Line of Defence Magazine - Summer 2023-24

Line of Defence

Issue 30 Summer 2023

New Zealand’s Defence and National Security Magazine

Judith Collins: We need to support innovation and embrace technology

Mark Mitchell: Giving Police the tools to tackle gangs and youth crime

Peeni Henare: Challenging the government on behalf of New Zealanders

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EDITOR’S NOTE Kia ora and welcome to the Summer 2023-24 issue of Line of Defence Magazine!

It’s amazing to think that with this final edition for 2023 we celebrate the 30th issue of Line of Defence overall since the inaugural issue of the magazine rolled off the printing press in April 2016!

In this post-election issue we are honoured to have among our editorial contributors no less than four New Zealand Defence Ministers past and present, including Dr Wayne Mapp, Mark Mitchell, Peeni Henare, and Judith Collins.

Ms Collins stands to be among our most important Defence Ministers ever, writes Wayne Mapp, with an historic opportunity to build up our naval defence capability and to realign our defence relationships. Ross Browne argues that a key opportunity available to the new minister is the chance to initiate system and cultural reform to capitalise on New Zealand’s wider innovation system.

If there is one thing we can do above all others to help us advance, writes new Defence Minister Judith Collins, it’s ensuring that we support innovation and embrace technology, including considering how AUKUS Pillar II may be part of the mix. For his part, Opposition Spokesperson for Defence Peeni Henare writes that he intends to constructively challenge the government on matters relating to defence on behalf of New Zealanders and Defence personnel in particular.

Ms Collins takes on her new role in a year in which conflict in Ukraine and the Middle East have presented challenges of moral resolve to the international community, and which have demonstrated the application and effect of novel technologies on the ground.

Hamas’ deadly 07 October attack on Israel and the latter’s devastating response is the context for an article by Dr Bianca Baggiarini, who argues that Artificial Intelligence enabled technologies may have increased the speed of warfare, but that AI has also spectacularly failed to deliver greater precision and less civilian casualties.

In his second article for Line of Defence, Ben Morgan suggests that new technologies, such as the cheap precisionstrike weapons we’re seeing being used by Ukrainian and Palestinian forces, will influence stabilisation operations elsewhere and challenge current assumptions over the ability of Australian ‘fires’ and logistics overmatch to protect deployments in the South West Pacific.

Taking an historical perspective, new contributor Kyrylo Cyril Kutcher argues the 2022 invasion of Ukraine is a recent example of Ruscism-fuelled expansionism, and that the international community’s failure to notice the pattern established by Russia in previous conflicts has set a dangerous precedent.

There are several more articles of note in this issue of Line of Defence, and we hope you find this issue to be among our best yet. Enjoy your summer reading, and wishing you the compliments of the season!

Nicholas Dynon, Auckland.

CONTRIBUTORS

Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO Hon Mark Mitchell MP Dr Bianca Baggiarini Ross Browne Matt Medley Nicholas Dynon

Hon Judith Collins KC MP Hon Peeni Henare MP Ben Morgan Kyrylo Cyril Kutcher Fortinet

SPONSORS

General Atomics Aeronautical Babcock Fortinet ASSA Abloy Loktronic simPRO

COVER IMAGE Defence Minister, Judith Collins

UPCOMING ISSUE

Autumn – March 2024 Main themes: Air Domain, Defence Estate Related events: Avalon 2024 Aerospace and Defence Exposition Copy Deadline: 20th February 2024 Publication: 1st March 2024

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CONTACT DETAILS

DEFSEC

Chief Editor: Nicholas Dynon M: +64 (0)22 366 3691 E: nick@defsec.net.nz

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CONTENTS

ISSN 2463-6258 (Online)

DEFENCE

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

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Arrowhead 140 to meet Navy’s future needs

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Judith Collins: Innovation, opportunities and being better together

Israel’s AI can produce 100 bombing targets a day in Gaza. Is this the future of war?

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Geopolitical volatility brings increased defence budgets to ensure preparedness

Quasi-Internal Armed Conflicts as a Tool of Geopolitics: Russia’s armed forces in Moldova, Chechnya, and Syria.

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Judith Collins Takes Charge: It’s time for change

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ISO 31000:2018 The Case for Reform

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Cyber espionage: difficult to attribute, difficult to detect

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MAPP: A place in history is in new Defence Minister Judith Collins’ future

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Peeni Henare: Bipartisan support crucial to provide stability for our Defence Force

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South Korea selects the Embraer C-390 Millennium

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New tactics for peacesupport operations the South West Pacific

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Mark Mitchell: Strong direction for policing and law and order

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Rise in military sales revenue delayed by production challenges and backlogs

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Surge in retail crime fuels the case for facial recognition CCTV

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Royal New Zealand Navy to trial uncrewed, renewablepowered vessel

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Protecting Crowded Places: What to look for in a security provider

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Linton Military Camp opens state-of-the-art maintenance facility to support NZ Army equipment

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Annual Tohu Awards recognise importance of employers and excellence

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Large Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operates From Aircraft Carrier

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HOMELAND SECURITY

Defsec Media Limited publishes Line of Defence, FireNZ Magazine and New Zealand Security Magazine premier publications covering industry sectors that help keep Kiwis safe. Find us online www.defsec.net.nz Copyright: No article or part thereof may be reproduced without prior consent of the publisher.

Disclaimer: The information contained in this publication is given in good faith and has been derived from sources believed to be reliable and accurate. However, neither the publishers nor any person involved in the preparation of this publication accept any form of liability whatsoever for its contents including advertisements, editorials, opinions, advice or information or for any consequences from its use.

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DEFENCE

Arrowhead 140 to meet Navy’s future needs Babcock’s capable, adaptable and cost-effective Arrowhead 140 is the company’s answer for the Royal New Zealand Navy’s future needs Babcock’s Arrowhead platform offers an unrivalled blend of price, capability and flexibility to suit the future needs of the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN), Babcock Australasia CEO Andrew Cridland says.

In response to the New Zealand Ministry of Defence’s industry engagement request to inform the development of the next Defence Capability Plan, Babcock has confirmed that it has formally presented its proven Arrowhead platform as the future solution for the RNZN.

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“We believe Arrowhead would deliver significant multi-mission capability to the Royal New Zealand Navy, meeting its requirements both now and in the future,” said Mr Cridland.

Babcock has offered a solution which allows for a mixture of Arrowhead 140, General Purpose and Modular Naval vessels, delivering a comprehensive range of capabilities for the RNZN. The Arrowhead 140 General Purpose Ship provides a modern, global combat platform capable of

operating for National purposes or within a coalition force.

The Arrowhead 140 modular mission bays can be re-rolled to provide space for up to two medium sized helicopters and additional offboard systems allowing the RNZN to operate with uncrewed capabilities or support littoral combat operations.

“Babcock’s Arrowhead platform would provide support for a range of RNZN functions including search and rescue, humanitarian, combat and disaster relief capability,” said Mr Cridland.

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“It delivers a flexible, long range, interoperable capability that can undertake a range of non-combat and combat missions, ensuring our service personnel have access to proven capability to face our emerging threats.”

Capable of operating with a core crew of only 100 people, Babcock’s Arrowhead platform allows the Royal New Zealand Navy to deploy more capability with a significantly smaller crew.

“Our Arrowhead design will provide a simplified fleet structure with an optimum number of fleet vessels based on common systems and equipment, ultimately reducing training requirements and increase crew familiarity between vessels,” said Mr Cridland.

As part of a growing multi navy customer base, the RNZN will benefit from Babcock’s global support for the Arrowhead platform and the wider partner Navy experience with existing Arrowhead customers including the UK, Poland and Indonesia.

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“There continues to be strong international interest in this highly adaptable ship,” said Cridland.

At its facilities in Rosyth, Scotland, Babcock is well underway with the design and build programme that will deliver five Type 31, Inspiration Class frigates for the UK Royal Navy, based on the Arrowhead 140 platform.

In 2021, Babcock secured its first export contract for the Arrowhead 140 through a licence agreement with PT PAL Indonesia, with the first keel, of the two-ship programme for the Indonesian Navy, laid this year.

Babcock’s Arrowhead 140 frigate has also been selected by the PGZMIECZNIK Consortium as the baseline platform design for Poland’s Miecznik frigates, with steel cut on the first of three frigates for the Polish Navy in August 2023.

“Arrowhead delivers operability, adoptability and reliability providing naval customers with operational choice and absolute confidence in performance,” said Mr Cridland.

Babcock recently held a suppliers’ day in New Zealand, attended by more

than 65 suppliers aspiring to undertake work to support the delivery of the company’s Arrowhead solution.

At the recent Indo Pacific International Maritime Exposition in Sydney, Babcock Australasia announced its first supplier to support the advancement and modernization of the RNZN fleet – McKay, an electrical engineering solutions company.

“Our local suppliers are critical to supporting the services we proudly provide the Royal New Zealand Navy, and they will be integral to supporting the country’s future naval fleet,” said Mr Cridland.

Babcock has a strong marine defence presence in New Zealand. The company is currently contracted to operate the country’s largest marine engineering and maintenance support facility in Devonport, Auckland.

“Babcock is proud to partner with the Royal New Zealand Navy as their strategic maritime partner,” said Mr Cridland.

“Now more than ever, what we do matters: creating a safe and secure world, together.”

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DEFENCE

Judith Collins: Innovation, opportunities and being better together We need to work well with others, to contribute, to innovate and to look for opportunities to be better together. AUKUS Pillar II may provide additional opportunity for New Zealand, writes Defence Minister Judith Collins, but it’s early days.

Hon Judith Collins is AttorneyGeneral, Minister for Digitising Government, Minister Responsible for the GCSB, Minister Responsible for the NZSIS, Minister of Science, Innovation and Technology, Minister for Space, Lead Coordination Minister for the Government’s Response to the Royal Commission’s Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques and New Zealand’s 43rd Minister of Defence.

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It’s not often you get to combine all the things you are passionate about in your job, but that’s exactly the privileged situation I find myself in.

My Ministerial responsibilities span a diverse range of specialist areas – from space to defence, the intelligence community, digitising government as well as science, innovation, and technology, to name a few. It may not be immediately obvious, but each portfolio has more in common than first glance suggests. There is quite a lot of interoperability, and they are interconnected in a number of areas.

They are also all vital for the future prosperity of New Zealand.

They rely on a foundation of hardworking professional people and personnel who are driven by a sense of service, commitment to our country and a tireless focus on delivery. There are also real opportunities, as well as real challenges, in each one.

I look forward to having the opportunity to learn more, and do more, in every area. If there is one thing we can do above all others to help us advance it’s making sure we support innovation and embrace technology.

We are a small but globally connected nation. We need to work well with others, to contribute, to innovate and to look for

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opportunities to be better together.

New Zealand relies on partnerships to meet our interests but we know the value of playing our part, both within our region and beyond.

That term beyond also encompasses space. When I think of space, I think satellites, critical lines of communications, and New Zealand’s ability to innovate and support a growing space industry. It is a domain which enables a deeper understanding of New Zealand’s security environments.

Space technology helps us to advance our national security and economic interests, such as using satellite imagery to help track illegal fishing, or GPS to support our maritime supply chains. Using space assets enables better communication, faster and better-informed decision making and helps to maintain an effective, efficient, combat capable New Zealand Defence Force.

New Zealand is an attractive place for space-related business — we have a business-friendly environment, a future-focused policy and regulatory regime, and advantages including geography, infrastructure, skills and global trust. Our researchers Line of Defence

and companies are using space technologies to tackle some of our planet’s big challenges and to create new and exciting opportunities for economic growth.

In the Defence portfolio I have a personal connection as well as a professional one. I understand the contribution New Zealand Defence Force personnel, past and present, make to enhance our security, to defend our interests and to respond when asked.

My father was a veteran of World War II having served as a Combat Engineer with the Royal New Zealand Engineers, and several of my great uncles served in World War I. I have been Minister for Veterans’ Affairs (during which time I was made an honorary sapper by the Sappers’ Association) and have travelled to conflict zones including meeting our personnel deployed to Afghanistan. I am also an honorary member of the Long-Range Desert Group and am deeply committed to their memory.

I recently returned from the South Pacific Defence Ministers’ meeting in New Caledonia where I met my defence counterparts to discuss regional security matters

and to demonstrate our ongoing commitment to the Pacific.

During those discussions the theme of working together to address shared challenges and opportunities continued.

Alongside other Pacific Island countries, our formal military ally Australia, and our other security partners, New Zealand has an interest in maintaining a stable, secure, prosperous and resilient region.

Which is why I’ll be taking up opportunities to engage with our international partners wherever possible. To make sure the New Zealand perspective is heard and to listen so we can contribute meaningfully. To be open to new opportunities, where they align with our interests.

AUKUS is one such area as it covers cooperation in emerging security areas, including areas in which we already work closely with Australia, the US and the UK. Pillar II may provide additional opportunity for New Zealand, but it’s early days and I look forward to finding out more before any decisions are made.

I’ll leave it there for now, but rest assured, there’ll be more to come.

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DEFENCE

Geopolitical volatility brings increased defence budgets to ensure preparedness As budgets increase and the spectrum of conflict scenarios widens, swarm drones take to the land, air, and sea and the double-edged AI sword adds cutting edges to cybersecurity, writes Matt Medley, Global Industry Director A&D at IFS.

Matt Medley, Global Industry Director A&D at IFS.

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Defence budgets are set to increase, but where will the spend go?

The conflicts of 2023 have caused major disruptions to military supply chains, leading to the inventories and resources of some military forces being drained and inadequate to combat hostile forces. It comes as no surprise that in 2024 defence budgets across the globe are set to increase— witness the UK defence budget set to increase by £5 billion and the US defence budget to increase by 3.2% from $816 billion in 2023 to $842 billion in 2024.

As a result of this, the global defence market is expected to grow significantly, with a lot of the budget set to be focused on increasing production to help military forces regain control.

The Deloitte report on supply chain risk management identifies the real conundrum underlying the increase in defence budget on the manufacturing sector: “As most A&D suppliers are highly specialised with unique expertise and complex equipment, they struggle to make quick changes to production in response to varying demands. The challenge is accentuated as many suppliers serve both commercial aerospace and defence. Any spillover risk from commercial aerospace

could leave defence OEMs vulnerable to sourcing critical parts for their programs and platforms.”

With rising budgets and increased procurement set to dominate the defence agenda throughout 2024— these are the four key areas I see large portions of these increased budgets being spent on.

Prediction 1: Widening spectrum of conflict calls for improved Total Asset Readiness The last 12 months have given rise to a wider spectrum of conflict.

The combat between Ukraine and Russia shows symmetric features, as it’s between traditional air, military, and naval forces on both sides trying to achieve dominance and territory.

On the other end of the spectrum, a more modern asymmetric style of combat can be seen in the Israel and Hamas conflict which features combatants that are not typically a part of military forces of the nationstate.

The difference in features of the warfare has called for defence ministries and departments to better prepare for a broader spectrum of eventualities from natural disasters to full scale theatre warfare, as well as a broad spectrum of military deployments ranging from high to low tech—tanks, boats, and boots on Line of Defence

the group versus parasailing and jet skis, remote locations versus heavily populated areas with schools and hospitals.

As highlighted in a recent Global Security Review essay which paints a picture of the new challenges defence forces face, and advocates for an agile approach to be taken towards The Changing Face of Conflict: “The agile approach to hybrid warfare offers a promising framework for responding to these complex and evolving threats. It emphasises flexibility, adaptability, and rapid decision-making and incorporates the impact of technological developments on warfare.”

This will even apply to the software infrastructure underpinning the military equipment supply chain, where disparate reporting mechanisms and software systems can be consolidated with an allencompassing solution to track Total Asset Readiness—giving commanders a clear real-time view of the assets at their disposal, in the context of the mission they need to complete, wherever and whenever they are deployed.

From this we expect to see an 16.3% increase in total defence spending in the US alone, with the IT spend in defence contractors rising from 3% of revenue up to Line of Defence

around 5% of revenue as they invest heavily in AI and automation to help pursue optimised asset management and other technology-driven priorities.

Prediction 2: Lack of assets ‘at the ready’ mean that defence industrial bases must change A radical re-think is required for Total Asset Readiness, as the conflict between Ukraine and Russia has highlighted the lack of assets, ammunition, vehicles, and inventories available to military forces in combat. This comes despite the mass investments made in ammunition and inventories by supporting countries.

Current defence industrial bases (DIB) do not have the facilities to match the increase in recent demand given that production rates were set up on non-large scale conflict replenishment. DIB expansion has never been so important!

This has been recognised by defence forces, including the US DoD which for the first time ever is set to release a defence industrial base policy. The policy outlines four key focus areas: building a resilient supply chain, improving workforce readiness, increasing flexible acquisitions, and economic deterrence. The U.S. is not alone

here. The UK military has also refreshed its defence strategy as it will reallocate £2.5billion to bolster the ammunition stockpiles as it aims to increase military power and agility.

New manufacturing principles are likely to play a key role. The US Army is already looking at logistics and readiness as the service examines more opportunities to boost those operations by using advanced manufacturing technologies such as Additive Manufacturing and 3D printing technology to improve and sustain readiness, as highlighted in a recent Janes report.

As we move forward in response to the US DoD policy focusing on building a resilient supply chain, improving workforce readiness, increasing flexible acquisitions, and economic deterrence, I expect significant flow down requirements to begin quickly appearing in over 50% of all new defence contracts.

Allied nations will likely follow suit with their own similar directives, requiring DIB organisations to transparently demonstrate supply chain resilience for not only themselves, but their suppliers as well.

Due to the current munitions shortages with allies supporting ongoing global conflicts, that number will approach 100% for munitions suppliers.

Prediction 3: The rise in low-cost ‘swarm’ drones As evidenced by recent conflicts, drones will continue to step up to the military plate – in swarms. Drones can be produced quickly, cheaply and have a range of features ranging from carrying out surveillance missions in previously to dangerous areas to even carrying out light attack missions without putting war fighters at risk.

As a result, they are becoming more prominent in military fleets and adoption rates are rising.

Drones are also hugely desirable for defence forces as they can be 11

DEFENCE

deployed on air, land, and sea, making them very versatile.

Enter the drone carriers, such as the Royal Navy’s HMS Prince of Wales, which they aim to house drones on to be able to transfer assets and supplies to and from vessels without requiring any manned vehicles. As an even cheaper alternative, some nations such as Turkey with their TCG Anodolu vessel and Iran with two old merchant container ships, are converting previously manned vessels into drone carrying vessels.

The US DoD is also seeing the benefit of swarm drones, as seen when the Deputy Secretary of Defence Kathleen Hicks announced the ‘Replicator’ initiative at the 2023 Defence News Conference.

The initiative aims to quickly build and field swarms of low-cost air, land, and sea drones or All-Domain Attributable autonomy (ADA2) able to swarm hostile forces.

The DoD aims to have these ready for deployment in the next 18-24 months. These ADA2 assets will help military forces overcome and overwhelm threats that are posed by large assets hosted by enemy forces, the drones will use Artificial Intelligence to autonomously “swarm” enemy forces.

Effective equipment alternatives such as a drones will be the way forward in 2024 as military powers seek to keep costs low and maximise budgets – while reimagining the concept of mass in the sea/air/land battlespace.

Prediction 4: The AI boom forces cybersecurity to up its game The increase in use of autonomous vehicles and digital technologies comes with heightened vulnerabilities to cyberattacks across the military supply chain.

As noted in a Deloitte report, “National security concerns elevate the importance of data security for defence manufacturers. They share and exchange covered defence 12

information (CDI) and controlled unclassified information (CUI) on program specifications, technology, and equipment performance as they collaborate across research, design, development, and deployment of defence products.”

The flip side of the AI boom has brought its own cyber threats, with AI-enabled hackers. AI has allowed for hackers to carry out cyberattacks at much larger scale, quicker, and with increased anonymity. AI accelerates malware and changing codes making it harder for threats to be detected.

We must fight AI with AI. An AI-enabled defence can enable cybersecurity to stay one step ahead of hackers. Machine Learning (ML) technologies can be implemented by defence forces to boost threat detection accuracy and quickly automate responses to cyberattacks.

It is more important than ever for all organisations connected to the military supply chain to have penetration tested underlying cybersecurity software, which can react quickly to prevent data breaches.

Many forces have already been deploying cyber defence tools as seen in a recent European Defence Matters report which reported that some autonomous cyber defence tools using intelligent agents already exist today, monitoring network activities and ready to

trigger immediate action when anomalous behaviour is detected.

Early malware detection, crucial for cyber risk mitigation, is considered a high-potential activity in which autonomous systems could excel in the future.

In the year ahead I expect to see defence forces exponentially increasing their use of autonomous agents and specialised digital artefacts to enhance cyber defence, as seen with the Defence Information Systems Agency looking to immediately expand its use of AIdriven tools to automate penetration testing on defence networks.

Adapting to new military dynamics The defence industry is poised for significant growth in 2024, driven by increased military spending worldwide as nations seek to modernise their equipment and capabilities. This growth is expected to be fuelled by several factors, including the widening spectrum of conflict, the lack of assets and inventories ‘at the ready’, and the rise in new equipment such as low-cost ‘swarm’ drones. This increased use of digital technologies will require cybersecurity to up its game.

Overall, the outlook for the defence industry is positive as military forces around the world look to adapt to the changing landscape of warfare.

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Judith Collins Takes Charge: It’s time for change Ross Browne, Director of public affairs firm Museum Street Strategies, writes that the new Defence Minister has an opportunity to initiate system and cultural reform to capitalise on New Zealand’s wider innovation system.

Prime Minister Christopher Luxon has formed his new government with new clusters of portfolios intended to deliver a Complementary ‘NZ Inc’ approach across portfolios and to get better results on the front line.

Responsible for Defence, Space, the intelligence agencies, the Science, Research and Technology portfolio, as well as being Attorney General, the Hon Judith Collins is one of the most influential figures in the Cabinet.

Clustering defence and intelligence under a senior minister to achieve stronger coordination follows the Labour Party approach in appointing Hon Andrew Little following the findings of the Royal Commission into the Christchurch mosque attacks.

Collins is one of the most senior defence ministers of the past 35 years.

In Opposition, Collins was particularly active in the development of technology, science, and innovation policy. Her seniority reflects the importance the new government has placed on security issues, innovation and economic transformation, and her portfolios effectively make her New Zealand’s first Space czar.

Evolving space-based technologies have important military and commercial applications, and that has clear implications for the intelligence agencies. The $900 million GDP contributions and Line of Defence

5,000+ jobs being supported by the space industry have driven investment in advanced manufacturing and STEM training.

New Zealand’s space launch capacity is world leading, and our geography is a critical market discriminator.

The science, tech and innovation system is a critical enabler to the Space portfolio. It too should be critical to the Defence portfolio.

In my article in the Summer 2018-19 issue of Line of Defence, I wrote about the emphasis the UK military was putting on innovation.

In the UK defence context, “innovation is gaining value from the exploitation of novelty.”

General Sir Nick Carter, the former professional head of the British Armed Forces, emphasizes the need to think differently, shift defence culture and criticized government procurement processes as impediments to delivering advanced military capability. “In technological terms, the private sector is ahead of us .... that’s where the best ideas and the best technologies are. This should be right at the core of what we do modernising defence.”

In stark contrast, NZDF’s innovation framework defines innovation as ‘the identification, creation and implementation of ideas that deliver new value, enhancing our operational outputs, organisational knowledge and capability.”

Laced with jargon and businessspeak, NZDF’s framework is silent on novelty and talks of ‘incremental innovation.’ It goes on to state that transformational innovation will typically require senior leaders to be involved. Innovation funding is discretionary. A 13-person committee predicts the future and writes more strategy.

It’s fortunate Hiram Maxim, inventor of the machine gun, was self-employed.

In Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, Mark Antony called for unrestrained and disruptive tactics – “Cry havoc and let slip the dogs of war” – to defeat the enemy. Prussian strategist von Moltke the Elder preached a culture that encouraged divesting authority and taking calculated risks, because in fluid environments that’s what it takes to respond immediately and exploit opportunity.

Risk-aversion, tradition, hierarchy, and structure are the enemies of innovation. In the armed forces, the cultural environment is the enemy.

The National Party campaigned on the need for economic transformation and innovation. It said bloated government back offices hold the country back. Collins has the mandate and the opportunity to bring system and cultural reform to capitalise on New Zealand’s wider innovation system.

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Cyber espionage: difficult to attribute, difficult to detect According to a Fortinet cybersecurity whitepaper, it’s almost certain that nation state malware is present and undetected in many government agencies and critical infrastructure entities.

On 8 December 2023, the New Zealand Government joined Five Eyes partners in condemning malicious cyber activity conducted by the Russian Government targeting organisations and individuals in the United Kingdom (UK).

According to Judith Collins, Minister Responsible for the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), the statement follows the UK’s attribution of spear phishing attacks impacting its domestic democratic institutions and civil society organisations to a Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) actor known as “Star Blizzard”.

“New Zealand does not tolerate attempts to undermine the integrity of democratic institutions through cyber or any other means,” said Ms Collins. “NGOs and civil society organisations also play an important role in enabling social inclusion in our democracies, and any attempt to interfere with their ability to do that is unacceptable.”

It was the second time in two months that the GCSB’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) had joined like-minded international partners to condemn malicious Russian cyber activity.

On 1 September 2023, the NCSC issued a Malware Analysis Report on the infamous Chisel malware, which was observed in a campaign targeting Android devices used 14

by the Ukrainian military. This malware was deployed by the actor “Sandworm”, linked to the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU)’s Main Centre of Special Technologies (GTsST).

“Russia’s pattern of malicious cyber activity continues to demonstrate disregard for the framework of responsible state behaviour online and for the international rules-based order,” said Ms Collins, adding that the recent spear phishing attacks were “a reminder to all New Zealand organisations to ensure they have strong cybersecurity measures in place.”

State-sponsored attacks pose espionage threat Published in November, the NCSC’s Cyber Threat Report 2022/2023 noted that 23 per cent of cyber incidents reported in the past year showed indications of a connection to state-sponsored actors, with a total of 73 incidents.

“State-sponsored cyber actors primarily pose an espionage threat to Aotearoa New Zealand,” stated the report. “These actors continue to demonstrate intent and capability to target Aotearoa New Zealand.”

“State-sponsored cyber actors are typically motivated to maintain covert persistence on computer Line of Defence

networks of high intelligence value.

To achieve this goal, malicious cyber actors continue to identify novel weaknesses in—or new techniques for—evading Aotearoa New Zealand cyber defences.”

These attacks typically seek to understand our diplomatic and policy positions or to undertake commercial espionage, including the theft of intellectual property from organisations. They may initially present as if conducted by a financially motivated actor or, at times, they may actually be financially motivated.

This type of activity, says the report, is difficult to attribute with high levels of confidence to specific cyber actors and specific states.

Indeed, about half of all incidents reported in the past year showed neither clear links to state-sponsored activity nor criminal activity.

Espionage attacks: quiet and patient “Beyond the risk of cyberattacks by nation-states, organised crime and even lone cyber hackers have the intent and capacity to threaten businesses and individuals,” write Glenn Maiden and Nicole Quinn, Line of Defence

authors of Fortinet’s Government and Industry: Partnering on Cybersecurity to Strengthen Data Security whitepaper.

According to the whitepaper, cyber threats present substantial new risks to individuals, businesses, governments, and nations, regardless of their origin.

“The speed at which one nation can target another nation’s vulnerabilities by cyber means is rapidly increasing. When a vulnerability is discovered, there are often weeks, months, or more before businesses identify the risk, giving organisations less time to patch and prepare their IT defences.”

According to Fortinet’s 2022 Networking and Cybersecurity Adoption Index, fewer than 49 per cent of New Zealand and Australian organisations said they could detect a security breach in less than 90 days, with 23 per cent taking between two and three months.

Surprisingly, says the whitepaper notes, high-profile, well-resourced, and cyber mature businesses can be more severely affected by attacks such as ransomware than smaller entities. In 2021, for example, large organisations in the United States

of America, such as JBS Foods, Colonial Pipeline, CNA Financial, and Frontier Software, all fell victim to destructive cyberattacks.

But whereas ransomware attacks tend to be quite obvious and immediate, given that the attacker wants to cause as much disruption as possible to elicit payment, a “motivated nation-state intent on espionage or intellectual property theft is far less easy to identify,” write Maiden and Quinn.

“As it stands, it’s almost certain that nation-state malware is present and undetected in many government departments and agencies, managed service providers (MSPs), electricity distributors, and other critical infrastructure entities,” they continue. “That malware may be lying dormant, waiting to be activated, or quietly stealing sensitive data from the compromised network.”

Regarding the recent Star Blizzard controversy, Moscow claims that there is no evidence for allegations of the digital spying campaign. The Russian foreign ministry has previously dismissed Western reporting on Star Blizzard as anti-Russian propaganda.

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MAPP: A place in history is in new Defence Minister Judith Collins’ future Judith Collins stands to be among our most important Defence Ministers ever with an opportunity to building up our naval defence capability and to realign our defence relationships, writes Wayne Mapp.

Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO was New Zealand’s Minister of Defence and Minister of Science and Innovation from 2008 to 2011.

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The new Minister of Defence, Judith Collins, will be among the most senior politicians to have ever held the role. While her immediate predecessor, Andrew Little, had also been the Leader of his party, the short time he was in the role meant he was unable to make a lasting impact. In contrast, the new minister is highly likely to hold the role for at least three years. She has the real opportunity to be the most significant minister of the last two decades.

The macro issues she will have to deal with are the recommendations of the Defence Review, due in May 2024, and the continuing evolution of New Zealand’s independent foreign policy.

The new minister will have the advantage of receiving the report of the Defence Review chaired by Sir Brian Roche early in her term of office. It is likely to be specific enough to enable the replacement of major capabilities to get underway.

The Review won’t influence Budget 2024. The upcoming Budget, due in less than 6 months, is most likely to be a holding exercise.

However, the minister will have much more substantial influence over Budgets 2025 and 2026. She will also be able to make recommendations

Sir Brian Roche. Image: NZ Government.

to Cabinet about how best to implement the recommendations of the Review.

Given the nature of the people on the Review, the recommendations are likely to be an artful compromise of making serious upgrades to New Zealand’s defence aspirations and capability within a reasonably constrained budget. They will be unlikely to recommend that spending increase to 2% of GDP. Sir Brian Roche has had enough experience of government to know that would be reaching too far.

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HMNZS Otago with an embarked SH-2G(I) Seasprite helicopter on fisheries patrol in Fiji’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Photo: NZDF

Similarly, Judith Collins, having been a senior minister, will know full well the necessary compromises that have to be made around the Cabinet table.

Nevertheless, it would be surprising if the Review did not recommend some uplift in defence spending. Both the international environment and the need to replace some of the most expensive capabilities of the Defence Force will demand it.

The replacement of the ANZAC frigates and the Project Protector is likely to be the centerpiece of the Review. This is the most pressing defence capability decision of the next decade. The ANZAC ships are already over 25 years old. Their intended out of service date is in the early 2030s when the ships will be well over 30 years old. There is only just enough time to replace them by then.

Even an accelerated procurement process will not see contracts for the construction of replacement ships before late 2025. There will be seven years to actually build and commission the ships. It is certain that New Zealand will buy ships that are already proven, the Type 31 frigate being among the credible choices.

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The foreign policy challenges of the next decade will test New Zealand’s diplomatic finesse. The Minister is well known for her desire to improve relations with the United States and has already given an early signal that she anticipates that New Zealand will be part of AUKUS Pillar Two. However, there is a nuance to this, and that is how the three smaller parties to the Five Eyes agreements are strengthening their trilateral relationship.

In early December the Prime Ministers of Australia, Canada and New Zealand, including new Prime Minister Luxon, issued a joint statement on the Israel-Hamas War. The statement was notable for two reasons. It showed that the three nations had a distinctively different view of the world to that of the US. There are also clear indications that all three countries, being Pacific Rim nations, want a somewhat less antagonistic approach toward China. It might be expected that this will lead to closer defence cooperation between the three than has traditionally been the case.

Canada is slowly orienting toward the Pacific as the region becomes more economically powerful. Along with New Zealand, Canada will also wish to be part of AUKUS Pillar

Two as part of this trend. There is also the prospect that India may also join Pillar Two. Although Australia and Canada, for somewhat different reasons, have much closer relations with the US than does New Zealand, they both have their own imperatives for a more distinctive foreign policy.

Neither of them see it as in their interest to be considered as no more than little brothers to the US. This reorientation could benefit New Zealand to do two things that superficially might seem contradictory. First, it could make it easier for New Zealand to build a closer relationship with the US. If New Zealand is doing more things in tandem with Australia and Canada, then New Zealand is less likely to be seen as the odd one out.

Second, it strengthens New Zealand’s independent foreign policy. If New Zealand is taking initiatives in common with Australia and Canada, then New Zealand’s diplomatic voice will be strengthened. Within the Asia Pacific, if Australia, Canada and New Zealand are acting in concert, then their overall voice and role within the region could increase.

Minister Collins has a particularly strong opportunity to be among the most important Ministers of Defence for many decades.

There is the obvious opportunity in building up defence capability in the naval area, which has particular importance in Asia Pacific strategic positioning. Perhaps of more significance is the realignment of defence relationships.

Most obviously, this opportunity will centre on Australia and Canada.

However, linking to India may be give this this grouping even more significance.

Opportunities for strategic reorientation only occasionally come along. It will be in New Zealand’s interest to be able to take them as they arise.

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Peeni Henare: Bipartisan support crucial to provide stability for our Defence Force

Opposition Spokesperson for Defence Hon Peeni Henare reflects on the achievements of the previous government and sets out his approach to constructively challenging the new government on Defence matters.

During the 2023 election campaign the key areas debated by aspiring politicians around the country focussed on important issues like the cost of living, education and health care. Sadly defence policy is rarely debated and barely registers on the radar of most voters yet it stands as an important part of protecting our national interests, projecting our sovereignty, supporting peace around the world and responding to significant natural disasters in and near the place we call home.

Through these functions and many more, the New Zealand Defence Force - Te Ope Kātua, have served our country proudly with mana and integrity yet many New Zealanders don’t engage in robust defence policy discussions.

None the less, voters made clear that they wanted change at the recent election. After the election I was chosen by the opposition leader to be the spokesperson for defence, but as a former Minister in the last Labour Government I am proud of the work we did with regard to defence. We undertook a much needed defence review to ensure that our defence force and related policies were fit for purpose given the dynamic and fast evolving strategic competition close to home and across the world.

I am proud of the fact that we procured new capabilities across 18

the three services and now have tangible outcomes that lift our capabilities. I am proud of the much needed investment in our ageing infrastructure which I was told during my tenure as Minister of Defence would be very familiar to my grandfather who trained at those facilities before being deployed in World War Two. However, the achievement I am most proud of is the investment we made in the people, the beating heart of the defence force. We know that defence force personnel who are well trained and highly educated are a much sought after recruit for a hungry and well-paying labour market so it was hugely important to make sure there was competitive remuneration.

By no means am I claiming perfection here and there is much more to be done, but our work in the last government signalled our belief in and commitment to our defence force and robust defence policy.

Now in opposition our role will be to constructively challenge the government on matters relating to defence. During my tenure as Minister of Defence I always believed that where possible, bipartisan support was crucial in order to provide stability for our defence force. In fact, I would often meet with the spokespeople from across the house to discuss defence matters. I was always disheartened

Hon Peeni Henare , Opposition Spokesperson for Defence

when the good work of our defence personnel was undermined by petty politics.

I look forward to doing this job on behalf of all New Zealanders but most importantly for the amazing and hardworking defence force personnel.

So my last word is to the service personnel of the New Zealand Defence Force both past and present.

On behalf of all New Zealanders we thank you for your unwavering service and dedication to our country.

This year you were part of operations around the world and continue in the fine tradition of our forebears. At home you were a sight of comfort for so many during the distressing and severe weather events our country has faced.

I wish you and your whānau a very Merry Christmas and an enjoyable festive season. Bring on 2024!

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South Korea selects the Embraer C-390 Millennium South Korea becomes Asia’s first C-390 Millennium operator after C-390 wins the LTAII program public tender to provide the Republic of Korea Air Force with new military transport aircraft South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) announced earlier this month Embraer’s C-390 Millennium as the winner of the Large Transport Aircraft (LTA) II public tender to provide the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) with new military transport aircraft.

Under the signed contract, Embraer will provide an undisclosed number of C-390 Millennium aircraft specially configured to meet ROKAF’s requirements, as well as services and support including training, ground support equipment and spare parts. The value of the contract will be included in Embraer’s backlog in the fourth quarter of 2023.

Embraer will also provide a comprehensive consortium and offset package including a significant amount of C-390 Millennium parts to be locally manufactured by Korean partner companies and the development of a local Maintenance Repair and Overhaul (MRO) provider.

“We welcome the Republic of Korea Air Force to the growing number of air forces operating the C-390 Millennium – the most modern military tactical transport aircraft. Day after day, the aircraft has proven its capability to complete a wide range of missions with great efficiency, serviceability and speed,” said Bosco da Costa Jr, President and CEO, Embraer Defense & Security.

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“This is a new era in BrazilSouth Korea relations and together with our Korean partners, we are committed to growing the capabilities of its aerospace and defence industries.”

South Korea is the seventh nation to select the C-390 after Brazil, Portugal, Hungary, the Netherlands, Austria and the Czech Republic.

The aircraft entered into operation with the Brazilian Air Force in 2019 and most recently with the Portuguese Air Force in 2023. The current fleet of aircraft in operation has accumulated more than 10,800 flight hours, with operational availability of around 80% and mission completion

rates above 99%, demonstrating exceptional productivity in the category.

The C-390 can carry more payloads of 26 tons and can fly at 470 knots. It is capable of performing a wide range of missions such as transporting and dropping cargo and troops, medical evacuation, search and rescue, firefighting, and humanitarian missions, operating on temporary or unpaved runways such as packed earth, soil, and gravel.

The aircraft has demonstrated its aerial refuelling capacity both as a tanker and as a receiver, receiving fuel from another KC-390 using pods installed under the wings.

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New tactics for peacesupport operations the South West Pacific New technology, especially cheap precision-strike weapons, will influence stabilisation operations and challenge current assumptions over the ability of Australian ‘fires’ and logistics overmatch to protect deployments in the South West Pacific, writes Ben Morgan Historically, Australia’s fires overmatch and overwhelming logistics protected and supported stabilisation operations in the South West Pacific (SWP). The proliferation of cheap precisionstrike weapons and unguided missiles, however, may challenge future deployments by providing new fires capabilities to smaller nations or paramilitary groups.

A history of successful peacesupport, underpinned by warfighting capability The SWP has a history of successful Australian-led peace-support operations. Australian forces provided logistics support and a guaranteed overmatch in combat power, with indirect fires capabilities providing a ‘big stick’ that rendered military opposition untenable.

Since 1998, joint forces have successfully deployed to Bougainville, East Timor, Solomon Islands, and Tonga in peacemaking roles, supporting peace negotiations or providing security aid; every deployment confident that Australia’s combat and logistics capability over matched potential opposition.

Other nations contributing to peace-support operations with Australia, including New Zealand, 20

CB90 raiding craft capable of travelling 400km at 20kt and carrying 21 fully equipped soldiers. Image: US Navy

Fiji, Tonga or Papua New Guinea, all benefit from this overmatch and contribute their relationships and cultural competence to joint task forces. By working together like this, the nations of the Pacific have conducted a wide and largely successful range of operations over the last 25 years.

The proliferation of precisionstrike is a gamechanger The proliferation of relatively cheap drones, missiles, and more importantly, digital technology that links sensors and shooters, however, is changing how indirect fires are applied on the battlefield. In 2020, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh

War demonstrated the effectiveness of a new generation of relatively simple and easily acquired drones, with Azerbaijan drones effectively targeting Armenian armoured vehicles.

Developing affordable, allweather drones with a useful payload has taken time, but in recent years the technology has been maturing.

Before the Second NagornoKarabakh War, drones had limited impact because they were cheap but too small and low tech to be influential, or if they were useful they were prohibitively expensive.

Drone war was limited to the major powers with funds to purchase and maintain sophisticated systems.

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The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War’s generation of drones, such as the Bayraktar TB2, were not only affordable but also carried useful payloads, could operate in most conditions and had sufficient range to make them highly effective.

An especially painful lesson of the war was that modern air defence is not designed to defeat drones, a concern highlighted in the November 2020 article “Military lessons from Nagorno-Karabakh: Reason for Europe to worry’’ by Gustav Gessel, who wrote: “Europe should look carefully at the military lessons of this conflict, and not dismiss it as a minor war between poor countries. Since the cold war, most European armies have phased out gun-based selfpropelled air-defence systems.

Man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) like the Stinger and Igla – the primary short-range airdefence systems in Europe – have little chance of acquiring such small targets like loitering munitions or small drones invisible to the operator.”

This analysis was proven correct in the Ukraine War Additionally, precision tech is getting cheaper and easier to access. The Corvo cardboard drone, made in Australia and used in Ukraine is an example. Costing about USD 3,500, it can carry 5kg of payload accurately to a target approximately 120km away, or it can be fitted with a high-resolution camera able to transmit real-time information to its operator.

It is also almost invisible to radar so is hard to shoot down. A fact demonstrated on 27 August 2023 when a swarm of Corvos damaged a Mig 29, four Su-30s, two Pantsir anti-aircraft systems and a S-300 air surface-to-air missile defence system at an airfield in Russia’s Kursk Oblast.

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Ukrainian soldier with an anti-drone EDM4S SkyWiper anti-drone rifle.

Image: Ukrainian Ministry of Defence

has also been demonstrated by Ukraine using these weapons to attrit the Black Sea Fleet. Ranging from submersibles like the Toloka TK-150 Uncrewed Undersea Vehicle (UUV) to relatively low-tech Uncrewed Surface Vessels (USV) such as the Magura or Seababy families of drones, Ukraine’s maritime drone capability has increased rapidly.

The skies of Ukraine are also full of precision-guided weapons ranging from guided artillery shells to HIMARs and cruise missiles, and the ability to observe a target and strike it accurately at long-range

is becoming increasingly common.

Further, there is a direct link between these weapons and drones being used as observation platforms, a new and powerful sensor-shooter link.

Hamas’s 7 October attack on Israel demonstrated that region’s proliferation of cheap, effective missiles. Hamas’s Qassam missiles are unguided but easily produced and can saturate areas within a range of about 15km. Hamas also recently deployed the Ababeel 1 series of locally built drones, including attack drones. Another Gaza para-military group, Palestinian Jihad’s al-Quds 21

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101 missile represents a dangerous escalation, with intelligence sources estimating the rocket has a high level of accuracy over ranges of about 20km.

The recent interception of missiles and drones targeting Israel launched by Houthi rebels in Yemen provides another insight into future conflict. The Houthi are a large group but are not a national army, yet they are using drones and missiles to attack Israel from around 1800km away.

Paramilitary organisations and smaller nations states can now acquire or build large quantities of cheap and effective indirect fire weapons. Therefore, stabilisation operation planning needs to consider indirect attack by missiles and air or seaborne drones.

1999’s successful lodgement of INTERFET in Dili enjoyed a total fires overmatch provided

by Australia’s airpower, naval gunfire support and ability to deploy artillery rapidly. Today, East Timor’s militias could be supported by foreign governments opposed to Australia, supplying weapons like the Qassam artillery rocket. By targeting pre-selected static targets like airports, potential helicopter landing areas or Dilli Harbour and firing scores of missiles from hidden and dispersed firing points, even a relatively small and poorly trained force could do considerable damage.

Add in a drone capability like the Ababeel 1 or Corvo able to strike key targets, and perhaps leadership or command teams spotted by civilians live streaming targeting information, and the operation becomes much more difficult.

Fighting smarter and thinking unconventionally Facing this challenge is difficult and will require re-thinking traditional methods of operation. Some thoughts include: 22

Political measures The proliferation of these weapons makes the relationship between military ‘hard power’ and diplomatic ‘soft power’ more important than it has ever been.

Now military planners require long-term hybrid thinking because an initial step to defeating this threat is reducing proliferation of these weapons systems within the region in the first place by legal and political action.

Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasse Sogavare stated this year, for example, that his government intends to build a defence force.

Although a highly unlikely and hypothetical example, Solomon Islands could use this tech to build a defence force able to deter intervention by an Australian-led coalition. It is important, therefore, that political steps are taken at the earliest possible point to disincentive acquisition of precisionstrike weapons and to build strong alliances so local states do not see the requirement for these capabilities.

Intelligence Australia and its SWP partners need to invest in intelligence operations during peace time. Specifically, relationships providing human intelligence (HUMINT) that can monitor local capabilities so that if required these weapons, their supply lines, and operators can be targeted.

Satellites, aerial observation and electronic monitoring struggle to identify underground facilities or those hidden in complex terrain, and HUMINT provides another information source.

Additionally, electronic intelligence or monitoring the electromagnetic spectrum to identify frequencies being used for command and control of surveillance and attack assets needs to improve.

Likewise, cyber dominance is an emerging requirement given that the internet is likely to be used to

transfer surveillance and targeting information.

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) is a further consideration.

Recently, OSINT company Bellingcat published information about the use of live video feeds from existing CCTV networks, a tool providing potential targeting intelligence to any force with internet access.

Electronic warfare Operational reporting indicates the most effective response to drones is jamming. Some examples include: • The relatively limited impact of US Switchblade drones in Ukraine is linked to effective Russian jamming using intelligence gained during the Afghanistan War. • Ukraine’s crossing of the Dnipro River in October 2023 is reported to include a specific programme of electronic drone suppression.

According to Gessell, “Azerbaijan’s drones roamed free because Armenia had no jammer able to interrupt the signals linking the drones to their guidance stations.”

The Australian Defence Strategic Review 2023 included investment in electronic warfare, but are countries like New Zealand following suit?

Air defence This is an area that many smaller militaries have tended to contract out of, relying on US air defence to secure their forces. Unfortunately, this model is based on an older picture of air threats from piloted aircraft.

Tomorrow’s Pacific conflict is likely to see very small forces fighting in widely dispersed organisations – a difficult model to provide air defence to. Militaries will need to protect their own units, including logistics infrastructure and units in depth, as long-range precision-strike becomes more available.

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Members of the ADF participating in Ex Sea Series 18 off the eastern coast of Australia. Image: US Marine Corps

Tactical organisation On land and sea tactical organisation will need to change, with dispersion becoming the rule to avoid presenting large targets. The US’s Marine Littoral Combat Regiments and experimental light cavalry units in the 25th Infantry Division point towards the future of land forces – very small units widely dispersed, relying on long-range rocket artillery for destruction of point targets and on mortars or light artillery for close support.

However, it is unlikely that armoured vehicles will disappear given that they provide not only combat power but protection, mobility and the ability to carry equipment. In an operational environment requiring widespread electronic jamming and close-range air defence more of this equipment can carried by vehicles than by infantrymen. Armoured vehicles can be loaded up with a range of equipment, thus providing an operational hub for a small infantry team.

On the sea, mobility and dispersion will also be vital for survival. Mooring large numbers of amphibious ships close to a lodgement is no longer an option.

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over the shore needs to be fast and flexible, probably at night and again dispersed across a range of unexpected locations.

The archipelagos of the SWP will require a new approach for amphibious operations using many small but long-ranged vessels like the Swedish CB 90 to quickly move small units around.

Forces like this would be supported by conventional naval assets able to support long-range surveillance drones and providing long-range air defence and precision-strike.

Logistics A weakness of dispersion is keeping small and dispersed forces supplied with ammunition, food, fuel and batteries. Future forces will need to be self-sufficient and able to operate by themselves, requiring the equipment and training to survive in the operational area. Self-reliance and the ability to operate far from a Forward Operating Base (FOB) will need to be developed in front-line troops.

Likewise, logisticians will need to think laterally and start to plan to supply widely dispersed small forces probably in the first stage of an operation from logistics ships

loitering far off shore and outside the range of drone or missile attack. A difficult proposition.

Summary China already has area denial capability, but SWP militaries need to start planning for other weapon exclusion zones created by rapidly proliferating precisionguided weapons and cheap unguided missiles used by smaller nations and paramilitary groups.

Even relatively limited area denial capability deployed in the complex terrain of the SWP will be difficult to counter and could deter deploying stabilisation forces. The implications for security in the SWP are potentially significant if the rulesbased international order cannot be supported by the deployment of stabilisation forces.

Small nations or paramilitary forces may soon be able to challenge Australia’s force overmatch that is currently a ‘given’ in operational planning. Countering this threat requires honesty and the courage to admit that considerable restructing of conventional military doctrine is required as dispersion, intelligence and hybrid operations become vital for military success.

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Rise in military sales revenue delayed by production challenges and backlogs According to new data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), revenues have dropped for the world’s 100 largest defence industry companies despite a sharp rise in demand Revenues from sales of arms and military services by the 100 largest companies in the industry totalled USD 597 billion in 2022, 3.5 percent less than 2021 in real terms, even as demand rose sharply, according to new data released on 04 December

by SIPRI. The decrease was chiefly the result of falling arms revenues among major companies in the United States.

Revenues increased substantially in Asia and Oceania and the Middle East. Outstanding orders and a surge in new contracts suggest that global arms revenues could rise significantly in the next few years.

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Demand for weapons grows but production lags behind Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and geopolitical tensions around the world fuelled a strong increase in demand for weapons and military equipment in 2022.

However, despite receiving new orders, many US and European arms companies could not significantly ramp up production capacity because of labour shortages, soaring costs and supply chain disruptions that were exacerbated by the war in Ukraine.

In addition, countries placed new orders late in the year and the time lag between orders and production meant that the surge in demand was not reflected in these companies’ 2022 revenues.

“Many arms companies faced obstacles in adjusting to production for high-intensity warfare,” stated Dr Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, Director of SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme.

“However, new contracts were signed, notably for ammunition, which could be expected to translate into higher revenue in 2023 and beyond.”

In contrast to the major US and European suppliers, companies in Asia and Oceania and the Middle East saw their arms revenues grow significantly in 2022, demonstrating

their ability to respond to increased demand within a shorter time frame. This was especially true in countries where companies maintain responsive ‘ever-warm’ manufacturing capabilities, such as Israel and South Korea, and those where companies tend to rely on short supply chains.

Arms revenues fall in the US due to production challenges The arms revenues of the 42 US companies in the Top 100 fell by 7.9 percent to $302 billion in 2022. They accounted for 51 percent of the total arms revenue of the Top 100. Of these companies, 32 recorded a fall in year-on-year arms revenue, most commonly citing ongoing supply chain issues and labour shortages stemming from the Covid-19 pandemic.

“We are beginning to see an influx of new orders linked to the war in Ukraine and some major US companies, including Lockheed Martin and Raytheon Technologies, received new orders as a result,” said Nan Tian, SIPRI Senior Researcher. “However, because of these companies’ existing order backlogs and difficulties in ramping up production capacity, the revenue from these orders will probably only be reflected in company accounts in two to three years’ time.”

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Asia outperforms Europe on back of military modernisation drives The arms revenues of the 22 companies from Asia and Oceania listed in the ranking rose by 3.1 percent to reach $134 billion in 2022. This was the second consecutive year where Top 100 arms revenues for Asia and Oceania were higher than those for Europe.

“Domestic demand and reliance on local suppliers shielded Asian arms companies from supply chain disruptions in 2022,” said Xiao Liang, a researcher with the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. “Companies in China, India, Japan and Taiwan all benefited from sustained government investment in military modernisation.”

The combined arms revenues of the four South Korean companies in the Top 100 fell by 0.9 percent, primarily due to an 8.5 percent drop recorded by the country’s biggest producer, Hanwha Aerospace. Two South Korean companies reported revenue growth, most notably LIG Nex1. South Korean companies are likely to see increased revenues in coming years due to a surge in booked orders after signing major arms deals with Poland and the UAE.

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Modest revenue growth in Europe as Ukraine-linked demand starts to filter through The arms revenues of the 26 companies in the Top 100 based in Europe rose by 0.9 percent to reach $121 billion in 2022.

“The war in Ukraine created demand for materiel suited to a war of attrition, like ammunition and armoured vehicles. Many European producers of these items saw their revenues grow,” said Lorenzo Scarazzato, a researcher with the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme.

“They included companies based in Germany, Norway and Poland.

For instance, Poland’s PGZ increased its arms revenue by 14 percent, benefiting from the accelerated military modernisation programme the country is pursuing.”

Trans-European companies Airbus and KNDS were among the main sources of arms revenue growth in Europe, largely due to deliveries against long-standing orders.

Turkish companies drive significant increase in Middle Eastern arms revenue The Middle East saw the largest percentage rise in arms revenue of any region in 2022, as all seven Middle East-based companies in

the Top 100 recorded substantial growth. Their combined arms revenues of $17.9 billion marked an 11 percent year-on-year increase.

The four Turkish companies’ total arms revenues reached $5.5 billion—22 percent more than in 2021. The aggregate arms revenues of the three Israeli companies in the ranking reached $12.4 billion in 2022, a 6.5 percent increase compared with 2021.

“Middle Eastern companies that specialise in less technologically sophisticated products were able to scale up production faster in response to surging demand,” said Dr Diego Lopes da Silva, SIPRI Senior Researcher. “A case in point is Türkiye’s Baykar, producer of the Bayraktar TB-2 drone. Baykar entered the Top 100 for the first time after its arms revenue rose by 94 percent, the fastest growth rate of any company in the ranking.”

Other notable developments In 2022 China accounted for the second largest share of combined Top 100 arms revenues by country, at 18 percent. The aggregate arms revenues of the eight Chinese arms companies in the ranking increased by 2.7 percent to $108 billion.

The arms revenues of the seven companies in the United Kingdom listed in the Top 100 grew by 2.6 percent to reach $41.8 billion, or 7.0 percent of the total.

Due to a lack of data, only two Russian companies were included in the Top 100 for 2022. Their combined arms revenues fell by 12 percent to $20.8 billion.

Transparency among Russian companies continues to decline.

The only Ukrainian company in the Top 100, UkrOboronProm, saw a 10 percent real-terms drop in its arms revenue to $1.3 billion.

Although its arms revenue increased in nominal terms, this was more than offset by the country’s high inflation.

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Royal New Zealand Navy to trial uncrewed, renewablepowered vessel The Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) will soon take delivery of a 6.8-metre renewablepowered Uncrewed Surface Vessel (USV) to trial on a short-term lease According to the New Zealand Defence Force, the Bluebottle is designed and manufactured by Sydney-based Ocius Technology, which has already sold a number of USVs to the Australian Defence Force and worked with Australian Border Force and other energy and scientific agencies.

USVs offer potential to undertake a wide variety of roles for the New Zealand Government. These could include fishery protection, border protection or providing meteorological data.

Once operational the Bluebottle will be able to undertake maritime tasks at sea without fuel or personnel on a trial basis.

The solar-, wind- or wave- powered vessel uses a retractable rigid sail to provide wind propulsion. Photoelectric cells on the sail can drive its motor.

In the absence of sunlight and wind, the Bluebottle has a unique flipper and rudder device to steer and propel itself. It has a top speed of five knots and the ability to operate at sea indefinitely in sea states up to 7 (wave heights of six to nine metres).

Sensors allow both safe and effective control of the system and identification of other vessels. Sensors include radar, and electro-optic and infra-red cameras.

The USV will be constantly monitored and operated from a control room at Devonport Naval Base, Communication with the control room is through mobile phone signal while close to shore or via high- and lowbandwidth satellite when further offshore.

The sheer size of New Zealand’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is one of the reasons the RNZN’s Maritime Component Commander, Commodore Garin Golding, is excited about the potential capability of the USV. “Our EEZ is the fifth largest in the world at more than four million square kilometres. Coupled with the 30 million square kilometre search and rescue area that New Zealand has responsibility for, that is a lot of ocean to cover,” Commodore Golding said.

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Courtesy Australian Government

“The evidence we’ve seen from our partner militaries overseas is that uncrewed drone aircraft and vessels can provide real value in fulfilling some of these search and surveillance tasks.”

The RNZN’s Autonomous Systems Staff Officer, Commander Andy Bryant, is also looking forward to the USV demonstrating its potential.

“The Bluebottle has already undertaken a range of activities in support of the Australian Government for long periods of time without the need for refuelling, recharging or crew respite.

I’m confident we will see similar benefits from the time we have with the vessel, particularly a better understanding of how to operate and sustain uncrewed vessels, and this will provide a great opportunity to share experiences on the new system with the Royal Australian Navy.

The USV can be transported by trailer to almost anywhere in New Zealand where it can be launched and recovered from a boat ramp. It can also craned on and off a Navy ship to launch on operations while deployed overseas.

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Linton Military Camp opens state-of-the-art maintenance facility to support NZ Army equipment The New Zealand Army has taken a major step forward in its ability to maintain a combat-capable, well-equipped and fully prepared fighting force with the opening of the new Maintenance Support Facility at Linton Military Camp Named Farrier Lines, the new 8,500-square-metre facility was opened on 06 December. It replaces Second World War-era buildings with state-of-the-art infrastructure which will allow personnel to maintain and repair current and future defence equipment.

From the Latin word ferrum (meaning iron), the name Farrier Lines is a nod to the history of artisanal metal work in the NZ Army, which includes repairing gun carriages and artillery, tending to cavalry horse shoes and blacksmith work, particularly during the First World War. The new facility cost around $50 million and is one of five planned infrastructure projects to be delivered as part of the NZ Army’s Consolidated Logistics Programme.

Chief of Army, Major General John Boswell, said the Linton facility would improve and modernise Army logistic service delivery to better enable the force to meet the demands of the modern day operating environment.

Farrier Lines has a number of features designed to improve its environmental footprint. It has underfloor heating, humidity and temperature controls, EV charging, solar panels and rainwater harvesting.

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Courtesy New Zealand Defence Force.

It will allow soldiers to work in comfort with drivethrough bays, hydraulic vehicle lifts, rolling roads, a gantry crane and a weapons range to test small arms after repairs.

This facility will help maintain the NZ Army’s primary combat vehicle, the Light Armoured Vehicle, the recently acquired armoured Bushmaster trucks and a wide range of weapons, radios and specialist equipment.

“Farrier Lines is key to ensuring future generations are well prepared for future challenges,” Major General Boswell said.

Fit-for-purpose logistics infrastructure is fundamental to our Army being combat-ready and able to operate across the spectrum of military operations, as and when required, domestically, throughout the Pacific and around the world.

Linton Military Camp, near Palmerston North, is home to more than 3,000 personnel, and is home to the Army’s primary operational force, 1(NZ) Brigade.

It is also home to its biggest workshop which supports several hundred vehicles and its widest range of equipment.

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Annual Tohu Awards recognise importance of employers and excellence The annual Tohu Awards, run by the Defence Employer Support Council (DESC), recognise excellence from members of the Reserve Forces, Cadet Force Officers and LSV Graduates and the commitment from the organisations who support them According to DESC, in addition to recognising members and their employers, the awards also recognise the fact that employers also benefit in employing and supporting Reserve Force members, Cadet Force Officers, and LSV Graduates, as the training they receive through the NZDF helps develop and sharpen their skills in leadership, teamwork, communication, discipline, planning, management, and much more.

Announced in the presence of senior NZDF Leadership and the DESC Chair on 07 November in Wellington, the 2023 award winners are: • Limited Service Volunteer Employer Recognition Award: Taylor Preston Ltd, represented by Barry Walsh • Reserve Employer of the Year (Large Employer Category): KPMG NZ, represented by Partner, Grant Riley • Reserve Employer of the Year (Small Employer Category): Reswax Ltd, represented by CEO, Peter Griffiths • Reservist of the Year: Jointly awarded to SGT Caroline (Daisy) Williams and LCPL Rhys Dillon • Outstanding Contribution to the Limited Service Volunteer Programme: Glenn Dawson, NZ Police • Cadet Forces Employer of the Year: Toi Ohomai - Te Pūkenga, represented by Associate Dean Automotive, Engineering, Maritime and Logistics, Dan Taylor

effective information sharing among team members. This software has been essential in coordinating the activities and outputs of the unit and LCPL Dillon’s efforts have been widely praised.

LCPL Dillon’s commitment to the NZDF is remarkable, especially given his demanding civilian job as a pilot for Air New Zealand. Despite his busy schedule, he has demonstrated exceptional dedication to his work within the NZDF Reserve Force.

SGT Caroline (Daisy) Williams is an outstanding performer within the NZDF Reserve Force and this has been recognised by her unit, the Directorate of Army Reserves, AGS. She has raised the profile of the Army Reserve Forces through her commitment in the role as a photographer and journalist. The quality of her images and the work she has produced has drawn praise and is a direct reflection of her enthusiasm, creative imagination and work ethos to produce exemplary media products.

Her professionalism, dedication and ethical standards make her an exemplary Reservist. SGT Williams is an asset to both the unit and the wider Defence Force, and she is thoroughly deserving of the Reservist of the Year Award.

Reservist of the year (jointly awarded) LCPL Rhys Dillon is an outstanding performer within the NZDF Reserve Force and this has been recognised by his unit, Southern Health Support Squadron, Deployable Health Organisation.

One of his major accomplishments was identifying a communication gap within the Reserve unit and introducing a new local software platform that enabled 28

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Reserve Employer of the year (Large Employer Category) KPMG (NZ) is interested in the careers of Reservists and willingly supports their careers in the military alongside a civilian career within KPMG NZ. KPMG recognises and embraces Reservists and the skills they have gained through military training, enabling cover of civilian engagements while Reservists attend NZDF training. Additional emergency response leave is also considered for Reservists when they are required to respond to domestic emergency events at short or even no notice.

KPMG enables a supportive work environment through an HR Policy which includes 10 days of Reservist Leave, enabling Reservists to attend training without having to take unpaid leave.

Reserve Employer of the year (Small Employer Category) Reswax (Resin and Wax Holdings Ltd) actively acknowledges the benefits of military service as a contribution to its business by providing flexible working arrangements as required, enabling time to be spent on both reserve and civilian tasks. This is formally provided for in employment contracts.

Reswax recognises the unique skills Reservists bring to their workplace. These skills are valued and seen as beneficial to the company. The company acknowledges the benefits of employing reservists by granting extensive leave when required and providing flexible day-to-day working arrangements.

Reswax has developed its ability to support Reservist employees while balancing the company’s goals through reassignment and/or reprioritisation of tasks ultimately contributing to the development of staff and organisational resilience.

Outstanding Contribution to the Limited Service Volunteer Programme The Outstanding Contribution to the LSV Programme Award for 2023 is awarded to Glenn Dawson in recognition of his enduring support and actions as an LSV Course Police Mentor, specifically his devotion and participation in course activities where he engaged with trainees and staff with consistent professionalism, enthusiasm and passion.

During his time as a Police Mentor for the LSV course, Glenn’s sole focus was the success of trainees on the course. Glenn made the most of his opportunities throughout his time, to create a rapport and bond with the course trainees. He is an engaging person who has the confidence to establish effective relationships with all youth, enabling him to gain their trust and break down perceptions and barriers.

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Glenn has regularly sought guidance and provided counsel and direction, allowing youth to make a positive change in their lives and give themselves options for a pathway towards a better life, including briefing them on the LSV course.

Employer Contribution to the LSV Programme Taylor Preston has been an enduring supporter of the Limited Service Volunteer (LSV) Programme and the company’s Recruitment Manager, Barry Walsh, is a long-time active benefactor of the LSV programme. Over many years, Barry has given up evenings to speak with the trainees in an open and honest approach about what working in the meat industry looks like, the type of work, and the opportunities that come from working in the industry.

Since the LSV programme returned to the Wellington region in 2019, Taylor Preston has employed over 30 graduates and these graduates are given time off to talk to current trainees about their LSV experience and work journey.

The values, vision and purpose of the LSV programme continue to be reinforced by Taylor Preston with graduates who accept employment opportunities with the company.

New Zealand Cadet Force Officer Employer of the Year Toi Ohomai – Te Pūkenga has demonstrated a strong commitment to supporting the New Zealand Cadet Forces (NZCF) and has consistently provided support to MAJ Crawshaw and the Cadet Units in Western Bay of Plenty.

Toi Ohomai – Te Pūkenga have HR policies that prioritise service in the organisation and recognise the value of skills obtained through the NZCF training programme, regularly utilising skills gained from NZCF in the workplace.

Leadership and guidance provided by line managers at Toi Ohomai - Te Pūkenga have been instrumental in helping nominator MAJ E. Crawshaw achieve success in his role as a senior Cadet Force Officer.

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Large Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operates From Aircraft Carrier

Photo of Mojave flying above the HMS Prince of Wales on November 15, 2023

Making aviation history doesn’t happen overnight. New Zealand understands the evolution of innovation in aviation, and the short takeoff and landing, or STOL, attributes of the General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc. (GAASI) Mojave Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) deliver on that mindset -- especially, as STOL capability is as applicable to rough, unprepared surfaces across the region as it is to flying from an aircraft carrier.

Engineers and executives at GA-ASI were confident the STOL Mojave demonstrator aircraft could, and would, launch from an aircraft carrier and then land back aboard the vessel on the first go-round: a less forgiving surface than a rough field but well within Mojave’s capability.

They just hadn’t done it before.

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“It’s sort of like when you take your 4 x 4 sport utility vehicle out onto a back country trail for the first time,” said one engineer involved with the project. “You know it was built for that. You know it’s got a mode for that…it’s got the right wing, tires, high clearance, everything. You just need to go out and prove it.”

Likewise with the Mojave, a medium-altitude, long-endurance aircraft derived from the company’s highly successful MQ-1C Gray Eagle. With a different engine, wings, control surfaces, and landing gear, Mojave had been built to need considerably less ground roll for takeoff and landing and to operate from rough or unimproved surfaces.

That, in fact, it had done, with highly successful tests in the

California high desert. The aircraft drove through dust and sand at an unpaved test strip and got airborne with no problem. Those tests mostly were focused on demonstrating the capability and not minimizing the takeoff distance or landing roll.

When they were complete, the engineering team needed to apply what they’d learned to a new operating environment: a ship at sea.

Feet wet Fortunately, GA-ASI has an eager partner just as interested in leaning forward into what’s possible.

The British Government is a world leader in innovative mediumaltitude, long-endurance RPAS. The Royal Air Force (RAF) is currently taking delivery of its 16 Protector RG Mk 1 aircraft manufactured by Line of Defence

Photo of Mojave as it landed on the flight deck of the HMS Prince of Wales

GA-ASI, which include significant industrial input from British companies and experts. Inspired by the RAF’s efforts, the Royal Navy took interest in seeing what Mojave could do aboard one of its most important warships, the aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales.

That meant, first, an analysis about how best to operate the aircraft from the ship’s flight deck.

One thing the study returned was the conclusion that even though the HMS Prince of Wales has an inclined ramp at its bow to help its jet aircraft power into the air on takeoff, Mojave wouldn’t need the ramp. Rather than driving the aircraft to a conventional starting position and then running straight down the normal launch axis of the carrier, Mojave could take off in a run from the stern at an angle toward the port side of the flight deck.

Another factor to consider was the difference between the way remotely piloted aircraft typically are flown – from a ground control station firmly stable on terra firma – and the way Mojave’s pilots would need to be situated on the ship. So, Line of Defence

GA-ASI engineers built a ground control station on the back of a truck bed and drove it at speeds similar to those used by the HMS Prince of Wales when underway at sea for flight operations.

“One thing we learned very quickly was that our guys needed seat belts!” laughed another engineer on the team. “We got them set up with harnesses. They continued training and it didn’t take very long to get the hang of it. These are the kinds of things you always learn when you’re taking something from the concept stage to the operational stage.”

Bolstered by more than 100 real-life takeoff and landing cycles at a company test facility as well as new software for the aircraft, the engineering team achieved a smooth process of execution and developed great confidence in their ability to take the Mojave from land to sea.

“We were hitting the box every time,” the second engineer said. “We knew it was going to go well.”

So it proved, with a successful takeoff on the first attempt from the HMS Prince of Wales at sea off the East Coast of the United States on

November 15, 2023. The ship’s flight controllers talked on the radio to Mojave’s pilot as though he was on board the aircraft, even though he was sitting by his instruments in a different part of the ship. After the flight, the ship recovered the aircraft as expected, just as it would any other in its air wing. Both takeoff and landing were achieved comfortably on the available deck space.

Mojave’s carrier operations were part of a broader effort by GA-ASI and its partners to push the worldchanging capabilities of mediumaltitude remotely piloted aircraft.

These aircraft have changed warfare, intelligence, disaster response, lifesaving, and other missions forever – though nearly always operating from conventional land bases.

Maritime operations More than 70 percent of Earth’s surface, however, is ocean. Deploying a new aircraft such as the STOL variant of the MQ-9B SeaGuardian – larger and more capable than the Mojave demonstrator – will revolutionize how defence forces operate.

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Render of MQ-9B STOL taking off from an LHD

The current version of the MQ9B can fly for 40 hours in some configurations, far longer than any conventional crewed aircraft. It has already logged many operational successes in service with the Japan Coast Guard, the Indian Navy, and in exercises with the U.S. and international navies. A sea-based STOL version would take those capabilities anywhere allied warships like the HMS Prince of Wales need to operate. And on land, very short, unprepared strips could be employed.

MQ-9B STOL might contribute to fleet defence by serving as an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; airborne early warning; or anti-submarine warfare platform for a carrier strike group.

It might scout ahead to be sure the waters and airspace are clear.

Or allied militaries could launch MQ-9B STOL and deploy to littoral areas, or deep inland, to contribute to missions without the need for a regional airbase on land to support 32

the aircraft. MQ-9B STOL could support humanitarian assistance and disaster recovery operations, including forest firefighting and search and rescue. Or it could take on a number of other roles staged from the carrier offshore.

Mojave’s successful test aboard the HMS Prince of Wales has shown what’s possible. Royal Navy leaders already say they are thinking about what will come next.

“During a deployment centered around experimentation and expanding the envelope of the Queen Elizabeth class carrier, this is one of the highlights,” said Royal Navy Cmdr. Martin Russell, head of air operations aboard the HMS Prince of Wales. “Integrating the Navy Develop and General Atomics personnel into the Prince of Wales team was key to enabling such a large RPAS to operate from the deck during this trial, with the capability feeling like a glimpse into the future of these ships.”

Following the demonstration, the Royal Navy’s Second Sea Lord, Vice Adm. Martin Connell, also suggested that his might not be the only sea service that could adopt new aircraft and capabilities.

“With so many international partners interested in the results of these Mojave trials on board HMS Prince of Wales, I am delighted that we are taking the lead in such exciting and important work to unlock the longer-term potential of the aircraft carrier and push it deep into the 21st Century as a highly potent striking capability.”

So, whether for short, unprepared regional landing strips or on board small ‘f lat-tops’ like the Australian Canberra Class Landing Helicopter Dock that do not have launch and recovery equipment, Mojave and its successor, the MQ-9B STOL, have the potential to expand multidomain capabilities for defence and security forces.

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Israel’s AI can produce 100 bombing targets a day in Gaza.

Is this the future of war?

Recent conflict demonstrates the ability of Artificial Intelligence to increase the speed of warfare, writes the ANU’s Dr Bianca Baggiarini, but does AI lose its compass in the fog of war?

Reports have emerged that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are using an artificial intelligence (AI) system called Habsora (Hebrew for “The Gospel”) to select targets in the war on Hamas in Gaza. The system has reportedly been used to find more targets for bombing, to link locations to Hamas operatives, and to estimate likely numbers of civilian deaths in advance.

What does it mean for AI targeting systems like this to be used in conflict? My research into the social, political and ethical implications of military use of remote and autonomous systems shows AI is already altering the character of war.

Militaries use remote and autonomous systems as “force multipliers” to increase the impact of their troops and protect their soldiers’ lives. AI systems can make soldiers more efficient, and are likely to enhance the speed and lethality of warfare – even as humans become less visible on the battlefield, instead gathering intelligence and targeting from afar.

When militaries can kill at will, with little risk to their own soldiers, will the current ethical thinking about war prevail? Or will the increasing use of AI also increase the dehumanisation of adversaries and 34

the disconnect between wars and the societies in whose names they are fought?

“authored” its outputs, no matter how objective and rational they may seem.

AI in war AI is having an impact at all levels of war, from “intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance” support, like the IDF’s Habsora system, through to “lethal autonomous weapons systems” that can choose and attack targets without human intervention.

These systems have the potential to reshape the character of war, making it easier to enter into a conflict. As complex and distributed systems, they may also make it more difficult to signal one’s intentions – or interpret those of an adversary – in the context of an escalating conflict.

To this end, AI can contribute to mis- or disinformation, creating and amplifying dangerous misunderstandings in times of war.

AI systems may increase the human tendency to trust suggestions from machines (this is highlighted by the Habsora system, named after the infallible word of God), opening up uncertainty over how far to trust autonomous systems. The boundaries of an AI system that interacts with other technologies and with people may not be clear, and there may be no way to know who or what has

High-speed machine learning Perhaps one of the most basic and important changes we are likely to see driven by AI is an increase in the speed of warfare. This may change how we understand military deterrence, which assumes humans are the primary actors and sources of intelligence and interaction in war.

Militaries and soldiers frame their decision-making through what is called the “OODA loop” (for observe, orient, decide, act).

A faster OODA loop can help you outmanoeuvre your enemy. The goal is to avoid slowing down decisions through excessive deliberation, and instead to match the accelerating tempo of war.

So the use of AI is potentially justified on the basis it can interpret and synthesise huge amounts of data, processing it and delivering outputs at rates that far surpass human cognition.

But where is the space for ethical deliberation in an increasingly fast and data-centric OODA loop cycle happening at a safe distance from battle?

Israel’s targeting software is an example of this acceleration. A Line of Defence

former head of the IDF has said that human intelligence analysts might produce 50 bombing targets in Gaza each year, but the Habsora system can produce 100 targets a day, along with real-time recommendations for which ones to attack.

How does the system produce these targets? It does so through probabilistic reasoning offered by machine learning algorithms.

Machine learning algorithms learn through data. They learn by seeking patterns in huge piles of data, and their success is contingent on the data’s quality and quantity.

They make recommendations based on probabilities.

The probabilities are based on pattern-matching. If a person has enough similarities to other people labelled as an enemy combatant, they too may be labelled a combatant themselves.

The problem of AI enabled targeting at a distance Some claim machine learning enables greater precision in targeting, which makes it easier to avoid harming innocent people and using a proportional amount of force.

However, the idea of more precise targeting of airstrikes has not been successful in the past, as the high toll of declared and undeclared civilian casualties from the global war on terror shows.

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Moreover, the difference between a combatant and a civilian is rarely self-evident. Even humans frequently cannot tell who is and is not a combatant.

Technology does not change this fundamental truth. Often social categories and concepts are not objective, but are contested or specific to time and place. But computer vision together with algorithms are more effective in predictable environments where concepts are objective, reasonably stable, and internally consistent.

Will AI make war worse?

We live in a time of unjust wars and military occupations, egregious violations of the rules of engagement, and an incipient arms race in the face of US–China rivalry. In this context, the inclusion of AI in war may add new complexities that exacerbate, rather than prevent, harm.

AI systems make it easier for actors in war to remain anonymous, and can render invisible the source of violence or the decisions which lead to it. In turn, we may see increasing disconnection between militaries, soldiers, and civilians, and the wars being fought in the name of the nation they serve.

And as AI grows more common in war, militaries will develop countermeasures to undermine it, creating a loop of escalating militarisation.

What now?

Can we control AI systems to head off a future in which warfare is driven by increasing reliance on technology underpinned by learning algorithms? Controlling AI development in any area, particularly via laws and regulations, has proven difficult.

Many suggest we need better laws to account for systems underpinned by machine learning, but even this is not straightforward. Machine learning algorithms are difficult to regulate.

AI-enabled weapons may program and update themselves, evading legal requirements for certainty. The engineering maxim “software is never done” implies that the law may never match the speed of technological change.

The quantitative act of estimating likely numbers of civilian deaths in advance, which the Habsora system does, does not tell us much about the qualitative dimensions of targeting. Systems like Habsora in isolation cannot really tell us much about whether a strike would be ethical or legal (that is, whether it is proportionate, discriminate and necessary, among other considerations).

AI should support democratic ideals, not undermine them. Trust in governments, institutions, and militaries is eroding and needs to be restored if we plan to apply AI across a range of military practices.

We need to deploy critical ethical and political analysis to interrogate emerging technologies and their effects so any form of military violence is considered to be the last resort.

Until then, machine learning algorithms are best kept separate from targeting practices. Unfortunately, the world’s armies are heading in the opposite direction. *This article was first published in The Conversation on 08 December 2023.

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Quasi-Internal Armed Conflicts as a Tool of Geopolitics: Russia’s armed forces in Moldova, Chechnya, and Syria Disguised as either peacekeeping or counter-terrorist efforts, three conflicts highlight Russian expansionism, and the international community’s failure to notice has set a dangerous precedent, writes Kyrylo Cyril Kutcher

Kyrylo Cyril Kutcher is a founding fellow of the “Creative Ukrainians” project in Aotearoa. Holding an MSc, he is pursuing a degree in Politics and International Relations in the Massey University of Auckland

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Introduction Internal armed conflicts are sometimes internationalised via external support for one of the parties involved. However, there are civil wars which are only masked as internal conflicts to avoid a stronger international reaction.

An escalation by the Russian Federation (RF) of its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 made its aggression a central and the most concerning problem of contemporary world affairs. The international community overlooked the so-called ‘Russian world’ retrogressing into the de-facto ideology of Ruscism to the point where it exploded with international hatred.

To understand the deeper causes of this phenomenon, international responses to those armed conflicts, which gradually and cumulatively facilitated the invasion of Ukraine, ought to be reassessed. It requires the understanding of a timeline that begins in the time of Muscovy or Moscovia (the original name of the state formed around Moscow in the 15th -17th centuries) through to the rebirth of the Russian state in 1991.

The focus of this essay is on politico-strategic aspects of armed

conflicts in three countries, which are conventionally classified as internal – the Transnistrian War in Moldova (1990-92), two Russian Chechen Wars (1994-96 and 19992009), and the Syrian civil war (2011-present) – but continue to be relevant in the context of today’s regional security.

The international community in the spotlight here include states, and intergovernmental and international organisations, which in various politically meaningful ways attempted to respond to those conflicts. Without due regard to history and the true motives behind Moscow’s moves, however, the international community failed to recognise the Kremlin’s deliberate distortion of reality in each of these conflicts and to identify and curb the escalating violence of Russian imperialism.

Transnistria in Moldova The first case study – the Transnistrian conflict in Moldova – demonstrates how a legacy of empire and its elite’s rejection of its irreversible collapse led to geopolitical issues that have resulted in ongoing diplomatic deadlock.

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The Republic of Moldova is situated in Eastern Europe, landlocked between Ukraine and Romania. The river Dniester (Romanian/Moldovan – Nistru) crosses the territory of Moldova from the northwest to the southeast, separating a 450km-long and 45kmwide strip of land on its eastern bank from the remaining 88% of the country. The most widely used name for this region is Transnistria.

Historically Transnistria’s political meaning as a separate administrative unit was artificially carved by Moscow in 1924 out of Ukrainian lands with a high percentage of ethnic Moldovans. It was named Moldavian Autonomous Oblast in propaganda efforts to grab the lands to the west of the Dniester.

After the pact with Nazi Germany, the Soviets occupied Moldova proper in 1940 and merged it with Transnistria into the Moldavian Soviet Socialistic Republic.

Like the eastern regions of Ukraine in the 19th century, the industrialisation of Transnistria after the Second World War brought labour, military and Line of Defence

administrative personnel from the eastern republics and made the region distinctively – but also ahistorically – Russian-speaking and dominated by Russian civilian and military elites. It started playing a disproportionally important role in the region, and the sentiments of those new local people in Transnistria became what Timothy Snyder called a “political resource” for Moscow on the eve of Moldova’s declaration of independence in 1991.

Wrapped up into local sentiments for international observers, Moscow’s handling of the conflict in Transnistria and its political aftermath became a playbook for manipulating other quasi-internal armed conflicts.

The conflict in Transnistria broke out in opposition to Moldova’s declaration of sovereignty in 1990, and for its remaining in the Soviet Union. However, the Transnistrian declaration of forming a Soviet union-level republic independent from Moldova the same year later was formally invalidated by the Soviet Union central government.

Upon the dissolution of the Soviet state in 1991, the UN recognised the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova in March 1992. Neither fact dissuaded the new Russian government in Moscow from dealing directly with the Transnistrian administration, aiding it militarily during the war and then economically and politically in the decades after, nor from signing a ceasefire agreement with Chisinau (Moldova’s capital) bilaterally, effectively implicating itself as a party to the conflict.

Internationally, the Kremlin presented the conflict in Transnistria as an internal problem, claiming the role of mediator and peacemaker.

Nevertheless, Moscow treated Transnistrian ministers as if they represented a recognised independent state, and in 2006 facilitated a summit in Sukhumi with leaders of Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia (two break-away regions in Georgia chipped away by Moscow in similar fashion), followed by the signing of a treaty and a declaration of the creation of a Commonwealth between them.

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY The international practice of deploying peacekeepers to protect civilians and prevent hostilities in conflict zones has been systematically abused by the Kremlin to further its own geopolitical interests, starting with Transnistria. The Transnistrian quasi-state has been preserved by Moscow-subordinate military forces since before the Soviet Union’s dissolution. The 1992 ceasefire agreement provided for the additional establishment of a contingent of so-called peacekeepers – the Joint Control Commission – consisting of Russian, pro-Russian Transnistrian, and formally Moldovan forces.

In practice, the Kremlin legitimised and strengthened the subordinate military force guarding its de-facto occupied territories and keeping Moldova permanently threatened and destabilised. Moscow systematically ignored requests made at several summits since 1994 and via NATO (2008) and UN General Assembly (2018) resolutions to remove an illegally remaining Russian division.

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Moldova’s suggestions to replace Russian ‘peacekeepers’ with a more neutral contingent under the United Nations’ command were ignored too. Permanent destabilisation through never-leaving ‘peacekeepers’ was replicated by Moscow in the Southern Caucasus – in the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia, and in the Nagorno-Karabakh, territory formally disputed between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The Transnistrian case highlights the fallacy of an international legal framework that allowed an external state actor to become an exclusive decision-maker in an armed conflict resolution process, effectively rendering the rest of the international community impotent.

The OSCE in its first engagement and proposals was naïve to assume the conflict was caused purely by ethnical sentiments and that the Kremlin itself had no strategic interest in keeping Moldova fractured. Where other parties pursued resolution, Muscovy’s goal was to ‘divide and rule’.

That became unambiguous when in 2003 Russian President Putin almost succeeded in pushing forward the so-called ‘Kozak Memorandum’, which envisioned the federalisation of Moldova and an exclusive role for the RF as a security guarantor preserving its ‘peacekeepers’ in the region. Concerns privately expressed to the then-President of Moldova by leaders of the European Union (EU), the Council of Europe and the OSCE helped to avert what could have become the irrevocable fall of Moldova to the Kremlin’s complete military and political control.

Neither alternative international plans nor a change in negotiation format, which included the EU and the US as observers, were able to move the process out of deadlock.

As noted by Johannes Socher, judgements of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in multiple cases over the next 15 years validated the direct political, military, and economic authority of Moscow over Transnistria. Timothy Snyder notes that for the Kremlin

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“the point of freezing a conflict is to prevent any resolution”.

Transnistria was one of the first de-facto Russian military springboards in the Black Sea region and a significant lever in Moscow’s geopolitical and future wars strategy.

That became apparent with the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Openly admitted by the RF Ministry of Defence, one of the goals of the Ukraine operation is to establish “a [land] corridor to Transnistria”.

Insofar as the original plan failed, the threat of destabilisation and orchestrated regime change in Moldova has become more acute on the security agendas of Chisinau, Kyiv, and their Western allies, as such an outcome would enable Moscow to bring in more Russian troops into Transnistria and threaten Ukraine along an extra 450km of frontline.

Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Histories and demographic realities Line of Defence

can be rewritten at a victor’s whim and, once enough time passes, primordial affiliation is claimed and assumed – the international community rarely objects unless the oppressed make a decisive stand.

Doom for the free Chechen people of the Northern Caucasus was initially brought by the illomened decision of the Georgian king from across the ridge to reach out to Russia for military assistance in the 18th century. As in the case of Georgia, this resulted in the conquest of Chechen lands by the newly established Russian Empire.

Chechens rebelled, sometimes successfully restoring control for a short periods, including in the middle of the 19th century.

Then, in 1917-1922, the independent Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus was formed by various ethnic groups, including the Circassians, Chechens, Ingush, Ossetians and Dagestanis, and was de-jure recognised by two

dozen countries, including the ‘great powers’ (Gülseven, 2021). As was the case for the Crimean Tatars, entire Chechen and Ingush populations were ultimately deported from their lands to Siberia in 1944 by the Soviet regime alleging they had collaborated with Nazi Germany (which barely reached the region). Half of them perished on the way.

Deportees were allowed to return after Stalin died in 1956 (for comparison, Crimean Tatars were ‘rehabilitated’ only in 1989), and after declaration of sovereignty in 1991, parliamentary and presidential elections, and a national referendum, the independent Chechen Republic was proclaimed. It then took two bloody wars over the next twenty years for Russian occupiers to reconquer the Chechen state, and to record the events into the annals of history as an internal armed conflict.

The Chechen case demonstrates the selectivity of the international 39

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY community when it comes to a recognition of a people’s selfdetermination and state’s sovereignty versus existing geopolitical priorities.

The 1990s were characterised by the embracing of benevolent relations between the West and the new Moscovian state. Europe’s ‘change through trade’ and the US’ ‘Russia first’ policies mainly ignored the interests of nations long imprisoned in the Soviet – and prior to that – Russian empires. Presidents George H.W. Bush and then Bill Clinton both advocated for as much unity within the RF as possible, calling the First Chechen war an “internal matter” of Russia.

The world leaders’ priority was security and stability of a region that possessed the largest nuclear arsenal in the world.

In 1993 the Chechen Republic refused to sign the Treaty of Federations composed by the Kremlin for its 89 subjects, as it no longer considered itself a Russian subject.

As Johannes Socher observed, the

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Russian Constitutional Court held in 1995 that “the Russian Constitution does not provide for a right to secede for its constituent republics”, despite the Soviet Union’s most recent constitution formally enabling union-level republics to do so, and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic amending its constitution in 1990 listing the Chechen-Ingush republic a union-level republic.

The court, as noted by many scholars, intentionally misapplied incomplete subclauses from selected international laws, concluding that “the Chechen Republic was not entitled to the right to secession on the grounds of the principle of selfdetermination”.

Still, the new Moscovian state saw the need to convince the international community that its invasions of Chechnya in 1994 and 1999 were exclusively internal business. And it succeeded. Other states and intergovernmental and international organisations remained indifferent.

Officials from the International

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) legally considered the situation in Chechnya as “an armed conflict of a non-international character”.

When the Kremlin, after losing the first war, started its second campaign, the European Council declared in 1999 that it “does not question the right of Russia to preserve its territorial integrity”.

The only country that recognised the independence of the Chechen Republic was Georgia in 1992. In 2022, Ukraine’s Parliament passed a resolution recognising Chechnya as temporarily occupied by Russian Federation and condemning “Russia’s genocide of the Chechen people”.

9/11 and the US-led Global War on Terror empowered Muscovy’s narrative framing of its deadly invasions of Chechnya as a fight against international terrorism.

Newly ascended to the Kremlin, Putin labelled his unimaginable violence in the Northern Caucasus a ‘counter-terrorist operation’ and claimed that it was internationally

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inspired, but after 9/11 he remained even more steadfast than before in preventing any international involvement.

Mark Smith notes that in July 2002, US Ambassador Vershbow “rather rashly” acknowledged that Al-Qaeda was aiding terrorists in Chechnya, which coincided with the growing US conspiracy about Iraq’s alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction. Once the US accepted the definition of the conflict in Chechnya as an ‘exercise in counterterrorism’, the Kremlin became relieved of any fear over international scrutiny of its atrocities committed as part of its coercion campaigns, even claiming that the campaigns bore some ‘moral value’.

Any time European criticism emerged, Putin claimed to be performing an honourable mission and rebuked critics for their lack of gratitude: “Russia is really standing at the forefront of the war against international terrorism,” he said in 1999. “And Europe ought to fall Line of Defence

on its knees and express its great thankfulness that we, unfortunately, are fighting it alone”.

No international actor appeared to possess enough political will and power to push back against this permanent member of the UN Security Council, with the US even seeming to concede to its rhetoric in the early 2000s.

Observing the Chechen wars, the international community failed to learn the lesson that Moscow engages in negotiations and promotes ceasefires not for genuine compromise but rather to gain a tactical or strategic advantage ahead of its next move.

Then-president of the RF Yeltsin never conceded to direct talks with the then-president of the Chechen Republic Dzhokhar Dudayev, as this could have been interpreted as a recognition of the latter’s government. The Kremlin, however, used negotiations as a pretext to get Dudayev on a satellite phone and get him killed in a satellite signal-guided

air strike in April 1996.

The ceasefire of 1996 was negotiated because Russia was not able to overcome the Chechen resistance and were losing the war.

Moscow traded the Khasavyurt peace talks to be brokered by the OSCE for Russia’s ascendance into the Security Council of Europe.

The first principle defined in the 1996 Khasavyurt Russian-Chechen Truce required that “[a]n Agreement on the basis for mutual relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic, to be determined in accordance with universally recognised principles and norms of international law should be achieved by 31 December 2001.”

No agreement, however, was able to stop the Kremlin from planning its next invasion, which from March 1999, according to the then-Minister of Internal Affairs Stepash in 2000, was “preparing for an active offensive”.

Rather, in the Second Chechen war, informal negotiations and 41

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY amnesties were used by Muscovites to coerce Chechen commanders to stop fighting or change sides or otherwise face “extrajudicial killings or attacks on and abduction of relatives.”

Occasional suggestions from various international actors about a ceasefire and negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv in 2022-2023 only prove that the lessons of the recent past have not been well learned. In the absence of Russia being defeated and prosecuted for its crimes, and without the systematic dismantling of the Russian imperial mentality, Muscovites will inevitably invade again.

Syria Impunity for the crimes only encourages a state aggressor to intensify and spread its application of violence as part of its political strategy. After the government of Syria employed military force to suppress civil protests in multiple cities across the country in April 2011, international sanctions against the Syrian regime under Bashar alAssad surged.

Nevertheless, over that year, Moscow sold to Damascus at least $1 billion worth of armed weapons, with the Moscow Times calling out “$4 billion in active armed contracts” with another “five major contracts impossible to verify” – that contrasts with $1.5 billion worth arms sold over the previous decade.

Building on their rich experience in the Second Chechen War, Russian military advisers assisted Assad to fight rebel forces mercilessly, including the use of technologies for targeting, methods of silencing international reporters, and the tactics of slaughtering dissidents and obliterating towns. In 2012, Putin, rebuked claims that Russia was supporting the al-Assad regime in this way, stating that “Russia does not supply such arms which could be used in the civil conflict.”

42

Russia vetoed the first UN Security Council resolution in 2012 that called for all parties to stop violence and urge the Syrian Government for a peaceful and inclusive dialogue within own state.

The RF has vetoed sixteen more UNSC resolutions on Syria since then. As noted by Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations Richard Mills, “Russia has sought to shield the Assad regime from accountability for its brutal human rights abuses, its chemical weapons use.”

It was in Moscow’s geopolitical interests to do this, and there was neither the institutional mechanism in the UN nor political will on the side of its members to peacefully deter the Kremlin from providing its support to the Assad regime.

Challenged in Syria, a liberal model of conflict management cracked under the violent force of coercive mediation and top-down peace enforcement. Over 2011-2013, opposition forces managed to execute basic governance over the territories they controlled in Syria, but Russia’s direct military intervention in 2015 hammered most of those into chaos.

Russia did not intend to treat rebels as equals in negotiations nor find a genuine compromise, instead, it used bombardments and sieges of cities full of civilians to persuade fighters to surrender or leave the territory as it had previously done in Chechnya and currently in Ukraine.

Russia developed local militias under direct control, such as the Tiger Force and the Liwa al-Quds, who it used to continue the violence while conducting talks; a tactic it had previously employed in Chechnya, Georgia and Ukraine.

“As Guarantor powers, Russia, Iran, and Turkey seek to achieve a reduction in violence through its constant use, and by demarcating what counts as legitimate and illegitimate violence as part of Syrian ‘peace’,” notes Samer Abboud.

As David Lewis observes, to achieve a political settlement, Moscow relied on violence, political exclusion and buying loyalties through its own network of official and unofficial humanitarian aid and religious organisations, using all its power in the UNSC to block UNled aid. In contrast to the inclusive format of the Geneva peace talks, the Moscow-led Astana process was built on geopolitical interests, and attempted to construct an alternative controllable opposition in Syria with whom the al-Assad government could strike a deal.

The international community did even worse than nothing in response. In 2019, US President Trump ordered the withdrawal of the US forces, which had carried out anti-terrorist operations and protection of civilians in oppositioncontrolled areas in Syria. In the end, the Kremlin honed its model of conflict management abroad and started marketing its service as an international security provider as an alternative to legacy international institutions.

The inadequacy of international law and enforcement created an opportunity for the Kremlin to deny direct involvement, while private military companies like Wagner did their criminal bidding on the ground.

In 2018 in Deir-ez-Zour, Syria, at least two hundred Russian citizens perished in Wagner’s attack against the US and Syrian opposition forces, who the Kremlin denied were even there. Wagner mercenaries took over the oil and gas fields in Syria, with the Russian Ministry of Energy standing to benefit through a share in future revenues.

The gravity and scale of war crimes perpetrated by the Wagner Group in Syria were highlighted in a case filed with the European Court of Human Rights in 2021 regarding the torture and beheading of a Syrian man, which Line of Defence

remains unresolved. Wagner’s formal designation as a terrorist organisation by the international community came rather late, only after its unconcealed atrocities in 2022-2023 in Ukraine.

From the covert military actions in Moldova, militias in Chechnya and Georgia, and troops without insignia in Crimea, the Russian mercenary group Wagner emerged during the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Fully employed in Syria, and with operations spread at least into Africa and South America, the group cultivated relations with local governments in the shadows on behalf of the Kremlin.

Ultimately, the international community failed to listen to and act on a foreknowledge of the outcomes that appeasement and indulgence towards Ruscism were bound to lead the world to.

Almost thirty years ago Dzhokhar Dudayev explained what the world should expect from Line of Defence

Russians, observing that Russia “started to flirt with Europe to regain strength and extend its reach to the Indian Ocean, the Middle East, the Bosporus, the Red Sea, but then it will hit Europe”.

A former Soviet Army General, Dudayev noted in 1995 that “there is yet to be a slaughter in Crimea; Ukraine will clash with Russia irreconcilably; [and] as long as Ruscism exists, it will never abandon its ambitions.”

His descriptions are even more pertinent today at the second year of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine: “Russians are facing the world stripped and turned inside out...

The whole world has seen who the Russians are, what Ruscism is, how dangerous it is for the world, and how much more important it was to fight Ruscism. Now this disease is neglected, and they [Russians] are rattling with black suitcases, […] hands are stretching to the nuclear pushbuttons...”

Conclusion Moldova, Chechnya, and Syria are just a few cases that demonstrate how dismissive the international community has been over the last three decades, reluctant to tame the Kremlin’s use of military violence as a continuation of expansionist strategy and imperialism concealed behind a ‘liberal mimicry’ and false narratives of peacekeeping and of fighting terrorism.

While Russia has been manipulating the consciousness of the international community, blackmailing, racketeering, and committing terrorism on an international scale, the international community has embarked on a quest to ‘understand the mysterious Russian soul’ and in trying to find a compromise, even when it meant appeasement towards the aggressor. Lessons must be learned and acted on before it is too late, as the implications for the global community are potentially dire.

43

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ISO 31000:2018 The Case for Reform

According to a just-published whitepaper, the current ISO 31000 Risk Management standard is based on 1980s models no longer fit for purpose – and it needs a whopping big overhaul to pull it into the current millennium If you’re a security consultant, risk consultant, security risk management professional or a member of one of any number of similar sounding occupations, then you probably know a thing or two about the international standard ISO 31000.

No doubt you’ve probably also got an opinion or two about it.

Love it or hate it, the phenomenally successful ISO 31000 standard is coming to the end of its life as a standard and a formal process of review will soon begin.

According to the authors of ISO 31000:2018 The Case for Reform, it’s an opportunity to give the venerable standard a complete overhaul.

“Although ‘ISO 31000’ has been a phenomenal success in its acceptance and take-up worldwide, the Standard is not without serious conceptual problems and practical limitations,” state the whitepaper’s authors. “The Standard has been widely criticised by various practitioners, professional bodies, academia, and by risk experts in different industry, science and technology domains.”

“It can be argued that the simplicity and accessibility that has made ISO 31000:2018 the global guidance document, may also be responsible for both preventing the adoption of better practices (scientifically validated), and for promoting an increasing misunderstanding about the nature of risk and its management,” explain authors Dr Carl A. Gibson, Jason Brown, and Dr Elizabeth M. Gibson.

44

“Indeed, it appears that many of the problems in contemporary risk management arise from a shallow understanding of the Standard and the nature of risk, as well as from problems innate to ISO 31000 itself.”

The whitepaper’s case for reform includes the following areas for change (among many others): • The Standard is highly generic.

This has been a strength of the earlier versions of the Standard, allowing its ready adoption by a wide range of users, including those with a low knowledge and experience base about risk management. In this latest version of the Standard, this generic guidance has become a weakness.

• Unproven claims made within Standard, particularly about its wide applicability and benefits, have result in the adoption of the Standard for purposes for which it is wholly unsuitable.

• A great deal of the Standard is conjecture, based upon assumptions that have not been surfaced, tested, or validated.

• The Standard ignores a great

•

•

•

•

deal of the high quality published literature that deals with uncertainty and risk. In doing so, the Standard uses concepts that are outdated and in various parts of the publication are incorrect.

The Standard presents itself as the de facto approach for managing risk, without proof. It is also a claim rejected by numerous domains that use risk assessment and have formal approaches for managing risk.

Under the ‘reign’ of ISO 31000, the outputs of risk management activities have become more and more about populating ‘risk registers’ and creating lists of risks.

The Standard promotes the use of a PDCA (plan-do-check-act) cycle that is ill-suited to the high complexity and uncertainty within which most organisations now operate.

All of the processes described in the Standard are highly linear in nature, which can increasingly struggle as complexity and uncertainty increase.

Line of Defence

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HOMELAND SECURITY

Mark Mitchell: Strong direction for policing and law and order Police will be given the tools they need to tackle gangs, youth crime, and violence, and resources to be refocused onto core policing activities, writes Police Minister Mark Mitchell

Hon Mark Mitchell is Minister for Police, Minister for Corrections, and Minister for Emergency Management and Recovery

46

It has been an absolute privilege to be appointed Police Minister.

Crime has been increasing across our communities under the Labour Government and I am committed to turning this around with a strong focus on law and order.

Having had a policing career, I know how important it is to have the resources and numbers focused on the frontline.

Before politics, I was on the management board of a global logistics company and Chief Executive Officer of a security and risk management company. I was very involved in emergency logistics response teams that acted as the private sector’s first responders into countries hit by natural disasters.

As outgoing Defence Minister in the last National government, I enjoyed having the opportunity to contribute to this publication, and am happy to connect again as Minister of Police.

National’s tough on crime approach is well recognised. We want New Zealanders to feel safe in their

homes, communities, and workplaces.

The previous government was clearly taking us in the wrong direction.

I have been clear in my letter of expectations to the Police Commissioner of what I expect.

I am committed to backing the Police, so they have the tools they need to restore law and order in our communities.

Line of Defence

In our first 100 days we’ve committed to: • introducing legislation to ban gang patches, stop gang members gathering in public, and stop known gang offenders from communicating with each other.

• giving Police greater powers to search gang members for firearms and make gang membership an aggravating factor at sentencing.

• beginning work to crack down on serious youth offending.

• beginning to repeal and replace Part 6 of the Arms Act 1983 relating to clubs and ranges.

For too long, gangs have been allowed to behave as if they are above the law. They have been taking over public roads and spaces and intimidating and assaulting innocent members of the public. There is no tolerance for this kind of behaviour and our new laws will support Police to take action against it.

I have been impressed over the past few weeks already by the approach Police have shown around Line of Defence

policing gang gatherings and the proactive approach to those breaking the law. I thank our frontline for that work. I know they are committed to protecting our communities and it’s my role to support them in that work.

Youth crime has also been on the increase, so Police will have a strong focus on targeting youth crime.

Violent youth offenders must be held accountable for their actions.

I also expect to see Police continue to work effectively with partner agencies to ensure youth offenders have pathways and targeted support so they can leave crime behind and turn their lives around.

We will be implementing our military youth academies next year.

I also don’t expect our Police to be undertaking roles that are not for them, such as managing mental health. In some instances, Police will need to attend where there is threat to life and threat of harm. However, these incidents require trained mental health practitioners.

Our Police need to be able to do their jobs of fighting crime and

disorder. My expectation is that Police will work closely with chief executive across partner agencies to identify where Police resources can be refocused back onto core policing.

I will also work with my Cabinet colleagues to deliver other changes across the justice system that will support Police in holding offenders to account.

This includes amendments to the Sentencing Act to provide real consequences for offenders, introducing an offence for anyone who injures or kills someone with a coward punch, considering a youth justice demerit point system, reforming fleeing driver legislation, and getting advice on the threshold amount for seizing gang assets under the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act. This Government has a serious agenda for law and order and we are determined to deliver. Everybody deserves to feel safe and be able to go out in their communities or workplaces without fear of harm or intimidation.

47

HOMELAND SECURITY

Surge in retail crime fuels the case for facial recognition CCTV It’s a year since Foodstuffs announced it would trial facial recognition in 30 stores. Since then, writes chief editor Nicholas Dynon, increasing retail crime – and recidivism in particular – is advancing the facial recognition business case

Nicholas Dynon is chief editor of Line of Defence, and a widely published commentator on New Zealand’s defence, national security and private security sectors.

48

Twelve months ago, Foodstuffs announced it would look to conduct a 30-store trial of facial recognition technology following a significant increase in the rates of theft, burglary, robbery, assault, and other aggressive, violent and threatening behaviour across its stores.

The 23 November 2022 announcement stated that serious incidents, theft, burglary, robbery, assault, and other aggressive, violent, and threatening behaviour in Foodstuffs North Island stores in that year were up 31% on the previous year. Serious incidents in stores were up 246% since 2020.

“Supermarkets are on the frontline of the rising trend of retail crime with our teams dealing with daily incidents of assault, aggression and theft,” Foodstuffs North Island CEO Chris Quin said at the time.

“This is the concerning reality for our teams as the number of incidents in grocery stores has risen significantly since early 2020 to record levels this year.”

“Facial recognition technology is one of the only tools we’ve identified that could help us to proactively target and reduce theft, burglary, robbery, assault, and other aggressive, violent or threatening behaviour by repeat offenders,” said Mr Quin.

“Facial recognition technology will only be used in our stores for this specific and limited purpose.”

Interestingly, Foodstuffs pointed to the fact that its data showed repeat offenders as being responsible for almost a quarter of serious offending in its stores. Consequently, it was looking to facial recognition to protect its staff and customers from repeat offenders in particular.

Line of Defence

The cooperative stressed that it had engaged heavily with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) in relation to the trial.

For its part, the OPC highlighted that it had prompted Foodstuffs to “carefully consider whether the use of facial recognition technology was a necessary, proportionate, and effective response to harmful behaviour in Foodstuffs stores.” The OPC also stressed the importance of being transparent with shoppers about the use of facial recognition technology, and to proactively engage with stakeholders, including Māori.

“We recognise Foodstuffs has a responsibility to take steps to keep customers and staff safe,” stated the OPC. “However, it is not clear to our office how facial recognition technology is going to achieve this. As a result, we have been counselling caution given the privacy intrusive nature of facial recognition technology and the inaccuracy and profiling risks involved.”

One year on and an ongoing spate of retail crime isn’t doing the case for facial recognition any harm.

According to Retail NZ’s Retail Crime Report 2023, out of 297 survey respondents, 92% of retailers had experienced some form of retail crime in the past 12 months. This is a significant increase on the previous survey in 2017 when the figure was 81%.

Line of Defence

“We calculated that the cost of crime that people responded to in our survey is about $2.6bn per year,” Retail NZ CEO Carolyn Young told me via phone interview, “and that’s a cost to the economy, and at some level the consumer pays for it as well.”

“There’s a lot of work that retailers are currently doing to combat crime, but crime has escalated to a level that’s unprecedented,” said Ms Young.

Employers have a responsibility to comply with the Health & Safety Act, she said, and to do the best they can to ensure they’re providing a safe environment for their staff.

But with retail crime and violence against retail staff continuing to increase, staff safety has become more challenging than ever.

“One of the things that we all expect in our jobs is that we can go to work in the morning, and we can come home at night. Unfortunately, in retail that’s not as easy as it sounds because of the aggressive behaviour we’re seeing in stores.”

She sees value in the creation of a sector-wide approach to the use of facial recognition and other proactive technologies capable of identifying a person who has previously committed retail crime or been trespassed from a store.

This would potentially echo the model upon which the Foodstuffs trial is based. whereby a camera is

able to match an individual to a facial image stored in the system of a person who has already been trespassed due to recidivistic offending against the store. The person would be identified, and a security guard or member of staff notified immediately, allowing them to enforce the trespass notice prior to the person entering the store.

“A person may have been trespassed from a store, but they still keep coming back, and once someone is in the middle of your store it’s really hard to do something about it without creating a scene,” said Ms Young.

“The idea is that you’re turning away someone that shouldn’t be coming into your store in the first place, and only the people who you have a photo of because they’ve offended have been loaded into the system.”

According to Ms Young, retailers are generally reluctant to consider facial recognition technology and that it is likely to suit larger business due to the investment involved and complexities around privacy and data.

There’s a number of businesses, she says, that are really interested to see how the trial with Foodstuff goes so that they can then work out how they might implement the technology in their own business. It appears that Foodstuffs is blazing a trail.

49

HOMELAND SECURITY

Protecting Crowded Places: What to look for in a security provider The Australian Government has released guidance to owners and operators of crowded places on selecting security providers, writes Chief Editor Nicholas Dynon, filling a key gap in the crowded places guidance suite Focussed on the guarding sector of the private security industry, the Australian Government under the auspices of the Australia New Zealand Crowded Places Committee (ANZCTC) has released Security Contracts Guiding Principles having recognised “opportunities to strengthen Australia’s security to help better protect crowded places.”

The new guidance is for use by owners and operators of crowded places to support them in preparing tenders to bid for security contracts, preparing invitations to security contracts, awarding and administering contracts, and transitioning in and out of contracts.

“The Security Contracts Guiding Principles aim to provide a best practice guide to support the Crowded Places Strategy.” stated an ANZCTC announcement.

“They recognise the important role that security personnel perform to protect Australia’s crowded places from terrorism.”

“Private security providers play a central role in protecting crowded places from terrorism,” states the ANZCTC. “In many cases, private security personnel (including security contractors, consultants and the frontline guarding security officers) are directly responsible for strengthening the security of crowded places. Furthermore, they are often the first responders to any incident. Consequently, they must be well-trained and professional.”

The document follows the checklist approach that other ANZCTC crowded places supporting documents, such as the Security Audit and Self-Assessment tools, use.

The checklist is ordered in accordance with eight guiding principles and several questions under each of these that are designed to illustrate gaps that an organisation may have in its current security contract arrangements. The guiding principles include: 1. Due diligence 2. Adherence to Government laws 50

3. Supervision and management of workforce 4. Training and professional development 5. Sub-contracting 6. Disclosure and transparency 7. Ability to call out wrongdoing 8. Key performance standards within contracts and tenders Under Guiding Principle 4 – Training and Professional Development, for example, the checklist questions include: • Will the workforce you are employing/contracting have appropriate training / education / skills for the duties expected of them?

• Will the contract address this?

• Will there be accreditation or a mechanism to recognise specific skills/competencies required?

• Will a training needs analysis be undertaken and updated?

• Will onsite training and education be provided. If so by whom, and, for what purpose?

• Will this training be ongoing throughout the length of the contract?

• Does the contract permit you to deliver training directly to the contractor’s personnel?

Just because a checklist box has been answered in the negative, states the ANZCTC, it does not necessarily mean that a security contract arrangements around that specific issue is defective. That being said, “several negative answers in the same section could illustrate that additional work is required.”

According to the document, many of the questions listed in the Guiding Principles can be incorporated in any contract prepared with a security provider. On the flipside, common errors or pitfalls that can arise from failing to do so can include: • Failure to conduct thorough due diligence Line of Defence

• Failure to conduct regular audits throughout the life of the contract • Lack of specific provisions in the contract regarding whether/under what circumstances sub-contracting is allowed • Lack of flexibility to meet the operating environment • Lack of supervision to confirm services are being provided to the standard required by the contract • Lack of an onsite induction • Lack of disclosure and transparency (for example ‘ghosting’ – services that have effectively not been supplied) • Exposure to reputational risk • You sometimes get what you pay for (for example the cheapest tender may come with significant other risks) • Lack of transitional arrangements within a contract (for example when a new contractor takes over).

The document stresses that although an owner or operator of a crowded place may utilise a security provider, the owner/operator remains responsible for ensuring a safe environment, ie. risk cannot be transferred to a contractor – the owner/operator still owns the risk.

It recommends that owners and operators of crowded places give consideration to membership of peak body or advisory networks “to stay abreast of industry information and protections that are available, with access to relevant and helpful resources.”

New Zealand guidance?

Within the online information on crowded places hosted on the New Zealand Police website is an FAQ titled, “I need to engage a private security professional; what do I need to think about to ensure I get someone with the right skills and experience?”

“Private security professionals play a central role in protecting crowded places,” states the FAQ. “In many Line of Defence

cases, private security professionals - including security consultants and contractors, risk analysis and threat assessment experts and private security officers - are directly responsible for strengthening the protective security of crowded places. They must be well-trained and professional to be effective.”

Implementing protective security measures can be a complex process which, if done incorrectly, can be costly and ineffective, it says. “In many cases, owners and operators will need to seek further advice from private security professionals.”

Although the NZ Police information does not go into detail on the selection and engagement of security guarding providers, it does provide some tips on the factors owners and operators of crowded places should consider when selecting a security consultant: • licenced or certified as a private security provider • education, qualifications, skills, and experience • referee reports • security clearance (where required/appropriate) • professional association and affiliations • previous experience conducting security reviews • ability to effectively undertake the security review (subject matter knowledge) • impartiality of advice (consider any commercial affiliations) • published professional work Specific skills and experience to consider may include: • security strategy and planning • security auditing • risk and threat mitigation • protecting different types of crowded places e.g. shopping malls, large office complexes, transport hubs, festivals, events and mass gatherings • capability to offer training for owners/operators and their staff 51

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Loktronic Limited Unit 7 19 Edwin Street Mt Eden Auckland P O Box 8329 Newmarket Auckland 1149 New Zealand Ph 64 9 623 3919 Fax 64 9 623 3881 0800 FOR LOK mail@loktronic.co.nz www.loktronic.co.nz

For expert advice and assistance with your security locking needs, trust in Loktronic, call us on 0800 367 565

GUARANTEE

*Standard terms & conditions of sale apply.

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