Line of Defence Magazine - Summer 2020/21 by Defsec New Zealand

Line of Defence Issue 18 • Summer 2020

New Zealand’s Defence and National Security Magazine

Information Domain: NZ in the age of information competition The Biden administration and New Zealand’s strategic choices

The Interview: Mike Yardley, Deputy Secretary Capability Delivery Violent Extremism: Addressing the home-grown threat

www.defsec.net.nz

TRUSTEDPARTNERS RHEINMETALL IS A PROUD INDUSTRY PARTNER TO THE NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE. Rheinmetall has been delivering and sustaining the most durable, reliable, versatile and cost-effective military vehicle in its class to men and women in service with the NZDF. This could not be possible without our growing network of industry partners, including: • TRT, Hamilton • Mobile Mechanical Solutions, Palmerston North • 360 Logistics, Wellington • Penske Commercial Vehicles, Auckland, Christchurch • Mills-Tui, Rotorua We acknowledge the work of our employees, partners and suppliers as we work together to sustain a high performance logistics backbone for the nation’s military. www.rheinmetall-defence.com

FORCE PROTECTION IS OUR MISSION.

Cost-Effective Force Multiplier

Leonardoâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ATR 72MP is the most advanced, operationally proven, twin turboprop multi-mission maritime patrol aircraft. The platform is based on the most reliable, efficient and uniquely-flexible commercial aircraft in its class, with over 1,500 units sold internationally. A state-of-the-art sensor suite enables electronic surveillance, C4I and real-time information management for unparalleled mission-success. Inspired by the vision, curiosity and creativity of the great master inventor Leonardo is designing the technology of tomorrow.

leonardocompany.com Helicopters | Aeronautics | Electronics, Defence & Security Systems | Space

CONTENTS Editor’s Note

Kia Ora and welcome to the Summer 2020 – and 18th – issue of Line of Defence. In this Summer issue of Line of Defence, we continue our focus on the New Zealand Information Domain. Thinking on this new domain continues to evolve, with the NZDIA’s IDEAS 2020 Part Two event in November showcasing Industry’s thought leadership around the collection, storage, movement, analysis, deployment and protection of data. Inside, I discuss some of the big takeaways from this ambitious – and stunningly successful - event. Harnessing the insights of IDEAS 2020 speakers, I explore how in the information era data is increasingly defining the geostrategic power of nation states and the nature of their societies. This presents big challenges to New Zealand, not least the need to conceptualise the information domain within a broader whole-of-society programme of policy development, investment and research. In his inaugural Line of Defence article, former submariner and recently appointed Opposition spokesperson for Defence and Veterans Chris Penk provides insights into the National Party’s NZDF connections. We look forward to Defence Minister Hon Peeni Henare’s inaugural article in our next issue. We’re excited to be joined in this issue by Mike Yardley, the Ministry of Defence’s Deputy Secretary Capability Delivery. Mike shares his insights into the Defence Capability System and the ways in which Defence has pivoted in the wake of COVID to keep procurement cycles turning. Nova Systems NZ provides insights into its partnership with the NZDF across numerous projects, including the Project Protector Remediation programme and Maritime Sustainment Capability Safety Case Review, among others. Matthew Medley of IFS explores what’s needed to turn disparate data into one infrastructure platform to achieve Total Asset Readiness. In International Security, Former Defence Minister Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO writes that recent United States and New Zealand election outcomes provide fresh opportunity to think through how Wellington will navigate the challenge of balancing our US and China relationships. Dr Reuben Steff suggests that any ambitions Wellington may have to act as an independent broker will need to be tempered with a consideration of the investments in institutions needed. In Homeland Security, with recent terrorist attacks in the West ‘home-grown’, Marc Collins explains how governments might go about countering the threat whilst preserving freedoms. Steve Honiss writes that COVID impacts and the rush for a vaccine have fuelled a rush of state-sponsored cyber incursions. I commend the above articles to you, along with the many fine contributions inside. . Nicholas Dynon Auckland

ASSOCIATION

CONTACT DETAILS Chief Editor: Nicholas Dynon M: +64 (0)22 366 3691 E: nick@defsec.net.nz

Publisher: Craig Flint T: +64 (07) 868 2703 E: craig@defsec.net.nz

Postal and delivery address 27 West Cresent Te Puru 3575, Thames RD5, New Zealand

www.linkedin.com/company/ defsec-media-limited www.facebook.com/defsecmedia/ www.twitter.com/DefsecNZ

Contributors & Interviewees Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO AVM (ret) Mike Yardley Chris Penk Nicholas Dynon Marc Collins Prof Nick Wilson

Geoff Comber PMP Matt Medley Andy Cross Dr Reuben Steff Steve Honiss Prof Michael Baker

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Dr Peter Greener Dr Bridgette-Sullivan Taylor Dr John Battersby Debbie Howarth Jennie Vickers Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO Ruth Currie DSD

Prof Rouben Azizian Dr Reuben Steff Paul Howard John Deal Douglas Pauling John Campbell MNZM Pat Cullen

SPONSORSHIP PARTNERS General Atomics Aeronautical Leonardo

Rheinmetall Defence Nova Systems

UPCOMING ISSUE

Autumn – March Main themes: Air Domain, 2021 Government priorities, Royal Commission of Inquiry, Securing NZ’s borders facilities and public spaces. Copy Deadline: 20 February 2021 Publication: 01 March 2021

Line of Defence

ISSN 2463-5774 (Print) • ISSN 2463-6258 (Online)

DEFENCE

HOMELAND SECURITY

Nova Systems up and running in New Zealand

Addressing the home-grown threat

The Interview: Mike Yardley, Deputy Secretary Defence Capability

Malicious cyber activity in the COVID-19 era

MQ-9B SeaGuardian supports Japan Coast Guard Missions

New Minister for Justice Portfolio

Total Asset Readiness: Five things not to miss

Serving the nation, serving the electorate

Trusted to Protect: EPE bringing the supply chain to New Zealand

Information Domain: New Zealand in the age of information competition

Defining the Information Domain

BORDER SECURITY

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Mapp: The Biden Administration and New Zealand’s strategic choices

Academic Spotlight: Reuben Steff talks big power

New Zealand needs a ‘traffic light’ system to stop COVID-19 creeping in at the border

Women in Security Awards Aotearoa launches

Defsec Media Limited publishes Line of Defence, FireNZ Magazine and New Zealand Security Magazine premier publications covering industry sectors that help keep Kiwis safe. Find us online www.defsec.net.nz Copyright: No article or part thereof may be reproduced without prior consent of the publisher. Disclaimer: The information contained in this publication is given in good faith and has been derived from sources believed to be reliable and accurate. However, neither the publishers nor any person involved in the preparation of this publication accept any form of liability whatsoever for its contents including advertisements, editorials, opinions, advice or information or for any consequences from its use.

Line of Defence

DEFENCE

Nova Systems up and running in New Zealand Nova Systems is New Zealand’s in-country capability and technology partner. Since 2014, we have been working closely with clients such as the New Zealand Defence Force to deliver solutions in response to their complex challenges.

Geoff Comber PMP, General Manager, Nova Systems NZ.

Our legacy In 2020, Nova Systems celebrated its 20th anniversary. The company was founded by two Australians who recognised that for local industry to assume a significant role in supporting the Australian Defence Force’s mission, there had to be a mechanism for military personnel to make an ongoing contribution once they completed formal Australian Defence Force service. They saw an opening to do this in the Test and Evaluation space and quickly set to work. For over 20 years Nova Systems has partnered with the ADF to deliver specialist engineering, test, management and/or systems integration on: • MRH-90 Multi-Role Helicopter • CH-47 Chinook Heavy-Lift Helicopters • PC21 Pilot Training System • F-35A Joint Strike Fighter and F18 Super Hornet • E-7A Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft • OneSKY - Air Traffic Control • Fixed Base Defence Air Traffic Management • Hawkeii Protected Mobility Vehicle • Air Warfare Destroyer and Anzac Class Frigate • Future and Collins Class Submarines • UHF Military and Next Generation SATCOM • Maritime Communications Modernisation Since 2014, the Nova New Zealand based team has built on and leveraged the experience and knowledge gained in Australia on these complex projects,

delivering close industry connection between the New Zealand Defence Force and Australian Defence Force. Our in-country team is made up of ex-defence personnel who have gone on to develop their professional knowledge and expertise in specialist areas directly related to defence systems. As a result, our smart people understand the defence environment and culture, can speak the language of our clients and appreciate what is important to achieve their mission. A workforce of ex-defence personnel means that there is immediate rapport with our defence clients, many of whom we served with. Our partnership with the New Zealand Defence Force Our first partnership with the New Zealand Defence Force was to provide support to the Platform Systems Upgrade programme and the Project Protector Remediation programme. We teamed with Marops (an Auckland based company) to conduct Test and Evaluation of the modified B757 aircraft for the Royal New Zealand Air Force – their first introduction to Test and Evaluation. Since then, Test and Evaluation has become a keystone requirement for new projects and is a requirement of the Capability Management System. We have partnered with the New Zealand Defence Force for Maritime Sustainment Capability (MSC) Safety Case Review. This was a short notice and quick turn-around independent review and Nova Systems was able to leverage our Australian and local workforces. The Line of Defence

team combined highly experienced Safety Assurance specialists (remotely from Australia), with on-ground support to the client provided by Royal New Zealand Navy operational subject matter experts. We were responsible for identifying examples and sources of inconsistency in documentary evidence and making recommendations to support safe transition to in-service safety management for the MSC. Our partnership with the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment We have also expanded our engineering and technology offerings to clients outside of Defence. We partnered with The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment’s Innovative Partnerships programme when they sought an experienced Programme Manager with a breadth of aviation systems knowledge to establish an Airspace Integration Trials Programme for Advanced Unmanned Aircraft. Nova Systems are responsible for providing a dedicated Programme Line of Defence

Manager with the requisite credibility, capability, and experience to deliver and manage a large and complex programme. Possessing in-depth knowledge of the New Zealand aviation environment, our Programme Manager was able to hit the ground running and rapidly integrate with the Innovative Partnerships Team. Through effective engagement with partner government agencies and industry, we developed a programme framework that could be tailored to the needs of various industry partners. This included partners looking to take their technologies from experimental testing through to in-service operations across a variety of cases, including urban air mobility, agriculture, and hazard management. Partnering to address increasing complexities As systems become more complex and the impact of information technology in delivering military effect becomes more prevalent, capability assurance, through Test and Evaluation becomes more critical. It is often difficult to see a complete capability in one tangible

space – a ship, aircraft or vehicle can be seen and touched but the interfaces with enabling systems are more difficult to identify. We recognise that all components of a capability need to be tested, as an integrated system. This assures the capability owner and user, that the system is safe, employable and effective. When Nova Systems conducts operational testing, we focus on the complete system which reaches beyond (but complements) land, air or sea worthiness. We combine our deep experience in Test & Evaluation with a philosophy of systems engineering – that is, the engineering (design) of systems (capabilities) and testing the agreed user requirements against the delivered systems – that is, the interaction of the capability components (PRICIE ) to achieve the mission outcomes. For example, the New Zealand Defence Force relies on capabilities and Force Elements to work together to deliver the mission. This principle of interface and integration also extends to our government partners and our coalition allies. This drives the 7

DEFENCE

need for pan-organisational, or Joint (and combined) Test and Evaluation. During the acquisition and delivery phases of a project, this can be difficult to achieve when individual projects are focused on delivering their project on time, on budget and on specification. To make matters more complex, the ‘I’ (Information and Information Technology) in PRICIE, is becoming much more critical. An aircraft, ship or land unit will not achieve the mission without good quality, timely information from which to make decisions. No longer do platforms operate disconnected from the HQ or other force elements. Platforms now need to be networked to operate effectively as part of a larger force. This continuing move into an information centric domain reinforces the need to ‘test’ that the information requirements of operational elements have been met and are used to gain an operational advantage, through situational awareness and timely, collective, decision making. 8

Real time decision makers do not have the time to sift through giga-bytes of disparate information from multiple sources, especially at the tactical level. In today’s modern battlefield, information advantage is forever fleeting. This means commanders need to respond faster and defence forces need to adopt technological decision aides (such as artificial intelligence and machine learning) that can help provide analysts and commanders with solutions or courses of action based on the influx of data collected. Nova Systems’ experience, and understanding of this environment, mean that we can provide capability managers the support needed to assure these complex systems. Conclusion Nova Systems has been building our team and supporting New Zealand’s Defence Force, and Government since 2014. We truly understand that defence capabilities are growing more

complex and information needs more demanding. Information is now a critical component of any military capability and needs to be part of any testing regime. To ensure the New Zealand Defence Force can meet these needs, Nova Systems provides experienced practitioners with the expertise and know-how to conduct effective testing across all components that make a capability mission ready. Having a wealth of experience in complex environments, Nova Systems looks beyond the simple and reaches well within the complex systems that are needed to support successful mission outcomes. We are a trusted partner when it comes to our engineering and technology offerings and look forward to leveraging these to deliver tailored solutions to the New Zealand organisations now and into the future, to ensure they can respond to the national security agenda as it continues to evolve. Line of Defence

Supporting New Zealand’s National Security capability In our constantly changing world, it’s tougher than ever for defence and national security agencies to develop national security capability that’s ahead of the curve. Technology and the information environvment are ever evolving, bringing new opportunities and solutions, but also new threats and challenges.

We enable our clients to overcome these challenges by partnering them with our team of in-country experts, to develop and implement world-class technology-enabled solutions with passion and integrity. Together, we can mobilise organisational change that delivers results that endure.

If you’re seeking a leading, innovative and collaborative partner to build New Zealand capability, contact our team at nova@novasystems.com search: Nova Systems

novasystems.com

DEFENCE

The Interview: Mike Yardley, Deputy Secretary Capability Delivery How has Defence pivoted in order to continue delivering capability during COVID, and what challenge does the Information Domain present? Mike Yardley, the Ministry of Defence’s Deputy Secretary Capability Delivery, speaks with Nicholas Dynon.

Mike Yardley, Deputy Secretary Capability Delivery, Ministry of Defence.

Mike Yardley began his military career in 1981 as a Navigator in No. 5 Squadron, Royal New Zealand Air Force. He reached the rank of Air Vice-Marshal, serving as Chief of Air Force, prior to being appointed Deputy Secretary Capability Delivery, Ministry of Defence, in March 2016. As Assistant Chief of Air Force – Capability, Mike led the RNZAF Capability Directorate work on introduction into service plans for the B757, P-3 Orion and C-130 upgrades and the obtaining of government approval for the A109 Light Utility Helicopter. In 2010, he was part of the team that designed and established the NZDF Capability Branch and was Head of the Programme Management Office. Mike commenced as Deputy Secretary Capability Delivery just weeks prior to the release of the Defence White Paper 2016, which outlined a modernisation plan worth nearly $20 billion out to 2030. Given more detail in the Defence Capability Plan 2018, the commitment covered not only the C-130, 757 and P3 replacements but also new cyber capabilities. It’s been a busy few years for Capability Delivery, with the delivery of a range of major capabilities along with the additional challenges of delivering capability in the COVID era. ND: Since being appointed Deputy Secretary Capability Branch in March 2016, how has the relationship between Defence and industry evolved?

MY: A real focus for me since taking on this role has been identifying opportunities for the New Zealand domestic industry and looking to see how we can be an intermediary in supporting industry with the larger international companies that are looking to work with them. Our role has not been to put companies forward but rather to look for opportunities to make these connections. We aim to make the introductions, so those overseas companies can see the range and nature of skill sets we have in New Zealand. We have done this in a number of ways since 2015, including travelling the country to see what capabilities are out there. We have focused on increasing our overall engagement levels, and we have continued to work closely with the New Zealand Defence Industry Association as well, which has seen a real increase in its membership. With our knowledge of local industry, when we know that we’ve got a large overseas company coming in, we can point out the linkages for them – and that ultimately helps them to connect with local businesses and expertise. ND: How has COVID-19 changed the landscape for Capability Branch over the past few months, and how has the Branch adapted to the new reality? MY: I’ve been really surprised about how we’ve been able to maintain the Line of Defence

Inside the CAE NH90 simulator. Image: supplied.

pace and the level of delivery of our work over the COVID-19 pandemic period. Like many, we probably all thought we weren’t going to be able to undertake contract negotiations, or that people having to work from home wouldn’t be able to do the due diligence that would be expected, and that we might start to see some project timeframes slip. Our expectation was that 2020 was always going to be a big year for us at the Ministry of Defence with a number of contracts needing to go out to tender, be evaluated and awarded. The pleasing factor for me is that I’ve seen the Ministry just continue on the schedule and path that we anticipated at the beginning of the year. I believe that this is in large part due to our people, and also to the foundation we have with our new procurement framework, the Capability Management System. This system gives us a robustness and assurance that enables us to continue with our work programme. Line of Defence

It’s a great outcome from something that we put in place not expecting to see a COVID-type situation. One of the things that I thought was a neat win for us over the COVID period was the installation of the NH90 simulator, which we bought from CAE in Canada. The delivery into New Zealand was held up due to COVID’s impact on shipping. Through a lot of hard work, the team was able to get the simulator into the country on 1st May. We then managed to get approvals for it to come down to Ohakea, but of course none of the Canadian technicians, which were a vital part of the delivery plan forthe project, were able to travel to New Zealand. A couple of RNZAF technicians were at the centre of bringing this together, setting up communications systems, including live video calling. This enabled the work that they were doing to be seen back in Canada in real-time, so they could get immediate advice on how to put this huge simulator together.

They decided that they didn’t have the technologies for some of the work that was needed, so they got hold of Weta Workshop in Wellington and arranged for them to assist in some of the set up as well. There are eight triangles that make up the dome, and they are six metres tall. If you can imagine having to put that together without all the set equipment and the expertise that couldn’t come out from Canada – these folk managed to put it together for us and it’s up and working today training our pilots and crew, which is a great result. In fact, the facility was opened in mid-October, which was within the same time that CAE had scheduled this to occur. ND: How would you describe the Capability Management System? MY: We designed the Capability Management System to improve coordination between the New Zealand 11

DEFENCE

The six-metre tall CAE NH90 simulator. Image: supplied.

Defence Force and the Ministry of Defence. There was a sense that the NZDF was in at the early stage setting the requirements and then it was the Ministry of Defence’s role to go out and buy the capability. And then, once we had purchased it, we would hand it back over to the NZDF. One of the fundamental outcomes of the new Capability Management System that we wanted to put in place was an end-to-end process, joined up between the two organisations, so that teams were formed right at the beginning and had ownership all the way throughout the process. Because we’re now forming these teams early, we’re managing to reduce some of the time periods that would 12

impact our large defence projects, when you’re trying to get through a business case cycle. Because we have our people engaged early, we find that as soon as government approves the business case and we go out to tender for it, the tender is already written. Previously, when the Government would say, “Go out to tender”, we’d put in a commercial acquisition lead and they would then develop the tender documentation. This created delays in an already long process. The Capability Management System has certainly reduced that. Because it’s end-to-end, we look at the whole of life costs from day one, and that’s a really important piece to us. This ensures that we are able to provide

greater certainty around the total costs for this capability when it comes into service and for the duration of its life. One way I’d describe it is that previously our job was to buy equipment, whereas now we are working closely with the NZDF and industry to ensure the capability is delivered. We consider everything from the people and their needs, such as ongoing training, through to the need for sustainment of whatever the asset is that we’re buying. It has to be a capability that we’re delivering, not just a platform or piece of equipment. ND: How does the introduction of the Information Domain change things in Line of Defence

levels, or need to upskill their people, so that they’re ready for a capability when we put it out to tender or want a delivery. But, of course, decision processes can continue over extended periods of time, particularly given the significant investments that are being made. So, for us trying to help industry, it would be better if we could give them a really good indication of our time periods, decision making processes, and what are the risks for them around that decision-making process. For New Zealand companies trying to get in at the ground level, in terms of Defence acquisitions, I think that traditionally we have seen that New Zealand companies have been more engaged in the sustainment than in the initial acquisition. So the challenge is how can we introduce our smaller companies to those larger international companies so they can be engaged right from the outset. No New Zealand company is going to build a 737 or P8 aircraft, for example, but there are opportunities for New Zealand companies, and we want to help find them, and see them realised. ND: Having made a successful transition from military career to civilian, is there anything you wished you’d been told prior to making the transition? (L-R) Chief of Air Force AVM Andrew Clark, Minister of Defence Hon Peeni Henare, and Mike Yardley. Image: supplied.

terms of capability development and delivery? MY: Just getting your head around what is a capability without it being built around a single asset like an aircraft or a ship has been something that we’ve needed to consider, and when we look at introducing the Information Domain capability, the change management component is large as well, which is probably something we haven’t seen on that scale previously. When you think about an Information Domain – whether it’s intelligence or cyber – there’s going to be a significant change component that we need to think about as well. Line of Defence

What is the change to the New Zealand Defence Force that they are going to need to put in place so that this will deliver and maintain a versatile and adaptable capability successfully? ND: What do you see as the major challenges for Defence and industry working together going forward? What are the opportunities? MY: For industry there’s always a desire for more speed in the decision making from Defence, a greater understanding of where we’re at in our decision cycles. We understand that because of course it’s important to them if they need to factor in increasing their staffing

MY: I accepted the role because the previous Secretary of Defence had recognised that there were significant challenges in the delivery of these major equipment projects. At the time a business case was presented to the Government to invest in the Ministry of Defence. This required an investment of $27 million over four years in the Ministry to ensure that it could successfully deliver these major capability projects. When I did come in, I came in with the knowledge that it was an excellent opportunity, because how often do you get to go into an organisation and they say, “We want you to be leading that change and we’ve got the money already and we’ve got the strategy and you just need to flesh out the plan”? It was incredibly exciting to be presented with this opportunity. 13

DEFENCE

MQ-9B SeaGuardian supports Japan Coast Guard Missions New Zealand’s economic and territorial seas of interest, spanning from the Equator to the Southern Ocean, require economical, realtime Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) to support civilian ministries and agencies in border and resource protection, policing and security, and humanitarian and disaster response options. Real-time ISR is critical to decision makers, especially when it involves criminal activity such as illegal immigration, drug trafficking, pollution and resource exploitation, and natural disasters including forest fires, floods, cyclones, earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic activity. The General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc. (GA-ASI) MQ-9B SeaGuardian Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) provides a versatile, responsive, and cost-effective real-time ISR system to defence, security, and other civilian authorities. The provision of ISR services to civilian authorities is not new for the MQ-9 series of platforms, and a recent extensive set of validation flights conducted by the Japan Coast Guard ( JCG) highlights the application of SeaGuardian in many roles relevant to New Zealand. This article describes the Japan Validation Flight Trial ( JVFT) for the JCG, and uses SeaGuardian to draw parallels on the potential use of this platform in New Zealand. In recent years, several entities in the United States have demonstrated the value of Predator B/MQ-9 series Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) for civil applications. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) use these assets to monitor the border, to help interdict illicit trafficking and in responses to natural 14

disasters. NASA has also employed its MQ-9 Ikhana RPAS to assist in fighting wildfires and, since 2017, the California Air National Guard has employed its MQ-9 RPAS in the same role. Furthermore, companyowned MQ-9 RPAS have been used for search-and-rescue efforts in the aftermath of hurricanes and flooding. During these civil support ISR missions, MQ-9 RPAS provided realtime, high-definition, electro-optical/ infrared imagery, synthetic aperture radar imagery, and communication support to ground/seaborne units. Real-time situational awareness and communication support provided a range of users, from first responders to senior commanders, with vital decision-making information necessary to save lives and resolve critical situations. The growing demand for support to civilian security missions has seen a number of collaborative MQ-9

demonstrations in the past two years. In 2018, a range of civilian support missions were flown from Iki Island in Japan over a two-week period, In 2019, a series of maritime support mission were flown from Greece. These activities reinforced the multidomain capability of the MQ-9 RPAS, particularly on a diverse array of civil support missions. The most recent civil security demonstration was sponsored by JCG and conducted in Japan during October-November 2020. In this JCG demonstration, GA-ASI partnered with Asia Air Survey (AAS) and Sojitz, a Japanese corporation, on a series of validation flights featuring the MQ-9B SeaGuardian. These flights validated SeaGuardian’s cost-effective, realtime, wide-area maritime surveillance capabilities in conducting JCG’s core missions, including search and rescue, disaster response, and maritime law enforcement. Line of Defence

Japan has recognised the need for an affordable, long-endurance airborne surveillance capability in the maritime domain. The SeaGuardian is a one-ofa-kind asset which satisfies that need â&#x20AC;&#x201C; and does much more. The SeaGuardian system for the JVFT featured a multi-mode maritime surface-search

Line of Defence

radar with Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR) imaging mode and an Automatic Identification System (AIS) receiver. The featured Raytheon SeaVue radar system provided automatic tracking of maritime targets and correlation of AIS transmitters with radar tracks. This radar is a variant

of the one employed on the P-8A Poseidon. The SeaGuardian was also fitted with GA-ASIâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Lynx multi-mode radar to specifically provide both very high-definition synthetic aperture radar imagery of land and infrastructure, and an additional maritime surveillance radar. A high-definition, full-motion video sensor equipped with optical and infrared cameras was also fitted to provide real-time detection and identification of surface vessels over hundreds of thousands of square nautical miles. During the Japan Coast Guard validation flights, SeaGuardian proved its value as an asset for a wide range of missions, including search and rescue operations over land and sea; monitoring and interdiction of suspicious fishing activity along Japanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s exclusive economic zones (EEZ); coastal surveying with highdefinition image collection; monitoring important ports and maritime routes; pollution dection; infrastructure surveying; urban and coastal disaster responses; rapid disaster-at-sea response; counter-drug smuggling operations; counter-illegal immigration operations; sanctions monitoring; and anti-piracy operations. 15

DEFENCE

Mission durations ranged from six to more than 24 hours, often focusing on multiple tasks during a single sortie, with operating altitudes ranging from low to high. The SeaGuardian operated in complex airspace, without the need for a chase plane, with separation coordinated through the Japan Civil Aviation Bureau, as well as operating frequently in trans-oceanic airspace over 1,500 nautical miles from home base. The SeaGuardian’s world-leading Detect and Avoid Systems played an important role for airspace access. While detailed analysis of this recent JCG validation trial continues, it was apparent that the SeaGuardian provided unprecedented ISR to the JCG in a very cost-effective manner, using a small footprint and workforce. The recent JCG validation trial in Japan using the MQ-9B SeaGuardian offers the most contemporary example for employment of the system in a multi-domain, civil security context. The challenges Japan faces through resource exploitation, other illegal activity, and responses to natural disasters offers a strong example for New Zealand. Japan (4,050,000km2) 16

and New Zealand (4,083,744km2) share comparatively same-size economic exclusion zones and land masses, but New Zealand’s Search and Rescue Region is over eight times larger. An additional difference is New Zealand does not face the challenging, multi-axis neighborhood threats that Japan faces. In the economic maritime environment, conversely Japan must deal with very vast complex fishing areas intermixed with dense shipping routes. However, the similarities in security challenges and the ability to address them through the real-time provision of high-fidelity ISR products from the MQ-9B SeaGuardian highlight the potential to vastly improve decision making and strategic benefits for both New Zealand’s security and its economy. SeaGuardian would provide the ability to presurvey large sections of coastline and infrastructure, which are vulnerable to natural disasters, and respond quickly and effectively with persistence when disasters occur. SeaGuardian can also develop normalcy patterns through regular, persistent coverage

for multi-agency tasks while freeing up the comparatively more expensive ISR workload from manned airborne or seaborne platforms, so they can be retained for cost-effective, focused, high-priority operations. SeaGuardian can further provide service to multiple ministries and agencies seamlessly during a single mission, while communicating in real-time/near realtime with a wide range of tactical-tostrategic users when operating across New Zealand’s vast area of interest. As conducted for the JCG Validation Trial, GA-ASI can provide leasing services, should a customer not wish to own or operate MQ-9 RPAS. Lease-toown services can also be offered. SeaGuardian presents a gamechanging, cost-effective ISR solution for New Zealand’s civil security, while also having proven potential to support a wide range of Defence needs. Meaningful New Zealand industry opportunities would exist through the lease or acquisition of the SeaGuardian RPAS – from a family of RPAS with over 6.5 million flight hours and the world’s most experienced RPAS manufacturer. Line of Defence

Total Asset Readiness: Five things not to miss Matt Medley, Senior Product Manager, IFS, highlights the five must-haves to transform disparate streams of readiness data into one infrastructure platform with a single view to achieve Total Asset Readiness. For military forces, achieving Total Asset Readiness may sound like a simple term. The U.S. Department of Defense defines operational readiness as “the capability of a unit/formation, ship, weapon system, or equipment to perform the missions or functions for which it is organised or designed.” But attaining high availability across all the equipment in an entire defence force is a hugely complex enterprise.

A Senior Product Manager at IFS, Matthew Medley is a graduate of the US Air Force Academy. He served as a Major in the US Air Force, compiling over 2,500 flight hours in C-130 aircraft. He holds the FAA Airline Transport Pilot and Certified Flight Instructor ratings.

The heavy price of poor readiness Readiness issues are a constant headache for military forces. Even a new generation asset such as the F-35 has its problems. Based on data from fiscal year 2019, the director of the Pentagon’s Operational Test and Evaluation Office said all variants of the aircraft remain “below service expectations”, with a goal set for 65 percent availability. Failing to achieve the required level of asset readiness not only means wasted expenditure and personnel time, it can also compromise mission success. Commanders must know exactly what assets are available when planning critical missions—and an inaccurate or partially complete picture is simply not good enough. New procurement and support models deliver improvement Military asset procurement, sustainment and support has been on an evolutionary path for some years. Gone are the days of the ‘traditional’ model of the military purchasing a complex asset from an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and then taking on the responsibility of keeping that asset operational during its lifecycle.

Line of Defence

The military has taken numerous steps up the ‘transformational staircase’ since this scenario. The first stage of contractor assistance was termed as buying ‘spares and repairs’ from the OEM. Following that, the risk and availability associated with supporting an asset throughout its military lifecycle has increasingly involved industry assistance. The generally accepted model for procuring and supporting military equipment is now on a performancebased logistics (PBL) basis. A step above: Total Asset Readiness PBL strategies work well when applied to particular assets, or components of assets such as engines and other complex parts. But these service-based agreements can be taken to another level – what we at IFS deem “Total Asset Readiness” – when it comes to force-wide asset mobilisation. This ‘next evolution’ is geared to putting in place a clear and consistent framework across a military fighting force. Disparate reporting mechanisms and software systems can be consolidated with an all-encompassing solution to track asset readiness— giving commanders a clear real-time view of the assets at their disposal, in the context of the mission they need to complete. The U.S. Navy is one military organisation which is targeting such an approach with its Naval Operational Business Logistics Enterprise (NOBLE) family of systems. The programme is reported to allow for the consolidation of over 23 standalone application systems and elimination of over 700 application/database 17

DEFENCE

servers—with the ultimate aim to improve material and shore readiness. Of course, putting in place such an Integrated Data Environment requires close collaboration from military and industry players. But such system implementations must span hundreds of thousands of users and thousands of assets. With this in mind, here are five key areas which must be focused on in order to achieve Total Asset Readiness. 1. Get as close to the asset as possible According to Deloitte, the rise of Industry 4.0 technologies will have a hugely positive effect on asset readiness—bringing a new approach to availability based on real-world data. The U.S. Navy has adopted a framework to leverage technology such as AI, IoT, predictive analytics, and blockchain. Meanwhile the USAF has prioritised use of predictive analytics to address a slide in readiness across its fleet of 5,400 aircraft. IoT-enabled sensors on individual components provide a huge data set on the exact status of a given asset wherever it is—a subsystem such as an aircraft engine can provide terabytes of data in a single flight. By analysing this data stream with AI/machine learning functionality 18

in enterprise software, real steps can be taken to make the maintenance of connected assets more predictive than ever before. An early example is the work on the F-35 ALIS project, although the software was designed before the first F-35 rolled off the production line, so the capabilities available today can even surpass this. But these data-producing assets will often be deployed in a disconnected setting, in a hostile environment without forward infrastructure and often with an essential mandate to keep operational security. Software infrastructure must also be configured to support such disconnected operations—that means aggregating, consolidating and storing data and technical records to be sent once connectivity is re-established. 2. The scale is way above normal business levels When putting together an Integrated Data Environment across an entire fighting force, the scale required is far bigger than even the largest business. A recent report outlined that going from analysis of alternatives for a technology system, defining the requirements, through to initial operational capability typically takes corporate technology companies six to nine months, but takes the DoD an average of 91.

Military deployments can mandate upwards of 100,000 users to have access to at least some elements of a software platform—requiring differing roles and permission sets on a peruser basis. It is this scale and level of security complexity which makes developing, integrating and activating an IT system an extremely difficult task. This is where strategic use of APIs can help reduce implementation times and link previously unconnected IT systems. An Integrated Data Environment must make strategic use of APIs to make sure data is visible and delivered to the right person at the right time, or it is worthless. 3. Apps and Containerisation to meet UX, UI expectations The representation and accessibility of asset data is just as important as accuracy—from two perspectives. Firstly, in an age where military personnel and industry technicians are using intuitive apps in their everyday lives—ease of use by maintenance controllers, commanders, industry experts and other users is vital for any universal software system. Significant importance must be placed on user interface (UI) and user experience (UX) to make sure the system, right down to individual screens for specific task requirements, is usable and streamlined with the end-user in mind. Line of Defence

Secondly, there is so much happening behind the scenes at the back end of such an IT consolidation project—apps are at the heart of this. There are a few layers of technology in the middle of the tech stack which are invisible to the user at the UX level, but drive how software is delivered, particularly in application form. Containerisation is key and involves bundling an application together with all of its related configuration files, libraries and dependencies required for it to run in an efficient and bugfree way across different computing environments. A ‘docker image’ can be created to pack up the application and environment required by the application to run. 4. Security and information assurance paramount This containerisation approach also has benefits from a security standpoint. Military software solutions must be deployed in a secure environment and meet strict regulatory requirements such as International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), cloud security mandates and the U.S. DoD Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) Version 1.0. While we’ve already touched on how managing finely tuned permission sets and roles becomes increasingly Line of Defence

more critical as an organisation scales up its user base, several other considerations also come into play. For example, operational security concerns often mandate strict controls on who within the contractor’s organisation and their supply chain have visibility into part and inventory status based on those user roles and permissions. Furthermore, electronic signatures are becoming increasingly essential to guarantee full transparency and traceability for audit and investigatory purposes. Clearly, total asset readiness must incorporate these ever-evolving requirements while staying on the leading edge of new and emerging security threats, known and unknown. 5. Transformation from excel to dynamic dashboards Snapshot reporting through excel exports are a thing of the past, but highly configurable dynamic dashboards should allow command centres to see exactly what assets are ready across the forces required for their specific mission. The culmination of a software infrastructure consolidation must translate into something that can give commanders an up-to-date and accurate picture of their asset readiness— usually represented as a force-wide availability percentage. How do you know your assets are available if you

can’t represent this data in a dashboard which is configurable to a commander’s needs? Systems that support RESTful APIs at the back end can knit together information from multiple data streams, allowing personalised information insights to be delivered to commanders. KPIs can be introduced into reporting and tracked in real-time according to the force in question—when it comes to readiness examples, we are talking differing requirements for nuclear forces vs. a non-weapon carrying airlift squadron running C-5 Galaxy aircraft. Asset readiness leads to mission effectiveness Answering the ultimate question about mission readiness requires getting a total view of asset status. You cannot have a mission without your assets. With a single software environment in place to measure asset readiness, every commander will know the status of the assets at their disposal. Any unexpected hiccup in mission planning – this aircraft is awaiting a part refit for example – can be easily rectified and factored into the planning procedure. Total Asset Readiness enables defence organisations to perform required tasks and missions on-time, every time, while achieving significant reductions in sustainment costs. 19

DEFENCE

Serving the nation, serving the electorate In his inaugural Line of Defence article, former submariner and recently appointed Opposition spokesperson for Defence and Veterans Chris Penk provides insights into the National Party’s NZDF connections.

Chris Penk, Opposition Spokesperson for Defence and Veterans.

Thank you for your service. I know that some in this country consider that a somewhat American turn of phrase but personally I like it. Expressing gratitude to our military on behalf of the National Party – and on behalf of all the New Zealand Parliament, I would hope – feels like an appropriate start to my first Line of Defence Magazine contribution. I’m writing as the Opposition spokesperson for Defence, having recently been given that role previously held by my colleague, friend and neighbour Mark Mitchell. I say ‘neighbour’ because our electorates border each other in Auckland’s rural north. In fact, at the recent election we each picked up territory from the other in a boundary change but I was pleased to retain RNZAF Base Auckland at Whenuapai within my patch. I am a big believer in the role played by our nation’s military, perhaps partly due to my own background.

Prior to entering Parliament, I served in the Royal New Zealand Navy and then the Royal Australian Navy, as a young man during the period 2000 – 2008. While in the RNZN I was lucky enough to be an officer of the watch at sea on HMNZS Te Kaha and spend a year as aide-de-camp to the GovernorGeneral. At that point I headed across the Tasman to fulfil my dream of driving submarines. My standard line there was that if a Kiwi naval vessel found itself underwater then someone like me had done something very wrong. I enjoyed my time beneath the waves as navigating officer on HMAS Sheean (one of the RAN’s Collinsclass submarines) and then headed to the Northern Arabian Gulf as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom. On leaving the service and then practising law for a number of years, I became a politician. In my three

RNZAF Base Whenuapai, Auckland. Photo Wikipedia.

Line of Defence

(L-R) Joseph Mooney, Tim van de Molen, Penny Simmonds, Andrew Bayly, Dr Shane Reti, and Chris Penk. Image: supplied.

years so far, I’ve particularly enjoyed the chance to think about what New Zealand is needing now in terms of defence. I’m firmly of the view that Parliament must already be thinking about what our national security demands will be as we head towards the middle of the 21st century. On that note, I’m looking forward to hearing the thoughts of NZDF personnel, the Ministry of Defence, our veterans community and all stakeholders on these subjects. I will be very happy to share some of my thinking in this regular column too. For now, it’s enough for me to observe that defence of the realm is the first and foremost duty of any government. It’s a traditional view of the world for which I make no apology. A government that cannot secure its territory for its people will not have the luxury of improving living standards for those within it. Those of us who believe that government should not expand at the expense of private enterprise will still always acknowledge that a key role of the state must remain to protect its citizens, including through the military. Line of Defence

I’m excited to be a member of a National Party caucus that is very strongly connected with the NZDF. In fact, I suspect that no party in Parliament has had a better record of service across its ranks since the postWorld War Two era. No fewer than six of our 33 MPs have served in uniform in the military, with a range of experiences from my own naval days to Andrew Bayly’s time with the Parachute Regiment of the British Army. Bayly is only outranked in terms of National seniority by Dr Shane Reti, who was in the Territorial Army in the mid-1980s, and Judith Collins. Our leader is a huge fan of the service and sacrifice of our forces, enjoying a special connection to those at the SAS base in her Papakura electorate. Back to those who have spent time in uniform, a number of our other MPs have also reached the nation’s capital via the Army Reserves, namely Tim van de Molen (Waikato), Penny Simmonds (Invercargill) and Joseph Mooney (Southland). As readers of Line of Defence will be well aware, service in our forces is an excellent background for many

different lines of work in civvy street. I’m a huge advocate for the potential of NZDF people in public life and the private sphere, once they decide to ‘get out’, and will offer some more thoughts on this subject in a future column. Many of the skills honed by our military personnel are directly relevant to political life. Among these are discipline, leadership, team work and time management, all underpinned by a strong work ethic that’s based on believing in the value of public service. In my new role as Defence spokesperson for National I’ll be working constructively with all MPs who love the role played by our forces in defining and defending New Zealand. And I’d love to hear from you: please email me at chris.penk@parliament. govt.nz if I can assist in any way. On that note, I’ll end these reflections as I began, thanking our service men and women for their service. In particular, at this time of year, my thoughts are with those who will be on duty over the Christmas-New Year period – wherever in New Zealand or around the world that may be – and I hope everyone is able to enjoy the break that they deserve this summer. 21

DEFENCE

Trusted to Protect: EPE bringing the supply chain to New Zealand According to force protection specialists EPE, COVID has highlighted the necessity for organisations to review their through life support and supply chain risks, and to enhance in-country support. New Zealand’s geographical remoteness is a major factor in the strong case for ‘at point of use’ Though Life Support (TLS), with the value of local delivery highlighted – and amplified – by the destabilising supply chain impacts of COVID-19. “Specifically, the inability of external contractors to travel into New Zealand and the logistical impacts on global freighting have had a major impact on availability of equipment, spare parts and also the ability for specialist offshore trainers to deliver training,” said EPE’s New Zealand Business Development Manager Andy Cross. “Rather than attempting to support customers from offshore, EPE delivers a model of maintenance and logistic support in New Zealand that overcomes these challenges,” he said. “In this way, major obstacles and challenges have been overcome and customers’ needs have been met.” EPE NZ staff are working closely with the NZDF to assist in maintenance and training on a recently delivered complex water treatment system, where the Europe-based OEM is unable to physically travel to New Zealand. Using internet conferencing, work is underway to provide a solution and way forward. TLS is something Andy is particularly passionate about. Prior to joining EPE, he spent 10 years with the NZDF leading a team responsible for managing procurement, introduction into service and through-life management of the NZDF CBRNE, Combat Engineer, Ground Support and Deployable Infrastructure equipment. This followed 22 years in the British Army’s REME Corps and eight years in the UK Defence Industry. 22

An SME operating across New Zealand and Australia, EPE’s Wellington facility services several critical customers, including the NZDF, NZ Police and Aviation Security. The company has three Master Service Agreements (MSA) with the NZDF covering maintenance and supply for a wide range of equipment, and one with AVSEC. EPE’s solutions include Deployable Infrastructure, Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED), Counter Chemical, Biological, Radiological,

Nuclear and Explosive (C-CBRNE), Remote Piloted Aerial Systems (RPAS) and Counter RPAS (C-RPAS); and unmanned systems. The company picked up a 2019 Minister of Defence Award for Excellence in the ‘Provision of Product to Defence less than $15 million’ category for delivery of the Counter Explosive Hazards (CEH) Expeditionary Project. “The CEH Project is to enable an expeditionary bomb disposal capability for both army and navy. Our personnel

EOD10 bombsuit in-service with NZDF and supported locally in New Zealand. Image: Supplied.

Line of Defence

are required to go into harm’s way to protect people and property, and in doing so we’re trying to give them the best protection we can for them to achieve their mission,” explained LTCOL Adam Modd from NZDF Capability Branch. “Working with a prime vendor such as EPE has allowed us to buy the right equipment in a timely manner and get it into service to meet the project timelines.” The EPE model enables in-country support that is agile and responsive, minimising the impact of differing time zones and avoiding the cost and time constraints. The model enables critical end users to: • Engage a single source located in country and in time zone to address all requirements, whether routine or critical. This is further enhanced as fast moving consumables and repair parts are stored and handled locally by EPE. • Achieve an increase in equipment Operational Availability (AØ) and a reduction in Administrative Logistic Down-Time (ALDT) • Where required and identified, have local access to time critical and fast-moving consumables and repair parts. • Leverage the long-term relationships EPE has with global Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM). OEM trained and certified technicians mean that work on equipment is completed in adherence with OEM procedures and standards to ensure full

NZDF photo of CEH Project capability. Image: NZDF.

Line of Defence

Minister of Defence Awards Dinner 2019. (L to R) Paula Brasovan, CEH Project Manager, Ministry of Defence; Hon Ron Mark, Defence Minister; Andy Cross, NZ Business Development Manager, EPE; Warwick Penrose, Managing Director, EPE. Image: Supplied.

technical compliance. An important aspect of understanding military specialist and First Responder requirements is knowledge of the users’ needs across Operational, Tactical and Strategic requirements. This is true from the initial requirements definition phase through to equipment disposal. EPE has this knowledge across all areas of Requirements Definition, Programme Management and Integrated Logistic Support – a claim verified through the many projects, large and small, delivered to its customers. “Key to delivering true through life support and assisting Defence to enhance their capability for mission success is understanding mission

requirements and training operators for optimal use of their equipment,” Andy explained. “EPE is built on the experience of veterans, with a training team based in NZ and Australia.” The EPE team is comprised of ex-members of the NZDF, ADF and British Army all with extensive operational experience in Counter IED activities including IED Disposal, Weapons Technical Intelligence, and specialist search (including high risk search operations). Several of the team have served as Counter IED trainers at military training units in New Zealand, Australia or the UK. “Maintaining this specialist training capability in NZ has enabled us to continue to deliver essential training to the NZDF during COVID when military bases could be accessed,” he said. This model has enabled EPE to grow its footprint in New Zealand with offices and an electronics workshop, and create jobs with an increase in staff over the past two years, including two in recent months despite the impacts of COVID-19. The company’s fiveyear Strategic Plan sees steady growth in personnel and capabilities and it is actively seeking additional partners. “EPE has a proven record of providing high levels of responsive TLS,” stated Andy. “This is evident by the feedback from customers and increasing contact from major global suppliers seeking New Zealand based support.” 23

DEFENCE

Information Domain: New Zealand in the age of information competition Data will define the geostrategic power of nation states and the nature of their societies, writes Nicholas Dynon. According to speakers at IDEAS 2020, this presents big challenges to New Zealand.

Nicholas Dynon is Chief Editor of Defsec Media’s defence, security and safety publications, and a commentator on New Zealand security affairs.

Humankind is moving in faster and in ever more connected ways to a future in which data – the building blocks of information – will be the single most important measure of a nation’s geostrategic power. It’s a process that’s already begun. In the information age, the ability to harness data instantly and to protect it from a proliferating array of information weapons is becoming paramount. It’s within this context that the New Zealand Defence Force and Ministry of Defence have turned their focus to the Information Domain. In the NZDIA’s IDEAS 2020 Part One virtual event, Defence called on Industry to help it define the New Zealand Information Domain and to identify the new models of organisation, engagement and working necessary to face the challenges of the information age. According to expert insights articulated several weeks later at IDEAS 2020 Part Two, New Zealand has significant ground to make up and some tough choices to make – and these go well beyond the remit of Defence. The big picture: Speed and connectivity According to Callaghan Innovation’s Vic Crone, by 2040, Artificial Intelligence (AI) will be everywhere. 50 percent of all cars will be autonomous, augmented reality and virtual reality will be the viewing platform of choice, and we will transition to that through voice control, touch control, and, potentially,

through developments in mind control. Half of all jobs would have been automated by then, which is just as well given that the working age population will have increased by only 10 percent. Robotics automation and machine learning will need to fill the jobs vacated by those entering retirement. 50 percent of the workforce will be Maori, Pacifica and Asian. According to Vodafone’s Matt Hitti, with 5G “everything that could be connected or can be connected, will be connected.” Fast internet and low latency will make possible remote surgeries and activities that rely on “being able to really feel how something is moving remotely and have it moved an exact lock step.” Myriad material objects, such as Internet of Things (IoT) devices, will have sensors placed in them that will be able in real time to monitor and potentially control them and make better decisions as a result. Massive amounts of data will therefore be collected for analysis in real time. The data we’ll be collecting, says Teradata’s Stephen Brobst, won’t just be growing in size, but also in diversity, including all kinds of geospatial data and non-traditional semi-structured data. We’ll need “different kinds of processing capability beyond the square tables and columns type of model for being able to do advanced analytics.” And, clearly, the speed and connectivity that allow us to do the above will necessitate faster and more connected cybersecurity controls. Line of Defence

“We ought to be optimising around the fundamental forces of the cyber domain,” stated Fortinet’s Philip Quade, “which are speed and connectivity, else we’re just fighting gravity.” The strategic context: Data as power Traditionally, measurements of a nation’s geostrategic power were based on formulas involving territory, natural resources, populations, the strength of conventional military forces, and the political systems to effectively coordinate these. The information age and its fourth industrial revolution have relegated such calculations to history. “In upcoming years and decades, it will be data that determines the superpower,” says Sadegh Riazi, founder and CEO of CipherMode Labs. “The quality of the data, as well as the ability to process large volume of data will be the differentiating factors.” This echoes the sentiments of top Indian officials who have called data a new form of national wealth. James Williams from the University of Canterbury notes that states like the

Line of Defence

USA, Russia and China are increasingly sparring within the information domain, or data domain. He attributes this to the rapidly falling cost of data collection and the growing ubiquity of sensors in terms of the IoT and distributed devices. “We have data that shows very clearly, tracking democratic election cycles in several countries the last couple years,” explains Microsoft’s Mark McIntyre, “and it’s just like clockwork, where we see mostly Russian activity against Western democracies leading up to their local national election cycles.” “Part of the development we’re seeing around this is that algorithms are being designed that can operate on a wider range of data sources, and can predict increasingly complex outcomes easily, he explains. “We’ve gone from just simple, straightforward prediction and classification, and we’re looking at these subtle manipulations of social networks for either economic, social, or political gain.” According to Williams, and many of his fellow speakers, it’s not having

the best algorithms that matters – it is having the best data. Lockheed Martin’s David Fallon discusses this in the context of multidomain operations and the ‘grey zone’, or the fuzzy space between interstate competition and conflict. “How do you prepare and work in those spaces where the use of social media may be an actual start point to any sort of conflict?” he asks. Mark McIntyre from Microsoft notes that the asymmetric nature of data-enabled interstate competition means that it becomes a potential battlespace for weaker states looking to project regional power. “It’s cheap, much cheaper than having to afford the upkeep of a military,” he explained. “You can hide, it’s really hard to do attribution in the security landscape.” Attribution difficulties may mean that adversaries can hide in cyberspace, but in data rich physical battlespaces, hiding will become increasingly difficult. Fallon suggests that the next fight will be a battle of signatures. “Everything we see and do can and will be observed.”

DEFENCE The strategic importance of data is reflected, notes McIntyre, by the fact that the US Defense Department has just-published its first ever data strategy. NATO has now also officially designated cyber as a new domain, and these developments will lead to “more and more of a convergence around data-enabled, multi-domain realities in warfare.” In New Zealand, the focus on data is reflected in the Defence Technology Agency’s four-year plan. The DTA’s Rob Read explains that the technology focus areas for the NZDF ‘s tech research arm are Automation, AI, data analytics and exploitation, multidomain awareness, and manned and autonomous systems. Challenges for New Zealand Investment The big challenge with New Zealand, says Vic Crone, is that our research and development is very low compared to other OECD countries. “We sit at around 1.4 percent in terms of R&D. The OECD average is over two percent, and the problem with that is that we are not applying the new technology coming through – including AI, robotics, AR, VR, drones, 3D

printing, 4D printing. We’re not taking that and applying it and researching and understanding how it can evolve our products and our services.” The big problem with this, she explains, is that these technologies are cumulative – they build on each other – starting with the internet, mobility and social media and cloud. “We’re now hitting the era of building on top of that – big data, machine learning, internet of things, robotics, cybersecurity. Then what’s going to build on top of that again is AR, VR, biometric identity, deep learning, large scale machine learning, natural language processing, blockchain, 3D printing, and 4D printing. “And then what’s building on that technology is all the autonomous systems for cars and drones and vehicles, nanotechnologies, advanced robotics into cyborgs and swarm bots, supercomputing. And then we go into autonomous super systems.” The message is glaringly simple: if you aren’t able to transition your organisation or your industry into the basics of machine learning, big data, AI, then you’re not going to make it to the next level. In an era in which the ability to wrangle data will determine the balance

of international power, New Zealand is at risk of being left behind. This is already evident in our widely acknowledged undersupply of people skilled in data and the protection of data, and it’s a challenge that is beyond the Ministry of Defence and the NZDF. It requires all-of-government and all-of-society solutions. Trust With a ranking of 1 out of 198 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, an area in which New Zealand does punch above its weight is political transparency and trust in government. “We are seen externally and internally to be a high-trust society and a country which is transparent and has high-trust political systems,” notes Auckland University’s Kate Hannah. Kate Hannah and her team from University of Auckland have studied the role of social networks in New Zealand’s COVID-19 disinformation landscape, identifying connections between COVID-19 disinformation and more extreme positions, such as white supremacism, extreme misogyny, and Q-Anon. The malevolent exploitation of extreme narratives online poses major potential national security challenges.

Line of Defence

But, just as targeted online activity can exploit and cultivate distrust in government, so too can data breaches due to inadequate information security, as well as poorly developed and poorly explained analytics. During 2019 alone, simple security mistakes within New Zealand Government agencies led to serious data loss events, including the high-profile NZ Police gun buy-back scheme and Tu Ora Compass Health breaches – the latter resulting in the potential exposure of sensitive medical information belonging to one million people. Many of these could have been avoided with better oversight, governance, policies and procedures. According to Microsoft’s Russell Craig, the development of AI has resulted in a new category of risk of harm “where automated decisionmaking systems, if they’re not well-governed, if they’re not being developed using proper ethical principles, could lead to actual harm.” He points to the fact that facial recognition algorithms have been found to be biased, particularly in favour of white males, and that healthcare remains an area of risk. “If models aren’t appropriately trained by people that understand bias at quite a deep level and domain specific level,” he

Line of Defence

explains, “diagnosis could be supported by automated decision-making systems that could be quite wrong.” Immigration New Zealand’s pilot data modelling programme was pulled in April 2018 amid allegations that it involved racial profiling, that it utilised a predictive algorithm leading to prejudicial enforcement action, and that it breached privacy in terms of the use of individuals’ personal data. Importantly, issues of trust are tied to issues of data ownership and the control and individuals and organisations have over their data. According to Atawhai Tibble from the Social Wellbeing Agency, the characteristics of data as powerful yet vulnerable fit with a Māori view of taonga. Data is precious, and it requires protection. Māori perspectives on data and data sovereignty, therefore, must inform New Zealand’s approach to managing this strategic resource. It’s an area in which partially developed technologies and an absence of robust legislative safeguards around its use leaves the window wide open for potential abuse and exploitation. Like the aforementioned challenge of investment, the challenge posed by trust requires all-of-government and all-of-society solutions.

What does it all mean? As a national resource – as a critical source of national geostrategic power – data will shape the international order and New Zealand’s place within it. And in an era of constant competition, we won’t need to wait for a kinetic conflict to witness this. It’s happening right now. Accordingly, and as the speakers of IDEAS2020 Part Two have highlighted, the development of a New Zealand Information Domain will need to reflect the inherent pervasiveness of data, and an understanding of information as a battlespace in which militaries are just one of a spectrum of actors. An information domain focused on the strictly military capabilities – electronic warfare, intelligence, cyber security, C4 and the Defence Information Environment – will be of little use to the security of New Zealand if, devoid of the faintest hint of armed conflict, our critical national infrastructure is crippled by cyberattack, or trust in our democratic institutions is destroyed by disinformation. In the ‘smokeless battlefield’ of the information age, success or defeat will almost certainly precede armed conflict as opposed to coming as a result of it.

DEFENCE Defining the Information Domain Drawing from speaker insights from the NZDIA IDEAS 2020 Part Two virtual event, Nicholas Dynon argues that the extremities of the information domain are critical. In identifying the Information Domain as a fourth domain of warfare, New Zealand has followed other militaries in moving beyond the previous threedomain classification of land, maritime and air – or what I analogously call the traditional ‘states of matter’ (solid, liquid and gas) domains. It’s not a domain most of us would have come across at university or during formative military training. It’s new, and it’s a bit different. In some ways – and to stretch the analogy – it’s a bit like plasma. This more recently identified state of matter behaves differently to the existing ones, and it’s a little more difficult to define. The new information domain effectively acknowledges the role played by data as an enabler, a weapon, and a vulnerability, and the networks and spectrums that data inhabits as new battlespaces. This is an important development, yet at the same time the introduction of the information domain presents us with questions around the ongoing categorisation of domains of warfare. What of the increasingly talked about space domain, for example, or the more recently mooted human domain? In defining a domain, one is inevitably met with questions of boundaries and scope. Domains are awkward containers, and like lines on a map they exist to structure and classify rather than to describe. They are not mutually exclusive. While concepts such as multidomain operations seek to account for this, one domain doesn’t necessarily start where another ends. It’s a problem that has taxonomic, capability and doctrinal dimensions. 28

Space While some nations, such as the US, identify space as a distinct domain, this is not the case for New Zealand. Nor does it appear to be the case that space will fall within the scope of the New Zealand information domain. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that what happens in space has profound implications for the information domain. In his IDEAS 2020 Part Two presentation, Craig Rodger, a physicist from the University of Otago discussed his research into space weather – a term that describes how changes in the space environment can impact on technology. According to Rodger, “satellites can be damaged, degraded, or possibly even die” as a result of space weather events. Given our dependence on satellites for the transmission of significant volumes of critical data, Rodger highlights the need to better understand the impact of space weather and the risks it poses, and develop strategies to mitigate them. Given that changes in the space environment also impact on the electromagnetic spectrum within the Earth’s atmosphere, space weather events have obvious major implications for the non-satellite transmission of data. Humans Within international military and strategic studies literature there is also much written on a ‘human domain’ – a domain of cognitive space, perception and behaviour. Here we find important crossovers with the information domain.

According to Pilot in the Loop’s Paco Uybarreta, “despite all the technology and all the quantitative [metrics], the human is still the most complex, but also very difficult to measure, quantify and understand because of the emotions and the frailties.” Yet humans – whether soldiers or members of the public – possess increasingly complex relationships with data. Humans are both consumers of data and they are biological and intellectual sources of data. Several IDEAS 2020 Part Two presentations picked up on this theme. Stuart Mcdiamid and Ed Wittich from Apple talked on the use of Apple Watch as a source of individual health and wellness data. As an IoT-enabled sensor, the watch is able to monitor physiological metrics, including heart rate, blood oxygen and sleep, as well as distance travelled, falls and ambient noise. According to Wittich, “what this gives us the ability to not just take a lot of information from athletes, which is happening every day, but actually give those athletes actionable insights themselves and involve them in the process of increasing their performance and reducing their injury risk.” Vodafone’s Jodie King discussed Vodafone’s V Life app, a mobile phone app deployed during COVID that enabled the company to “ask a series of questions to its employees around how they and their Whanau were feeling, whether they were fit and healthy and how they were feeling emotionally and from a resilience perspective.” Where people Line of Defence

indicated they were struggling the app provided that data to enable real time intervention. Drew Broadley, Executive Director of Data Ventures at Statistics New Zealand, presented on the development of a COVID pandemic risk model based on individuals’ anonymised movement data, which identified where people were and where they were most mobile in the initial days of the outbreak. According to University of Canterbury’s James Williams, the impacts of political advertising on user behaviour in Facebook can be studied. Noting political donor advertising in the US, he notes that you can “see more subtle effects of users in groups that are influencing information dissemination, and even focusing on the individual psychology of users on Line of Defence

the platform to try and sway votes or influence a certain outcome.” In his cyber security presentation, Unisys’ Ashwin Pal talked behaviour analysis in the context of zero trust. “Being able to understand how users are actually working, and network behaviour analysis, and if a particular threshold is breached,” he says, “… you can detect that and you can respond to it”. In the context of his discussion on NEC’s iQuarantine solution, Steven Graham highlighted the benefits of facial recognition enabled physical access control. Gone is the need for access cards, with security hardened via the use of a unique biometric identifier. Iris scanning, he says, would provide for an even higher level of security. In summary, humans, their biologies, their perceptions, their

behaviours, and their movements can all be harnessed as potential sources of data, and they are becoming more aware of the data that they generate. The human dimension of the information domain is one that will require careful navigation to ensure that solutions and outcomes maintain human confidence and trust. For this reason, the information domain is very much a human domain. Finally, these are just some of the many relationships identified between data and humans as ‘sources’ of data made during IDEAS2020 Part Two. Speakers also discussed at length the myriad issues relating to humans as ‘users’ of data – a topic just as complex and just as problematic for those involved in the ongoing work of defining and developing the information domain. 29

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY Mapp: The Biden Administration and New Zealand’s strategic choices

Recent United States and New Zealand election outcomes provide fresh opportunity to think through how Wellington will navigate the challenge of balancing our US and China relationships, writes Dr Wayne Mapp.

Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO was New Zealand’s Minister of Defence and Minister of Science and Innovation from 2008 to 2011.

The recent tensions between Australia and China show how difficult it is for smaller nations to balance the relationship between China and the United States. While New Zealand is not at the forefront of United States Pacific security policy in the way that Australia is, New Zealand is indisputably part of the US’ Pacific security arrangements. The recent Five Eyes protest about China’s treatment of Hong Kong legislators is clear enough testament to that. New Zealand is not in the same strategic situation as Australia. We do not have the ANZUS security guarantee, at least not in the way we did prior to 1985. We are also arguably the most secure country in the world, the COVID crisis is a demonstration of how distance and isolation serve to protect us. New Zealand therefore has a different range of choices than Australia. We should ensure these

choices are clearly reflected in New Zealand’s defence policy. The new Biden administration, and a new Labour government in New Zealand, provides a fresh opportunity to think through how New Zealand is going to navigate the ongoing challenge of balancing our most important set of relationships in the Pacific, that being the relationships with China and the US. New Minister of Defence, Peeni Henare has the family history and connections, and has a considered approach to navigate the difficult waters ahead, however, the nature of this challenge will be substantial. If the Biden administration does anything like what is advocated by the Economist in its leader “The China strategy America needs”, which suggests that Biden should mobilise America’s allies in a “cold war against China” then the relationship between China and the US will sharply worsen. However, many of

Line of Defence

Washington’s partners will not see it in their interests to embark in a cold war against China. New Zealand will surely be among these nations. So, what are the realistic choices? It is indisputable that New Zealand will remain within the US security orbit. We are not about to depart the Five Eyes intelligence arrangements or terminate our security alliance with Australia. China is fully aware of these security fundamentals. However, neither should New Zealand do anything that will significantly imperil our largest trading agreement, which is with China. New Zealand’s foreign policy and defence experts will be trying to find the path whereby both of these objectives can be maintained. One way to look at the challenge is to figure out what is the minimum that is required to satisfy our security obligations. New Zealand joining the recent Five Eyes communique about Hong Kong could probably be seen in this light. Our role in Iraq and Afghanistan can also be measured this way. Perhaps the most skillful of such strategic calculations was Australian Prime Minister John Howard’s decision to send a squadron of F 18 aircraft to Iraq in 2003. It was a high profile contribution, but it also had minimal risk of . Arguably Prime Minister Morrison has not been so adroit. Asking for an apology (in relation to Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lijian Zhao posting of an offensive Line of Defence

fake image on Twitter) when there is no chance it would ever be made is not looking for a pathway out of the dilemma. New Zealand’s defence procurement choices raise possibilities to send a signal to our various partners as to where our priorities lie. Successive Defence Reviews clearly indicate our priority is the South West Pacific, essentially from the Equator to the Antarctic. All of New Zealand’s sovereign territory and the realm countries are within this zone. It is an immense area of the world. New Zealand’s defence assets are broadly configured to cover this region, although the small number of platforms means the coverage is episodic. Some assets, in particular, the frigates and the Orion aircraft, soon to be replaced by the Poseidon aircraft, have more utility outside the region. However, the immensity of the region is such that only the Orion/Poseidon aircraft have the range and endurance to undertake surveillance within the region and thus are the appropriate choice. Within the next three to five years, New Zealand will have to make the choice on what ships will replace the two Anzac frigates. The current upgrades will see the frigates through to the early 2030’s, which will be 35 years after they entered service. Their replacements need to be planned now. It would be a legitimate choice for New Zealand to replace the frigates and the current offshore

patrol vessels with much more capable offshore patrol vessels, such as the Canadian Harry DeWolf class, capable of navigating the waters from the Equator to the Antarctic. They may be less useful outside the South West Pacific, but there is certainly enough maritime patrol, humanitarian and environmental work to keep them busy within the region. Such a decision has a number of advantages. They are cheaper than frigates. They ensure better patrol capabilities within our region, while being less concerned with matters outside our region. We have other defence assets that would be more useful for coalition tasks, including the new tanker/logistics vessel, the Aotearoa, as well as the new Poseidon aircraft. Such a choice would clearly show that our principal interests are within the South West Pacific. It would also show that New Zealand has not built a defence force that replicates, on a small scale, the expeditionary capabilities of our larger partners, but neither are we so insular that we have no capabilities that can contribute to wider coalition roles. The next few years will almost certainly pose some difficult choices for defence and foreign policy decision makers. Some of these choices can make it apparent to our partners that it is New Zealand ‘s strategic interests – not others’ – that will be paramount in how New Zealand positions itself in the strategic balance. 31

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Academic Spotlight: Reuben Steff talks big power

Dr Reuben Steff bemoans the absence of robust debate in New Zealand on foreign policy issues and the lack of investment in local research and strategic supply chains. He talks exclusively to Line of Defence.

LoD: You’ve had a couple of books published lately. Tell us about them.

Dr Reuben Steff, Senior Lecturer at the University of Waikato.

RS: In US Foreign Policy in the Age of Trump (Routledge, 2020), I investigate the drivers, tactics, and strategy that propelled the Trump administration’s international agenda. In short, it looks beyond the ‘noise’ of the Trump presidency to make sense of recent US foreign policy to examine the long-standing convictions of the president and the brutal worldview that he applies to US foreign policy; his hard-line negotiation tactics and employment of unpredictability to keep the world off-guard. Finally, at the level of strategy, the book finds that the Trump administration is responding to a new multipolar structure of power through a turn towards realpolitik and a focus on great power competition. It also considers whether the administration has been successful in these efforts or if the methods and tactics employed have weakened America’s position. The second edited book, Emerging Technologies and International Security: Machines, the State, and War (Routledge, 2020), contains contributions from a multi-disciplinary pool of authors to analyse emerging technologies and their impact on the new international security environment. The theme of the book is that while recent technological developments (such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), robotics and automation, 3D printing, UAVs, blockchain, deepfakes and others) have the potential to transform international relations in positive ways, they also pose challenges to peace and Line of Defence

security. They raise new ethical, legal and political questions about the use of power and the role of humans in war and conflict. The chapters examine the implications of these technologies for the balance of power, examining the strategies of the US, Russia and China to harness emerging technologies (and how their militaries and private corporations are responding); how smaller and less powerful states like New Zealand and non-state actors are adjusting; the political, ethical and legal implications of AI and automation; what these technologies mean for how war and power is understood and utilized in the 21st century; and how these technologies diffuse power away from the state to society, individuals and non-state actors. LoD: What’s your take on the current state of great power rivalry? RS: The US-China relationship is in a downward spiral and how the two manage crises illustrates this. A key complication in recent years stems from the mixed messages out of Washington. On one hand, Trump has portrayed himself as an arch-realist uninterested in ideology or human rights, even Line of Defence

willing to trade his silence on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) human rights abuses in Xinjiang in exchange for trade deals and Beijing’s purchase of US agricultural goods. On the other, a bipartisan consensus has formed that views the US-China competition in starkly ideological terms, holding that CCP President Xi Jinping is guided by a totalitarian ideology – a development that will harden China’s resolve to resist America and heighten their concern that the long-term goal of Washington is regime change, rather than mutual coexistence. In any event, the changing relationship is accelerating US technological decoupling from China, and disengagement on 5G by US allies and partners (including New Zealand). It is also spurring the US to take actions to balance China’s military rise along two vectors. The first is by discussing the possibility of turning the QUAD (an informal strategic forum between the United States, Japan, Australia and India) into a security alliance like NATO (and that could eventually be extended to New Zealand). The second is the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. US Senate Armed Services Committee in June 2020, this will be rolled out in the coming years and

is designed to “maintain a credible balance of military power” vis-à-vis China by increasing investments to strengthen America’s regional military presence and to sustain its militarytechnological edge. This includes increased funding to boost US defences in the AsiaPacific with China specifically in mind, and will lead to modified and more flexible basing arrangements, improve active and passive defences against theatre cruise, ballistic and hypersonic missiles, and strengthen alliances and partnerships. A Biden administration is unlikely to fundamentally change this trajectory. On one hand, we can expect Biden to try to calm international tensions, and forge broad coalitions to address global governance issues (such as trade, climate and nuclear non-proliferation) that will invigorate the layer of cooperation between the China and the US. However, on the other, Biden has promised to place ideology and values – in particular, an emphasis on upholding and spreading democratic norms and values (objectives Trump had no interest in) – to the forefront of US foreign policy. Towards this end, Biden has strongly criticised China, calling Xi Jinping a “thug” who “doesn’t have 33

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY a democratic bone in his body”, and dubbed China’s treatment of Uighur Muslims as a “genocide”. If we see a renewed push by the incoming Biden administration for greater economic engagement with the region (that excludes Beijing), we could be witnessing the rollout of a belated military-economic strategy to contain China. The most significant and eyecatching policy is Biden’s intention to hold a “Summit for Democracy” in 2021 “to renew the spirit and shared purpose of the nations of the free world” and build a united front of democratic allies to challenge illiberal states. Collectively, this suggests that Biden is nearer to the neoconservative wing of US foreign policy that seeks to use US power to promote American values. As such, a Biden administration is likely to be more focused in its opposition to China than the Trump administration, calling upon America’s Asia-Pacific allies to clearly take a stand alongside them. Choppy waters are ahead. LoD: What part can a small state like New Zealand meaningfully play in dispersing great power tensions in our region? RS: We could make a positive contribution if we were invited to play some kind of intermediary role. However, it would be presumptuous to declare we have special expertise that could cut the Gordian Knot of worsening US-China relations. If New Zealand wanted to build up capacity in this area, it should consider former Defence Minister Wayne Mapp’s suggestion to fund an Aotearoa Peace Research Institute modelled on the Norwegian Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO). Furthermore, New Zealand presently benefits from good political remains with both states – the US primarily for security and defence reasons and China for our economy. The more we overtly get involved the greater the risk either side will use their leverage over New Zealand to pressure us to take positions that antagonises the other, and in turn risks retaliatory action. 34

Big challenges facing New Zealand academics.

LoD: In terms of the above, what role can/do New Zealand academics play? RS: With clear eyes, they must continue to draw attention to the emerging geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific security environment and developments in the South Pacific, and decipher what they mean for New Zealand’s national security. Compared to practitioners we (academics) have more time to undertake research on these topics, and government agencies could make it clearer to us what specific research they would find valuable. LoD: What are the key challenges facing New Zealand’s defence/ strategic/security studies and international relations research centres? RS: I think the challenges are systematic. On most foreign policy issues (many of which link to our domestic policy settings), New Zealand lacks robust debate. For a variety of

reasons, when it comes to great power tensions and our place in it, New Zealand scholars are loathe to put forward new ideas or even set out their own positions clearly. Instead, there is constant celebration and a call for New Zealand to maintain foreign policy ‘independence’. This sounds nice but means a different thing to everyone, and therefore means nothing. It distorts, rather than clarifies. There is also, despite worsening trends and growing great power competition, virtually no debate between political parties over foreign policy – this was starkly illustrated in the recent general election in which it was barely mentioned. Lack of funding is another. If we want sustained and systematic research into what the emerging global and regional security environment means for New Zealand’s national security interests, the money has to be there to free up scholars to undertake this research. Line of Defence

I think the same goes for our defence forces – they need to respond to signals from the international system and bolster/adjust our forces accordingly. These include a new era of great power competition that extends into our part of the world (our key allies, Australia and the US, are gearing up for this); emerging technologies, many of which we do not fully understand and pose novel security threats; and diffusion of power away from states to more non-state actors (including individuals). Finally, New Zealand needs a greater capacity for self-reliance. This does not necessarily stand in opposition to our support for multilateralism and global co-operation, but assuming that just-in-time supply chains and the cheapest price for every international good will always provide us with what we need is incredibly risky. Our luck will eventually run out. Some things are of strategic import – like fertiliser (that we currently buy offshore), fuels and the capacity Line of Defence

to refine them, and the ability to manufacture some key goods (for example basic pharmaceuticals and medicines). We may also eventually want an independent capability to deter larger hostile powers from blackmailing us. The sooner we start discussing these things in a frank manner, prioritising what we need and how we can acquire them, the better. LoD: What was your road into an academic career? What is your key motivator as an academic? RS: My original interest in international affairs and academia came from my parents. My father is American, and has always had one eye on the world beyond New Zealand, and both my parents in general are willing to question established shibboleths. Therefore I naturally gravitated towards international issues, and spent nine years at the University of Otago studying to get my PhD in strategic studies, examining the theory and strategy of nuclear deterrence

and its intersection with great power competition from 1945 to 2014. I then spent 2.5 years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, which gave me an insight into the ‘real world’ of international relations and allowed me to deepen my understanding of the link between theory and practice. An academic job then opened up at the University of Waikato and I was lucky enough to get it. The motivator? At a selfish level, I enjoy doing deep dives into dense topics and concepts, breaking them down, finding gaps, and then writing about them and sharing my insights with others. The creation of new ideas and expanding the breadth of debate is something I really enjoy. Now that I am a lecturer, I feel it is very important to assist our students to understand the world they live in, give them perspective amidst all the chaos and information bombarding them, and provide them with practical skills to succeed in the workplace. 35

HOMELAND SECURITY

Addressing the home-grown threat With recent terrorist attacks in the West ‘home-grown’, Marc Collins, Protective Security Team Manager at Icaras, explains how governments might go about countering the threat whilst preserving freedoms.

Marc Collins is Protective Security Team Manager at Icaras.

According to the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence, the US is facing a growing threat from ‘home-grown’ terrorism. Domestic threat actors often plan and carry out their acts of violence alone and with little apparent warning, in ways that limit the effectiveness of traditional law enforcement investigation and disruption methods. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) in its annual threat assessment in March 2020, issued a warning that right-wing groups are more organised than in previous years. “In Australia, the extreme right-wing threat is real, and it is growing. In suburbs around Australia, small cells regularly meet to salute Nazi flags, inspect weapons, train in combat and share their hateful ideology.” Technology plays a critical role in facilitating the spread, evolution and interaction of violent ideologies and narratives of personal grievances, and the subsequent security implications, are recognised. For some time in the US, there has been a move towards recognising terrorism and targeted violence as intertwined and interrelated, and the DHS national-level strategy explicitly states that terrorism and targeted violence overlap, intersect and interact as problems, and that they necessitate a shared set of solutions. Guiding principles in countering the ‘home-grown’ threat Defending borders is necessary to prevent foreign terrorists and other

hostile actors from entering the country. Border security, however, cannot stop violence originating from within the country. Governments must therefore focus on empowering and equipping agencies and the public with prevention strategies and capabilities. Prevention efforts must be multidisciplinary and include enhanced whole-of-society partnerships with mental health professionals, social service providers, and civil society in order to provide “off-ramps” away from terrorism and targeted violence. The DHS details five guiding principles for operationalising countering terrorism plans, all of which are relevant to other governments facing similar challenges: 1. Understanding and adapting to the threat environment A government’s capacity to respond to terrorism and targeted violence depends on its ability to understand the evolving threat environment, and to adapt to it. Intelligence priorities and capabilities must adapt to the new security landscapes and craft innovative responses. Prior to the Christchurch Mosque attack, carried out in March 2019 by an Australian-born white supremacist, New Zealand’s assessed level of threat from a terrorist attack was Low (an attack is assessed as possible but is not expected). It was assessed that an attack would most likely be carried out by Islamic extremists or their affiliates, including a small number of ‘foreign fighters’ Line of Defence

who had returned from the Middle East, and the intelligence services were monitoring up to 40 New Zealanders on a government watch list. The threat from domestic extremists was assessed as Very Low (an attack is assessed as unlikely). Prior to the attack, the New Zealand Intelligence Community’s security settings were focused on a fairly narrow part of the threat spectrum. The Intelligence Community, which is understandably limited in terms of resource and capability, had not made one specific mention of the threat posed by white supremacists or right-wing nationalism in the last ten years. It has also been evident that the Mosque attacks have raised important questions about what happened in the lead-up to that day and the performance of state sector agencies, many of which were captured in the report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the attacks published 08 December 2020. The report focused on the actions of the attacker, the actions of relevant Public sector agencies and any changes that could prevent such terrorist attacks in the future. Making 44 recommendations around four themes: (i) the requirement for strong Line of Defence

government leadership and direction; (ii) a need for engaged and accountable government decision-making; (iii) the role that everyone plays in making New Zealand safe and inclusive; and (iv) the need for fit for purpose laws and policies. In the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Annual Report 2019, the threat from terrorism, and home-grown violent extremism, was included in the list of National Intelligence Priorities. This demonstrated a subtle change in mindset post-Christchurch and a more realistic understanding of the wider spectrum of threats, including the threat from ‘home-grown’ violent extremist actors. 2. Understanding technology and its malicious use Terrorists and violent extremists have proven adept at exploiting the internet’s potential, leading to changes in target selection and modus operandi. These so called ‘Gen Y Terrorists’ have a desire for instant gratification, meaning they are more likely to carry out low capability or less-sophisticated attacks that require minimal training and planning, such as active shooter attacks, and as a result become much harder to detect and prevent.

Online extremist communities lionise attackers, encouraging others to follow in their footsteps, and the online space has made attackers more operationally competent, as they use the Web to glean technical information for their attacks. The widespread adoption of social media, development of the ‘dark web’, and the proliferation of encryption and anonymising technology has helped people to view themselves as part of global communities that transcend national borders. They provide users with a sense of intimacy with others half a world away and emboldens the adoption of identities or causes that may once have been obscure, marginalised, or otherwise unknown. As part of the strategy to counter the threat, governments must understand technological advances that attackers will employ, and should: • conduct risk-based assessments of these advances • examine the promise and peril of emerging technologies, including unmanned systems, such as drones • work closely with the private sector, including Internet Service Providers and social media companies, to address the spread of violent extremist content on their platforms • encourage the sector to help inform 37

HOMELAND SECURITY

Flowers and Candles at the Hanau shooting site, Germany, February 2020.

the public of the risks associated with the spread of violent extremist ideology • participate in and contribute to prevention and resilience efforts. 3. Collaboration between agencies Multiple layers of security and intelligence can provide awareness of hostile threat actors long before they attempt an attack. However, ‘homegrown’ threat actors pose a particular challenge as they tend to operate alone, with little or no communication regarding their intention and capability to cause harm. They do sometimes leave a trail of pre-attack activities, such as target reconnaissance, overseas travel and social media exchanges, which if collected and collated centrally, could indicate a cause for concern and warrant proactive action. The sharing of information between agencies and, where appropriate, private sector partners, is a key element of any government’s strategy to counter the threat from home-grown actors. The gathering and sharing of Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR), and the need to establish robust standards for 38

gathering, documenting, processing, analysing and sharing of terrorismrelated SAR information, are central to this strategy. The development of a Fusion Centre can also play a critical role in collaboration and information sharing efforts, as this becomes the central repository for all threat-related information, increasing the likelihood that ‘dots can be joined together’ to form a pre-emptive picture of an emerging threat. 4. Whole of society approach Working closely with academia, mental health professionals, educators, and faith leaders is crucial in order to better understand the threats faced and to develop strategies to address them. To enhance the efficacy of prevention programmes, governments and state sector agencies need to take a whole-of-society approach working with stakeholders to employ strategic frameworks that integrate various programmes to increase community resilience and reduce the number of individuals exposed to violent

extremism, while identifying with individuals (‘off-ramping’) before violent or criminal acts occur. This approach recognises that peers are best positioned to notice individuals exhibiting signs of radicalisation to violent extremism and mobilisation to violence. Awareness briefings, engagement strategies and outreach efforts are required across the widest cross-section of society, explaining what to look for and how to respond if an individual is mobilising to violence. Denmark’s de-radicalisation strategy, known as the Aarhus Model, is a globally renowned whole-of-society approach. The programme is based on holistic collaborative efforts between various public, private and people sectors agencies and has gained global attention due to its ‘soft’ approach towards home-grown extremists, in contrast to many Western countries programmes which involve detention and incarceration. The Danish de-radicalisation model is composed of an assortment of multiple agencies and has its roots in a broader approach to crime prevention in Danish society. The programme Line of Defence

comprises three main guiding principles: • inclusion rather than stigmatisation or exclusion • strong collaboration between the various private sector bodies, institutions and government agencies • importance of a scientific foundation for the de-radicalisation programme. 5. Upholding civil rights Any strategy to counter the threat from ‘home-grown’ actors must respect and protect national values, including the prioritisation and protection of civil rights, civil liberties and individual privacy. Governments and agencies must uphold the rule of law and earn and maintain the trust of the public. Domestic terrorism and ‘homegrown’ violent extremism are inherently tied to ideas and ideologies. Planning or committing acts of violence is a crime, while expressing Line of Defence

or holding radical or extreme views is part of civil freedom. Any government must take care while addressing the scourge of violence, to avoid stigmatising populations, infringing on constitutional rights, or attempting to police what the public should think. Additionally, how terrorism and targeted violence is identified and detected requires faithful adherence to fair information practice principles and privacy-focused agency policies. Agencies must consistently incorporate privacy protections in all they do, ensuring they consistently work within the parameters of their operational remit and in adherence to the legal framework within which they operate. Conclusions ‘Home-grown’ terrorist and violent extremist attacks are on the increase. They present a different set of challenges to governments and agencies by limiting the effectiveness of traditional law enforcement

investigation and disruption methods. In order to counter this everevolving threat, governments, Intelligence Communities and state sector agencies need to work collectively to understand and adapt to the changing threat environment. They must also understand the role that technology plays and how it can be used or misused for malicious purposes, collaborating together and sharing threat-related information whilst adhering to robust information sharing protocols in order to establish a whole-of-society approach through multi-stakeholder prevention strategies and programmes. Most importantly, any strategy must also strike a balance between the secrecy necessary to operate effectively, the public’s expectations of accountability and transparency, and the legal framework they operate within. The protection of privacy, civil rights and civil liberties will remain a constant challenge. 39

HOMELAND SECURITY

Malicious cyber activity in the COVID-19 era Steve Honiss, Director at Aardwolf Consulting and Senior Fellow at the Azure Forum for Contemporary Security Strategy, writes that COVID impacts and the rush for a vaccine have fuelled a rush of state-sponsored cyber incursions.

Steve Honiss is a Director at Aardwolf Consulting.

It is fair to say that aside from the health impact of COVID-19, the wider impact of the pandemic is something that has never been seen before. In a hyperconnected world, where national economies are experiencing downturn or recession, populations are suffering illness and fear of death, and people are looking to their governments for leadership, it is hardly surprising that the resources of governments are focused on finding prophylaxis, treatment, or a cure for the virus. This is being manifested through the significant and urgent efforts being undertaken by universities, pharmaceutical and vaccine researchers, government health organisations, and other R&D entities. Vast sums of money are being dedicated to this. Large pharmaceutical companies, who by nature are traditionally competitors, are now working together in pursuit of the cause. The threat landscape Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) has been closely monitoring statesponsored threat groups carrying out COVID-related espionage. In July, the US Department of Justice indicted two Chinese hackers associated with the WICKED PANDA threat group and charged them with carrying out cyber activity against a range of Western assets. These actions were reportedly carried out both in their own interests and also at the behest of the Chinese Ministry of State Security.

Amongst other crimes, the pair are charged with targeting US organisations involved in developing COVID-19 testing, anti-viral treatments, or vaccinations, on behalf of the Chinese government. The hacker group known as COZY BEAR and linked with high certainty to Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, the SVR, has been accused of targeting vaccine research networks in the US, UK, and Canada. This activity is said to have focused on vaccine development work being carried out jointly by Oxford University and AstraZeneca. Likely South Korean APT group Darkhotel is believed to have been responsible for a series of sophisticated attacks against the World Health Organisation (WHO). The WHO makes a very attractive target for threat actors because of the possibility that it holds unreleased information about virus testing, cure, vaccine research progress. Gaining a foothold within the WHO network would be a valuable outcome for an APT group. Vietnam linked threat group OCEANLOTUS has been accused of conducting campaigns against Chinese government organisations, including China’s Ministry of Emergency Management, as well as Wuhan-based government officials. In addition to these, Iranian and South American threat groups have also reportedly been identified as carrying out cyber activity related to COVID-19. All told, the Google TAG is tracking no less than twelve APT groups undertaking COVID related activity. Line of Defence

Like much cyber activity, these campaigns targeting bio-tech entities and government agencies have not been particularly sophisticated – but the fact is they don’t always need to be sophisticated to be successful. Well-crafted phishing emails, carefully mimicked domains, and enticing lures are often all it takes to obtain account credentials that frequently provide attackers with their first access point. Alternatively, similar techniques may be used to entice a user to unwittingly download or execute a malicious application that provides technical access to the victim network. In April, investigative journalist and security researcher Brian Krebs wrote about the huge increase in new domain registrations featuring the keywords coronavirus or Covid-19 early in the pandemic. One researcher reported that these sorts of domains were being created at the rate of as many as 2,000 per day. A significant proportion of these will have been used for malicious purposes. Commentary It is difficult to find any aspect of our governments or economies that are not reliant to some degree on technology and the Internet. Line of Defence

Even pre-COVID we saw regular public reporting of nation states being called out for hostile cyber activities. It is not unreasonable to assume that what was reported publicly then was only the tip of the iceberg – part of a constant unseen war being waged by those states that have offensive cyber capabilities, or at least have the will and ability to pay for it. This sort of activity has a range of motivations, including obtaining state secrets, financial bargaining positions, defence policy and plans, material to use for blackmail, academic research, R&D and other valuable intellectual property; destruction and disruption; and, in some cases, fundraising efforts to support national economies. In addition to this normal level of cyber espionage, the global impact of COVID-19 on health, public confidence and way of life, working situations and employment, and economies in general has provided a new and fertile ground for malicious cyber activity to take place. There has been a real flurry of compromises and other malicious activity that has connections in one form or another with the pandemic. There are three likely key motivations for this: (i) traditional

financially motivated cybercrime, (ii) state-backed espionage, and (iii) corporate or economic espionage: (i) Cybercrime actors are attempting to steal intellectual property and other secrets to sell to the highest bidder, or undertake ransomware attacks in order to hold secrets to ransom. (ii) The pandemic is having wideranging effects on economies. Some states, it appears, are prepared to carry out unlawful activity, potentially in violation of bilateral or multilateral agreements, for economic reasons. (iii) It stands to reason that whoever wins the race to develop a safe and effective vaccine stands to make massive profit. Paying state-level hacking groups to attempt to copy the opposition’s homework seems a reasonable investment. Implications Cyber espionage is not a new thing, it’s just that COVID-related espionage is a hot topic right now. Nevertheless, it is hard to say what the implications of this increased activity will ultimately be. 41

HOMELAND SECURITY

Cyber espionage has become a new arms race. Instead of a traditional race for kinetic weapons, states are building bigger and more skilled offensive (and defensive) cyber capabilities. There are clear signs that states are engaging their national defensive capabilities in support of protecting COVID research and vaccine developments. The bigger questions perhaps are around the end goal. Is it a case of states attempting to: â&#x20AC;˘ get hold of research so they can advance their own vaccine production efforts; â&#x20AC;˘ identify who is furthest along the development path in order to support their vaccine nationalism agenda; or â&#x20AC;˘ collect good intelligence on which to base planning for their ongoing pandemic response? Responses by states Over recent years we have seen agreements and treaties executed that have the intention of at least reducing 42

state-sanctioned cyber activities. They have had questionable effect. The US Department of Justice has not infrequently indicted individuals who they accuse of computer crime on behalf of countries such as China, Russia and Iran. These have been, in my view, largely symbolic acts. Public denunciation of attack campaigns where strong attribution has been carried out are also not uncommon, but to what effect? They send a message to perpetrators that they have been caught, but it would be naive to believe that they go any way to curtailing the malevolent behaviour. These tend to amount to little more than political statements. The standard practical measures ought to be taken. States should be investing national resources in shoring up their defences and supporting holders of valuable research and intellectual property. Perhaps some might engage in active defence measures or return fire. Information owners and governments need to raise the cost of attackers doing business to

a level where the return on investment becomes questionable. Policy response options have not had great effect. When dealing with threat actors supported by major world powers, a public telling off is unlikely to change behaviour significantly. In the case of a perpetrator state already subject to global sanctions, there are few options. Agreements to not behave badly in cyberspace are only going to be adhered to by states that are either not doing it in the first place or are confident that they can continue without either being caught or retaliated against. In conclusion, COVID-19 has provided a rich environment for countries with capability to put those capabilities to use in their own national interests to mitigate the impacts of the virus. Past and present behavioural trends indicate that this will continue and become part of the new normal. Making the task too hard, too expensive, or too time consuming may be the best approach for defending against malicious cyber activity in the COVID era. Line of Defence

New Minister for Justice Portfolio In the post-election ministerial line-up, Aupito William Sio retains the Justice Associate Minister role, while Hon Kris Faafoi replaces Andrew Little to become New Zealand’s 50th Minister of Justice. Following the Labour party’s landslide election victory, Aupito William Sio has picked up the role of Minister for Courts while retaining the Justice Associate Minister role he’s held since 26 October 2017. Sio has also retained his Pacific Peoples ministerial portfolio while adding foreign affairs, education (Pacific Peoples), and health (Pacific Peoples) to his list of associate portfolios. Kris Faafoi is now Minister of Justice in addition to his roles as Minister of Immigration and Minister of Broadcasting and Media. Faafoi was elected as the Member of Parliament for Mana in November 2010, following more than a decade working as a journalist at both TVNZ

New Zealand’s Minister of Justice, Hon Kris Faafoi.

Line of Defence

and the BBC. He had also served as chief press secretary for the then Labour leader Phil Goff. After the resignation of Mana MP Luamanuvao Winnie Laban on 10 August 2010, Faafoi represented Labour in the resulting by-election, which he won, becoming the first MP of Tokelauan descent. Faafoi became Minister of Civil Defence, Commerce and Consumer Affairs and Associate Minister of Immigration in October 2017. He assumed the Customs portfolio in August 2018 after Minister of Customs Meka Whaitiri stood aside over a ‘staffing matter’. On 7 September 2018, he was appointed Minister of Broadcasting, Communications and Digital Media upon the resignation of Clare Curran. On 27 June 2019, Faafoi was appointed Minister of Government Digital Services. He also assumed the position of Associate Minister for Public Housing, and relinquished his position as Minister of Civil Defence and Minister of Customs. On 22 July, he became Minister of Immigration after Iain Lees-Galloway was dismissed following admission of an inappropriate relationship with a former staffer. According to Pacific Media Network, Minister Faafoi says he will provide a different perspective to the Justice portfolio. “The fact that we’ve got a Maori corrections minister [Kelvin Davis], a Cook Island police minister [Poto Williams] and a Tokelauean justice minister, I think we’ll bring a unique

perspective to that because we’re really sick and tired of seeing our friends and whanau being over-represented in those spheres,” he told PMI. “It’s time to make sure that we do all the long-term stuff to make sure that if they are going through, they come through the system better people.” Faafoi’s parents came to New Zealand from the Tokelauan atoll of Fakaofo in the 1960s. His father, Amosa, was one of the first scholarship students to leave Tokelau for New Zealand, attending boarding school in Masterton. In his maiden speech in parliament, Faafoi commented that the Tokelauan custom of inati—sharing on the basis of need—is something that is ingrained in his DNA. “I saw it first hand in 2003 on my first visit to Tokelau,” he said. “The men of the village set a large net to catch fish for all the families. It was then divided up to ensure that no family would go without.” As Immigration Minister, Faafoi recently announced that from January 2021, up to 2,000 experienced seasonal workers from the Pacific will be able to travel to New Zealand to address labour shortages in the horticulture and wine growing sectors. Under the arrangements, employers are required to pay the workers at least $22.10 per hour (living wage), and the equivalent of 30 hours work per week while in managed isolation. Meanwhile, the majority of New Zealand’s front line security guards are being paid at or around the minimum wage ($18.90). 43

BORDER SECURITY

New Zealand needs a ‘traffic light’ system to stop COVID-19 creeping in at the border Following the sixth COVID-19 incursion in three months, New Zealand needs to shift from a one-size-fits-all strategy to a risk-based approach to border management, writes University of Otago Professors Nick Wilson and Michael Baker.

Professor Nick Wilson

Professor Michael Baker

Two staff have recently tested positive after coming into contact with international seafarers in the course of their duties at a managed isolation facility in Christchurch, where 31 mariners with COVID-19 remain in quarantine. Mandatory testing of international mariners, who may be only briefly in the country to join their vessels, is being introduced from this week. This latest incursion follows five earlier border failures since early August. One of these led to the recent outbreak in Auckland. We propose an urgent shift to a traffic-light approach to border control. This system would facilitate travel to New Zealand from places that are free of COVID-19 (some Australian states and Pacific islands), while reducing the risk associated with travellers from jurisdictions with uncontrolled spread. Keeping COVID-19 at the border One of the recent border failures led to the relatively serious outbreak in Auckland, with 179 cases, three deaths and major social and economic impacts. Two other outbreaks, including one from a returnee infected in a quarantine facility and the latest from port workers infected by incoming seafarers, were controlled at an early stage. The others involved infections of border facility workers: health workers on two occasions and a maintenance worker. These six events represent system failures — the goal should be to have

complete containment of infection at the border and no cases in the community. Contributing factors include the use of hotels for quarantine (for which they are not designed) and poor system design, including the lack of testing of seafarers flying into the country to join their ships. Such failures could increase if the proportion of infected travellers coming to New Zealand increases as many parts of the world experience resurgences and rising infection rates. Given the marked difference in the intensity of the COVID-19 pandemic in different regions and countries, we propose a traffic-light system of risk stratification for jurisdictions from which travellers arrive in New Zealand. New Zealand has much of the infrastructure already in place to support this shift, including a booking system that could help to manage it. We would also get very rapid data on whether it is working, based on the rate of positive cases detected at the border. Green: quarantine-free travel with precautions A growing number of countries in the Asia-Pacific region have eliminated COVID-19, notably most states of Australia. Some Pacific island jurisdictions have never had cases. Quarantine-free travel should be possible from these jurisdictions, provided an assurance program is in place to ensure elimination requirements are being met, including Line of Defence

adequate levels of testing. Since there is always a small risk of outbreaks from border control failures (Australia also uses hotels for quarantine, which failed in Victoria), we would need to consider retaining some controls, such as: • rapid testing (using PCR methods) on arrival in New Zealand, or rapid antigen tests once these are considered reliable enough and are available in New Zealand • digital tracking for the first three weeks in New Zealand (via a traveller’s smartphone and with government-provided phones for those who don’t have their own) • paying a bond (eg NZ$1000) to be returned after three weeks if the traveller has adhered to the digital tracking system. Amber: current border quarantine and testing These could be states with evidence of ongoing pandemic spread, but where it is relatively well controlled (for example, in Japan, South Korea, Singapore). For this zone, the current measures (facility-based quarantine for Line of Defence

14 days and testing twice during that period) could apply, albeit with some refinements. Facility-based quarantine periods could be shorter and replaced with home quarantine. The isolation period at home could be combined with the usual PCR testing, digital tracking, mask use and heavy fines for any breaches. Various East Asian jurisdictions, including Taiwan, have successfully used home quarantine. As above, a bond could be used to encourage adherence to the conditions. Red: additional measures or no travel Jurisdictions with uncontrolled pandemic spread (including US, UK, Russia and India) would fall into this category. For New Zealanders returning from these places, the government could require pre-travel measures in addition to the current quarantine. The form of these measures needs careful development, but could include evidence of both pre-travel home quarantine (for three days or more) and negative pre-travel test results. New Zealand should evaluate the experience in countries already

using pre-travel COVID-19 testing to determine the most feasible approach. Currently, Cyprus, Bahamas, Bermuda, Hawaii, Hong Kong and Italy require proof of a negative result on arrival. Such measures add to the burden these travellers face, but can be justified. They reduce the risk of outbreaks on incoming aircraft as well as the load on the isolation/quarantine facilities. Quarantine facilities for these travellers could be restricted to those outside of Auckland, for example at the Ōhakea air base, ideally in purposebuilt facilities with properly designed ventilation and no shared spaces. If all these measures still resulted in high numbers of infected travellers arriving in New Zealand, we would need to consider suspending travel from these red-zone jurisdictions. New legislation could empower the government to allow for such constraint on the right of citizens to return to New Zealand from high-risk countries during a global pandemic. This article was originally published in The Conversation on 04 November 2020 and is republished under a Creative Commons license. 45

BORDER SECURITY

Women in Security Awards Aotearoa launches Maritime NZ security professional recognised in new awards initiative celebrating the women who are making a difference and achieving security excellence in Aotearoa. Natasha Hallett, Senior Advisor Maritime National Security at Maritime NZ, has been recognised for her dedication and commitment to improving maritime security both in New Zealand and the Pacific, taking out the ‘Executive’ category of the inaugural Women in Security Awards Aotearoa. Established to recognise women who have advanced the New Zealand security industry, the Women in Security Awards Aotearoa initiative attracted an impressive 37 nominations across seven categories following a fleeting 10-day nomination period. “By offering recognition to women working in the field, other women may be inspired to consider security as a career, which in turn helps address the imbalance,” said Bonnie Butlin, the founder and international coordinator of WISECRA, a global network of female security and resilience professionals. The Women in Security & Resilience Alliance (WISECRA), Defsec Media, ASIS New Zealand and New Zealand Security Association (NZSA) announced the launch of the inaugural Women in Security Awards Aotearoa recognition program on November 10. Nominations were accepted in relation to women with more than three years of experience in New Zealand working in physical security, personnel security and/or information security, with an international judging panel selecting winners from seven categories. According to her nomination, the international relationships that Natasha has built up have provided ports in New Zealand exposure to agencies in the US and across the Pacific Islands, resulting in improving their overall knowledge of security risks and controls. 46

Natasha Hallett, Senior Advisor Maritime National Security, Maritime NZ. Image: supplied.

“Natasha has inspired the Port Security personnel she works with to aim for a higher standard of Maritime Security, and to work with the other agencies in this space to help achieve better results,” it stated. Natasha’s work has had an impact across multiple agencies, regions and port companies, with the relationships she has built benefitting New Zealand ports and also ports in the Pacific, and further afield. “Natasha is committed to lead from the front, responsible for bringing together international security agencies that are traditionally lead at senior level by men though the development of trust and integrity,” continued her nomination. “The positive feedback and support she has from these agencies is unheralded.”

According to Natasha, maritime and port security plays a significant role in reducing risks to New Zealand’s global maritime transportation system, but it is not very well understood or visible. As Maritime NZ’s Senior Advisor of Maritime National Security, Natasha is committed to promoting and enhancing maritime and port security capacity. This includes inspiring port security personnel to aim for a higher standard of security – a standard that is recognised internationally and guides best practice. Having worked across all levels of maritime and port security, from guiding port personnel to developing and participating in international agreements that support and assist countries to improve their security capability, Natasha is completing her Masters in Emergency Management. Line of Defence

REACH

NEW HEIGHTS in Professional Excellence

ASIS accredited certifications can help you reach your career goals.

Globally recognized as the gold standard for more than 40 years, the CPP is designed for senior-level security managers with seven to nine years of related experience.

WHY EARN THE CPP DESIGNATION? • Validate your security management expertise • Gain global recognition by your peers and the industry • Get a competitive edge in the marketplace • Enhance your career and earnings potential • Enjoy personal satisfaction and professional achievement Be one of the many ASIS board certified practitioners who are leaders, mentors, and trusted strategic partners, serving both their organizations and the profession.

"This gave me a better understanding of security management, and in turn made my conversation with clients and stakeholders more meaningful and useful. It has also increased my profile in the profession. I encourage any security professional to become board certified. I wish I had done this sooner." - Rehan Du Toit CPP

WHY SHOULD AN EMPLOYER HIRE ASIS CERTIFIED PROFESSIONALS? • Build a strong, dedicated team committed to high standards and continuing professional development • Promote ongoing education of critical job knowledge and skills • Feel confident that your staff are using best practices • Recruit the most qualified professionals • Reinforce or elevate your organization’s reputation and credibility Increase the competency level of your staff by supporting your security professionals in their certification journey.

Visit www.asis.org.nz for more information

MQ-9B SeaGuardian

THE MOST VERSATILE

MULTI-DOMAIN SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY Cost-effective, multi-role ISR • Multi-agency ISR for resource protection, disaster response, critical infrastructure monitoring and security across land and maritime environments • Capable of securing New Zealand’s vast area of interest - from the mainland to off-shore territories • 40+ hour endurance capable of supporting missions in the South Pacific or Southern Oceans

Leading The Situational Awareness Revolution