Line of Defence - Autumn 2019

Line of Defence

Issue 12 • Autumn 2019

New Zealand’s Defence and National Security Magazine

Unrivalled Multi-Mission Airlifter Leonardo’s C-27J Spartan is the most capable multi-mission airlifter; ideally-suited to the New Zealand Defence Force’s requirement to enhance national security.

Its capability to operate from the most rudimentary airstrips in extreme environmental conditions is unrivalled by any other twin-engine military transport aircraft. The platform provides flexibility and total autonomy from ground support for transport missions, disaster relief efforts, humanitarian assistance and in support of Homeland Security missions.

Inspired by the vision, curiosity and creativity of the great master inventor Leonardo is designing the technology of tomorrow.

leonardocompany.com Helicopters | Aeronautics | Electronics, Defence & Security Systems | Space

SeaGuardian

THE MOST VERSATILE FASC COMPLEMENT • Cost-effective, multi-role, multi-domain ISR solution • Responsive, persistent and long-range to support all-of-Government employment • Capable of securing New Zealand’s vast area of interest – from the mainland to off-shore territories • Assured networking across the NZDF and civil C4ISR networks • Acquisition or Lease • Inherent growth for broader roles

ga-asi.com ©2019 GENERAL ATOMICS AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS, INC.

Leading The Situational Awareness Revolution

CONTENTS Editor’s Note

Earlier this month, the lives of 50 people were inexplicably cut short, and New Zealand came face-to-face with an evil it had hitherto only seen from afar. Families, communities and the nation are privately and collectively grieving while trying to make some sense of what happened and what the future now holds.

In this issue of Line of Defence, providing their thoughts in relation to the events in Christchurch of 15 March are Dr John Battersby, Dr Richard Shortt, Dr Bridgette Sullivan-Taylor and Dr Layla Branicki, specialists in terrorism, national security and intelligence, extreme events and individual and organisational resilience respectively. It is an interdisciplinary panel offering sober analysis and thoughtful perspectives on the way forward.

In Defence, we interview Paul Jordan, the NZDF’s CIO on the CIS Change and Transformation Programme, described as the largest and most complex business change programme Defence have ever run. We also gain a truly fascinating insight from Sheryl Boxall into the NZDF’s Strategic Foresight Programme, which generates insights about the future so that the NZDF can make better decisions in world of change and disruption.

Also in Defence, Defence Minister Hon Ron Mark and Opposition Defence Spokesperson Hon Mark Mitchell provide their updates, Jennie Vickers gets us up to speed on Avalon 2019, we hear from our fantastic sponsors: Loop Technologies, Leonardo, GA-ASI, and Embraer; and more.

Plenty also in the International, Border and Homeland Security sections. In the latter, we gain two very different perspectives from security consultants David Horsburgh CPP PSP PCI and James Knapp on the report of the State Services Commission inquiry into the use of external security consultants by government agencies.

I am delighted to announce the establishment of the Line of Defence Editorial Advisory Board. Commencing with the upcoming Winter 2019 issue of the magazine, the EAB will provide valuable advice on editorial direction, ensuring that our content is the best that it possibly can be.

Founding members of the Board include: Dr Peter Greener (Senior Fellow, Centre for Strategic Studies, VUW), Prof Rouben Azizian (Director, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University), Dr Bridgette-Sullivan Taylor (Senior Lecturer, University of Auckland), Dr Reuben Steff (Senior Lecturer, University of Waikato), Dr John Battersby (Senior Lecturer, CDSS), Paul Howard (Assistant Chief Joint Defence Services (Commercial), NZDF), Debbie Howarth (Director, Industry Engagement, NZDF), John Deal (Deputy Director Engagement & Business Relations, CIS Branch, NZDF), Jennie Vickers (CEO, NZDIA), Douglas Pauling (Director, Global Defence Solutions Limited), John Campbell MNZM (CEO, Ra Moana Consulting), Ruth Currie DSD (Vice President Government & Defence Logistics, Kuehne + Nagel, Pat Cullen (Public Sector, IBM New Zealand) and Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO (former Defence Minister).

And lastly, a shout out to Government, Defence, Law Enforcement, Emergency Services and Health Services personnel and volunteers who are working under extraordinary circumstances to carry New Zealand through these darkest of days.

Kia kaha.

Nicholas Dynon Auckland

4

CONTACT DETAILS Chief Editor: Nicholas Dynon M: +64 (0)22 366 3691 E: nick@defsec.net.nz Publisher: Craig Flint T: +64 (07) 868 2703 E: craig@defsec.net.nz Postal and delivery address: 27 West Cresent Te Puru 3575, Thames RD5, New Zealand

www.linkedin.com/company/ defsec-media-limited www.facebook.com/defsecmedia/ www.twitter.com/DefsecNZ

CONTRIBUTORS & INTERVIEWEES Dr John Battersby Dr Richard Shortt Ross Olifent Ant Tyler Tim Cummins Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO Sheryl Boxall David Horsburgh CPP PSP PCI Nicholas Dynon Dr Layla Branicki

Dr Bridgette Sullivan-Taylor Paul Jordan Hon Mark Mitchell Hon Ron Mark John Campbell MNZM Jennie Vickers Dr Germana Nicklin James Knapp Dr Damien Rogers

UPCOMING ISSUE Winter - June 2019 Features: Land domain; Defence Estate; Simulation; Counter terrorism; Border security Copy Deadline: 01 June 2019

ASSOCIATION

Defsec Media publishes Line of Defence, New Zealand Security Magazine and FireNZ Magazine premier publications covering industry sectors that help keep Kiwis safe. Find us online www.defsec.net.nz Line of Defence

ISSN 2463-5774 (Print) • ISSN 2463-6258 (Online)

CHRISTCHURCH 15/3 6

Countering terrorism where there used to be no terrorism to counter

8

Interview: Call out extremist behaviour, define underpinning values

10

Christchurch Mosque Attacks: A tipping point for New Zealand

BORDER SECURITY

DEFENCE 40

A Sensible Precaution: Foreign fighters and passport disqualification

42

Division and differentiation: Insights for border management from Ireland and Aotearoa New Zealand

HOMELAND SECURITY 14

Leonardo and Northrop Grumman Australia sign C-27J MOU

16

Interview: Shifting the focus from corporate to warfighter

20

Good as New: Tactical communications hardware gets new lease on life

22

Commemorating the past and planning for the future

24

Electrical Standard amendment bridges aviation industry gap

25

GA-ASI continues on-time development of MQ-9B

26

KC-390 Proven - Modern Technology

28

Community, Nation, World: Defence stepping up in 2019

29

Top ten issues for contracts and commercial

30

New Zealand’s Maritime Border – an opportunity for industry

32

NZDF investments set to determine nature of partnerships

34

Observations of Avalon 2019 from a first-time attendee

36

Insight into the NZDF Strategic Foresight Programme

Line of Defence

46

SSC Report and Surveillance: Need for a legal and ethical rethink

49

SSC Report and Surveillance: Big brother looking out for you?

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

52

New Zealand, China, and the limits of friendship

54

International Criminal Court: Another prosecution fails

Copyright: No article or part thereof may be reproduced without prior consent of the publisher.

Disclaimer: The information contained in this publication is given in good faith and has been derived from sources believed to be reliable and accurate.

However, neither the publishers nor any person involved in the preparation of this publication accept any form of liability whatsoever for its contents including advertisements, editorials, opinions, advice or information or for any consequences from its use.

5

CHRISTCHURCH 15/3

Countering terrorism where there used to be no terrorism to counter

The failure to prevent the Christchurch attack is a collective one, writes Dr John Battersby of Massey University’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies.

It is a horribly uneasy and uncomfortable feeling to review one’s own work of not so long ago and see in it foreshadowed some of the reality of recent events. This was very much the feeling I had when I read my article “Countering terrorism where there is no terrorism to counter” in the Winter 2018 issue of Line of Defence.

It is a heavy hearted pen that is now compelled to amend that title to the one that heads this piece.

It is indeed the case that those responsible for our national security were acutely aware than if an event, such as the Christchurch attack, was to occur that they would be challenged about why they didn’t see it coming or why they failed to prevent it. Within hours of the 15 March attack precisely those questions were asked and the event described as an ‘intelligence failure’.

Dr John Battersby of Massey University’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies.

6

Outside the Deans Avenue mosque thousands of people came in the hours and days following the atrocity that occurred there, their quiet, subdued and respectful demeanour exuding a collective solemnity that powerfully underscored the enormity of that failure. I was there the day after, and watching it, and feeling it, left me in no doubt there had indeed, been a massive and tragic failure.

But it is a failure not to be sheeted to a small section of our law enforcement and intelligence community, it is a failure we all share a part in causing. We have for far too long assumed that we had not previously been affected by terrorism.

It is clear that a careful review of New Zealand’s past events from 1970 showed the reality of lone actors prepared to use violence or the threat of violence to articulate political or religious ideological messages. Yet we didn’t remember them, we didn’t take the lessons out of them that were there.

We have never adequately legislated for terrorism at any point in our recent history and we still have not.

New Zealand has previous examples of lone actors legally acquiring arsenals of weapons, and of mass killings. These are few and far between but they are there, and the fact that there have been clear inadequacies in our Arms Act since it was passed in 1983 has been raised by many.

No significant changes have been made to our Arms legislation since, and consequently we allowed the Christchurch offender to legally arm

himself with multiple military style weapons designed to kill volumes of people. He demonstrated how effectively we succeeded in letting him do this.

We have for far too long believed that our geographical isolation has insulated us from terrorism. We have had safe and distant seats observing the global rise of modern violent extremism over the past 20 years.

We have watched the internet and social media eliminate geography and distance as factors affecting the terrorscape and yet we continued to believe that we were immune.

As a society, we genuinely believed that the absence of modern terrorism here was because we were too good, too caring, too laid back and too far away. The mass murder of 15 March hideously exposed the fact that we are not. The perpetrator streamed his assault as an audience around the globe watched, some cheering him on.

We are not some distant land too far for terrorists to notice – cyberspace has placed us in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas. Our 9/11 has now come. The possibility that it would come, has existed for some considerable time.

Inevitably there will be a torturous process of establishing how the 15 March attacker planned his attack.

In hindsight, with the outcome now certain, critics will retrospectively spot the ‘flags’ that could have alerted security agencies to the fact this man was a clear and present risk which should have been acted on. Allegations have been made that security eyes Line of Defence

were focused in the wrong place - on violent jihadism instead of right wing extremism, which on the face of it, looks like a possibility.

But predicting events that have already happened is easy, and proving how they came to occur a lessor challenge than positively identifying what might happen amid the myriad of possibilities that exist ahead of time.

Watch lists of possible perpetrators are kept, targets investigated and assessed, and a small number of individuals here have been intercepted probably prior to committing any serious crime. They have appeared in court on various lesser criminal charges. In preventing a grievous outcome however, is the elimination of any proof that any such thing would have happened. The success of our security sector will go unheralded here.

Watch lists work. But they do not work all the time. Most people on them never commit any crime; some do but are not stopped because the ‘flags’ just don’t fly high enough. Some, Line of Defence

like the Orlando offender, are taken off watch lists and offend anyway.

Others, like the Lindt Cafe perpetrator in Sydney, were actively being watched, but still their rapid decision to act caught police unawares.

On information available so far, the Christchurch perpetrator simply didn’t raise flags in Australia or New Zealand, has no criminal history, and many people who knew him saw no sign of his extremism. A number endorsed him in 2017 as a fit and proper person to hold a firearms license. He should have been on a watch list and he should have been stopped, but it’s the known outcome that now makes this obvious.... it’s a more difficult task when there hasn’t yet been an outcome.

Terrorist organisations with long term goals and plans to run campaigns of repeated violence generate logistical, communications and planning footprints. Security agencies see the patterns and connections in these and can be in a position to counter them.

Lone actors or small cells, with tight and small organisational networks, with the sole objective of carrying out just one attack, are far more difficult to see and identify. It is more difficult to be sure about the need to interdict.

The Christchurch offender has not finished; he gave himself up. He wants the world stage a court room will give him. His trial must be full and fair, but to counter his terrorism it needs to be a closed court, without media to repeat and amplify his twisted message. I have deliberately not named him. I will not remember him or allow him ‘credit’ for what he did.

Over coming weeks and months we will look for answers in the fine detail, we look to identify whose responsibility it was to get in front of the Christchurch perpetrator and prevent him from committing his massacre of innocent people. Someone, or some security sector group, will be blamed perhaps, but ultimately we all share responsibility for this.

7

CHRISTCHURCH 15/3 Interview: Call out extremist behaviour, define underpinning values Dr Richard Shortt, former Combined Threat Assessment Group manager (New Zealand Police/NZSIS) and national security policy advisor (DPMC), suggests the need for a circumspect response to extremism.

LoD: There are reports that the perpetrator of the Christchurch mosque shootings had come to New Zealand for training and attack preparation. Is there a likelihood that New Zealand is harbouring terror support and training networks?

RS: New Zealand, as a liberal, western democracy has the potential to be misused in this way. We need only look back in the past decade to see at least one other occasion where NZ Police felt there was ‘training’ taking place and that people harboured unacceptable views, some would argue extreme views.

There was an outcry when this became public, rightly for the way the operation was handled in my view, but underlying it was a sinister commentary that was dismissed by

some at the time as ‘that does not happen here’. I am confident that New Zealand Police and NZSIS are constantly alert to the possibility (however remote) of support and training networks (or groups) and if information is supplied to either agency about such activity by concerned citizens it will be looked at appropriately.

I am confident that extremism, of whatever ideological background, is of concern to New Zealand’s security agencies. We have watched with interest the right wing activities overseas. Before 9/11 right-wing extremism and extreme nationalism was the primary threat in the US for law enforcement. Unfortunately, in more recent years we have seen this scourge spread further afield.

Extremism is the threat.

LoD: In the wake of the attack, gun control has been raised as an area that needs tightening. Do you agree? To what extent can tighter gun control legislation have an impact given the existence of illegal avenues for the sourcing of weapons

Dr Richard Shortt

8

RS: Guns in the wrong hands are a lethal mix. No amount of legislation will remove all of the risk associated with the presence and legitimate use of firearms in society.

However, like the shootings at Aromoana, these recent tragic events

present a further opportunity to review the legislation in New Zealand and to determine if it still adequately balances access to firearms by sporting and recreational users and the ability to keep society safe from those who would seek to use firearms for evil.

The types of firearms available, the capacity of magazines, the sale of ammunition and the vetting of licence holders (both when applying for a licence and during the life of the licence) will all no doubt be looked at.

LoD: Online forums providing outlets for extremist ideologies and hate speech appear to play a role in attacks such as this. What possible mechanisms do the New Zealand government have in terms of enhanced monitoring and controls?

RS: I am confident that both Police and NZSIS are aware of the online sites involved and seek, within the law as it stands, to monitor their use. They provide an opportunity to identify individuals of security concern through the ‘telescoping’ of a person’s extreme views and possibly their intentions and capabilities.

But, saying things online may not be sufficient to put a person into a security case file and to warrant resources to further check on them, or to surveil their activity. The bar for that is high, as it should be. I am sure questions will be asked about how effective our Line of Defence

can perpetrate evil without warning.

That’s not an ‘intelligence failure’ necessarily, that’s just reality.

Arising from the above is the need to ensure we have comprehensive understanding of how to build a resilient society that does not ‘kneejerk’ out of fear or horror, and which can continue to focus on its values and beliefs. Perhaps in New Zealand we need more public discussion of what our society’s underpinning values and beliefs are so that in times of upheaval we can be reminded of them rather than letting emotion and distress drive us.

LoD: Looking ahead, how does this event change New Zealand’s threat landscape and security outlook?

current monitoring of social media is, and whether the current legislative arrangements permit appropriate oversight by security agencies.

LoD: Is the New Zealand Police and intelligence agencies adequately resourced and structured to focus on the identification and monitoring of fixated persons?

RS: The agencies themselves will need to answer this question. However, as with all government agencies in small countries the funding of activities is always dependant on proved need, political policy settings and just how much funding is available to cover all of the country’s needs. Our resources in NZ are not limitless and need to be allocated carefully.

I suspect in the wake of this tragedy security agencies will be asked to submit additional funding bids Line of Defence

through the coordinating agencies like DPMC for consideration by Government. They will also be asked to comment on their current legislative settings and to advise if any of these need review or modification in light of what we discover about the events leading up to these tragic attacks.

LoD: What are the key learnings the New Zealand Government should take away from the mass killing in Christchurch?

RS: For me they are: we are not immune from some of the terrible acts we see perpetrated in other parts of the world; we need to ensure, within reason, that our security agencies are funded appropriately, are working well together to manage and mitigate risk, and, finally, that even with the best professionals, funding and management there remains a residual risk that an individual or small group

RS: We have had a powerful and horrible reminder of the evils of extremism. The threat landscape continues to be one where extreme views of all types, hues and persuasions need to be watched with caution. A spirited democratic country can and should have debates about social issues and politics, but the extremists amongst us need to be a focus of security attention.

We have had through our history a number of criminal and now terrorist outrages, these should just remind us all that a well-resourced, well led and lawfully guided security regime is necessary in today’s world. Some who decry NZSIS and the GCSB (and to a lesser extent NZ Police) may now wish to pause and reflect on their positions.

We should also be reminded that every citizen bears a responsibility to call out extremist language and behaviour, and to report concerns to authorities so an assessment can be made of the threat they may represent.

New Zealand is a resilient country.

We will rebound from this and be, I trust, stronger for it. We should debate our national values and beliefs to better understand what it is we pride ourselves in as New Zealanders and that we will not tolerate being attacked.

These are what make us Kiwis and what should help to steady us in times like this when people try and divide us, to shock us or to drive us towards actions that are not supported by those values and beliefs.

9

CHRISTCHURCH 15/3 Christchurch Mosque Attacks: A Tipping Point for New Zealand New Zealand is experienced in responding to crises, write Dr Bridgette Sullivan-Taylor (University of Auckland) and Dr Layla Branicki (Macquarie University), but achieving resilience requires a joined-up approach before crises hit.

New Zealanders are collectively shocked and saddened by the events at the mosques in Christchurch last Friday. However, sadly, some of us are also not surprised that a tragic event has eventually reached New Zealand’s shores.

The ‘tyranny of distance’ has meant that New Zealand has enjoyed being a long way from most political turmoil which has meant we have enjoyed a relaxed attitude towards political issues and instead successive governments have focused their attention on becoming a resilient nation in the face of natural hazards such as recurring earthquakes and extreme weather events.

However, due to the interconnectivity of technology, New Zealand is no longer isolated from cyber-crime affecting both individuals and organisations. The Christchurch events also demonstrate how domestic extremism can breed onshore (or be imported here) via exposure to extreme ideologies online (seemingly under the radar of authorities) and how livefootage of a real-time extreme event can then be difficult to manage once it has gone viral on a global social media platform.

As anyone who has experienced these extreme forms of terrorism involving violence directed at civilians will know, it is deeply upsetting

Dr Bridgette Sullivan-Taylor is Senior Lecturer in business at the University of Auckland. During 20 years in the UK, she worked in the NHS and with the UK Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat.

Dr Layla Branicki is a Lecturer in the Department of Security Studies and Criminology at Macquarie University, Sydney. She specialises in individual and organisational resilience and extreme events.

10

for everyone involved, whether as individuals, communities or those organisations that are responsible for public health and safety. It undermines individual and collective ontological security, and invokes the reset button.

Why? Who? What should happen to avoid further attacks?

Hence, after such extreme events such as this there is always a collective call for investigations into how this could have been allowed to happen, and who is to blame? Here in New Zealand this is something that government agencies are bracing themselves for.

Our research has found that exposure to recent events influences organisations’ willingness to be prepared to invest in mitigation and resilience to any future events.

However, often the nature of the event, such as earthquakes, focuses all activity around preparing for a similar event, rather than a different risk scenario.

There is often an element of nimbyism and denial as communities find it difficult to prepare for an event they have never experienced and consider unlikely to happen ‘in their back yard’.

From 2008 onwards the UK government realised the need to revise and broaden out the scope of its National Security Strategy every few years to ensure it maintained relevance to the threats faced. This meant that the scope of security-related events broadened out to include counterterrorism, cyber, international military crises and disasters such as floods.

Line of Defence

This included a greater emphasis on spotting emerging risks and dealing with them before they became crises.

Additionally, there was a desire to build a much closer relationship between government, the private sector and the public when it came to national security.

It was recognised that “business and government need to work more closely together to strengthen our defence against cyber attack and to prepare for the worst, so that if it happens, we are able to recover rapidly and keep Britain moving.” The overall aim was to protect Britain’s security and remain vigilant and taking stock of changing threats Britain faced (UK National Security Strateg y, 2010).

Events in the UK have recognised that the threat of extreme events can come from within our outside, and hence that domestic extremism and terrorism need a joined up, multiagency approach to monitor online and other behaviours to protect citizens.

According to Adey and Anderson (2011), there has been an increasing emphasis by government on the responsibilities of private sector companies “to have a broadened understanding of civil Line of Defence

contingencies activity to include planning, preparation, response, recovery, and protection.”

While the accountability of private sector actors for achieving continuity and resilience in the face of extreme events has been strengthened, there is little evidence on how organisations are meeting this challenge and still less evidence regarding the shared responsibilities of government and non-governmental organisations in producing secure and resilient communities.

Additionally, our research indicates that one size doesn’t fit all when it comes to resilience, and that routes to security vary significantly depending upon factors such as organisational size and risk profile. This poses a significant challenge for government, which needs to enable organisations to adapt to the evolving security challenges that they face, whilst recognising the constraints - including financial - within which they operate.

Tipping point For some time the accepted wisdom has been that the threat of terrorism is higher in not only particular countries

and cities, but also in specific locations including government offices, tourist attractions and business clusters.

On the back of other recent terrorist events in Europe where soft targets were attacked, including parades (Bastille Parade, Nice 2016) and family-focused concerts (Ariana Grande in Manchester 2018), there has been an increasing concern by authorities for managing ‘open spaces and public places’ which includes in places of worship.

In the past weeks, and years, we have also seen terrorists target places where we feel safe and are therefore at our most vulnerable. How can government work with organisations to make us all more secure whilst still providing accessible and inclusive places of meeting and meaningmaking?

Within the Australasian region, Australia has recently faced its own ‘tipping points’, with the recent Sydney Lindt Café (2014) attack and others (such as the foiled Anzac terror plot in Melbourne, 2016) and has thus recently published Australia’s Strateg y for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism (2017), which is a government counter11

CHRISTCHURCH 15/3 terror strategy built around localised public-private forums, the bringing to the table of business leaders, and promotion of the private security industry as a valuable consultancy resource.

The more recent Australian Security Policy Institute paper Safety in Numbers (2018), explores the potential for government to work more proactively with the private manned security industry whose tens of thousands of security guards are a potential on-the-spot resource capable of identifying and reporting suspicious behaviours and unusual occurrences at street level.

New Zealand National Security: Challenges, Trends and Issues published in 2017 by Massey University states: What we in New Zealand think of as ‘security’ has changed. It is no longer the sole domain of our defence forces to protect New Zealand and its citizens’ way of life. Lives and livelihoods around the globe are increasingly connected through the internet, telecommunications systems and complicated trade supply chains. These connections are great — they improve our lives immensely — but they also connect us to people and groups (both state and non-state actors) who threaten our security via cyber-attacks, terrorism, transnational crime and human trafficking. Other global threats, such as the complex, interrelated effects of global warming, environmental disasters, pandemics and the depletion of food stocks now impact us nationally and globally.

Yet there has been a real reluctance under previous and current governments for New Zealand to develop a national security strategy, and instead they have focused on existent threats that are known and perceived as legitimate concerns, such as earthquakes and cybercrime (hence the 2012 New Zealand National Cyber Policy).

The government and security services have been aware that an event may happen in New Zealand in the near future but have not been able to determine when, and hence there has been a real reluctance to alert the public to a ‘known unknown’.

Additionally, there has been a reluctance for New Zealand society, policy makers and corporate managers to prepare for terrorist-related 12

scenarios ,which were deemed a low risk and low priority. Research indicates that senior managers and organisations vary widely in their preparedness for managing the threat of terrorist activity.

The Christchurch mosque attacks now act as a tipping point for the nation in relation to recognising the need for a rethink on security. Since an extremist attack has occurred on New Zealand soil, one would expect a higher level of citizen and stakeholder engagement as the threat is now perceived as real, credible and therefore legitimate and can no longer be deprioritised against traditional natural hazard threats.

Shared resilience Urban resilience is the capacity of individuals, communities, institutions, businesses and systems within a city to survive, adapt and grow no matter what kinds of chronic stresses and acute shocks they experience due to such events as terrorist attacks.

Of all the cities in New Zealand to attack, Christchurch is arguably the most resilient and able to bounce back from disaster due to its still recent traumatic earthquake experience, which had brought the community together. As a result, Christchurch is one of the Rockefeller ‘100 Resilient Cities’. The city released its own Resilience Strategy in 2016.

The New Zealand government has also signed up to the UNISDRSendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. Adopted in 2014, the Framework aims for the “substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities and countries.”

One of its priorities is “public and private investment in disaster risk prevention and reduction through structural and non-structural measures,” which it sees as essential to enhancing resilience. These can potentially become drivers of innovation, growth and job creation.

In our research we focus on the extent to which government and business leaders can generate a more joined-up organisationally proactive,

informed and effective stance towards managing the threat and actuality of terrorism.

As a society we need new perspectives on global, national and local security that highlight joint thinking and joint acting over isolated responses to specific risks.

Government, businesses, NGOs and communities need to work towards a shared responsibility to achieve improved national security and crisis response.

Organisations need to move beyond a process of business continuity compliance, which is internally directed, to a focus on both the adaptive capabilities and relationships required to deal with the threat of terrorism. For an organisation this operationally might take the form of a new focus on meaningful engagement with supply chain, local community and government.

During a terrorist attack a lack of clarity about roles, processes and expectations across organisational boundaries can create considerable delays in response and limit the pace and effectiveness of recovery.

Resilience comes from more than a focus on the technical aspects.

Community resilience is often achieved from change from below.

Societal resilience requires not only physical and financial resources from organisations, but also cultural and emotional adaptation, arbitration and reconciliation between affected people.

The letter penned in the wake of the Christchurch attacks by the heads of three of New Zealand’s largest telecommunications companies to the CEOs of Facebook, Twitter and Google to help them look for ways to limit videos like the attacker’s livestream, is an example of acting in a joined-up way.

The compassionate response of New Zealanders to this tragedy is also a striking example of society acting in a joined-up way. Research increasingly indicates that compassionate responses - particularly by government - can build individual and organisational resilience.

New Zealand responds well to a crisis. The challenge for the future is to act together to prepare well.

Line of Defence

Women in Security 3rd May 2019 Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa

A must-attend New Zealand security sector event Key note speakers, Bonnie Butlin and Grant Lecky CSyP, CBCP, CMCP, CORP are joined by leaders from the New Zealand Cyber, Defence and Government sectors.

Sponsorship opportunities are now available.

Visit www.asis.org.nz for the prospectus or contact secretary@asis.org.nz.

Don’t miss out on the opportunity to support the advancement of the New Zealand security sector and to connect with the Pacific’s top security leaders and influencers.

This event has limited spaces. Please register to attend via Eventbrite.

Principal sponsor

Converged Security Provider

DEFENCE

Leonardo and Northrop Grumman Australia sign C-27J MOU Leonardo and Northrop Grumman Australia have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) during Avalon 2019 to partner on C-27J through life support services in New Zealand.

Under the memorandum, Leonardo, manufacturer of the C-27J Spartan tactical airlifter, and Northrop Grumman Australia Pty Limited, a leading provider of regional aircraft and electronic component sustainment services, will jointly bid the incoming Future Air Mobility Capability (FAMC) Program of the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF).

The parties will use their existing relationship to offer the C-27J to New Zealand as a replacement for the aging C-130H fleet.

Leonardo, together with Northrop Grumman Australia, will bring a whole-of-life sustainment approach to the C-27J, and a roadmap for future modernisation and upgrades using

14

extensive reach-back and sovereign capabilities. The versatility of the C-27J, combined with Northrop Grumman Australia’s proven track record and exemplary performance with the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Spartan fleet, will allow the RNZAF to seamlessly perform the widest range of airlift missions, along with humanitarian aid & disaster relief, search & rescue and VIP transport, in the harshest environmental scenarios.

Maurizio De Mitri, Marketing and Sales Director at Leonardo Aircraft, said: “with this partnership we want to make Australia our hub for the C-27J in the region to provide New Zealand with true excellence not only in terms of product, but also in terms of

services, to ensure decades of efficient transport and relief operations. The successful experience of the RAAF fleet is a testament to our commitment and we are convinced that New Zealand would receive significant advantages by becoming the next Spartan Customer.”

“We are excited to be able to take our combined strengths and deep knowledge of C-27J and deliver highly optimised services and support to regional customers,” says Nic Maan, director of Northrop Grumman Australia, Technology Services sector. “This MoU confirms the importance of the establishment of this strategic partnership between Northrop Grumman Australia and

Line of Defence

Leonardo, as it brings together the two organisations best placed to deliver C-27J operations in New Zealand,�

Maan adds.

The Northrop Grumman Australia team of more than fifty personnel at RAAF Base Richmond provides logistics, engineering, modernisation and upgrade capabilities to provide forward-thinking analytical solutions for the C-27J platform. The team delivers a predictive, holistic and continually optimised approach to provide game-changing mission readiness and anticipate necessary modernisations and enhancements to the fleet.

The Leonardo C-27J Spartan has been designed as a true military tactical/battlefield airlifter to routinely operate from short austere airstrips.

The Spartan offers unique qualities, not found in aircraft of the same class or derived from commercial turboprops, such as: ruggedness, reliability, outstanding survivability and maneuverability. The aircraft has the capability to perform autonomous operations from remote areas and is qualified to perform short take-offs and landings on any type of unprepared airstrips (snow, sand, gravel and grass). The C-27J is currently in operation globally with various military services, including the U.S. Army, U.S. Coast Guard, Italian Air Force and the Royal Australian Air Force.

The C-27J has the capability to perform autonomous operations from remote areas thanks to the installation of an APU (Auxiliary Power Unit) making the aircraft totally independent from ground support. The

Line of Defence

APU operates the air conditioning, hydraulic, electrical systems and, when installed, in the medevac configuration, the medical equipment. Looking to flight performance, the C-27J has a cruise speed of up to 325 kts, which is at least 20-25% higher than its direct competitor and such performance, associated to a quick climb ability to reach 10,000 ft in less than six minutes (only 1/2 to 1/3 of the time needed by the competitor) and to the aircrafts excellent manoeuvrability, makes it an ideal performer in operating easily and safely in mountainous environments like the valleys in the Alps or in remote areas due also to its agility and controllability at low speed.

The Spartan is qualified to perform short take-offs and landings (STOL) - with a run of less than 600 m at take-off and less than 400 m to landing at its near maximum weight - on snowy, sandy and unprepared

airfields. Compared with other military transport aircraft in its class, the C-27J has the best descent and climb rate (4,000 and 2,500 ft/min) and can also perform 3 g tactical maneuvers, minimizing its approach phase and reaching a safe altitude more quickly in high threat scenarios.

Employed with full satisfaction by the Australian RAAF, the Spartan has already fully proven its ability to effectively accomplish any tactical transport mission, ranging from disaster relief to “last tactical mile� troops support. Nowadays, a modern Air Force needs a highly costeffective aircraft, capable of being quickly reconfigured to perform a high number of different missions, whilst retaining its primary role of tactical airlifter. Thanks to multiple Roll-On/Roll-Off easily installable and transportable mission kits and systems, the C-27J can be configured to carry out tactical transport including transportation of troops, cargo, paratroops and VIPs, cargo airdrop, Medevac/Casevac, VIP, Search And Rescue, ISR and Fire Support. The C-27J has a cargo bay with the largest cross section in its class (3.33 x 2.60 m), a wide rear door with opening ramp, a strong cargo floor (4,900 kg/m max load for the entire fuselage length), large paratroop side doors, a cargo loading system designed to handle standard 463L pallets/platforms and many types of cargo loads which can be easily loaded, transported and air-dropped.

15

DEFENCE Interview: Shifting the focus from corporate to warfighter Paul Jordan, Chief Information Officer of the NZDF, speaks with editor Nicholas Dynon about the CIS Change and Transformation Programme and new ways of working with industry to achieve an integrated and networked combat force.

LoD: We understand that the CIS change and transformation programme is probably the largest and most complex business change programme Defence have ever run. Can you provide an overview of what the change entails, and a sense of its scale?

PJ: The CIS change and transformation programme (CISCTP) is a significant people and culture change that will be a critical foundation to realising the vision set out in NZDF’s Strategy25, of NZDF as an integrated, combat-ready military force.

CISCTP will deliver a fundamental shift in our operating model that underpins the delivery of all NZDF capability. It is an exciting programme, through which we will expect to profoundly change the way we work with industry, improve the way we

Paul Jordan, Chief Information Officer of the NZDF

16

target investment in our people, and change how we manage and deliver communication and information services overall.

Through the CISCTP, we will build the people and process capability (and capacity) required to deliver technology infrastructure and systems that are modern and enduring, but flexible enough to deal with threats in our ever-changing operating environment. A major part of CISCTP is leveraging industry to deliver some more generalist services on our behalf, and investing in our own staff to focus on the more specialised military services the market may not be able to provide.

CISCTP is founded on the notion that communication and information services are a system in their own right but they can and must support NZDF operations.

It is a complex business change programme that touches all parts of the NZDF mission. The operating model has a number of key components and assumptions, which are that: • NZDF CIS branch will deliberately refocus its services and functions towards supporting the “front line” – the warfighter • NZDF will leverage and partner with industry to provide some services that are currently delivered in-house • NZDF will leverage our international defence partners’ capability where it is aligned with our national intent • NZDF will work with industry as

true partners not as competitors • CIS branch will work much more closely with our NZDF mission partners • NZDF will adopt cloud technology as the basis for our future infrastructure needs • CIS branch will use scaled, agile framework as its internal development methodology.

LoD: CJDS Charlie Lott has mentioned that the programme will “reach out and up to all Defence’s stakeholders (suppliers, partners, allies) in the way Defence’s ICT shop actually does its busi ness”. How will the programme affect how Defence interacts with its stakeholders?

PJ: Our intention is to deliberately leverage the commercial sector to deliver services to NZDF where it makes good business and operational sense to do so – from financial, resilience and delivery perspectives.

The NZDF has worked with a range of partners for quite a few years although this has been very much a transactional relationship. As we mature in our interactions with the commercial sector, NZDF is intending to become more of an intelligent partner.

We expect to partner more to achieve our goals – we are moving away from the traditional supplier/ consumer (seller/buyer) way of doing business and moving towards a true partnership model. We will however need to retain the ‘decider – provider’ paradigm to make sure Line of Defence

An NZDF P-3K2 Orion conducts a maritime surveillance patrol over New Zealand’s EEZ in cooperation with the Ministry of Primary Industries.

Source: NZDF.

that communication and information services are provided to the NZDF in a synchronised, coherent way.

We are keen to work with suppliers who actually buy into the NZDF mission and will work with us to achieve success for our organisation. If we are to rely on the market to deliver some services, we want to make sure that these market relationships are strong and enduring. We already have some excellent relationships with the supplier community and we expect to build more.

We’re entering into an era where we don’t have all the answers. We need industry partners who can roll with us on this journey. We’re really chasing this type of agility from partners.

We already have strong relationships with our international FVEY and NATO Defence partners – leveraging their capabilities to source products and services they have developed for their own militaries.

This is important to ensure that we remain interoperable and don’t fall behind.

The New Zealand Defence Force has traditionally fought alongside our allies – meaning that we need Line of Defence

capability that can integrate easily with their capability. Over the past 12-18 months we have put much more effort and investment into our mission systems in this space – this is starting to realise benefit for our NZDF mission customers.

Our larger allies invest billions of dollars in research and development into military capability – as a partner, we can and do leverage this R&D for our needs. Given the close partnership, this is freely given and shared by those partners.

LoD:Can you provide any insight into the roles played by private sector partners in the change programme?

PJ: We are seeking to work with the commercial sector in new ways - blending their expertise with ours to deliver a comprehensive suite of information systems services that enables military operations. In the past we have been transactional and prescriptive: part of the new approach is for us to set direction and enable partners to develop ‘the how’ based on shared outcomes.

For this approach to work well,

we will have to change the way we work with private sector partners, and vice versa: we will need to make sure partners understand our needs, and partners will need to fully understand the needs of a modern military force.

Ultimately, it’s about ensuring there’s value for both sides. Both parties have different objectives, but we have to make sure that our values align.

We are seeking to establish a more strategic relationship with a number of key technology partners, and expect to ask them to play a greater role in quality assurance, cyber resilience and in assisting to derive a much higher level of value from their solutions.

We are also expecting to ask partners to assist us to implement their technologies in a better way, support professional development opportunities and invest in time in understanding our core business.

It will take us some time to mature this model but we see real benefit in building partnerships.

We are very similar to any other government or private sector organisation in that we have commodity IT requirements. We’re 17

DEFENCE also different, as we also have tactical requirements, and as an organisation, we are shifting our focus from commodity IT to tactical.

LoD: You stated that a major part of CISCTP is “leveraging industry to deliver some more generalist services on our behalf.” What are some examples of these services? Will this involve the outsourcing of some personnel-provided services?

PJ: We have some ideas of services we might want to be a customer of, but we are looking to the market as to what it might provide. There are real opportunities there, and I know the market is quite keen to work with us.

We are looking at options such as outsourcing and are asking what we could or should outsource? While we’ve not made any firm decisions, there may be opportunities to automate some services we currently provide or to let the market help us deliver those services. What that does for our CIS people currently employed on those tasks is to potentially enable them to be redeployed into more directly supporting the war-fighter.

We have a 24/7 battle rhythm, so civilian service levels may not meet the standards required of the Defence Force. There is also a fine line between the mission enabling services and corporate enabling functions. They’re very much intertwined, with our corporate enabling systems also delivering key mission services.

LoD: You have previously stated that “The Kaikoura earthquake in November 2016 was a catalyst for change in how the business thought about ICT service delivery, with an increased focus on resilience. How is this being played out in the context of the change programme?

PJ: The Kaikoura earthquake was a wake-up call for NZDF and a catalyst for change in ICT services delivery.

The quake highlighted the fragility of some of our core systems. Over the past couple of years we have been working behind the scenes to build resilience and to ensure that if another ‘event’ strikes, we will be in a much better position to maintain the delivery of services to our customers.

The migration of our infrastructure to a Cloud platform will give us much better resilience. We will also be working with our partners to ensure they can deliver the resilience we need for our core networks – our own people will ensure that we can continue to deliver services to the front line.

LoD: Former CIO Victor Vae’au was quoted as saying that the NZDF “is like a country in many aspects.

Every line of business is there. We have our own transport industry, logistics, airplanes, hotels, and hospitals – the whole lot. And all of those come with systems and people to operate these.” How is the change programme addressing the challenge of harmonising disparate systems?

PJ: NZDF is like a country in many aspects – we provide services across the entire enterprise from a corporate perspective, as well as providing services to the front line. In the past we have lacked a common architectural approach – resulting in a multitude of systems that are all built subtly differently but are not necessarily

A Communications and Information Systems Officer (CISO) gives instructions regarding the WGS HSS-130 satellite dish. Source: NZDF.

18

Line of Defence

An Air Warfare Officer at work on the TACRAIL of a P-3K2 Orion aircraft during a maritime surveillance patrol. Source: NZDF.

connected. Our future approach is to establish a suite that everyone will be able to use, e.g. utilising our common security framework and infrastructure.

We are aiming to deliver a common user experience from headquarters to the frontline.

LoD: Further to this, is the change programme looking to deliver a common technology across multiple security domains. If so, how will it achieve this?

PJ: We have invested in a proof of concept (POC) in the Cloud space, working with Datacom and Microsoft using the Azure platform. Our goal with this POC is to demonstrate capability across multiple security domains and classifications.

There are specific security and hardening requirements for systems operating at the higher classification levels – we believe that it will be much better from a cyber security perspective if we can utilise the same technology at every domain. We have coined the phrase “XIE”, the X being “any classification” and the IE being information environment.

The POC has been very successful and we are now exploring ways to put this solution into production, including the commercial arrangements and market delivery model.

LoD: CJDS also mentioned that the change programme is part of a refocus away from ‘corporate’ to ‘warfighter’.

Can you elaborate on this?

Line of Defence

PJ: When I started in CIS it didn’t take very long to realise that it is vitally important that all aspects of the services we deliver and support have to be relied upon. Our mission customers were poorly served (in my opinion) by some of the services we were offering and they were crying out for improvement. It’s essential that corporate services are effective.

However, it’s even more critical that our service men and women on the front line can rely on technology when they need it most.

As a move towards this, we have shifted the weighting of our IT investment over the past two years. Already, we have seen the benefits of making this shift and our mission customers tell us they are much happier than they were. As I said, however, it’s also vital that our corporate systems are well supported – everyone wants to get paid, for example; so the payroll system needs to work.

LoD: What improvements or outcomes have been delivered by the change programme so far? What will overall success look like?

PJ: It’s still early days but we have already delivered some components of the future world. An early example was the establishment of the Defence Information Services Operations Centre (DISOC) Forward Element, embedded in Joint Force Headquarters.

This is a 24/7 team providing response to our forces anywhere in the world – we built the team very

carefully, ensuring our new entrants (as well as those who transferred over from existing roles) understood explicitly that their role and purpose was to support the warfighter on the front line. As a result of this we have a highly motivated team of people who totally “get” their customers’ needs.

We have also established the Defence Cyber Security Centre (DCSC), a key component of our Cyber Defence strategy for the future.

This team will grow significantly over the next few years as we continue to build our cyber capability within NZDF. We have also established the Business Management Directorate and the Architecture, Policy and Design Directorate and the office of the CIO. We have recruited a lot of new people for these new teams and have managed to bring in many exceptional individuals who have a strong desire to work for CIS and the NZDF. We want people who buy into the future vision and understand where we are going. My leadership team and I talk a lot about “attitude, aptitude and capability”, which are fundamental to our future success. Many of our existing people also want to be part of our future and we will encourage them to join our journey, providing them with new skills as we change our ways of working.

Fundamentally, the CISCTP is a people and culture change – through building people capability we will be able to deliver the technology and services that the NZDF mission needs to achieve an integrated and networked combat force. Success for me will be the delivery of world class ICT services to NZDF and a satisfied group of customers.

The CISCTP has exceptionally strong support from NZDF senior leadership, from the Chief of Defence Force down. We as an organisation all understand that effective communication and information services are fundamental to the successful conduct of military operations now and certainly in the future. We also understand that we cannot and should not expect to deliver those services on our own.

19

DEFENCE Good as New: Tactical communications hardware gets new lease on life Hamilton-based Loop Technologies and Babcock NZ extend the life of the Protector fleet’s tactical communications systems, delivering significant savings to Defence.

Loop Technologies turned heads when the company was nominated

by Babcock NZ as a finalist in the 2016 Minister of Defence Awards for Excellence to Industry. The nomination recognised Loop’s obsolescence support of a tactical communications system in the RNZN’s Protector fleet.

Having built its business on component level repair of carrier-grade telecommunications equipment, Loop was engaged by Babcock in November 2015 to determine if the Protector fleet’s tactical communications VT (Voice Terminal) units could be repaired, as the original manufacturer was having difficulty with hardware support.

The VT units form part of the fleet’s DM3000 system, which has provided tactical communications for its ships for well over a decade.

Ross Olifent, Director Loop Technologies

20

Manufactured in New Zealand, the system’s components are predominantly commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) Windows XP computer equipment, comprising: • Voice Terminals – The main user interface equipped with a touch screen and audio interfaces. The VTs are located inside the vessel and are used for internal intercom communications and for accessing external radio channels.

• Remote Voice Terminals – A weatherproof user interface that resides outside the vessel and is used for tasks such as Flight Deck Operations.

• Voice Servers – Interface between the intercom system and external radio channels.

• Voice Tunnels – A connection

between the secure terminals and the non-secure network.

• System Controller – Configures the system.

“That type of hardware deteriorates over time and isn’t intended for a service life of more than ten years” Loop Technologies Director Ross Olifent told Line of Defence. “It had been in service and used intensively for many years, so it was starting to fail.”

“The difficulty with PC hardware is that it has a relatively short lifecycle,” he said. “It is designed and manufactured in a window of maybe 4-5 years, and once manufacture ceases and the warranty expires there is typically no further support from the original manufacturer.”

Line of Defence

in relation to the fleet’s RVTs, recommending remanufacture. They provided a prototype to Babcock who arranged for defence personnel to evaluate and test the units. The deployment of these units has been successful, with high service reliability “It’s been a real success,” said Olifent.

Following the success of the RVT re-manufacture, Loop shared its first re-manufactured VT prototype to the NZDF in August 2017, and received its first order for re-manufactured units in June 2018.

It’s an issue faced across many types of organisations. High-value assets, such as communications networks, power networks, public utilities, factories and ships, tend to be dependent on highly integrated electronics for which direct off-theshelf, like for like, replacements may not be available as the equipment ages.

“After ten years, you’ve basically got to have spares of the original hardware sitting in a box in a warehouse ready to replace the failed component. If you attempt to source a replacement motherboard, for example, it may not necessarily support the earlier version of Windows that you’re running, this is something that the military and industrial users face all the time.”

Loop provided an obsolescence report on the VTs to Babcock in March 2016, which involved an initial investigation to identify age-related part and component failure, and the possibility of pro-actively replacing these parts. Its first refurbished VT was delivered to the NZDF the following month, and it has since gone on to refurbish 100 units.

At the same time, the system’s voice servers were also failing. Following a process similar to that of the VTs, Loop delivered its first refurbished server in January 2017, and have to date completed 32 units.

Refurbishment involved sourcing and testing alternatives for a range of parts and components that were Line of Defence

end-of-life. Loop designed and manufactured a laboratory test system that replicated the on-ship installation and provided real-life evaluation of repaired and refurbished equipment.

From repair to remanufacture With old parts and components increasingly challenging to source, Loop was conscious that there was always going to be a limit to how long the units could continue to be refurbished.

Re-manufacture involves the design and manufacture of a replacement item while still utilising the original software and user interface. The end product is physically near identical to the original, but with the new hardware providing improved reliability and prolonged supportability.

“Essentially, we can take the original unit and we can recreate it using brand new hardware but to the user it still operates in the same way,” explained Olifent.

The technology changes that occur in the years between the initial design of a part and the end of its production present challenges but also opportunities. For one thing, replacement components are often smaller. The space made available by smaller components can then be used to provide additional capabilities, such as fitting a redundant power supply.

In May 2016, Loop provided an obsolescence report to Babcock

Savings for Defence “What we were dealing with was industrial grade computer hardware manufactured at scale with a number of bespoke hardware elements and packaging constraints. And it was all required to operate reliably in a harsh environment,” said Olifent.

All these factors are ultimately reflected in the price, however, avoiding the cost of full system replacement still made Loop’s lifecycle extension an attractive option.

“And it’s not just the cost of the new system hardware, there’s also installation, training and the overall project management. There’s a huge amount of work involved in fitting something new into seven Defence vessels,” said Olifent.

“For Defence the value we provide is also about the opportunity cost.

Extending the life of this equipment frees up money and manpower for projects more critical than replacing this system.”

Through the provision of obsolescence advice, Loop established themselves as a trusted Defence partner. But, according to Loop, Babcock’s expertise was a critical enabler.

“Babcock were open to the idea, they had the technical capability to assess whether we would be able to do the work, and their skill set was complementary to ours,” said Olifent.

“Babcock knew exactly what the equipment does, how it’s used, and they understood that whole aspect of Defence operations that we didn’t. We’re the people that can take something and keep it going, but we didn’t have the operational knowledge and context. They connected the dots.”

21

DEFENCE Commemorating the past and planning for the future The Defence Minister’s wish for the Defence Estate Regeneration to be in a positive, future-proofed position before the end of this term of Government, writes National Party Spokesperson for Defence Hon Mark Mitchell, is looking shaky.

To protect our interests, at home and abroad, it is vital that New Zealand has a world class Defence Force. This can only be achieved by continually investing in our Defence Force and security services. We live in an unsecure world. However, by having the means and capabilities to assist our global partners as they face new security challenges, we can help maintain global security.

New Zealand’s Defence Force personnel are internationally recognised and respected for their professionalism and dedication to the job. Whether it is helping out with natural disasters at home, or countering violent extremism overseas, our Defence Force play an instrumental part in keeping New Zealanders’ safe.

Hon Mark Mitchell is the Opposition Spokesperson for Defence, and former Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee. He is the former Minister of Defence.

22

That is why the Defence Estate Regeneration Programme Plan is so important to the future of the NZDF and the safety of New Zealanders.

Regeneration is required to ensure the Defence Estate is modern, fit-forpurpose, multifunctional and able to support future capability.

Under National, we gave approval for a $1.7 billion rejuvenation of the Defence Estate over a 17 year period from 2013/2014 to 2029/30. Our vision was to improve the Defence Force’s ability to sustainably accommodate future military capabilities in an uncertain environment, the quality of military capability, and the working, training and living environments for personnel and their families by providing the right infrastructure.

We also aimed to better maximise the use of the Estate, optimise asset management, and ensure the Estate is legislatively and regulatory compliant.

Although current Defence Minister Ron Mark has expressed a dissatisfaction with the current condition of the Estate, we are yet to see any real action. The Minister has indicated that he wants to have “Estate Regeneration in a positive, futureproofed position before the end of this term of Government”, but I do not see this happening.

Under the Government, the already delayed Defence Capability Review will take priority before new work can be expected to be done in the area of the Defence Estate.

Under National, the first phase of the Regeneration Plan, “Ramping up”, would have almost been complete,

and next year would signal a period of major investment. This puts the current Government way behind schedule.

Being Defence Minister is no easy job, but some things need to take priority. With the nature of threats to international stability constantly changing, we need a Defence Force that is able to respond to modern challenges as they arise.

Not only would Estate Regeneration be a big deal for our Defence Force, it would provide significant economic stimulus across a number of regions in New Zealand.

At the time of writing, we are coming up to the 82nd Anniversary of the Royal New Zealand Air Force.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the RNZAF for their loyal service.

I would also like to say a few words on the upcoming Anzac Day. As we stand together at dawn, we will remember the courageous Australian and New Zealand Army Corps soldiers who fought and died for their country so that we could live in peace and prosperity. We will reflect on what they fought for and the sacrifices they made, so that our people would be safe. Let us not forget the lessons learnt from the past, as we plan for our nation’s future.

They shall grow not old, as we that are left grow old: Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn.

At the going down of the sun and in the morning, We will remember them.

Line of Defence

DEFENCE Electrical Standard amendment bridges aviation industry gap Engineers and electricians who design or repair electrical systems in an airport environment now have a common electricity standard, writes Ant Tyler, Senior Advisor Communications & Marketing, Standards New Zealand (MBIE.) The New Zealand military and civilian aviation industries have been provided with an amended standard that covers the design and repair of aviation-related electrical systems in the airport environment. The updated Section 6 of NZS 6114 includes the aircraft, airstairs, GPU, hangar and workbench.

Up to now, engineers and electricians who design or repair electrical systems in an airport environment haven’t had a common standard to follow when electricity is supplied or used at voltages or frequencies other than Standard Low Voltage (SLV).

However, the hard work put in by the committee developing Amendment 2 – which updated and reintroduced Section 6 Aviation electrical installations, facilities and equipment – will address this gap and provide a standardised solution that makes aircraft sufficiently safe to be connected to the national grid.

Committee chair, Blue Freeman, said the updated standard “clarifies and gives guidance on a common method for the safe supply of electricity to installations, facilities and equipment operating at non-standard voltages and frequencies in the aviation environment.”

Air New Zealand aircraft taxiing at Christchurch International Airport. Source: Air New Zealand.

Standard enhanced with additional technical and informative content He acknowledges the work done by members of the development committee that crafted the original section 6.

The committee that developed the latest Standard has added to their contribution. “This has helped us collectively deliver a standard which will stand the test of time and meet the demands of the broader aviation industry,” he said.

Section 6 of NZS 6114 has been enhanced specifically with the addition of technical and informative content in Appendices B and C. Appendix B describes typical electricity converter operation when supplying an aircraft, and Appendix C covers in-service electrical safety testing for non-standard systems.

This is particularly helpful in providing licensed industrial electricians with guidelines when they operate within an aviation environment.

“Through the new Standard we now have a reference of recommended procedures,” said Mr Freeman. “This gives us commonality, ensuring those in the industry are safe.”

A P3 Orion undergoing work. Source: Blue Freeman.

Time frame reflects extensive consultation process Reflecting on the 15-month commitment made by the Standards New Zealand-convened committee, Mr Freeman said he has been extremely impressed with the wellbalanced grouping of talented aviation and broader industry contributors.

“The investment in time was well-spent,” he added, “as it allowed us to undertake extensive public consultation and go through a thorough independent review of the technical content of the standard.”

Carmen Mak, Manager of Standards New Zealand, said she is extremely pleased with the release of Amendment 2.

“I’d like to thank the members of the committee for their hard work completing this important project.”

24

Line of Defence

GA-ASI continues on-time development of MQ-9B General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA-ASI), the leading designer and manufacturer of proven, reliable Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) systems, radars, and electro-optic and related mission systems, continues the on time development of its latest RPA, the MQ-9B. GA-ASI designed MQ-9B as the next generation of multi-mission Predator® B fleet and named its baseline MQ-9B aircraft SkyGuardian, and the maritime surveillance variant SeaGuardian.

The Royal Air Force (RAF) is acquiring SkyGuardian as part of its Protector RG Mk1 program and is scheduled for first delivery in the early 2020s. Belgium also selected SkyGuardian for its defense needs. The RPA is being considered as an option for the Australian Defence Force, who chose GA-ASI to supply the RPA system for Project Air 7003.

“MQ-9B is the world’s only RPA being developed to be certified to fly in non-segregated, controlled airspace,” said Linden Blue, CEO, GA-ASI. “The development is the result of a five-year, company funded program to deliver an unmanned aircraft to meet the stringent airworthiness type-certification requirements of NATO and various civil authorities.”

As part of the certification effort, MQ-9B is being provisioned with a GA-ASI-developed Detect and Avoid (DAA) system. The DAA system consists of a Due Regard Radar (air-to-air radar), coupled with a Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B).

The first-ever trans-Atlantic flight of a Medium-altitude, Long-endurance (MALE) RPA that was accomplished last July, and commemorated the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) centenary celebration (RAF100) in 2018. SkyGuardian flew from Grand Forks, North Dakota to RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire, UK, covering 3,760 nautical miles in 24 hours. Other recent development achievements include: • Demonstration of SATCOM Launch and Recovery for MQ-9B Using Expeditionary Command and Control (XC2) – December 2018 • First Flight of the Second MQ-9B SkyGuardian – September 2018 • Integration of MQ-9B with GPS and GALILEO Satellite Systems – June 2018 • Conduct of successful lightning tests on MQ-9B – May 2018 • Demonstration of Auto Takeoff and Landing Using SATCOM for MQ-9B – December 2017 The MQ-9B development aircraft (YBC01) set an endurance record for GA-ASI aircraft when it flew for more than 48 consecutive hours in April 2017. This is an unprecedented level of endurance which enables the MQLine of Defence

9B to provide persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) around the clock with an operating cost well below most manned platforms. MQ-9B has a range of over 6,000 nautical miles and is equipped with nine hardpoints for sensor or weapons carriage with over 4,000 lbs. of available payload.

Both MQ-9B SeaGuardian and SkyGuardian are capable of all-weather day/night operations. The cold weather engine start capability allows ground operations down to -41°C. These RPAS also have an Electro-expulsive De-icing system (EEDS) for wing leading edges, anti-ice heated engine inlet, heated pitot tube and static ports, and lightning protection.

Interoperable with NATO, SkyGuardian’s multi-mission capability makes it a valued asset in a variety of scenarios – from environmental protection, to Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), to Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), to Search and Rescue (SAR) and overland and overwater Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance. (ISR).

To date, GA-ASI has delivered over 850 aircraft and more than 300 GCS. Every second of every day, there are 69 GA-ASI-delivered RPA airborne worldwide.

25

DEFENCE

KC-390: Proven, modern technology Transport aircraft cannot be too modern or too capable for the mixed operations of both today and the future, says Embraer, and the KC-390 ticks all the innovation boxes while being built on proven technologies.

At Embraer we use mature technologies that meet our discerning customers’ requirements. Our modern systems and designs are well understood and have proven themselves in service on multiple aircraft. Their performance characteristics are proven with wellestablished design specifications.

Embraer ensures that our aircraft are reliable, easily operated and efficient above all else. Our technologies deliver long term success!

Boldness and innovation are our hallmarks. The development, manufacture and delivery of the KC-390 has been a well-considered process by professionals and experts, engineers and practitioners. Embraer collaborated closely with the Brazilian Air Force to build a modern, medium sized military airlift aircraft that will deliver and exceed user requirements for today and the future.

26

At the heart of its design and systems selection was the decision to incorporate proven and mature technologies. We are an innovative and curious organisation with a strategic vision that enables us to overcome challenges. “Mature technology�, is technology that has been in use for long enough that most of its faults and inherent problems have been removed or reduced by further development.

In addition, it is technology whose scientific background and performance characteristics are well understood.

At Embraer, we fully understand the technology and systems embodied in the KC-390. As we fly and demonstrate the aircraft around the world, we are noticing that many more interested parties are beginning to recognise our mature technology advantage once they get to see and touch the aircraft first-hand.

It truly is a delight when military and procurement staff get on board the KC-390 and see for themselves the realities of the mature technologies on board. We recognise that customer loyalty must be earned by ensuring their total satisfaction. To be successful we fully test and exercise the entire technology suite to exacting standards which assures our customers of system maturity before entry to service.

People are recognising that the trusted avionics architecture incorporating the Collins Aerospace Pro Line Fusion is derived from those systems already operating in a wide range of successful aircraft in business, commercial and military aviation.

People are recognising that mission systems integration has been achieved using industry standard protocols such as MIL-STD-1553 data bus and ARINC 661 for cockpit display systems thereby ensuring proven systems sit at the heart of the avionics architecture.

Line of Defence

People are praising the decision made by Embraer to select the International Aero Engines V2500 two-shaft high bypass turbofan engine, which also powers a large fleet of airliners widely spread around the globe. Over 7,000 engines are in operation with 200 worldwide customers.

It is the engine of choice in its class, delivering unequalled efficiency and reliability and superior tolerance to foreign-object damage. It propels the KC-390 with over 31,000lbs of take-off thrust each. Support for this engine exists world-wide so no problems being away from home base for extended periods on operations.

When you get to fly the KC-390, the experience is again magnified. A full fly-by-wire (FBW) flight control system replaces the older and heavier mechanical manual flight controls.

The FBW computers continually act to stabilise the aircraft and adjust its flying characteristics without the pilot’s input, and to prevent the pilot operating outside of the aircraft’s safe performance envelope.

Again, we see the re-use of mature systems in the setup of the FBW Line of Defence

system on the KC-390. Evolved from the certified Executive Jets Flight Control System, the KC-390 system lowers pilot fatigue and crew workload and increases the safety envelope of the aircraft inflight.

The philosophy of re-using mature mission systems is also seen with the integration of “Commercial-Off-TheShelf” (COTS) equipment, such as the Rafael Litening Electro Optical and Infra-Red Pod (more than 1,000 delivered), the Selex Galileo Gabbiano Tactical T20 Radar (selected by 10 international customers) and the Cobham 900E Wing Air Refuelling Pods (4th generation). All of these COTS systems provide high levels of performance and flexibility in support of the modern military serviceman and woman.

After 2,000 hours of flight testing and civil certification, we are seeing how effective and reliable the KC-390 really is.

We are seeing airliner levels of availability, very low levels of downtime and reduced direct operating and maintenance costs. What this means is that the KC-390 now has the lowest total cost of ownership metrics

in its class. We are seeing a working supply chain to manufacture, and in turn support the future fleet of KC-390 on a global scale.

The KC-390 maps closely the capabilities of future military operations and doctrines. In keeping with this, the scale and the configuration of global airlift requirements in the next 20 years will have many new features.

Experience amongst military practitioners, over the last 20 years, indicates that legacy transport aircraft are no longer adequate.

Critically, the increasingly dangerous threat environments limit the operational effectiveness of such aircraft. Older aircraft may also lack the speed and payload capacity needed to conduct airborne operations and logistics support operations over the distances and on the scale required in future.

The lesson being, that a transport aircraft cannot be too modern or too capable for mixed operations of today and in the future. Enter the KC-390 with its superior performance, lower direct operating costs and mature and proven systems.

27

DEFENCE Community, Nation, World: Defence stepping up in 2019 Defence Minister Hon Ron Mark highlights recent work done by the NZDF, indicating Defence Estate focus will follow soon-to-be published Defence Capability Plan.

Last year we launched the Coalition Government’s Strategic Defence Policy Statement. In it we talked about Defence’s value to the Community, the Nation and the World. We also talked about some of the challenges we’re going to face in the future.

Sometimes, these documents are launched to great fanfare and then sit on the shelf. While they might guide policy professionals behind the scenes, they don’t make much difference in the real world.

I’m proud to say that the Strategic Defence Policy Statement is not one of those documents. On the contrary, Defence is stepping up its work in a number of areas, and the month of February was a fantastic example.

Let’s start with their work in the Community. The headline for February was their work on the Nelson Fires.

157 Defence Personnel deployed at short notice to work in logistics and support roles, a Hercules was also

Hon Ron Mark, Minister of Defence

28

used to get firefighters and emergency services personnel into the operations area. Security patrols kept evacuated properties secure. Above all they kept the emergency workers on the front line fed.

Alongside this, the Air Force supported MPI in their fight against wilding pines and racked up big hours doing search and rescues around the country.

The Navy were also excellent in their support of Waitangi Day and Napier’s Art Deco weekend.

Moving on to work for our Nation.

The Air Force continued to support Antarctic operations with three flights carrying 356 passengers and 306kg of freight. They also spent over 30 hours supporting the Police in their annual cannabis recovery efforts, alongside a further 6.2 hours supporting Customs work preventing illegal drugs coming into our nation.

The Explosive Ordnance Disposal Teams were called out 20 times.

Around the world, the NZDF sent six personnel to Fiji to assist in their preparation for a UN Deployment to the Middle East, for a review of their military justice system. Firefighting was again on the agenda with five personnel deployed to Tasmania, and a P-3 Orion was dispatched to the Solomon Islands to conduct fisheries patrols.

On top of this, the NZDF continued to do excellent work in its ongoing deployments to South Sudan, Mali, Israel/Lebanon, Egypt, Afghanistan, Iraq and the Republic of Korea.

The NZDF provides outstanding value to New Zealand. This value is

driven by the quality of our people.

I recently travelled to the Middle East and Sudan to visit our deployments. The messages I heard from our partners was the same no matter where I went; “We couldn’t do this without you.”

It is Government’s role to support our women and men in uniform through good policy. We’ve laid the foundation with our policy work, and the NZDF has stepped up in a big way.

Our updated Defence Capability Plan will identify the equipment we will need to purchase over the next decade in order to support our people, and is in the final stages of preparation for release.

Once that is done, our focus will shift to the Defence Estate. It’s becoming clear we are at a critical point when it comes to the Defence Estate, and we’re going to have think a bit differently in order to provide the right facilities, to go with the right platforms which in turn will support our outstanding people in enacting our defence policy.

Unfortunately, Defence equipment and Estate have been run down over decades, and the nature of the Defence portfolio is we cannot turn it around overnight. But we have made huge progress already, with the decision to procure the P-8 Poseidons, the purchase of the Dive/Hydro vessel, the new King Airs, the Frigate upgrade and the many other significant investments made in Budget 18.

With the calibre of people we have in Defence we’re in good shape to continue to make great strides in this term of Government, and beyond.

Line of Defence

Top ten issues for contracts and commercial International Association for Contract & Commercial Management (IACCM) President Tim Cummins sheds light on organisations’ contract management priorities for 2019.

As we enter 2019, what are the key focus areas for improving contract and commercial management? IACCM gathered data from approximately 750 organizations to discover their plans and priorities.

Number one on the list, being tackled by 61 percent, is contract management tools and systems.

Many have yet to take the plunge on meaningful automation and others are back in the market either to replace or augment existing systems. But the range of tools now being considered is also becoming more diverse, as some organizations look at deploying ‘apps’, ‘bots’ and other enabling devices, such as dynamic playbooks and clause libraries, or more specialist applications, such as machine-based negotiation.

In second place, scoring 59 percent, is the development of new terms and updated contract standards.

This traditional housekeeping task is becoming much more frequent; the speed of change in markets means that

IACCM President Tim Cummins

Line of Defence

some corporations are undertaking review as often as every quarter to ensure competitiveness. Others are recognizing the need to innovate their commercial offerings or to develop new contract templates, for example for cloud services or to support performance-based agreements.

Coming third, at 49 percent, is contract simplification. There are several potential drivers and the perception of ‘simplification’ can take several forms. For some it may be about greater standardization. For others it may be increased alignment of contracts with RPA (robotic process automation) initiatives. But for the leaders, it is potentially much more than this; it is about fundamental re-assessment and re-design of the way their contracts are structured and worded.

For these organizations, there is recognition that contracts should be designed for users because this reduces risk, cuts cycle times and increases ease of doing business.

Given the changes that these focus areas indicate, it is perhaps not surprising that almost 50 percent highlight a priority for skills development. Contract and commercial management have tended to be overlooked areas for training investment and senior management is awakening to the issues this creates, both for their dedicated CCM staff and more broadly for those across the business with a need for greater commercial awareness.

Looking down the list, it is interesting to note that 40 percent are seeing an expansion of their role (reinforcing IACCM’s view that

automation is actually increasing the relevance and demand for contracting and commercial skills). For almost a third, this is accompanied by a change in reporting line – though interestingly there is no great consistency in the shift being made (IACCM has issued a more detailed report on this topic).

Contract Management Tools New Terms and Contract Standards Contract Simplification Skills Development Contract Analytics Risk Mgnt and Corp Governance Role Expanded Reporting Line Change Knowledge Management System External Benchmarking Research

61.1 59.0 49.1 48.5 47.2 44.0 40.5 31.4 27.1 25.5

Overall, the list illustrates the growing focus on raising contract and commercial competence and business contribution. While technology is an enabler of these improvements, there is increasing demand for talented individuals who can lead change and interpret trends and opportunities.

This is why topics such as analytics and benchmarking now appear on the list – they were not in the Top 10 five years ago. It also indicates that the role is becoming steadily less transactional and more strategic.

Over coming weeks, IACCM will be releasing more detailed data on the state of contract and commercial management, and continuing its work with members to assist them on this important journey.

This article was originally posted on the IACCM Commitment Matters Blog on February 14 – https://blog.iaccm.com/ commitment-matters-tim-cummins-blog 29

DEFENCE

New Zealand’s Maritime Border – an opportunity for industry Some blue sky procurement thinking can make all the difference in the delivery of New Zealand’s border surveillance and patrol capabilities, writes John Campbell MNZM, CEO of Auckland-based Ra Moana Consulting..

The last six months has seen a shift in the way we think about monitoring New Zealand’s sea border. It has been driven by changing circumstances, new technologies and a changing mindset.

It started with the Government’s announcement to procure the Boeing P8 Poseidon maritime surveillance system as a replacement for the capable but aging Lockheed P3K2 Orion. A sturdy and reliable workhorse for our region, the P3K2 has served us well both on military operations in the Arabian Gulf and Indian Ocean and in our front yard – the South West Pacific.

The P8 Poseidon is a more than capable replacement and one that will offer good interoperability with our partners, especially Australia, and our area of operations in the SW Pacific.

However, as discussed at the New Zealand Defence Industry Association (NZDIA) Forum in November last year, we will need to complement the P8 Poseidon with a less complicated capability in order to meet nonmilitary government agencies’ requirements for protecting our sea border and monitoring New Zealand’s maritime domain.

The Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) Air Surveillance Complementary Capability (ASCC) project was borne out of a need to conduct maritime civilian surveillance activities that are deemed too expensive for the high-end capability delivered by the P8 Poseidon.

Initially it was thought that the ASCC would be consumed by the ever-expanding funding requirement for the P8 Poseidon. However, the voices of the border agencies appear to have been heard and the ASCC is now a standalone funded project within MOD.

At the NZDIA Forum, MOD, Border Agencies (the customers) and industry were given an opportunity to pitch the outline of the project, the broad requirements of the capability from the customers and what industry had to offer to meet some of the intent.

It was great to see that this was one of the best attended briefings during the Forum and I believe all came away with what the art of the possible could be.

In my mind, the best outcome was a green fields / blue sky approach to how the capability could be delivered.

All options are on the table: outright ownership; lease; partnerships; layered technologies and graduated response.

No doubt industry is looking on with interest to see how MOD will develop the business case to deliver the capability. I am a firm believer that there is more than one way to do something, and true partnerships between Defence and a Supplier can deliver outstanding results for both parties. Industry is developing some outstanding technologies at present, and in our region, to provide for this capability.

John Campbell MNZM is CEO of Auckland-based Ra Moana Consulting.

He was previously Group Manager Business Improvement and Innovation, New Zealand Customs Service following a 27 year career in the Royal New Zealand Navy.

30

Line of Defence

Is it time for Defence to look at lease or partnership options to provide the surveillance of New Zealand’s coastline and beyond?

Given the right incentives I believe so, especially if it means that the RNZAF does not have to introduce into service another aircraft or platform type into service at the same time as the P8 Poseidon is coming on line. The NZDF should have learnt that lesson from previous experience and the drain it takes on seconding personnel away to conduct this.

In the meantime, there are some exciting, and not so exciting things happening in the marine space. The RNZN Inshore Patrol Craft have been a topic of debate since they were launched. When I was the Maritime Commander I would regularly defend questions about availability and supportability, both around crews and maintenance.

Hindsight is a great thing and I guess if we could redo Project Protector (the purchase of HMNZS Canterbury, two Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) and four Inshore Patrol Vessels (IPV)) we would have done it differently.

Arguably in 2001 the NZDF was still looking backwards at what we had and not looking forward at the opportunities that we would face.

Hindsight tells us that an OPV is far more portable as a unit than an IPV; there is very little an IPV can do that an OPV cannot. Hindsight tells us that we should have recommended three or four OPVs and no IPVs. For a small increase in crew size, and marginal difference in specialist crew qualifications (where the real issues lie across the RNZN) the NZDF could have gotten far more bang for their buck.

Wind the clock forward to 2019 and we see the IPV fleet being laid up with only one vessel operational for training purposes. How does this affect the support the RNZN provides to border agencies for maritime surveillance of the border?

Arguably the demand from Agencies was decreasing. Having served in Customs, the argument was to not ask for Navy support because it was unable to supply it due to lack of crew and vessels. On the other side of the fence, Navy did not push crewing extra vessels because demand was Line of Defence

being met with two operational IPVs. It was a double edge sword.

At the start of February, NZ Customs advertised for one and possibly two Rigid Hull Inflatables (RHIB) to support their new launch HAWK and existing RHIB RAPUA. One could be a cynic and say this is because the NZDF cannot provide the support required by Customs to patrol the coastline, but no.

This project was part of the very successful budget bid by Customs last year for more intelligence led intervention at the border, along with roughly 10 percent increase in personnel. Although I see no Concept of Employment for the capability, we know that the RHIB will be moved by road to where it is required, operate locally and is commercial off-the-shelf (COTS).

It is about delivering the effect. An IPV with two RHIBS is a complicated

military off-the-shelf (MOTS) solution for a relatively simple civilian effect.

I believe the NZDF and Agencies have an opportunity to shift from complicated systems with long integrated support and supply chains behind them to more simple, robust solutions provided by industry to deliver the desired effect. That way when the outcome changes, maybe because the adversary has changed tactics, they are not left with an expensive asset unable to deliver the desired effect.

With new platforms being delivered for the NZDF over the next five years in the maritime space, I believe now is an ideal time to relinquish the reigns of ownership and accept that for less up-front costs and a good partnership relationship the same if not better effect can be offered by industry for some of the more administrative or constabulary roles.

31

DEFENCE

NZDF investments set to determine nature of partnerships With big ticket acquisition decisions on the horizon, writes former Defence Minister Hon Dr Wayne Mapp, to what extent will the NZDF keep interoperability pace with its bigger international partners?

One of the most fundamental questions for the government in respect of defence is whether New Zealand is keeping pace with Australia.

Keeping pace with Australia has not required New Zealand to match everything that Australia has on a one sixth scale. New Zealand has not done that for many decades. Rather the issue is whether New Zealand can make a meaningful contribution to the defence of the South Pacific and coalition operations with forces that are fully interoperable with those of Australia.

Australia is currently going through a comprehensive modernisation of its defence force. Over the last decade

Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO was New Zealand’s Minister of Defence and Minister of Science and Innovation from 2008 to 2011.

32

Australia has bought a wide range of new equipment. There are new aircraft from the C17 to the F35 fighter bomber. Australia was among the first to buy the P8 maritime surveillance aircraft. The navy has new ships from the helicopter carriers, the air warfare destroyers, and the modernised ANZAC frigates. Importantly, Australia along with Canada and Britain, has ordered the Type 26 frigate to replace the ANZAC frigate.

The Army has also been ordering new equipment, from helicopters, main battle tanks to new armoured personnel carriers.

Modernisation is not just about the highly visible capital equipment, it is also about modern command and control systems. They are the backbone of a fully digitised armed force, able to seamlessly work with the most advanced armed forces in the world, typically those of the United States.

The New Zealand story is more mixed. There have been significant new acquisitions, and there is no doubt that these will be fully interoperable with those of Australia. Importantly the new acquisitions are among the most important assets that contribute to regional security and capability.

The decision to buy four P8’s means that the RNZAF will have 25 percent of the total P8 capability in the Australasian region. Similarly, the new ice strengthened tanker will be a significant boost in Australasian tanker capability. In fact, one-third of the total capability within the region, and the Aotearoa will be the only tanker that is ice strengthened.

The upcoming replacement for the transport aircraft should also see the NZDF being able to keep in step with Australia. Whatever the choice of aircraft, it is obvious they will be fully interoperable with the Australian Air Force.

Ross Browne, in his recent Line of Defence article, put the case for New Zealand acquiring the A330 MRTT to replace the existing B757’s. The A330 MRTT would meet a number of needs.

They would be capable of fulfilling the Antarctic resupply role without any concerns over “point of no return” issues. They would be able to fulfil a tanker role with the P8s and possibly with future tactical transport aircraft.

They would have a substantial cargo carrying capacity. They would solve the range issues that beset the Boeing 757. Importantly they would fit within an existing logistics system with the Australian Air Force.

The most challenging future acquisition will be the frigate replacement. The two ANZAC frigates are undergoing a major combat systems upgrade, which won’t be complete till 2022. For each frigate, by the time the upgrade is complete, they will be 23 years old.

The original forecast life of the frigates was 28 to 30 years. However, it is hard to imagine that the frigates will be replaced as early as the originally intended time; not after hundreds of millions has been spent on the upgrades. A more likely out of service time will be 35 years or more, that is 2032 for Te Mana and 2034 for Te Kaha at the earliest.

Line of Defence

The New Zealand Army School of Signals Corps Training exercise at Waiouru. Source New Zealand Ministry of Defence

That means the key decision point for their replacement will be in the early to mid 2020’s, a decade out from their replacement.

The Australian Type 26 programme will start delivering ships around 2028 with deliveries to be completed in the mid to late 2030s.

The production lines for long run items will start closing in the early 2030s. So New Zealand could make a firm order to acquire Type 26 ships as late as the mid 2020’s.

The Type 26 ships are big ships, being 150 meters long compared to 118 meters for the ANZAC frigates, and with nearly 50 percent more displacement. That might well suit countries as large as Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. But for New Zealand, which has an economy that is only one sixth as large as the smallest of these countries, it might be seen to be overly ambitious. The counter argument is that it makes sense for all four nations, including New Zealand, to have the same type of ship.

However, the British are also planning to build a Type 31 light Line of Defence

frigate, which will be very comparable to the ANZAC frigates. New Zealand may well think that the Type 31 is a better option. In any event, the decision on which type of frigate need not be made until the early 2020s.

Of more immediate concern is the ability of the NZDF to be fully networked with its partners. The Australian Defence Force has made major investments in networking so that all parts of the deployed force are fully data linked when on operations.

The Australian Defence Force has been able to datalink their P8s, their Seahawk helicopters and the ships that carry the helicopters. This has required substantial investments in communications and data sharing.

The New Zealand Defence Force is very much aware of the issues, but it would seem that the investment in command and control systems has been lagging. The acquisition of the P8 and the frigate upgrade will spur the need to datalink these platforms.

The February announcement of a $40 million contract with Harris Australia for mobile tactical command

network systems for special forces and headquarters in the New Zealand Army shows the way forward. The networking of the New Zealand Defence Force has been a long running project. While some fixes have been made, serious money has yet to be spent.

The contract with Harris Australia was noted as being the first tranche.

Some years ago, it was envisaged that at least $500 million would need to be spent to ensure a fully interoperable data capable force. Some of that money has already been spent, but the great bulk of it remains unspent.

To fully realise the capabilities of all the platforms and vehicles that have already been acquired will require a real focus on this issue. Our service people will expect that as a testament to being in a first world defence force.

Networking capabilities may not be as newsworthy as buying large platforms like the P8, but they have become the central dividing line between those forces that are fully interoperable with the most advanced partner nations, and those who have to take on lesser roles.

33

DEFENCE Observations of Avalon 2019 from a first-time attendee NZDIA CEO Jennie Vickers notes that in the heat of Avalon 2019 there was much to suggest that New Zealand industry’s potential to make inroads into Australia’s Defence supply chain is no mirage.

The NZDIA spent much of the event talking to the key industry bodies based in Australia to identify next steps, next opportunities and next skills gaps, and to help New Zealand businesses join Australian Prime supply chains.

The presence of Ministers Pyne and Ciobo (Defence and Defence Industry respectively), in the first few days of Avalon, meeting industry and presenting awards to innovators, sent the right message to industry in Australia but also in New Zealand and globally. It therefore came as a bit of a shock when the announcement of their impending retirements was delivered in the latter stages of the event.

NZDIA CEO, Jennie Vickers.

34

From New Zealand’s perspective this is of concern, because Minister Pyne has taken supportive steps of critical importance to our economy, reminding Primes and Government buyers in Australia that our goods and services are included with Australia for AIC purposes.

The new Minister, Senator Linda Reynolds CSC, was sworn in as the Minister for Defence Industry on 2 March 2019 and on my first introduction to her last year, I was impressed that she understood the special linkages between industry and defence and the challenges of workforce needs, having experienced both sides of the equation.

Still on an Australian theme, I was delighted to pick up a brochure from the Austrade Stand that talks about opportunities in New Zealand for Australian companies in the Aviation sector. The more we think of our trans-Tasman neighbours as providers of capacity and innovation and viceversa, the faster and better we will all do.

NZDIA Members and friends were at Avalon, and the connections being made were a reminder as to why we have to keep taking opportunities to be together, make introductions and imagine opportunities. The benefits of face-to-face far outweigh digital techniques.

The Defence Science Institute, Defence Innovation Network and the Defence Innovation Partnership ran an

Avalon Pitchfest, with 21 shortlisted companies pitching their innovations.

There were solid and innovative ideas in the mix.

The challenge SMEs like those presenting continue to have is how to pitch their innovations and inventions well, and in a manner that will influence Primes and others to buy and invest. NZDIA has been talking about doing more to help our Members to pitch and position better, and will get on and launch a programme this year.

The Jericho Precinct at Avalon included “Jasper” telling the Jericho Story and the Air4 “See it to be it” programme that launched in November 2018. Both programmes are aimed at encouraging gender diversity in STEM-based careers.

The visual effects and digital animation were impressive and would be impressively outside of NZ’s budgets. But having said this, it’s worth noting that the Schools to Skies Programme which is taking 40 students in 2019, is operating on a slimmer budget I am sure; and the Kiwi make-do attitude has turned this into a winning programme delivering results.

Have I mentioned the heat? With climate change and 40 degree plus heat, we may need Avalon to pick a time slot into the cooler months in order to prevent the overstretch of emergency services who were run off their feet assisting members of the public dropping like flies!

Line of Defence

AVALON 2019

DEFENCE Insight into the NZDF Strategic Foresight Programme Sheryl Boxall, Strategic Foresight Manager, NZDF, explains how the Defence Force is generating insights about the future in order to secure New Zealand against the threats you haven’t thought about yet.

“National security is the condition which permits the citizens of a state to go about their daily business confidently free from fear and able to make the most of opportunities to advance their way of life. It encompasses the preparedness, protection and preservation of people, and of property and information, both tangible and intangible.” This definition of security is described in the National Security System Handbook.

To contribute to New Zealand’s “defence, security and well-being”, the NZDF needs to be capable “every hour of every day, 365 days a year,” according to the 2018 Strategic Defence Policy Statement.

Sheryl Boxall, Strategic Foresight Programme, Defence Strategy Management, NZDF. 36

Knowledge Understanding The facts A body of coherent facts

Verifiable claims Right or wrong I know something to be true I respond on cue with what I know

The meaning of the facts The ‘theory’ that provides coherence and meaning to those facts Fallible, in process theories A matter of degree or sophistication I understand why it is, what makes it knowledge I judge when to, and when not to, use what I know

The difference between knowledge and understanding. Source: UK Ministry of Defence Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre, “Understanding and Decision-Making”.

The Statement also directs that the NZDF needs to “be prepared to respond to sudden shifts in the strategic environment.” Sudden shifts can surprise us, and devastating events can shock us.

Reading tea leaves or crystal ball gazing are not, however, part of the NZDF’s Strategic Foresight Programme, nor are prediction and guessing lottery numbers. Rather, the Programme generates insights about the future.

Enhancing decision confidence is another outcome of the product and process of Strategic foresight.

Strategic foresight delivers value by helping to grow understanding within the decision maker. The old continuum of ‘data – information – knowledge’ is no longer sufficient in a future world of viral information volatility.

Leading us to deeper understanding, foresight guides us through the maze of knowledge dilemmas. Decisions made today from such understanding have a greater chance for future outcomes to achieve our desired intent.

Information volatility and knowledge dilemmas In an organisation like the NZDF that contributes to New Zealand’s defence, security and wellbeing through the profession of arms, members are called by a sense of duty to serve across the spectrum of operations from humanitarian assistance to combat, as directed by the Government. Under such a mandate, our decision makers are likely to be faced with an authorising environment beset by information volatility and knowledge dilemmas.

These challenges test decision confidence.

Information volatility and knowledge dilemmas arise from a global communication transformation born of smart devices enabling simultaneous social media interactions across the world - for positive and negative effect.

Calculated and instant worldwide information campaigns waged by adversaries, both influential individuals and dissatisfied groups, Line of Defence

can erode trust and coerce people (including governments) into taking actions against their will or ahead of schedule. Nuggets of truth are blurred with falsities - fake news, spinning sound bites, and alternative facts disrupt narratives that we once trusted (rightly or wrongly). Deliberate interference operations undermine democratic and governance processes.

Trust in evidence-based research and science can be undone by a simple tweet from a person who has influence but lacks wisdom. Opinions are treated as facts. We get anchored in our bias. Rejection of other ideas prevents us from seeing our unconscious blind spots. All the while we believe we are enlightened and have the free will to make the best decisions.

Informed decision makers experiencing this knowledge dilemma may wonder: • How reliable is the data source?

• What variables have not been included?

• Has the data been processed appropriately to become information?

• Is it the right information?

• How much knowledge is enough?

• What don’t we know (knownunknowns)?

• What is fake?

• Is this true?

• Is the context based on reality or opinion?

• Do we truly understand the situation presented to us?

When words like complexity, uncertainty, or ambiguity are used to describe the future they create another level of confusion in the dilemma. This obscurity deepens information volatility. How can complexity be simplified, or uncertainty known?

Also, one person’s ambiguity can be another’s exploitative advantage.

Greater understanding about change In the early 2000s, the need to overcome these future challenges was identified by LTGEN Rhys Jones (ret) who asked, ‘what is important to know about the future?’ Seeing the need for our strategic capability Line of Defence

to be enhanced by forward thinking methods, he set up a small unit within the NZDF. Off to a good start, the unit waxed then waned as futuring methods were tested and did not produce the desired effect. Though possibly it was before its time as a new concept, like any innovation, it needed to mature to prove its value.

In the early days of designing and adjusting the Programme, I was attempting to clarify its purpose and seek to understand what methodology would deliver the preferred robustness. We couldn’t have imagined the effect of the internetof-things, and were laughed at when trying to highlight the feasibility of electrifying vehicles.

Could we have conceived the emergence of a global online community with influence and power far greater than what governments and international corporations possess? We did not realise we could be so profoundly shocked by populist leaders and disenchanted voters.

People look to these influencers for guidance on such a wide range of activities – for good and evil.

The 15 March Christchurch shooting was such a shock, likely changing New Zealand’s domestic security environment forever.

New Zealand’s security analysts often cited this type of action as not an ‘if but when’ possibility. Despite knowing such an event may occur, knowing when and by whom would require Delphic-like prediction – which belonged only to the Greek gods. Also, imagining the impact of it on us individually and collectively goes beyond our imagination. We can only ‘feel’ its effects afterwards.

When an event causes shock, the prevailing effects include paralysis and confusion. During a state of shock we feel vulnerable. While vulnerable, if exploitation occurs or a perception of mistreatment is felt, possible responses may include anger and/or violent behaviour. Extra care is needed during this period until adjustment takes place.

Being prepared for shocks and surprises is one outcome of strategic foresight. It may not prevent or lessen the impacts of such an event, but

it does help build resilience in our responses. For example, the NZDF maintains a range of first responder options, which are prepared for a range of contingences from domestic to regional events.

In developed western countries, we hadn’t yet felt the impacts of climate change. History told us ISIS was an ancient Egyptian goddess.

We naively believed slavery had been abolished in the 19th century.

All the indicators for today’s existence were on the horizon back then. All we needed to do was to know how to see them. We also didn’t fully understand why we needed to look.

After decades of liberal democracy, relative economic growth and no major world war, it could be said that complacency was our ‘happy place’. Then the pace of change started unravelling the future into our lives seemingly faster than normal, with disruptive effect: • Through artificial intelligence (AI) technology, Google knows my preferences better than I do.

• Electric cars cruise our streets.

• Global deployment of affordable smart devices enables instant worldwide conversations and the ability for wide-spread mobilisation.

• A real estate salesman can become a President.

• The European Union is potentially sans England.

• Devastating storms impact countries simultaneously with ever growing intensity and frequency.

• Temperatures fluctuate at the extremes and at unseasonable times.

• ISIS (Daesh) declared to the world “the restoration of the Caliphate,” advertising its extreme violence on the internet.

• As at June 2018, nearly 70 million people around the world are forced from their homes as a result of persecution, conflict, violence or human rights violations, including 12 million children under the age of 18.

• On any given day, an estimated 40 million are victims of modern slavery.

• One in thirteen teenagers 37

DEFENCE

experiences post-traumatic stress disorder.

• Nearly 30 million people suffer from an opioid use disorder.

• Human loneliness yields to relationships with Siri, Alexa or AI-equipped life-size Barbies.

• Pollution of our air, oceans, waterways and even outer space have unbalanced Mother Nature, whose compounding effects in response have yet to be played out on our grandchildren.

This quick scan of today’s scene may come across as alarmist, but I pondered, how did we arrive at today? Are we wilfully blind to the changes taking place around us? Do we feel helpless to respond to negative outcomes of change? One thing I’ve learnt during the development of the Programme, is that often human complacency needs a mighty shock before we wake up to take action.

Returning to the question, ‘what is important to know about the future?

The answer was found in the 1970s classic Future Shock by Alvin Toffler, an edgy book describing how change unfolds the future into our lives. With 20/20 hindsight, as they say, it seems obvious now shown by the disturbing 38

list above. But what will that list look like in another 10, 20, or 80 years to 2100? In all good faith, can we honestly describe that today?

In the Programme, inquiring into change became the foundation for generating foresight, and my main task was to spot emerging change on the horizon or fringe and bring it to the attention of leadership. A Foresight Inquiry involves the ability to imagine the impacts and implications of that change – to envisage something that does not yet exist.

In his book Sapiens, the Brief History of Humankind, Yuval Noah Harari said “[The] ability to speak about fictions [the future] is the most unique feature of Sapiens language. ... only Homo Sapiens can speak about things that don’t really exist and speak about six impossible things before breakfast.”

We don’t want to be like the three proverbial monkeys who see no ‘change’, hear no ‘change’, nor speak no ‘change’. Like strategic intelligence, generating foresight is like taking a recce into the future to check out what change is up to. When no one else is looking, a role of strategic foresight is to ring the bells that change is underway.

Principles, Process and Participation Upon the restructuring of the NZDF’s Capability Development Branch in 2010 and with a renewed appetite for foresight, MAJGEN Tim Gall (ret) asked me, “How do I get busy people to think about the future, today?”

Slightly daunted, I went back to my academic roots – to the books.

There are journals full of theories and philosophies about the analysis of history, but I found little theory of learning about the future. How can we analyse the future when it hasn’t happened yet?

There are, however, books galore about futurology, trends, scenarios, and forecasting. But for me their tendency towards prediction seemed too fanciful for a conservative and resource-constrained organisation like the NZDF. I felt our organisation needed an approach that generated practical outcome-based strategic thinking about the future – a process that would deliver ‘so what does it mean for the NZDF?’ Strategic foresight, practiced mainly in Europe, provided a depth of rigour and practical findings that to my mind suited the NZDF, and the Line of Defence

then Vice Chief of Defence, RADM Jack Steer approved of this approach.

The academic robustness I was searching for was found at the Manchester Institute of Innovation Research (University of Manchester). Encompassing more than twenty years’ evaluation of foresight methods, Manchester’s Professor Rafael Popper’s definition of foresight was adopted as the foundation for the NZDF’s Strategic Foresight Programme: “… a systematic, participatory and prospective process which, with the support of environmental and horizon scanning approaches, is aimed to actively engage key stakeholders into a wide range of activities anticipating, recommending and transforming…technological, economic, environmental, political, social, and ethical futures.”

The ‘participatory’ aspect of the process then answered this second question. One day after loudly bemoaning my professional loneliness as a ‘lone voice’ for foresight (then, not now), I was promptly reminded

by MAJGEN Gall, that there were actually 14,000 brains I could access within my organisation (the size of the NZDF), let alone the diversity of Line of Defence

thought from anyone else willing to participate!

It made me realise that my own negativity bias had been at play. I was seeing the Programme’s processes in a negative light that stifled my ability to be innovative with the resources available to me. We could actually seek learning from the crowd and source diversity of thought from both within and beyond our organisation and then weave it all together for our senior leaders.

Who was I alone to tell anyone what the future may unfold? No one owns the narrative of the future because we all experience it differently. Instead, the Strategic Foresight Programme aims to learn about how change unfolds the future into our lives through a spirit of collaboration.

Discovery of new insights is the principle aim of the Programme. It may not be new ‘under the sun’ but at least new for the organisation; a realisation that may challenge us or expose opportunities.

Our most recent Foresight Inquiry Reports (all unclassified) have been on the Future of the Deep South and the Future of the Security Environment of the Pacific Islands Region. Both Inquiries

highlighted the dynamic changes impacting our region and challenges for the NZDF. Currently, we are drafting the findings of our inquiry, Kaitiakitanga o te Moana: Guardianship of the Oceans through Understanding the Future of the Seas. If things go according to the Foresight Plan, the next Foresight Inquiry that has been approved is the Future Challenges Facing Small Country Militaries.

Future Foresight Inquiries identified and prioritised by 30 people (in the NZDF and Ministry of Defence) include: the Future of Talent in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the Future of Automation, Autonomy and Artificial Intelligence with Creativity in the Security Environment (A3IC) and Changes in Space - the final frontier for New Zealand.

Our Strategic Foresight Programme has a busy time ahead inquiring into the future to bring a deeper understanding to help enhance confidence in decision making. Foresight is not policy but the beginning of understanding.

Generating foresight provides an opportunity to enter the future with greater leadership over our shared destinies.

39

BORDER SECURITY

A Sensible Precaution: Foreign fighters and passport disqualification Legislated prohibitions against passports for foreign fighters is a sensible precaution, writes Dr John Battersby of Massey University’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies, but do we really know what the numbers are?

According to the results of an Official Information Act request by the New Zealand Herald late last year, eight New Zealanders have had their passports cancelled or declined since the Foreign Fighters Bill 2015 preceded the Intelligence and Security Act 2017.

Some commentators have suggested this is an over-reaction – and that ‘eight’ is a surprising number.

Both pieces of legislation specially defined the grounds to disqualify individuals from holding or obtaining a passport. If there is reasonable cause to believe that an intention to travel and harm New Zealand’s national security, or to commit an act overseas involving terrorism against another country, or to act criminally with significant economic loss to New Zealand – the responsible minister may cancel a passport to mitigate the risk.

Dr John Battersby of Massey University’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies.

40

The cancellation or refusal could last for one to three years. Estimates vary, but something like 40,000 individuals from countries across the globe travelled to Iraq or Syria from 2012 until the decline of the ISIS caliphate in those countries. They became known as ‘foreign fighters’.

They included hundreds from Australia, and about a dozen from New Zealand. A number of those New Zealanders had joint Australian-New Zealand citizenship. A number of New Zealanders have been killed, a small number survive, and most notably Mark John Taylor has now been captured and publicity given to his desire to return here.

Foreign fighters went for a number of reasons. In some cases it was the adventure of battle that has always drawn young people – usually, but not exclusively, males – to war. Some were genuinely motivated by concern for their fellow country-folk under attack from totalitarian governments, others for their co-religionists apparently under siege by secular powers. Some were pathological killers or misfits who sought a place to engage in bullying and violence unfettered by the inconvenience of lawful society.

They joined local extremist-led organisations, made up of cohorts of religiously driven militants mixed with many who were just hungry, jobless, disenfranchised and dispossessed by the chaotic or despotic political situations that existed.

Terrorism is driven by interrelated complexities and while its political or ideological motive is essential to

most definitions – the impetus for an individual’s involvement in terrorism can include numerous unrelated motives. Many fighting for ISIS were probably doing little more than fighting for their own survival in circumstances in which not doing so probably seemed more dangerous.

The fate of ‘foreign fighters’ has varied. Jihadi John achieved enormous notoriety through his deliberate participation in the gruesome decapitation of ISIS prisoners. His notoriety eventually got him killed.

Many died in the intense fighting as the ISIS ‘caliphate’ shrank under the military weight of Syrian and Iraqi government campaigns, supported by the West, Russia, Turkey and even the Kurds.

A significant number of local ISIS members have perished and many surviving foreign fighters have left. Some have disappeared. Others dispersed to Africa and Southeast Asia joining a plethora of militant groups in localised terrorist campaigns or insurgencies.

In the days when ISIS was ascendant, foreign fighters could be leaders, but many were fodder and died quickly, or were less trusted and given menial tasks. Some realised on arrival that the egalitarian and noble paradise ISIS propaganda had promised was a fiction, and some managed to reverse the terrible mistake they had made.

ISIS murdered hundreds who changed their minds and were not quick or clever enough to get away.

It brain-washed or radicalised others.

Line of Defence

Some have been captured by Iraqi forces, and were quickly tried and executed by their captors. No one cares about foreigners in someone else’s war and there has been very little media coverage of the fairness of such trials or the justification for executions that followed. These actions seem not dissimilar to those for which ISIS has been so roundly condemned.

It is difficult not to think of many of those involved in perpetrating atrocities as victims themselves – of the intense psychological battering they were subjected to – but it is equally impossible to forgive them for what they’ve done. Those who have committed crimes should expect to be held accountable.

The collapse of the caliphate has left many foreigners now wanting to return home, prompting fears of the effect seasoned veterans of asymmetrical warfare could pose to their countries of origin.

Eighty years ago, thousands of people from around the globe travelled to Spain – motivated much as today’s foreign fighters are – to fight in the international brigades in the Spanish Civil War. The conflict was a lengthy, brutal, atrocity-ridden internecine conflict, and the international brigades were on the losing side. Individuals involved returned home if they survived, but were regarded as a threat Line of Defence

and treated with suspicion when they did. Those New Zealanders who were involved in Spain in reality posed no threat on their return.

A number of commentators have questioned whether the threat from returning foreign fighters is more imagined than real, and studies suggest that those retuning from failed insurgencies pose much less of a threat than those who come back following a victory.

Another group, whose activities appear to concern no one, are those who have left for the same war zones, often driven by very similar motives – but with the goal of fighting against ISIS. Many of these people similarly funded their own activities, often sold their entire possessions to do so, covertly and possibly illegally armed and trained themselves and then joined battlefields against ISIS fighters. They took the same risks, experienced the same brutal conditions, numbers were killed and many survivors have now returned to their normal lives in home countries.

There are no great numbers of New Zealanders among this group, but there are some. Should their passports have also been cancelled? Should they have been stopped from going? These people have a new set of dangerous skills, a history of non-state sanctioned militant activity and possibly physical

and mental injuries from their experiences.

Is the cancellation or refusal of eight New Zealand passports an overaction? There have been no recent refusals – most date back to when ISIS had real territory. Now there are far fewer places to go and far less reason to go there, and cancellations will probably now become quite rare.

Any place a New Zealander goes to join a militant group such as ISIS will be dangerous, the people they go to will exploit them, implicate them in atrocities and probably kill them if they do not cooperate wholeheartedly.

If they survive and want to return – life here for them will never be the same. Real or imagined suspicions will persist around them for years.

If a New Zealander hit the headlines involved in atrocities elsewhere, and we could have – but didn’t – take all reasonable steps to prevent that from happening, the first question the media will ask is why not?

Eight passport cancellations would seem not an over-reaction then – but a sensible precaution and arguably a little light. Eight is less than the number of New Zealanders some databases suggest have actually gone to fight with ISIS and other groups since 2013, and no one knows how many have gone and come back after fighting against ISIS. 41

BORDER SECURITY

Division and differentiation:

Insights for border management from Ireland and Aotearoa New Zealand Irish and New Zealand experiences show how borders can be places where the flare-up and resolution of conflicts are expressed, writes Dr Germana Nicklin, Deputy Director at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University.

The practicalities of Brexit are creating a huge dilemma for the United Kingdom government, which cannot agree on what withdrawal from the European Union should encompass. Central to the debates is how to prevent a ‘hard’ Irish border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland; in other words, physical control points impeding passage from one sovereign state to the other.

This is a land border issue, and one that states blessed with purely maritime borders can sit back and watch with interest, thankful that they don’t have a land border to manage.

What is at stake with the Irish border question is not just trade and

Dr Germana Nicklin has over 30 years operational and policy experience in the Australian and New Zealand public services, including over 17 years with the New Zealand Customs Service, where she held senior policy and management positions.

42

economics. It is maintaining the peace between the Republic of Ireland and the Northern Ireland – a hard-fought peace made possible by the 1998 Good Friday Peace Agreement.

An effect of that agreement was the opening of the land border between the two Irelands. From the 1970s to 1998, the border that divided two peoples politically and physically was the locus of significant violence and militarisation.

Post-1998, the effect of the opening and the demilitarisation can be seen in the lives of the citizens of both states, particularly those that straddle the border. It has enabled them to intertwine their lives as if they were living in the same state.

The extent of this intertwining is evident in the over 200 official road crossing points and many more informal ones; by the farms and villages that straddle the border; by the over 100 million border crossings annually. A powerful symbol of the peace is the lack of a visible border between the two states, even though the border exists politically and cartographically.

The Irish border at this point in time ‘differentiates’ between the two states; but doesn’t divide them.

A desire to maintain this status and avoid a return to the divisive history that preceded the 1998 Good Friday Peace Agreement is evident in the UK negotiations with the EU. This article examines how the socio-political factors in two contested territories have and may continue to manifest at the border. More specifically, I am interested in how

those conditions affecting the Irish border can inform our understanding of the territorial dynamics evident at Aotearoa New Zealand’s border, and of border management more generally.

Modern border management is much more than the control points at the physical border. It both affects and is affected by the societies contained by the borders. This article highlights how political decisions can disrupt or can accommodate the different interests at the border, potentially resulting in different expressions of ‘divisiveness’ or ‘differentiation’.

I will reflect on transitions from divisiveness to differentiation at the Irish border, and then apply these concepts to the history of contested territory in Aotearoa New Zealand since the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840. In this context, I use the term divisiveness to mean the expression of different political worldviews that are unresolved and often involve discord and violence; and the term differentiation to mean a respectful accommodation of differences in political worldviews that enables the management and crossing of borders to occur without divisiveness.

Brexit and the Irish border The UK’s withdrawal from its deep economic and political integration with the EU requires extraction from a wide range of EU systems, processes and policies, such as financial contributions, political representation, industry standards, external foreign policy and border policies and processes. Because Northern Ireland Line of Defence

is part of the sovereign territory of the UK, it is subject to the terms of the UK withdrawal. However, it is also physically part of the island of Ireland.

The Republic of Ireland became a member of the EU in 1973, the same year as the United Kingdom.

The UK’s withdrawal from the EU will, unless a suitable agreement can be made, require the hard border between the two Irelands to be reinstated. In the event of a ‘no deal’, border checks and collection of customs duties would be required to manage the different rules for crossing between the two states. If the UK maintained the EU policies and standards for these crossings in order to keep the border open, it would be as if it had not exited the EU at all.

This is the political conundrum facing the government of the UK with potentially significant social repercussions for both states, and particularly for borderland communities.

The divisive border Common membership of the EU in 1973 was no guarantee of peace.

Tensions between republicans and British loyalists existed from the creation of the Irish Republic in 1921. That agreement was meant to accommodate both republican and loyalist interests. However, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) did not accept the division of the island and continued to push for unification of Ireland under a republic.

They spearheaded violence that escalated in the 1970s, and continued until shortly before the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. This violence, known as The Troubles, was particularly evident at the physical border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland.

In an attempt to contain the violence, a deeply divisive physical barrier was constructed at the border.

Many roads were made impassable with barriers such as huge concrete blocks and deep canals. Traffic was directed to official access points controlled by watchtowers, soldiers and police.

The impact on the lives of peoples living in the borderlands was significant, not only interfering with Line of Defence

their ability to move around, but also subjecting them to more bombings, deaths and injuries than any other place excepting Belfast. The violent action at the border can be seen as symbolising the divisive nature of the political environment.

The differentiating border In 1998, peace transformed the divisive border into a differentiating border.

Road signs indicating a change from

kilometres to miles or vice versa were a powerful symbol of this transition, marking not only the crossing from one state to the other, but also the transition from violence to peace.

Even so, however powerful this symbolism might be, the Good Friday Peace Agreement did not lead to necessary processes of reconciliation.

With the underlying conflicts remaining unresolved, the risk of a flare up of sectarian violence should 43

BORDER SECURITY a physical border be reinstated is very real. Until Brexit is resolved, the Irish border is a locus of uncertainty, caught in its violent history, hovering between differentiation and divisiveness.

As discussed earlier, there is a relationship between borders and violence and borders and control.

Borders are places that delineate a state’s authority and also where it exercises its authority. The delineation is often gained through violence, and in the case of the Irish border in The Troubles, maintained by violence.

The history of The Troubles is still fresh and not easy to forget. The status of ‘differentiation’ is therefore fragile and not assured.

In other countries, the path from divisiveness to differentiation can be harder to see and therefore harder to remember. There is a good reason for this, from a state’s perspective. Adam McKeown in Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders put it thus: “For nearly two centuries, forgetting the past has been fundamental to the naturalization of border control.”

As can be seen with the Irish border, remembering the violence and the source of the violence creates instability and divisiveness, but it also reminds people how precious the peace is. Maintaining a sense of differentiation is a peaceful way to recognise transitions from one status to another and also to help keep the peace.

Aotearoa New Zealand’s border history Unlike Ireland, Aotearoa New Zealand is an integral island state, with a natural and uncontested maritime border and no land borders.

Nevertheless, the political border is as constructed as the Irish border – a fact that is largely obscured by assumptions about a border as a natural physical feature, like the sea.

The notion of Aotearoa New Zealand as a sovereign state came about through a treaty, the Treaty of Waitangi, between the indigenous Māori tribes (iwi) and the British Sovereign (in Aotearoa New Zealand law, ‘the Crown’), similarly to the agreement between Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1921.

44

Before the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, there was no ‘state’ and no particular divisiveness. British newcomers were unruly and caused problems for Māori but there was no significant conflict over borders between settlers and Māori.

However, the nature of the Treaty itself created internal divisiveness that affects the relationship between Māori and the Crown to this day, creating social divisions between Māori and non-Māori. In the Treaty, the parties agreed to a partnership. But the nature of the partnership was different to each, because there were two different versions of the Treaty. Māori chiefs signed a Māori version, and representatives of the Crown signed an English version, and they meant different things.

Each party acted according to their version, which inevitably resulted in conflict. The British saw the Treaty as providing the authorising environment for British governmental institutions to govern the whole country, with law

applying to all citizens, including Māori.

Māori, on the other hand, expected the Treaty to guarantee them continued governance over their lands and collective ways of life. This did not happen. Instead, they lost most of their lands through illegal confiscation and military action, and suffered huge loss of life through war, illness and poverty.

This history shows a fundamental divisiveness that affected and still affects social outcomes for Māori and their influence in government. However, in the 1980s, the Fourth Labour Government started to incorporate the principles of the Treaty into legislation. Since that time, government departments have been adopting differentiating practices that recognise Māori interest and rights in a wide range of areas, including border management.

So far as border management is concerned, the Crown defined and controlled the border of Aotearoa New Zealand by exporting the customs legislation from Britain (the Customs Act 1841). This legislation Line of Defence

had a detrimental effect on Māori economically and therefore socially.

Prior to the Treaty, Māori were entrepreneurial traders with control over access routes for trade and thus economically independent. The Customs Act imposed customs duties, collected by a Comptroller of Customs.

Māori could no longer levy their own fees, such as anchorage fees. Trade also diverted elsewhere to avoid the customs duties, ships choosing instead duty-free ports overseas.

For the Māori, these and other rules introduced by the settler government became more and more intrusive and divisive, disrupting the Māori way of life.

Māori did not contest the definition of the border in 1841, just the disruptive controls the British placed on it, recognisably similar to the divisive British controls at the Irish border.

Today, effective management of goods, people and craft across Aotearoa New Zealand’s border Line of Defence

benefits Māori generally and specifically. For example, the export of pounamu, a Māori taonga, is strictly controlled; effective processing of exports contributes to Māori economic wellbeing just as the Good Friday Peace Agreement enable Irish and United Kingdom citizens to reap the benefits of EU membership.

Conclusions What conclusions can we make from this discussion? The Irish border reminds us that borders are often locations of contestation. That contestation can be violent and it can be discriminatory. People living close to the Irish border experienced both, through much greater violence and injury than in Northern Ireland as a whole.

The violence in the history of Aotearoa New Zealand manifested through cultural divisiveness between the two Treaty partners, resulting in a violent suppression of Māori interests for over a century.

Like the IRA, Māori activists never stopped protesting; unlike Ireland, successive governments of Aotearoa New Zealand have been working since the mid-1980s on righting past wrongs, and Māori interests are much more visible in government policies, including those relating to managing the border. The shift to differentiation has been lower key than in Ireland, and it is still developing.

While Māori interests can be said to be moving towards differentiation in a positive sense, there are some citizens who do not see it that way. However, while differentiation continues to evolve, it is difficult to imagine a violent socio-political flare-up affecting the New Zealand border in the way that could occur out of Brexit.

Looking more broadly, beyond the specifics of these two situations, it is possible to see how borders can be places where the flare-up and resolution of conflicts are expressed, and that they can move between the two. The concepts of divisiveness and differentiation provide ‘coat hangers’ for examining any given situation.

Being able to read the signs of movement from one status to the other could strengthen the effectiveness of border management. Questions such as: what is the status of a particular border – is it in divisiveness or differentiation?

Who and what is making it so, and how? Are there signs of a shift of status? Who has a stake in keeping the status quo? Who has a stake in shifting the status from one to the other?

These are very broad but important questions that reach beyond standard risk management questions of likelihood and impact. They start to transform border management from its operational function to a barometer for security. Using the concepts of divisiveness and differentiation to look at the status of the border and the way it is managed makes the political realities more visible – a divisive border signalling potentially unresolved social and political issues; a differentiated border reflecting a sociopolitically secure society.

These are bold claims that do not give adequate recognition to the nuances present within them. More reflection and research is needed to develop these ideas further.

45

HOMELAND SECURITY SSC Report and Surveillance: Need for a legal and ethical rethink David Horsburgh CPP PSP PCI writes that the 18 December report of the SSC Inquiry into the use of external security consultants by government agencies raises need for debate of the security industry’s legal and ethical use of intrusive surveillance.

The release of the State Services Commission’s report into private investigation company Thompson and Clark has signalled a need for the security industry to re-evaluate both legal and ethical implications in the use of surveillance technologies.

The challenges facing the New Zealand private security sector are far broader than the issues highlighted by the State Services Commission Inquiry, and blame for reputational damage to the industry cannot be laid solely at the feet of Thompson and Clark.

The SSC Inquiry was initially driven by publicity around Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd’s engagement of Thompson and

David Horsburgh CPP PSP PCI

46

Clark Investigations Ltd to conduct surveillance of individual insurance claimants. Southern Response is a government-owned company and as such is bound by the State Services Commission Code of Conduct.

After the Inquiry was announced, further questions arose regarding Thompson and Clark’s relationships with other government agencies, including the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, the Ministry for Primary Industries and the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service. The Inquiry was expanded to finally include 131 government agencies and subsidiaries.

The Inquiry found that Southern Response, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, Crown Law, the Ministry of Social Development, the New Zealand Transport Authority, and the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service all breached the State Services Code of Conduct when conducting business with New Zealand private investigation and security consultancy companies.

A key issue addressed by the SSC Inquiry was the use of surveillance technologies by Thompson and Clark. The Inquiry defined the term ‘surveillance activities’ and ‘surveillance’ to include ‘any close observation of people, places, things or information, with or without the use of devices’.

The Inquiry described the term as including following or tracking people in public or private places and suggested that it could extend to social media monitoring using assumed identities that interfered with a reasonable expectation of privacy. This is arguably a fair meaning of the term surveillance.

The SSC Inquiry found that an unlicensed private investigator, contracted to Thompson and Clark, undertook covert audio recordings in closed meetings involving Southern Response claimants. The Inquiry disagreed with the Thompson and Clark argument that covert attendance at claimant meetings and conducting audio recordings of claimants was not surveillance.

In its reports to various government agencies, Thompson and Clark referred to ‘issue motivated groups’ which were reported as including Save Animals From Exploitation, Oil Free Otago, Climate Justice Taranaki, Farmwatch, the Green Party, the Mana Movement, various iwi and Greenpeace. The SSC Inquiry was highly critical of government agencies designing their enforcement functions based on the construct of ‘issue motivated groups’.

The Inquiry found that Thompson and Clark conducted large-scale surveillance operations against Greenpeace, involving close observation, extensive searches of the Line of Defence

Motor Vehicle Register and access to other databases including the Driver Licence Register. The report implied that Thompson and Clark considered surveillance and analysis of ‘issue motivated groups’ was justified on the grounds that those groups posed threats to the safety and security of their client organisations.

The Inquiry formed the view that activities such as electronic surveillance of individuals, covert surveillance of groups, attending meetings using false identities, and involvement in activity that conflicts with human rights may breach the SSC Code of Conduct and potentially contravene the provisions enshrined in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBoR) including freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom from discrimination.

An important view expressed by the Inquiry was that legal requirements applying to Crown agencies apply equally to activities carried out by contractors working for government agencies. That means private security consultants and investigators contracted to government agencies become bound by the SSC Code of Conduct and the NZBoR. Line of Defence

In 2017 the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment created an ‘All of Government’ sub-panel to facilitate the private security sector delivering Protective Security Consultancy Services to government agencies. Thompson and Clark were part of the sub-panel.

Key requirements within the subpanel agreement include: (a) Services must be provided in accordance with industry best practice. (b) Providers must act in the best interests of the participating agency. (c) Providers must comply with all privacy and other policies and guidelines issued by the participating agency, including the State Services Code of Conduct. (d) Providers must obtain, maintain and comply with any governmental, regulatory or other relevant approvals, permissions or requirements. (e) Providers must comply with all laws relevant to the provision of services. (f ) Providers must use all reasonable endeavours to avoid damaging or adversely affecting the reputation of the participating agency.

So, what are the consequences to the security industry from the SSC Inquiry? The Inquiry report should not be examined in isolation but rather the debate needs to about the industry’s legal and ethical use of highly intrusive surveillance devices and techniques that intrude unreasonably into the privacy of individuals.

The Principles contained in the Privacy Act 1993 require that personal information collection must (i) be for a lawful purpose; (ii) be necessary; (iii) not be collected unfairly; and (iv) not intrude to an unreasonable extent upon the personal affairs of the individual concerned.

However, a review of the private security industry requires an analysis broader than an examination of the Privacy Act principles. The Private Investigators and Security Guards Act 1974 placed restrictions on the use of imaging and audio recording devices by private investigators. Those restrictions were a response to reports of unethical behaviour by private investigators involved in divorce investigations.

The Private Security Personnel and Private Investigators’ Bill of 2010 originally contained the imaging and 47

HOMELAND SECURITY audio recording restrictions from the 1974 Act. However during the passage of the Bill through the House in 2010, those restrictions were removed. The removal met strong opposition from various parliamentarians, as recorded in Hansard, during the second reading of the Bill on 7 September 2010 and at a subsequent hearing of the Justice and Electoral Committee. Some key excerpts from Hansard include: (a) “There is good reason why there should be protections around the way that the industry operates when it comes to an individual’s privacy.”

(Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern). (b) “I do not think they should have carte blanche to use [digital devices such as cameras, voice recorders and so on] in any way that they see fit, which is effectively what this bill allows them to do.” (Hon Chris Hipkins). (c) “Now that we see private investigators using [surveillance] technology and being so intrusive into the lives of others, it is appropriate that they be properly restrained.” (Keith Locke). (d) “When discussing the expansion of technology that intrudes on our privacy we have to consider carefully how it might be applied by private investigators and the like in our society today.” (Keith Locke). (e) “The select committee held divergent views on this topic and although a number of people argued that the original restriction would inhibit the work of private

48

investigators, and that the public interest in investigating criminal activity outweighed public privacy, a number of people argued that the clause should be retained to avoid potential abuse and unfairness.”

(Hon Iain Lees-Galloway). (f ) “It is important to be mindful that not all of the work that this provision covered would have been investigation around criminal activity. In fact, probably some of the more frequent activity might have simply related to, for instance, marital disputes …” (Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern). (g) “Our privacy is under threat as never before because of the reach of digital technology, and who is leading that invasion? It is the private spies, often private corporate spies, who engage in industrial espionage and in the invasion of private rights that is pushing the boundary.” (Hon David Cunliffe) (h) “We need to protect New Zealanders’ privacy. We need to protect them from sophisticated private individuals not covered by the restraints that apply to the State, who have access to advanced technology and can access information about other individuals in unprecedented ways.” (Hon David Cunliffe).

Since the removal of the restriction placed on private investigators’ use of imaging and audio recording

devices, investigators have seized the opportunity to engage in the use of intrusive technologies to levels even greater than opponents had feared.

For example in the field of ‘infidelity investigations’ research has identified some New Zealand licensed private investigators marketing surveillance, GPS vehicle tracking, computer forensics, phone data recovery and covert cameras to investigate suspicions that a husband, wife or partner is ‘cheating’.

Some such companies are openly marketing ‘Honey Trap’ services, claiming use of ‘male and female investigators of all ages, interests, looks and levels of education, equipped with the latest video, voice and visual recording devices’, to test whether a husband or wife might be open to an extramarital affair. Investigators are described as ‘all former police detectives and the surveillance teams staffed with former military Special Forces and Police specialists’.

Another company describes their ‘Honey Trap’ service in the following terms: ‘If you want to know the honesty and integrity of your partner, a honey trap will present them with an opportunity that they can choose to accept or reject. All conversations are recorded and include video evidence.’

The use of ‘Honey Traps’ may well be a breach of Privacy Act Principles 4(b) (i) and (ii), in that personal information is being obtained both by unfair means and by means that unreasonably intrude into the privacy of the individual. It may also reach the threshold of the tort, intrusion into seclusion, as described in C v Holland [2012] NZHC 2155. These types of investigations call into question the ethics of the private investigation industry.

The release of the State Services Commission Inquiry Report into the Use of External Security Consultants

by Government Agencies provides the security industry, and in particular the private investigation sector, an incentive to examine both the legal and ethical aspects of how their businesses are conducted. A failure to do so may result in a re-introduction of the 1974 restrictions on private investigator use of imaging and audio recording technologies.

Line of Defence

SSC Report and Surveillance: Big brother looking out for you?

James Knapp, Principal Consultant at Stag Risk Management, writes that the SSC Inquiry into the use of external security consultants by government agencies raises more urgent questions than answers.

The report from the State Services Commission (SSC) investigation into government agencies’ use of private security providers, and in particular the private investigation firm Thompson and Clark Investigations Limited (TCIL), was widely reported as ‘scathing’. ‘Paradoxical’ is perhaps a better description, raising the question, “Okay, so what do we do now?”

On releasing the report, State Services Commissioner Peter Hughes stated, “It is never acceptable for an agency to undertake targeted surveillance of a person just because they are lawfully exercising their democratic rights – including their right to freedom of expression, association and right to protest. That is an affront to democracy.”

I don’t think one would find a single New Zealander in disagreement with that statement. I strongly doubt any public servant or agency would ask for surveillance ‘just because’ someone is

expressing an opinion; rather I suspect the concern would come from how they were expressing it.

No public servant wakes up in the morning determined to use their work to trample on people’s rights.

Yet since the inquiry, the media, activist groups and even security commentators seem to have used a very broad brush to paint all commercial intelligence-gathering and threat assessment activities as anti-democratic.

According to the SSC website, the inquiry “looked at TCIL’s reporting to government agencies on ‘issue motivated groups’, which treated those groups as a security threat.”

Did all agencies really consider issue-motivated groups (IMGs) to be security threats, or is that a generalisation? If the generalisation is broadly accurate: was that position based on the advice provided by TCIL, was it tribalism (“your group

James Knapp specialises in health, safety and physical security for remote workers who face high-risk situations. He is a member of the NZIPI and IIRSM. Line of Defence

is opposed to my group, therefore you pose a threat to me”), or was it perhaps a genuine misunderstanding of the nature of the risk?

I personally never regarded any ‘group’ as a threat. A group is made up of individuals who, like all members of society, sit somewhere on a spectrum from great to awful. I have categorically ruled out several individual activists as safety threats, saving time and stress, largely thanks to advice from TCIL. However, in order to work out who might be and who is not a threat, one has to look at the bigger picture. Is it fair to monitor the public activities of a group in order to detect and prevent offences?

I asked Gavin Clark, Director of TCIL, for comment about whether IMGs are a threat. He was adamant that “TCIL believe in and embrace the right to freedom of speech and expression”, adding that “TCIL have never prevented any lawful protest or activist group exercising their democratic rights”. He confirmed that they did monitor the activities of certain IMGs to detect unlawful protest activity that could threaten people or the continuity of legitimate business.

It seems fair to me that everyone should expect to attract some scrutiny if, in the course of expressing their opinion, they display concerning or threatening behaviour, if they do so in a public place or forum where they have no reasonable expectation of privacy.

We have rights, but we also have a responsibility to exercise those rights in a way that does not frighten other people, solicit or incite violence or obstruct the carrying on of a lawful business.

49

HOMELAND SECURITY The risk While it is indeed the case that not all activists pose a threat to people or the organisations they oppose, it is equally true some fixated or extremist persons or elements within those IMGs could, and have, posed a genuine security risk to the lawful activities of the organisations they oppose.

Threatening interpersonal situations and direct action are uncommon, but they do occur regularly and they rarely make the news. Some examples of anti-1080 threats from the recent past include: • Agitated persons visiting an office and yelling at staff • Veiled threats to place man-traps that would cause injury to workers • Threats or intimidation delivered directly from one person to another • Online threats to behead, shoot, assault or poison workers • Accosting, following and personally abusing off- and on-duty workers • Various attempts to sabotage or disrupt operations, such as attempting to illegally access active helicopter landing sites; scattering ‘Z’ nails on access routes; felling trees across access roads (in one case felling two large native trees); sabotaging equipment, such as fuel trailers; and threatening to shoot down helicopters.

The vast majority of contemporary threats come to staff attention via social media; they are usually non-specific and not targeted at any individual person.

However, sometimes posts target an individual and this can cause distress.

Online posts that cause serious emotional distress may breach the Harmful Digital Communications Act 2015.

A common tactic that is not necessarily a threat, but is potentially harmful, is that of ‘naming and shaming’ individual company directors or workers. While the original post itself may not be a criminal offence as it may not be threatening in nature, many of the comments or replies are vitriolic and sometimes threatening.

The fact that the originator does not always remove threatening comments only lends weight to the presumption that by ‘naming and shaming’ they intend to intimidate the target person or organisation.

50

A recent trend is the ironic labelling of 1080 use as “terrorism” along with attempts to suggest or justify extremist action.

The need Workplaces have a legal and moral duty of care to protect people from work-related risks to their health and safety, including their mental health.

If an employer knows of a risk, it is incumbent upon them to assess and then eliminate or minimise the risk, whether it has been realised or not (yet). It is expected that organisations, whether Government or commercial, will take reasonable steps to ensure their own security.

Good practice involves not just a general security risk assessment, but also an assessment of every threat or concerning client interaction.

An essential element of risk management is risk analysis and evaluation. Since statistics on violent incidents in New Zealand are limited, it is instructive to look overseas to gain statistically significant insights.

For example, the most common venue for mass killings in the United States, including active shooter events, is commercial workplaces, not schools.

Sadly, we are not immune in New Zealand - client violence against workers is a serious risk, with the shootings in Northland and Ashburton being extreme examples.

It is essential that concerning interactions are internally reported and assessed for threat potential.

The US Secret Service has noted that over three-quarters of mass killers in 2017 “made concerning communications and/or elicited concern from others” before attacking, while an FBI study of 63 active shooters from 2000-2013 found that a shooter will have displayed on average four to five concerning behaviours.

It seems unlikely that any aggrieved person will stew to the point of violence entirely in silence.

Yet paragraph 1.16 of the Inquiry’s report contained the judgement that it “[does] not consider that health and safety obligations require or justify surveillance [including the monitoring of social media] of individuals or groups by external security consultants in circumstances such as these. The company’s other actions to mitigate the risks were appropriate, including physical security measures, and staff training in de-escalation strategies.

For more serious concerns, the proper response was to seek assistance from the Police” [my emphasis].

This implies that an organisation needs to define ‘serious concern’.

Should they just report every veiled threat or concerning client interaction?

The Police are unlikely to continue to respond every time a client becomes upset or abusive. That doesn’t seem to Line of Defence

be a sensible use of Police resources.

Conflict is unavoidable, but violence does not always result, and people should not be afraid of harmless venting if they are trained to deal with it. To filter ‘serious concerns’ from normal conflict or trifling abuse, some form of threat assessment may be needed. A threat assessment may include having an independent specialist make objective observations of a client’s tone and behaviour. At a public meeting held on private property, for example.

Proportionality Intelligence-led risk and threat assessment saves time, money and stress. The traditional (and largely pointless) approach to health and safety risk assessment is to multiply likelihood and consequence using a simple 5 x 5 matrix. That approach does not suit security risk management, because: 1. The consequences of a single rare event can be catastrophic; 2. Risk is not static; and 3. A purely consequential risk assessment could lead to a constant state of high alert.

If every threat or risk event is treated equally, risk may appear to be cumulative rather than dynamic. Ramping up security levels in response to multiple events will eventually translate into a state of constant high alert.

This is undesirable because normal business becomes inefficient, security measures may become prohibitively expensive and the effects of alertness can be damaging. Constant alertness (hypervigilance) can cause unnecessary alarm, stress, and an unnecessarily defensive approach to all client interactions. Conversely, it may result in complacency at the exact wrong time.

Therefore, in assessing emergent security threats from external sources, security managers consider three main elements: capability/means, intent/motivation, and vulnerability/ opportunity. Occasionally, a practitioner might seek specialist advice in relation to the likelihood that a specific person will commit violence.

Under the government Protective Security Requirements (PSR), an agency must have a system for setting alert levels. The outcome of Line of Defence

a new risk assessment or a specific threat assessment is aligned with a response measures table, which sets out proportionate response measures.

Responses are time-limited and cease when the situation normalises.

For example, where social media monitoring detects an online threat to assault staff as they depart their office, a threat assessment may indicate that the originator has a low chance of success. Weighed against the potential consequences of success, staff may be informed that there is a low risk of protest action and be reminded of standard security protocols, but with no additional security measures implemented.

Proactivity vs reactivity In his book Protecting People in New Zealand, Carlton Ruffell CPP, PSP rightly states, “Those responsible for the security of people should not just wait for threat material to arrive on their desks”.

I take that to mean that those who become aware of the existence of a general risk should then make efforts to proactively detect threats using intelligence gathering. Intelligencegathering works like a funnel, with a broad collection mechanism to source data internally and from outside the organisation, which is then progressively sieved by analysis until it is either disseminated for action or discarded as irrelevant.

Criminal offences have been successfully detected, and in some cases prevented, through intelligence-led risk management, yet the SSC maintains that the surveillance of groups should not occur. If surveillance is defined as broadly as the SSC defines it, how can an agency proactively scan for threats that they can then report to Police?

There is, to my knowledge, no Government-led service that provides the kind of low-level security intelligence service provided by TCIL; it is a gap that is not quite covered by either Police or NZSIS, and that otherwise remains unfilled. Adding to the gap is the fact that information-sharing between agencies is complex, and threat information isn’t shared among Government agencies, let alone commercial organisations that face similar threats – sometimes from the same people.

So what now?

Perhaps the intelligence function could be brought in-house. If so, what is the qualification or experience necessary for intelligence and threat assessment?

Does, or should, that capability exist in every organisation and state agency?

Agencies are prevented from comparing notes on persons of concern – despite anecdotal evidence that a person inappropriately interacting with one organisation will often have had run-ins with another. That means an internal capability would have to be duplicated in every agency, but there simply is not enough qualified security managers in New Zealand to fill those potential vacancies.

Building an in-house capability and delivery without a solid framework and tight protocols might also present the same or greater reputational and ethical risks as outsourcing.

Worse, the report may suggest to organisations that their safest option, in terms of reputational risk, is to treat every client as a potential threat.

That means installing expensive and disproportionate physical security controls, such as holding their clients at the door or confronting them with a uniformed guard.

To me, that seems not only disproportionate but also inefficient and potentially counter-productive. Simply transferring the risk of interpersonal conflict or attack to a lightly trained security guard without screening technology, defensive equipment or legislated powers beyond that of an ordinary citizen, is neither fair nor a very effective control for the risk they are put there to prevent or respond to.

Health, safety and security practice demands that practitioners do not wait for harm to occur before acting to prevent it. Yet without evidence to back a ‘serious concern’, or evidence that a serious offence is imminent, Police are usually unable to act.

Without monitoring, how do organisations gather the evidence to form a judgement on what is a ‘serious concern’? Should they assume that every member of an opposed group is of equally good character, with equally peaceful intentions?

It seems illogical and irresponsible to allow a known risk to be realised before taking any action.

51

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY New Zealand, China, and the limits of friendship Whatever the current state of New Zealand – China relations, writes editor Nicholas Dynon, Wellington could do well to stick to sinologists for understanding China and to diplomats for communicating about China.

Media coverage of the recent apparent deterioration in the New ZealandChina relationship has jumped to find signs of discord in developments that might be considered benign in more sober times. The Huawei block out, a delayed ministerial visit, shipments stalled at Customs, and a turned-around Air New Zealand flight circumstantially evidencing the story of souring relations.

Such is the trope of a media more interested in the story than in the answers – which are admittedly far more elusive. Of this, Victoria University Wellington Professor Robert Ayson observes in a recent article in The Spinoff that we seem to be “stuck in a room of many mirrors, trying to work out which reflection is genuine.”

Purposely avoiding the tea leaf reading frenzy, Massey University Associate Professor Beth Greener, also in The Spinoff, sensibly asks, “how might we seek to navigate New Zealand’s diplomatic relationships, including with China, into the future?”

Nicholas Dynon, Chief Editor, Line of Defence.

52

It is one of the big questions of our times, and it attracts no shortage of opinion.

Security analysts, political scientists, economists, and entrepreneurs are well represented in public debate over the place of China in contemporary New Zealand. As a consequence of these line-ups, we tend to be presented with an unnecessarily binary framework for understanding China as either a trading partner or strategic threat.

Such approaches tend also to see the relationship through largely Anglophonic linguistic and intellectual prisms, which limit their analytical utility in the context of China.

New Zealand is blessed with a quality core of China specialists, or sinologists; following paths blazed by the likes of pioneering China scholar and political activist Rewi Alley (18971987). Most widely known among these is University of Canterbury’s Professor Anne-Marie Brady, whose Magic Weapons research into China’s ‘sharp power’ has famously exposed Chinese intrusions into New Zealand’s democratic processes.

In particular, suggestions that Brady’s personal security has been compromised by pro-China groups unhappy with her claims around Beijing’s undue influence in New Zealand’s electoral system have jammed journalistic airwaves.

Most New Zealanders would not be aware of just how internationally authoritative Brady’s research on the Chinese Communist Party’s systems of propaganda and social control is.

But with the intrigue around apparent break-ins at her home and university office, Brady herself has unwillingly become the story, which isn’t helpful.

The UC professor, who gained her PhD from the Australian National University, credits eminent sinologist and ANU emeritus professor Geremie Barmé as a long-time “model and an inspiration” for her scholarly work.

Now based in the Wairarapa, Barmé was one of her doctoral supervisors.

Barmé is China watching royalty, an international rock star among China specialists, who developed the idea of ‘New Sinology’ as a model for studying China. The goal of New Sinology, he writes, “is to understand, study and appreciate ‘China’ through locating itself inside the Chinese world in order to communicate what animates and inspires this world.”

It is informed by an acknowledgement that as China in recent decades has become stronger and more confident, her thought traditions, literature and cultural practices have attained renewed importance – part of an “articulation of modern selfhood.” Thus, for the ‘new sinologist’, a must-have skill for true China literacy is the ability to read, write and speak Chinese.

Former Australian Prime Minister and Barmé protégé, Kevin Rudd, is well-known for his command of the Chinese language. Prior to his now legendary Mandarin-delivered speech to students at Peking University in April 2008, former ANU China Club president Rudd had sought Barmé’s advice on how to weave into his script the uncomfortable topic of China’s human rights violations in Tibet. Accordingly, the professor suggested that he use the concept of ‘zheng you’ to characterise a new type of Australian relationship with China.

Line of Defence

Statue of Wei Zheng. Detail of image by Fanghong/Wikipedia (GFDL and CC 2.5).

“A true friend is one who can be a ‘zhengyou’, that is a partner who sees beyond immediate benefit to the broader and firm basis for continuing, profound and sincere friendship,” Rudd told his audience.

“In other words, a true friendship which “offers unflinching advice and counsels restraint” to engage in principled dialogue about matters of contention.”

In an essay published in April last year (on the tenth anniversary of the speech), Barmé described zhengyou as an “independent-minded interlocutor who was sufficiently well thought of so that when they offered the unvarnished truth they would not cause offense.”

Barmé had come across the term when he’d read the classic Political Essentials from the Zhenguan Reign while working in the 1970s for a Chinese bookstore and publisher in Hong Kong. Compiled in 708-710, this Tang-dynasty guide to ideal government recounts the frank and fearless advice provided to Emperor Li Shumin (626-649) by official Wei Zheng, a zhengyou still-celebrated by Chinese leaders.

Ultimately, as Graeme Dobell wrote in a 2014 edition of the Lowy Interpreter, “Beijing did not want a Kevin Rudd who offered unflinching advice. China eventually hammered Line of Defence

Rudd and Australia to make the true friend shut up and get back in line.” It was only after a ‘ceasefire’ agreement in October 2009, writes Dobell, that “China’s diplomatic version of the death of a thousand cuts was brought to an end.”

With a free trade agreement signed between Beijing and Wellington just two days prior to the Rudd speech, New Zealand’s relationship with China followed a somewhat different trajectory.

New Zealand prides itself as an independent ‘honest broker’ in international affairs; as a small state we champion multilateralism and the maintenance of a rules-based international order.

The most recent documentary expression of this is last year’s Strategic Defence Policy Statement (SDPS), which noted China’s military-led territorial expansionism in the South China Sea and its failure to recognise Court of Arbitration rulings, and singled out China’s views on human rights and freedom of information as standing “in contrast to those that prevail in New Zealand.” Add to this other rebukes, including the GCSB scuttling Huawei’s hopes of involvement in the country’s 5G network, and New Zealand’s ‘rules-based’ pretensions start looking in Beijing more like ‘alliance-based’ behaviour.

Beijing’s resulting displeasure has been the subject of wide conjecture in New Zealand. But whatever the tea leaves may or may not reveal, history tells us that such pointed public rebuke is never easily digested in the corridors of Zhongnanhai.

In the rules of propriety that Beijing assiduously follows in its public interactions with foreign governments, symbolism is important, as is the notion that critical words are spoken behind closed doors and beyond the public narrative of ‘win-win cooperation and mutual benefit’.

Rudd’s zhengyou bid was destined to fail. The unvarnished truth delivered in Mandarin at its most venerable university was always going to cause offence. Just as we can be confident that the SDPS and Huawei rebukes have been interpreted by Beijing as a public slap on the face and an unfortunate turn by Wellington towards the ‘China containment’ position of its traditional Anglophonic allies.

Could the SDPS have articulated what it needed to without outing China in the way it did? Could the Huawei position have been more delicately stated, perhaps along lines more akin to the subsequent UK GCHQ announcement? Probably.

It’s not about acquiescing to Beijing’s dictates in order to protect New Zealand export revenues, and it’s not about making a choice between Beijing and the Western alliance. Such binary views of New Zealand’s options are overly simplistic, and not overly helpful. Which brings us back to Professor Brady.

As an outspoken and principled critic of Chinese interference in New Zealand’s domestic politics, Professor Brady provides – and should be encouraged to provide – unflinching counsel to Wellington, just as Wei Zheng would have done in the court of the Tang emperor fourteen hundred years ago.

But Wellington should also learn from the thwarted zhengyou ambitions of Kevin Rudd and consider a more diplomatic communications strategy with Beijing… one that avoids the type of indelicate – and zero sum – public shaming we’ve seen over the past several months.

53

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY International Criminal Court: Another prosecution fails

Recent ICC failures are at odds with New Zealand’s longstanding commitment to international juridical institutions, writes Dr Damien Rogers, Senior Lecturer at Massey University’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies.

In January this year, judges belonging to the International Criminal Court at The Hague dismissed some very serious charges laid against Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé.

The ICC prosecutor alleged these two men were responsible for crimes against humanity committed during violence that erupted in Côte d’Ivoire after the results of the 2010 Presidential election were hotly disputed. Specific crimes included murder, attempted murder, rape, persecution and other inhumane acts.

According to the prosecutor, Gbagbo planned and organised widespread and systematic armed attacks against civilians, which Blé Goudé helped lead on the ground.

These attacks displaced about a million people and the prosecutor pointed

Dr Damien Rogers’ latest book is Law, Politics and the Limits of Prosecuting Mass Atrocity, published by Palgrave Macmillan in late 2017.

54

to several mass graves as a means of underscoring the situation’s gravity and horror.

Two of the three judges, however, thought there was insufficient evidence upon which to try the two men. Both men have now been released and are free to return home.

This is not the first time the ICC prosecutor has failed to secure a conviction. Nor is it the first time a case has failed to reach and undergo trial.

Of the forty or so individuals so far indicted by the prosecutor, eight have had their charges dismissed, declared inadmissible or were acquitted by judges, and two have been withdrawn by the prosecutor. Five of the accused are now dead or presumed dead. Many of the accused remain fugitives.

The International Criminal Court sits at the apex of a global criminal justice system. It was established in July 1998 by way of a treaty known as the Rome Statute. The lofty rhetoric found in the Statute’s preamble proclaims all those states that sign this treaty are determined to end the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community. The ICC is one of the international community’s key mechanisms for deterring political violence, especially against civilians. It is supposed to elevate the rule of law above the rule of tooth and claw.

Yet the ICC has registered only eight convictions since it began operating on 1 July 2002.

Given that the ICC exists in order to try the most serious international crimes — war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and acts of aggression — we might be forgiven for expecting a somewhat higher

prosecutorial strike-rate. Its budget for 2018 was just under 150 million Euros.

Now that’s hardly a shoestring.

Perhaps the various defence teams have had a good run. Or perhaps only very few of those accused actually committed the heinous crimes of which they stood accused.

In any case, this recent decision will come as a blow to the prosecutor’s reputation. This latest acquittal will cast a long shadow over the prosecutor’s performance and her investigatory and leadership competency will be called into question. This is partly because the case was seven years in the making. If the prosecutor held any serious doubts about the strength of the available evidence, then she probably should not have proceeded. She may well have even been blindsided by the judges’ decision.

Rather than prompting some deep professional soul-searching and selfreflection, the prosecutor lost no time in issuing a press release stating her investigations in this small African country will continue while victims’ suffering remains on her mind. Despite these fighting words the prosecutor’s record of achievement suggests justice for those who suffered in Côte d’Ivoire’s post-election violence is unlikely to be delivered any time soon, if at all.

It appears the grand pursuit of international criminal justice has once again stalled on the starting grid. This inertia ought to concern New Zealand’s policymakers given the current debates over our own criminal justice system at home, and our country’s longstanding commitment to international juridical institutions in particular and multilateralism in general.

Line of Defence

ENGAGING CO-CREATION TO PREPARE FOR FUTURE SECURITY THREATS 2 - 4 July 2019 Sands Expo & Convention Centre

•

Singapore

www.interpol-world.com

Global Safety Today • Improving Security for Tomorrow • Forecasting and Planning for the Future

Register for INTERPOL World 2019!

INTERPOL World is a global co-creation opportunity which engages the public and private sectors in dialogue and fosters collaboration to counter future security and policing challenges.

30 strategic Co-creation Labs to discuss the challenges and solutions for combating the crimes of the future Exhibition that serves as a business and networking event for 250 manufacturers, distributors, and Research and Development organizations to offer innovative products and cutting-edge technologies

EVENT OWNER

SUPPORTED BY

INTERPOL Working Groups (by invitation only) including the chief innovation officers group, artificial intelligence, drones and the Darknet and cryptocurrency group

INDUSTRY INSIGHTS BY

visitor@interpol-world.com

HELD IN

MANAGED BY

JOURNEY OF WONDER

KC-390

The KC-390 incorporates 50 years of Embraer's heritage STATE-OF-THE-ART and experience in developing, certifying and delivering reliable aircraft.

The aircraft is equipped with the V2500 high bypass TECHNOLOGY AND turbofan engine which has accumulated more than 100 million PROVEN SYSTEMS flight hours. Combined with proven avionics, which comply with exacting standards for cockpit display systems, and full fly-by-wire flight control systems, the KC-390 is ready to accomplish any mission. Furthermore, the KC-390 has accumulated more than 2,000 hours of flight testing and achieved civil certification.

In support, is a world-wide sustainment alliance of reputable suppliers contributing toward making the KC-390 the most reliable, easy to operate and efficient choice there is.

kc-390.com