology, society and politics.

- Obstruction options are complex.

- Research concerning bioterror, detection and rapid response to biological threats is insufficient.

The core elements of international counterterrorism are prevention and preparation, containment and management, damage control and mitigation. But considering the complexity of bioterror and its alarming potential impact, I suggest the following as a theoretical model of operative biosecurity:

1. Awareness – considering the relatively low awareness of bioterror compared with other types of terrorism, it is essential to improve awareness of bioterror as a national security threat and to enhance academic research in relation to its multivariant aspects.

2. Prevention based on pre-incident detection (intelligence) and ethical considerations – there is a rule of thumb that prevention and risk reduction against bioterrorism are more effective than obstruction. Detection is essential to early warning, and any information achieved by preincident intelligence can contribute to the reduction of uncertainty and fear.

It is manifestly clear that getting information about new types of biological agents and/or biological weapons is crucial to biosecurity, but it is difficult to achieve this. New initiatives and ideas should be encouraged. Ethics approaches can be used to denounce bioterrorism, and – for that purpose – bioterror should be presented as an extreme, immoral and illegitimate action.

3. Medical containment – the means, tools, functions and constituents used in terms of counter measures based on medical institutions, such as hospitals, and programs.

In practice, it refers to establishing a program using advanced technology, including robotics and automation, that can perform medical activities without direct contact; medical teams; reliable medical diagnostic kits; medical protocols on critical basic triage and immediate response; bio forensics capability with a focus on mass casualties; safe hospitalisation, including isolation (quarantine); medicines and vaccinations; personal protective equipment (PPE); and physical distancing.

4. Identification – initial hazard identification of bioterror is a key preliminary element. Equally important is classification of the various types of biological agent, its form, its source, and the identification of the geography affected.

5. Legislation / domestic law and order – the use and stockpiling of biological weapons must be legislated as a criminal offence based on the US Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act.

6. International Affairs / Diplomacy – implementation of conventions and treaties relating to bioterrorism, including the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which covers the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxic weapons, as well as the destruction of biological weapons. Although even when such conventions/treaties are established, there remains the challenge of how to apply them.

Active participation of relevant UN organisations is essential and can contribute to international compliance. However, international politics makes it difficult to impose sanctions for violations of such agreements. The possibility of dual-use medical and/or pharmaceutical materials must also be taken into account.

Diplomacy can be helpful in building medical cooperation, integration of international medical efforts, assurance of medical supply chains and financial support. Diplomacy can also be very helpful in the prevention of leakage of biological weapons to terror organisations.

7. Medical treatment, containment and inspection based on the principles of integrated risk management – coordination and control in terms of roles, sources of authority, decision making process and responsibilities for administration and resource allocation, action planning and strategy (including exit strategy); and coordination between institutions and organisations with a focus on health and the economy.

8. Situation analysis based on damage control principles.

9. Political leadership, trust and psychological factors – public trust in government is a key element of success in the fight against bioterror. Relevant, transparent and reliable information provided in real time lends credibility and trustworthiness and is a counter measure to misinformation, fake news and rumors.

10. Obviation, research and recovery plan – studying of medical test results, indices, time range, expansion, infection spread circles, incubation period, and collateral damage. Development of future recommendations that include legal aspects, economic inducements for resilient and sustainable development aimed at a return to normality and reduction of future vulnerability.

This theoretical model of operative biosecurity is offered as a road map for combatting bioterrorism as a national security threat.

The views expressed are based on the author’s academic background and do not reflect that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel. This article is based on a presentation delivered at the Asia-Pacific Security Innovation Forum, Queenstown, 29-30 July 2020.