Ilias Benmokrane
Senior Thesis | 2024
FORGING A FUTURE FOR TAIWAN AND ITS INDEPENDENCE
Democratic ideologies have been extensively challenged by suppressive rule time and time again in the course of world history. Global superpowers enjoy regional hegemony, or influential power, over large swaths of continents and the world. Asia’s own superpower, China, is the perfect example. China has failed to relinquish its oppressive rule over Taiwan, a democratic nation of over 23,000,000 citizens. The island nation has experienced all the consequences of overseas rule including restrictive laws and regulations, constant threats of military intervention, and diplomatic isolation in world politics.
This island territory, just slightly bigger than Maryland, has been home to one of the most prevalent, contentious, and sensitive conflicts in the international world. Ever since modern day communities established themselves in Taiwan, they’ve never been internationally regarded as a sovereign nation. Nearly every developed nation in the world has some sort of strategy or general comment over the status in the Taiwanese strait. The people of Taiwan and the international community have three solutions: seek independence, negotiate diplomatic relations with China, or uphold the status quo.
What should the people of Taiwan do? Must they earn independence through diplomatic, or military conquests? How should China, the United States, and the world interpret and react to the actions of the island territory? This thesis aims to explain the inceptions of the nation of China and the territory of Taiwan, the birth of concepts for Taiwanese independence, and the outcomes of China, the US, Taiwan, and the world.
HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT IN CHINA AND TAIWAN
The most significant holiday for Taiwanese inhabitants is Double Ten, or the National Day of the Republic of China, celebrated every year on the island on October 10th. It is a common misconception even among the residents of the country that the day symbolizes the Republic of China or Taiwan’s birth date. Instead, it marks the start of the Wuchang Uprising, an armed rebellion against mainland China’s Qing dynasty, eventually leading to the end of imperial rule in the country as a result of the Xinhai Revolution. This uprising gave birth to the Republic of China, or ROC, in 1911, marking the birth date of the Chinese Nationalist Party as October 10th. The ROC and their Nationalist forces would retreat to the island and govern it following losses in the Chinese Civil War to Communist party members. The ROC, and its date of inception, bears major significance to Taiwanese independence, as the island nation’s sovereignty has been relentlessly threatened by the Communist mainland government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Republic of China symbolizes an ongoing struggle for the self-determination of Taiwan against Communist units.
The inception of the ROC provides insight into the country’s future governmental structure, which helps inform the history of international and domestic relations with the territory of Taiwan. Today, the US recognizes the PRC, or People’s Republic of China, rather than the ROC. The Qing dynasty, who occupied modern-day China and Mongolia, handed over control of Taiwan to the Japanese following the first Sino-Japanese war. Taiwan had never been an independent entity, leading the way for countless disputes and arguments over control and rule of the territory. Following Japan’s surrender in WW2, the Republic of China ruled over the land for part of the latter half of the 20th century.
China was ruled by absolute monarchies until the early 20th century, however growing rebellions and disdain with the country’s status weakened and ended their rule. The Qing dynasty suffered massive public backlash preceding the 1911 Revolution. The results of the two Opium wars led to losses in economic independence, sovereignty, and national pride. The PRC came into being after the Chinese Revolution of 1949. The two ruling parties of the early part of the century, the Nationalist and Communist, actually joined forces in military efforts during 1926 and 1927 to get rid of various warlords that claimed to control pockets of the country. However, the Nationalists grew a deep disdain for the Communist party, mainly their ideologies and concern for power, and turned on them in an attack known as “White Terror” in 1927, murdering Communist party members.
In the 1930s, a fear of a Japanese invasion, the popularity of the Communist party, and the failure to control warlords further weakened the power of the Republic of China. The ROC’s authority especially weakened during World War II, where civil war soon was imminent between the Nationalist party and the CCP. While the leaders of both parties agreed that China should rule as one party with a shared military force, their striking ideological differences caused a truce agreement to fail in 1945, leading to an all-out war.
In the end, the Communist party’s improved military technology and strategies along with overwhelming local support carved the path for a likely victory. In addition, Nationalist party leaders were accused of mishandling funds and nepotism. The unpopular and corrupt Nationalist Party sought to flee to Taiwan.
In October 1949, CCP leader Mao Zedong founded the People’s Republic of China.
While the establishment of the PRC helped to alleviate the constant state of civil unrest and the stresses of governmental
restructuring, the country struggled to gain international support, especially from western countries, for decades.
The fall of Chinese imperial rule and eventual conflict between the Nationalist and Communist parties shaped the geopolitical landscape in the region, and helps clarify the complex history of Taiwan, and how these ideological differences shape the interactions between the island and mainland today. The history of rule in China is parallel to the history of rule in Taiwan, with various parties assuming authority over the island territory. Even with Taiwanese people and officials side with a specific ideology, nationality, or identity, governments outside the island are quick to assume control. The constant struggle for power within China leads to governments needing to seek legitimacy and total representation, effectively making Taiwan a symbol of political significance and power.
SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH THE ROC AND PRC
Around the time the PRC was established, the U.S. lessened their support of the Nationalist party in fear of being associated with China’s fall to communism. The U.S., faced with evident ongoing global tensions, failed to find common ground with Zedong, and became indirectly responsible for the country’s fall to communism. The CCP further grew into resentment of the Americans through their escalation of the Korean War. Further cooperation between the countries was inevitably delayed. Through the US’s diplomatic suspension with the PRC, President Einshower signed the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954, agreeing to protect the island from PRC invasion (Yale Law School). The US signified an unrelenting support for the Nationalist Party, otherwise isolated in the international community, as they were increasingly concerned of a Red China.
For the next 30 years, the United States made little to no diplomatic engagement with the CCP. President Nixon traveled to meet Zedong in 1972, seeking to forge new relations with the Communist Party and end the decades of hostility between the countries.
The US sought to work with communist governments following the Vietnam War in an effort to reduce future conflicts and create leverage against the Soviet Union. Nixon worked to remove Korean War-era trade restrictions as well as reinstate SinoAmerican ambassadorial relations. At the end of Nixon’s visit, the two parties agreed upon the Shanghai Communiqué, pledging for a “normalization” of relations (Washington: Government Printing Office).
Taiwan grew to become the forefront of Sino-American relations from this moment. Both sides agreed that the issue of the province’s control shouldn’t dissuade them from crafting a diplomatic agreement, however, the concern would plague the nations’ relations for decades to come. During the creation of the communiqué, the United States continued to recognize the Nationalist Party on the island, and were initially seeking a “two China” approach. However, hopes of dual government died out mainly with the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, admitting the PRC into the UN and agreeing it was the “only legitimate representation of China”. Taiwan, ousted in the process, laid at the mercy of the US’s ability to seek fair and adequate relations with both governments.
The PRC called for the US to remove military troops from the island, citing a breach of their sovereignty, and insisting it was their internal conflict. They ultimately decide to postpone the issue, and in a recollection by the US Department of State, the US stated they declared their, “interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves”, as well as agreeing to, "progressively reduce its forces and military installations on
Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes” (Washington: Government Printing Office). The Republic claimed it was the sole government of China and Taiwan was an established province of the country. Nixon’s administration agreed that Taiwan is a part of China but left out any phrasing about the governance of this “one China”. In private talks, the US sought to further increase diplomatic relations with China, at the cost of Taiwan, however the Watergate scandal delayed any of this work.
The ROC, diplomatically ousted following UN Resolution 2758, refused to seek diplomatic relations with countries that recognized the PRC (National Library of Medicine). However, they allowed for the US to station troops in Taiwan through 1979, where physical forces were pulled but security intelligence aid maintained.
Through the late 1900s, Taiwanese people steered away from US and international diplomacy to focus on local efforts to establish a democracy. Martial law, which had been in place since 1949, ended in 1987, four months after the ROC's accidental massacre of 19 Vietnamese refugees seeking asylum on a nearby island (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan)). Various demonstrations, including the Wild Lily Student Movement, where over 20,000 students peacefully protested with sit-ins in 1990, paved the way for the first direct elections in 1992, and a constitutionally established democracy ever since (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Taiwan)).
ONE-CHINA POLICY
The one-China policy was developed to alleviate differing opinions between the Chinese and American governments regarding the control and sovereignty of Taiwan. Relations conducted with Taiwan were first outlined in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, introduced by the Carter administration. In short, the
act required the president to inform Congress promptly regarding any possible danger to Taiwan and convene to discuss a response. The TRA also continued the tradition of general cultural and commercial relations between the people of Taiwan and America. The act has ensured substantive and strong ties between the US and Taiwan with the lack of a formal agreement.
The US chose to stand on the position to only acknowledge Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan in 1979, disallowing the Chinese government to alter the translation of the policy to recognize.
In 1982, the US declared it would no longer pursue a “oneChina, one-Taiwan” or “two-China” policy. However, since the 80s, the attitudes and formal relations between the countries have not changed. American presidents and their administrations have maintained diplomatic relations with China and unofficial relations with Taiwan.
ARGUMENTS FOR TAIWANESE SOVEREIGNTY
Taiwan, as a territory who has never had real footing in the field of international relations, has had its sovereignty question debated time and time again. Professor Baogang He at Deakin University attempts to identify reasonings behind the territory seeking its own independence in chapter 6 of her book, Governing Taiwan and Tibet: Democratic Approaches.
Professor He understands Taiwan’s ambiguous status within the international community. He begins by explaining that UN membership is the most signifying aspect of sovereignty. However, the “one China” policy that US and other world leaders have adopted has recognized China as the only legitimate ruler of the territories. A different approach to sovereignty must be reached.
Professor He classifies sovereignty as internal and external. Internal sovereignty, “denotes the state’s entitlement to control the population and border” while external sovereignty, “covers
representation in international organizations” (He, 109). He is arguing for the implementation of external sovereignty regarding Taiwan, allowing the prospective country to establish diplomatic relations with nations and expand its global affairs, currently suppressed by China.
As previously mentioned, the most direct method of obtaining external sovereignty is through UN membership. As of 2023, 13 of the 193 UN member states recognize Taiwan (UK Parliament). Taiwan has also expanded international democratic organizations in an effort to promote its diplomatic relations. Homegrown organizations such as the Democratic Pacific Union and the Taiwan Federation for Democracy aim to protect human rights and individual freedoms in the region.
Outside of trade, Taiwan has failed to gain a productive diplomatic relationship with the PRC in recent history. Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, has reaffirmed the territorial integrity of Taiwan, and its unwillingness to establish a nation with China. In 2020, following a landslide re-election victory, Lily Kuo, a writer at The Guardian stated that Tsai told China they must “face [the] reality” of Taiwanese independence, and urged the country to reconsider its policy. A few days prior, China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, stated that reunification was a “historical inevitability” (Kuo, 2020).
Taiwan’s greatest obstacle to sovereignty has been an unrelenting and uncooperative Chinese government. Professor He explains an alternative approach to the sovereignty question for Taiwan. She cites scholar Y. Frank Chiang at Fordham University. Chang claims that China has no legitimate authority to rule over Taiwan. Chang cites the US occupation of Cuba after the SpanishAmerican War as a similar parallel to the ROC’s occupation of Taiwan after the Japanese surrendered. While both occupations were authorized by legitimate mediums, the US withdrew when Cuba was able to set up its own government. In the case of
Taiwan, when they established a domestic democratic government, the ROC did not withdraw. A constitution signed abroad in China in 1947 continued the occupation of the island. While Taiwanese independence supporters have been pushing for a new document since the 1990s, it has never come to fruition (Sho-ling, 2007). Since then, China has simply threatened the use of force in the failure of future reunification with the nation. Military measures such as bombers, fighter jets, and surveillance aircraft over the island have only ramped up since the elections of Tsai and her running mate, Lai Ching-te, both pro-Taiwanese independence candidates (Maizland, 2023). In 2020, cyberattacks were reported to Taiwanese government offices, and China also began restricting tourism, pressured global corporations to sever ties, and negatively influenced trade relations.
Taiwan remains unaffected in their pursuit of equality on the island through open elections and fair democratic leadership. Their strong sense of nationalism bonds citizens, even when a claim for independence remains a significant challenge. Throughout all these attacks and misinformation campaigns spread during Taiwanese elections, the Economist Intelligence ranked Taiwan in the top 10 on the Democracy Index in 2022, higher than most countries in Asia. (Economist Intelligence, 2022). In September of 2023, a poll conducted by the Taipei Times found that 48.9% of people supported independence, 26.9% supported the status quo, and 11.8% supported unification with China (Li-hua, 2023). Professor He argues for a compromise between independence and reunification. She weighs in China’s unrelenting attitude towards unifying the nation and territory, including the very realistic scenario of military intervention. To protect the safety and integrity of Taiwan, she argues for Beijing to allow the territory to enjoy UN membership status. He suggests that with Taiwanese involvement in international affairs, anti-China sentiment would lessen. Although, as Taiwan scholar Ya-Chung Chang notes, China
would still impose a greater influence, being a member of the security council, and the territory would continue to face an asymmetric relationship.
TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE: FURTHER APPROACHES
In 2016, Professor Funie Hsu at the San José State University helped publish a scholarly article in the John Hopkins University Press. Her article, Collective Statement on Taiwan Independence: Building Global Solidarity and Rejecting US Military Empire, focused on Taiwanese citizens leading a homegrown, grassroots effort to fight for independence. While, at the time, Professor Hsu was drawing off policies from the Trump administrations, the concept of an American president boldly supporting Taiwanese sovereignty had remained unheard of since the Einshower administration. In January, writer Steve Holland at Reuters reported that, “the United States does not support the independence of Taiwan” (Holland, 2024). While seeking international support remains a significant challenge, Professor Hsu argues that the Taiwanese people should establish their own local freedom groups, separate from American influence. She states that the citizens of the territory should work in, “solidarity with groups marginalized by American Empire and with other global movements for decolonization.” (Funie, 2017). The professor sees a viable approach in establishing international alliances with those who would fight to death for freedoms, comparing such a cause to the Black Lives Matter movement in the US.
Finally, an author in the New York University Law Review, Christopher J. Carolan, discovers an argument for Taiwan on an international law standpoint. Carolan first states that by declaring independence, Taiwan would also secede from China, which would give the mainland the ability to suppress the action with force. However, he explains that China, even though they argue
that the territory has been established by the Chineses’ blood, sweat, and ingenuity, has no true claim to the land. The Taiwanese people have resisted colonization and an outside governance since the 1800s. Specific war-time declarations do not hold up for centuries after they are proclaimed. Even when the Allies declared that Taiwan should be handed over to China following the surrender of Japan in WW2, Taiwan was still, “not legally part of the territory of any state party to the declaration.” (Carolan, 449). Taiwan’s case for the independence, Carolan claims, may be reconsidered under the UN Charter, since they qualify by not being a legal entity of China, and would not be seceding.
Carolan continues by arguing that Taiwan must qualify as a state under international law to declare statehood. The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States outlines the formal language of a country declaring independence. Article 1 of the Convention states that, “ a state should possess "(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) [a] government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other States”. (451). Taiwan, with 21,000,000 inhabitants, easily qualifies for the population criteria. A defined territory simply means defined borders, and as an island territory, Taiwan’s borders are clearly marked. However, China’s claim to the land seems to jeopardize this claim, however, Carolan explains that the principle of effectiveness nullifies China’s claim to the land. The principle states that when, “a state has controlled a territory for a significant period of time with "the intention and will to act as sovereign," that state will be considered to have incorporated the territory.” (453). International committees have long given territorial claims to governments who have historically ruled over the land themselves (and those with consent of the governed). In 2008, the International Court of Justice ruled that the self-governing nation of Kosovo operated under international law when it declared independence, and numerous European nations and the US went on to recognize
the country (ICJ). China, therefore, would certainly lose a territorial claim of Taiwan on this basis of international law. Taiwan also clearly operates under a government, having a constitution adopted in 1947, allowing for legislative order on the island. Finally, Taiwan has the capability of establishing itself in foreign relations, maintaining diplomatic relations with UN member states and enjoys being a participant in alliances such as the Asian Development Bank. Carolan provides auxiliary criteria such as the regard for human rights, and the law of state responsibility, governing how a state could be liable for breaches of international legal obligations. Taiwan is applicable for both criteria.
Carolan claims that, by being applicable for all the following benchmarks, Taiwan is already a “de-facto” state. Their sovereignty lies in the complications of the PRC, who has agreed to not interact with nations that recognize Taiwan sovereignty. Taiwan then lies at the mercy of international committees and the UN to defy the unlawful threat China proposes to nations. While an argument for self-determination exists, Carolan concludes by reiterating that the battle for Taiwanese sovereignty has been played out, “with ‘no law or justice, no conception of right or wrong, and no morality’” (465). Should Taiwan claim sovereignty, international law would clearly back up the bold claim. China, threatened with the loss of credibility and prestige in the case of an independent Taiwan, have proven they would act with military force. Realists have described that certain world leaders have been in limbo to avoid conflict with China, but also have not completely ignored Taiwan in an effort to respect international law. Carolan, similar to Professor He, argues for a compromise between the island and China, however this is stated on the basis that a Chinese war would be costly, and may not be a clear and decisive victory for the mainland. Carolan stresses that countries make international law what they will, but they are compelled to uphold centuries of
doctrine which have provided the framework for international interactions and global cooperation.
Professor He, Hsu, and author Christopher Carolan provide three separate viewpoints on paths for Taiwanese sovereignty. Professor He preaches for a compromise between reunification and international recognition as the most practical approach to alleviate Beijing’s aggression, Professor Hsu recommends a grassroots approach through freedom groups and international committees from Taiwan citizens, while rejecting US involvement, and Christopher Carolan argues for a compromise on the basis of a moral solution on the basis of international law.
Taiwan sees two paths for independence, cooperation with the mainland, or the forceful expansion of freedom and anti-colonial committees. Additionally, cooperation with the mainland can also be seen in two different ways, through direct reunification with China, or cooperation with the mainland through arguments stemming from international law. Taiwanese sovereignty has been upheld through many mediums with some scholars yet to find conclusive evidence to China’s claim to the territory. Taiwan’s autonomous population and government have historically been oppressed by outside governments and influence, and have yet to be recognized internationally for their self-governance.
DESIRES OF CHINA, UNITED STATES, AND THE WORLD
The People’s Republic of China has long-stated their claim to sovereignty over the island of Taiwan. Media coverage of China’s bold stance to the issue on the island has significantly increased preceding and following the late Taiwanese presidential election. On January 12, Al Jazeera reported that, “China’s military has promised to ‘crush’ any efforts to promote Taiwan’s independence”. (Cheng, 2024). China has long conveyed their
dismay for the leading Democratic Progressive Party, who reject the mainland’s territorial claims to the island. The country has verbally warned nations who support Taiwan in any aspect. The Associated Press recently reported that China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated to reporters, “‘We would like to sternly tell the Philippines not to play with fire on the Taiwan issue ... [and] immediately stop making wrong words and deeds on Taiwanrelated issues, and stop sending any wrong signals to Taiwan independence and separatist forces’” (Associated Press, 2024). China remains dedicated to barring nations from influencing Taiwans’ claims to independence, frequently reiterating their claim to the island.
Reunification had always been an integral policy of Chinese administrations for decades. In 1979, China provided Taiwan a more peaceful co-existence, temporarily ceasing military exercises over the strait that divided the lands. They largely withheld formally addressing the conflict on the island until 2005, when the mainland country codified their beliefs towards Taiwan in a doctrine named the 2005 Anti-Secession Law. The legislation reiterates the nation’s desire to reunify with Taiwan, but also authorizes all “appropriate” forces, such as military power, in the event of a Taiwan ‘succession’ or independence. (Curtis, 2023).
Dean P. Chen, an associate professor at Ramapo College of New Jersey, explains the role of trade in China’s altering perspective on Taiwan. Professor Chen builds on the aforementioned description of China’s temporary ‘peaceful’ approach to the issue, but also their unrelenting military threat. She describes several factors in China’s decision making, including America’s influence across the Taiwan Strait, their ‘fragile’ superpower status, and economic factors regarding trade with Taiwan (Chen, 2014). Professor Chen begins by stating how the US has fought to keep peace and stability in the strait since the Cold War, through policy and declarations to defend Taiwan.
While the United States remains in support of the One-China doctrine, they will deter ill-advised actions from the mainland in an effort to protect democracy and peace. The author continues by describing how China is a lagging superpower and faces various domestic issues, such as corruption and internal conflict, economic inequality and regression, and growing social unrest. The Chinese military continues to fall behind the US, and officials remain weary of brash foreign policy and international conflict with superpowers like America. Lastly, bilateral trade across the strait has been increasing for decades, reaching $205.11 billion in 2022, according to the Taiwan government. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024). China risks a conflict with the United States, complicating a variety of domestic issues, and over 200 billion dollars worth of trade if they act upon attempting to unify Taiwan, specifically with force. While they are debates to these causes and China’s actions, Professor Chen concludes the article by stating that, “the ‘one China’ principle is essentially a socially constructed communicative discourse and process that allow for competing arguments and persuasions.” Each side essentially preaches for their truth to be heard, and the conflict remains ambiguous for countries to dissect.
Jude Blanchette and Gerard DiPippo, writers at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, published an article detailing the likely events following a successful military invasion of Taiwan. China, even though long desiring reunification, could only seek control of Taiwan through the outlet of force considering cooperation has been unlikely. Blanchette and DiPippo argue that China’s economy would first be immediately affected through international sanctions and tariffs from China’s critics and “rivals”, such as the US, and by the immediate loss of trade with Taiwan. (Blanchette, DiPippo, 2023). Apart from arms sales, China would face a determined Taiwanese army fighting for their homeland, as well as some sort of physical US military resistance. It's highly
likely a technologically advanced and capable force would prolong the conflict and also raise costs for China. Furthermore, in the event of a victory, the mainland would rule over an extremely hostile and war-torn population, effectively eliminating the practical prospect of attaining the land, with the move only a display of Chinese pride and protection from outside influence. China has long desired for other countries to dissociate themselves from the Taiwan question. However, it is simply a probability for the US and its allies to intervene in some form in the course of a hostile attack on the island. Therefore, China’s only ‘safe’ medium would be cooperation with the territory. China has had the intention to reunify with Taiwan since the 1900s, and the economic and social-political factors of conflict simply outweigh any significant benefits. While the CCP desires to use any means to achieve control of the island, they have proven to be reluctant to use any significant military actions. China’s path of least resistance to reoccupy the island would likely be through mutual agreements and inevitable compromises that maintain the peace and security of both nations.
The United States’ Desires
In the western hemisphere, the United States has governed on the basis of the One-China policy, and also by the defense of democracies across the nation. China presents a unique and defying challenge to US foreign policy, as one of the global superpowers asserting unilateral dominance in the sphere of international relations. Beijing’s growing military presence stops America from an outright declaration of unwavering Taiwanese support. The United States Congressional Service has provided an outlined history of American administrations and their governance of policy with Taiwan and China. (Congressional Research Service, 6). President Nixon in 1972 stated that Taiwan was a
Chinese issue, however by 1978, the country had moved to express its desire for a “peaceful resolution” by China. The Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 provided evidence that the US would defend against unjust acts towards the island, even though President Reagan in 1982 reiterated that a resolution would be a Chinese concern. The Reagan Administration did however declare ‘six assurances’ to Taiwan, which included no Chinese influence in arms sales, no end date for sales, no revisions to the TRA or the US’s stance on the sovereignty issue, and no pressure or influence in mediating or pressuring negotiations between Taipei and Beijing. In 1995, President Clinton was found to have sent a secret letter to the then-Chinese president, later named the “three notes”. Clinton stated that the US would “oppose” Taiwan’s independence, would not support “two Chinas” or one-China or one-Taiwan, and would not support Taiwan’s admission into the UN. (CRS, 11). His words were consequential, changing the US’s stance from neutral to against. Professor Michael Y. M. Kau at Brown University further talks about the reactions regarding perceptions of US policy following Clinton’s words. Professor Kau identifies several key points America should follow including, “sustaining the existing peace and stability along the Taiwan Strait based on the status quo [...] should be the primary objective [...] advancing and protecting human rights and democracy [...] comprehensive engagement and building strategic partnership with China [...] [and], the U.S. maintain[ing] its strength, commitment and vision in such a manner as to inspire trust, credibility, and strategic leadership [...] in the Asia-Pacific region.” (Kau, 7). The professor outlines common diplomatic strategies and policies America has taken in past times in similar incidents. Preaching for peace and democracy has been paramount in American foreign policy, and it guides US-Taiwanese relations to this day. China’s consistent threat of force has forced the US to continue arms sales to the island, seemingly supporting the
territory in self-defense. Through President Clinton and Bush, this support remained, with the latter stating that the US would do, “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend itself”. (8). The US’s bid to defend the island nation is the most aggressive part of its foreign policy in the region. China sees this promise as a threat to, what it understands is, its sovereign territory. However, even through strong language, US policy regarding Taiwan has still only supported the process of a peaceful resolution, rather than a specific result. Congressional actors have also supported the general prospect of a peaceful resolution, with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States stating Taiwan boasting bipartisan support in the US Congress, with over 200 members in the House Congressional Taiwan Caucus and 30 senators representing the Senate Taiwan Caucus. (Republic of China (Taiwan), 2024).
Since the 2000s, US Presidents have upheld the status quo. While Presidents Obama and Biden’s administrations were more ambiguous and representative of the current doctrine, President Trump and his team were more forceful in implementing a rougher approach on China, while conversely strengthening ties on Taiwan. (Crabtree, 2024). Lawrence Chung, a writer at the The South China Morning Post, recalls how Trump’s administration, “lifted various in-house rules to allow high-level exchanges between the two sides [and] authorized a record 11 batches of arms sales worth US$15 billion to Taiwan and signed multiple bills friendly to the island.” (Chung, 2024).
As of today, President Biden has reaffirmed that he does not support independence, most notably doing so on January 13rd. (The White House, 2024) U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated at the beginning of the year that Biden’s administration backs the ‘one China’ policy, which deals with a, “world of internal tension”, in regards to peace and stability in the region. (Cohen, 2023).
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs found through polls in 2023 that 65% of Americans believe that US security’s relationship with Taiwan does more to strengthen American national security. In addition, 78% of Americans support sending food and medical supplies to the island in case of an invasion, while only 44% of US citizens support sending troops to Taiwan to engage in battle with China. However, half of Americans do support the navy breaking up a Chinese blockade around Taiwan. (Kafura, 2023).
With just about half of Americans becoming increasingly concerned about the tensions regarding the island and China, it is clear that support remains for the ‘one China’ policy and the defense of international democracies. (Huang, 2023). While Taiwan is not a country, America is steadfast in its promise of the protection of democracies, which seems loosely similar to the ongoing war in Ukraine. While the circumstances are different, in both instances, the US still pledged its support for a democratic ally through military sales rather than American troops fighting on the ground. CIA Director William Burns recently stated, “One of the surest ways to rekindle Chinese perceptions of American fecklessness and stoke Chinese aggressiveness would be to abandon support for Ukraine. Continued material backing for Ukraine doesn’t come at the expense of Taiwan; it sends an important message of U.S. resolve that helps Taiwan” (Foreign Affairs). Burns explains that the US’s commitment to defend for worldwide democracies, such as Ukraine, overwhelmingly benefits the security of Taiwan by deterring Chinese interference. Extensive aid has helped Ukraine troops fended off Russian invasions, and even weakened some forces, and it is clear that China understands the message the US cast during this conflict and understands that similar resistance would occur in the case of a Taiwanese invasion. As a whole, the US government and an increasing number of Americans have been motivated, in part by
their growing dislike for China and its government, to express a majority support for aid, and just about half of US citizens express mandatory action by the Navy to prevent and protect the surroundings of Taiwan.
For the foreseeable future, the United States will likely uphold the status quo, and considering that the policy has not been amended for decades, China may see it as a move of aggression for the President of a country as influential as the US to alter the policy in either party’s favor. Additionally, the general sentiment of the American people also supports the current policy. The United States has been identified as the most impactful country in this conflict as nearby superpowers like Russia faithfully support China’s claim of Taiwan, or follow similar “one-China” policies like India (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Menon).
Taiwan’s Desires
Perhaps the most important party of this conflict, Taiwan, has an immense dilemma surrounding the conditions of China’s aggression. China has historically been an integral trade partner for the island territory, with 42% of exports heading towards the country. This trade pattern is a chain necessary for the Taiwanese economy, China exports raw materials to Taipei, while Taiwan sends high-end computer technology, most notably semiconductors, back to Beijing. China has claimed to have programs designed to help build these components themselves, however up to today, they have not been able to replicate Taiwanese manufacturing strategies for these chips. (Kohlmann, 2022). However, the Wall Street Journal reported in November of 2023 that Taiwanese exports to the US have soared over 80% throughout 2023, while mainland exports decreased by 1%. (Wang, 2023). The significance of even -1% is paramount to
China, who had been enjoying steady growth and integration with the island nation. The United States have expressed their wishes for Taiwan to expand and diversify their sourcing, noting China’s weakening economy and low wages.
Even through alternatives and a slumping Chinese market, breaking away from the mainland through trade would remain disastrous for both parties. Due to this, change is not expected to occur within either party for the short-term.
Support on the island hasn’t veered one way or the other in the modern era. Former Vice President and President-Elect Lai Chingte has stated that he will always “support Taiwanese independence” but would not declare it. Ching-te claims that the island is “already independent”, the identical claim made by his predecessor President Tsai.
As previously stated, nearly half of Taiwanese citizens support independence. However, the poll makes it clear that most respondents understand the political and economic constraints and don’t seek for full independence immediately. In the case that the status quo is no longer sustainable, even more citizens support independence.
In all, trade seems to be a motivating factor in Taiwanese citizens desiring independence or the status quo. With potentially disastrous economic consequences for all parties involved, lagging popular support for the cause, and a universally adopted unwavering and strong sense of nationalism, the prospect of immediately claiming Taiwan’s independence is not entirely favored. Most desire to continue and improve the status quo, by potentially attempting to negotiate with China for more diplomatic freedoms (Yi).
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER THOUGHTS
The freedom of over 23,500,000 people is at stake on this small island. Many fail to realize the extensive significance Taiwan has on global affairs. Letting Taiwan fall would signify a horrific failure to uphold and protect international political freedoms, a worst-case scenario for controlling global power and China’s regional hegemony, and a consequential shift in the world economy. China’s influence would continue to dominate not just in Asia but across all continents, their striking down of democratic nations would signify a loss for all people regardless of political affiliation. Oppressive governments have proven to be unbeneficial for all parties, and it should be clear that this practice should be abandoned. This ideology must start with China and Taiwan. There are many ways for the people of Taiwan or others around the globe can help influence and participate in spreading their voice and helping the cause. Scholars like Professor He who suggested international diplomatic committees, and Professor Carolan who asked for cooperation and compromise, have both provided more peaceful mediums for resolving this conflict. Many think this dispute would inevitably be sent down the path to war, however, we must understand the importance of preserving and continuing the effective practices of non-violent and progressive ideologies. In a time of nonstop global conflict, a campaign–a strong and unwavering example of freedom, must prevail.
Work
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