ACI’S 2ND ANNUAL
NATIONAL C-UAS CONGRESS
SECURING
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
DEFEND TODAY, SECURE TOMORROW
SECURING
DEFEND TODAY, SECURE TOMORROW
CISA’s mission is to lead the national effort to understand, manage, and reduce risk to our cyber and physical infrastructure.
The integration of unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace system and within critical infrastructure operations has emerged as a particularly concerning physical and cyber threat.
▪ Most common incidents
▪ Intent not required to represent a threat
▪ UAS maintenance and operator training unverifiable leading to recklessness
▪ Unintentionally or unknowingly violate flight restrictions
Non-attack nefarious Cyber / physical attack
▪ Hide in plain sight
▪ Spying to conduct IP theft or Espionage
▪ Pre-operational planning surveillance
▪ Disrupt to distract or delay
▪ Deliver payloads supporting insider criminal acts
▪ Battle tested
▪ Traditional security measures ineffective (gates/guards)
▪ Close-in blast capable
▪ Expansive cargo array
▪ Payload / drop capable
▪ Sprayers
▪ Cyber-attack platform
▪ Sensors / Cameras
Commercial Facilities Sector incidents include disrupting sporting venues and crashing into amusement rides.
Energy Sector incidents include drones crashing into electricity substations, damaging powerlines, and surveillance on oil & gas facilities.
Transportation Systems Sector incidents include disrupting air operations and suspicious activity around rail facilities and pipelines.
Chemical Sector incidents include conducting surveillance around chemical facilities and drones landing/crashing in secure areas.
Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector incidents include interfering with nuclear facilities and conducting surveillance.
Majority of critical infrastructure is owned/operated by the private sector
Airspace above most critical infrastructure is generally unrestricted
Limited/no air domain awareness due to legal restrictions/ambiguity when operating detection-only technology
When detection is possible -- attribution and accountability are unreliable
Private sector AND their supporting SLTT law enforcement not authorized mitigation technology to counter credible threats
Modifying risk assessment methodology
Engaging local communities and posting signage
Investing in and operating authorized detection-only technology
Updating incident response plans and partnering with local law enforcement to address suspicious activity
Advocating for federal, state and local laws and regulations
Execute the Domestic C-UAS
National Action Plan
Reauthorize and expand existing C-UAS authorities
✓ TSA C-UAS authority
✓ Detection-only for critical infrastructure
✓ SLTT law enforcement C-UAS Pilot
Improve UAS incident reporting
Operationalize Remote ID
Implement Section 2209 of the FAA Extension, Safety and Security Act of 2016
“Establish procedures for applicants to petition the FAA to prohibit or restrict the operation of drones in close proximity to a fixed site facility (critical infrastructure)”
Invest in public awareness and education activities
“hardware, software or other product or service…primarily intended to fulfill or enable the function of information or data processing, storage, retrieval or communication by electronic means”
Why it matters – too often inexperienced operators view drones as a toy and ignore airspace rules –similarly, organizations with siloed security functions can overlook drones as a connected device and ignore cyber hygiene and cybersecurity standards required to protect information and networks.
Chinese UAS market dominance
Chinese Intelligence Law of 2017
Executive Order 13981
Chinese military-civil designations – 1206h
2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy
2023 ODNI Annual Threat Assessment
Invest in tested and verified secure drone technology
Integrate physical and cybersecurity security functions
Establish and maintain secure drone fleets
Train drone operators on cyber hygiene and cybersecurity before, during and after flights