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The Cancellation Curse Grows Less

Tihe *". when an order meant mighty little in the lumber business; at least to a whole lot of people on both ends of the game-manufacturing'and retailing.

In those days, to such people (and there rvere lots of them) an order simply meant that this transaction would be completed unless there was some considerable change in the lumber market before the stock was shipped. If the market took a slump and he found he could buy the stock much cheaper, Mr. Retailer used to cancel the order. If it went the other way, and the mill found that he could sell that stock to much better advantage, the order was slipped down to the bottom of the order file, awaiting such time as once again the pendulum swung'back to where they could afford to ship it.

Sad and unbusinesslike, rvasn't it ? No doubt. Yet it WAS done, and a whole lot of it. Every sweeping change in lumber prices brought its little flood of bitterness from either one side or the other, depending on whose "ox was gored." It would require a Solomon to say rvhich side '"vas the guiltiest dlrring the past trventy years'

Of course, there has been much change in this particulirly sa<l trait in lumber merchandising. Today nine out of every ten lumber dealers looks upon an order as a contract, and takes his medicine rvhen he guesses wrong on the lumber market. Nine out of ten mills look on it tl-re same way, and ship the stock as soon as they had intended to do when the order was taken.

But there is still that other one out of probably ten that keep up the old cancellation habit. And it still continues to cause trouble. \Me have been hearing specific cases of the same thing lately.

And rve continue to express the same thought that we have in these columns for eleven years, namely, that an order when agreed to by two parties is a legal and moral contract, and should not be violated except for good and sufficient cause. It should NEVER be violated because one or the other guessed wrong on the market. That is the weakest of all excuses.

But the ordinary lumber order as it is made today is NOT specific enough to be the most legal of contracts, because it is not sufficiently clear as to terms. If the mill is to be able to hold a dealer to an order and say to him, "Because you signed this order you must accept this stock on delivery" it is necessary that the buyer likewise be able to say to the mill, "You must ship that stock within a certain time or accept certain penalties." The obligation on the buyer is that he must accept the stock "on delivery." Then a specific obligation must necessarily likewise rest upon the sl-ripper. Otherwise the obligations are NOT mutual.

Let us srlppose that a dealer orders a car of lumber, and by the time it is shipped the market has slumped five dol-

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