2ND NATIONAL SUMMIT ON
UNCREWED AERIAL VEHICLES SAN DIEGO
February 25–26, 2025 • Admiral Baker Clubhouse, San Diego, CA
Exclusive Speaker Interview
BRIAN KEITH
Protective Security Advisor
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
LTGEN SAM MUNDY, (USMC-RET)
Distinguished Sr. Fellow on National Security Middle Eastern Institute President, One a Marine, LLC, Former Commander, MARCENT
DR. MARK MAYBURY
Vice President, Commercialization, Engineering & Technology Lockheed Martin
BRANDON YOUNGBLOOD
Principal Drone Security Services
Former FAA Group Manager, UAS Security, and CUAS Integration, (AJR-26) Air Traffic Organization
Insights from Industry Leaders: Exclusive Speaker Interviews from the UAV Summit
At ACI's UAV Summit, attendees will gain exclusive access to thought-provoking sessions with some of the most influential voices in the UAV field. These distinguished experts bring a wealth of experience from cybersecurity, military strategy, advanced technology development, and airspace security. Through in-depth discussions, they tackle critical questions about the regulatory, operational, and tactical challenges facing UAV adoption in military operations. Read on, as they share their perspectives on the latest technological innovations shaping the future of UAVs, as well as the strategic and security considerations for their effective deployment. These interviews offer a rare glimpse into the minds of leaders driving the evolution of UAV technology and its integration into modern military strategy.
Emerging Challenges: What do you see as the biggest regulatory, operational, or tactical challenges currently impacting the adoption and integration of uncrewed aerial vehicles in military operations, including intelligence, surveillance, and logistics support?
Brian Keith: I cannot speak for military challenges as CISA is a civilian security agency. However, some of the challenges being faced by critical infrastructure owners and operators is the inability to control uncrewed aerial vehicles from flying over their infrastructure sites. This makes it very difficult for infrastructure owners and operators to determine “actual” kinetic and/or cyber threats from uncrewed aerial vehicles as opposed to ones being used for legitimate commercial purposes, i.e. medical supplies and package deliveries.
Sam Mundy: First, from a homeland defense aspect, I think the U.S. needs to adapt and improve its regulatory architecture to deal with the increasing use of UAS systems. As reported in the news in December 2024, several unidentified UASs flew at will over towns and at least one military base (Picatinny Arsenal) in New Jersey. The lackluster response to these events underscores a possible disconnect between Federal and state/local levels when it comes to identifying, tracking and ultimately countering UAS systems. It also highlights the value of having low collateral effects CUAS systems to use in populated areas and to facilitate capture/ exploitation. We’re not alone in this. The Israelis noted a similar problem in their ability to deal with low-flying drones where the threat reportedly found a “loophole” in radar coverage below their multi-layered air defense systems (Arrow, David’s Sling, Iron Dome). One solution may be the adoption of simple air space deconfliction, i.e. a “low sky layer” or related practice, that enables local CUAS implementation.
Second, the production at scale of counter-UAS systems still seems to be lagging the novel and rapid development of UAS systems used for offensive purposes. Replicator 2 is supposed to address this, in part, but its success over time remains to be seen. We need a broad approach to address this problem by working with allies and partners, especially the Ukrainians, to balance exquisite systems with cheaper, attributable systems, and - as many have cited - to use transaction authorities that enable rapid prototyping and fielding. (On that last point, my understanding is the Ukrainians in some cases are able to move from prototyping to fielding within days. While they have the “immediacy of the battle” to compel decisions, I am unaware of any similar metric in recent U.S. acquisition experience.) The new DoD Strategy for countering unmanned systems is a good start, with lines of effort redolent of our counter-improvised explosive device efforts 20 years ago, but it also seems late-to-need.
Other challenges include: supply chain shortages arising from Chinese sanctions; the development of smaller, lighterweight systems for individuals and teams, both stationary and on-the-move; and perhaps more attention paid to passive defensive measures that protect vehicle apertures/openings, shelters, and defensive positions
Mark Maybury: Ensuring UAVs are trusted in contested operations. This means they both have the capability to operate autonomously but also operators have confidence in their ability and predictability in an uncertain environment.
Brandon Youngblood: The lack of trust in the technology and a general apprehension by military leadership to commit to large scale integration. The only scaled mission set that has been fully integrated into military operations, which one could argue exceeds manned aircraft involvement, is intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) collection. This is a proven and non-controversial usage of UAS technology so, therefore, low risk from an acquisition and leadership reputation perspective. However, when the RQ-1 Predator was first utilized in an operational environment (Kosovo), it took bold military leadership to “buck” the traditional way of thinking and overcome an enormous amount of negative pressure from cultural norm “hawks.” There has been limited adoption of precision strike UAS operations via the MQ-9 Reaper, however, those missions are largely intertwined with an ongoing ISR role. Additionally, weapons employment by armed UAS are still primarily confined to permissive, asymmetric warfare environments.
While there are multiple prototyping and development programs being pursued, e.g. MQ-25 airborne refueling drone, there has yet to be a full commitment to a scaled program of record which leverages UAS technology. For example, I personally believe there is potential for a low-risk acquisition program to develop and integrate a logistics specific UAS “hauler” which could reduce general logistics operations of the current UH-60, CH-47, MV-22 and other “manned” VTOL aircraft fleets. While the military desires versatility in equipment, e.g. being able to transport logistics and personnel, there is space for a material transport vehicle which would reduce the need for the number of VTOL personnel transport carriers which performs both tasks.
As with the RQ-1 Predator program, this would require bold and innovative leadership to champion such a program.
Innovation and Trends: In your view, what are the most exciting advancements in UAV technology over the past year, and how are these innovations shaping the future of military applications, from battlefield strategy to force readiness?
Brian Keith: One of the most innovative advancements in UAV technology currently being used in the homeland security arena is drones being used to conduct LiDAR assessments of critical infrastructure both pre and post incident response. Several of the federal response government agencies such as CISA and FEMA are currently evaluating this capability to gather “real time” data for areas that have been impacted by natural disasters and man made incidents.
Sam Mundy: I’m short on details, but the Defense Innovation Unit’s effort to develop a common software for uncrewed (and presumably counter-uncrewed) systems along with a compatible C2 backbone sounds like a timely initiative. Merging and coordinating numerous, overlapping UAS and CUAS systems must be a real burden for even our best communications specialists.
The development and use of AI to guide drones in high EW threat environments, mesh networks for improved coordination among UAS systems, and FPV drones as a counter-UAS system are all innovative advances worthy of further exploration. Honorable mention goes to the effective use of the USS Carney’s 5-inch main gun to shoot down Houthi missiles and drones in the Red Sea last year — a CUAS success story that might imply a continuing, cost-effective role for “direct fire” systems enabled by powerful sensors.
Mark Maybury: The rapid advancement of generative AI and machine learning is both disrupting the (generative) design and intelligent manufacture of UASs but also enabling their rapid advancement in terms of the OODA loop. The ability to learn and operate at scale will yield decisive advantage in the battlefield. However, attacks against machine intelligence to undermine the integrity of an uncrewed system will become increasingly sophisticated and deleterious, turning friendly forces into foes.
Brandon Youngblood: Automated navigation and non-GPS required spatial awareness technological advances have progressed at incredible speeds. The most advanced UAS systems no longer require GPS or a human-in-the-loop to navigate confined spaces or through an urban environment. Advanced sensors, e.g. miniaturized LiDAR, and onboard computation power have enabled UAS to “see” and navigate the world as a human would; sometimes with more awareness and precision than a person.
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the Conversation at the Cocktail Reception
Opportunities and Next Steps
Operational and Security Considerations: As uncrewed aerial vehicles become increasingly integral to military operations, what are the primary challenges and considerations in ensuring their secure and effective deployment in complex operational environments?
Brian Keith: One of the major challenges for first responders operating uncrewed aircraft in major urban areas is the deconfliction of flights (crewed vs. uncrewed) around densely populated areas such as downtown Los Angeles. In the absence of a regulated Unmanned Air Traffic Control System, there will continue to be safety concerns around flying these aircraft in class G airspace around major metropolitan cities. Another challenge is the lack of cyber security measures built into these aircraft. A large percentage of commercial drones that are being used by hobbyists and first responders are not being made in the United States. This presents several operational security vulnerabilities in the integrity of the data being collected by the aircraft.
Sam Mundy: I read recently that AI enabled offensive developments are outpacing AI for defensive purposes. We need to make sure our CUAS systems are appropriately equipped and enabled to deal with AI developments in UAS.
As with any new capability, having enough time for our individual soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines to train with and master the employment of UAS systems will be a key concern for every commander. Realistic training environments (ranges, air spaces) that allow the use of representative UAS threat types and varieties, and our CUAS systems, could be a related challenge, given the rapidly developing character of UAS capabilities and our normal bureaucratic approval processes.
The proliferation of technology in the hands of potential adversaries puts a premium on rapid development, fielding and employment. Our acquisition system, governed by laws and funding provided by the U.S. Congress, must adjust to this reality.
Mark Maybury: Operational test and evaluation of learning and evolving machines will be a primary challenge as well as dealing with denial and deception (e.g., consider that humans now have difficulty discerning deep fakes from reality). Operators are faced with the challenge of needing to accrue the benefits of uncrewed systems (e.g., operating in dull, dirty, and dangerous environments) while at the same time mitigating the threat they pose to safe operations and/or the new attack surface they introduce as adversaries will seek to exploit vulnerabilities in their perception, decision, and action (e.g.., poisoning the data they use to learn from, exploiting biases or brittleness in their AI models, or undermining the baroqueness of machine learning systems which are poor at explanation and justification of action).
Brandon Youngblood: As uncrewed aerial vehicles become increasingly integral to military operations, what are the primary challenges and considerations in ensuring their secure and effective deployment in complex operational environments?
UAS are robots. They have no loyalty; they have no emotion. They execute their programming regardless of the intent, outcome or any other “human” characterization one could apply. With this comes inherent risks.
1. Cyber takeover – UAS, at their most basic level, are computers running programs. Like all computers, they are susceptible cyber intrusions and take over. Cybersecurity and/or cyber hardening requirements need to be a primary consideration when developing requirements for UAS.
2. Data Receiving – following the cyber vulnerability train of thought, a UAS must be able to decern from adversarial data reception and friendly. Data encryption and verification of data source will be fundamental in protecting from potential cyber “takeover” or disruption of operations.
3. Adaption to battlefield uncertainties and decision making – One of the greatest assets the U.S. military employees on the battlefield is the empowerment of combat decision making authority to squad levels. This delegated decision-making authority enables combat forces to move and adapt to the combat environment which substantially increases their combat effectiveness and the likelihood of achieving overall mission success. However, those decision-making abilities are derived from innate human characteristics which are incredibly difficult to program into programming computational processes.
Stating this issue in another way, UAS are limited in their ability to apply deductive reasoning within their decision-making calculations. While there have been significant advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) through various machine learning methodologies, programs lack and will likely continue to lack the innate human characteristics of loyalty and complex risk vs. reward, non-quantitative computation and action. This simple to say, yet complex to articulate matter is why United States doctrine on “pushing the button” for weapons employment MUST be executed by a human and not an automated computer function. Therefore, UAS weapons employment will be limited to act in combat environments in ways that a human pilot is not.
Shaping the Future of UAVs in Military Operations
With UAVs playing an increasingly pivotal role in intelligence, logistics, and combat scenarios, the UAV Summit will provide a platform to discuss the most pressing operational, security, and technological considerations. Attendees will gain valuable insights into the trends shaping UAV integration into complex operational environments and discover how emerging innovations are driving new possibilities for military applications. This event is a must-attend for anyone invested in understanding the transformative potential of UAV technology and its impact on modern military strategy.