The qualification develops and advances critical research, critical thinking and writing, analytical best practice as well as exploring relevant twentieth and twenty-first century intelligence operations. It is aimed at those wishing to develop advanced critical skills in relation to their existing or prospective intelligence sector careers in New Zealand.
Graduates of this year long programme will possess an advanced knowledge of intelligence analysis processes, be grounded in relevant previous operational intelligence experiences and have a critical understanding of the ethical and professional issues involved.
The programme of study consists of two 30-credit courses:
Qualification Requirements
Semester ONE, 294741: Intelligence in the International Security Environment
A critical examination of intelligence theory and practice, focusing on key concepts and methodologies of intelligence collection and analysis, analytical tools, frameworks and concepts applied to investigations and operations in the contemporary international security environment.
Course Controller:
Dr Rhys Ball, Centre for Defence and Security Studies (Auckland)
Semester TWO, 294744: Intelligence Operations
A comprehensive grounding in the operational intelligence environment in the second half of the 20th century, into the 21st century. Participants will consider the development of intelligence practices both in New Zealand and around the world, from the evolution of intelligence contributions from the end of World War Two, to the intelligence challenges of the 2020s. Intelligence operations are critically reviewed, including intelligence success and failure, espionage against friends and allies, and policing and private intelligence formats.
Course Controller:
Dr John Battersby, Senior Fellow, Centre for Defence and Security Studies (Wellington)
To enroll in this qualification, students must have been awarded or qualified for a relevant Bachelor's degree, or be able to demonstrate scholarly work in conjunction with extensive relevant professional experience for Admission with Equivalent Status.
For further information, please contact John: j.m.battersby@massey.ac.nz, or Rhys: r.ball@massey.ac.nz.
Babcock plays a crucial role in international defence, ensuring critical services and readily available, affordable and long-lasting. Now more than ever, what we do matters.
EDITOR’S NOTE
Kia ora and welcome to the Summer 2024-25 edition –and 34th issue – of Line of Defence Magazine!
In this edition, we’re privileged to be joined by contributing writers former Defence Minister Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO, Editor-at-Large Dr Peter Greener, CloudFlare’s Steve Bray, Dr John Battersby from the Massey University Centre for Defence & Security Studies, and Associate Professor Helen Petousis-Harris from the University of Auckland, and expert commentators Ben Morgan and Kyrylo Kutcher.
Some excellent updates also from Line of Defence sponsors Babcock, Nova Systems, and GA-ASI. These leaders of the Defence Industry make our publication possible.
The Defence Capability Plan has been delayed yet again. This time, we’re being told that China is to blame. Beijing’s testing of an ICBM over the Pacific appears to have changed the state of play. Dr Peter Greener investigates the claim.
With the Trump administration taking office on 20 January 2025, Dr Wayne Mapp considers the implications for New Zealand Defence policy. The master of ‘the art of the deal’ will be expecting an uplift in Defence spending by international partners, and this may be problematic for the New Zealand Government.
Domestically, New Zealand’s Privacy Commissioner is currently reviewing a recently concluded trial of facial recognition technology by supermarket cooperative Foodstuffs North Island.
Facial recognition CCTV has been touted as an answer to recidivism in retail crime. Far from being a silver bullet, however, a recent determination by Australia’s privacy commissioner on the deployment of FRT in Bunnings stores suggests that facial recognition is more of a sledgehammer.
According to Commissioner Carly Kind, deploying facial recognition technology “was the most intrusive option, disproportionately interfering with the privacy of everyone who entered its stores, not just high-risk individuals.”
While the collection of individuals’ biometric facial data at international airports and in certain other use cases appears to enjoy widespread public acceptance, the deployment of FRT in retail settings does not. More on this topic inside.
All this, and much more in this issue of Line of Defence, including a close look at the Wagner Group, foreign interference, the South Pacific Defence Ministers Meeting, the Southwest Pacific ‘shatterbelt’, and the latest Defence Industry news.
Season’s greetings from the Line of Defence team, and here’s to a fantastic 2025!
Nicholas Dynon, Auckland
CONTRIBUTORS
Associate Professor Helen Petousis-Harris
Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO Professor Paul M. Bacon
Dr Peter Greener
Dr Nicholas Ross Smith
Mr Ben Morgan
Dr John Battersby
Mr Steve Bray
Mr Kyrylo Kutcher
Mr Nicholas Dynon SIPRI
GA-ASI
Nova Systems
SPONSORS & PARTNERS
Babcock
Nova Systems
GA-ASI
ASIS International
Massey University Centre for Defence & Security Studies
COVER IMAGE
Cover image courtesy NZDF. Duty personnel perform daily colours ceremony onboard HMNZS Aotearoa while at McMurdo Station
UPCOMING ISSUE
AUTUMN: March 2025
Main themes: Information Domain, cyber, space, non-traditional security Copy Deadline: 29 February 2025
11 South Pacific defence meeting fosters collaboration 12 Uncrewed aircraft systems arrive, training takes off 13 Defence begins replacement of utility vehicle fleet
Preventing a South West Pacific ‘shatterbelt’ 18 Hardware and software upgrades for NH90 fleet
19 War-fighting and new Bushmasters key focus for new QAMR commander 20 Mapp: Testing Times ahead under Trump 2.0 22 Defence Capability Plan: Kicking the can down the road yet again?
25 Sex, drugs and terror: a glimpse inside Kabul’s fortified compounds 26 Babcock and PteroDynamics sign UAS MOU for New Zealand and Australia 27 Collaboration between Sentinel and NZDF on navy sea boats
or
Disclaimer: The information contained in this publication is given in good faith and has been derived from sources believed to be reliable and accurate. However, neither the publishers nor any person involved in the preparation of this publication accept any form of liability whatsoever for its contents including advertisements, editorials, opinions, advice or information or for any consequences from its use.
The Wagner Group: A terrorist organisation with Russian characteristics
The Indo-Pacific is an idea more than a region – and it’s pushing politics in a ‘pessimistic and paranoid’ direction
HOMELAND SECURITY
Deliberate disinformation campaigns are a public health risk – but NZ has no effective strategy to deal with it
Strengthening New Zealand’s Cyber Defences in the New Security Landscape
Qualification of RNZAF P-8A Poseidon Flight Simulation Training Devices
The New Zealand Defence Force’s (NZDF) P-8A Poseidon aircraft project marks a new era in New Zealand’s airborne surveillance and response capabilities. The aircraft support the country’s peace and security operations, maritime surveillance, resource protection, and humanitarian and disaster responses, both domestically and abroad.
Replicating Nova Systems’ success qualifying the RAAF P-8A Flight Simulation Training Devices (FSTDs) at RAAF Edinburgh, Nova Systems NZ has won a contract with the New Zealand Ministry of Defence (NZ MoD) to qualify the RNZAF’s state-of-the-art flight simulation suite for front and rear crew training. The work is to qualify and ensure that the devices comply with the NZ Defence Aviation Rule 119.10 and can be utilised for training in a newly constructed facility at RNZAF Base Ōhakea.
An FSTD creates a realistic and immersive environment that mimics the experience of flying and operating the real aircraft, achieved by replicating the performance, handling qualities, and systems as closely as possible. The FSTD is treated in the same way as an actual aircraft to make the whole experience as real as possible; crews wear flying clothing, life support equipment and step through flight authorisation and ‘aircraft acceptance’ procedures as they would for the actual aircraft. However, the illusion of realism can be easily broken. Noticeably incorrect vibrations, audio and visual cues and system functionality, as well as incorrect flight models
can all reduce the training benefit from using an FSTD. Likewise, any real-world inputs from the local environment or infrastructure, such as noise, vibration or even smells, that affect the building that the FSTD is installed in, can degrade or eliminate training value. Any deficiencies between the FSTD and the real aircraft could result in incorrect skills being learned within the FSTD which is categorised as ‘negative training.’ There is a risk that these incorrect skills are then relied upon when operating the real aircraft. Therefore, it is necessary to understand any deficiencies of an FSTD, the corresponding risk introduced by that deficiency and to tailor the training accordingly. To understand any deficiency, each FSTD requires an individual initial qualification to:
• Compare the FSTD with that of the real-world aircraft, identifying any discrepancies and determining their effect on training.
• Ensure the FSTD adheres to the relevant regulations.
• Produce a Master Qualification Test Guide, which sets the baseline for recurrent evaluations to be compared against.
During each FSTD’s recurrent, annual evaluation, the device is assessed to ensure it continues to accurately replicate the behaviour of the real aircraft and is still safe and compliant with regulations. It is also important to keep the FSTD at the same standard as the actual aircraft and that modifications and upgrades are mirrored accordingly. Following upgrades to the FSTD, it would then undergo a Special Evaluation to ensure any modifications are correctly represented.
Nova Systems has extensive experience with the RAAF P-8A FSTD programme. This experience allowed Nova Systems to come prepared with the knowledge of the deficiencies identified on previous RAAF P-8A FSTD software baselines, and the subsequent mitigations developed. Nova Systems will therefore be able to focus attention on these areas, leading to efficient testing, reporting and ultimately device readiness for RNZAF training activities.
Nova Systems can also deliver bespoke training packages on evaluation of FSTDs to customers in New Zealand. Their independence from both aircraft and FSTD OEMs allows the delivery of impartial
knowledge and practical skills required to either lead a flight simulator evaluation team, or to function effectively as an evaluation team member.
Having had personnel embedded as part of the ASMP Integrated Project Team throughout the introduction into service of the NZ P-8A capability, the team has previously assisted in the development of documentation to
support the issuance of a Military Type Certificate, Capability Management and ILS planning, and P-8A Trials and Development, working alongside No 5 Squadron within the RNZAF.
“At Nova Systems, we’re proud to provide specialist support to the NZDF and the Ministry across several key strategic projects including the P-8As. Our team includes specialists in Test & Evaluation, system safety, flight test and space launch support. We’re backed by our global workforce of more than 1000 people, bringing a vast breadth and depth of experience to support our NZ clients” says Peter Johnson, who leads the Nova Systems Aerospace team in NZ.
Nova Systems NZ’s involvement with the ASMP Integrated Project Team was recently recognised in the Minister of Defence Awards of Excellence to Industry for its work on the project. “The high calibre of skill and technical knowledge brought by Nova Systems enabled the
project to efficiently and effectively pass through the new airworthiness requirements rapidly, ensuring this critical capability was introduced into service without a capability gap” P-8A Integrated Project Team leader, Rob Whight said.
As a Trans-Tasman company, Nova Systems can leverage support and provide efficiencies when engaging with Test & Evaluation activities between Australia and NZ. “Nova Systems is proud to continue assisting NZ Defence with establishing and sustaining the ASMP capability. Nova’s contract award for delivery of P-8A FSTD qualification leverages our nearly four years of pedigree of supporting the P-8A in NZ along with our prior experience with the RAAF P-8A FSTD. This win will allow Nova Systems to establish its simulator support credentials in NZ, forging a path to secure future opportunities with new and existing simulation devices.” said Jude Rushmere, General Manager, Nova Systems NZ.
Image courtesy NZ Ministry of Defence
Peter Johnson leads the Nova Systems Aerospace team in NZ
The uncertain security outlook around the world has prompted many nations to step up their preparedness, starting with the foundation for all action: insight.
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), along with its related functions, is the basis for realtime assessment, decision-making, and execution. That’s why demand for the highest-performing systems able to support complex ISR mission lifecycles continues to grow.
One leading example is the MQ9B SeaGuardian® / SkyGuardian®
Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS), built by the U.S. manufacturer General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. The versatility, long range, endurance, and cost-effectiveness of the MQ-9B make it particularly well-suited to New Zealand’s all-of-government surveillance requirements.
RIMPAC 2024
Each MQ-9B flight, along with the growing number of MQ-9B operators around the world, further validates its use across a diverse set of missions. Earlier this year, at RIMPAC, MQ-9B SeaGuardian successfully transmitted over 100 hours of real-time ISR data using signals intelligence and full-motion video via data feeds to the U.S. Pacific Fleet Command Center’s intelligence centres, enabling operators to perform real-time dynamic tasking.
SeaGuardian also delivered new capabilities, including Long-
MQ-9B SeaGuardian® successfully participated in this year’s Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), the world’s largest international maritime exercise
Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) targeting as well as a new Sonobuoy Dispensing System (SDS) and Sonobuoy Monitoring and Control System (SMCS). SeaGuardian’s multi-domain capabilities allow it to flex from mission to mission and pass real-time sensor data directly to maritime fleets. For RIMPAC 2024, SeaGuardian added the Link 16 JREAP-C (Joint Range Extension Applications Protocol – “C” Internet Protocol) and an integrated Minotaur Mission System to provide real-time sensor data to the various maritime operations centres, ships, and aircraft.
Also at RIMPAC, MQ-9B proved once again its ability to avoid some of the outdated and complicated practices used by older remotely
piloted systems. It is no longer necessary to disassemble the aircraft, transport the components like cargo, and then reassemble them at the forward operating area. Upon its completion of the exercise, MQ-9B self-deployed to its home base at El Mirage in California—a distance of 4,190 km (2,260 nmi), which is well within the maximum range of 9,260 km (5,000 nmi).
INNOVATIONS AND BREAKTHROUGHS
MQ-9B’s 80,000-Hour Fatigue Testing
In September 2024, GA-ASI completed the full-scale fatigue testing of an MQ-9B. The aircraft was fatigue tested to a “second
lifetime”, which is equivalent to 80,000 operating hours and represents an important step in validating the design of the airframe. The testing is part of the aircraft’s certification to the NATO standard STANAG 4671, where the aircraft will ultimately be tested further through three lifetimes.
MQ-9B’s Cold Weather Flight
GA-ASI successfully performed Cold Weather Validation using a companyowned MQ-9B SkyGuardian in early 2023, adding to the cold weather experience of the MQ-9 family. The system’s ground servicing actions, manoeuvres, and flights were based out of GA-ASI’s Flight Test and Training Center in Grand Forks, North Dakota, during one of its harshest winters. The successful validation effort widens and accelerates the global operational employment of the MQ-9B, especially for countries that need to operate in freezing conditions, and adds to the proven adverse weather and austere employment of the platform.
To prepare for the flight, SkyGuardian endured a 12-hour “cold soak” that sustained the aircraft at a temperature well below
-21°C/-5°F and was then prepared for ground manoeuvres and flight through a de-icing process using de-icing and anti-icing fluids. In a second scenario, SkyGuardian transitioned from a climatecontrolled hangar to engine start and system checks under the same conditions. For the flight, the temperature remained below -21°C/5°F. All scenarios were successfully and consistently conducted in impressive time, relying on standard de-icing and anti-icing procedures, fluids, and support equipment.
A New & Powerful Engine
In July 2024, GA-ASI flew a company-owned MQ-9B with a PT6 E-Series model turboprop engine supplied by Pratt & Whitney Canada. The flight test demonstrated exemplary handling and acceleration.
The PT6 E-Series is a reliable and versatile turboprop engine family that provides key performance and sustainment enhancements applicable to future MQ-9B missions. PT6 delivers a 33 percent increase in power over MQ-9B’s current Honeywell 331 engine, with a highly mature dual-channel Full Authority Digital Engine Controller.
Net-Enabled Weapons Employment
GA-ASI and Lockheed Martin are collaborating to provide Net-Enabled Weapons (NEW) capability for GA-ASI’s MQ-9B SeaGuardian. The addition of NEW capability for SeaGuardian will bolster the Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting (ISRT) capability for the aircraft.
The NEW technology provides expanded sensor targeting for precision long-range weapons. SeaGuardian’s demonstrated persistence coupled with its vast array of precision targeting sensors enables more efficient kill chains, especially in contested environments.
GA-ASI and Lockheed Martin have been developing Link 16 messages to communicate with weapons in flight in preparation for overwater range flight testing.
Radar Technology Advancements
General Atomics continues to invest in the Lynx® Multi-mode Radar to meet the emerging needs of its customers. An enhanced Maritime Wide Area Search (MWAS) mode has been added to enable detection of vessels beyond the 300-km
MQ-9B SkyGuardian® conducting its cold weather flight in Grand Forks, North Dakota, in 2023
DEFENCE
slant range. Flight testing has been successfully performed on the Lynx radar’s ability to detect and track high-speed, low-altitude Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (SUAS) in real time. Finally, GAASI is making great progress on an Extended Range multi-mode, phased array antenna that will enable two to three times the range performance.
Proliferated Low Earth Orbit SATCOM Services
Current MQ-9A and MQ-9B customers operate largely on SATCOM Ku-band, with some moving to Ku- and X-band options. These SATCOM services are mostly based on Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) and Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) satellites. Such services tend to have incomplete global coverage, with reduced coverage in some maritime areas and at high latitudes. However, there is a growing supply of Proliferated Low Earth Orbit (PLEO) satellite services becoming available to provide global coverage. Starlink is one example. Within the next few years, GA-ASI anticipates many customers will migrate to a PLEO SATCOM capability.
MQ-9B STOL
To provide even more versatility to the MQ-9B, GA-ASI is developing an MQ-9B Short Takeoff and Landing (STOL) variant that will be capable of operating from bigdeck amphibious vessels and short unimproved runways. A group of current and future MQ-9B customers is driving the STOL development, which will support ISR, ASW, and other advanced capabilities. A standard MQ-9B will be converted to a STOL variant by fitting an enhanced wing and tail kit.
A Growing International Customer Base
MQ-9B continues to see global adoption for defence and surveillance missions. India is acquiring 31 MQ-9Bs for its Navy, Air Force, and Army—the largest single customer sale to date—following the Indian Navy’s successful lease of two pre-production MQ-9Bs in 2020. The UK’s Royal Air Force has received 10 of 16 Protectors, while Belgium awaits its first MQ9B SkyGuardian. Canada signed a contract in December 2023 for a fleet of MQ-9B SkyGuardian aircraft, with delivery set in 2028 to address
Arctic-capable needs. And Taiwan is acquiring four MQ-9Bs under a contract announced in March 2024. In support of Japanese requirements, the Japan Coast Guard is set to receive two SeaGuardian aircraft in 2025, complementing its CompanyOwned Company-Operated (COCO) operations for maritime search and rescue, while the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force has downselected the MQ-9B to replace crewed patrol aircraft, with deliveries planned from 2028 to 2032.
Investments by GA-ASI, combined with the growing operational experience of customers using the MQ-9B RPAS, highlight the platform’s versatility and costeffectiveness for a wide range of defence and security applications. With adoption increasing globally, MQ-9B’s capabilities and interoperability continue to evolve. An investment by New Zealand would tap into this extensive knowledge base, allowing the country to benefit from the collective experience and advancements of current operators to meet its unique defence and surveillance requirements.
Artist rendering of GA-ASI’s MQ-9B STOL landing on a big-deck amphibious assault vessel
South Pacific defence meeting fosters collaboration
South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meeting takes place in Auckland, affirms renewed commitment to regional security, green-lights deployable Pacific Response Group.
Defence Ministers from Australia, Chile, Fiji, France, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Tonga gathered in Auckland for the ninth annual South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meeting (SPDMM) from 1 to 3 October 2024.
They were joined by observers from Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as Mr Baron Waqa, Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum, as a special guest.
The SPDMM is the premier defence ministerial dialogue in the South Pacific and an important forum for cooperation and Pacific-led responses to shared regional security challenges. The theme of this year’s meeting was ‘collectively looking to the future: our region in 2050.’
Climate change and its impacts, maritime security and strategic competition, the role of emerging technology, and operational collaboration between the militaries of the South Pacific were key topics of discussion.
“Members agreed on the importance of working with civilian agencies when it comes to supporting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts, and in the areas of combating maritime security threats such as illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing and transnational organised crime,” said Defence Minister Judith Collins.
“These are issues that have significant impact on many South Pacific nations which, like New Zealand, have large Exclusive Economics Zones.”
The meeting saw the endorsement of the detailed concept for the Pacific Response Group – or PRG –and called for it to be established immediately. It was agreed that the PRG would enable more effective codeployments in an increasingly disaster-prone region.
Participants agreed that the PRG would provide greater certainty and predictability to Pacific island countries in advance of an incident and strengthen Pacific-led regional response capabilities.
A proposed PRG Pacific Special Advisory Team (PSAT) – a small rapidly deployable group available to support civilian authorities and other organisations in an affected state to plan a disaster response and identify
potential follow-on tasks – was also given the green light. The PSAT is to be co-located in Brisbane during the highrisk weather season for rapid mobilisation.
The PSAT will participate in Exercise CROIXDU-SUD in April and May 2025. Regional Exercise LONGREACH 2024 in Brisbane will be used to validate the PRG detailed concept.
The meeting also welcomed a proposed Future Leaders’ Summit to be held in Australia in 2025. The Summit will bring together young leaders – civilian and military – from across the SPDMM membership to connect, network, and share perspectives on the regional security environment.
Appreciation was extended to Pacific Islands Forum Secretary General, Mr Baron Waqa, for attending the meeting as a special guest, and commitment given to regular mutual exchanges between the two fora.
Members thanked New Zealand for hosting SPDMM 2024 in New Zealand and agreed that Chile would host the SPDMM in 2025.
Minister Collins arrives at the SPDMM meeting. Image courtesy of Inside Government.
Uncrewed aircraft systems arrive, training takes off
The Ministry of Defence has taken delivery of a suite of uncrewed aircraft systems and remote ground sensor systems, and operator training is underway.
The military grade uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) will improve the New Zealand Defence Force’s ability to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance activities in environments that are difficult to access, such as combat zones or cyclone damaged regions.
According to the Ministry, the primary purpose of the new capability is to extend and improve situational awareness beyond line-of-sight.
“The new systems will be used by New Zealand Army units deployed on stability and security operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, and search and rescue deployments,” said Sarah Minson, Deputy Secretary, Capability Delivery.
“The remotely operated systems are expected to reduce the risk to soldiers operating in challenging environments by providing timely and accurate information that enhances risk assessments and decision-making in the field,” said Ms Minson.
The UAS are being delivered as part of the Ministry’s Network Enabled Army programme, which is moving the New Zealand Army’s planning, intelligence and communications functions to modern, interoperable and digital-based systems.
The four systems that have been delivered and are being introduced into service are:
Small UAS
Quantum-Systems Inc. has delivered a number of Vector systems for 16 Field Regiment. These fixed-wing UAS
have a wingspan of three metres when assembled and can fly up to 35 kilometres over a period of three hours. They have vertical takeoff and landing capability, are backpack portable, and can be operational within three minutes.
Micro UAS
EPE New Zealand Limited has supplied a number of Skydio quadcopter systems for the Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment. They can fly up to 10 kilometres for up to 35 minutes. They are backpack portable and can be operational in less than 75 seconds.
Nano UAS
Criterion Solutions PTY has supplied a number of Nano Black Hornet UAS for the Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment. The pocket-sized systems have a single rotor airframe that folds down into a pouch and can be operational in less than 20 seconds.
Remote Ground Sensor (RGS) Systems
EPE New Zealand Limited has supplied Bertin Exensor Flexnet RGS Systems for the Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment. They provide a variety of wireless and battery powered sensors and cameras that use seismic, acoustic and infrared sensors to detect and identify moving objects.
The UAS will not be armed, and will be ready for use from next year.
Defence begins replacement of utility vehicle fleet
The Ministry of Defence has signed a contract to begin the replacement of its most frequently deployed operational utility vehicle fleet.
According to the 21 November announcement , Spanish military vehicle manufacturer, UROVESA, will deliver 60 new VAMTAC ST5 light and CK3 medium sized unarmoured utility vehicles to Defence from 2027.
The current fleet is made up of Unimog and Pinzgauer vehicles, which are used by New Zealand Defence Force units for domestic training and overseas operations.
“The operational utility vehicle fleet has long-been the backbone of NZDF land operations, deployed to transport personnel and critical equipment during stability and security operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, and search and rescue deployments,” said Sarah Minson, Deputy Secretary of Defence, Capability Delivery.
“The VAMTAC ST5 and CK3 vehicles are modern, efficient and fit for purpose. They have a proven track record, with more than 20 countries around the world using them including Singapore, as well as Spain and a number of other NATO nations,” said Ms Minson.
The Government has approved the first tranche of the Ministry of Defence-led project, which received $100 million in funding as part of Budget 2024.
This will deliver 40 medium CK3 variants and 20 light ST5 variants to replace 25 percent of the New Zealand Army Pinzgauer and Unimog vehicles assigned to operational roles.
Tranche one covers the purchase of the vehicles, spare parts, computing and communications equipment, support equipment, project costs and introduction into service costs.
Chief of Army, Major General Rose King, said that the new vehicles represent a significant improvement in the New Zealand Army’s capabilities, and will provide soldiers with a robust and versatile vehicle.
“Both the Unimog and Pinzgauer vehicles have served the New Zealand Army well over the years - but their retirement from service is overdue,” said Major General King.
“These new vehicles will improve our effectiveness across a variety of scenarios while making our people safer and able to deliver their outputs easier,” said MAJGEN King.
The medium variant is able to load nearly four tonnes of equipment or up to ten personnel, while the light variant can carry up to 1.7 tonnes. The medium variant can operate in water up to 1.5 metres deep.
The new vehicles will have integrated rollover protection and a tyre inflation system, which adjusts tyre pressure for operations on difficult or soft terrain.
The existing operational utility vehicle fleet has provided the NZDF with critical transportation capabilities for close to 40 years.
VAMTAC ST5 - Light utility vehicle general variant
Maximum authorised gross vehicle weight: 6,000 kg
Payload capacity: 1,700 kg
Max speed: 110 km/h
Ground clearance: >350 mm Height: 2.62 metres
Length: 5.68 metres Width: 2.30 metres
Wading depth: 750 mm
VAMTAC CK3 - Medium utility vehicle general variant
Maximum authorised gross vehicle weight: 9,950 kg
Payload capacity: 4,000 kg
Max speed: 110 km/h
Ground clearance: >350 mm Height: 3.03 metres
Length: 6.34 metres Width: 2.30 metres
Wading depth: 1.5 metres
Preventing a South West Pacific
‘shatterbelt’
The South West Pacific is at risk of becoming a shatterbelt, and military and political strategists would do well to acknowledge the region’s challenges and sources of potential division, writes Ben Morgan.
This is the Pacific’s century, the focus of world affairs pivoting towards the region. It’s an era that could see either great prosperity coming to the region or some parts of the region descending into chaos.
In particular, the South West Pacific (SWP), a sub-region including Melanesia, Oceania and Polynesia, possesses a range of existing risk factors, with recent economic, social and political trends contributing to these.
Renowned geopolitical theorist Professor Saul Cohen characterised ‘shatterbelts’ as strategicallypositioned regions that are deeply internally divided and caught between the conflicting interests of great powers.
This article argues that the SWP’s currently benign security environment is at risk, and that it is in the interests of all states within the region to acknowledge this risk and to take action to mitigate it. The potential consequences of failing to do so could be the descent of the region into instability and its becoming a 21st century ‘shatterbelt.’
What makes the SWP a risky place?
Beyond the postcard images of tropical beaches, there exist a range of complex factors that increase the region’s risk of instability.
The first, is that its member states tend to be small, relatively new nations. Many were recently colonised, and are now working hard to build new post-colonial state institutions.
A slow process exacerbated by the region’s poverty. With few resources available for governance, security or stability, most SWP nations have struggled to maintain governance systems and the rule of law, with some local militaries cross traditional lines of control, interfering in politics:
• Timor Leste . A very new nation, that has suffered political violence requiring Australian and New Zealand military intervention to reassert the rule of law in 2006.
• Papua New Guinea. A nation that suffers from inter-tribals wars, piracy and unstable
Ben Morgan is a former NZDF officer. He blogs on Substack on international conflict and military affairs.
Professor Saul Cohen
government. The 1997 Sandline Affair involved direct conflict between the elected government and the military over the employment of mercenaries to fight in Bougainville. More recently, in 2012, the army mutinied in a dispute over pay and conditions.
• Solomon Islands. Descended into civil war in the early 2000s and until 2017 has required military interventions by other Pacific nations to re-assert the rule of law, including a surge of additional Australian and New Zealand soldiers and police in 2006 to stop politically inspired rioting in the capital.
• Vanuatu. In 1996 the country’s military abducted the Prime Minister over a pay dispute. Recently the nation has seen rapid changes in political leadership.
• New Caledonia and French Polynesia . French Pacific colonies that have a long history of political violence as
their indigenous peoples seek independence. In the late 1980s New Caledonia’s issues resulted in armed insurrection, and this year the island was subjected to violent political riots.
• Tonga . The nation’s capital Nuku’ alofa experienced political riots in 2006 requiring military intervention by Australia and New Zealand.
• Fiji . A nation with a history of political instability, including military coups in 1987, 2000 and 2006.
Geography also contributes to the SWP’s risk of instability. Rugged and dispersed island terrain presents challenges to the imposition of state authority. Road access is often limited, making regular surveillance and responding to threats quickly difficult. Recent violence in Papua New Guinea is a case in point , with inter-tribal fighting and violence escalating quickly in remote, mountainous, hard to reach areas. Additionally, the region’s complex geography presents opportunities
for illegal activity to be conducted far from the eyes of government. Recent increases in the Pacific’s drug trade are influenced by the ability for traffickers to set up large operations in remote areas. This aspect of the region’s geography also makes it suitable for the waging of insurgent war.
New challenges
In addition to these factors, the SWP currently faces a set of additional security challenges that may contribute to the region collapsing into a divided and dangerous area:
Challenge 1 – Unexpected wealth
Money is pouring into the SWP – from legal both legal and illegal sources. The first and most wellknown legal source is foreign aid. China, the US and others competing for access to the SWP are willing to use aid money to influence local politics, delivering projects and providing finance for economic development.
As significant as it is, this income may be dwarfed by new
Dili, Timor Leste.
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revenue through the exploitation of natural resources, including oil and gas reserves, abundant terrestrial minerals, fish and wood. New technologies are making the mining of the sea floor economically feasible, with Narau and Cook Islands already investigating options for deep-sea mining.
Alongside increasing legal revenue, the SWP must manage the impact of increasing illegal income. The region’s expanding drug trade, for example, pays for weapons, transport and for corrupt officials to ‘look the other way.’ This undermines already shaky state institutions, expanding the ‘grey areas’ of legitimate donations and lobbying.
Challenge 2 – Great power competition
It well-known that the Indo-Pacific region is an area of intense SinoAmerican competition. The SWP is key terrain in this competition because it provides an alternate route for maritime trade if the Malacca Strait or South China Sea were to be compromised. Further, the small size and political instability of the region’s states mean that diplomatic influence may be easier to exert.
Another factor that is less well-understood, is the impact of other ‘emergent’ and ‘legacy’ powers in the region. Legacy powers include France, which retains SWP colonies, and emergent powers include NATO, an organisation that conducts military exercises in the region and provides foreign aid funding. Another emergent power is India, which is building an embassy in Timor Leste. Likewise, Japan is an active foreign aid funder and recently signed a new defence agreement with Australia.
A challenging factor is that modern great power competition is multi-spectrum. It involves propaganda, disinformation, the use of proxies (like partner
states, insurgencies or even private military companies), legal claims, cyber-operations, criminal activity, diplomacy and trade. Using all means to compete, states operate in a ‘grey zone’ of hostility below the threshold of conventional war.
All great powers with an interest in the SWP have doctrine regarding this type of competition, and a region like the SWP that has small nations with limited state resources is fertile ground for grey zone competition.
Challenge 3 – New military technology
The ability to hit an enemy accurately at long-range was once the preserve of the world’s most powerful militaries. Since 2020, when Azerbaijan’s small army prevailed over Armenia’s larger army using a force that included large numbers of surveillance and attack drones, the way wars are fought has changed.
The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War demonstrated the capabilities of cheap long-range guided weapons, which have become a ‘democratised’ capability, available to small nations and insurgencies alike. From
Ukraine to the Red Sea, armies and insurgents are equipping themselves with cheap, easy to move drones and missiles.
Recently, Houthi militia launched missiles targeting Israel, more than a thousand kilometres away. In the SWP, a force equipped with similar weapons firing from Papua New Guinea’s Enga Province, could engage targets in Port Moresby, Cape York, the Gulf of Carpentaria, the western Coral Sea and the Torres Strait. A force firing from Solomon Islands could engage targets in Vanuatu, the northeastern Coral Sea and the Solomon Sea. And, a force firing from the highlands of Timor Leste could hit Darwin.
This trend increases the risks of great power competition enacted via proxies. An insurgency or rogue nation acting as proxy, can now be supplied with cheap but accurate long-range weapons, enabling them to deny the use of maritime trade routes, or to attack other nations. This is the reason Australia is so concerned about Chinese influence in Melanesia. A Chinese proxy in the region would pose a direct physical threat.
The Royal Navy’s HMS Tamar patrolling the South Pacific. Image courtesy Royal Navy.
Testing the SWP’s ‘shatterbelt’ potential
Three key elements characterise Cohen’s ‘shatterbelt’ concept, which are underlined as follows: strategically-positioned regions that are deeply internally divided and caught between the conflicting interests of great powers
These three elements provide a useful set of tests to consider whether the SWP is at risk of becoming a ‘shatterbelt’:
• Test 1: Is the SWP a strategicallypositioned region?
• Test 2: How internally divided is the SWP?
• Test 3: Are the great powers competing in the SWP?
The evidence indicates that the SWP is both a strategicallypositioned and orientated region and is subject to great power competition relating to trade, resources, and geostrategic posture. If there is conflict in the South China Sea, for example, the region provides alternative shipping routes. Its seas also provide redundancy for US forces in the North West Pacific, and for Australia the region provides a
second logistics hub for operations if supply lines from Hawaii are blocked.
Test Two requires more analysis because the case for internal division is less clear. The SWP’s politics are opaque and evolving rapidly. Interstate divisions, for example, are offset by cultural links and regional architectures, such as the Pacific Islands Forum and its sub-group the Melanesian Spearhead Group, which have historically provided a forum to discuss security issues.
Complicating this is the region’s history of colonisation, the result of which is several active indigenous independence movements, including Kanaks in New Caledonia, Papuans in Irian Jaya, and the Tāvini Huira’atira pro-independence party in French Polynesia. In Bougainville there is currently debate over a peaceful transition to independence.
The SWP is in a transitional era as ex-colonies work to establish prosperous independent nations, and as indigenous groups achieve either greater autonomy or independence. Meanwhile, the most influential powers in the region, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand, each have chequered histories of
colonisation. This creates a natural fault line that must be acknowledged and managed.
The second fault line is likely to be the divisions created by the region’s natural resources. Deep sea mining, oil and gas operations are set to bring enormous wealth to the region, and that will escalate existing tensions over ownership of the seabed, as seen in Solomon Islands and Vanuatu’s dispute with France over territorial waters.
Conclusions
Currently, the SWP is far from becoming a ‘shatterbelt,’ but there are worrying trends that need to be addressed before they become threats. It is important that military and political strategists acknowledge the region’s challenges, particularly focussing on countering any tendency towards divisions, including:
• Supporting strong regional governance through the Pacific Islands Forum, with larger nations listening and engaging with smaller nations. The age of colonial powers dictating security solutions is disappearing as China presents an alternative security partner.
• Developing the role of the Pacific Islands Forum as a key element of the SWP’s security architecture. Essentially, ensuring that all SWP nations can participate in security discussion, are actively engaged and feel that larger powers are treating them fairly.
• Larger nations continuing to support smaller nations to manage security issues, using long-term exchanges to build relationships and develop interoperability, creating trust. Larger nations should retain rapidly deployable security forces able to support legitimate governments in smaller nations.
Hardware and software upgrades for NH90 fleet
A Ministry of Defence project will deliver an upgrade to the NH90 fleet’s encrypted radios and a new navigation system for the helicopters that complies with updated Civil Aviation Authority requirements.
A contract has been signed with NATO Helicopter Industries (NH Industries) covering both hardware and software upgrades and the company will be undertaking the hardware modifications in New Zealand.
According to a 24 October announcement by the Ministry, this is the first time the company, in partnership with Airbus NZ, has undertaken this work locally.
“New Zealand is the first country which uses the NH90 helicopter that will undertake the work to retrofit the navigation system and upgrade the secure communication system.” Frank Dyer, Integrated Project Team Leader at the Ministry of Defence said.
“We’ll also be working with sub-contractor Airbus Australia Pacific (AAP) who will test and qualify the upgrade using the NH90 software test rig located in Brisbane, Australia.”
This work is the next phase of the Operational and Regulatory Aviation Compliance Sustainment (ORACS) project. The upgrades are expected to be complete by 2030.
The ORACS Projects are a series of phased projects addressing changes to the technological and regulatory aviation environment.
Communication, navigation, air traffic management and identification systems in particular must be updated
due to changes, such as new regulations and technological upgrades that improve safety and security.
ORACS has been carried out in two phases.
Phase One focused on Automatic Dependant Surveillance-Broadcast to meet changing civil aviation regulations. Phase Two addresses Performance-Based Navigation and secure communications systems updates.
$52.83 million in funding was approved by Cabinet in April 2019 to commence the first phase, enabling the update of civil air traffic management systems to get underway for a range of NZDF aircraft fleets. These upgrades were prioritised for delivery due to the fast approaching compliance date.
The upgrade of the NH90 helicopter fleet was excluded from the 2019 business case as a solution could not be confirmed and investment quality information was not available at the time. In May 2020, a separate business case for the NH90 work was approved to the tune of $21.21 million, so that ORACS Phase One could be delivered across fleets.
Phases 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c) are also underway, following approval by Cabinet in December 2021, April 2023 and June 2024 to deliver secure communication systems updates and a new navigation system.
Axel Aloccio, President of NH Industries and Frank Dyer, ORACS Integrated Project Team Leader, with members of Airbus, Airbus Australia Pacific and ORACS project team.
War-fighting and new Bushmasters key focus for new QAMR commander
2025 is shaping up to be a significant one for the Army’s Queen Alexandra’s Mounted Rifles Regiment (QAMR) as it prepares new armoured vehicles for operations and eyes two warfighting exercises in Australia.
The Linton-based QAMR is the oldest Regular Force unit in the NZ Army and its sole armoured unit. Primarily equipped with the New Zealand Light Armoured Vehicle (NZLAV), it is currently introducing into service its new Australian made 11 tonne Bushmaster four-wheel-drive armoured vehicle.
According to the NZDF, Lieutenant Colonel Caleb Berry, who has recently taken over as QAMR’s new commanding officer, has been part of the project that introduced the Bushmasters and
LTCOL Berry deployed as a 25-year-old patrol commander to Afghanistan in 2012 where he fought in the Battle of Baghak, and he led a training sub-unit in Iraq in 2017/18.
He said he wanted to train, mentor and develop combat-focused and inspiring leaders within the unit.
“Everything we do will be linked to enhancing lethality and our combat effectiveness and survivability on the battlefield,” he explained.
The Bushmaster would be key, Lieutenant Colonel Berry said.
“In 2025 we’ll be introducing them into active service, and we’ll need to do that while maintaining our warfighting culture within the regiment.
“As the sole armoured unit in the NZ Army we hold the expertise for mounted combat, noting that
the wider NZ Army is on a journey towards greater motorisation too.
“What this means is that infantry soldiers and commanders should be proficient in operating from and working with armoured vehicles.
“We’re fortunate that we have some great exercises coming up over in Australia in 2025 that will really test us in this space, and allow us to really push our capabilities alongside our partners.”
As part of Exercises Diamond Strike and Talisman Sabre, QAMR’s combat team will integrate with infantry from 1st Battalion Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment, artillery gunners from 16th Field Regiment and sappers from 2 Engineer Regiment.
It will operate as part of Australia’s 7th Brigade, which will conduct both defensive and offensive tasks.
LTCOL Berry said he was also acutely aware of the importance of protecting his people.
“Combat is a brutal experience to go through, the decisions we make as leaders can ultimately result in our soldiers being killed or wounded,” he said. “So the onus is on us to be the best that we can be, to reduce that risk and look after our people as much as possible.
“And it’s more than just the personnel themselves, it’s the families and friends at home who also sacrifice so much in support of our people’s service. That is the burden of command,” LTCOL Berry said.
Image courtesy of the NZDF.
Mapp: Testing Times ahead under Trump 2.0
Being seen as a reliable security partner will be one way to ensuring our overall relationship with the US remains in good shape. With the Trump administration, however, the reverse is also likely to be true, writes Dr Wayne Mapp.
Senior Contributor Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO was New Zealand’s Minister of Defence and Minister of Science and Innovation from 2008 to 2011.
The election of Donald Trump as the 47th President of the United States will send reverberations throughout the United States’ security partners.
In his last term of office President Trump put substantial pressure on members of the NATO alliance to meet the agreed 2% defence spending target. United States allies, including Australia and Japan, also increased their defence spending.
The international security situation is substantially more difficult than it was in 2016. During the election campaign President Trump said he would end the current wars and would not start new wars.
President Trump will test the international security system in two ways. First, he will demand clear commitments from allies and partners in respect of United States initiatives – effectively a new hegemony where there can be no doubt which side the allies and partners are on. Second, as a consequence of the first, a greater commitment to building up strong defence forces.
The team that President Trump has chosen, notably Senator Marco Rubio as Secretary of State and Congressman Mike Waltz as National Security Advisor, believe deeply that the United States defence forces must have unparalleled strength. All allies and partners will be expected to conform to this expectation and to build up their
own defence forces in to enhance overall security.
In short, the intent is that the defence forces of the western alliance are so strong that any potential adversary will be deterred from military action and will be willing to negotiate.
Within NATO, President Trump has already indicated that the new goal for defence spending will be 3% of GDP. Other allies and partners will also be expected to increase their defence spending.
What are the implications for New Zealand?
New Zealand is not a formal ally of the United States, but it is hard to imagine that New Zealand will be immune from the pressure to show our commitment to the western alliance, and to increase defence spending. In our case this pressure won’t only come from the United States, it will also come from our only ally, Australia.
It is clear that Prime Minister Luxon is fully aware of the coming expectations. In his speech to the Lowy Institute in August 2024, Prime Minister Luxon made it clear that the Asia Pacific region had increased strategic competition and that as a consequence New Zealand had greater obligations to its security partners.
He specifically committed to “bolster shared security”. This
included being a “credible and effective partner and ally”.
The Prime Minister made reference to the upcoming Defence Capability Plan (DCP) with the intent that it would include investment in new capability. More recently the Prime Minister has indicated that the DCP would require increased defence spending.
Much of the focus on New Zealand’s relationship with the United States will be on the quality of the security relationship. Will the United States perceive New Zealand to be a reliable security partner?
While past commitments always matter in these considerations, it is the future that is the real testing ground. AUKUS Pillar Two will be the crux of the test. Making a commitment to join will ensure New Zealand meets the test.
That will be seen to be the case in both Australia and the United States. Conversely, failing to join would be an indication of unreliability. Leaving after having joined, as the Labour opposition has indicated, would amplify the perception of unreliability.
Those of us who were around in the late 1980s after the ANZUS rift will well recall the frigid circumstances on security issues that New Zealand found itself in. It took two decades, from the early 1990s to around 2010 with the Wellington and Washington Declarations, before the security relationship with the United States was fully repaired.
While AUKUS Pillar Two may not have the drama of the ANZUS rift, it is hard to imagine that New Zealand would be immune to adverse consequences if it failed to join, particularly if Canada and Japan were to join AUKUS Pillar Two. New Zealand would be the odd one out.
Being seen as a reliable security partner will be one way to ensuring the overall relationship with the United States remains in good shape. With the Trump administration, however, the reverse is also likely to be true.
Being an unreliable partner will have its own set of consequences. This may be evident in the selective application of tariffs and quota restrictions on New Zealand’s primary exports to the United States. This sort of penalty was never applied during the ANZUS rift, but an administration as transactional as the Trump administration is likely to be, may have no such qualms in applying this type of penalty.
It won’t be enough to keep the formal security partnerships in good order. There will be the expectation that New Zealand will increase its defence spending. This is also likely to be part of the means to defray the prospect of harmful tariffs.
I have previously noted in this column that replacing existing capabilities, most notably the Navy, on a like for like basis will require defence spending to increase to 1.5% of GDP, up from the current 1.3% of GDP.
When the Labour/New Zealand First government purchased the P8 Poseidon’s and the C130J Hercules, defence spending did increase to 1.5% of GDP for 2020 and 2021. The naval replacement programme will be substantially more expensive. New Zealand’s defence partners are unlikely to be convinced by a programme that merely replaces platforms of a one for one basis.
Australia is particularly notable for the very substantial increase in the size of its Navy over the last decade. They, along with the United States, will expect New Zealand to take at least some steps toward increasing capability. I have previously mooted an increase in the naval combat force from two frigates to either three or four such ships. This will require an increase in defence spending to up to 2% of GPD, which is still less than that of Australia.
The DCP is the most likely lens in which to signal such an increase in defence spending. With the Trump administration taking office on 20 January 2025, there may be a case for the DCP to provide for more than one option in the replacement of key capabilities. For instance, the option of either two, three or four naval combat ships, with the appropriate costings for each option.
The government will then have the basis to make realistic choices depending on how the strategic situation, including the expectations of New Zealand’s defence partners, evolves over the next year or two.
Defence Capability Plan: Kicking the can down the road yet again?
Are the recent actions of the Chinese really the reason for the delay, or do the politics of the Coalition have a part to play? asks editor-at-large Dr Peter Greener.
Dr Peter Greener is Senior Fellow, Centre for Strategic Studies, VUW, and Honorary Professor, NZDF Command and Staff College. He is Line of Defence Magazine’s Editorat-Large.
Speaking to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee on 3 December during Scrutiny Week, Minister of Defence Judith Collins announced that China’s recent military activity had once again led to a delay in the publication of the Government’s Defence Capability Plan.
Thomas Manch of The Post reported that the latest explanation for the delay in the plan, which had originally been expected in mid2024, was a further “deterioration” in the security situation. The Minister added, “Everything’s been changing this year and, as you will know, we are living in a more difficult, strategic environment.”
Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, Minister Collins went on to
comment that there had been concern about the visit of Chinese warships to Vanuatu in October, and that this had followed the testing of a Chinese ICBM in the South Pacific in September – the first launch in four decades. Manch highlighted that Collins then added, “People need to understand that if it can go to Kiribati, it can get to New Zealand.”
Perhaps not surprisingly, there was an immediate response from academic commentators to the delay.
Dr Jim Rolfe , Senior Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University of Wellington, responded on LinkedIn saying “It’s just nonsense to assert that China’s 2024 military activity in the region is such a surprise that long-term plans
Launch of the Chinese ICBM in Hainan, a DF31AG. Image: PLA.
need to be rethought. China has been militarily active for years. We just haven’t cared.”
Dr Reuben Steff, Senior Lecturer at the University of Waikato, agreed. “This makes little to no sense. We are kicking the can down the road again (and by again, I mean again, again, again) because of China’s escalatory actions in our region? So, are we thinking by delaying the DCP that things will get better for us? Given the speed of China’s military buildup and naval projection, isn’t it the case that time is of the essence and we need to start rejuvenating the NZDF now?”
Delay flagged previously However, a month before the beginnings of the Chinese activity noted by Judith Collins and almost four months prior to the Minister’s announcement, Prime Minister Christopher Luxon gave a foreign policy address at the Lowy Institute in Sydney on 15 August 2024 .
Whilst the speech focussed on the Australia-New Zealand relationship and strengthening interoperability with Australia, the Otago Daily Times added that ,“Mr Luxon also
suggested the defence capability plan may surface later than expected” and, presaging Judith Collins’ announcement, added “Mr Luxon told the Lowy Institute ‘we expect that to be completed towards the end of this year, maybe early next year’.”
Three days after speaking to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee, Judith Collins was in Auckland also discussing strengthening interoperability with Australia at the second ANZMIN meeting, attended also by Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles, Foreign Minister Winston Peters and Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong.
Here New Zealand and Australia struck a new agreement to further integrate defence forces across military procurement, planning, and operations. Thomas Manch, reporting for Stuff , indicated that Judith Collins said she had decided with Marles earlier this year that “we should have something like an Anzac force”.
At the meeting Penny Wong said Peters had described the importance of being a “participant and not a spectator”.
Providing adequate capability
There are two issues to contend with here. Firstly is the issue of providing relevant, adequate capability. In the Winter issue of Line of Defence in 2023, former Defence Minister Wayne Mapp emphasised the following:
“Security relationships require a certain level of commitment, if they are to be taken seriously. Not slavishly, as New Zealand’s stand on Iraq showed, but at a sufficient level to be seen to be making a useful contribution .
“… the contribution to security partnerships has to be more than token, it must add something of real value.”
And here lie the dilemmas facing the current government. In my article in the Spring 2023 issue of Line of Defence , I made the point that prior to the election the National Party had made clear in their defence policy that they supported the then current defence procurement plan, and would ensure regular reviews (author’s emphasis).
The National-led coalition came into government with all of the parties having indicated a wish to support Defence and increase the funding commitment. In the event , we have seen a wholesale slashing of funding
Sam Sachdeva writing for Newsroom on 4 December noted that he had been told by a senior defence official that “New Zealand governments must stop “robbing Peter to pay Paul’” and no longer unduly delay making decisions on expensive capability acquisitions.”
A main topic for discussion at the meeting was the financial strain facing the NZDF, “with RNZ reporting the military had told staff it needed to find $360 million in operational savings for the next financial year.”
Nevertheless, the Chief of Defence Force, Air Marshal Tony Davies was able to say,
Commander of the US Pacific Fleet ADM Steve Koehler and RNZN Chief of Navy RADM Garin Golding
DEFENCE
“We have not failed to deploy or do an operation that we’ve been asked to do – the issue really is it takes us longer to prepare to do those missions … and we might not be able to send the same number of people that we have previously sent.”
Interoperability or independence
Here is the link to the second issue, that of New Zealand’s foreign and defence policy. Strengthening interoperability with Australia has already been highlighted, and I have previously focussed on this in my article, New Zealand Defence Policy and Capability – A Rejoinder, published as a Line of Defence update on 2 August 2023. Interoperability is something of immense value.
However, so is the value of “a uniquely New Zealand relationship with the world” as was highlighted in the Defence Policy and Strategy Statement 2023 (p.7).
Also in the Statement is this provision, on page 9:
“Defence will act early and deliberately to shape our security environment, focusing in particular on supporting security in and for the Pacific.”
The development of an Anzac Force may have a number of advantages, but the ability to deploy an independent New Zealand force has many others.
There is a danger that focussing on the development of an Anzac Force might dilute the unique contribution Kiwi forces can offer in the Pacific. This was brought home to me forcefully some time ago, when I was researching for a book chapter on Kiwis on deployment, ‘New Zealand Military as Peacekeepers: International Perceptions .’
One of my field trips was to Timor-Leste, and comments from one participant, President José Ramos-Horta, are I think particularly worth noting:
“In 2006 when I wanted (rebel leader) Alfredo to surrender, he said he would only surrender to Kiwi troops – he trusted them. Even the rebel soldier trusted them. New Zealand is perceived as not taking sides, being neutral, being fair. Over all of these years I’ve never had a single complaint from the people, the police or the army about Kiwi troops.”
Ill supported to respond
Speaking at the Select Committee meeting, Secretary of Defence Brook Barrington highlighted that interoperability with the Australian Defence Force was important, but also acknowledged that “we still have our own interests and we need to pursue those”.
However, as noted earlier, Chief of Defence Air Marshal Tony Davies said, “… we might not be able to send the same number of people that we have previously sent.”
The implications of this statement are many. CDF observed that, “at some point we need to be prepared to make decisions which could see our sailors, our soldiers and aviators going into harm’s way, to protect our interests. That worries me”.
The DPSS is clear (p.22) that “New Zealand’s security requires that Pacific Island countries are secure, sovereign, and resilient, and that Pacific security challenges are
met in ways that support our shared interests in Pacific regional security.”
Should New Zealand in the near future be called upon to respond to a situation similar to East Timor, the New Zealand Defence Force would do its best to respond, but at the moment it seems singularly illsupported to do so.
Addressing this further delay to the DCP, Judith Collins was reported by Thomas Manch as saying that the new defence secretary and chief of defence needed to be happy with the capability plan. Are there potentially significant changes to what has previously been well signalled? Are there some new, more advanced capabilities under consideration? Hardly likely when the necessary shopping list is already so long.
Are the recent actions of the Chinese really the reason for the delay? Or do the politics of the coalition have a part to play? (The non-announcement of the new ferries on Wednesday 11 December 2024 may be an indicator of how tough coalition decision-making can be).
We may never know the reason but my colleagues Jim Rolfe and Reuben Steff are absolutely correct; absent other evidence, the delay in the release of the DCP makes no sense. And the can is being kicked down the road yet again.
Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles with Judith Collins.
Sex, drugs and terror: a glimpse inside Kabul’s fortified compounds
What happens when you take individuals from around the world, confine them to a prison-like environment in the middle of a war zone, and expect them to work and live together?
This was one of the questions explored by University of Auckland Business School doctoral candidate Sam Mackay in his thesis ‘Sexcapades, drug hazes and terrorist attacks: exploring expatriate work and well-being in fortified compounds in a hostile environment’.
Mackay, who spent a year and a half in Kabul between 2018 and 2019 as a senior consultant for the United Nations, encountered a surreal environment within his compound. The “crazy, intense experience” inspired his doctoral research.
Drawing from in-depth interviews with 36 expatriates, including three New Zealanders and two Australians, Mackay’s study reveals how fortified compounds, designed to protect employees in hostile environments, introduced additional stressors that compounded expatriates’ already challenging experiences in war-torn Kabul.
“I found that although they were designed to shelter inhabitants from the risks outside, compounds generated additional threats on the inside— particularly in the inescapability of toxic bosses and colleagues, sexual harassment, racism and social exclusion.”
For expatriates working and living in fortified compounds in
Afghanistan’s capital, life was a mix of extreme monotony and extraordinary stress, blending overwork with an intense, often toxic, living environment.
These expatriates, most of whom worked for aid and development agencies, shared deeply personal insights with Mackay about life inside different compounds between 2014 and 2021.
Many expatriates described compound life as “oppressive” and “claustrophobic,” with the monotony of daily routines leading one interviewee to label it a “pathetic... repetitive life.”
With bedrooms sometimes mere steps from offices, the line between professional and personal time practically disappeared, says Mackay. Many expatriates felt overworked, describing a culture that expected 24/7 availability.
Seven out of 18 of the female expatriates interviewed experienced sexual harassment, and several more expressed feelings of unsafety.
Racism was another troubling theme, with some interviewees experiencing discriminatory behaviours that exacerbated the difficulties of life in the compounds.
Meanwhile, most interviewees said privacy was difficult to achieve, and the close quarters fuelled gossip, which became a source of both entertainment and tension.
These dynamics turned the compounds into what Mackay calls hostile environments within a hostile environment.
Faced with these challenges, expatriates developed various coping strategies.
On the healthier end of the spectrum, some turned to exercise, meditation or gardening. But for many, escapism took the form of binge drinking, drug use, and what several interviewees called “sexcapades”—casual sexual encounters.
“Some people become hunks, some people become monks, some people become chunks, and some people become drunks,” one participant said, capturing the diverse and sometimes destructive ways people in the compounds managed their stress.
Fortified compounds remain a standard operating practice for many international organisations working in conflict zones and Mackay says decision makers should consider the appropriateness and sustainability of placing employees in such environments.
“My research shows the limits of compounds as an effective strategy to protect employees in hostile environments and I hope the findings will contribute to improving expatriates’ experiences in these extreme contexts.”
Babcock and PteroDynamics sign UAS MOU for New Zealand and Australia
Babcock Australasia and US-based autonomous aircraft pioneer PteroDynamics Inc. have signed a Memorandum of Understanding to explore opportunities for unmanned aerial systems (UAS).
According to the 09 December announcement, the two companies will come together to pursue greater autonomous capability within Babcock’s current and future defence and civil contracts across Australia and New Zealand.
PteroDynamics is an innovator in the design and manufacture of autonomous vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft systems, including its patented Transwing UAS.
Transwing marries the speed, range, and endurance of a fixed-wing aircraft with superior VTOL performance. Its foldable wings transition it seamlessly between vertical and winged horizontal flight, requiring no launch and recovery infrastructure. Its ground footprint is up to a third less than other VTOL aircraft of comparable wingspan.
The Transwing’s capabilities make it ideal for automating time-sensitive delivery of critical high-value payloads to hard-to-reach locations with no runways and in austere conditions, including maritime logistics support and reconnaissance and surveillance.
The capability was showcased during the biennial Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in July, where multiple Transwing UAS demonstrated ship-to-ship and ship-toshore logistics and maritime resupply missions from the deck of a US Navy guided-missile destroyer.
RIMPAC involved 40 surface ships, three submarines, 150 aircraft, 14 national land forces, and more than 25,000 personnel from 29 countries including Australia.
Babcock and PteroDynamics will now collaborate on a series of initiatives to introduce PteroDynamics’ next-generation UAS to the Australasian market. The collaboration will also focus on the delivery of training for Babcock teams to provide in-country support of future contracts.
“We are pleased to forge this strategic relationship with PteroDynamics,” said Babcock Australasia
Managing Director Aviation & Critical Services Duncan Milne. “We can see many complementary capabilities between our two businesses, and we look forward to pursuing these opportunities in the UAS sector together.
This type of advanced technology has any number of applications, including surveillance, infrastructure management and disaster relief, which makes it particularly well aligned with Australian Defence Force priorities.
The Transwing’s VTOL and wing-borne performance characteristics could also be of strategic use in the littoral environment in Australia’s north, where logistics and resupply missions in remote locations are currently undertaken by crewed aircraft. There are also many advantages in civil enterprise.
“Australia and New Zealand are leaders in the advancement of autonomous UAS, and opportunities for the Transwing in the region’s civil, defence and commercial sectors will expand quickly,” said PteroDynamics CEO Matthew Graczyk.
“Babcock is a world-class organization with decades of experience and deep working relationships with key customers. We are excited to explore together new ways to meet current and future needs of operators in a region of growing strategic importance.”
Collaboration between Sentinel and NZDF on navy sea boats
A New Zealand Defence Force elegation spent two days at Sentinel Boats’ workshop in Hobart in early December to review progress on the 780R platform.
The review included full scale models of the 780R deck layout and console arrangement to allow the acquisition team, including operators, to provide direct feedback on the vessel design before it goes into production.
Sentinel Boats CEO, George McGuire, said the visit also provided insight into Sentinel’s build process and the unique properties of High-Density Polypropylene (HDPE) for performance boat building.
The sessions also involved a range of key partners such as One2three naval architects, HDPE supplier Roechling/Dotmar, Shark Seating, West Ribs, ARA Marine, Hefring Marine and Hamilton Jet.
“Collaboration is essential, because you can get a boat 95% right and the 5% will be the things the operators have a problem with,” Mr McGuire said. Whereas with everyone bringing their perspective and unique insights into how the boats will be used and maintained, we can get a chance to get it 100% right.
“We can adjust the design to take in account all the different cases and supply a boat that is ready to go from day one, without any modifications required,” he said.
Commander Murray Tuffin said the success of the Sentinel 1250 Littoral Manoeuvre Craft had given the RNZN confidence in the strengths of HDPE and the workmanship of Sentinel Boats.
“We understand we are a tough customer - we set a list of really tough requirements and expect delivery on time, on schedule, and better than what we asked for and so to have the relationship and rapport with Sentinel makes a huge difference to the process,” Commander Tuffin said.
He said the Sentinel 780R had been designed as an all-rounder. “It’s the ute of the navy, basically - everything you can think of doing with a boat at sea, we’re going to try and do it with one boat, so it’s got a huge list of requirements and that’s what these couple of days are about, zeroing in on each requirement and making sure it ticks all the boxes at once.”
Jason Lock, Integrated Project Team Leader at the Ministry of Defence, said the preliminary design review was the most important part of the entire project.
“This boat needs to go on all our platforms, all the ships we have in the navy, so we are trying to match the requirements we have, for five different classes of ships, and that’s part of the walk around here looking at all of those things in person, rather than a diagram,” Mr Lock said.
Sentinel Boats is contracted to supply 17 780Rs, with an option for a further three electric or hybrid propulsion vessels to use for training and development purposes.
The New Zealand Defence Force is set to receive the first of its new sea boats towards the end of 2025.
Wars and Regional Tensions: World’s top arms producers see revenues rise
Revenues from sales of arms and military services by the 100 largest companies in the industry reached $632 billion in 2023, according to new data released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
Evident in all regions, there were particularly sharp rises among companies based in Russia and the Middle East. Overall, smaller producers were more efficient at responding to new demand linked to the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, growing tensions in East Asia and rearmament programmes elsewhere.
Top 100 companies ramp up production
In 2023 many arms producers ramped up their production in response to surging demand. The total arms revenues of the Top 100 bounced back after a dip in 2022. Almost three quarters of companies increased their arms revenues year-on-year. Notably, most of the companies that increased their revenues were in the lower half of the Top 100.
“There was a marked rise in arms revenues in 2023, and this is likely to continue in 2024,” said Lorenzo Scarazzato, a Researcher with the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. “The arms revenues of the Top 100 arms producers still did not fully reflect the scale of demand, and many companies have launched recruitment drives, suggesting they are optimistic about future sales.”
US companies’ arms revenues rise, but production challenges remain
The 41 companies in the Top 100 based in the United States recorded arms revenues of $317 billion, half the total arms revenues of the Top 100 and 2.5 percent more than in 2022. Since 2018, the top five companies in the Top 100 have all been based in the USA.
Of the 41 US companies, 30 increased their arms revenues in 2023. However, Lockheed Martin and RTX, the world’s two largest arms producers, were among those registering a drop.
“Larger companies like Lockheed Martin and RTX manufacturing a wide range of arms products often depend on complex, multi-tiered supply chains, which made them vulnerable to lingering supply chain challenges in 2023,” said Dr Nan Tian, Director of SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. “This was particularly the case in the aeronautics and missile sectors.”
European arms industry trails rest of world in revenue growth The combined arms revenues of the 27 Top 100 companies based in Europe (excluding Russia) totalled $133 billion in 2023. This was only 0.2 percent more than in 2022, the smallest increase in any world region.
However, behind the low growth figure the picture is more nuanced. European arms companies producing complex weapon systems were mostly working on older contracts during 2023 and their revenues for the year consequently do not reflect the influx of orders.
“Complex weapon systems have longer lead times,” said Lorenzo Scarazzato. “Companies that produce them are thus inherently slower in reacting to changes in demand. That explains why their arms revenues were relatively low in 2023, despite a surge in new orders.”
At the same time, a number of other European producers saw their arms revenues grow substantially, driven by demand linked to the war in Ukraine, particularly for ammunition, artillery and air defence and land systems. Notably, companies in Germany, Sweden, Ukraine, Poland, Norway and Czechia were able to tap into this demand.
For instance, Germany’s Rheinmetall increased production capacity of 155-mm ammunition and its revenues were boosted by deliveries of its Leopard tanks and new orders, including through warrelated ‘ring-exchange’ programmes (under which countries supply military goods to Ukraine and receive replacements from allies).
Wartime production leads to sharp rise in Russian firms’ arms revenues
The two Russian companies listed in the Top 100 saw their combined revenues increase by 40 per cent to reach an estimated $25.5 billion. This was almost entirely due to the 49 per cent increase in arms revenues recorded by Rostec, a state-owned holding company controlling many arms producers, including seven previously listed in the Top 100 for which individual revenue data could not be obtained.
“Official data on Russian arms production is scarce and questionable but most analysts believe that the production of new military equipment increased substantially in 2023, while Russia’s existing arsenal underwent extensive refurbishment and modernisation,” said Dr Nan Tian.
“In particular, combat aircraft, helicopters, UAVs, tanks, munitions and missiles are all thought to have been produced in greater numbers as Russia continued its offensive in Ukraine.”
South Korean and Japanese companies lead revenue growth in Asia and Oceania
The 23 companies in the Top 100 based in Asia and Oceania recorded 5.7 percent arms revenue growth year-on-year, to reach $136
billion. The four South Korea-based companies recorded a combined 39 per cent increase in arms revenues to reach $11.0 billion.
The five companies based in Japan saw their combined arms revenues rise by 35 percent to $10.0 billion. A policy of military build-up in Japan since 2022 drove a flurry of domestic orders, with some companies seeing the value of new orders increase more than 300 percent.
“The sharp growth in arms revenues among South Korean and Japanese companies reflects the bigger picture of military build-ups taking place in the region in response to heightened threat perceptions,” said Xiao Liang, a Researcher with the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme.
“South Korean firms are also trying to expand their share of the global arms market, including demand in Europe related to the war in Ukraine.”
Middle East arms producers see revenue growth linked to Gaza, Ukraine conflicts Six of the Top 100 arms companies were based in the Middle East. Their combined arms revenues grew by 18 percent to $19.6 billion. With the outbreak of war in Gaza, the arms revenues of the three companies based in Israel in the Top 100
reached $13.6 billion. This was the highest figure ever recorded by Israeli companies in the SIPRI Top 100.
The three companies based in Türkiye saw their arms revenues grow by 24 percent to $6.0 billion, benefiting from exports prompted by the war in Ukraine and from the Turkish government’s continued push towards self-reliance in arms production.
“The biggest Middle Eastern arms producers in the Top 100 saw their arms revenues reach unprecedented heights in 2023 and the growth looks set to continue,” said Dr Diego Lopes da Silva, Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme.
“In particular, as well as taking in record arms revenues in 2023, Israeli arms producers are booking many more orders as the war in Gaza rages on and spreads”.
Other notable developments
The nine companies in the Top 100 based in China saw their smallest year-on-year percentage increase in arms revenues (+0.7 percent) since 2019 amid a slowing economy. Their total arms revenues in 2023 reached $103 billion.
The combined arms revenues of the three Indian companies in the Top 100 increased to $6.7 billion (+5.8 percent). NCSIST, the only Taiwan-based company in the Top 100, recorded a 27 percent increase in its arms revenues to $3.2 billion.
Türkiye’s Baykar produces armed uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) that have been widely used in the war in Ukraine. Exports accounted for around 90 percent of its arms revenues in 2023, which increased by 25 percent over the year to $1.9 billion.
The United Kingdom’s Atomic Weapons Establishment, which designs, manufactures and maintains nuclear warheads, recorded the largest year-on-year percentage increase in arms revenues (+16 percent) among UK companies in the Top 100, to reach $2.2 billion.
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
The Wagner Group: A terrorist organisation with Russian characteristics
The product of Russian state sponsorship, the Wagner Group has benefitted from the profits of exported violence and the allure of ethno-nationalist extremism, writes Kyrylo Cyril Kutcher.
Private military company (PMC) the Wagner Group is an organisation orchestrated by the Russian foreign military intelligence agency (also known by its Soviet-era abbreviation GRU). The Group has fought on behalf of and acted in the interests of the Russian state since 2014 in Ukraine, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Mali, and the Central African Republic (CAR), among other countries.
For its crimes, Wagner has been formally designated as a terrorist organisation by Estonia, Lithuania, France, the United Kingdom, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In the United States, a bill has been introduced to Congress to designate
the group a foreign terrorist organisation under the HARM Act 2023 , and the US Treasury has already designated it a transnational criminal organisation.
Leading terrorism scholar Katarzyna Maniszewska classifies the Wagner Group’s activities as “mass scale international systemic state supported terrorism”.
Her definition of Wagner as not simply a criminal but a terrorist organisation is based on five conditions: (i) conducting violence (tortures, executions, indiscriminate killings of people and destruction of residential areas) to (ii) have a psychological effect (instilling fear), (iii) intentionally (in a planned and
Kyrylo Cyril Kutcher holds an MSc and is pursuing a degree in Politics and International Relations at Massey University.
organised manner), (iv) illegally (conducting military operation in a country whose government did not issue an official consent to it), while (v) being ideologically motivated (nationalistic, aligned with Russia’s foreign policy).
This article starts by outlining the Wagner Group’s origins and activities in order to situate an analysis of the motivations behind its terrorist behaviour. My analysis of Wagner’s evolution as a terrorist organisation will draw from theories of state sponsored terrorism, globalisation, and Rapoport’s wave theory.
Sustained through state patronage and a complex web of international corporate structures, illicit commercial deals and obscure financial flows, and motivated by ruthless strains of Russian nationalism, the Wagner Group has become uniquely equipped to conduct international terrorism at the service of the Russian state with impunity. In doing so it far exceeds the scope of operations of conventional private military and security companies (PMSCs).
History
The GRU formally signed the Wagner Group into existence in May 2014 for deployments to the Donbas region of Ukraine as part of its covert armed incursion of the neighbouring
state. Initially, it consisted of a few reconnaissance-assault detachments composed mainly of veterans of Russia’s previous wars in Chechnya and Afghanistan, mixed with elements of Russian special forces (Spetznaz).
Many of Wagner’s members had experience as mercenaries in similar military formations (for example, in the Slavonic Corps or Moran Security), saw campaigns in Crimea, Syria or Georgia, and often served in prisons.
The GRU delegated operational control over the organisation to an appointed director and the Council of Commanders. The leading fighting commander, Dmitry Utkin, an ex-Spetznaz officer of neo-Nazi ideology – and an admirer of Hitler’s favourite composer – gave his call sign ‘Wagner’ for the Group’s name.
Yevgeny Prigozhin assumed the role of a director. He was a Soviet convict who rose in Russian business by developing powerful connections through the 1990s and, by 2014, controlled most of the catering business for the Russian military. He also actively promoted state interests abroad through his Internet Research Agency, subsequently infamous for its social troll farms and disinformation campaigns waged during elections in the United States and United Kingdom.
Wagner built a reputation for out-of-battlefield atrocities from its very first campaigns. Engaged in illegal fighting in Ukraine over 201415, which included documented sabotage and harassment operations, Wagner also played a custodian role over Russia’s various proxy forces there, conducting executions of wayward leaders and units who failed to follow orders from Moscow.
Since their first deployment to Syria in September 2015, the Wagnerites were allegedly making money by terrorising the civilian population. The group’s brutality came into the international spotlight after a video emerged of the sledgehammer torture and execution of a Syrian national.
Wagner kicked off commercial relations with the Syrian government by capturing and defending oil and gas fields for a slice of the profits. The Russian state also received its share of revenue from these fields. Over time, Prigozhin registered hundreds of shadowy firms, forming vast and resilient financial arteries facilitating Wagner’s financial transactions.
In 2017, Wagner expanded its military presence and transnational commercial operation into Africa. The Company entered the Central African Republic (CAR) and Sudan alongside Russian diplomatic missions, supplying weapons to
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
warring local parties, establishing business relations and receiving gold and mineral exploration concessions.
Wagner then expanded its commercial activities, propaganda services ,and ‘gloves-off’ terrorisingand-killing force offering to regimes from Libya and Mali to South Africa and Madagascar. The Company secured multiple strongholds across Africa for its permanent military bases and transportation hubs.
As Wagner continued to achieve its goals through indiscriminate violence, the Russian state remained unconcerned. In 2019, the group reportedly mined and drove away civilians from the outskirts of the Libyan capital. One of the Group’s wounded commanders, airlifted to Russia, was cited in a rare interview as describing the action as “fighting international terrorism to protect Moscow’s interests” in Africa.
Various journalists and humanitarian missions reported the company’s involvement in mass
killings, tortures, rape, pillage, kidnappings, summary executions and indiscriminate violence in many African countries. Among these crimes were the killing of Russian investigative journalists in the CAR in 2018 and well-documented involvement in a massacre and mass rape in the Mali town of Moura in 2022.
After joining Russia’s overt invasion of Ukraine, Wagner’s massacres of civilians included the infamous Bucha massacre , where more than 1,300 non-combatants were documented as having been killed, with many having also been tortured and raped.
Later, during Wager’s 10-monthlong assault of Bakhmut, the city was shelled indiscriminately to its destruction while hundreds of non-combatant residents were killed. There were multiple reports of the deliberate shooting of civilian survivors, including children, as well as the torture and execution of prisoners of war.
In 2022, the Russian state officially acknowledged fully financing and provisioning the Group over the preceding decade. Managing its own media and recruitment campaigns, Wagner even shared online the execution of an alleged traitor with a sledgehammer, while sending another to the European Parliament as a threat over Europe’s military support of Ukraine.
Shortly after publicly accusing the Russian Ministry of Defence of sabotaging the Group’s war efforts in Ukraine in the spring of 2023, Prigozhin sent the Wagner army on its way to Moscow in an act of open rebellion. For that action, Prigozhin, Utkin and other key leaders of Wagner were assassinated later that year. Wagner was subsequently placed under the direct control of the Russian Ministry of Defence and restructured, but it retained its presence overseas.
State sponsorship of the Wagner Group’s violence
The Cold War era theories of state sponsorship of international terrorism, including schools claiming that most or “all roads lead to Moscow” have proved relevant for the 21st century.
The Kremlin has provided various types of support to such terrorist organisations as Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. Its most widespread international terrorist project has, however, been the Wagner Group, active in a dozen countries from Venezuela to Africa, Syria to Ukraine.
Private intelligence agency Molfar has catalogued 37 Russian PMCs across 34 countries as far east as India and Sri Lanka and traced their connections to the Kremlin. Under the existing international legal framework, most of these organisations are able to evade accountability and penalties for their criminal activities.
Of these, the Russian state provided Wagner with the most comprehensive support. This has included training grounds, operational intelligence support, money, munitions, weapons, aircraft, logistical aid, and sanctuary and support, including clandestine diplomatic backing.
The Wagner Group’s apotheosis stemmed from the Russian state’s need to destabilise its neighbours –Ukraine at the time – and to expand de-facto control to territories beyond internationally recognised borders. Sponsoring and defining strategic direction for the militarised private group acting abroad was deniable and cheaper, and hence preferable, to waging war directly.
Following success in Ukraine in 2014-15, Russian political and military leadership continued to exercise authority over Wagner’s geostrategic objectives and for many years denied having anything to do with the organisation.
The Kremlin’s strategic ends in using Wagner included reestablishing Russia as a superpower, which involved power projection far beyond its neighbourhood, strengthening favourable regimes, destabilising regions and shaping animosity towards Western influence there.
Unlike conventional PMSCs, with the Russian state’s vast weaponry support, Wagner gained a virtual monopoly on uniquely equipped, informed (through state military intelligence) and experienced mercenaries readily available in well-organised combat units to wage actual battles against identified enemies.
Rather than regime change, Wagner’s activities across vulnerable developing countries were focused on supporting authoritarian regimes and enabling a kind of ‘ de-territorialised terrorism’, as exemplified in Colombia during the last three decades of the 20th century. This
support magnified violence against local populations and opposing groups to gain their control over profitable territories, such as precious metals mines in Africa and oil and gas fields in Syria, and it enabled the Russian state’s control over minerally rich and fertile land in Ukraine.
Since 2022, the Wagner Group has perpetrated terrorism in its illegal operations in Russia’s fullscale invasion of Ukraine.
In The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, McAllister and Schmid emphasise that terrorism is often unduly dismissed within the context of international wars. Yet certain practices, they argue, such as systematic rape, the taking and killing of hostages, the massacre of prisoners of war, and the bombing and deliberate targeting of civilian populations, constitute terrorist tactics. Feldman and Hinojosa refer to these “acts perpetrated by state agents or by private groups on the
orders of or on behalf of a state that seeks to terrorise the population and propagate anxiety among citizens” as direct state terrorism.
Targeting civilians (as in the Bucha massacre) has been a calculated strategy of the Russian war effort to coerce Ukrainians into quick surrender and deter further resistance at earlier stages of the invasion. In later stages, it became a tool for achieving publicised goals (such as in the battle over Bakhmut) and pressuring of the Ukrainian government into considering negotiations of an unfavourable ceasefire due to the high human costs of continued war.
While state military and diplomatic resources drove Wagner’s transnational diffusion, especially during the first years of its existence, another powerful modern catalyst enabled and partly motivated Wagner’s further evolution as an organisation – globalisation.
Rescuers working at the site of the downed aircraft carrying Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023. Photo: AFP / Russian Investigative Committee / handout.
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Globalisation and the Wagner Group’s transnationalisation Globalisation simultaneously motivated and enabled Prigozhin to evolve Wagner Group into a profitable and self-sustained transnational corporation capable of orchestrating and performing violence across expanding geographical reaches.
Globalisation is both an enabler and a motivator for terror. By providing services in targeted violence and military support to regimes in Syria, Africa and elsewhere, Prigozhin generated profits and moved them around the international financial system to sustain and expand the Wagner company.
Legal systems allowed Prigozhin to utilise a web of dynamically emerging and disappearing firms to obfuscate transactions and their origins and even fight international sanctions imposed on him by states in foreign courts. He was motivated financially to engage new clients (state actors) privately, preparing the ground for what McAllister and Schmid call Russia’s “cultural and economic penetration”.
Globalisation undoubtedly became a technological enabler of transnational violence for the Wagner Group. State military resources and diplomatic backing, combined with private profits and relationships with foreign regimes, facilitated Wagner in acquiring military bases and developing transportation hubs spanning from Syria to Libya and into SubSaharan Africa. This transnational infrastructure enabled stealthy procurement of military equipment, weapons, and personnel for contracted violence operations.
Meanwhile, local media acquisitions and online expertise in disinformation influence operations, combined with ubiquitous penetration of the internet and social networks, enabled the dissemination
of politically motivated narratives to bolster the desired psychological effect of its operations.
The fifth wave theory
To understand the ideological motivation of Wagner’s leaders and individual members, Rapoport’s wave theory of terrorism provides a useful starting point.
David Rapoport has outlined four historical waves of terrorism since 1880: (i) anarchism, (ii) anticolonial terrorism, (iii) new left, and (iv) religious terrorism, with each lasting a few decades. He also suggested that a rise of aggressive populism in the United States and Europe, particularly in reaction to immigration, signals a possible emergence of a fifth extreme right wave.
Other researchers agree that terrorism is an evolving phenomenon and suggest that the next wave might be driven by ethnonationalism and
characterised by authoritarianism, a radical quest for purity, and withdrawal from globalism into particularism.
Hostile anti-diversity and purestate rhetoric with distinguishable neo-Nazi roots has delivered electoral successes to right-wing populist parties across Europe and motivated such recent violent events as the storming of the Capitol in the United States in 2021 and the Christchurch mosque attack in 2019.
Preoccupied with the transformative power of mass violence, Wagner’s public animosity towards conventionally labelled terrorists, especially jihadists, can be seen as indicative of its role as a proponent of fifth wave terrorism.
The Wagner Group is one of the champions of ruscism – an expansionist ideology of Russian nationalism, which, driven by the state, dominates modern Russian society.
Three members of the Wagner Group, right, survey the streets in Northern Mali. French Army/Associated
Culturally embedded Russian national chauvinism combined with bitterness over the collapse of the Soviet Union – symbol of Russian greatness and power – has provided fertile ground for the rise of a ruscism , or Russian fascism. Wagner’s members and its supporters practice ruscism as a martial patriotism directed against external, specifically Western, enemies who are allegedly obsessed with the humiliation and destruction of the Russian state.
Sometimes referred to as Putinism, the ideology has been cultivated by the Russian President, fusing it with the fascism of his favourite Russian imperial philosopher Ivan Ilyin and the civilisational Eurasianism of Alexander Dugin. Along with notable extremist groups such as the Russian Imperial Movement and Rusich, Wagner has become a leading proponent of ruthless Russian nationalism.
Since its inception, Wagner’s leaders and soldiers have been motivated by a longing to reclaim and expand alleged Russian greatness. Rather than thinking of themselves as mercenary or nonmercenary, Russian mercenaries see themselves as representing Russia and Russia’s national interests.
Prigozhin himself saw the curation of the Wagner Company and its activities as his form of service to a Russian cause, claiming that Wagner’s success was due to its strong ideology that aligned with the Russian state’s own ideology. Russians saw PMCs and, specifically, Wagner’s role abroad as a deterrence to Russia’s enemies through their showcasing of strength through preemptive violence.
Obsessed with a sledgehammer as a symbol of threat and respect and as a central tool for the torture and execution of both enemies and
traitors, rituals of violence hold significant for the group.
Intoxicated with violence, impunity and success, however, the Wagner Group grew conceited over their ideological devotion and selfperceived purity over the Russian state’s formal military leadership. Ultimately, their turn of violence against the Russian Ministry of Defence led to their leaders’ elimination.
Beyond state sponsorship, globalisation and ethnonationalism, there are other factors potentially relevant to explaining the evolution of the Wagner Group. For instance, its commercial expansion can be analysed in terms of the pursuit of profit by Prigozhin, and by other beneficiaries, including the Russian state.
Additionally, the abundance of ‘volunteers’ ready to join organisations like Wagner may be explained by the economic and social disenfranchisement of vast elements of the Russian society and the inertia of ex-soldiers.
Conclusion
Ultimately sponsored by the state and devoted to its ideology, Wagner exploited the opportunities of globalisation and grew increasingly more independent in operations and vision, but ultimately failed in its rebellion against the state’s authority.
Despite meeting the criteria of recognised definitions of terrorism in addition to its formal recognition by several states as a terrorist organisation internationally, Wagner presents analytical challenges due to its operations falling between conventional state warfare, private military operations and fifth wave terrorism.
These complexities and blurred edges must provoke further research, particularly into the ongoing metamorphosis of global terrorism and the changing motivation and behaviour of its perpetrators.
The Indo-Pacific is an idea more than a region – and it’s pushing politics in a ‘pessimistic and paranoid’ direction
Over the past decade, the idea of an important geopolitical space called the “IndoPacific” has become integral to the grand strategising of countries inside and outside this vast geographical area.
The term is not new, however. Australia – one of a few truly IndoPacific countries – used it during the 1970s to paint an optimistic vision of a future in which it was interlinked economically and politically with its neighbours in the Indian and Pacific oceans.
However, since Japan (under the leadership of Shinzo Abe) first used the term in 2007 as a way of conceptualising relations with India in the context of “broader Asia”, the Indo-Pacific has evolved significantly.
And with the advent of the AUKUS security pact in 2021, it is now common to refer to the Indo-Pacific as either a region or super-region. But this oversimplifies what is, in fact, a far more complex geopolitical reality.
What is a region?
A region is best thought of as a geographically enclosed complex. According to political scientist David Lake, regions are “so interrelated in terms of their security that actions by any one member, and significant security-related developments inside any member, have a major impact on others”.
The problem with thinking of the Indo-Pacific as a region or super-region is that at its widest definition – stretching from the east coast of Africa to the west coast of South America – it comprises more than half the geographic space of the surface of the Earth.
Simply put, the Indo-Pacific is too large to meaningfully conceive of as a region or even a super-region.
Furthermore, although many states have adopted an Indo-Pacific outlook in their strategising, they typically (save for greater powers)
still think of their national security in a strict regional sense.
So, the Indo-Pacific as a geopolitical space looks vastly different in Washington DC than it does in Jakarta, Wellington, Tokyo or Manila (to choose but a few).
This is not to say the IndoPacific concept should be ignored. It represents an important development in international security. The fact is it has experienced the greatest geopolitical shift over the past decade or so – and this is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.
The China factor
If not a region or super-region, then, what is the Indo-Pacific?
It is perhaps better thought of in terms of what international relations experts Barry Buzan and Ole Waever call “macrosecuritisation”: the identification of an “existential threat” to something deemed precious and worth protecting which demands an immediate and, if necessary, extraordinary collective response to protect it.
This was given a major boost in 2017 when the United States – still by far the most powerful global actor – formally adopted the Indo-Pacific concept at the centre of its strategic thinking.
In the process, it identified China as a clear strategic competitor. This decision had immediate real-world implications.
Firstly, it helped resuscitate the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) involving the US, Australia, India and Japan after nearly a decade of impasse.
Secondly, after Joe Biden ran for president on an “America must lead again” foreign policy platform, it led to the formation of AUKUS in 2021 and the launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity in 2022.
Geopolitical
complexity
Importantly, not only the US is involved in this macrosecuritisation. Australia, India, Japan and, more recently, the United Kingdom and European Union (and particular member states, such as France) are all involved.
Together they are pushing an Indo-Pacific concept that is built on the identification of the rules-based international order as being under existential threat due to China’s rise and perceived assertiveness.
The framing of China as a “threat” rather than an “opportunity” – which dominated the previous “Asia-Pacific” construct – means a radically different perspective in the countries adopting Indo-Pacific outlooks.
This clearly matters greatly to regional geopolitics. But it still does not mean the Indo-Pacific has to be seen as a region or super-region.
Rather, the concept is distorting the geopolitics of different regions –especially East Asia, South-east Asia, South Asia and the South Pacific. These remain genuine regions with their own unique security dynamics. But the Indo-Pacific idea is enveloping them and shifting the dynamics in a more pessimistic and paranoid direction.
A ‘New Cold War’
There is now a concerning habit of treating the Indo-Pacific as a coherent unitary geopolitical space rather than a constellation of different regions.
This lends credence to the simplistic analogy of the Indo-Pacific becoming the ground zero of a “New Cold War”. And it ignores the perspectives of the smaller countries that find themselves being sucked into this growing contest.
Seeing the Indo-Pacific for what it really is – not a natural geographical phenomenon but a construct – is an important step towards developing more coherent and nuanced policies that adequately capture the geopolitical complexity of the Indo-Pacific constellation.
But this runs contrary to the macrosecuritisation process already in place.
There are many reasons why the current situation in the Indo-Pacific is nothing like the original Cold War. But the securitisation process is simplifying the geopolitics, at least in perception, into something reminiscent of it. The ramifications could be devastating.
This article was originally published in The Conversation on 08 November 2024.
A Chinese take on US Cold War mentality in the Pacific, Image: CGTN
Foodstuffs’ facial recognition survey results inconsistent with existing research
A recent survey conducted on behalf of Foodstuffs North Island suggests that the new Zealand public is accepting of facial recognition cameras in retail, but something’s not adding up, writes chief editor Nicholas Dynon.
Nicholas Dynon is chief editor of Line of Defence, and a widely published commentator on New Zealand’s defence, national security and private security sectors.
Foodstuffs North Island Limited has claimed its six-month trial of facial recognition camera technology a success. According to Foodstuffs, an “independent evaluation” has found “the benefits outweigh the risks”, with “strong public support” for use of the technology.
Foodstuffs commenced a sixmonth trial of FRT across 25 of its New World and Pak’n Save supermarkets in February. Citing historically high rates of retail crime and customer-initiated violence across its stores, Foodstuffs looked to the tech’s ability to identify persons of interest from among shoppers entering its stores.
FRT has been hailed internationally as offering gamechanging security, safety, efficiency and profitability benefits, but the
technology has also been the subject of significant controversies over privacy, accuracy, racial bias, and concerns over the ‘chilling effect’ of over-surveillance and the loss of practical obscurity.
As part of its trial, the supermarket cooperative commissioned a survey to gauge how “New Zealand consumers feel about the use of facial recognition (FR) in retail settings”, claiming that 66% of respondents were accepting of the use of FRT, “even if the impact it has on reducing harm from incidents of retail crime is minimal.”
Conducted on behalf of Foodstuffs by branding and consumer insights consultancy One Picture, the survey of 1,007 New Zealand consumers aged over 18 found that 66% of respondents said
they will accept FRT even if the harm minimisation is very small, 79% would accept it even if it only achieved a 0.7% reduction in harm, 86% would accept it if it achieved a 3% reduction in harm, and a staggering 89% would accept FRT if it achieved a 10% reduction in harm.
Impressive numbers. But they fly in the face of established international data on FRT public acceptability published in several peer-reviewed survey-based academic research studies. In the US, for example, which typically has relatively higher rates of public comfort with FRT, recent studies indicate that the acceptability of FRT in retail sits at between 54% and 59%.
The results also appear wildly inconsistent with a biennial privacy survey of 1,200 New Zealanders released by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner on 13 May this year.
In that survey, 49% of respondents stated that they were concerned or very concerned about the use of facial recognition technology in retail stores to identify individuals. 22% were neutral on the topic, 25% were either not concerned
or not really concerned, and 11% were unsure.
Public acceptance of FRT is a sliding scale FRT is controversial in some scenarios but widely accepted in others. FRT deployments in retail stores, for example, seem to frequently result in media controversy, while most of us are happy to have our facial images captured at airport passport control.
Many of us are comfortable using the technology to unlock our smart phones, yet we’re not so comfortable about its use in monitoring public spaces.
The international research on FRT public acceptability, demonstrates that some deployments of FRT are more publicly acceptable than others. The research highlights that there are clear patterns to acceptability depending on the purpose of deployment and – importantly – whether the operator is a government agency, law enforcement, a business, or individual.
In a recently published paper in Massey University’s National
Security Journal , I collated 200 data points from over a dozen international research studies to ‘map’ the public acceptability of a range of FRT deployments.
Broadly speaking, the research tells us that public acceptability of individuals’ operation of FRT on their own device, such as unlocking their smartphone, is associated with low levels of perceived risk (they trust themselves) and often high levels of perceived reward (they derive direct benefit from it, such as convenience).
By contrast, government agencies’ operation of FRT is associated with mixed levels of perceived risk (it depends on what it’s being used for, and how) and perceived reward (there is perceived direct (personal) benefit in certain use cases, such as passing quickly through airport border checks, and perceived indirect (public) benefit in others, such as fighting crime and thwarting terrorists.
Lastly, private companies’ –including retailers’ – operation of FRT tends to be associated with relatively higher levels of risk, and often lower levels of perceived reward for surveilled individuals.
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Individual use of FRT FRT acceptability data confirms that individuals tend to place trust in the facial recognition technology on their own smart phones. According to a 2024 survey, 68.8% of Australians are comfortable with using facial recognition to unlock their smartphone.
Such statistics that may seem somewhat counterintuitive considering that many of these users may report feeling less comfortable about – or even object to – the idea of having their facial image recorded by a public-facing camera.
But, as the data suggests, when an individual uses facial recognition technology on their own phone they feel in control – even though they may in fact have little control over how their facial data is being used and who it may end with.
Beyond device unlocking, other individual uses of FRT are associated with lower levels of acceptability.
According to a 2016 UK study, 31% of respondents were comfortable with the idea of using FRT to bid in online auctions, and only 24% regarded using FRT for contributing to online forums as acceptable.
Commonly cited perceptions of convenience and proportionality are relevant here. Using one’s face to unlock one’s device is considered a convenient alternative to unlocking via password or even finger scan. The idea of having to provide one’s biometric in order to comment in an online forum, however, is viewed as a disproportionately intrusive measure of little perceived benefit to the user.
Government use of FRT
Just like individual use of facial recognition technology, the research tells us that public acceptance of government use of RFT varies greatly depending on the purpose for which it is being used. There are a few reasons for this:
Familiarity: The rule of thumb that the more familiar people are with a particular technology the higher their level of acceptance of it tends to hold true in relation to FRT.
The research data tells us, for example, that people tend to be relatively comfortable with the now commonplace use of facial recognition for identifying
passengers at airport customs (76% according to a 2020 Australian study). When it comes to less familiar deployments, such as identifying voters at polling places, it’s a different story (47% according to a 2022 US study).
Proportionality: People generally accept the use of facial recognition technology by police to identify terrorists and investigate serious crimes (over 80% in US, UK and Australia, according to one study) but are resistant to it being used to identify minor offences and antisocial behaviours, such as traffic violations (51%) and parking violations and littering (33% according to the abovementioned 2020 survey).
Specificity: The more ambiguous the use of the technology is, the greater the degree of discomfort around it. Deployments such as “monitoring crowds as they walk down the street” (31%) and “ day-to-day policing ” (41.69%) lead to concerns over ubiquitous surveillance and the loss of “practical obscurity”.
Private sector use of FRT
A key finding of the research data is that people are generally less accepting of FRT cameras when they are operated by private sector organisations. In short, people place little trust in businesses’ ability to operate the technology responsibly or to the benefit of the public.
The use of FRT by retailers to identify known shoplifters and antisocial patrons, for example, is considered no more acceptable by the public that the idea of its use by police to identify minor offenders or traffic rule breakers.
That being said, the public is more accepting of retailers’ use of FRT to identify shoplifters, antisocial patrons and fraudsters than it is of its use by retailers for other purposes –such as loyalty programs, advertising
(15.7% according to a 2024 Australian survey), payments and the tracking of customer behaviour (7% in the UK, 2019).
The public acceptability of FRT operation by businesses in other contexts echoes the patterns we see in the retail setting. In gaming venues, for example, the use of facial recognition for age verification or to identify self-excluded gamblers is more accepted than its use in identifying VIP gamblers for customer experience or marketing purposes.
That being said, the available data indicates that the public tends to be generally more accepting of FRT in gaming than it is of FRT in retail. But that doesn’t mean that FRT in gaming is uncontroversial.
Risk and Reward
Ultimately, the data tells us that public acceptance of FRT tends to involve a range of trade-offs between risks and rewards
Individuals may be willing to accept the risks involved with providing their facial data to an FRT operator where they perceive a potential (i) direct benefit, such as greater convenience, faster service, or privileged access to a restricted area, or (ii) indirect (public) benefit, such as safer international borders, safeguarding of national security, or a decrease in serious crime.
Whereas the use of FRT by police to investigate crime may be seen as ‘rewarding’ in terms of delivering a public benefit, the use of FRT by private businesses – even when it is purportedly for the purpose of crime prevention – tends to be seen as self-serving and holding little or no reward to those being surveilled.
In addition to the rewards, the risk calculus is heavily influenced by who the operator is, and what they are using the technology for. Private businesses are generally perceived as ‘riskier’ FRT operators compared to government. Additionally, less
familiar, less specific, and less proportionate uses of the technology are perceived as relatively risky.
Social licence for FRT yet to be established
The approximately 200 data points I collated from the US, UK, and Australian research provide a clear picture of deployment-specific FRT public acceptability within and among those jurisdictions, which are of indicative value for acceptability modelling in the New Zealand context.
To date, however, survey data of an academic standard is yet to be produced in relation to FRT public acceptability among New Zealanders. This is significant given that the data – even between politically and socially proximate countries (such as the UK, US, and Australia) does differ and that in New Zealand issues such as Maori data sovereignty hold critical local importance.
Despite noting this absence, an extensive 2020 New Zealand Law Foundation report on FRT in New Zealand comments that the views of the public constitute a potential constraint on the expansion of surveillance through FRT.
Indeed, in a 2021 article promoting the report, co-author Associate Professor Nessa Lynch of Victoria University of Wellington comments that the “role of public opinion on matters like this is massive”. The report raises the relevance of ‘social licence’, the idea that a practice that lies outside general norms should be subject to societal acceptance.
A clearly established relationship exists between social acceptability and social licence, and this is relevant to FRT (and biometric technologies generally). Yet the major FRT-related research and policy documents produced in New Zealand to date –including those by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, NZ Police,
research institutions, and others –are yet to incorporate empirical local acceptability data into their findings.
Understanding how various FRT deployment scenarios are perceived by New Zealanders would be useful in identifying how local perceptions differ from those in the jurisdictions covered by the existing international research, and in establishing an evidence basis for discussing social licence and developing legislative and policy-driven safeguards.
The aforementioned biennial privacy survey of New Zealanders by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner goes a little way in this regard, but as a survey on privacy concerns that fall within the OPC’s Privacy Act remit it affords limited attention to FRT specifically.
The recent public consultation conducted by the OPC on an exposure draft of a biometrics code of practice is another recent example of eliciting public perceptions, but again it is not FRT deploymentspecific, and nor does it engage directly with issues of acceptability.
Although it purports to reveal “how New Zealand consumers feel about the use of facial recognition (FR) in retail settings”, the recently released results of Foodstuffs’ survey of 1,007 New Zealanders raises more questions than it answers. Its methodology and design are not matters of public record, and nor does the survey appear to have been the subject of academic peer review.
In the absence of objective published research on FRT public acceptability in New Zealand, the academics who inform policy, vested interests and lobbyists who seek to influence it, and officials who formulate it, are left to draw their conclusions largely from foreign data and foreign guardrail precedents. They do so without first having empirically established either the existence of social licence for it or the range of scenarios that social licence might cover.
New Zealand’s foreign interference conundrum
A serious counter-intelligence capability and a population who can think for itself, is our best defence against unwanted foreign interference, writes Dr John Battersby of Massey University’s Centre for Defence & Security Studies.
Dr John Battersby is a Senior Fellow at Massey University’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies, and Managing Editor of the National Security Journal.
The Prime Minister has announced there will be no public inquiry into foreign interference in New Zealand. Calls for an inquiry have been prompted by the alleged activities of agents or proxies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The targets of such activities have been Chinese people, many of whom have opted to leave China or Hong Kong to escape the autocratic and oppressive PRC regime. Their complaints appear genuine. Intimidation is being felt.
China’s money has likely found its way into the coffers of New Zealand political parties, and pro PRC candidates may have entered our local body and national political system. Cyber hacks and cyber infiltration, by perpetrators either directed (or at least unrestrained) by the Chinese government have also occurred here.
These have all been stringently denied by China. Such activities have always been run under a cover of ‘plausible deniability,’ the euphemism for a lie - “We are not involved,” when they know damned well they are.
China makes no secret that it considers Taiwan, the South China Sea, and Chinese people generally, as rightfully under its domain. Since 2014, China has had legislation (albeit revised since) which more or less requires its commercial entities, and its people, wherever they are, to aid its ‘intelligence’ efforts. It would appear such efforts extend to the activities which have attracted media attention recently.
But do we need a Commission of Inquiry into the matter? Such an inquiry would likely achieve nothing beyond extending the suspicions we already have – for which we can obtain little by way of concrete proof as it is.
Moreover, while the Chinese government appears to be the most recent perpetrator – they are not the only government up to such tricks.
The reality is that any country with the capability to exert power beyond their own borders will likely be doing so using their intelligence services, or a range of private entities akin to them, in efforts to influence the internal affairs of other states. This is the real world, not the bubble New Zealanders think they live in.
Our traditional friends and allies have historically engaged in propaganda campaigns infusing money or misinformation into financial or media systems in attempts to influence the political direction of other countries. The post World War II ‘West’ did not just fall into its liberal democratic state, it was arguably bought and furnished by American money. It was of course a far more subtle interference than the USSR’s brutality in the Eastern Bloc.
New Zealand’s split with ANZUS in February 1985 and subsequent anti-nuclear legislation was seen by the USSR as a fissure in the Western alliance; KGB operations immediately stepped
up here. In July that year, a French intelligence operative infiltrated Greenpeace, and a French special forces team bombed the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland Harbour.
Palestinian groups, and the Israeli secret service, have both have been detected here stealing New Zealand passports, or the identities of New Zealanders for the purposes of obtaining them to use in more sinister activities.
We are not enemies of any of these people – but their agents were here, nonetheless.
Others are likely still here for the purposes of espionage, or through proxies with bags of money are buying political favour, investing in commercial entities, dropping hints to media outlets to follow one story rather than another, or seeding social media chaff for the emoji generation to tag its likes and dislikes onto.
It is not a commission of inquiry that New Zealanders need, it is the capacity to critically think about how foreign influence works in a country economically dependent on overseas markets, technologically dependent on foreign suppliers, forced to hedge between nations we share a political system with, and those we need
for economic survival. This is the environment in which emerges an influence-to-interference spectrum defying any straightforward attempt to distinguish the sinister from the well-intentioned.
The vast bulk of foreign influence here is simply flashed in front of us, and we not only take it, we pay big bucks for the privilege.
Technology is not neutral. Nor is mainstream or social media, or television, benign; while we use these things, they are collecting our habits, our interests, our likes and fetishes, or through subliminal content, designing them.
That foreign governments set out to do the same should come as no surprise. Stealing our secrets, hacking our systems and intimidating people – are illegal, and we need a solid ability to confront the perpetrators. But nudging us this way or that, by persuasion, offering solutions, gifts and financial support, all comprise a spectrum of greys where one shade differs very little from another.
Not an inquiry then, but a serious counter-intelligence capability and a population who can think for itself, is our best defence against unwanted foreign interference.
SECURITY
Transport minister floats potential privatisation of aviation security services
Debate has ramped up in recent months around a proposal by transport minister Simeon Brown to privatise aviation security services at airports around the country, writes chief editor Nicholas Dynon.
Nicholas Dynon is chief editor of Line of Defence, and a widely published commentator on New Zealand’s defence, national security and private security sectors.
Transport Minister Simeon Brown wants New Zealand’s Civil Aviation Authority to be more efficient and to deliver quicker for the travelling public.
In June 2024, he noted, 87 percent of domestic passengers and 77 percent of international passengers were screened within 10 minutes at Auckland airport. That figure, he said, should be at least 95 percent.
“As the saying goes, time is money, and many people’s time has been chewed up through an inefficient aviation security service,” he said at a 27 August speech to the Aviation Industry Association Conference.
“It has become clear to me that AvSec is not operating as efficiently as it should.”
“For example, under current legislative settings, instead of outsourcing for staffing when a plane arrives at a smaller airport or outside normal hours, Avsec is required to set up full teams to do this service,” he said. “This lack of flexibility is a significant issue, especially when it limits airlines and airports from establishing new flights at different hours.”
“We have also seen significant queues at our major airports with airports telling me that they want to have the option of being able to provide this service themselves and that they can do this more
efficiently and cost effectively than it is currently done.”
Minister Brown outlined his argument in a document to Cabinet, stating that he wanted to use the opportunity the Civil Aviation Authority funding review “to test the appetite of industry to take on a role in aviation security services, including seeking the views of those who are enabled to deliver these services after the new Act comes into effect.”
Industry support for consultation
NZ Airports’ submission into the government’s consultation Investigating alternative delivery arrangements for aviation security services confirmed a strong appetite from airports to see these functions opened up to industry.
“This is a milestone consultation on an issue NZ Airports has been raising for many years,” stated a 22 October statement by the industry group. “We appreciate the work of Hon Simeon Brown, Minister of Transport, to move it to the next stage.”
“While we have high regard for CAA and AvSec officials, airports consider the current aviation security model to be inefficient and inflexible in meeting the needs of New Zealand’s air transport system. We see clear efficiencies to be achieved through greater government-industry collaboration,” stated the group.
“This collaboration should include the transfer of functions to industry where we are able to deliver secure, lower cost and more flexible services.”
The minister’s proposal also received strong endorsement from the New Zealand Security Association (NZSA).
“New Zealand security providers would welcome the opportunity to work with airports, airlines and Avsec in providing a reliable and efficient aviation security service similar to those offered by thirdparty providers overseas, such as Australia and the United Kingdom,” stated Gary Morrison, NZSA Chief Executive Officer.
“The private security industry in New Zealand employs over 35,000 people, including over 25,000 licensed security personnel and generates $3.0 billion in annual revenues, so the industry is well resourced and very capable of providing high quality, secure and cost-effective services that would create a favourable and positive experience for travellers and visitors.”
“NZSA member companies are currently providing security and screening services at high security government and corporate sites and have supported Police and government agencies at large scale events including APEC, the America’s Cup and the Woman’s Football World Cup,” he said.
“We welcome the opportunity to engage with the Minister and key stakeholders accordingly.”
Unions point to ‘risks’
One of the three unions involved in Aviation Security, the National Union of Public Employees (NUPE), says that it is “alarmed” by the government’s proposal to outsource aviation security services (AVSEC).
NUPE Secretary Janice Gemmell stated that the Minister’s proposed outsourcing of the aviation security function reflected a desire for greater “flexibility” in service delivery.
“Flexibility”, stated Ms Gemmell, “is also another term for potential job losses and privatisation, which could significantly impact passenger safety and security.”
The NUPE stated that it “is opposed to any compromise on safety.”
“The rules that govern security on planes are not arbitrary; they have been carefully discussed and established at both domestic and international levels,” Ms Gemmell said.
She also emphasised NUPE’s opposition to outsourcing to private security firms or organisations that “usually offer inferior terms and conditions, potentially leading to less experienced staff and higher staff turnover.”
NUPE also opposed the idea of airports directly delivering the
service, arguing it would lead to inconsistencies airport practices being profit driven.
E tū, Aotearoa, the country’s largest aviation union, sang a similar tune.
“Avsec’s sole mission is to keep our airports safe, and they do it with highly skilled workers,” said Michael Wood, E tū Negotiation Specialist. “Once you bring in private companies with a commercial interest, profit becomes a key priority instead.”
“Experience from other privatised services shows that when a profit motive is introduced to a sector where revenue is fixed, service quality often suffers as costs, including investment in staff, get slashed. If profit is the driver, there’s a real danger of services being compromised. New Zealanders have seen this happen before in many other sectors.”
E tū also expressed its concern that “conflicting operational pressures” could apply if either airlines or airports were to operate aviation security.
“Asking airlines to run security services introduces a conflict of interest that could undermine the thoroughness and consistency of screening and other security measures. While our airlines are committed to safety, the thoroughness of screening processes would be in direct conflict with their goal of getting people onto planes as quickly as possible.”
“While everyone agrees the system should be more efficient and minimise delays,” said Wood, “privatisation isn’t the solution”.
“Avsec’s costs are covered by passenger levies, which are intended to fully fund operations. It’s unrealistic to expect private operators to save money, keep levies low, improve safety and functionality, and still turn a profit. The idea that privatisation could magically solve all these problems doesn’t stack up.”
HOMELAND SECURITY
Deliberate disinformation campaigns are a public health risk – but NZ has no effective strategy to deal with it
A coordinated, large-scale and multi-pronged strategy to combat misinformation remains elusive, writes Helen Petousis-Harris, Associate
Professor
in Vaccinology, University of Auckland.
Helen Petousis-Harris, Associate Professor in Vaccinology, University of Auckland
The recently released Royal Commission of Inquiry report about New Zealand’s COVID response highlights the harmful impact of misinformation and disinformation on public health.
While the report offers no solutions, it notes that disinformation campaigns fuelled division and loss of trust in government. It’s an age-old problem that has proved extremely difficult to counter.
Indeed, the practice of disinformation and propaganda has ancient roots , with some of the earliest recorded use of these techniques dating back to antiquity. The Greeks were among the first to study and formalise the art of rhetoric, a cornerstone of effective propaganda.
In 2010, colleagues and I published research that analysed vaccine narratives for the use of logical fallacies defined by Aristotle. We highlighted many common techniques of manipulation. It was a fun exercise in a more innocent time.
Understanding and analysing these manipulative tactics has evolved alongside their use in both
political and military strategies. So have the tactics of mitigating the impact of such strategies.
Early approaches to counteract these effects typically involved promoting transparency, education and critical thinking. This still stands today, but the time for merely talking about the problem has passed.
What’s required now is decisive action and robust policy to address misinformation and disinformation as we navigate the ongoing impacts of the COVID pandemic.
How to recognise misinformation and disinformation
Misinformation refers to inaccurate information spread without harmful intent, often due to a misunderstanding or mistake. Disinformation, on the other hand, is deliberately deceptive and crafted to manipulate public sentiment or promote discord.
Research has meticulously mapped the contours of misinformation and disinformation surrounding vaccines . Experts highlighted that the conditions for the spread of misinformation were ripe before the pandemic.
Identifying misinformation and disinformation involves a critical evaluation of content and its source. A first question is the source credibility. Is the information from a recognised authority or reputable news source?
The next bit, logical consistency, is harder to detect. Does the information contain contradictions or logically impossible claims? Many false narratives are internally inconsistent or implausible.
Often there will also be at least some level of emotional manipulation. Disinformation frequently exploits emotions such as fear or anger to enhance engagement and sharing.
The subtle art of rhetoric
Logical fallacies are errors in reasoning that undermine the logic of an argument. For example, the ad hominem fallacy attacks the person making an argument rather than the argument itself. This is a common tactic to undermine credible sources.
Cherry picking is the practice of selecting data that support a particular argument while ignoring data that contradict it. This is harder to spot if you are unfamiliar with the topic.
Conspiracy theories are another major tool in the propaganda kit. During the pandemic, numerous conspiracy theories have misrepresented scientific evidence and the intentions of health authorities and experts. The claim of cover-ups is often the final go-to when there is no other convincing argument.
Studies have repeatedly shown how false claims spread across social media platforms and how this influences public perceptions and behaviours detrimental to health . From myths about vaccine ingredients causing harm to conspiracy theories about global surveillance, these untruths have a real impact.
Surveys have repeatedly highlighted a worrying trend: a segment of the public, including some health professionals, harbours scepticism about vaccines , fuelled by unmitigated misinformation.
How to counter disinformation
The consequences of disinformation campaigns are not abstract or random. It is crucial to recognise that such campaigns are meticulously designed and executed with specific goals in mind. One of the most insidious is the erosion of social cohesion.
This is achieved by injecting divisive and false narratives into public discourse. They exploit socio-political fissures, amplifying scepticism and opposition to public health measures such as vaccination. These campaigns leverage sophisticated strategies and technologies to manipulate public perception. They exploit societal divisions and foster distrust in authoritative sources, particularly in science and medicine. Once consensus on basic facts is eroded, effective action becomes difficult.
Significant research efforts have aimed to understand how best to counter misinformation and sophisticated disinformation campaigns. These studies emphasise the importance of clear, consistent and credible communication from trusted sources.
Public health campaigns that engage directly with community leaders and employ tailored messaging have shown promise in increasing trust and positive health behaviours . “Pre-bunking ”, which involves educating people on how to spot misinformation before they encounter it, is gaining traction.
Authorities and public health leaders must prioritise transparency to rebuild and maintain public trust. Being open about the uncertainties and evolving nature of science can help mitigate the impact of
disinformation that exploits gaps in public knowledge.
Increasing media literacy is also important. By understanding the common tactics used in disinformation campaigns, people can become less susceptible to their influences.
Collaboration between governments, international organisations and tech companies is essential. These stakeholders must work together to detect and limit the spread of harmful content and promote accurate information appropriate to the audience (right message, right messenger, right platform).
Time to act
Despite these insights, a coordinated, large-scale and multi-pronged strategy to combat misinformation remains elusive. Governments and health organisations often react to misinformation rather than being proactive, or worse, leave a vacuum. The challenge of misinformation is not insurmountable, but it requires more than ad-hoc responses. We need a strategic, well-resourced commitment from the highest levels of government and health leadership. It takes courage and the ability to walk a tightrope between freedom of speech and protecting public health. Both are human rights.
As we continue to navigate the repercussions of the COVID pandemic, let us prioritise the integrity of our public health communications and bring all the facets we need to do this together. This includes media, tech companies, academics and community leaders.
Only through a united front can we hope to restore and maintain the public trust essential for overcoming this crisis and future public health challenges.
This article was originally published in The Conversation on 12 December 2024.
Strengthening New Zealand’s Cyber Defences in the New Security Landscape
Steve Bray, Vice President at Cloudflare ANZ, provides insights on the state of New Zealand’s cybersecurity and the critical steps businesses need to take to strengthen their defences in an increasingly volatile environment.
Steve Bray is Vice President at Cloudflare ANZ.
It’s no secret that New Zealand’s digital landscape is evolving, bringing with it both opportunities and unprecedented challenges. As businesses and government continue to develop and become more reliant on modern digital infrastructure, cyber threats become a pressing concern.
Cloudflare recently conducted a market report in New Zealand, surveying over 200 cybersecurity decision-makers and leaders. The findings underscore the significant challenges they face in protecting their businesses and customers from global cyber threats.
The report revealed that 42% of New Zealand’s cybersecurity decision-makers experienced data breaches within the past year.
With nearly half of businesses impacted by a data breach, it highlights an increasingly volatile environment where malicious actors are continuously developing more sophisticated attack methods.
These threats, from phishing to ransomware, are not merely disruptive— it is known, they have the potential to cause severe damage, not just to organisations and their customers, but also the wider economy.
In the global scheme of things, New Zealanders have been relatively successful in their strategies to prevent and combat
cyber threats, but staying ahead requires constant evolution. To maintain this edge, businesses must continue to elevate their cybersecurity efforts, investing in stronger protections and proactively adapting to new risks.
It’s no longer enough to simply respond when threats arise— organisations need to anticipate risks before they emerge, staying agile in the face of an ever-shifting threat landscape. By doing so, they’ll not only safeguard their own operations, but also help protect the broader economy.
Cybersecurity Investment Priorities and Challenges
Across New Zealand, organisations are increasingly recognising the need to strengthen their cybersecurity frameworks. With businesses now allocating 10% of their IT budgets to cybersecurity, it’s clear that protecting digital assets has shifted from being an optional expense to an essential investment.
This investment is directed at key areas, with 24% going towards protecting company financial information, 22% to defend against cyberattacks, and 21% in place to secure networks and data. This investment is critical and equally important for businesses to ensure effective resource allocation.
Cybersecurity is also being shaped by the rise of AI and automation. While AI has the potential to enhance defences, it also poses a growing threat by enabling more sophisticated cyberattacks. Organisations in New Zealand are grappling with the dual challenge of integrating AI into their defences, while protecting themselves from AI-driven threats becoming an investment priority.
New Zealand’s Strengths in Cybersecurity
Despite the challenges, New Zealand has demonstrated considerable resilience in its cybersecurity approach, standing out in the Asia-Pacific region.
The study reveals that 82% of New Zealand’s cyber leaders feel their organisations are prepared to prevent data breaches, positioning New Zealand as a leader in cybersecurity innovation, particularly in its proactive stance towards tackling cyber threats.
Organisations in New Zealand have also demonstrated strong strategies when it comes to tackling ransomware. While ransomware remains a growing global threat, New Zealand businesses are notably less likely to pay ransoms compared to their regional counterparts—a stance that serves as a significant deterrent to cybercriminals.
This reflects a broader commitment to resilience, with 67% of businesses focusing on proactive measures like employee training and two-factor authentication to protect their operations.
What also sets New Zealand apart is its relatively stronger talent pipeline. While many APAC countries struggle with a shortage of skilled cybersecurity professionals, only 32% of New Zealand organisations report this as a major challenge. This highlights the country’s continued focus on building and maintaining robust defences against rising cyber threats.
New Zealand’s Path Forward
New Zealand is in a solid position when it comes to cybersecurity, but can’t afford to be complacent. To stay ahead, it’s important to focus on simplifying security solutions. Many organisations struggle with the complexity of managing multiple vendors, and by consolidating these, not only can businesses make things more manageable, but they can also better use resources—a challenge that 57% of organisations already face.
Another critical step for companies is embracing Zero Trust models, which are becoming essential for securing supply chains by ensuring threats are contained before they cause damage. With 37% of organisations already on
board, this approach is clearly taking root as a key component of modern cybersecurity.
Combating ongoing issues such as ransomware resilience and AI is important for businesses to not forget about amongst upcoming pressures. Staying prepared for ransomware or AI-driven attacks will be key in AI adaption.
Finally, as compliance pressures grow, streamlining regulatory processes is essential to keep organisations agile, especially considering that 41% of respondents are already dedicating significant time to regulatory demands. So, while New Zealand is in a good place, it is important they don’t rest on their laurels—there’s still work to be done to ensure they stay ahead of the evolving threats.
New Zealand is in a prime position to emerge as a regional leader in cybersecurity. With the digital landscape becoming more interconnected, there’s the chance to set the standard by adopting a proactive and resilient approach. By focusing on innovation and staying adaptable, New Zealand businesses can not only tackle the challenges of today’s cyber threats but also influence the direction of cybersecurity across the region.
It’s about being forward-thinking and making smart investments to keep New Zealand’s digital world secure.
REACH NEW HEIGHTS in Professional Excellence
ASIS accredited certifications can help you reach your career goals.
Validates your ability to conduct security investigations through the effective use of surveillance, interviews, and interrogations. Designed for those with 5 years of related experience.
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Be one of the many ASIS board certified practitioners who are leaders, mentors, and trusted strategic partners, serving both their organizations and the profession.
“PCI is an important element in the ASIS C ertification programme, dovetailing into both CPP a nd PSP for a comprehensive understanding of broader security industry objectives. An effective and reliable investigation depends on objectivity, thoroughness, relevance, accuracy and timeliness. PCI helps identify critical investigative outcomes, including evidence collection, case management, and the process of offender detection, iden tification, interview and prosecution. Good physic al security designs, together with robust policies and procedures are key elements in a successful investigation. The PCI certification p rov ides an insight into how these pieces interrelate."
- D avi d H orsburgh, MSc CPP PSP PCI
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