Catalan International View
Special Issue 7 • Summer 2010 • E 5
A European Review of the World
Dossier NEEWS: New
Emerging European Western States
Articles by Antoni Abat, Jaume López, Montserrat Guibernau, Ulisses Moulines, Joan Costa-Font, Carme Junyent and Josep M. Colomer
Interviews with Martin McGuinness, Alex Salmond, Bart de Wever, Artur Mas, Joan Puigcercós, Juan José Ibarretxe and Patxi Zabaleta
Tourism, Identity and Added Value
by Francesc Iglesies, Jaume Font and Marien André
The Unfinished Family
by Alfred Bosch
Cover Artist: Gabriel SECTIONS: Opinion · Interview · Europe · Universal Catalans · Green Debate A Short Story from History · The Artist · A Poem
To Our Readers
Editor
Víctor Terradellas
6......... The names and reasons behind the new Europe of the twenty-first century by Víctor Terradellas
Dossier: NEEWS
Francesc de Dalmases
vterradellas@catmon.cat Director director@international-view.cat Art Director
Quim Milla
Contents
8......... Pay attention to the NEEWS, they’re the new Europe by Francesc de Dalmases and Marc Gafarot
10........ Catalan internal enlargement
by Antoni Abat
designer@international-view.cat Head of International Relations
14........ New states in Europe?
20. ...... The rise of the radical right
Marc Gafarot
marcgafarot@catmon.cat
Editorial Board
Martí Anglada Manel Balcells Enric Canela Àngel Font Anna Grau August Gil-Matamala Montserrat Guibernau Guillem López-Casasnovas Manuel Manonelles Fèlix Martí Arcadi Oliveres Eva Piquer Ricard Planas Vicent Sanchis Pere Torres Carles Vilarrubí Vicenç Villatoro Chief Editors
Judit Aixalà Francesc Parés
Language Advisory Service
Nigel Balfour Júlia López Webmaster
Marta Calvó Cover Art
Gabriel
The reproduction of the artwork on the front cover is thanks to an agreement between Fundació Vila Casas and Fundació CATmón Executive Production Headquarters, Administration and Subscriptions
Fonollar, 14 08003 Barcelona Catalonia (Europe) Tel.: + 34 93 533 42 38 Fax: + 34 93 319 22 24 www. international-view.cat Legal deposit
B-26639-2008 ISSN
2013-0716
© Edicions de la Fundació CATmón. All rights reserved. Neither this publication nor any part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, protocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of Edicions de la Fundació CATmón. Printed in Catalonia by
Imgesa Published every three months.
by Jaume López
by Montserrat Guibernau
by Ulisses Moulines
26........ The Nation in the current European context 32........ The economic prospects of Catalonia’s identity
by Joan Costa-Font
38........ Ecolinguistics, or a mirror on the real world
by Carme Junyent
42........ Europe, like America
by Josep M. Colomer
Interviews
46........ Martin McGuinness 50........ Alex Salmond 54........ Bart de Wever 58........ Artur Mas 62........ Joan Puigcercós 66. ...... Juan José Ibarretxe 70........ Patxi Zabaleta opinion
74........ The unfinished family by Alfred Bosch Interview
78........ Jaume Cabré
by Eva Piquer
Special - Tourism
88........ Tourism in Catalonia
by Francesc Iglesies
94. ...... Catalonia, a tourist country
by Jaume Font
100...... Tourism, economy and identity
by Marien André
Universal Catalans
104. ..... Josep Trueta
by Antoni Strubell-Trueta
Green Debate
108. ..... Halting the loss of biodiversity
by Carme Rosell
A Short Story from History
114....... The Consulate of the Seas The Artist
116....... Gabriel A Poem
118....... Desolation
by Joan Alcover
Catalan International View
Editorial Board Martí Anglada Foreign news editor at TV3 (Catalonia television). He has been foreign correspondent in the Middle East, Italy and Great Britain (19771984) for the Barcelona newspaper La Vanguardia and United States correspondent for TV3 (1987-1990). He has also been an international political commentator. His latest book is Afers no tan estrangers (Not So Foreign Affairs) published by Editorial Mina (part of Grup 62).
Manel Balcells (Ripoll, 1958). Doctor specialising in orthopaedics, traumatology and sports medicine. Holds a degree in Health Management from EADA and is a member of a number of scientific societies. In his distinguished career in the health sector he has been medical director of Granollers General Hospital (Barcelona); both director and secretary of Coordination and Strategy for the Department of Health of the Generalitat de Catalunya; councillor for the Department of Universities, Research and Information Society; and consultant for the Catalan Hospital Consortium. Since the 27th of December 2006 he has been president of the board of directors of the Private BioRegion Foundation of Catalonia.
Enric Canela (Barcelona, 1949). Holds a Chemistry degree from the Universitat de Barcelona (UB, 1972) and a PhD in Chemistry with Biochemistry as his specialisation. Lecturer at the UB since 1974, he is professor of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology and head of the department of the same name in the Biology Faculty of the UB. He collaborates in research on intracellular communication and theoretical biochemistry. He regularly publishes in scientific journals of international renown. Between 1991 and 1995 he was vice-president of the Catalan Biology Society. He has been president of the Society for Knowledge since September 2007. Since June 2007 he has been patron of the National Agency for Quality Assessment and Accreditation (ANECA) for the Spanish state.
Àngel Font (lleida, 1965). Holds a degree in Chemical Sciences from the Universitat de Barcelona and a diploma in Business Management from EADA Business School. Began his career in an environmental engineering company and subsequently joined Intermón Oxfam where he held the post of coordinator on projects in Latin America, fund-raising and public relations and assistant to the director general. Since 2000 he has been director of the Un Sol Món (One World) Foundation financed by the Caixa de Catalunya (savings bank) where he runs projects for social housing and employment for disadvantaged groups as well as the development of microfinance in Spain, Latin America and Africa. Àngel Font is a member of the Cooperation Council of the Generalitat de Catalunya and was the first vice-president of the European Microfinance Network. He carries out teaching duties related to the management of non-profit organisations at a number of business schools.
Anna Grau Journalist and writer. From 1991 to 2005 she worked as a political journalist in Barcelona and Madrid, where she was the correspondent for the Avui newspaper and numerous programmes for TV3, Catalunya Ràdio, Ràdio4 and COM ràdio. In 2005 she left for New York, where she currently works. Author of El dia que va morir el president (the Day the President Died), Dones contra dones (Women Against Women) Endarrere aquesta gent (Reject These People) and the essay Per què parir (Why have a baby?).
August Gil-Matamala Has been a practising lawyer since 1960, specialising in the fields of criminal and labour law. He has taken part in numerous cases in defence of people on trial for their demands in favour of people’s rights, as well as hearings before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Matamala fought the first successful case against the Spanish state for the violation of basic rights. He is a founder member of the Commission for the Defence of Individual Rights of the Col·legi d’Advocats de Barcelona (the Barcelona Bar Association) and the Catalan Association for the Defence of Human Rights, which he presided over from its foundation in 1985 to 2001. Gil Matamala has also been president of both the Fundació Catalunya and the European Democratic Lawyers organisation. In 2007, coinciding with his retirement, he received the Creu de Sant Jordi (St. George’s Cross, the highest honour awarded by the Catalan government).
Montserrat Guibernau Professor of Politics at Queen Mary College, University of London. Holds a PhD and an MA in Social and Political Theory from the University of Cambridge and a degree in Philosophy from the Universitat de Barcelona. She has taught at the universities of Warwick, Cambridge, Barcelona, the London School of Economics and the Open University. Guibernau has held visiting professorhips at the universities of Edinburgh, Tampere, Pompeu Fabra, the UQAM (Quebec) and the Austrian Academy of Sciences. Currently she holds a visiting fellowship at the Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics. Montserrat Guibernau is the author of numerous books and articles on nationalism, the nation-state, national identity, and national and ethnic minorities in the West from the perspective of global governance.
Guillem López-Casasnovas (Menorca, 1955). Holds a degree in Economics (distinction, 1978) and Law (1979) from the Universitat de Barcelona (UB). He obtained his PhD in Public Economics from the University of York (UK, 1984). He has been a lecturer at the Universitat de Barcelona, visiting scholar at the Institute of Social and Economic Research (UK), University of Sussex and at the Graduate School of Business at the University of Stanford (USA). Since June 1992 has been full professor of economics at Barcelona’s Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF), where he has been vice-rector of Economics and International Relations and dean of the School of Economics and Business Science. In 1998 he created the Economics and Health Research Centre (CRES- UPF), which he directed until recently. Co-director of the Master’s in Public Management (UPF-UAB-EAPC). In 2000 he received the Catalan Economics Society Award and in 2001 the Joan Sardà Dexeus Award. He is also a member of the Menorcan Institute of Studies, The Catalan Royal Academy of Medicine and a distinguished member of the Economists’ Society of Catalunya. President of the International Health Economics Association and since 2005 one of the Spanish Central Bank’s six independent Council members.
Manuel Manonelles Political commentator specialising in international relations, human rights and democratisation processes. Currently director of the Foundation for a Culture of Peace, Barcelona. He has been special advisor to the Co-chair of the UN High Level Group for the Alliance of Civilisations, as well as advisor to the coordinator of the Secretariat of the World Forum of Civil Society Networks (Ubuntu Forum), which is a member of the International Council of the World Social Forum. He has been an international electoral observer and supervisor for the OSCE and the EU on many occasions, and has participated in several international intergovernmental and non-governmental processes.
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Catalan International View
Fèlix Martí Former president of the International Catholic Movement for Intellectual and Cultural Affairs (Pax Romana), from 1975 to 1984; director of Catalonia magazine (1987-2002), a publication printed in four different languages, aimed at disseminating Catalan culture; director of the UNESCO centre of Catalonia (1984 to 2002) and later its honorary president (from 2003). From 1994 to 2002 he was editor of the Catalan editions of the yearly reports of the Washington-based Worldwatch Institute, L’Estat del món (The State of the World) and Signes vitals (Vital Signs). He promotes the Declaration on Contributions by Religions to a Culture of Peace, signed by leaders of the great religious traditions in 1994. President of the Linguapax International Institute from 2001 to 2004 and honorary president thereafter. Wrote his memoirs Diplomàtic sense estat (Diplomat Without a State), published by Edicions Proa in 2006. Was awarded the UNESCO Human Rights Medal in 1995 and the Generalitat de Catalunya’s Creu de Sant Jordi (St. George’s Cross) in 2002.
Arcadi Oliveres (Barcelona, 1945). PhD in Economic Science, lecturer in the Department of Applied Economics at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and president of the organisation Justícia i Pau ( Justice and Peace). He is also president of the Catalan Council for the Promotion of Peace, the International Peace University Foundation of Sant Cugat del Vallès, the Federation of Internationally Recognised Catalan Organisations (FOCIR) and the Easy to Read Association. He is an expert on North-South relations, international trade, external debt and defence economics and also lectures on aid and development for a number of master’s and PhD programmes.
Eva Piquer (Barcelona, 1969). Writer and journalist. Works for the Avui newspaper where she coordinates the cultural supplement and the culture section. Has been a lecturer at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and a New York news correspondent. Won the 2002 Josep Pla prize for her novel Una victòria diferent (A Different Victory). Also author of several books, including La noia del temps (The Weather Girl), Alícia al país de la televisió (Alice in Television Land) and No sóc obsessiva, no sóc obsessiva, no sóc obsessiva (I’m Not Obsessive, I’m Not Obsessive, I’m Not Obsessive).
Ricard Planas (Girona, 1976). Journalist, art critic and cultural promoter. Studied Philology and the History of Art at the Universitat de Girona. In 1999 he founded the magazine Bonart, dedicated to the contemporary art scene in the Catalan Countries. More recently he created and directed the Catalan art fair INART in 2005 and 2006. Has worked as the curator for exhibitions by important artists such as Arranz-Bravo, Lamazares, Formiguera, Cuixart, Ansesa and Grau-Garriga. Ricard has collaborated with Ona Catalana, Catalunya Ràdio, iCatfm and Onda Rambla radio stations. Has also worked for the Diari de Girona, El Punt and El Mundo newspapers, among others.
Vicent Sanchis (València, 1961). Holds a degree in Information Sciences from the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. In his career as a journalist it is worth highlighting that he has worked and collaborated on many publications and with numerous publishers; he has been editor and director of El Temps magazine; director of Setze magazine, the Catalan supplement of Cambio 16; and director of the newspapers El Observador and Avui. He has also excelled as a scriptwriter and director on different TV programmes. At present he is president of the editorial board of Avui, content director of Grup Cultura 03 and vice-president of Òmnium Cultural. Vicent is also lecturer in the Faculty of Communication Sciences at Universitat Ramon Llull de Barcelona.
Pere Torres Biologist and environmental consultant. After some time spent on research (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona), he joined the Government of Catalonia in 1991. He was in turn secretary of the Catalan Inter-university Council (1991-1993), head of the Environment Minister’s staff (1993-1995), general director of Environmental Planning (1995-2000) and secretary for Regional Planning (2000-2003). Since 2004 he has done consultancy work in public management, sustainability and land use planning and has been a regular contributor to the International Institute for Governability and the Cerdà Institute.
Carles Vilarrubí (Barcelona, 1954). Businessman. He is currently Executive Vice-President of Rothschild Spain Investment Bank, specialising in key mergers and takeovers in the financial sector on an international scale. President of CVC Grupo Consejero, an equity and investment advisory firm, with a portfolio of shares in consulting and service companies from the world of communications, the media, marketing, technology and telecommunications. President of Doxa Consulting Group, independent consultants on technology, media and telecommunications, leaders in the sector and with a presence in Spain and Portugal. He is a member of the advisory board of the Catalan confederation Foment del Treball Nacional (National Employment Promotion) and patron of the Fundació Orfeó Català - Palau de la Música. He has also been a member of the governing council of ADENA WWF (World Wild Fund for Nature), and sat on the boards of the Fundación Arte y Tecnología, Fundesco and Fundación Entorno.
Vicenç Villatoro (Terrassa, 1957). Writer and journalist. Holds a degree in Information Sciences. Former president of the Ramon Trias Fargas Foundation. As a journalist he has worked for numerous organisations. He was the editor of the Avui newspaper from 1993 to 1996 and head of the culture section of TV3. Between 2002 and 2004 was director general of the Catalan Radio and Television Corporation. He has contributed to a range of media companies, such as Avui, El Periódico, El País, El Temps, Catalunya Ràdio and Com Ràdio. As a writer he has written a dozen novels.
Francesc de Dalmases (Director) (Barcelona, 1970). He works as a journalist as well as being a logistician and consultant in humanitarian aid and cooperation and development. Has been president (1999-2006) of the Association of Periodicals in Catalan (APPEC); coordinator for the delegation to the Spanish state of European Bureau for Lesser-Used Languages (1995-1999); coordinator for the third conference of the CONSEU (Conference of European Stateless Nations) (1999); and coordinator for the publication Europa de les Nacions (1993-1999). Has acted as a foreign expert in aid projects in such diverse locations as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mongolia, Kosovo, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mexico, Guatemala and Morocco. He a member of the Cooperation Council of the Catalan government.
Víctor Terradellas (Editor) (Reus, 1962). Entrepreneur and political and cultural activist. President and founder of CATmón Foundation. Editor of Catalan International View and ONGC, a magazine dedicated to political thought, solidarity, aid and international relations. Víctor has always been involved in political and social activism, both nationally and internationally. The driving force behind the Plataforma per la Sobirania (The Platform for Self-Determination) as well as being responsible for significant Catalan aid operations and international relations in such diverse locations as Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Albania, Afghanistan, Mongolia, Pakistan and Kurdistan.
Catalan International View
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To Our Readers
The names and reasons behind the new Europe of the twenty-first century by Víctor Terradellas
On the 24th of October 1971, Pau Casals was awarded the Peace Medal before the United Nations General Assembly. His acceptance speech included a few words that reaffirmed the fact that he was Catalan and the Catalan’s people desire to be accepted as such. He reminded those present that Catalonia believes in world unity and diversity. We are the rightful inheritors of this idea because we know that the Europe we wish to construct is not one of obsolete nation-states, but rather the Europe of its peoples and that without accepting this diversity Europe is not possible. Maestro Casals said: ‘I am a Catalan’ and he also reminded us that, ‘today it is a province of Spain. But what has Catalonia been? Catalonia has been the greatest nation in the world. I will tell you why. Catalonia had the first parliament in the world, well before England did. Catalonia had the beginnings of the United Nations. In the eleventh century all the authorities of Catalonia met in a city of France –at that time Catalonia- to talk about peace. Peace in the world and against war. The inhumanity of wars. This was Catalonia…’. As Casals reminded us, ten centuries later, Catalonia is still a country that fights for peace and the freedom for all peoples. This is something it wishes for 6
Catalan International View
its own people, three hundred years after losing its own freedom. Once more we have the challenge of following the path to freedom and hope for Catalonia and for all European nations. This summer we received news of a study conducted by twenty-one European universities and led by Pompeu Fabra University of Barcelona. It analyses and foresees a new wave of self-determination processes in Europe following what happened during the nineties as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. This rigorous scientific study (coordinated and directed by Professor Jaume López, who has contributed to the current issue of the CIV) refers to these possible new state entities based on three requisites: having had their own institutions during the modern era; not forming part of the majority culture of which they find themselves a part and finally, currently enjoying a certain level of decentralisation that allows them to have a share of the legislative power. The study concludes that there are six countries in Europe that can be defined using these parameters: Scotland, Northern Ireland, Flanders, Greenland, Euskadi and Catalonia (while also mentioning Quebec in North America, due to the obvious parallels).
The presentation of the study coincides with the publication of the latest issue of Catalan International View, which we have decided to focus on what we propose should be called the NEEWS (New Emerging European Western States). As well as Professor López’s view, we have sought six more academic opinions, from Queen Mary, University of London, the University Ludwig-Maximilian of Munich, the London School of Economics, the University of Barcelona, Pompeu Fabra University and the SUNY Law School at Buffalo. Simultaneously, we have analysed the coming political process with important political opinions from Northern Ireland, Scotland, Flanders, Euskadi and Catalonia. It is a marvellous document for understanding the Europe to come. We suggest it is read in view of the present and more importantly with a view to the future. Europe is necessary, precisely because the world needs Europe; Europe needs to distance itself from the stateled, Jacobin conception promoted by De Gaulle. It needs to return to Jean Monnet’s deeper sense of Europe: a federal, diverse Europe which recognises its own roots. By sheer coincidence, this summer Europe saw one of the largest political demonstrations in history. In Barcelona, the capital of Catalonia, on the afternoon of the 10th of July, more than a million and a half people took to the
streets in favour of a new political beginning for the Catalan nation. The initial purpose of the demonstration was to protest against the Spanish Constitutional Court’s ruling against the Catalan Statute (and against the sovereign decisions taken by the Catalan parliament, the Spanish congress and the referendum conducted in Catalonia on the 18th of June 2006). However, Catalan society, while displaying impeccable democratic behaviour throughout, went on to unanimously call for a new future of liberty and sovereignty for the Catalan nation, in the European Union framework.
In Barcelona, the capital of Catalonia, on the afternoon of the 10th of July, more than a million and a half people took to the streets in favour of a new political beginning for the Catalan nation Europe faces the challenge of recognising a new map that brings it closer to the people and nations that make it a reality. It must do so without preconditions or hindrance, listening to the arguments and respecting the unalienable right to self-determination for all nations. We sincerely wish that this edition of the Catalan International View helps us to take this new path of understanding and consolidation of the new Europe of the twenty-first century. Catalan International View
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NEEWS (New Emerging European Western States)
Pay attention to the NEEWS, they’re the new Europe by Francesc de Dalmases and Marc Gafarot
In 2003, Jim O’Neill, an economist for Goldman Sachs invented the acronym BRIC to refer to the four countries which, according to him, will dominate the world’s economy in 2050: Brazil, Russia, India and China. In effect, we find ourselves faced with new players on the political and economic chessboard of the twenty-first century and we must get used to a more complex world, balancing between various spheres of influence. A world that has little in common with the politics of the great blocs which we were all too used to in the twentieth century. Nevertheless, in Europe we need to go beyond the list of states to find the new names of those that will be the protagonists in the upcoming decades. We at Catalan International View 8
Catalan International View
would like to suggest these new players are referred to as the NEEWS (New Emerging European Western States). We see them as representing the new Europe which is to come. It is a Europe that recognises its roots and which simultaneously wishes to re-emerge and become a new axis of knowledge and interpretation of national diversity in the new global geostrategic map required by the twenty-first century. These are new actors who are already outlining, practicing and projecting new ways of understanding the world and of behaving in the face of globalisation. They develop local strategies for a global world that are combined with their languages, cultures and traditions in a more natural way, far removed from the manner in which Europe has been constricted by state models of a restrictive nature.
To this end, in the ‘Dossier’ we present some truly significant and representative cases of these emerging states in Western Europe, in the very heart of the European Union: Scotland, Flanders, the Basque Country, Catalonia and an Ireland that wishes to be a whole. They are in contrast to a part of Europe that insists on interpreting itself on the basis of old fashioned, outdated principles and premises. On the following pages, the NEEWS suggest that Europe’s institutions and nations change course towards the societies and the peoples of which they form a part. These are societies to which the NEEWS intend to adapt themselves in a natural manner to suit the new administrative limits, while simultaneously proposing to overcome them in
order to construct a common European space for political and economic action that is respectful of Europe’s national, cultural and linguistic diversity. Some of the NEEWS already speak openly of their demands as to how they wish to fit in with Europe. Without exception they all work in the right direction, towards consolidating a social majority that encourages fundamental political changes that distance them from states which are tied to a Jacobin, centralist state model, a hangover from the past and incompatible with the new Europe. Each of them, via their leaders, speaks of both their national project and their European project. A Europe with the NEEWS is good news!
NB: The interviews in the ‘Dossier’ were conducted by Víctor Terradellas, Francesc de Dalmases and Marc Gafarot. Catalan International View
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NEEWS (New Emerging European Western States)
Catalan internal enlargement
by Antoni Abat*
‘The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime’. Article 2 TEU. This paper analyzes the secession of Catalonia within the European Union treaties, in other words, how an internal enlargement and a process of secession will be developed in the European Union. The starting premise is the notion of internal enlargement, since Catalonia is a European territory and Catalan citizens have European citizenship. I understand that neither Catalonia nor the other territories that secede from the current Kingdom of Spain will need to apply to be admitted as members under the provision of Article 49 of the Treaty of the European Union, which establishes that any European state which respects the principles set out in Article 6 (1) may apply to become a member of the Union. It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after receiving the assent of the European Parliament, which in turn acts by the absolute majority of its component members. The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded which such admission entails shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States 10
Catalan International View
and the applicant state. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting states in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. This article does not deal exclusively with legal parameters, but rather analyzes some political and practical solutions to be applied to the secession of Catalonia in the European Union foundational and constitutional treaties. The international praxis demonstrates that state secession is shaped by the concrete political events of each secession. I believe that every state secession is unique. Nevertheless, in each instance, the juridical reality has been adapted to the political events and not the reverse. In this sense, political solutions were applied to the demise of the former Yugoslavia, the USSR and others. As Beemelmans (1997:2) states, in spite of inaccuracies when codifying the significant issues of state secession and the lack of consensus among the specialized doctrine, a sort of agree-
Dossier-Europe
ment seems to be emerging in recent case law practices, suggesting that state secession does not need to provoke an interruption in legal relations at all levels. This ‘legal and political continuity’ is advocated by the international community when attempting to establish a useful and feasible international legal norm to regulate state secession. Consequently, I understand that Catalan secession should not imply an interruption in the implementation and enforcement of the European Treaties’ rights and obligations. European law will still be relevant to natural and legal (EU and Catalan) citizens in Catalonia. Certainly there are doctrinal opinions that reach opposing conclusions after analyzing similar information. However, even the authors of these studies (Happold 1999, Happold 2000) themselves recognize the Doxa and not Episteme nature of the conclusions. This article does not end with a specific outcome for the Catalan secession process within the Treaties of the European Union, and does not establish whether the current Spanish state will
be dissolved once Catalan independence is reached or how many political entities will secede from Spain. I consider that anticipating a particular result would be pure speculation. At this point, I would classify Pettit’s conclusions as exploratory and politically motivated (Pettit, 2007). As I mentioned earlier, every secession is unique and it seems imprudent to predict a specific outcome. The first step to analyzing what a suitable internal enlargement within the Treaties of the European Union would be like is to analyze the primary sources, that is, European Union legislation. There is no specific legislation in the European Union legal framework regulating a possible procedure for internal enlargement. We therefore face a legal vacuum, an anomy, which must be filled by applying customary international rules. At this point it is important to state that a lack of a specific provision does not mean that the doctrine of the Union ceases to be supreme to state law. EU legislation still applies. This doctrine was established throughout the Catalan International View
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NEEWS (New Emerging European Western States)
terms of freedom, democracy, equality and respect for human rights including the rights of minorities. Lisbon does not prohibit an internal enlargement process. Once the existing situation has been defined as one of anomy, it is compelling to point out and analyze the sources of customary international law that will be applied to an internal enlargement process within the EU. Due to space limitations in this paper I will mention these legal bodies without entering into a detailed study.
European legislation and jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice following Flaminio Costa v ENEL, 6/64, 1964, ECR585. The Court stated that the supremacy of EU legislation was necessary in order to protect the objectives that the Treaty established, to ensure the uniformity of European Law. At this point it is necessary to mention the content of Article 4.2 of the consolidated version of the EU Treaty. It states that the Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential state functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the state, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State. Consequently once independence is obtained the EU cannot interfere with the secession process. Nevertheless, the interpretation of this article should be in harmony with the fundamental principles of the Union, in 12
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The first legal text is the Vienna Convention on the Secession of States in respect to Treaties, and specifically Article 34 of the Convention, that states that when a part or parts of the territory of a state divides to form one or more states, whether or not the predecessor state continues to exist: (a) any treaty in force at the time of the secession in respect of the entire territory of the predecessor state remains in force in respect of each successor state so formed; (b) any treaty in force at the time of the secession of states in respect to only part of the territory of the predecessor state which has become a successor state remains in force in respect of that successor state alone. A simple literal interpretation of this article clarifies the possibility of an internal enlargement. The second source of customary law applied to the issue analyzed in this paper are the resolutions of the Committee of Legal Advisers on Public International Law (CADHI) of the Council of Europe. These resolutions are promoted and ratified by the members of the European Council. It can be a useful exercise to examine the conclusions of these reports in order to gauge the possible reactions of the council members to the internal enlargement of the EU.
Dossier-Europe
The CAHDI emitted a pilot project on the state practice regarding state secession and issues of recognition (CAHDI 98. 5), Strasbourg, March 3-4 1998. This project developed the issues analyzed in the extraordinary committee of February 16th 1992. The results were ratified by Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Chapters two and three of this document establish the procedures necessary for the recognition of a new state in international treaties. The third chapter of the resolution regulates state secession within the treaties, and therefore is outside the scope of this paper. CAHDI firmly establishes that the continuing existence of a state will be determined by other subjects of international law (CAHDI 92. 2). Another important fact is that the Vienna Convention on the Secession of States in respect of Treaties of 1978 was applied directly by the CAHDI experts; this fact highlights the significance and applicability of this doctrinal body in public international law, at least as a source of customary law. The third source of customary law analyzed is Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 208-10 (1987) that deals directly with the secession of states in respect to international treaties. The third restatement aims to achieve the same juridical effects as an international treaty. This US normative law is important in several aspects, first because it defines clearly the sources of international law
in §102, stating that: (1) A rule of international law is one that has been accepted as such by the international community of states (a) in the form of customary law; (b) by international agreement; or (c) by derivation from general principles common to the major legal systems of the world. (2) Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation; and second because it deals with the secession of states as a controversial issue (Onuf 1992:834).
I understand that Catalan secession should not imply an interruption in the implementation and enforcement of the European Treaties’ rights and obligations
As a conclusion, it is important to mention that ‘pragmatic exceptionalism’ is a general practice in international public law. The EU is also affected by this political and juridical behaviour, i.e. in the case of Greenland. Sooner or later the EU will face nations without a state such as Catalonia, the Basque Country, Scotland, Wales, Flanders and others claiming an internal enlargement. All these nations have a strong European sentiment that must be safeguarded and enhanced. The EU has the capacity to regulate an ex-nunc juridical mechanism to enable a juridically and politically satisfactory response for all the parties involved; Catalonia, the Kingdom of Spain and the EU itself.
*Antoni Abat Faculty Affiliated at the SUNY Law School at Buffalo (NY ) and Visiting Scholar at the Stanford Law School. Associate Professor at the University of Barcelona. This article is based on the report ‘Catalunya independent en el si de la Unió Europea. Un informe sobre la viabilitat del procés d’ampliació interna a la UE’ (Independent Catalonia in the heart of the European Union. A report on the viability of the EU’s internal expansion process), presented on February 19th 2010 at the European Commission’s HQ in Barcelona.
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New States in Europe? by Jaume López*
The twentieth century, saw the creation of states in three great waves. These corresponded to the collapse of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires after the First World War, the processes of de-colonialisation in the second half of the century, and finally, the collapse of the Soviet regimes in the nineties. Moreover, at the start of the twenty-first century we find calls for self-rule in established states in Europe and North America which, in an increasingly open way, include the creation of new states as a possible scenario for selfrule. To what extent is a fourth wave of state-creation possible? It is difficult to predict institutional changes. No one predicted the collapse of the USSR or the fall of the Berlin Wall even a few months before they took place. Who could have guessed that 14 new states would be created in Europe and that, just ten years later, 5 of them would become members of a European Union consisting of 27 members? Writing at the end of the eighties, William Riker, the renowned political scientist and a scholar that has focused his field of study on federalism, asserted that both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (and Czechoslovakia) would remain stable and united thanks to the institutional ties generated by these federations. Since then, things have changed a great deal. Nevertheless, it is still true 14
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that it is difficult to make predictions. What we can do is highlight mechanisms, factors and variables that significantly influence social and historical processes without having to go out on a limb in stating that there will be what is known in political science as a ‘window of opportunity’: when the time is right, in other words. Nonetheless, we can also comment on these ingredients.
Change of context, change of ingredients To begin with it is worth noting that, in the absence of wars, new potential states will have to emerge from so-called ‘internal growth’, the result of secessions within already established states. How can we analyse them? In
all states there has always been centreperiphery tensions. These logical tensions are the product of the inevitable problem of the distribution of power, which tends to centralise itself and to be more amenable to the socio-economic demands which happen to be closer to the decision-making centre. As a result, the further we move away from the political centre, the more likely we are to find centrifugal tendencies that are in disagreement with the management of central power. For centuries these tendencies were counterbalanced by the guarantees of an economic market and military security offered by the centre of the state. In the twenty-first century things have changed. As a number of important writers have already pointed out,
both in the fields of economics and political science, the new context marked by economic globalisation and military stability has significantly modified this equilibrium and the structure of opportunity costs. If domestic markets are no longer the main objectives of the businesses in a country, if monetary policies are no longer set by a centralised state bank, if peace and security no longer rely on national armies, then the cost of continuing to suffer the inconvenience of the centre-periphery relationship within a ‘host’ state that is unused to regional demands, greatly increases. It seems logical to ask oneself: what if we were a state? In other words, we nowadays find ourselves in a context that is favourable to new states, where they could even become ‘species’ that are more efficient and better adapted to Catalan International View
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their current surroundings (in the same way as they would cease to be so if the situation were to change once more). Although the circumstances that have made this situation possible have undergone an exponential increase in recent years they are not entirely removed from the fact that the number of states that exist worldwide has gone from 50, at the start of the twentieth century, to 200, at the start of the twenty-first. The countries are eversmaller in size and currently, over 500 entities exist with a government and a legislative assembly and some form of sovereignty. As a cause, but also as a consequence of this fact, one can point to the growing strength of the entities of supra-state membership. Without these ‘regional empires’ the secessionist strategy would lose part of its appeal, especially for those territories that do not reach a minimum size. The question therefore becomes: who? Who are the likely candidates to form new states? Which units could mutate to become this species that is well adapted to meet the demands of the twenty-first century? In order to answer these questions, the perspective of the analysis needs to change, we must now essentially concentrate on a third ingredient to add to the earlier two (globalisation and stability), democracy, in two different ways: the definition of new demoi and the level of democracy of the states that currently exist (‘host’ states).
Speaking of demos By demos we mean a social collective as a reference upon which to apply some form of rule of the majority in order to generate collective democratic decisions. If we are aware that any secession process will be the result of a community’s right to decide, in which the ‘yes’ 16
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to secession ought to succeed, then it is fundamental we identify those places in which it can be legitimate to take a democratic decision without counting on the entire state within which it currently resides. We should bear in mind that all instances of the creation of new states of the third wave followed referenda or democratic consultations, with the exception of Slovakia and Kosovo. It is clear that there must be a social desire to form a unit, a desire that we can link to the traditional definition of a nation: a human group, conscious of forming a community, with a defined territory, a shared historical memory, its own culture, political will and so on. This leaves us with the map of the so-called stateless nations, but to speak of demoi allows us to move forward in various ways. Firstly, in order to define them we needn’t waste one minute on debates as to their ‘national nature’, which we do not take for granted. Secondly, the concept of demos exclusively refers to a possible legitimate application of the collective right to decide (once again, we do not take for granted the application of a possible ‘peoples’ right to self-determination’). Finally, this right is already exercised in the context of elections for regional institutions that have been developing as the result of political decentralisation. This has been a general tendency that has continued uninterrupted since the seventies in the majority of Western countries. This means that the holding of democratic, sub-state elections is a reality nowadays and not a ‘nationalistic demand’, with clear-cut limits, legitimised by the existing institutional systems that help to demarcating the definitions of these demoi as potential subjects of possible processes of the creation of new states. Naturally, this places the debate in a more objective context.
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With this in mind, and as a result of the trends outlined earlier, we could identify Quebec, Greenland, Scotland, Flanders, Euskadi and Catalonia as possible demoi and candidates for becoming new states in the OECD context. In spite of their socio-demographic and territorial differences, the strength of their ‘candidature’ can be explained by highlighting the fact that they have all had their own institutions (legislative power) during the modern age (15th century to the 18th), with the exception of Greenland, they are societies that do not belong to the majority or dominant culture of the state of which they form a part (they have their own language
or a different religion, as well as other differences) and at present, they benefit from very high levels of decentralization (they possess legislative power of their own within the larger state).
The key: democracy The other aspect of the democratic ingredient we need to examine is the host state in which these demoi reside. What possibilities do their institutional systems have of adjusting to and recognising some type of democratic process within these new demoi? The conflict between democratic legitimacies and the need to solve them through a hierCatalan International View
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archy of criteria is clear. In this respect we find some remarkable differences between the various states.
Any secession process will be the result of a community’s right to decide, in which the ‘yes’ to secession ought to succeed The United Kingdom has recognized the political existence of Scotland in a variety of ways as a nation that is a co-founder of the state, defined via fundamental decisions such as the idea of pluri-nationality (Devolution, the Good Friday Agreement in the case of Northern Ireland). In Canada, following two referenda on self-rule in Quebec, in 1998 the Supreme Court (Secession Reference) recognised the need for bilateral negotiations between the state and sub-state governments if there were a clear majority in favour of secession. What is more, in 2006, the Canadian parliament recognised that the Québécquois are a nation. Denmark did not prevent Greenland from expressing its difference of opinion by leaving the European Union in 1985 via a referendum. This was followed, in 2008, by a referendum on an enlargement of its self-rule, incorporating the recognition of its right to self-determination. Belgium, as a federal monarchy, is essentially built on the recognition, of its two distinct communities. In contrast, the Spanish Constitutional Court established in 2008 the unconstitutionality of the law of consultations approved by the Basque parliament. It confirmed that the only demos in Spain is the Spanish nation (Nación española). The institutional system does not recognize any area of democratically exercised sovereignty other than that which is expressed by the Spanish parliament. Likewise, it is worth mentioning the difficulties faced by the process 18
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for the enlargement of self-government for Catalonia, via a new statute, which has been considered not completely constitutional by the Spanish Constitutional Court (2010). Are these differences relevant within the framework of the trends examined above? The third wave of the creation of states can help us to answer this question. The collapse of the communist system gave way to calls for more democracy that gradually transformed into secessionist movements. In all instances, the negative reply from the ‘host’ states to a strengthening of democratic rights was the origin of widespread sovereignty movements. These did not originally start from positions that were previously secessionist. Instead, the calls for independence were the result of the lack of a democratic response from the ‘host’ state. Ukraine is a clear example of this process. In two referenda, over a period of eight months the population went from voting in favour of being part of the Russian federation, to voting for independence. In other words, the less wellequipped the institutional system is to deal with democratic demands, the greater the incentive there is to find a way out. Albert Hirschman, the wellknown political scientist who established the explanatory virtues of the binomial ‘voice-exit’, also pointed out that between the ‘voice’ and the ‘way out’ there is loyalty, the capacity to use one’s voice and to search for improvements in the system, while remaining within, when the way out is easy and attractive. In midst of the 21st century, when the means to stop a secession movement with the use of tanks is removed from the list of acceptable responses on behalf of the international community, then the creation of loyalty to the ‘host’ state is the key to avoiding the secession of a part of its population and ter-
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ritory. Therefore the recognition of the pluri-nationality, the harmonization of the territorial fiscal contributions (and the reduction in fiscal deficits), among others, ought to be behind the returns made by the centre towards the periphery referred to above. In Catalonia we have experienced two consecutive failures following promises of political accommodation short of the secessionist path. The European promise outlined by the European Union as a possible means for the protagonism of the regions broke down following the referendum for the so-called constitutional Treaty (finally, passed as the Treaty of Lisbon) and the poor reception of the proposals of the
Catalan Convention for the Future of Europe and other regional claims. On the other hand, the promise of a pluralistic Spain that would give way to a state made up of autonomies organised as a federation has failed with the PSOE’s government. In theory they are the party that would be most open to such a proposal, but they have shown a lack of commitment to it while in power. Two promises: a plural Spain and a Europe of the regions seem to be coming to an end. To conclude, if there are no important changes in the elements examined above, it only remains for us to wait for a window of opportunity (a trigger) to observe how new states grow up in our environment, or nearer, beneath our very feet. *Jaume López
Lecturer of Political Science at the Pompeu Fabra University and at the Open University of Catalonia. He holds a PhD in Political Science from the Pompeu Fabra University and an MSc in Philosophy of the Social Sciences from the London School of Economics. He has directed the comparative studies: ‘Analysis of Experiences of Direct Democracy on the International Scene (1995-2007)’ and ‘New Statehoods and Sovereignty Processes in Europe’.
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The rise of the radical right: social malaise and the failure of mainstream politics by Montserrat Guibernau*
The rise of the new radical right partly reflects the insecurity and instability brought about by rapid social and economic changes and a technological revolution that has resulted in the restructuring of the world economy. The end of a bipolar division of the world led by the US and the former USSR and the subsequent collapse of communism has irremediably weakened socialism and trade unions, together with the traditional values underpinning them. Feelings of solidarity and equality have weakened and competition and individualism have gained importance. World trade and labour markets are predominantly guided by capitalist principles resulting, among other things, in the displacement of manufacturing industry away from industrialized Western societies, to Eastern Europe and the developing countries, where production is less expensive, labour regulations less strict, wages lower and workers’ rights are weaker and sometimes nonexistent. While a successful elite benefits from operating in this flexible global market, a growing number of low and medium-skilled workers are joining the ranks of the unemployed. They suffer from an escalating sense of vulnerability and defeat, often accompanied by an increasing lack of self-esteem. In addition, the public’s perception that immigrants come to their countries to ‘steal’ their jobs as well as the view, substantiated or not, that asylum seekers and refugees receive greater social benefits than nationals, is contributing to a process of increasing resentment towards the state and towards society as a whole. Their own personal insecurity leads them to disregard the generally precarious con20
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ditions in which immigrants often tend to find themselves and the frequent unwillingness of nationals to take up so called ‘immigrants’ jobs’.
Cultural anxiety As such, social class and education tend to exacerbate a growing divide between those competent to move around and benefit from living in the global age and those on the margins. In a sense, the transition from industrial to post-industrial society requires rapidly adapting individuals capable of surviving within a dislocated society where moral norms, values, ideologies,
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traditions and knowledge are constantly challenged and revised. In this context, only a few achieve an elite position while a substantial underclass, having few chances of escaping their situation, grows at the bottom. Inequality is rampant not only between different parts of the world but also within particular societies and this generates resentment and fragmentation. Furthermore, increasing numbers of immigrants belonging to cultural, ethnic, and religious minorities are settling in the West. The substantial influx of refugees and asylum seekers recorded in the last fifteen years or so is contributing to an enhanced perception of
diversity in Western Europe and North America where, in many instances, indigenous cultures are being challenged, rejected, and confronted by those of the newcomers. Such attitudes are generating heated debates about various models of integration, their success and desirability. They also open up the debate as to the basis of a cohesive society and whether this requires the sharing of some cultural, linguistic, religious and civic values among all citizens. Ultimately, it poses some questions about the conditions for the coexistence of different identities within a single nation, thus directly addressing issues as to the limits of tolerance within liberal democracies. Catalan International View
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Political alienation In the political arena, far reaching changes at the national, European, and global levels have affected people’s views of the stature and role of politics and politicians alike, and have added to their sense of powerlessness. In the 1990s, the United States saw the ascendance of neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism, which has since spread to Europe and other parts of the world. To some extent as a reaction to this, numerous societies experienced political radicalization, often accompanied by strong anti-system movements beyond the control of traditional conservative parties, a development which, in some instances, has crystallized in the constitution and advancement of radical right-wing populist parties. At the national level, a lack of trust in politicians and the political system alike has weakened the traditional role of the political party as the representative of the interests and concerns of its supporters. A growing number of people regard the political system as alien to their lives and politicians as being primarily concerned with maintaining their own status and privileges.
Inequality is rampant not only between different parts of the world but also within particular societies and this generates resentment and fragmentation The ideology and political discourse of the ‘new radical right’ It would be a mistake to consider that the new radical right appeals primarily to those negatively affected by globalization. On the contrary, the new radical right-wing parties have done 22
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particularly well in some of the most affluent countries and regions in Western Europe, for example in countries such as Austria, Norway, Denmark and Switzerland, and regions such as north eastern Italy and Flanders. Although most of their supporters are to be found among the ranks of the working classes, it is quite striking to note that support also originates from some well-educated middle class people. They are not so much driven by economic motivations, but regard the impact of migration as a deadly threat to national identity. Basically, they are concerned about the ‘levelling down’ of their own cultures as a result of ‘hybridization’. Although considerable variation exists across countries, there are a number of common themes that can be found in the political programmes of virtually all new radical right parties. These include a strong resistance to the existing (political) establishment and a commitment to democratic reform, a dominant anti-immigrant narrative, and flowing from this, a strong emphasis on protecting Western values and the national preference principle. The new radical right seeks to rob elites of their moral and political legitimacy and denounces the corruption affecting Western style democratic systems. A sharp anti-elite rhetoric that claims to replace dominant values with the ‘common sense of the people’ occupies a key place within the new radical right’s discourse, which often adopts a populist style. In spite of its extremely critical view of the functioning of liberal democratic systems, the new radical right does not advocate their replacement by some kind of fascist style political system. On the contrary, the new radical right, stands in favour of a radical regeneration of democracy, at least in theory.
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Programmatically, the new radical right’s doctrine involves a claim for genuinely popular participation and representation. In line with this, it defends the use of referendums and open lists in elections. The most important item in the new radical right’s political agenda concerns its antipathy to immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees. In some instances, open hostility towards immigrants describe radical right-wing parties which do not stand against all migration but solely against those immigrants who are deemed to pose a cultural threat to Western values, national identity and culture. At present, and following the wave of Islamophobia generated by the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, Muslims are singled out
as posing the most serious threat to Western civilization and are often portrayed as the most ‘alien’ and difficult to assimilate. As such, the radical right regards the growing number of Muslims settling in Europe as a severe danger to Western culture and values. In Europe, the new radical right advocates the preservation of Western values, a principle that is often turned into a call for ‘national preferences’; that is, citizens should enjoy priority access to social welfare and to the protection of their own culture and language, ahead of foreigners. Citizenship should delineate a sharp boundary between those who belong and those who do not, and the latter should be excluded from the social, economic and political rights associated with it. This principle is enCatalan International View
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dorsed by, among others, the National Front (France) and the FPÖ (Austria). The platform Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) created by the Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn (assassinated during the 2002 Dutch electoral campaign)- also emphasized this particular point. The new radical right presents itself as the defender of otherwise marginalized groups: as a radicalizing force for democracy and as committed to sustaining social cohesion. It defends the idea of a ‘fortress Europe’, which they argue is compatible with the protection of national cultures and identities as well as economic prosperity. It exploits the fears and anxieties of citizens who feel threatened by socio-economic changes 24
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and resent a rise in the number of immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees entering their countries. For many of these citizens, national identity operates as the last resort, able to sustain an already damaged sense of self-esteem. For them, identification with the nation offers a source of pride, which they do not experience as a result of supporting any of the mainstream parties. Belonging to the nation means participating in all its achievements and replacing the focus on one’s own life, and the (at times unfulfilled) expectations and insecurities that go with it, with identification with a larger entity, the nation, offering past and present reasons to feel important, valuable, and a member of a distinctive group. In these circum-
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stances, the new radical right skilfully portrays the retreat to a national identity which citizens can feel proud of as a right, almost a duty.
Conclusion All things considered, the new radical right offers strong arguments destined to foster a sense of togetherness among citizens. However, the new radical right’s offer comes at a price: the exclusion of those considered ‘too different’ and the request for them to ‘stay away’ in order to avoid their own cultural and ethnic contamination. So far, mainstream political parties have not even attempted to understand why the radical right has been able to strike a chord with the electorate. By emphasizing the ‘politically incorrect’ and ‘unpalatable’ discourse and ideology of the new radical right, mainstream parties have underestimated the extent to which their arguments resonate with the public and have tended to reject the possibility of these parties becoming real contenders for political power. Of course, such assumptions are beginning to change as new radical right parties have entered into coalition governments in various European countries, have gained a significant number of seats in the European Parliament, and are making progress at a local level in countries where they previously had no support, such as in the UK. Contrary to what many new radical right parties argue, mainstream parties have in fact taken steps to reduce pub-
lic anxiety over increased immigration. Most governments across Europe have been restricting migration flows, even though for many European citizens these measures may not have gone far enough. What they have not done sufficiently, however, is inform the public about the measures they are implementing and the outcomes they anticipate as a result. The new radical right’s fierce attacks on mainstream parties’ passive attitudes and so called ‘open-door policies’, need to be countered much more forcefully by them with arguments proving the contrary.
Belonging to the nation means participating in all its achievements and replacing the focus on one’s own life with identification with a larger entity This does not mean that mainstream parties should co-opt the new radical right’s discourse. Quite the opposite, mainstream political parties should focus on offering an alternative narrative based on policies that strike a balance between respect for human rights on the one hand, and a rational approach to immigration on the other. Similarly, mainstream parties should do more to convey the message that, while certain fundamental human rights are universal, there are other rights exclusively available to citizens. Reassuring citizens that policies are in place which are fair and will not undermine their rights is a key step toward removing the concerns that drives voters to the new radical right.
*Montserrat Guibernau Professor of Politics at Queen Mary, University of London. This article is based on a longer paper that was published as part of Policy Network’s research seminar ‘Migration and the rise of nationalist right-wing parties: confrontation, isolation or engagement?’ The original paper can be found at http://www.policy-network.net/publications/publications.aspx?id=3690
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The Nation in the current European context by Ulisses Moulines*
In contemporary Europe we find that it is very difficult to broach the topic of national identity in a dispassionate, unprejudiced manner. This is equally true of the Spanish state, which like many others in Europe is a de facto multi-national entity, without wishing to legally admit it. There are various factors that can explain this situation. One of them is undoubtedly the fact that wide sections of public opinion, the intelligentsia and naturally the political class of these countries all share a fear of nationalism. This is to say they are frightened of any political programme that defends the national identity of any nation, whether represented by a state or not. Many intellectuals and politicians, whether conservatives or on the left, view the nationalism of minority nations as a conflictive, destructive ideology, which must be vigorously countered. It is symptomatic that the members of the public who have such a negative opinion of nationalism in European countries are precisely those that belong to a nation which has possessed its own 26
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state for a long time. This is in contrast to those that have recently obtained a sovereign state, as is the case of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, or those citizens of Western Europe who identify themselves with a minority nation within a multi-national state, as is the case with the Catalans, Basques, Corsicans, Bretons, South-Tyroleans, the Scots and so on. In my opinion, there is a pressing need for the national question to be openly debated within the European framework. This urgency is particularly apparent in the case of the Spanish state, where the debate surrounding the topic is so dangerously heated. Throughout the twentieth century, many ‘well-meaning’ intellectu-
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als, more or less politically liberal or on the left, were convinced that the nationalist ideal belonged to a phase in humanity’s history that had been definitively overcome, that the time for the ‘citizen of the world’ had arrived and that those that insisted on declaring themselves nationalists were reactionaries of the worst kind. The Cold War period, characterised by the confrontation between two blocs that apparently were not at odds for nationalist reasons, but rather as a result of incompatible social and economic programmes, exacerbated this perception. These same well-meaning intellectuals and politicians were shocked and surprised to observe how, a few years or even months following the collapse of the Soviet Union, strong nationalist
movements broke out all over Central and Eastern Europe in groups reclaiming their national identity, ahead even of social and economic reforms. Who would have imagined that Latvians simply wished to be Latvians before anything else? How frustrating it was to discover that the small Slovakian nation was prepared to resist, with the use of arms if necessary, the powerful Yugoslav army (in other words the Serbian army) in order to preserve its national identity! However, if the Western intellectuals in question had paid a bit more attention to the role of true collective, lasting sentiments, not only of small, more or less exotic nations, but also of their own fellow citizens, they could not only have Catalan International View
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foreseen but also explained the foundations of this phenomenon. A prophetic few had foreseen this for some time. Here is a quote from 1941, the author of which I shall reveal below: ‘It is not possible to see the modern world as it is without recognising the burning force of patriotism, of national loyalty. Under certain circumstances it can be demolished, in certain levels of civilisation it does not exist, but as a positive force nothing can compare to it [...] What is more, we should accept that the divisions between one nation and another are based on real differences in attitude. Until very recently it was sufficient to pretend that all
Nationalism is not a passing fashion, but rather a profound, universal cultural phenomenon
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humans are very similar, but in fact anyone capable of using their own eyes can see that human behaviour differs enormously from one country to another’. Guess who wrote these lines: a German Nazi, an Italian fascist, a Serbian Chetnik? No, they were written by George Orwell, a militant socialist who mercilessly criticised British imperialism in India, a member of the International Brigades that fought fascism in Spain, where he was gravely injured on the Aragon front for defending the cause of the international proletariat. In spite of his credentials, Orwell, who had lived for a long time in a number of countries on two continents, was ‘capable of using his own eyes’ in order to see the obvious. This was in contrast to many ‘internationalists’ both before and especially after him.
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Inspired by reading this text by Orwell, by the incomprehensible incomprehension shown by many of my colleagues and friends in various countries when faced with the nationalist phenomenon, and last but not least by my condition as a member of the Catalan diaspora, a couple of years ago I decided to embark on a philosophical and methodological analysis (the only kind of which I feel myself capable) of the concept of the nation and the sense of nationalism as a political programme. The result of my reflections was published under the title Nationalist Manifesto. This was followed by replies to critics and subsequent revisions. The reaction of people in Europe who read my ‘Manifesto’ has been typical: some considered it an intolerable provocation and have not spoken to me since; others, including one publication in particular, have suggested I am an ETA sympathiser; others have taken it as a joke in bad taste; another asked me why I spent so much energy on something that at the end of the day is already stated in the United Nations Charter (an observation that is basically correct, but which has not prevented the states that make up the UN from systematically ignoring it). A Jewish anti-nationalist friend even used the following ad personam argument, ‘how is it possible that you, Ulisses Moulines, with a French grandfather and Catalan parents, born in Venezuela, having lived for many years in Mexico and having been a German teacher for the last 25 years, how come you of all people don’t call yourself a citizen of the world?’. With a smile I replied: in effect I do consider myself a citizen of the world and a nationalist at the same time; there is no contradiction (for the reasons outlined in my Nationalist Manifesto). I mention these personal experiences in order to note that, while it is apparent that it is necessary to inspect the
topic of nations and nationalisms with a keen conceptual approach and not in a superficial manner, in Europe it is practically impossible to take on this task at the academic level. In as much as European intellectuals deign to say anything about nationalism, they usually do so in two ways: either to virulently denigrate it, or in order to undertake a historical analysis, highly erudite, but often also rather tedious, in order to work out whether, for example, one can detect the appearance of a nationalist movement in the north of Italy in the eighteenth century or in the nineteenth century Austro-Hungarian Empire. The how and why of the problems they are currently facing in Northern Ireland, Scotland, Flanders, Bretagne, Euskadi, the Catalan Countries, Corsica, South Tyrol (not to mention what has happened and what continues to happen in the immensity of the ex-Soviet bloc), is often all left to journalists. Undoubtedly there are honourable exceptions among university researchers, but I am referring to the general tendency. The message transmitted to public opinion by the immense majority of European intellectuals, with considerable success, is that the history of these nations and nationalisms is radically ridiculous or perverse, or at best only of interest from a theoretical point of view. On the contrary, in my opinion the debate surrounding the national question should not be solely left to the journalists and politicians that are concerned with day to day events (although, naturally it is also a good thing for them to take the question seriously), neither should it be left to psychiatrists (as some Spanish intellectuals appear to suggest) or museographers. In my opinion, the topic presents a sufficient level of complexity and significance for the study of human affairs for a philosopher to also poke their nose out of their ivory tower and cast an analytical Catalan International View
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eye over the matter. Such was the objective of my ‘Manifesto’, even if it was to be in a fragmentary and provisional manner.
Nationalism should be valued positively: in the same way as we should be in favour of diversity in animal and vegetable species I shall not repeat here the detail of the arguments presented in this essay. Some readers may already be familiar with it, others can consult the book in a library or even (I almost daren’t say it) buy a copy. Here I shall limit myself to briefly outlining the three main arguments that I defend: 1) Nationalism is not a passing fashion, but rather a profound, universal cultural phenomenon (historicalcultural argument). 2) The concept of the nation (as opposed to the concept of the state) is not empty: nations are real entities, even though they are not identifiable from the point of view of direct perception in the sense that mountains and houses are (ontological argument). In all disciplines we find endless concepts that refer to real entities, even if they are not directly detectable by the senses (some examples are: ‘electromagnetic fields’ in physics, ‘genes’ in biology, ‘grammar’ in linguistics and so on). 3) Nationalism should be valued positively: in the same way as we are in favour of diversity in animal and vegetable species, we should also be in favour of national diversity. For this reason it is necessary to be a nationalist in any part of the world; nationalism is the cultural equivalent of ecology (ethical-political argument). 30
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What are the prospects for nationalism in the countries without a state in the European context? In the heart of the European Union I believe they are rather poor, at least in the midterm. The reason is simple. The European Union is no more or less than what its member states want it to be. It would therefore be naïve to expect that any of its states would show the slightest interest in preserving the European nations that do not have a state. In effect, the states that make up the European Union are essentially of two types (leaving aside Belgium, which is a special case): either they are homogenous uni-national states, such as Germany, Holland and the majority of states in Central Europe and the Nordic countries, or else they are multi-national states that are clearly hegemonistic (which is to say they are states where, for demographic reasons, one nation exercises hegemony over the others). This is the situation in Spain, the United Kingdom, France and Italy. It is clear that no state of the latter kind will lift a hand to help minority nations in another state in the club. It would be like expecting landowners from one region contributing in all good faith to agrarian reform affecting landowners in a neighbouring region. As for states of the former kind, the uni-nationals, some time ago they resolved their own national question and they have no reason to raise the issue in other nations; at best we can expect total indifference from them, at worst active opposition. This is the case of Germany, where for concrete historical reasons (the term ‘nationalism’ sounds to German ears a lot like ‘National Socialism’), the official and unofficial opinion makers are rabidly intransigent with respect to any form of nationalist loyalty on behalf of the nations without a state. Do the minority European nations therefore have to desperately
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wait alone in slow agony? I think not. Each and every one of them should be conscious of the fact that they are not alone with their problem. The national question is a worldwide phenomenon. ‘There is safety in numbers’, as the saying goes. According to experts on the subject, a minimum of 600 hundred nations can be identified worldwide. There are 193 sovereign states, however, only a minority of which are uninational states that are more or less homogenous. Applying basic arithmetic, this means that the vast majority of existing nations lack a state that defends their identity. An enormous potential exists, therefore, for a shared interest. Due to its very nature, the UN is completely inept at representing this
community, for the same reasons that the European Union is. Having said this, allow me, as a philosopher who moves in the realm of speculation, to propose the following utopia: a global organisation, which could be called ‘OSN’ (the Organisation of Stateless Nations), that is responsible, as far as possible, for the interests of its members and raising awareness as to the problems facing nations without a state among international public opinion, including those journalists, intellectuals and politicians from the hegemonic nations who are sympathetic to the problem (who do exist, in spite of everything). It may be that in the future this proposal is not as utopian as it seems... *Ulisses Moulines
(Caracas, 1946). Holds a degree in Philosophy from the University of Barcelona and a PhD from the University of Munich. He has been a professor in UNAM (Mexico), the University of California, the University of Bielefeld (Germany) and the Free University of Berlin. Since 1993, he has been the director of the Institute of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Theory at the University of Munich. He is a member of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences, a Laureate of the Ecole Normale Supérieure of Paris and a correspondent Member of the Institut d’Estudis Catalans. He has published a dozen books and two hundred articles, mainly on philosophy, in Catalan, Spanish, German, English and French.
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The economic prospects of Catalonia’s identity in the twenty-first century
by Joan Costa-Font*
The field of economics gradually reveals how certain behaviours are learnt, whether socially or generationally. When said behaviours contain a desire for self-determination, then social identity comes to be called national. For the purposes of research it is possible to observe spatial identities, which slowly express the value and characteristic conduct of a territory and which are the result of intergenerational and intragenerational social interaction that has allowed the culture to survive over time.
The economic characterisation of the Catalan identity This article examines national identity in a nation’s economy. I will try to analyse how the role of spatial identity goes beyond political order, and into the mechanisms of the economy. This is to say, the socio-economic effects it has on the demand and motivation of the population, as well as to the offer and capacity for the differentiation of products. A nation’s identity is represented on the outside via some defining products, such as ‘German design’, ‘American science’, ‘Dutch butter’, ‘Italian pizza’ and so on. In all these examples, the national qualifier provides an adjective which signals added value by offering higher prices, higher tariffs and the equality of conditions. A good or a service that carries this additional element of identity ends up being fi32
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nancially rewarded. In other words, identity encompasses information that signals the quality of the product, and all things being equal, individuals have a less elastic demand, which means they are prepared to pay more per unit.
Identity and public policy Besides the individual value of identity, it is important to acknowledge that there is a collective value as well, and most identities can be conceptualised as club goods, as they have both properties of public and private goods. It overcomes the distinction between public and private goods, which is often held by private goods when they contain elements of a public good. Generally, identity can be understood as part of a country’s social capital, which allows it to cooperate and carry
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out actions that individually may not make any sense. Social identity is the result of the sum of individual conducts in time, that have carried on over time. Nevertheless, both social identity (national) and the institutional structure that underpins such identities are in constant interaction in that one may determine the other (France and the French Republic, for example). One of the functions of public powers is, therefore, to guarantee the recognition of the identity of the area in which they institutionally exercise their authority. As I shall argue later, in
as far as national identity has properties of a public good, actions that lead to improvements in identity suppose an externality that benefits to every member of the club at the same time. This means that the result of the promotion of identity is a game from which all benefit. The importance of the promotion of identity is especially relevant in a globalised world where increasingly the barriers to the exchange of information (the essence and basis of markets) are steadily shrinking. As a result, the spatial and geographic differences are not now Catalan International View
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a reflection of distance in transport time, but rather end up relaxing the differences in social values in respect to the past of each community (they reflect differences in historical processes). Clear examples can be found in Catalonia in attitudes towards public intervention in the economy, individualism of a community nature and openness to foreign markets.
Figure 1. Question: In the following situations; indicate how easy you find it to identify agricultural products of Catalan origin
Finally, without wishing to define the Catalan identity, it is worth saying that the historical lack of an institutional structure (the lack of an independent state), identity promotion becomes harder to motivate extrinsically (with immediate tangible rewards), and instead it has been compensated for by a greater degree of social implication in the inter-generational maintenance of the Catalan identity, namely by intrinsic motivations. Catalan identity, perhaps because of the influence of commerce in exchanges with the outside world, has been a very dynamic one, and is particularly difficult to summarise in a few words. Figure 1 shows how a very significant proportion of the population can identify the Catalan origin of certain products. It is interesting to note that of the three products in the survey, the Catalan origin case of wine is clearly apparent.
70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Fruit
Fish
Restaurant wine
Source CEO: Omnibus, November 2007
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The economic value of identity Spatial identity generates a chain of effects in the demand for goods. As a result, nowadays there is a bulk of evidence which links lifestyle (eating habits, consumption timetables and so on) not so much with individual decisions, but rather as the given result of collective acts, which organise and share or spontaneously accept a particular identity. Simultaneously, identity also has an effect on the offer of products, given that consciously or unconsciously individuals adapt the products and services they offer to their identities. The products and services reflect the characteristics of the origin of the individuals behind them, in that this becomes a vital tool for differentiating them from their competitors. This is the case of Italian designer or gastronomic goods, for example, and in general terms the denominations of origin and certificates of origin and so on.
Identity motivation as a nonmonetary payment Motivation is one of the main mechanisms through which spatial identity operates, although it is not easy to observe. In market economies and forms of economic reasoning, one can reasonably assume that the principal motivation of economic agents is the maximisation of profit or utility (extrinsic motivations). However, it is progressively being recognised that individuals not only act to attain higher salaries and higher prices, although this evidently may be one of the main operating principles of economic activity. While this does occur, individuals also have intrinsic motivations such as satisfying other, less tangible ideas, but equally satisfactory as they bring cognitive benefits, and sense of well being. One of these forms of intrinsic motiva-
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tion lies in satisfying the expectation of ones identity, whether personal or social and ultimately national. If a particular activity supposes the betraying of values on which a society is based, it is possible that a conflict may occur between extrinsic motivations (to earn more) and intrinsic motivations (identity). In terms of an organisation, whether state run or private, identity is the source of cohesion in that it allows individuals who feel part of the group to be prepared to sacrifice time and money in order to form part of a particular group. A feeling of belonging to a group motivates the existence of reciprocity and reduces the costs of transactions by not having to explain things which make up the collective inheritance of an organisation, such as the significance and meanings of words. This idea has been supported by some recent research by
Akerlof and Kranton (2005) who have seen the debate on identity as a mechanism that incentivises economic effort, although they do not mention ‘the nation’ per se.
Identity is the source of cohesion in that allows individuals who feel part of the group to be prepared sacrificing time and money in order to form part of a particular group National and supranational identity Spatial identities (or national when there is an underlying aspiration to a state structure), understood in a broader sense, can encompass a broader reach than that of their territorial limits, and Catalan International View
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Figure 2. European identity and Catalan national identity Source: opinion poll, 2004, Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials (ICPS)
European Identity
60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Only Spanish
More Spanish than Catalan
Equally Spanish and Catalan
More Catalan than Spanish
Only Catalan
Catalan Identity
NB: European identity means the percentage of people who say they are more European than Spanish or only European. 36
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be more or less consistent with universalism. Catalan identity is an example of the latter. As shown in Figure 2, one can conclude that Catalan identity is constructed in conjunction with European identity. This is in contrast with Spanish identity in Catalonia, which on the contrary defines itself in terms of closer spatial scales, arguably more parochial. In effect, while almost no one who considers themselves Spanish sees themselves as ‘more European than Spanish- or only European’, 57% of those who define themselves as ‘only Catalan’ at the same time define them-
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selves as ‘only European’ (Costa-Font et al, 2006).
Conclusions As globalisation advances, individuals increasingly need collective identities that act as protective arrangements underpinning common understandings and interests. Hence, its is possible to state that spatial identity takes on a key role in influencing the preferences of the population, and accordingly their market and institutional demands, as well as a means of channelling the quality of products. Simultaneously, in the framework of the possible constitution of a state, Akerlof and Kranton’s recent economic theory (2005) allows us to state that a state that incorporates Catalan national identity at its centre would be able to provide the population with greater cohesion and thereby a means of non-monetary payment for certain actions that up to now have benefited the Spanish state. In the context of consumption decisions, identity is an experienced good that can be consumed through the interactions with one country’s goods and services, and is exemplified by its ability to add additional value to these goods. It is increasingly evident that the value of goods reflects a collection of mechanisms that are transmitted through social interactions and creates social norms. Simultaneously it is a mechanism in the hands of companies to differentiate themselves from their com-
petitors above and beyond the price of the product. Hence, public authorities have an important role to play in providing support to these actions which improve, in the case of Catalonia, the identity of Catalan products and allow them to extract more international value from these products, such as wine, cava, the restaurant business, tourism, education and so on.
Identity policies help the people of Catalonia to have an integrated place in the global world
The objective of policies which promote identity is ultimately to help the people of Catalonia to have an integrated place in the global world. As with all goods that share public good properties, an increase in the prestige of Catalonia, implies an improvement for all without harming anyone within the community (or what technically can be called the club). On the contrary, the increase in economic value of Catalanism becomes an asset in the hands of the Catalans in order to extract more value from the globalisation process. Finally, in the case of Catalan identity, evidence shows that national identity has a key role in attaining certain collective actions and values, such as universalism, as the project of Catalonia goes naturally hand in hand with the European one.
*Joan Costa-Font Senior Lecturer in Political Economy and Director of the Catalan Observatory at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). He holds a PhD and MA in Economics, and degrees in Economics, Law and Political Sciences. Before working at LSE he worked at the Universitat de Barcelona where he has been nominated Professor of Applied Economics, and has honorary fellowships from Oxford University, Munich. FEDEA and IESE.
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Ecolinguistics, or a mirror on the real world by Carme Junyent*
From a linguistic perspective, it is not possible to separate Europe from the rest of the world. Languages which have spread far beyond the areas in which they developed are generally European in origin, with the exception of Arabic, Chinese and others such as Quechua and Swahili, with a more localised expansion. This diffusion has been accompanied by a devastating linguistic ideology which has allowed for the justification of the destruction of the linguistic heritage of all the areas where dominant languages have been implanted. It goes without saying that this destructive pattern began in the languages’ own territory: the process of global linguistic homogenisation began in Europe, which currently finds itself in the closing stages of the process. This fact must be kept in mind when it comes to constructing a new Europe, since the risk, which is more than ever present, is that the linguistic diversity that is preached (that of official languages) could become devoured by its own voracity. This is now apparent in some areas, such as science and technology, where English is virtually the sole language; but it does not fail to be the logical conclusion of a process based on the negation of the other: when we cannot annihilate them physically, we can ensure that they cease to be what they were. Not so they become like us (this is part of the ideology), but because distant populations are more easily manipulated. In such a context, it appears obvious that the new Europe of the twenty-first century has to rebuild its foundations if it does not wish to perpetuate an ideology that will lead to its destruction. For this task it is necessary to find a perspective for the analysis that will enable the reestablishment of networks that 38
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favour exchange. In the past 20 or 30 years ecolinguistics has provided a fresh perspective that, in terms of the dynamics of languages, has noticeably diverged from conventional sociolinguistics. If we analyse the postulates of the processes of linguistic planning, it soon becomes apparent that they intend to reproduce the models of the dominant languages, and history has already shown us that it is the model itself which makes the revitalisation of languages impossible if certain conditions are not present. For the majority of world languages, these conditions are impossible to obtain. This is also true of European languages. One only has to take French as an example to realise that the dynamic that has led to it being the hegemonic language in France has not only prevented its situation (including cases of official status such as in Belgium and Switzerland) from being the same outside the state, but it is also the cause of the precarious situation in which it finds itself in places where it is unable to impose itself. The same can be said of German,
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the language with the greatest number of speakers in Europe. Ecolinguistics aims to question the concepts with which we have traditionally worked and, in the case which concerns us here, the two concepts we need to examine are as basic as ‘language’ and ‘linguistic boundary’. The concept of language which we use as our basis does not cease to be a cultural construct that implies a perception of the code as a closed element, clearly
differentiated from the rest. Such a representation of language is what allows us to state that in Germany or Denmark, for example, only one language is spoken; the same can be said for France or the United Kingdom if it were not for the fact that we know that other languages are spoken there, even if only in a residual manner. If we were to ask ourselves where most languages are spoken, in Italy or Switzerland, we would be bound to choose the latter. However, if we were to seek our Catalan International View
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answer in what is probably the most consulted database in the world, the Ethnologue, we would find that the number of languages in each of these countries (without including either extinct languages or those introduced by immigrants) is the following: Germany (27), Denmark (7), France (23), United Kingdom (12), Italy (33) and Switzerland (12). Italy, therefore, is the state with the most languages, followed by Germany, two states which, although we may see them as plurilingual, we would never think of them as territories with so many languages. How is such a difference possible? It appears obvious that between two or three languages and the almost thirty that exist there must be some difference in the criteria employed in calculating the numbers. Nevertheless, both proposals are more similar than they may at first appear: one opts for the ‘invisibilization’ of non-official languages, and the other opts for ‘divide and rule’, which is also characteristically European. Both, however, share the same concept of language and end up with the same objective: the reduction of linguistic diversity, because both share the concept of the linguistic boundary as a limit.
The new Europe of the twenty-first century has to rebuild its foundations if it does not wish to perpetuate an ideology that will lead to its destruction If we concentrate on how these more homogenous forms that we call languages are differentiated within the totality of manifestations of human language, we realise that what they do is identify a group that lives together and distinguish it from the others; however, the difference, except in cases in which a language has 40
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occupied the space of another, is not unbridgeable, but rather the reverse. It is a continuum, a ‘buffer zone’ as it is known in historical linguistics, where traces of both languages are conserved. This is the concept of a linguistic boundary, understood as a space of exchange and not as an obstacle. What ecolinguistics proposes is that it allows us to see that the European perception of languages leads to fragmentation because on one hand it forces internal homogeneity and on the other it promotes external differentiation. These opposing forces end up leading to fragmentation and, therefore, unintelligibility and lack of understanding. This is a false basis on which to construct the new Europe of the twenty-first century. If we have to begin from a collection of states that, as much as they may claim to eliminate boundaries, do not recognise as their own the linguistic forms that are not official, we can only expect that by the same token they will impose a language which hides both variety and creativity. Currently the US is the space which can be seen as the Mecca of recognition: Europe no longer appears to be the place to triumph. Ecolinguistics does not propose the development of processes in isolation. In the case of linguistic diversity it does not call for the recuperation of isolated languages, but rather the reestablishment of communication networks that allow for the revitalisation of languages as a whole. This implies that rather than taking communication from above, which we already know leads to annihilation, what we need is to recover the connections that allow for unmediated exchange. In other words, we should not give up what we are in order to continue to be free. In the same way we can see that the communities in South America, for example, would not have reached their current isolation if a single language had
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not destroyed the social fabric and created the current Amerindian linguistic islands. We can also see that Europe will go the same way if we do not change our linguistic model. It is clear that our self-destructive process is now far advanced, but Europe’s recent history has been marked by a factor which could help restore the networks which are currently damaged. This factor is immigration which, aside from bringing a new diversity also brings us a new vision of our history, if we know how to take advantage of it. As Harald Haarmann says: ‘The broadening of the linguistic kaleidoscope brought on by the influx of immigrants is an experience which has opened the Europeans’ eyes. Experiencing exotic cultures and linguistic contrasts has led people to focus their attention on the linguistic realities of their surroundings, which is to say, to the realities that had been twisted and falsified by the ideology of the nation-state and its glorification of mono-culture’ 1. The same writer reminds us that: ‘In a positive vision of the future, ethnic identity could be a source of cultural enrichment that could take on a significant role in the balance of self-esteem and the recognition of others in inter-ethnic relations. This process of equilibrium could operate without the distorting effects of ethnic boundaries that are erected in order to create stereotypes, to mobilise destructive intentions, to manipulate ethnicity as part of the political power games or to deny other groups their recognised rights to linguistic and cultural self-identity. We all know, however, that keeping ethnic identity under control depends more than any-
thing on individual good will and much less on the measures taken by any government’ 2. Europe’s demographic renovation therefore opens up an alternative path to the recognition of its own diversity. Nevertheless, we need to keep in mind that this path is not one way, that the basis of exchange is reciprocity and for this reason, if we fail to recognise and promote languages that have been historically marginalised, true coexistence will be impossible. The same goes for freedom, as those who establish submissive relations are creating the foundations of their own subordination. The treatment which languages have received in Europe is clearly at odds with the objective of unification, especially as it discriminates against people in terms of their language and also because this discrimination contributes to the creation of boundaries-obstacles that make them more vulnerable. On the other hand, the same conception of languages as an obstacle means that diversity is seen more as a problem than as a connection. With such an ideology, the sole coherent outcome is the destruction of linguistic heritage, including official languages. From an ecolinguistic perspective, the restoration of the connections between communities that implies the recognition of their languages is a viable alternative to the communication that always requires a dominant language as an intermediary and a way of accommodating people without requiring them to stop being who they are, in other words, of robbing them of the possibility of making new, creative contributions to society.
1 HAARMAN, H. (2001) Babylonische Welt. Geschichte und Zukunft der Sprachen. Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York, p. 47 2 HAARMANN, H. (1996) Language in Ethnicity. A view of Basic Ecological Relations. Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin, p. 184
*Carme Junyent She is a Senior Lecturer of General Linguistics at the University of Barcelona and director of the Endangered Languages Study Group. She has written a number of works on linguistic diversity and ecolinguistics.
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Europe, like America by Josep M. Colomer*
Europe is at a crossroads. The current economic crisis challenges previous arrangements and induces innovative Europe-wide responses in favour of more integration and less state sovereignty. For some, the process of building the European Union begun in the mid-twentieth century has been too long and too slow and the EU’s decision-making mechanisms are still too inefficient. However, if we adopt a comparative historical perspective of the most similar experience of building a continental democratic federation in modern times, the United States of America, the European Union can still make it and may soon reach a crucial, irreversible point.
Where does Europe end? A crucial decision for the European Union to make is the establishment of clear external borders. Only when the territorial limits of the Union will be stable, will Europe be able to make its internal institutions work effectively, achieve sufficient economic and legal integration, and develop a consistent foreign policy beyond the problems of dealing with potential members and uncertain neighbours. In this regard, the European Union may be close to the tipping point that was passed by the United States about one hundred years ago. For the United States of America, the process of annexing the bulk of its current territory once the initial 13 colonies became independent states took more than 60 years (approximately between 1787 and 1850). The territory of the initial core was finally increased by about four-fold. The population in the 42
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original territories at the time of independence from Britain constituted about half of the total population. Similarly, for the European Union, the process of enlargements from its initial six member-states, which formally began in 1957, has already lasted more than 50 years, while several large territories remain potential subjects for further inclusion. So far, the initial territory of the founding members (not counting their former colonies overseas) has increased three-fold. As in the US, the population of the six initial EU member-states currently constitutes about half of the total population. As with the present day European Union, the establishment of the American Union’s external borders was not predetermined by geography or destiny. Several additional territories could have been included, while some current members could have remained
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outside. Specifically, the limits in the north-east corner sought not only to include the basin of the St. Lawrence River, but sufficient land in Canada to allow access to Quebec and Montreal. In the north-west, negotiations led to the former Oregon ‘Country’ being split with the British, subsequently forming part of the Canadian province of British Columbia. In the west, half of California was in, while the other half was out, in Mexico. In the south, Puerto Rico was associated with the Union, while the much closer Cuba was not. Not to mention territorially disconnected Alaska and the Pacific archipelagos. Rather than shaped by natural features, the territorial limits of the American Union were established for the Union’s capacity for assimilation and the consistent institutionalization of its components. Likewise, the external borders and the internal full membership of the ter-
ritories of the ongoing European Union are not entirely predetermined by Christendom or geography. The initial core of the European Community was located at the territorial centre of the continent, largely coinciding with the lands of Charlemagne’s medieval empire which later evolved into the Holy Roman and German Empire. After successive enlargements, the frontiers of the Union are now at the Atlantic Ocean in the west, the Mediterranean Sea in the south, and the Arctic Ocean in the north. Nevertheless, in the south-east corner in particular, the limits of the European Union are still undefined. Official and officially potential candidates to join the European Union now include all the remaining former members of Yugoslavia, that is, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and the international protectorate of Kosovo, as well as enclosed Albania. All these countries already belong Catalan International View
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to the Stabilization and Association Agreement giving them access to EU markets and financial support. They are now completely encircled by European Union territory. The total population of these seven countries is only 5 percent of the total population of the European Union, which may make them adaptable to EU rules and processes at not insurmountable costs. Some of the current candidates’ access to full membership to the EU may depend on pending democratization and institutionalization. A failure to integrate these countries might imply the persistence of conflicts and violence and make the area a kind of temporary ‘Wild East’ of the Union. If the Balkans remained outside, they would risk becoming the Caribbean of Europe, with comparable features of internal instability, mass emigration and recurrent hostility to the European Union.
Building a stable federal EU implies abandoning the concept of sovereignty that was forged around the treaty of Westphalia in the seventeenth century More controversial is Turkey’s candidacy. This remnant of the Ottoman Empire, a very large, underdeveloped, mostly Muslim and strongly nationalist country, is also subject to scrutiny regarding its civil rights and democratic credentials. Also, although officially the whole of Cyprus belongs to the European Union, about one third of the territory in the north of the island is a Turkish enclave beyond EU control. The exclusion of Turkey from the European Union might evoke the exclusion of Mexico from the American Union, including its subsequent effects of isolationism and resentment. However, given the current situation, it seems unavoidable. 44
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Abandoning sovereignty The European Union’s assimilation of new territories and states requires increasing efforts as they are located at increasing distances from the initial centre and have significantly different populations in economic and ethnic terms. As occurred in America during the nineteenth century, territorial expansion was able to assimilate new, relatively close units at the beginning, but it had to adopt more flexible formulas of linkage and association with less cohesive territories in the more distant peripheries. Nevertheless, building a stable federal European Union implies abandoning the concept of sovereignty that was forged around the treaty of Westphalia in the seventeenth century and has been gradually eroded as the process of Europe-wide integration has moved ahead. This was certainly anticipated by the founding fathers of the European Community as the assertion of states’ sovereignty led to increasingly frequent and lethal inter-state wars. One of them, Jean Monnet, forecast during World War II: ‘There will be no peace in Europe if the states rebuild themselves on the basis of national sovereignty, with its implications of prestige politics and economic protection (...). The countries of Europe are not strong enough individually to be able to guarantee prosperity and social development for their peoples. The states of Europe must therefore form a federation or a European entity that would make them into a common economic unit’. The current economic challenges make this diagnosis and recipe more relevant than ever. However, as for the process of territorial delimitation mentioned above, building federal political institutions from previously existing ‘sovereign’ states may take a while.
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In America, from the official establishment of the United States in the late eighteenth century and for more than one hundred years, the founding states of the Union kept their ‘sovereign’ rights, very different institutions existed across the territory (including direct rule from Washington) and the territorial limits of the union were undefined. Only after the inter-state, intra-American Civil War, did the United States begin to be referred to in the singular –the United States ‘is’ rather than ‘are’. A United Stateswide intelligence agency and security organization, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, only came into being in 1908, while the central bank of the United States conducting a common monetary policy, known as the Federal Reserve, was established five years later in response to a series of financial crises. The union only managed to organize the whole territory into states with elected legislatures and governors as late as the early twentieth century. As for the federal institutions, the number of seats in the House of Representatives was only established in 1911 and the federal Senate began to be elected with homogeneous rules in all the states just two years later. In comparison, the European Union has made very significant advancements during the last few decades. These have included the Schengen agreements on borders control, police and judicial cooperation, which were incorporated into EU law in 1997, as well as the creation of the euro and a
common monetary policy by the central bank, a process begun in 2002, although not yet including all countries. Democratization and the rule of law have been the European Union’s prerequisites for any potential candidate. The recent enforcement of the Treaty of Lisbon on the EU institutions is shaping a better-defined balance than in previous arrangements between the two-chamber Council of Ministers and Parliament and a dual executive around the Commission and the innovative Presidency of the European Council. In contrast to the United States of America, the European Union is still characterized by high economic inequality and varying degrees of attachment to certain institutions and policies among its members. However, the links across Europe are already sufficiently strong to make any hypothetical backlash extremely costly. If in response to the current crisis some member-states abandoned the euro or even the Union, protectionist policies were adopted and inter-state rivalries were to re-emerge, the consequences for all Europe would probably be close to catastrophic. The union of Europe, as the union of America more than a century ago, has always advanced in response to crises and challenges. New Europe-wide financial regulations and common state budget and tax policies are now being approved. The outline of a potentially more democratic and efficient federal European Union is basically designed and positively tested. The current emergency demands nothing short of more continental integration. *Josep M. Colomer
Research Professor at the Higher Council for Scientific Research (CSIC), elected member of the Academia Europaea and life member of the American Political Science Association (APSA). He is currently distinguished Visiting Professor at Georgetown University, Washington DC. He is the author of more than two-hundred articles in international academic journals, as well as ten books in English, mostly on comparative and European politics, political institutions and institutional change, where he has used game theory and social choice theory for applied analyses. He has been awarded the APSA’s Leon Weaver Award, the Spanish Political Science Association’s Prize for the best book in two years, the Ramon Trias Fargas Foundation and the Anagrama Awards for Essays, the Institute of Catalan Studies’ Jaume Carner Award for the best doctoral dissertation in six years and the Prat de la Riba Award for the best book in philosophy and social sciences in five years. His most recent publications include the textbook The Science of Politics. An Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2010).
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Martin McGuinness Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland
A long-time Irish Republican activist. He is currently a Member of the Northern Irish Assembly and holds the position of Deputy First Minister, following the St Andrews Agreement and the 2007 elections. For the past four decades he has been one of the leading voices in his party, Sinn Féin. Bearing in mind what was concluded in the Good Friday Agreement, what assessment can be made of the self-determination process in the six counties? My evaluation is clearly positive. The progress we have made would not have been realistic some years ago. However, we still face a long way ahead and now that a lasting peace seems more possible than ever we shouldn’t forget where we are coming from. Still, the necessary steps are to be made and as Irish Republicans we want a full sovereign, reunited Ireland. Our great challenge implies persuading the Protestant community that a united Ireland won’t harm them either. It will be a win-win situation for everyone. 46
Beyond all the political agreements, is there a road map that Sinn Féin supports? The most important thing to say is that Sinn Féin isn’t going back to anything. We are a party on the move. Sinn Féin is willing to play our part in facing this exciting challenge that is a fair, prosperous and a reunited Ireland. No conflict, anywhere in the world, would be resolved without leadership from people who are at the heart of the conflict. And to find ourselves in the position we are in at this moment requires leadership. Courageous leadership. Putting aside the huge political challenge of national reconstruction, what are the main pillars of
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Sinn FÊin’s government policies in the fields of welfare, economics, health, etc? Sinn FÊin seeks the establishment of a new Ireland based on sustainable social and economic development. Our challenge is to build a country and an economy that creates wealth and shares wealth
that is based on enterprising excellence and social solidarity. Despite the crisis we are committed to improving our welfare system through fair redistribution. Many analysts indicate that education has brought change in your society.
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As a former education Minister in Northern Ireland I believe education should play a leading role in the reconciliation of both communities. In my opinion, what changed the situation eventually - and, of course, it took a lot of time to change it, things like that don’t change in a week or a fortnight - was the new educational system. Your party has already been in government for several years with the Unionists. Have they accepted the irreversibility of the process? Along with that ongoing process Sinn Féin took a decision to establish a peace commission, which had the responsibility of travelling around the country to receive submissions from the general public, and also our opponents. Most of them do not see it this way and are still very reluctant to accept a united Ireland. Having said this, I want to acknowledge that some people within the Protestant community are slowly changing their views and they’re starting to change their mind about the reunification of the whole island. How do you evaluate the role of the Republic of Ireland in the peace process and what strategy should they follow to ultimately achieve reunification? Some politicians in the Republic of Ireland traditionally have not appeared to be overly keen on the issue of Irish unity. As peace and reconciliation in the north is gaining ground the opinion is being modified and more people in the political spectrum openly advocate Irish unity. It is nonsense, and very costly, to have two separate administrations in our small island. However, we feel the 48
support of the people of the Republic. This is our greatest asset. Will the recent breakthrough have the historic significance of the Good Friday Agreement? It will have an important impact of great consequence. For the first time in Northern Ireland the powers of policing and justice will be exerted from a democratically elected chamber on a cross-community basis. The Good Friday Agreement was an incredible breakthrough, something that has laid the foundation stone for all that has followed. But we have seen the ongoing success of the peace process; we’ve been through the St Andrews Agreement, which obviously propelled us forward a bit more. But it’s my view that the Hillsborough Agreement could see politics in the north come of age, and see us all move forward on the basis of equality and partnership. When it seemed impossible, ways were explored to clear the main obstacles to the peace process. To what extent has your own thinking changed over the decades? I have always been an Irish Republican; I truly believe in a united Ireland and I’m working to achieve that. But over the course of 15 years or more, people like others and myself have been working to end the vicious cycle of conflict. Has the British establishment accepted Irish reunification?
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Officially not, but I believe they privately admit the inevitability of the process. Does the prospect of a new Tory administration jeopardise this goal? Let me put things in perspective. I think that Tony Blair showed himself to be the first British prime minister in the history of Britain’s relationship with Northern Ireland to seriously make the effort to understand what was wrong here and what was required to put it right. The Conservatives will do a grave disservice to this process if they don’t make a similar effort. What’s your view on the role the EU has played to secure the peace process and make it successful? The EU has played a positive role in the search for peace, reconciliation and prosperity in Northern Ireland. The EU plays a part in assisting all of Ireland’s social and economic development into the future. The financial contribution has helped people from the six counties and border regions to exit social exclusion and have a real chance to improve their own lives and the lives of their children. It’s not a modest contribution. In your opinion, can one say a new Europe of the peoples and (small) nations is being defined? Will countries like a reunited Ireland, the Basque country, Catalonia, Scotland or Flanders have a say in it? I believe in the Europe of its peoples. Countries like those you have mentioned will certainly play a role in a new Europe that is emerging. The EU cannot turn its back on nations like ours that have been around for centuries. How do you regard the political evolution of Catalonia? I feel close to the Catalans in their struggle for liberty. Just like any other nation it is up to them to decide their future and what to do with their country. I hope in the future we will be able to strengthen our cooperation since there are many common interests and challenges to face.
Do people usually make comparisons between the Irish and the Basque situation? In recent years we have seen how a number of Batasuna’s militants have been jailed. These leaders were apparently trying to create new political proposals to reach a peaceful compromise between the different parties. From what you know, how do you feel about it? We have had, and we still have, strong links with our friends from the Basque Country. Sinn Féin has always argued for the need to revive the Basque peace process. The banning of Batasuna, alongside the continued jailing of political representatives will in no way aid this task.
I believe in the Europe of its peoples. The EU cannot turn its back on nations like ours that have been around for centuries
Will there be a united Ireland in your lifetime?
Well, I’m working to achieve that. I believe that the agreements we have made allow us to go forward to bring an end to the old hatreds and divisions that have been so much to our detriment. I believe a united Ireland is inevitable. Absolutely. But I believe it can only happen by peaceful and democratic means.
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NEEWS (New Emerging European Western States)
Alex Salmond First Minister of Scotland Leader of the Scottish National Party (SNP) and the current First Minister of Scotland. He is the Member of the Scottish Parliament (MSP) for Gordon and has also served as a Member of Parliament (MP) in Westminster. Recently you mentioned ‘there’s a clear and consistent demand for further Constitutional progress’. Which political scenario looks more feasible for twenty-first century Scotland? Well as you know, the SNP stands for independence. We understand that small countries are better ruled, more accountable and more able to face the challenges of a globalised world. However, we have a very small majority in our chamber, therefore, we need to build a bigger majority and for that we need to come to see other parties. It is important that along with the pro-independence discourse we run effectively the powers we have been granted. In which policy areas will your Parliament’s powers be extended? 50
The SNP clearly wants full independence - so clearly that means gaining powers over those areas currently held at Westminster. The Scottish Parliament has full powers except in those areas specifically listed in Schedule 5 of the Scotland Act 1997 -key things include constitution, economic and fiscal powers, defence, international relations, the civil service, consumer affairs, social security etc, etc-. We want control over all of these. The Calman Commission has recommended modest increases in powers in certain areas, including slightly enhanced taxation competences. The new coalition UK government in its Programme for Government state that they will implement the Calman proposals. Whilst the SNP did not take part in the Commission, the Scottish government
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did publish a response. The Scottish government supported the implementation of those recommendations which can be immediately acted upon and has provided Draft Orders which would allow for this to happen. Nevertheless, there are a number of proposals in Calman which are unacceptable - and it is clear that it is nowhere near an adequate alternative to independence. Can you point out the main challenges your country (and also your government) faces? The ongoing global economic situation obviously throws up key challenges. Whilst the Scottish
government is actively involved in building towards recovery and have sought early engagement with the new UK government, Scotland currently lacks the full fiscal tools to set a clear Scottish agenda. Taxation powers remain largely reserved in Whitehall - and the Calman proposals offer little in the way of improvement. Before the worldwide financial crisis your government had plans to join the so-called Arc of Prosperity where countries like Ireland or Iceland were included: these countries have been terribly affected by the crisis. Has this crisis produced any strategic changes?
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balanced parliament where our chances to exert influence should grow. We should play our cards effectively and advance the cause of the Scottish people. Will it somehow affect the devolution process? Not really. A Tory government will not change much from the policies the new Labour administration have inflicted on us. Both parties are clearly unionist, however it is true that the Tories’ image has worsened over the years.
It is true that both countries have been severely affected by the crisis, just like many big countries including Spain and the UK. We believe what we call the Arc of Prosperity can be a great opportunity for a country like ours. They are our neighbours and are prosperous and stable, I see no reason not to get closer to them. For example Norway, a small country, has been the country least affected by the crisis. Being capable of using our own resources would be a positive asset for us and would make us an even more responsible country.
We understand that small countries are better ruled, more accountable and more able to face the challenges of a globalised world
Do you expect any significant political changes from Westminster once the new government is formed? In the next legislative term we will have tremendous opportunities in Westminster. The perspective of a hung parliament will bring a more 52
In contrast to its spending autonomy, Scotland has very limited responsibility for raising money for public spending. Will this situation change? The need for borrowing powers to manage capital spending has huge implications for us. I think the argument for having strong fiscal powers, powers over revenue, powers to expand the economy within a monetary context, within a European Euro context, will prove to be a very strong one for the people of Scotland. Your government has opposed the arguments of the Commission on Devolution (the Calman Commission) with those of the so-called National Conversation. Still you don’t yet have a clear majority in the chamber. How will you persuade or drag the other parties to move towards further devolution? In the National Conversation we have taken the views of the people into account. Any debate has to come to a conclusion and through the tool of the referendum the people will determine the future of the country. What’s the point of us having a legislative chamber if we cannot decide on the affairs that really affect us. The Scots are a mature and a responsible society so we don’t need either the London Government or Westminster to meddle in our affairs.
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How does your Government interact with the Secretary of State for Scotland? Is this institution trying to trim your powers or limit them? It interferes from time to time in our work. This is clear. It is nothing new, but nonetheless it seems to me a largely irrelevant institution. It keeps an eye on our affairs but we should not be too worried about it. What future do you foresee for European stateless nations? Can we expect any joint actions to help more policy coordination towards common goals? It is time for Scotland to take more responsibility in the world we share and, therefore, regarding stateless nations we remain attentive to the steps other countries are ready to undertake. Obviously we are very sympathetic towards nations that want to preserve their identity, language and culture and as a Scottish nationalist I know that having your own state is the most effective way to keep all of them alive. Having said this, launching a joint action is complicated since one nation like ours can
have a different political cycle or agenda than another one. We may have common problems and goals but often the channels and ways may differ.
In the next legislative term we will have tremendous opportunities in Westminster Finally I would like to ask you something about Catalonia since you have been in our country several times. I wonder if you would like to send a message to our Catalan audience. I have followed the constitutional debate that has taken place in Catalonia, which finally led to the approval of the new Statute. I don’t usually make comments on other countries’ business since as a First Minister of Scotland that could be misinterpreted. However, I believe that only the Catalan people should be entitled to decide on their own future.
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Bart de Wever Leader of the NV-A De Wever is the leader of the New Flemish Alliance (NV-A), which headed the results in the past federal elections in Belgium. His new prominent role in Belgian politics may spur this country to a new state reform. You have made the claim that in your head Belgium no longer exists. When will a new independent Flanders be born? (Laughing) Not only in my head. Belgium did exist, but not anymore. The Flemish national movement defends the view that Belgium has been an artificial entity ever since it was created in 1831. At its birth, Belgium was determined by the will of the elites. All of them were French speaking. In the beginning the Flemish movement did not pursue the end of Belgium. It only wanted to modify the initial project intended to eradicate our Flemish identity. It was at the beginning of the 20th century, once the Flemish movement realised that the Belgian state and its establishment would 54
never understand our culture and our identity, that the Flemish nationalists started to consider to quitting Belgium. Right now Belgium is highly artificial with two separate political systems, two education systems, two different social and cultural networks and so on. The link between both parts of the country is about to evaporate.
How many years would you give Belgium?
It’s hard to say. It is a long-term revolution and at this point I don’t see this process being halted. It is not a new institutional arrangement that will change the course of history. Brussels will be a problem for separation. Granting the city a new statute could be a solution for some, but many others will oppose it, and we should not forget that Brussels is still the capital of Flanders. It also depends on the
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way Europe evolves. In this sense Belgium is already supranational in many aspects. I believe that a national level requires a certain degree of homogeneity. Belgium cannot survive as a perpetual diplomatic conference between two different countries. Let’s talk about Brussels. Is the nationalist Flemish movement ready to give up its capital? We don’t have to, and we don’t want to renounce our capital, Brussels. I believe that in the hypothetical case of the independence process being on the negotiating table, a deal would have to be reached concerning this city. A double capital could be a possibility; a European district similar to Washington could be another. Different people have different ideas. Given this, I must say that at the moment Brussels is not at the centre of our political debate.
We have other issues to tackle. Moreover, Brussels is not a problem, geographically it lies within Flanders but it is highly Gallicised. I have no doubt that a compromise will be found and the Walloons will always be welcomed. Brussels belongs to the ‘bruxellois’ but it is nothing without Flanders. Ultimately what do you want for Flanders and for Belgium? Separation? Two separate states within the EU? Evolution will bring an end to Belgium. This is not Kosovo and we are not in the nineteenth century. We are part of the European Union, a body that makes decisions on sixty per cent of our laws. Independence as it was understood in the past is not realistic. As Flemish we will be active members within the European integration project.
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Will the electoral success of your party, leading the results in Flanders, start a new cycle in Belgium politics? Federalism no longer works. Belgian democracy is split, we have to move towards European federalism where two autonomous entities agree to sign a treaty that stipulates what they will do together. I believe that in the June elections the Flemish voted for change and for an end to a state that refuses to move and which blocks everything. It is in both parties’ interest to put an end to this stalemate and to allow the country to evolve. Do you express a regionalist viewpoint in order to advance towards a Flemish state? I am not a revolutionary and I believe that in this phase it is necessary to advance towards federalism within Europe. If Belgium disappears one day it will be the product of this same evolution. Sometimes the Flemish political class are accused of expressing one position when they are in opposition and then holding a radically different one when they are in government. This is true and it has worn out a large part of the Flanders public who have stopped voting for the majority parties since they’ve lost the necessary credibility. The problem is that when Flemish politicians govern they alter the viewpoint they held in opposition and become ‘the perfect belgicistes’. How are the negotiations going regarding the delicate issue of BHV? Your party is in government, what are you going to do? The Flemish Government, which is a coalition of various parties, has a number of agreements: the borders of Brussels won’t be extended; in the peripheral area of Brussels we will not concede anything to the francophones. We are not intolerant, as some French speaking parties claim, those borders were a compromise reached by both communities in the 1960s. The Constitutional Court has also ruled on it. We constantly remind those who forget those compromises of their existence. 56
Can Borders always be moved?
It’s a dangerous game. You need to know Flanders and its history. Borders have always been changed at the expense of the Flemish people. In some respects the Flemish are like the Catalans, the Québéquois. They need to protect their culture from another, very powerful one. I fail to understand why the francophones don’t accept what was arranged in the 1960s when the linguistic border was established. Are you for the preservation of solidarity within Belgium? Whilst we have been part of this country we have never brought the notion of solidarity into question. On the other hand, we try to reach a fair deal with the francophones, something which at present does not exist, which jeopardises the future of the Flemish people. The Belgian establishment, with the excuse of the current system of cooperation federalism, are unable to move, they want things to remain as they are and this is very harmful for Flanders and even for the French speaking side. How do you view the rise of pro-independence adherents in Catalonia? With enormous enthusiasm. I very much respect the noble cause of the Catalan people for demanding greater recognition and more political and legal rights. I understand the way the new political statute is under attack from the authorities and the Constitutional Court. Events are on the move, however. I think Catalonia will succeed in becoming what the Catalans wish their country to be with no impositions.
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Tel. +34 977 757 473 · +34 977 756 265 • Fax +34 977 771 129 Camí Pedra Estela, 34 • 43205 Reus (Baix Camp) www.demuller.es
NEEWS (New Emerging European Western States)
Artur Mas President of CiU
Photos by Xabier Miquel Laburu
Mr Mas is the leader of the Convergència i Unió Party and their candidate for President of the Catalan government. This year he will have his last opportunity to be elected President of Catalonia. Currently he is well positioned in the polls. Nowadays the European project is in crisis. What Europe does the CiU party believe should be built in order to overcome the current stagnation? A Europe of peoples and citizens, but at present these two Europes don’t exist and only the Europe of states is visible. We want a Europe of nations, which means of its peoples and citizens. What role should stateless nations such as Catalonia play? As long as they don’t have a state, what they need to do is find a place for themselves in the world. I’ll give a couple of examples: Catalonia doesn’t have its own state, but Catalan culture can nowadays project itself to the world in a way that’s different from Castilian culture. We could project ourselves to the world more strongly and we don’t do it well enough. We have to improve our capacity for exchange with the outside world. Stateless nations find themselves sidelined in terms of the European decision-making process. Is there a way to alleviate this shortcoming? They are most certainly sidelined, yes. Nearly all of them, with the exception of Flanders, are part of 58
very powerful states, such as Britain, France and Spain. Can these stateless nations find a place for themselves in the world? I believe that they can and that we need to boost their level of involvement to the maximum degree. On a more general level, in this Europe in crisis, do you think that the public continue to see Europe as the solution to all our problems? In spite of everything, Europe is more of a solution than a problem. We need to be part of Europe. Of course we need Europe to once again become the solution. Europe is undoubtedly in the midst of a crisis, but we must never lose sight of the collection of ideas, values, economic security and legitimacy that Europe has brought us as a whole. Will we need to rethink Catalonia’s role within the European Union if we don’t become a state? I believe that if we aren’t a state it’ll be almost impossible. If we aren’t a state it’s very hard to rethink our role within the EU. We have commercial, logistical, economic, cultural power and so on, but on its own this doesn’t give us power within
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European institutions. If we install suitable Catalans within the decision-making organisms of the European institutions we could exercise a greater influence. But this doesn’t sit well with the Catalan character and we haven’t done it very much. If anything we’re too reserved. Following the fiasco surrounding the new Statute, do you think that there is a way ahead in Catalonia’s relations with the Spanish state? Does the famous ‘tolerance’ still exist? In the good times, when there was a more or less democratic system the tolerance existed. Unfortunately, there’s been repression most of the time since 1714. Catalonia wasn’t strong enough to make Spain into a plurinational state and although Spain has at times exercised its strength with great brutality it hasn’t been strong enough to put an end to the Catalan issue. Catalanism has shown itself to be
naive, both on the right and left, in thinking that it could change Spain. Even if we had our own state we would have to conclude that our own independence would be limited.
We want a Europe of nations, which means of its peoples and citizens Based on people’s attitudes, do you believe that Spain wants to eliminate any Catalan national aspirations? They have never been interested in Catalan culture and our difference annoys them. At various points in time there have been clear attempts to eliminate our culture and our institutions. The relationship has never been perfect and it is going through an especially difficult period at the moment.
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the right to decide is all about. In order that it doesn’t fail, I see that the right to decide should be applied progressively. As social majorities grow and become consolidated we will advance in terms of the right to decide. Do you feel disappointed by everything that has emerged from the approval of the new Statute? Some commentators say that it’s the price that had to be paid to make people understand that, ‘there’s no solution to Spain and the Catalan nation will never be well-received’? Yes, I feel deeply disappointed because the Statute was a noble aspiration in order to renew a collaboration, on a more ambitious level: the relationship between Catalonia and Spain. While this basis is an advance in terms of the 1979 Statute it is no way the culmination of our aspirations. It was not the end of the journey and neither was the Statute that was approved by the Catalan Parliament. It was aborted by the state’s apparatus.
You have made it clear that CiU’s electoral manifesto does not include independence. So what exactly is your commitment to the right to decide? I never said that independence will never be part of our programme. At the moment, independence won’t be included in our manifesto. That battle should only be fought in order to win it. I don’t want to lead the country in defeat. Keeping in mind our mutual ‘tolerance’ of Spain has to come to an end, Catalonia as a nation has every right to decide its own national future: that’s what 60
While the objective wasn’t in order to prove that nothing can be done about Spain, this may well have been the outcome. This wasn’t the objective; it was a noble objective to move Catalonia and its self-government forward and at this moment in time this is being frustrated. Do you favour strengthening the area of international relations in a future government led by the CiU Party? As is the case of any country with ambitions and its own personality, I would like the government of Catalonia to have its own Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I’m not sure if we’ll be able to do it
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from the start due to budgetary limitations. Nevertheless, I’m certain that we in the government will project a first class foreign policy. In your speeches you continually speak of ‘rebuilding Catalonia following the political and economic crisis’. Does this imply that management policies will be in sympathy with national reconstruction? This must be the case. We not only have to manage, we have to help Catalonia find its place in the world. We have to find Catalan culture’s place in the world for example, as we have world class people in almost all fields. Not every country is able to say this. We have an excellent position in the Mediterranean which means that in the future, if we do everything right, we could be the capital of southern Europe. We have a capital like Barcelona with an international reputation that we need to maximise. Catalonia needs to have a wide vision, it has to be connected to the Valencian Country and the [Balearic] Islands and lead a project with a great potential and with enormous challenges. We have complementary economies and we have to take advantage of this. Economic theory places a big emphasis on human capital as generating wealth in a society. What human capital does Catalonia possess? What are our great challenges as a country? We have great professionals in almost every field. We have doctors at the highest European level. We are beginning to have research centres that we didn’t have ten years ago that have attracted scientists from Catalonia and further afield. We have elite sportspeople, we have the best chefs in the world and therefore gastronomic creativity, we have great professionals in the world of graphic and industrial design, and we have great economists, writers, professionals in the arts, music and so on. The challenge, however, is to help them, to provide an impetus that adds to all this human capital. We are a small country, but we continue to produce great people.
Do you support the idea of building synergies in the field of international relations? Yes, of course. As I mentioned earlier, in this sense we have important assets as well as great ambassadors. We have an organisation like Barça [Barcelona FC] that is internationally well-known. No other country in the world of a similar size excels to the extent that Catalonia does. This gives our country a lot of strength and if you add to this a government of similar standing to the aforementioned, then we could go a long way.
No other country in the world of a similar size excels to the extent that Catalonia does I wonder whether in reality we don’t have a broader problem in terms of a lack of political leadership and a lack of ambition when facing Europe’s common challenges. Nowadays, leadership in Europe is weak, but we have the European Union’s experience which should help us to find the way. If we add the fact that nowadays the states largely decide the EU’s policies it is clear that there is not much of a role for a European leadership.
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Joan Puigcercós President of ERC Photos by Xabier Miquel Laburu
Mr Puigcercós is the current president of the Esquerra Republicana Party. In the elections scheduled for next fall his party may once again play a key role in obtaining a majority in the Catalan Parliament. As someone who is well aware of the European reality, do you believe we are witnessing changes in European morphology? It’s happening by default. The states’ greed in holding onto and even increasing their power has led citizens of European stateless nations to increasingly see the need to create their own. The European project is being blocked by the states. In such a context it’s logical that emerging states can’t find a place to make their voice heard within the existing Europe and for this reason favour the establishment of a new arrangement. This is why the issue of internal enlargement will take centre stage in the political agenda.
What role do you see for Europe?
Europe needs to understand that it is no longer at the centre, it’s on the margins. Europe is no longer the reserve of human rights, democracy, civil liberties and social protection. Its role is trembling. The economic situation breaks the moulds and the nerve centre has moved towards the East. As Europeans we face the challenge of reinventing ourselves economically and constructing an authentic political project. 62
In the future, Europe will have a knowledge role, with a democratic state model, a role as moderator between the US and China and defender of a sustainable, environmental model. Europe has to find new partners such as India, with its strong Anglo-Saxon tradition that is worth taking advantage of, and new emerging regional powers, like Brazil. During the process of national emancipation, should we continue to operate on left-right lines, or should we evolve towards pro-independents and unionists? We should prioritise the national axis, while recognising that, in the majority of cases, the secessionist movement comes from the left, such as in the case of the SNP in Scotland, in Catalonia and the Basque Country. The only exception is Flanders due to its unique internal circumstances. What challenges do we Catalans face in the international arena? We have to reach new markets. I have always emphasised the need for the internationalisation of the Catalan economy. We have the Maghreb very
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close by and we have to become its gateway to Europe. Algeria has gas and its economy is growing. We have to do business there and we have to find business partners there who might want to do business here. The same is true of Morocco, Egypt and the rest of the region. We’re already present, but not in sufficient numbers. And not to forget Asia, where aside from China, Korea is a country with an enormous potential. We could become its great partner in Europe, not only in southern Europe, and we could help them reach Latin America. We have to meet new challenges and bring ourselves closer to new realities, and do so while always striving for excellence. Your party predicted the end of the autonomous state’s journey with surprising foresight. Nevertheless, this hasn’t prevented you from supporting a government with a clearly unionist option such as that of the Socialist Party. How does this fit in with the strategy of national liberation?
It works thanks to the inherent weaknesses of Catalan society. Catalan society is complex, partly thanks to the significant influxes of immigration which it has received. It’s a society which we have made increasingly more cohesive, but the Catalan
Europe needs to understand that it is no longer at the centre, it’s on the margins. Europe is no longer the reserve of human rights, democracy, civil liberties and social protection emancipation process has two difficulties: on one hand there is the internal division of Catalan society and on the other there is Catalan economic dependence on the Spanish economy. Once the country has overcome the autonomous process it
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has to decide to move ahead and find allies with those formations that defend the Catalan national project.
The question won’t be which government we should form, this is secondary; the question will be what to do when we’re faced with the fact that the autonomous process has been exhausted What route map does ERC propose in the medium and long term? The next parliament should be one of change. The question won’t be which government we should form, this is secondary; the question will be what to do when we’re faced with the fact that the autonomous process has been exhausted. We need to be sufficiently agile to create synergies between the pro-independence parties and be able to oblige the undecided to take the final step. Convergència could be an ally even though its leadership is still not pro-independence. The key is whether we can provide security and confidence to those who see the federal relationship with Spain has been shown to be unviable. We are faced with a signifi64
cant qualitative change and we have to go where up to now the pro-independence movement has been unable to go. This is our great challenge.
And how will we get there?
There are various ways: they require the highest degree of civil cohesion, a reduction to a minimum of the discourse of opponents’ to Catalonia, an increase in the degree of openness of the Catalan economy and the finding of common ground for taking the next step. For its part, Spain will do the rest as it is creating the conditions for a profound institutional crisis that cannot be resolved, similar to what happened in 1898. Many Catalans have given up on the Spanish project. The economic crisis has led us to a great institutional crisis. What do you think about a possible summit of European leaders from different countries who are currently involved in national emancipation? We would need to make a club with the understanding that sooner or later we would have to leave to become a state. Our combined experience is a resource that can’t be underestimated or ignored. I think the idea is very interesting. We need to think how we can help each other and be clear on the fact that we are emerging states and that the condition of not having a state is not permanent.
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Juan José Ibarretxe Former lehendakari of the Basque government
Photos by Xabier Miquel Laburu
He will go down in history as the architect of a new political statute for the Autonomous Community of Euskadi, a project that was unable to be realised thanks to a boycott by the Spanish unionist parties who were on the brink of removing him from his post as lehendakari. Ibarretxe is highly regarded by Basque nationalists who saw a leader who could scale the highest peaks. He currently lives away from politics, but who knows whether he will soon hear the siren’s call once more. What reasons do we have to be optimistic in terms of present day Europe? At a time like this, of institutional, economic and political crises, we have to be very clear that our identity is an added value. Europe can’t turn its back on a reality that is much more plural and diverse than the one defined by the states. ‘Small is beautiful’ is a concept that is valued now more than ever. We small nations are closer, we are more mobile and we have a greater need to get out and bring a breath of fresh air. Will the current model of the nation state evolve? The only way in which the state will survive is if it undergoes change. The defence of identity, language and the nation form the basis of human development. There’s a need for collective rights to join individual rights. As Gandhi said, it’s possible and necessary to love what we are without hating what we are not. The principles of Jacobinism, of state centralism, do not have a place within the European Union. 66
By defending these principles you were the target of attacks, not only on your ideas, but against your person… The Basques aren’t violent, and nor are they immature. Consulting the population, participative democracy, shouldn’t be traumatic for anyone. The Basques and the Catalans will be whatever we want to be. I’m not frightened by this point, I’m as clear as I was the first day, whatever anyone else says or does. Let’s be clear, I have no doubt that in the same way as the Basques existed two thousand years ago, in two thousand years time we’ll continue to exist as a people and speak our language, Euskera. This will happen whether or not the judges or politicians continue to deny us our bread and butter. Historically nationalism has been criminalised. Why do you demand a national debate about it? Zero-sum nationalism is the problem. It is sometimes carried out by states which reinforce themselves on the basis of denying their internal
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differences. It goes against our form of inclusive nationalism, which is open and which has room for everyone. The undercurrent is not against the defence of Catalan and Basque identity. The defence of universality isn’t in conflict with the defence of the individual. The new paradigm of globalisation is that the local moves the world, something that was denied in the past. We must join together the different sovereignties and thereby build a stronger, more cohesive European Union that is capable of facing up to the coming challenges with renewed vigour. But the reaction from the Spanish state, in terms of your proposal for a new statute for Euskadi, hasn’t exactly been in this direction, has it? If Spain is prepared to share its sovereignty with Lithuania, Finland or Sweden, what’s to stop it from doing so with Euskadi or with Catalonia? I wish
the ideas that are blowing from the other side of the Channel had some effect here. There’s the situation of the Scottish within the United Kingdom. No one in Great Britain will deny the Scottish the possibility of becoming independent if that’s what the Scottish citizens want.
The new paradigm of globalisation is that the local moves the world Some Catalan commentators such as Salvador Cardús and Vicenç Villatoro argue that a proposal such as the Ibarretxe Plan has revealed the pre-democratic nature of the Spanish state. Do you think that the so-called ‘Transition’ was more one of appearances than of substance? They prevent democratic consultations, they’re scared of asking the people about certain questions,
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they ignore decisions made by the Basque parliament. Some Spanish political leaders are scared of democracy. Shame on anyone who is scared of democracy. I’m not afraid of finding out the opinion of Basque society, even if they think radically differently from what I think or what my party defends. Spain has regressed from a pluri-national 68
state to a uni-national state. Decisions like those taken by Austria, Germany or Belgium to allow for a greater level of participation by their regions and nations at the European Council level would be unthinkable here. Nowadays Spain shows itself to be a uniform, uni-national state, in spite of its rhetoric of a decentralised state.
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Dossier-Europe
So is there a clear conflict of legitimacy? Without a doubt. In this case it’s a democratic fight that requires dialogue, mutual understanding and a long term view. In this sense I want to make it clear that I can’t imagine that in the future Euskadi won’t be whatever the Basques want it to be. Beyond the interpretations of the Constitutional Court or a politico-legal order that’s against a plural vision of a state and one which has put a lehendakari in the dock. What do you think will occur politically in the twenty-first century? In the twenty-first century, political violence will have no place among us. The Basque people are not a violent people and will not be dictated to by anyone and least of all by ETA. ‘We will be whatever we want to be’, as the much-loved poet Miquel Martí i Pol once said. This is the key. I have no doubt that the Basque and Catalan societies will reach a moment in which they decide to initiate their own path by overcoming the current judicial framework, always via democratic means. Defending one’s identity is something common to this century and doesn’t mean a return to the nineteenth century. It is all related to economic and social progress. It’s knowing where we come from in order to know where we’re going.
Defending one’s identity is related to economic and social progress
What do you think about the phenomenon of the referenda that are taking place in Catalonia? I think it’s an extraordinary event, you Catalans have demonstrated that your heart as a people is still beating. We in Euskadi have seen that you are an optimistic, aware people and that you wish to keep moving forward. A movement of this kind shows that the democratic spirit of the Catalan people is very strong.
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NEEWS (New Emerging European Western States)
Patxi Zabaleta Chief Coordinator of Aralar Photos by Francesc Parés
Before becoming leader of Aralar, Patxi Zabaleta was a prominent figure in Herri Batasuna (HB). He left the coalition in part because of its dependence on ETA. He currently leads an organisation that strives to attain the same objectives through peaceful means.
When we talk of Euskadi we keep talking about ETA, political normalisation and victims on all sides. Batasuna’s leaders, such as Arnaldo Otegi have repeatedly called for unity in the actions of the abertzale (Basque nationalist) left. Do you think that this is only possible in the context of the absence of violence? Yes. Remember that at the start HB was not a creation of ETA, it was a lot more pluralistic and contained diverse kinds of people. When the end of the armed struggle arrives we’ll be obliged to reach an understanding with the other great force in the abertzale left. There are several components that will be necessary in order to reach unity of action: respect for political channels, a plurality of opinions, an internal democratic structure, the taking of autonomic status as a starting point and always accepting the EU framework. 70
It seems as if Batasuna is evolving towards exclusively political means? Are we coming to an end of the phase of a subordination to ETA? Yes, they’re gradually doing so. In their latest document they speak of achieving peace unilaterally, of exclusively political means, of overcoming a situation of the banning of political parties. The Basque people call for ETA to end their armed struggle and to stop presenting themselves as the sole representatives of the Basque people. Do you believe that the Spanish state is in a position to offer guarantees that, in a context of the absence of violence, all policies and strategies will be possible within the state? We Basques have to make peace ourselves. We have to be the main protagonists in the peace proc-
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ess. Having said that, peace has to come from ETA’s unilateral, unconditional end to violence. Any political agreement with ETA would be a brake on and put a ceiling on our national aspirations. As we said in the Anoeta Declaration, we defend a dialogue in which all options are defended and which all political agents are included, following an end to the armed struggle. It will be necessary to negotiate an amnesty; we will have to face the question of compensation for all the victims, as happened in [Northern] Ireland, and accept the different memories. But in [Northern] Ireland the British government actively participated in the search for peace. In your opinion, is the situation the same with regard to the Spanish government? Unfortunately not. It is way behind what happened under successive British governments that
supported the process. The socialist government lacks the nerve to distance itself from the viewpoint held by the People’s Party. The Spanish public is much more advanced than its political class.
The Basque people call for ETA to end their armed struggle and to stop presenting themselves as the sole representatives of the Basque people Let’s talk about Europe. Its integration project is in crisis. Will we see a Europe emerge that is truly respectful of diversity and where the large states don’t control the big issues, as we’ve seen with the current crisis?
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In the short term I feel that the large states will continue to exercise an important leadership, but in the mid-term things will change. The fact that European institutions didn’t have any role in the current crisis is something worthy of deep reflection. Europe is facing the challenge of whether or not it should maintain its model of social policies or follow the American model. Moving towards a European space of social and economic liberties is irreversible.
The right to self-determination should be the basis of the national agreement, together with the defence of the unique cultural characteristics that define us as a nation You said that, ‘ETA has to declare a unilateral, unconditional ceasefire’. Do you see this as possible in an organisation with more than fifty years of history and that in spite of its obvious weakness continues to mobilise new members? ETA has to realise that its role in the political vanguard is no longer acceptable to the public. There will have to be a negotiated dialogue following a unilateral end to the armed struggle, but in a democratic system it’s the political and social actors who have to lead the political struggle. In Catalonia there’s a growing agreement that everything that had to be resolved with the ‘Transition’ is becoming unravelled. What do people in Euskal Herria [the Basque Country] think? 72
We all agree that the transition was not ideal and that it hid and failed to resolve certain problems. In some ways, nothing really changed. Nowadays there’s a political restructuration taking place in Euskadi which will lead to a strengthening of the two major abertzale options. On both the left and the right. We have to face the challenge of being connected and engaging in dialogue, even if this is critical. At the same time, we have to be able to do the same with Spanish forces. This is the political normalisation of this country. Our challenge is to do this in a way that is compatible with our presence in Europe. Nowadays, identities are multiple, and this gives us a lot of room for manoeuvre. The different abertzale formations don’t appear to raise their voices like they did and, for different reasons, they appear to be somewhat disorientated. In your opinion, is Basque nationalism in crisis? This may well be true for the PNV. Following thirty years in power they are now in opposition, but nevertheless continue to retain important power structures in Euskadi. They have an internal debate as to whether to move towards the right to self-determination or to maintain a dynamic of calling for change within the state. The defence of the right to self-determination should be the basis of a national agreement, together with the defence of the unique cultural characteristics that define us as a nation. Forces on the abertzale left are clear on this and the PNV will sooner or later have to make a decision about it. Our goal will be to drag the PNV towards a position on sovereignty and do so on the basis of shared policies and strategies. In Catalonia, referenda on independence are taking place throughout the country with a good response from voters so far. What do people in Euskal Herria think of this phenomenon? We see it as positive and as an instrument of promoting the participation that will act as a clear precedent. I understand that it’s being done well. When the time’s right we could use it in Euskal Herria.
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Opinion
The unfinished family by Alfred Bosch*
George Orwell wanted to tear it down. While he was in Barcelona during the Spanish Civil War, he openly criticized the anarchists for not having blown it to pieces. From his particular point of view, the building, which he mistook for the city’s cathedral, was the most hateful and embarrassing of all religious fancies. Perhaps he had heard those early-hour revolutionaries had actually tried, and failed, to blow up Antoni Gaudí’s most famous work of art, the unfinished Church of the Holy Family, or Sagrada Família. That is precisely what happenend. In July 1936, anti-clerical arsonists paid a courtesy visit to the place, alongside most other religious buildings. The trouble however, was that there was not much to burn: most of the site was just a pile of hewn stone. The rioters did as much mischief as possible with the furniture from the crypt and the hundreds of invaluable maps and documents in the old workshop, but when it came to the monument itself, they could do little more than break off chips with tools. Eventually, however, they got hold of an artillery piece and aimed it at the church. As they were about to fire, a Catalan separatist succeeded in stopping them with a ruse that the towers would be of great value as anti-aircraft nests to scare away fascist planes. This, according to the legend, is how the monument was saved. The full story, which Orwell probably did not know or did not care to know, is in fact quite inspiring. Why should anarchist militants try to blow up the Holy Family? Well yes, of course it was a religious site, but not really a working church or convent, and nobody could ignore what Gaudí’s masterpiece meant as far as artistic value was concerned. Why should a Catalan separatist risk his life in order to save such a work of art? Was there any par74
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ticular connection between Catalan nationalism and artistic Catholic symbols? A small clue: take a quick look at the original four towers. Look again. Do you notice anything special? We shall put aside such questions for a while and admit that, to all intents and purposes, the Sagrada Família is indeed a religious complex. Even the most uninformed of tourists will be aware of this fact, although there are reports from tour guides that after a long, detailed visit, a few Japanese visitors still ask the fateful question, ‘which family did you say used to live in this house?’ Anyway, all in all, it remains quite clear to most observers that the three sets of four spires stand for the twelve apostles, that the central missing spires will come to represent Mary and the Four Evangelists, and that the tallest of all will embody the Savior, Jesus Christ. Towers aside, the whole church is plagued with spiritual references and scriptural and symbolic language. The mastermind behind such an ambitious project was a very devout man, and not someone who could be called a liberal. Gaudí was a deeply conservative Catholic, just like his patrons, the members of the Congregation of Saint Joseph or josephines. They
campaigned for obedience, law and order and, of course, proper demeanor in the context of traditional patriarchal families. The Holy Family was not a name chosen on a whim, it was charged with ideological as well as religious meaning. No two groups were as diametrically opposed as the josephines and anarchists in those troubled times, and a confrontation was eventually unavoidable. So much for the anarchists, but why on Earth should a Catalan freedom partisan, of all imaginable heroes, stop the arsonists from accomplishing their ardent mission? The answer is quite clear; there is a third dimension to the building, that goes unnoticed by many visitors. A partly hidden explanation, which is at least as important as the religious and the artistic sides, for the Holy Family not only carries the weight of spiritual creeds and architectural excellence; it also stands for a nation. The nation, of course, is not by any means Spain, since Antoni Gaudí never felt himself to be Spanish: he was a staunch Catalan nationalist and did his best to leave a clear imprint of his condition and beliefs on his most outstanding legacy.
During the military dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, Gaudí was arrested for refusing to speak to a policeman in Spanish and insisting on using his native Catalan (the fact that he dressed as a pauper most surely did not help). The matter was resolved with a few hours detention and a fine, but such language collisions seemed to be typical of Gaudí, and meant the need for interpreters when the King of Spain, the writer Unamuno or other celebrities showed up at the Sagrada Família, according to witnesses at the time. The famous architect seldom wrote anything down, but occasional annotations of his, plus reported conversations with colleagues, point to the idea that he Catalan International View
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felt very strongly about a marked Catalan spirit as distinct from a Spanish (or Castilian) personality. He believed that Catalans were Mediterraneans, prone to a special sensibility connected with a milder climate, the influence of the sea and a very subtle sense of color, that is more subdued and responsive to hues. According to Gaudí, Spaniards were some sort of black and white ascetics: good for conquering or chasing Jews, and little else.
There is a third dimension to the building, that goes unnoticed by many visitors Gaudí thought there was something fundamental, something basic, which marked the Catalans’ national character. He strove to convey it in his works, first with a romantic-gothic look (much more Frankish or Germanic than Hispanic-Moorish), and thereafter with his use of materials. The things he employed and the craftsmanship he applied were clearly Catalan: wrought iron techniques (his father was in fact a cauldron maker), local ceramics, local stone, local glass. He insisted on the austere nature of everything: ordinary, cheap brick and polychromes based on shattered tiles (trencadís). He certainly did not reject the label of Catalans being tight-fisted, as the Jews or Scots of Spain. He actually cultivated the stereotype. The genius of the Holy Family lies in the notion that the results will be much better if the building rises slowly, thanks to many small, private donations. ‘My boss is not in a hurry’, he used to say, and we cannot tell if he was referring to God or to his country. In any case, the excruciatingly slow trickle of humble alms, which guaranteed the expiation of individual sins (which is what the church was all about), appar76
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ently ensured that innovations would be applied and digested only very gradually. Huge contributions and lavish spending were seen as big risks, not only for the spiritual process, but for the artistic enterprise as well. Gaudí’s state of mind would fit with what Catalans recognize as ‘seny’, a word with no adequate translation in any other language, being something close to both ‘common sense’ and ‘propriety’. The natural opposite of ‘seny’ in Catalonia is ‘rauxa’, another untranslatable term which would take us close to the domain of ‘dissipation’. Indeed, the Sagrada Família surely has its own share of insanity, with its sheer size (at present and especially in the future), in its baroque details, in the dreamlike overflow of pious motifs, and the mere thought that such an excessive project can be undertaken with such meager resources. In fact, this contrast or contradiction between seny and rauxa is not the only genuinely Catalan game of opposites in the church. Must we remind ourselves that the temple was promoted by ultra-Catholics in the most anticlerical of cities? That its architect was celibate, perhaps even a misanthrope, and yet embarked on a megalomaniac tribute to the traditional holy family? That the greatest of talents was given absolute creative freedom by the most reactionary and conservative of religious brotherhoods (the josephines)? That a construction process of some 130 years, which could well take twice as long, may finally be completed when there is not a single practicing Catholic in sight? That a temple, the most conventional, consecrated and sacred kind of building is seen to represent a country? The most unusual, bizarre and complex kind of nation? There is a sweet justification for this last contradiction, however.
Opinion
Gaudí was probably aware of it, and we can be sure he relished the image of a country and basilica rising in parallel, both growing together. To put it plainly, both the church and the country are a work in progress. They are both unfinished: in the case of the Holy Family, it is quite obvious, but so to in the case of Catalonia, if you come to think of it. The Catalan nation is stateless, it is not internationally recognised, it has been crushed at times and it has remerged, it has reinvented itself time and again, never reaching true adulthood. There is always an unmistakable air of teenage self-doubt about Catalonia. This is possibly the reason why both, church and land, can become so terribly appealing to the inquisitive mind, as unfinished families and unfinished creatures like adolescents often are. So how can we recognize this powerful message of Catalan personality in the Sagrada Família? Gaudí was very fond of imagery and symbolism, so it is inconceivable that he would not have accompanied the religious signs with their national or cultural counterparts. In actual fact he did: the building is full of clues, you just need to find them. To start with, all inscriptions are either in the more ritual Latin, or else in the straightforward language of the people –i.e. Catalan. There is not one permanent engraving in Spanish. Furthermore, if one cares to examine the old Nativity façade, the one that Gaudí personally oversaw, there is no way one can ignore the rounded shapes reminding us of Montserrat (the Catalan holy mountain).
To top it all, we must, of course, come back to the groups of four towers. Have you spotted the undeniable visual statement? There is a symbolic expression in those four spires, rising to the clouds like four fingers on a hand, the thumb chopped off. No, not yet? Fair enough, some experts on tradition and folklore will point out the resemblance between the shape of the needles and the quaint steep parabola of human towers (castells) so typical of Gaudí’s birthplace, the countryside around Tarragona. Not a shadow of a doubt; the Catalan human castles, a lesson in group solidarity, balance and strength through togetherness, were present in the designer’s mind when he drew those shapes.
There is a symbolic expression in those four spires, rising to the clouds like four fingers of a hand with the thumb chopped off So why on Earth should the towers be assembled in groups of four? To be honest, it is not a common arrangement: how many churches have façades with four spires in a row? Islamic minarets? That was clearly not what our good old genius had in mind when he conceived his masterpiece. To add up to the 12 apostles, he could have grouped them in twos or threes or sixes: why fours? The answer, my friend, is blowing in the wind. Just take a look at the Catalan flag (not the Spanish banner which, believe it or not, is derived from the older Catalan flag). What distinguishes the Catalan flag from its younger Spanish rival? Colour? Pattern? No, dear reader. I’m sure you’ve got it by now. *Alfred Bosch
Alfred Bosch (Barcelona. 1961). Writer and journalist. He holds a PhD in History from the University of Barcelona. He has become a prestigious Africanist in academic circles and a renowned writer with a prolific output covering everything from essays to novels. His work has been well received by both readers and critics and several of them have won awards. Currently he lectures on African History at Pompeu Fabra University and is director of the Centre for Contemporary Studies.
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Interview
Jaume Cabré ‘With our own state, we Catalans would be happier and would live more peacefully’ Interviewed by Eva Piquer* Photos by Xabier Miquel Laburu
Jaume Cabré (Barcelona, 1947) writes in Catalan. The German edition of his latest novel Les veus del Pamano (Voices from Pamano) has so far sold over 300,000 copies. Over 300,000, which is not to be sniffed at. His books have also been translated into Spanish, English, French, Dutch, Italian, Portuguese, Greek, Norwegian, Hungarian, Romanian, Croatian, Albanian, Slovene and Galician. Jaume Cabré’s novels have a life of their own, each is unique, but they also form part of one of the most solid narrative projects ever witnessed in Catalan literature. As a recipient of the Premi d’Honor de les Lletres Catalanes in 2010, Cabré is in a delightful period in which the critics praise him and the public, as usual, read his books. You have become the ambassador of Catalan literature, and therefore of Catalonia in general. Do you think of yourself in this way? Yes, and I’m delighted to do so, but I find that I need to explain what Catalonia is less and less. Five or ten years ago, in order to explain what Catalan literature was you had to go back as far as Adam and Eve. Nowadays, largely due to Frankfurt 2007, both in Europe and America, they understand what Catalonia and Catalan literature are. Barcelona is always practical as a reference, but now they also know that Barcelona is the capital of Catalonia. I mean people of a certain cultural level, who I deal with professionally. They still keep asking me about the situation regarding the Catalan language, as they find it very interesting. And do you offer them an optimistic view of the situation regarding the Catalan language?
I speak about reality. But the truth is that above all I can now talk about literature and that’s what I like about it. Ten years ago you almost couldn’t speak about literature. Nowadays, they ask me about Catalan at the end and it generates interest, but it’s not the main topic of conversation. So nowadays you can go around like a normal writer. Precisely. I tell them about my new books and I discuss my own literary tradition. I can mention my colleagues, knowing that some of those present will have read them. This didn’t happen before. As for the publishers, I get the impression they have a lot of respect for my work and for Catalan literature in general. Is being Catalan and writing in Catalan a handicap to international exposure?
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I’ve never had the experience of writing in any other language. I could say that, theoretically, yes, it is a handicap, but for me the real handicap would have been to have written in Spanish, because I’m sure my novels wouldn’t have come out in the same way as they do in Catalan. They wouldn’t have interested anyone and they wouldn’t have been translated. But I’m talking about a situation that hasn’t happened. It’s always more difficult to get known when one comes from a small country... Of course, yes. I’ve seen it with my Slovenian colleagues and even with Hungarians, even though they write in a language that has a state and one imagines that a state favours a language, something which doesn’t happen in our case. It doesn’t happen to us clearly, repeatedly and obsessively. It’s hard for us to become known because we’re from a small country, but mostly because we write in a language from a country without a state. This is already a big reason for independence. With our own state all 80
of our problems would not be solved, but I’m sure we’d be happier and we’d live more peacefully in terms of personal and collective dignity. Albania, Hungary and Slovenia have problems being heard in Europe and the rest of the world, in spite of being independent countries. Nevertheless, they have an interior calm. They know that if something doesn’t happen this year it will happen the next, or the next, or whenever, because they don’t have the urgency which we have. I’d change places with them any day. Does the future for the Catalans reside in independence?
Yes, I think so. If not, then tough!
Do you think it’s possible that we’ll achieve independence? It depends on us. If we have to depend on Spain, we’ll never be independent. But thanks to Spain’s attitude, more and more Catalans are com-
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ing to appreciate that independence is the only way out. Our independence will never be given to us from outside and neither will it be understood. That’s why we have to slam the door shut! Do you think Catalan society is currently capable of slamming the door shut? I’m not a sociologist or a politician. Maybe the hardest part is convincing ourselves. But as with all processes, it has its stages. We can’t imagine that it will be over in a month, but it can be solved in a generation. There is currently a very interesting process taking place, the referenda in which every town votes on independence. There’s only a 30% turnout, but imagine if money was spent on it and it received the support of all the state’s apparatus of persuasion. They’re done in good faith by members of the public that go leafleting door to door after work. It’s something entirely voluntary and makeshift that nevertheless manages to achieve the participation of considerable numbers. This 30% that vote in favour of independence are a cross-party political force that the traditional political parties should take into account. One thing is the people, who are beginning to take things into their own hands with initiatives such as the referenda, and another thing are the political parties, who look like they need to go to the gym and are in need of a makeover. I believe they need to place themselves in another reality. Today I was listening to the president speak to parliament. The politicians come to argue with each other. It’s a show, but there are aspects that they don’t dare touch. The parties have to keep in mind that the desire for independence is nowadays shared by 50% of the population. Look how we Catalans are committed to the ballot box, I’m pleased to say. We want to become independent via the ballot box. But it might turn out that a lot of pro-independence Catalans don’t know who to vote for in November. It’s what I said: if the parties don’t go to the gym and don’t get into shape, then it’s not good. We’ll have to see what will happen between now and November, how they’ll regroup, but I believe that it won’t be good if abstention wins. Look at the Basque Country, which is in the hands of the socialists and the People’s Party thanks to absten-
tionism. If abstentionism wins, everything will end up in the hands of those who know how to take advantage of it. Can we Catalans hold our head up high in the world?
Yes, in a lot of ways yes, even in football.
Mainly in football...
Well, not entirely, since we only have one football team at this level. But in economic, industrial and business aspects there’s a very impressive network of Catalans around the world. In cultural terms one could mention literature or art or contemporary music made by Catalans. Catalan artists are clearly well known and Catalan writers are an interesting discovery. Before there was a hidden agenda: ‘these Catalans have so many problems, let’s see what they’ve got to say’. Now they think: ‘yeah! I like Catalan writers, they help me make money’. We’re talking about market forces and literary interest. And I’m not speaking about myself, but in general. In the past, Catalan writers moved in circles that protected them, made up of people who were sensitive to minorities. But not any more. My Italian publisher has even hired someone who speaks Catalan so they can answer the Catalan writers’ phone calls and emails in their own language. It’s because Catalan writers earn them money.
Nowadays, thanks to Spain’s attitude, more and more Catalans are coming to appreciate that independence is the only way out What social responsibility does a writer have? Should a writer have to publicly commit themselves to certain causes? Everyone has to do what they feel is right. I can’t ask anyone to define themselves, that’s if they’re not already in a situation in which they define themselves or they are defined by someone else. A writer has as much of a responsibility as a lawyer, a politician or an economist. Perhaps rather than writers, we should speak of think-
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a collective level. And just to be clear that I don’t mean the so-called experts, the know-it-alls that inhabit debates and speak about things they don’t even know anything about. The intellectual has to think bravely, say what they think in terms of the political situation in their country. Now in particular we are at a time when we need intellectuals to make themselves heard... Yes, we need voices that speak with foresight, that know how to direct people’s desires to move one way or another. And here I don’t mean the professional politician. It’s one thing for the intellectual to jump into the political arena, which I think is a good thing, and another that the intellectual world reflects on society. In the eyes of those who keep track of things, you’ve gone from being a commercial writer to being a literary writer, but your books are essentially the same now and then.
ers or intellectuals, a term which includes more people. Intellectuals have a moral obligation to say what they think, here and everywhere. For example, right now it makes sense that we complain about the silence of Spanish intellectuals as to Spain’s current relationship with Catalonia. They say nothing because they know they’ll be attacked. It may also be that they’ve changed their minds, because Spain is very much in favour of a single way of thinking. This upsets me, it’s a way to hide in the shadow of the majority, you feel you’re right because everyone thinks like you do and those that don’t think like you do are far away and you don’t see them and that’s comforting. So the intellectuals have to say what they think. But the fact that a person is a good painter a good philosopher, a good writer or a good poet doesn’t mean they’re a good thinker. An intellectual can demonstrate their own way of thinking or, if they have the capacity to do so, they can reflect on and make proposals on 82
I’ve always done my own thing, ignoring the way people around me might perceive my actions. I realise that the fact that I’ve dedicated myself so much to the audiovisual realm might have scandalised some, although I guess eventually they’ve stopped being scandalised, but I just don’t care. The same ones that before despised you now defend you arguing that you are the most solid author that we’ve got... And what’s odd is that they defend me based on the same novels. This could mean that things are reread, they make intellectual rereading. I’ve carried on writing and have avoided discussions about this topic. A writer said to me: ‘Literature is an endurance race; the winners are those that don’t throw in the towel’. In your case, you have won the race by miles. They have ended up putting you in the place that you deserved. What I had written was already written. Fra Junoy o l’agonia dels sons (Brother Junoy or the Agony of Dreams) came out in 1984. Now when they say to me, ‘what a great novel’ I’m flattered, but it
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was just as good in 1984. I didn’t ask them to flatter me then and nor do I ask for it now. What I do say is that every novel that I’ve made is nourished by the previous one. I like the image that you’ve mentioned of the ability to resist. You have to keep on making your own way, what you can’t do is expect that somebody shows you where you have to go, because this somebody will change their opinion or someone else will come along saying that you have to follow another way. You have to make your own way, and if you don’t know what it is, it will turn up in the end. It’s something that I learnt or guessed at quite an early age: you can’t be a slave to fashion, because fashion changes. Francesc de Borja said: ‘I’ll never serve a master who will eventually die’. You can’t serve a master who’ll eventually die, you always have to do what you believe you have to do. Have you always known what path you had to follow? No. I’ve realised I had to do a particular novel, that it took a lot out of me, and that when I finished I saw that I had to write another one, making use of everything I’d learnt from my experience on the previous one. I have the feeling I’ve climbed a stairway, not because I’m higher, but because there are steps built on top of steps lower down. Every new step I’ve taken is due to having climbed the previous step, which in turn is built on top of the previous one. In this sense you could argue that I resist the temptation to rush myself, because it leads nowhere. Being in a rush only leads you to regret, to waste your efforts. If a particular speed is creative for me, that’s it, I don’t change it. If I need to fight to defend it, I will. You’re limited and you realise that at any one moment you have to dedicate your time and energy to whatever you consider to be most important, and you have to be consistent. Is that why you publish a book every seven or eight years? I’d prefer not to be so slow, but that’s the way it is. Something I’m proud of is that a lot of my books are still in print and are reprinted every year. There are people who discovered me at the start of the nineties with Senyoria (His Lordship), and those who discovered me in the seventies with
Carn d’olla (Stew), and there are youngsters who have discovered me now with Les veus del Pamano who have to go back. Foreign publishers have this problem: they don’t know what order to publish my novels in. German readers have begun to read me with Les veus del Pamano. The Italian publisher will now publish L’ombra de l’eunuc (The Shadow of the Eunuch) and they’ve asked me to wait before bringing out the next book.
Right now it makes sense that we complain about the silence of Spanish intellectuals as to Spain’s current relationship with Catalonia Have you ever felt less respected for having commercial success? I don’t feel like I’m too successful. I never compare myself to others, every situation, every personal circumstance is different. Writing a novel takes a lot of work, whether it ends up being good, average or bad. I know what it takes to write one and I have a lot of respect for those who decide to write novels. When I see a young person who has written a couple of stories and wants to continue writing, I say to them, ‘Well done, but you don’t know what you’re letting yourself in for’. Because it’s complicated. There comes a time when you risk your life on it or it’s not worth it. You often say: writing is only worthwhile if you believe your life depends on every book. If you don’t feel like your life depends on every book, you don’t try hard enough. And you always have a way out by thinking, ‘I’ll do another one that’ll be better’. If you’re placing bricks, you need to put mortar in the joints to hold the wall up. On one hand you have to put everything into it, and on the other I guess you have to know how to keep things in proportion and not take yourself too seriously. You have to take the work you’re doing very seriously, but the role of a reader helps keep you
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very balanced. As a reader you need books that are unputdownable and you give thanks that Proust, Arthur Miller and Rodoreda exist. You give thanks for the fact that they have taken the risk and that they have had the talent, luck and energy to do the work they have done. You aspire to produce a similar feeling of joy and euphoria in a reader as you get when you read the work of Proust, Miller and Rodoreda. And you know that other people won’t like you at all. A bad review can dishearten you, but you need to know how to keep critics at a distance, both the negative ones and the enthusiastic ones.
I feel that beauty and intelligence are pretty much inseparable. I’m sure that a beautiful phrase is intelligent What opinion do you think literary critics deserve? This is like asking me what opinion literature deserves. Every critic has their own style, their own ways, likes, dislikes, criteria, level of seriousness…
What should the role of a critic be?
Well, this is something else. I firmly believe in the role of the critic. They guide the reader, because the critic is a privileged reader. They have made reading their profession, which presupposes they have special knowledge of that literary tradition and that they know how to transmit the fruit of their reading. Critics provide the writer with feedback. There are critics that teach you things about your books. Aside from this, there’s their evaluation of your book. I enjoy the feedback of someone who understands and for this reason I also have to take both praise and rejection. Have critics revealed aspects of your work that you were unaware of? Of course, because there are lot of things in a novel, but the writer puts them there unconsciously. With the eyes of someone looking from a different angle, they come out in an obvious way. This goes 84
both for the approach to characters and the structure of the novel.
Were you always certain you wanted to be a writer?
When I was young I wanted to be a farmer, a pilot, a fireman, the Pope, or just about anything. But I ended up being a writer. You get to a point when you say, ‘for a while now, aside from reading, I also write’. And you make attempts that are increasingly more serious, that take longer, until you end up with a novel. And you say, ‘look, I’ve published a book’. But you still don’t know if you’re a writer. Bringing a character to life with words isn’t easy. As it’s something you build piece by piece you don’t have the foresight to say: ‘in forty years from now I’ll have written twenty or thirty novels’. You never know, it’s impossible. Nowadays, when you look back, are you surprised by what you have written? It’s part of my life. Now I look at myself and it seems obvious that that is what I should have done. But in reality it wasn’t obvious at all. It all depends on your own biographical circumstances, on your artistic circumstances and what you read and your interests. It could have been one thing or another. One thing that hasn’t changed is the striving for excellence or the desire for excellence, for never allowing myself any weakness that I could detect and that I could do something about. Another thing is whether I later find all the weaknesses I’d missed, but while I can detect them and do something about them I’ll never give in.
Can literature change the world?
It can change the way people see the world, yes of course. From a romantic, idealistic point of view I’d say that literature can change the world, because history is affected by politics and it is written by the winners. But literature is done from liberty. This is the advantage literature, philosophy and the arts in general have, above that of history. The history we know is overly influenced by the political process.
Do we need to change the world?
Yes, the world always needs changing. From the role of women in society, to the rural-urban
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dichotomy, the East and the West, the spread of culture, the distribution of profits, tolerance for economic, ideological, religious and thought processes. The world has to evolve in so many ways! I’m convinced that any time in the past was worse, but sometimes there are people who deny it. The twentieth century was so full of brutal wars and unimaginable cruelty that it makes you think badly of humankind. Do you believe humanity progresses, in spite of everything?
Yes it progresses, but there’s a long way to go!
What do you appreciate more, beauty or intelligence? As an artist, I guess I pursue beauty, but I know that if you’re in an indifferent situation, beauty disappears and the way to fight against indifference, greyness and déjà vu is by using intelligence. I feel that beauty and intelligence are pretty much inseparable. I’m sure that a beautiful phrase is intel-
ligent. Whatever is good is beautiful, as the Greeks said.
What have you learnt by getting old?
One thing I’ve learnt is to be tolerant with my surroundings, with life, because you see that you operate at a different speed. People who are older or younger than you have a different rhythm and you need to be able to negotiate. On one hand I’m becoming more tolerant, but on the other I’m in a hurry, I have a different kind of impatience, because my time is running out. In the past I was incapable of leaving a book half read out of respect for the writer, but now I do.
Is there a positive side to being old?
The best thing about it is that you’ve made it.
I see you’re happy...
Yes, I am. I’m about to be a grandfather and it makes me really happy.
*Eva Piquer Writer and journalist. Works for the Avui newspaper where she coordinates the cultural supplement and the culture section. Has been a lecturer at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and a New York news correspondent. Won the 2002 Josep Pla prize for her novel Una victòria diferent (A Different Victory). Also author of several books, including La noia del temps (The Weather Girl), Alícia al país de la televisió (Alice in Television Land) and No sóc obsessiva, no sóc obsessiva, no sóc obsessiva (I’m Not Obsessive, I’m Not Obsessive, I’m Not Obsessive).
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Tourism, Identity and Added Value Coordinated by Jordi Fexas
The Catalonia Tourism Observatory is the first instance of integrated information, study, research and monitoring created in Catalonia. This instrument of tourism knowledge-management, part of the Government of Catalonia’s Ministry of Tourism, was created with the aim of offering an effective tool for encouraging the competitiveness of the tourism sector in Catalonia and strengthening the Catalonia brand as well as its products and territories. Thanks to the collaboration of Catalan International View we can use this internationally prestigious organ to present this monographic dossier on tourism in our country. The history of tourism in Catalonia, the new, modernizing public policies in the sector, identity as an added value to Catalan tourism in the twenty-first century... These are some of the topics that our specialists would like us to discover and reflect on. Tourism is and should continue to be a great opportunity for countries like ours to better connect ourselves to the globalised world. At the same time we are strengthening our culture, identity and a strategic sector in the new added-value economy. Catalan International View
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Tourism in Catalonia:
considerations on the way to a true industry by Francesc Iglesies*
The development of tourism in Catalonia in recent decades illustrates a continual process of growth and improvement towards a true industry. If one considers the growing importance of tourism in terms of wealth and job creation, we can see how its specific weight in Catalonia is more than 11% of GDP and 13% of employment, while it is also the driving force behind a number of other related economic subsectors (agriculture, manufacturing industries, construction, transport, business services, cultural industries, trade and more). It is the cross-sectional nature inherent in tourism that makes it an object of recurring demands for promotion and investment by different government agencies, as well as business groups in the sector, agents and representative consortiums. At the same time, it is surprising how a major economic and social activity, which has existed as a mass, specialist, seasonal industry in Catalonia for 50 years, has developed historically with relatively little support from the 88
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governments and, above all, with no decisive and systematic policies in term of orientation, planning, organisation and promotion. Firstly, it is clear that the tourism industry and its business-generation capacity based on the convergence of favourable factors deserves praise, as it has made our sun and sand a desirable environment for the emerging demands of the new European middle classes since the 1960s. It made the most of a number of opportunities, using its strengths to create an original holiday destination and a highly pricecompetitive offer of leisure activities. It is in the stages after the mass growth of tourism on our coast that the lack of planning and organisation of activities has become clear, exposing certain parts of the tourism sector to trends, inertias and vices that are difficult to overcome and manage. After decades of a Fordist, supply-driven
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tourism market, Catalonia now has hotel facilities that in some areas are showing their obsolescence and, what is worse, show the results of a progressive dynamic of bad practices on the part of some travel agencies, often acting as predators of environment, cultural and territorial resources, compromising the very survival of parts of some destinations. Today, in Catalan holiday destinations there are certain tourism businesses that are struggling to survive in market conditions radically different from those that enabled them to develop. In any case, the context of the current economic crisis and its contribution to accelerating change heightens the urgent need for new approaches to revitalise the more mature productive tourism sectors, enabling them to better meet new demands, with the aim of facing the more intense competition and challenges arising from transformations in the tourism industry value chain.
The evolution of the concept of tourist destination: from the concentration of supply to focus on demand The concepts of the tourism industry have developed as tourism has started to consolidate its position as a major economic and social phenomenon. If one briefly examines how the concept of tourist destinations1 has developed over recent years one can trace a historic thread that has produced various approaches by the administrations and has defined the challenges faced by agents in the sector on the way towards a true industry: • In the first stage of development, from the 1960s to the end of the 1980s, the tourist destination was conceived as a set of basic accommodation and catering services creating a tourism space around a given product. This was a productive specialisation in supplying tourism services, Catalan International View
1 CHIAS (2004) et al. El papel de las motivaciones del turista en la formaciĂłn de la imagen de destino turĂstico. XVII Encuentro de profesores universitarios de marketing. Pages 673688 Madrid, 22nd and 23rd September 2005.
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but which are decisive in increasing competitiveness. In this stage, the destination was a territory that provided support for logistic activities and services while having to reconcile tourist practices in the industry with the basic product (sun and sand, mountains, city, the countryside). In this sense, approaches that consider conserving environmental resources began to gain influence. With this concept, the keys to competitiveness involve making it easier for demand to hire the services and reach the destination under good terms of quality and price (promotion and marketing, airport, road and port links, and other factors).
where location was decisive. In this respect the destination served to concentrate supply. Thus, tourists have to travel to the place or destination that attempts to provide the necessary attractions to meet their needs. Tourist activity is highly vacational and seasonal, dominated to a great extent by the working and middle class seeking greater quality of life.
2 Cultural tourism in the broad sense of the word includes cuisine, architecture, history, wine tourism, art, design, handicrafts and more, as cultural expressions of the host community. 3 Walmsley, D J and Young, M Evaluative Images and Tourism: The Use of Personal Constructs to Describe the Structure of Destinations’ Images, Journal of Travel Research, vol. 36, no 3, page 65. 1998.
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• During the second stage of evolution, from the 1990s onwards, due to tourism’s growing importance, the destination widened in meaning to include a set of services that facilitate and promote tourist activity. The horizontal nature of tourist activity and its economic impact highlighted the importance of meeting the challenges of mobility, infrastructure, facilities, urban planning, trade, transport and more. In this sense, the destination, without abandoning the idea of specialisation in supply, extended its territorial vision and included needs that appear to be outside the scope of tourism as strictly defined, Catalan International View
• Finally, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, as a result of the social, economic and cultural transformations inherent in the new knowledge society, the concept of destination has moved closer to demand, in the sense that, apart from the territorial component, which is the tourism product itself, other aspects such as identity and cultural tourism have become crucial, in its broadest sense2, intangible and emotional factors and the ability to live new experiences3. In this current stage, the consolidation of information and communication technologies (ICT) in the tourism industry value chain generate the overwhelming need to manage the avalanche of information that surrounds the decision to purchase in order to design products that meet the needs of a micro-segmented demand, in which ICTs play a key role. Here, the paradigm of tourism competitiveness centres on innovation and sustainability, understood in the triple sense of economic and social, cultural and environmental and a capacity to generate unique and authentic offers.
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The stages of tourism administration of the Government of Catalonia Alongside this process, from the perspective of the Autonomous Government of Catalonia, the work of encouraging tourism was almost limited exclusively to promotion, from the 1980s onwards. It involved a primitive tourism industry, geared towards leisure holidays, which based its competitiveness on price and climate. In this context, the general organisation of the sector had clearly been overlooked, tacitly choosing a model of tourism laissez faire, as illustrated by the fact that the first general tourism organisation act was not passed until 20024. Following the abovementioned historical thread, the essential task of tourism administration was based on guaranteeing minimum regulations for accommodation and catering and the huge task of communicating and promoting the tourism offer through the creation of the Turisme de Catalunya Consortium in 1986. The Barcelona Olympic Games represented a major boost for tourism in the city, providing Catalonia with a major tourist centre, adding the city of Barcelona, as a cultural, business and city break tourism product, to the holiday sun and sand tourism and the snow of the Pyrenees and the Vall d’Aran. In this sense, the decision in 1995 to create the consortium structure of Turisme de Barcelona represented a milestone in the commitment to co-responsibility between the public and private sectors in managing tourism promotion, and the task of lobbying for the sector to introduce tourist activity within the space and daily life of the city. This innovation in managing promotion was followed up by the Autonomous Government of Catalonia with the conver-
sion of the Promoció Turística de Catalunya Consortium into the Turisme de Catalunya Consortium, a promotional body attached to the Tourism Directorate General, even though private coresponsibility was inexistent. If we examine the development of tourism, the growth since the mid1990s is evident, as illustrated by data on tourist arrivals and port and airport traffic to Barcelona, Girona and Reus, with the consequent impact of lowcost airlines on air traffic. There are also other key factors, such as the deseasonalisation of demand beyond leisure holidays and the consequent increase in journeys with the reduction in accommodation at the destination. In this regard, the arrival of new information technologies has transformed habits of consumption, promotion and marketing, while there has been a growing increase in the value of rural tourism, culture, business tourism and cuisine. In this context, the change of government in 2003 saw the start of a new stage in the public management of tourism, being the result of actions to meet the challenges in an industry that has grown dramatically, involving the implementation of the first general tourism organisation act in the history of the country.
The Catalonia Strategic Tourism Plan 2005-2010: a new agenda for tourism The response to the challenge resulted in the consensus definition of the Catalonia Strategic Tourism Plan (PETC) 2005-2010, which was conceived as an unprecedented ‘road map’ jointly for government agencies and the private sector. This was the first of its kind in both Catalonia and Europe, and was conceived as a document to Catalan International View
4 In the context of Spain, the autonomous communities that passed general tourism organisation acts before Catalonia (2002) were: the Basque Country (1994), the Canary Islands (1995), Castile-León, Galicia and Extremadura (1997), Andalusia, the Balearic Islands, Madrid, Aragon, Castile-La Mancha and Cantabria (1999); La Rioja (2001).
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provide a comprehensive and crosssector analysis and diagnosis of tourism and its challenges and determining factors within the scope of a specific country.
5 The Ministry of Innovation, Universities and Enterprise. Previously, responsibility for tourism had switched between the ministries that were also responsible for consumer affairs and/or industry. 6 The Ministries of Culture, Territorial Policy and Public Works, Agriculture or Environment.
1990-2002
1977-1989
7 Catalonia has 10 territorial tourist brands (Girona-Costa Brava, Costa Daurada, Terres de Lleida, Barcelona, Pirineus, Vall d’Aran, Catalunya Central, Terres de l’Ebre, Costa de BarcelonaMaresme and Garraf ).
The idea of the ‘road map’ was justified by the fact that it was conceived not just as a tool for the Catalan Government’s tourism authority, but was also aimed at all administrations in the territory with responsibility for tourism, at other government ministries with responsibility for areas relevant to tourism, and, above all, the private tourism sector, as a shared agenda to be developed. The structuring of the PETC into 10 programmes and 48 actions has been the overall driving force for the actions of the Directorate General for Tourism and Turisme de Catalunya since 2005 and, above all, has inspired the direction of a number of policies of the ministry currently responsible5, beyond the boundaries of responsibility strictly for tourism, such as Gastroteca or Artesania de Catalunya, as initiatives run by the Trade DG.
Although the PETC did not define the operational aspects of its programmes and actions in terms of a schedule and budget, it set a number of concepts and challenges that have been decisive in the Government of Catalonia’s influence on the success of its tourist activity, given that Catalonia was for the first time conceived as a complete tourist destination. The inspiring principles and axes of the PETC are defined in a tourism model based on sustainability, innovation, focus on demand, territorial balance and collaboration, and cooperation and coordination between public and private agents. Among the action programmes, without providing an exhaustive analysis which lies outside the scope of this article, are such key aspects as the need to coordinate policies in the areas of responsibility of other government ministries6, the importance of strengthening the Catalonia brand7, the definition of territorial product creation plans, the creation of the Catalan Tourism Agency, the creation of
1997 - Creation of the promotional body ‘Turisme de Catalunya’
2007 – Creation of the Sub-directorate General for Tourism Planning
1979 – III Tourism Congress of Catalonia (Barcelona)
1997 – Creation of TURISPRO – a workshop for professionals and companies
2007 – Creation of PLADETUR, an incentives plan for tourism development
1980 – Creation of the Ministry of Tourism and Consumer Affairs
2001 – III Tourism Congress of Catalonia (Tarragona)
2007 – Law creating the Catalan Tourism Agency
1982 – First Decree on the organisation of campsites 1986 – Creation of the Catalan Tourism Promotion Consortium
Law on Tourism (2002) 2002 – Creation of Tourism Promotion Awards 2004 – III Tourism Congress of Catalonia (Girona)
1986-1987 Sector regulations for tourist accommodation (requirements, minimum services, classification)
2004 – Creation of the Family Tourist Destination Stamp
1989 Decrees on organisation, classification, and tourist apartment rental companies 1994-1998: First sector regulations (travel agencies, tourist apartments, tourist guides, decree on prices, bookings and complementary services, organisation and classification of catering, accommodation, residence (country cottages) establishments, among others).
2005 – Creation of the Tourism Observatory
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2005-2010 Strategic Plan 2005 – Strategic agreement on the internationalisation, job quality and competitiveness of the Catalan economy 2006 – Decree on Rural Tourism Establishments 2006 – Creation of the Sports Tourist Destination Stamp
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1979 – The Statute of Autonomy included tourism as an exclusive area of authority
2008 – III Tourism Congress of Catalonia (Tarragona) 2008 – First BUY Catalunya (Large workshop on tourism marketing) 2009 – Opening in Teià of the first Tourist Welcome Centre of the CAT Network 2009 – Inauguration of the Way of St James of Galicia 2010 - Rural tourism classification system by wheat ear symbol 2010 – Creation of the Catalunya Convention Bureau 2010 - Catalan Research and Innovation Plan
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the Catalan Tourism Observatory as a tool to obtain intelligence on tourism, moving forward in legislative modernisation and administrative simplification, improving quality, improving tourist information and, in general, raising awareness and increasing the degree to which tourism is valued among Catalan society. The success of the PETC lies in the decision to prioritise certain aspects of the agenda, which has created the need to move beyond the plan itself, as some programmes have been overtaken by circumstances and have exceeded supply through the implementation of their policies and actions. In this sense, the tourism authority itself, consisting of the Directorate General for Tourism (DGT) and the Turisme de Catalunya (TC) promotion consortium, has changed its structure and internal organisation in order to focus more on the joint needs of the tourism industry defined in the PETC. Firstly, Turisme de Cataluna set up the Catalan Tourism Agency (ACT)8 with the aim of building wider co-responsibility in the private sector, under the principles of co-decision making and co-financing, and providing it with greater involvement in the promotion and marketing of the tourist industry and Catalonia as a destination. Secondly, the Directorate General for Tourism developed a new Sub-di-
rectorate General for Tourism Planning, to meet the needs for the design, promotion and creation of the tourism product contained in the PETC9. It is worth mentioning that the PETC itself has been exceeded in this context, providing a much fuller response to the actions as they were defined and has successfully influenced the desire to organise and integrate the development of tourism with the demands of the target public and the territory’s capacity and potential. The success of the PETC is due to a qualitative factor, as it has acted as the guidelines for everyone working in tourism both inside and outside Catalonia and because it has set a sufficiently ambitious precedent to continue along the route of making tourism the strategic consideration that it deserves to be, as one of the country’s economic driving forces and a factor for territorial balance. Finally, going beyond the current PETC, the government’s tourism authority is working to define new challenges for 2011-2014 that must be included by Catalan destinations in the new trends outlined in tourism after the first major worldwide crisis in the industry, and which demand new proposals in terms of innovation and sustainability, in its triple sense of identity, economics and environment, in order to reinforce attractiveness, quality, competitiveness, territorial balance and social and economic profitability.
8 The Catalan Tourism Agency was founded by law in December 2007 and came into force on January 2010, once its articles of incorporation had been approved in December 2009. 9 The creation of long national routes (the Way of Saint James of Galicia, the Pyrenean Counties Route), the network of Tourist Welcome Centres and in general identitybased product creation engineering.
*Francesc Iglesies Graduated in Economics from the University of Barcelona (UB), 1995 Gained a PhD in Economic Theory Research in the Faculty of Economics and Entrepreneurship of the UB, 1996-1998. University lecturer at the Universitat de Vic (UVic - Barcelona) and the Universitat de Barcelona, in the Sociology of Labour, on the Business Administration and Social Economics Degree course. Member of Uvic’s Research Group in Tourism. He was the Tourism and Trade Advisor to the Minister of the Department of Trade, Tourism and Consumption of the Government of Catalonia, 2004-2007. Since 2007 he has been the Tourism Strategy Planner of the Catalan Tourist Board in the General Directorate of Tourism of the Government of Catalonia.
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Catalonia, a tourist country by Jaume Font*
‘A country’s international prestige is directly related to its prestige as a tourist country’. Antoni Muntanyola: L’organització turística de Catalunya [Tourism Organisation in Catalonia], Barcelona, 1932.
Introduction: milestones in the development of Catalan tourism This article briefly reviews the historical development of tourism in Catalonia, understood as an important productive sector in the context of the country’s economic structure, both in terms of contribution to GDP and the generation of employment, and also seen as a factor for innovation and territorial balance. Aside from this role as an economic driving force, tourism is very valuable socially and culturally in as far as it allows access to relaxation and holidays and becomes a powerful tool for the exchange of culture and knowledge between peoples. It must be said from the start that tourism in Catalonia has a long tradition, which is not always recognised and sufficiently valued. The fact is that, at the beginning of the 20th century, there were already excellent resorts in Catalonia, such as Sitges or S’Agaró, as well as the city of Barcelona, which were compared with the prestigious destinations of the 94
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French Côte Bleue and the Italian Riviera. Later, various governments of Catalonia, first the Commonwealth of Catalonia (1914-1923) and then the Republican Government (1931-1939),undertook a tourism planning policy that would be cut short by the Civil War (19361939) and Franco’s dictatorship. Finally, the tourism boom of the second half of the 20th century arrived, during which Catalonia and the rest of the peninsular Mediterranean coast became one of the top world destinations for sun and sand tourism. In summary: from a practical point of view, three stages can be distinguished in the history of Catalan tourism development: 1) The first stage with the forerunners or predecessors of modern tourism, occupying almost the entire history of the country, but in the strictest sense running from the end of the 18th century to the last third of the 19th century. 2) The second stage considered as the full development of elitist, aristocratic and bourgeois tourism which,
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in the case that concerns us, broadly covers the period from the last third of the 19th century to the first third of the 20th century. During the last part of the period, the first social visions of tourism appear. 3) The third stage begins after the parentheses of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and the Second World War (1939-1945), with the appearance of mass tourism and the consolidation of Catalonia and the peninsular Mediterranean coast as one of the great destinations of European tourism. It hardly needs be said that the development of tourism in Catalonia has also been conditioned by some highly favourable geographic circumstances. In this sense, the country’s strategic location, on the Pyrenean isthmus; its situation as a corridor with a triple orientation: European, Iberian and Mediterranean; and its diversity of landscapes, should be highlighted. Many travellers from all periods and origins have highlighted the Mediter-
ranean character of the country, the good climate, the luminosity of the landscape and, in general, the Mediterranean features which, in and of themselves, make Catalonia very suitable for tourism. Many travellers also stress the original character of the country, the existence of its own language and the way the Catalans themselves have historically upheld their own identity. Generally, the country has been explained in different ways depending on the period. During the 18th century, enlightened travellers came to construct a true ‘white legend’ about Catalonia; by contrast, during the 19th century, the country was often seen as a wild, inhospitable environment, immersed in endless fratricidal wars.
From the distant predecessors to the appearance of the romantic tourism of the 19th century The predecessors for modern tourism must be situated in the period of Enlightenment of the 18th century Catalan International View
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nature of the Catalans, the wealth and power of Barcelona and a relative situation of opulence and wellbeing. Examples, can be found in the writings of two authors of the time: the Englishman Arthur Young (1787) and the Castilian Francisco de Zamora (1785-1790).
and the appearance of romantic tourism in the first half of the 19th. This is the period of the ‘Grand Tour’, which all English gentlemen had to embark on to discover the world, and also the era of the enlightened travellers of the 18th century, who were to have their counterparts in the romantic travellers of the 19th. They were times when tourism, understood in a broad sense, developed quickly alongside growing industrialisation and the appearance of fast, efficient forms of transport, such as steamships and railways. For many enlightened travellers passing through Catalonia, the country was seen as an exception within Spain; they usually highlight the hardworking 96
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When the 19th century arrived, the romantic travellers fixed the types and trends of bourgeois tourism, along with more than a few national stereotypes. These were times when Greece and Italy (from Tuscany and Venice to Sicily) became fashionable, and when stereotypical Spanish characteristics were established by writers, travellers and artists like the Englishman Richard Ford (1796-1858), the Frenchman Alexandre de Laborde (1773-1842) and the American Washington Irving (1783-1859). The common denominator of their writings (and those of others like Prosper de MerimĂŠe) is the exotic, orientalist charm of the Spanish south, particularly Andalusia. In this context, Catalonia and Barcelona are hardly noticed, as they are a long way from these Spanish stereotypes that have lasted to the present day. When they do speak of Catalonia, many travellers, by contrast, underline the wild nature of the region and its inhabitants, stubbornly fighting endless civil wars, about which wellknown figures such as Karl Marx and Frederick Engels wrote sensationalist reports.
From the emergence of bourgeois tourism in the 19th century to the appearance of social tourism The stage of full development of aristocratic and bourgeois tourism broadly falls, between the last third of the 19th century and the first third of the 20th. In Catalonia, the outstanding milestones during this stage are the two
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big universal exhibitions in Barcelona, in 1888 and 1929. These were times when there were constant improvements to the means of communication and transport, increasingly facilitating the expansion of tourism. It is the period of the great transatlantic liners, such as the famous Titanic, and of luxury trains, such as the legendary Orient Express described by Agatha Christie, culminating in the appearance of the car and of air transport at the beginning of the 20th century. In Catalonia, the improvement in transport had a notable effect on the development of tourism. Aside from Barcelona, which received a great boost from hosting the universal exhibition of 1888, the first Catalan tourist destinations were established during the last third of the 19th century. This is the case with Sitges, which was very well connected to Barcelona by rail and which became an intellectual and artistic focal point, with the Art Nouveau gatherings promoted by Santiago Rusiñol. The Barcelona bourgeoisie, in particular, made the spas and the first summer holiday centres fashionable, both on the coast and in the nearby Pyrenees. This is the case with La Garriga, Caldes de Montbui, Caldes de Malavella and Sant Hilari Sacalm, mountain villages like Camprodon and Puigcerdà and coastal resorts like Calella, Blanes and Lloret de Mar. With the arrival of the 20th century, the first investments were made aimed at attracting international tourism, with the construction of the Hostal de la Gavina complex at S’Agaró, while the Costa Brava was christened as a tourist branding exercise (1909). In those days, the Costa Brava shamelessly imitated the French Côte Bleue, while S’Agaró advertised itself on posters as a ‘sunny winter resort’. The administration’s interest in tourism gradually increased. From the
beginning, local institutions set up Societats d’Atracció de Forasters (Foreign Tourism Attraction Societies) and, later, the Sindicats d’Iniciativa (Tourist Information Bureaus), of French origin, particularly in destinations which had begun to stand out, such as Lloret de Mar. Tourism policy was given a decided boost by the recovered institutions of Catalan self-government: the Commonwealth of Catalonia between 1914 and 1924 and the Republican Government between 1931 and 1939. Despite their brief duration, the two institutions carried out notable tourism planning work.
The Commonwealth well understood tourism’s role as an economic driving force The Commonwealth well understood tourism’s role as an economic driving force and determinedly promoted it. In those days, the car was beginning to play an outstanding role in tourist expansion (the Royal Automobile Club of Catalonia was established in 1906), and this encouraged the Commonwealth to establish inns located at strategic points on roads in the Pyrenees, such as the La Bonaigua Pass and Collada de Toses. These were the immediate predecessors of the Spanish paradors, or roadside hotels. In turn, the Republican Government undertook a decided policy of tourism planning and promotion through the Catalan Tourist Board (OTC). The management of the Tourist Board was entrusted to Ignasi Armengou (18951954), who ran it effectively, and the quality of the posters and promotional material it published were outstanding. In fact, it was a period in which there was an awareness that tourism had to be developed carefully, with criteria that Catalan International View
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we would now call sustainability, organisation and territorial balance. This is well reflected in Antoni Muntanyola’s work, L’organització turística de Catalunya (The Organisation of Tourism in Catalonia), of 1932, which describes the country’s huge tourism potential, compares it to that of other European countries and ends by putting forward a model for the organisation and management of Catalan tourism. That same year, the GATCPAC architects formulated the Ciutat de repòs i de vacances (City of Relaxation and Holidays) project, linked to working-class leisure and holidays, which was a pioneering step in the field of social tourism.
The Mediterranean corridor motorway became one of the great European tourist corridors Unfortunately, the work of the Republican Government was cut short by the outbreak of the Civil War and the imposition of Franco’s dictatorship, as it was a model effort in many senses. Among other consequences, the dictatorship would lead to the exile of many of the professionals who had promoted the tourism policy of the Republican Government, including Ignasi Armengou, the director of the Catalan Tourist Board. It is probable that, had there been democracy and had the country been able to rely on professionals of his calibre, the chaotic tourism model of desarrollismo (structuralist economics) would not have become established.
The expansion of mass tourism during the sixties and seventies Tourism’s third stage begins after the parentheses of the Civil War 98
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(1936-1939) and the Second World War (1939-1945). The Marshall Plan and the European economic miracle would allow a spectacular development of mass tourism in Catalonia, Spain and Europe. This was basically due to the increase in living standards and the consolidation of the welfare state in Western Europe, with practically universal access to paid holidays for European workers. It is a stage characterised by unprecedented exponential growth in mass tourism. It starts with the Stabilisation Plan of 1959, which represents the adoption by the Spanish Government of an orthodox monetary policy and the acceptance of the recommendations of international economic bodies concerning the orientation of economic growth towards innovative sectors such as industry and tourism, rather than Franco’s obsession with agriculture. This change of orientation would continue through the promulgation of successive ‘development plans’ and would, among other consequences, lead to the beginning of an unprecedented rural exodus and start off the Spanish tourism boom. It was a boom brought about, among other factors, by the improvement in air transport, the establishment of charter flights and the construction of the Mediterranean corridor motorway, from La Jonquera to Alicante, which would become one of the great European tourist corridors. All this growth was carried out without planning and without the democratic control of local councils and institutions. These were times of laissezfaire, leading to the massive occupation of the Catalan coast. This is the case with certain sectors of the Costa Brava, the Costa Daurada and the Barcelona coast (El Maresme and El Garraf ); only the coast of the Ebre region would remain somewhat removed from this
process of intensive occupation of the coastal area. It was the period of ‘Spain is different’ and structuralist economics, which would, over many decades, consolidate a tourism model based almost exclusively on sun and sand. This ‘single crop’ tourism remained practically unchanged until the Barcelona Olympic Games (1992), except for the isolated development of snow tourism in the Pyrenees (Vall d’Aran, La Cerdanya, El Pallars) and the continuation of traditional destinations such as Montserrat, Vall de Núria, Castellar de n’Hug and Rupit, which would notably increase their visitor numbers with the generalised car ownership of the sixties and seventies.
The current stage, by contrast, is characterised by the diversification of the tourist products Catalonia can offer, which include conventional sun and sand, snow and mountain tourism, active and nature tourism and cultural tourism. Finally, regarding tourism development in Catalonia, both in the past and the present, the principles and values set forth by Antoni Muntanyola in his work, L’organització turística de Catalunya, with a quote from Miquel dels Sants Oliver, are still valid: ‘What is right for a people, just as for individuals, is to be themselves, without ceasing to exist, to grow and to improve’. And this is what I believe should be done in terms of tourism. *Jaume Font
Full Professor of Geography at the University of Barcelona, specialised in matters involving land use planning, a subject on which he has published various books and articles. Since 2006, he has held the post of Deputy Director General for Tourism Programming, where he has promoted the publication of the Tourism Atlas of Catalonia, the setting up of Catalan routes and the publishing of guides, among other tasks related to his position.
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Tourism, economy and identity
by Marien André*
‘Identity reveals a new way that preferences can be changed’ 1 For some years now economists and scholars of productive processes from various disciplines have been talking about a new concept: the economy of identity. The changes that took place in the last decades of the twentieth century towards a global world, which were increasingly unifying, at first appeared to be a threat to the social and cultural aspects of the planet’s peoples and nations. However, globalisation itself has brought about a revaluation of these aspects. Thus, criteria such as the consumption of local products, goods and services, blessed with a uniqueness characteristic of a given society and region, are gaining ground, as they are perceived by the demand as bearers of a new concept of added value.
1 AKERLOF, G. and R. E. KRANTON (2000): ‘Economies and identity’, The Quarterly Journal of Economies, Vol. CXV, No. 3. August 2000
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This change of paradigm in consumption is leading regions and the agents operating therein to promote production with a seal of origin, with its own designation, a clear, differentiated identity that gives them a competitive edge. One should bear in mind, however, that this process is neither direct nor simple. In the first place, there must be a genuine collective identity, and a deep-rooted sense of belonging, an awareness of this identity. An identity as the sum of a series of distinctive elements, highly charged with symbolism, with a traditional yet dynamic and changing base, with tangible elements, such as material cultural heritage or landscape, and also non-material heritage, such as traditions or ways of life. Indeed, it is the people acting in a region should start the process of recovering identity, iniCatalan International View
tially as part of its wealth and heritage, but also as an economic driver. Furthermore, this identity should be perceived by the potential demand; the identity must be able to be defined and differentiated through a series of attributes that will make up what is known as the associated ‘image’. Finally, these attributes, this ‘image’, must be explained and valued by the demand; it must be attractive to draw their attention. It therefore requires strategies from marketing and promotion, and also the creation of labels, such as those for the designation of origin, quality seals, or other types of certification in the most general sense. Cuisine, agriculture, wine production, crafts and cultural production in any of its forms (material and non-ma-
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terial) are some of the sectors directly linked to this growing trend. It is in this respect that we also witness a change of paradigm towards tourism. The differentiation, singularity and identity of destinations are, more than ever today, the keystone to the competitiveness of destinations. Indeed, tourism becomes an opportunity to address socio-cultural standardisation, as an element of visualisation, preservation and even reaffirmation of their identity. Tourism is a privileged tool for projecting (and protecting) the attributes of identity, bringing them closer to the consumer, while generating positive effects on a social and cultural level. However, it also brings economic advantages. Tourism becomes key to the construction of an economy of identity, as it enables the destination to become known in-
ternationally and its differentiation is an added value, and also thanks to the direct generation of economic activity, its extension to other branches of the economy through significant multiplying effects, and the vertebration of economic and social activity in regions that are in decline or undergoing transformation. In this way, tourism enables us to draw together endogenous and sustainable development and growth models, and becomes a luxury showcase for promoting the region and its society. If we analyse the relationship between tourism and identity, the first thing we notice is that every sustainable tourism model incorporates three basic pillars: environmental protection; economic profitability; and, the Catalan International View
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one that concerns us, social and cultural preservation and promotion. It is therefore a close, entirely unavoidable relationship. In this respect, it should also be said that although there are types of tourism in which this relationship is abundantly clear (such as cultural tourism, or what is properly called ‘identity’ tourism), limiting the scope to these specific cases would be reductionist. In the case of regions and societies with defined, singular identities, this identity really does pervade everything from lifestyle and forms of production to the natural landscape and the human landscape. Therefore, any tourism activity on offer and undertaken within this region must naturally and spontaneously include elements of itself, material or non-material, perceptible or not. This dynamic has for years configured highly consolidated destinations with an associated image clearly defined on the tourism map. An undoubtedly paradigmatic case in point is Scotland.
Tourism is a privileged tool for projecting the attributes of identity, bringing them closer to the consumer, while generating positive effects on a social and cultural level However, as previously mentioned, in the last decade many other destinations have realised how strongly identity has become a basic element of differentiation and competitiveness; hence the general change in strategy for attracting visitors. The chance to compete does not just come from offering attractive prices, as it used to, or even from having resources like sun and sand, snow, or in extreme cases, a given monumental or artistic heritage. The reduction of distances in cost and time, and the inclusion of new destinations, amongst other factors, have 102
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helped bring about an increase in the range of options, so that the mere presence of the resource is no guarantee of success without differentiation. The level of attractiveness lies increasingly in being able to present oneself as different from the rest, and so offer visitors unique experiences. Moreover, the advantages are not only for tourism per se, and for the competitiveness of the destination. We have already mentioned the multiplying effect on the rest of the economy, or the external effects towards the region. We still need to add other opportunities from tourism widely recognised by the academic literature and empirical evidence as an element, amongst others, of landscape and environment regeneration; the reassertion of social and cultural pride and self-esteem; or the recovery of the identifying elements of local material and non-material culture, whether in use or having fallen into disuse. As an example it is worth mentioning that the main factor of preservation, recovery and use of cultural heritage in Catalonia in the last fifteen years has been the growing consideration of cultural assets as a tourism resource. In regard to the application of a destination and product differentiation strategy within the economy of identity, it should be said that this is based on three clearly separate pillars: - Identification of those differential features that constitute the image to be presented. - Tangibility and marketing through the creation of goods or services. - Development of a marketing strategy adapted to the product. This all leads to defining a tourism brand as a symbolic element aimed at
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making a profitable image and a differentiated product that responds to the values and interests of one or several market segments, without sacrificing its own interest. This brand becomes the basis for marketing the destination and its products. In this respect, there are destinations, like Catalonia, that use the region-brand as an umbrella brand to present a tourism offer linked to the identity aspects. If we analyse the evolution of the strategies used by destinations up to now, we must emphasise that although at present agreement on the fundamental role of identity is practically unanimous, experience has shown that incorporation of this approach has not been uniform either in time or space. Therefore, in some destinations, like the aforementioned Scotland, identity has always existed, whether consciously or unconsciously, within the tourism policy followed in the public and private sectors and amongst civil society. However, in other cases, like most Mediterranean destinations (including Catalonia), which have a climate and geography that favour the spontaneous development of products popular with the masses, such as sun and sand tourism, although it put them prominently on the world tourism map, it pushed the question of identity into the background. In fact, as one can read in articles on tourism in Catalonia, it was not until recently that identity became a priority in Catalan tourism policy. Indeed, it was only with the drawing up and approval of the 2005-2010 Strategic
Tourism Plan for Catalonia that the promotion of the tourism-identity binomial was specified. The Plan includes specific areas in this regard, but the most important thing is that it states a new focus in which identity pervades the definition of the Catalan tourism model right across the board. In conclusion, here and now in the twenty-first century one can state that tourism has reached a level of maturity in which the consumer’s decisionmaking process is a far cry from what was heralded by the tourism boom as a large-scale phenomenon. Experience, uniqueness, authenticity are key in the planning and success of destinations. And all of them could be joined under the seal of ‘identity’. Tourism and identity are therefore inevitably twinned by the building of new economic models, in tune with the criteria and principles that inspire the current moment and the near future. *Marien André
She holds a PhD in Economic Science and Business Studies from the University of Barcelona, where she is professor of Applied Economics. She is also a researcher at the Institute of Applied Economics Research (IREA) of Barcelona Science Park, and a former Coordinator of the Catalan Tourism Observatory.
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Memories of my grandfather
Josep Trueta by Antoni Strubell-Trueta*
The memories we have of our forbears are generally subject to a good many mental processes. Memory is selective and so we have a tendency to idealise them, a practice which may sometimes be ill-advised, as illustrated by Jaume Cabré’s best-selling novel ‘Les veus del Pamano’. In countries such as ours, taboo and fear have for years contributed to keeping things disguised, if not actually hidden. To this syndrome we must add that awkward habit (so Catalan and lastingly harmful) of keeping political subjects hidden well away from our children’s ears to prevent them from ’getting into trouble‘ one day. Who can be surprised, then, that memories are subject to change, bias or even ’self-censorship‘? Who can be surprised by the alarming distaste that exists for politics? None of this,I am glad to say,has affected my own memories of my grandfather Josep Trueta, professor of Orthopaedics at Oxford University (1949-1967). I am lucky enough to be able to say I had a forbear who was not only famous, but also truly worthy of admiration. In our family those ‘other questions’ were sometimes raised. They were certainly not taboo. This is probably due to the fact that, as a family in exile, we lived free from the whole web of fear many Catalans were subjected to. Nonetheless, even today new anecdotes emerge that invariably add to my admiration. In the book recently published by Quim Torra, ‘Estimat doctor / Admirat mestre’ (published by Acontravent), there is a good selection of the correspondence Trueta maintained with the cellist Pau Casals. The letters reveal a whole series of episodes that speak of values that are sometimes not too easy to find nowadays. Let me start by speaking of the selflessness and capacity for sacrifice of the two correspondents, Trueta and Casals. Despite residing far from home (the former suffering a second spree of German bombing raids, the latter the 104
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Gestapo’s constant scrutiny in Prada de Conflent) neither of them ceased to struggle for the freedom of their homeland and compatriots. Although there was a huge amount of work for any wartime surgeon, my grandfather managed to find time to write ‘The Spirit of Catalonia‘ (1946), a history book requiring months of research in Oxford’s Bodleian Library. He sent the book to influential personalities in the hope that they would sympathise with the Catalan cause and put pressure on politicians to act accordingly. He wanted to explain to them what it meant to leave the Catalan people at the mercy of Franco. Little did he know that the Generalísimo would shortly become the free world’s favourite dictator, the only fascist leader allowed to survive into the seventies. Obviously the book failed to have the desired effect despite its dozens of editions in several languages. Meanwhile, Casals was bravely refusing to give concerts in countries that
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acknowledged the Franco regime. One black mark on the British government’s record is that Casals’ bank account should have been frozen for his support of the legally constituted Spanish Republic. That same government also treated my grandfather as an alien (in both the legal and literary sense) for the same reason, despite the fact that he saved the lives of tens of thousands of allied wounded as well as obtaining British nationality as early as 1949. Thus it became clear that the West was not willing to do anything to rid Europe of the regime Hitler had helped create. It seems odd that a country that had declared war on another for invading Poland should have unquestioningly supported an ally of those same invaders for so long.
Catalonia was obviously on the wrong side of the great geopolitical divide. I do hope that before I die I shall see some kind of apology from England on that score. It would be most democratically fitting for some gesture to be made of the same calibre as the apologies made in 2008 by the Consuls General of France and Germany for the part those countries played in capturing and handing over our president, Lluís Companys, in August 1940, thus condemning him to a certain death. Couldn’t the United Kingdom do something similar (albeit of a purely symbolic nature) as recompense for having penalised exiled enemies of Franco? And couldn’t it be done with something just a little bit less private than the reception Queen Elisabeth Catalan International View
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Doctor Josep Trueta with Queen Elisabeth II of England
offered the Catalan Joan Pujol, whose spying operations the Ministry of Defence termed as ‘crucial’ to the success of the 1944 D-Day landings? Even at the risk of upsetting Madrid.
My grandfather Josep Trueta, professor of Orthopaedics at Oxford University, was not only famous, but also worthy of admiration Another priceless episode that emerges from Quim Torra’s collection, with more details than I personally recall, was the whole question of the BBC broadcasts my grandfather was involved in. They were designed to bring a ray of hope, albeit over the radio, to Catalan households suffering under Franco’s regime ‘in their own flesh’, as we say in Catalan. The idea was to offer them a few minutes in Catalan every fortnight. The truth is that the subjects my grandfather was asked to speak about were sometimes quite innocent and far removed from what listeners might have been expecting. However, there was great pressure to keep them thoroughly apolitical and ideologically ‘harmless’. I even think he had to speak about vaccinations or something as politically banal as that. He even had to double up and repeat the same contents in Spanish so that no-one could accuse the BBC of being partisan. Such is the lot of a people deprived of freedom! 106
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As recent revelations have also shown, the subject matter of the broadcasts was not the only bone of contention. Their very existence incensed the Spanish authorities. What is perhaps more shocking to have found out, quite recently in my case, is that it was not only the Spanish Embassy in London (headed by a distant relative of Churchill) that riled against those broadcasts. Even Republican exiles of the status of Salvador Madariaga did so. This Spanish intellectual is known to have written letters to the British government to have the broadcasts interrupted while at the same time he was acting as if he were the best of friends with Trueta, with whom he went on regular weekend rambles on Headington hill overlooking Oxford. I cannot help saying, at this stage, that if we observe the current political relationship between Catalonia and Spain, the sense of déjàvu becomes quite oppressive. As my grandfather used to say, it is really the Spanish, with the expression of their acute allergy to Catalonia, who are the most separatist. When I reflect on episodes such as these, I cannot help thinking that history has so far been cruel and unjust to Catalonia. Perhaps other Catalans may feel that we have what we deserve, as does, in general, The Economist. Allow me to counter this by suggesting that Franco worked very hard to make the former think just that. It is as if history had been swept away and Catalonia had never been a nation. Trueta and Casals were members of a generation that had committed themselves heart and soul to the cultural and political emancipation of Catalonia before the Civil War. When the Catalan Statute was done away with and the Catalan president shot by Franco, they never witnessed the return of their country to democracy and freedom as they had dreamed. May I add that, quite frankly,
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neither have I. I fear that if they could see us today, Casals and Trueta would be shocked to see how little we have advanced with our meagre autonomous regime in line with sixteen others. They would surely be distressed to see the bullying that Catalans still have to put up with daily in Spain. I feel they would not have remained silent on seeing the recent humiliation Catalonia suffered with the High Court sentence which suspends 15 articles of its new Statute. They would not have remained silent on contemplating the State’s ongoing refusal to officially pardon all who were sentenced under Franco. I’m sure they would have suffered to see how today’s Generalitat (Catalan Government) sees fit to pay a higher tribute to certain ex-Francoists than it did to its only former president to have died since Franco’s disappearance. I’m sure they would have protested that the only TV stations broadcasting entirely in Catalan were being closed down by the courts in Valencia. They would certainly have complained that the Catalan language should have been deemed inferior in status to Spanish and non-obligatory, as the Constitutional Court has just done, a decision that is both offensive and humiliating to so many Catalans. In other latitudes such steps would be catalogued, I feel, as nothing short of cultural genocide. Catalonia today is sadly bereft of personalities such as Casals and Trueta, who would surely have made it much more difficult for episodes like this to go
by unnoticed. In this sense, I remember how my grandfather, shortly before he died, openly challenged Spanish president Suarez for declaring that Catalan was not ‘a language that could be used in science’. Nowadays the Spanish political make-up has completely lost its respect for Catalonia and its politicians. What has current Catalonia got to do with ‘The Spirit of Catalonia’ or with Casals’ famous ‘Cant dels Ocells’, itself almost an anthem to Catalan dignity? I’m sure that my grandfather would have thought there was still a lot of work ahead for his country. Not only with regard to achieving an acceptable degree of democracy, but also in beginning to be able to see itself as a country that is free and respected. In Catalonia, therefore, memory is still a problem. This isn’t England with its Poppy Day and the Dambusters’ March. No. Ours is a country that a Swedish friend of mine describes as ‘the Estonia of the Mediterranean’ but where ‘the Soviets and the Soviet mentality still exist’. The severest blow to the incipient rebirth of Catalonia’s national freedom was inflicted in the thirties, to the on-going benefit of a minority. It is a country where an agreement between Francoists and democrats vigorously prevent the memory of our forbears’ ideals taking root again with any real political consequence. The contemplation of today’s situation would certainly have made my grandfather a sadder man than he was when he died, at a time when it still seemed possible that Spain might respect us. *Antoni Strubell-Trueta
Born in Oxford in 1952, to an English father and a Catalan mother. He holds a degree in Romance Languages (French, Catalan, Spanish) from the University of Oxford (1971-1974). He has just published El moment de dir prou. La manifesta incompatibilitat amb Espanya (Time to Say ‘Enough’. The Obvious Incompatibility with Spain. Published by Pagès) with a prologue by Francesco Cossiga which has been translated into Spanish, Hasta aquí hemos llegado. Claves para entender el hartazgo de Catalunya con España (This is Where We Are At. Keys to Understanding why Catalonia is Fed up with Spain. Ttarttalo-Elkar). He is coordinator to the Secretariat of the Dignity Commission. He was awarded the St George’s Cross in 2003.
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Green Debate
Halting the loss of biodiversity: essential for human well-being by Carme Rosell*
The conservation of the variety of plants, animals, their habitats and genes is essential for human wellbeing. Natural systems provide services that are the basis of a healthy environment, including food, medicine, timber, climate and water cycle regulation and the maintenance of soil fertility. However, biodiversity conservation is facing a serious crisis and the efforts that have been made to halt biodiversity loss have not achieved their goals. Nevertheless, instead of resignation there is a growing awareness of this issue, and new policies, plans and actions are being prepared to halt and reverse these negative trends. Hopes are now pinned on the meeting to be held in Nagoya, Japan in October 2010. The decline in biodiversity is not only an environmental issue, but also a threat to human life on Earth. As pointed out by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment launched by the United Nations Secretary General, we are spending the Earth’s natural capital and putting at risk the ability of ecosystems to sustain future generations. The World’s governments are aware of this threat, and consequently in 2002 they agreed ‘to significantly reduce the rate of biodiversity loss at the global, regional and national level as a contribution to poverty alleviation and to benefit all life on Earth’. To extend this commitment, in 2006 the European Commission approved a communication entitled Halting the loss of biodiversity by 2010 - and beyond. Sustaining ecosystem services for human well-being, in which its members recognised biodiversity loss as one of the major threats to human life and defined an Action Plan with 10 priority objectives. However, this year, which has been proclaimed the International 108
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Year of Biodiversity, has arrived and the target has not been met at a global level. Therefore, new targets are being established for 2020, to make substantial changes to policy and practices and reverse the decline of biodiversity and the services that it provides to human communities.
Some facts The International Union for Nature Conservation estimates that current species extinction is occurring at up to 1,000 times the natural rate, due to the pressure that human activities put on natural ecosystems. Some facts in the Global Biodiversity Outlook reveal the extent of the decline: • Of the 47,677 species assessed to date, 36% are threatened with extinction. • On average, the abundance of vertebrate species fell by nearly a third
Green Debate
between 1970 and 2006, with particularly sharp declines in tropical habitats and in freshwater ecosystems. • In the last 300 years, the Earth’s forested area has dropped by almost 40%. Although the amount of forest is increasing in some European regions, globally deforestation continues at a high rate with a net loss of over 50,000 square kilometres per year from 2000 to 2010. Forests have global and local benefits that influence local rainfall and help to regulate climate change. • Although global data is not available, inland waters (rivers, lakes and wetlands) have suffered severe alterations due to drainage, water extraction and pollution. Between 56 and 65% of inland water systems in Europe and North America had been drained by 1985, 60% of the original wetland areas in Spain have been lost and two-thirds of the big rivers of the world have been severely frag-
mented by dams and reservoirs that restrict the migration of freshwater species and threaten the viability of their populations. • Marine habitats, particularly coastal ones, have also declined in extent and quality. Seventy per cent of coral reefs are threatened or have been destroyed, salt marshes have lost about 25% of the area they originally covered globally, and 35% of mangroves have disappeared in the last two decades through conversion to aquaculture or overexploitation. • Excessive harvesting has also had a strong impact on marine habitats. The total biomass of fish stocks worldwide has declined by 11% since 1977 and an increasing trend in stock collapses has been observed. Therefore, the challenge is clear. For humans it is not only a matter of altruistic involvement in the conservation of the rest of the planet’s species, but Catalan International View
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also of ensuring the habitability of our planet for future generations, guaranteeing the provision of food or freshwater and being less vulnerable to the catastrophic events that will increase due to the effects of global warming.
The decline in biodiversity is not only an environmental issue, but also a threat to human life on Earth Raising awareness of the benefits and losses Ecosystem services have been classified into four categories that can be provided locally or at a global scale: the supply of goods (often with a clear monetary value) such as food, medicine or timber; regulation services, which include the regulation of climate, protection against catastrophes such as the degradation of coastal ecosystems due to storms, and the removal of pollutants by filtering water; support services, which include processes such as plant growth or soil formation; and cultural services, such as the value associated with landscapes that provide calm, aesthetic beauty, inspiration and a source of recreation, and the spiritual values associated with sacred places. These intangible benefits are one of the most visible values of our natural capital, as shown by people’s greater willingness to pay for the conservation of natural areas and biodiversity. The expected consequences of biodiversity loss can be analysed in terms of ecological, ethical, aesthetic, sociological and economic factors. Quantification of the economic value of ecosystem services is a key step that will help raise social awareness and encourage decision-makers to take the actions needed to halt biodiversity loss. The 110
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Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity for Policy Makers (TEEB) hosted by the United Nations Environment Programme, has begun to analyse a wide range of economic values of ecosystems that give us an idea of the monetary cost of degrading biodiversity. Links between environmental degradation and poverty are also well established in some examples provided by the TEEB. An extreme example is that of Haiti, the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, which has been in the international spotlight since the devastating earthquake that struck the country in January 2010. Haiti was originally a forested area, but today only 3% of the forest remains. Consequently, soil erosion has led to the loss of fertile soils. Deforestation has also caused a 40% decline in total rainfall, due to the reduction of evaporation back into the atmosphere. This has reduced the water flow in streams so that the irrigation capacity cannot cover the needs of arable land. The lack of original vegetation cover exposes the soil to rain erosion and does not provide efficient water retention, resulting in major floodings. The country’s recovery will require massive international assistance, but the poverty will not be eradicated unless the recovery plans include the restoration of environmental degradation. Other benefits provided by the natural world are more difficult to quantify in terms of economic value, but their effects on human health are obvious. The book Sustaining Life: How Human Health Depends on Biodiversity was published in 2008 and provides an overview of the potential threats that a loss of biodiversity poses to human health. In the book, more than 100 experts explore threatened groups of organisms that are valuable to medicine. They highlight the impact on human health when species become extinct,
Green Debate
in terms of the loss of new treatments, medicine and diagnostic tests. A particularly illustrative example is the recent extinction of two species of gastric brooding frogs that were discovered in the untouched rainforests of Australia in the 1980s. These frogs were the only amphibians known to raise their young in the adult’s stomach. The fertilized eggs were maintained in the stomach of the females, who then regurgitated the young once they were fully developed. Preliminary studies with young frogs showed that they secreted substances to inhibit the secretion of acid and enzymes by cells in the mother’s stomach. This stopped them from being digested by their mothers. Better knowledge of these substances promised to bring important insights into the treatment of
human peptic ulcers, a disease which affects millions of people worldwide. However, the opportunity to discover a new treatment for this illness was lost when the species became extinct. These examples of ecosystem services, which cannot be substituted by human technology, show us how biodiversity sustains and enriches human development and how its decline is a threat not only for nature, but also for the services that it provides for humans.
The causes of biodiversity decline and actions to halt it There are five main sources of pressure on biodiversity: habitat loss and Catalan International View
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degradation, climate change, pollution, over-exploitation of resources, and invasive alien species. Of course, some of these factors act together and exert combined pressure on biodiversity.
There is a need for strong but realistic changes in our policies and practices that reconcile land use and development needs with biodiversity conservation The conversion of natural areas to agricultural land, urban developments, and infrastructure networks is one of the major causes of biodiversity decline. The fragmentation of ecosystems caused by such land use reduces the ability of species to adapt to climate change by migrating to areas with more suitable conditions. Warming temperatures, more frequent extreme weather events and the changing distribution of rainfall and drought will lead to many changes in biodiversity, which are already clearly evident. Global mean surface temperature scenarios do not leave us in any doubt as to the increasing effects on the distribution of species. The composition and distribution of our ecosystems 112
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are already changing at a surprising rate and we do not know exactly what the consequences of this will be or the changes that it will bring about in our current way of life. One example related to marine habitats is seen in the Mediterranean Sea, in which a growing number of alien species of fish and algae are observed, some of them from subtropical areas. Other events are reported as a consequence of climate change, including the acidification of seawater, which will lead to a decrease in marine species that have carbonate skeletons, such as coral. To date, governments have acted to reduce the current loss of biodiversity by increasing the preservation of natural protected areas, safeguarding important habitats and species, implementing regulations to reinforce the compatibility of human development with ecosystem conservation and reducing the impact of international trade on global biodiversity. Some of these actions have had very positive results at a local level, but we still have to define more effective action plans to considerably reduce global impacts. The delegates at the meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Techni-
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cal and Technological Advice of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) that was held in Nairobi last May discussed the technical and scientific aspects of a new Strategic Plan for the next ten years, which would set targets to reduce the global rate of biodiversity loss. A new set of 20 targets has been defined to prevent the extinction of species and habitat loss or degradation, and to restore ecosystems that have already been damaged. These proposals will be presented at the 10th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the CDB in Nagoya, Japan next October. At this meeting, a post-2010 Strategic Plan will be drawn up that
will include vision, mission statement, strategic goals and targets. ‘Business as usual’ will not lead to any progress. There is a need for strong but realistic changes in our policies and practices that reconcile land use and development needs with biodiversity conservation. Of course, the global economic situation is not helping to put these priorities on the agenda of our governments, but inaction will have greater costs in the future. We must invest now in the conservation and restoration of ecosystems to guarantee a healthy environment: there is no time to lose. *Carme Rosell
Arbúcies (1962). Director and founding member of MINUARTIA. She has a PhD in Biological Sciences from the University of Barcelona (UB). Graduated of the ESADE Business School’s Executive Education Programme ‘People and Team Management’. She is an expert in wildlife management, particularly in reducing the impact of infrastructure on wildlife and managing populations of wild boar and cervidae. She has led numerous projects on these topics, and has published several books and articles mainly focused on monitoring and mitigating of the impact of roads, railways and canals on vertebrate populations and restoration of the connectivity. She is part of the Vertebrate Ecology Quality Research Group, which is linked to the UB’s Department of Animal Biology. She coordinated the Spanish team’s work on the European project for technological and scientific exchange COST 341 Action: Habitat fragmentation due to transportation infrastructure (1999-2003). She is the technical secretary of the working party formed by the Ministry of the Environment, Rural and Marine Affairs, which gives continuity to the European project. It’s also integrated into the network Infra Eco Network Europe (Iene), which has been coordinator for the Spanish government until 2008 and currently operates in the Election Commitee entity based in Sweden.
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A Short Story from History1
A Catalan contribution to International Law: The Consulate of the Seas
Cover page of one of the earliest Catalan editions of the Book of the Consulate of the Seas
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At the beginning of the 13th century, the development of maritime trade was one of the bases of the growth of the Catalan economy and its political influence on both shores of the Mediterranean. A dense network of sea routes was developed from Barcelona to Algiers and Tripoli, passing through Marseille, Genoa, Sardinia, Pisa, Sicily, Naples and Venice, to Damascus, Constantinople, Alexandria and Cyprus. This network of sea routes was reinforced with a ‘Northern’ one connecting Barcelona with Bruges and from there to the Hanseatic cities. The increasing complexity of this commercial activity, as well as the important investments and profits linked to it, demanded a set of rules to regulate it
Catalan International View
and to provide a degree of security to a potentially volatile business. The Consolat de Mar or Consulate of the Seas was one of the earliest institutions to deal with these practices. It was established in Barcelona between 1260 and 1282, and developed a series of ordinances and customs that became codified in the Llibre del Consolat de Mar or the Book of the Consulate of the Seas around 1350. This dealt with the rights to boats, sea routes, harbours, the salaries of sailors, insurance, shipwrecks, relations between merchants and shipowners, and so on, becoming the first comprehensive set of norms regulating all aspects related to maritime trade issues. Thanks to the major presence of Catalan trade throughout the whole Mediterranean, these juridical norms that were originally created to regulate Catalan maritime commercial activity became progressively implemented as ius mercatorum in a large part of the Mare Nostrum, and later on in the
Atlantic. They therefore went on to become one of the bases of International Maritime Law. In another field of study, the importance of the Catalan maritime trade of the time was also reflected in the enormous improvement in cartographic science. Of special interest is the Cartographic School of Majorca which focused on the Mediterranean and was mostly made up of Jewish scholars and which is considered to be one of the finest of the pre-Modern era. With the arrival of the printing press, the Consulate of the Seas was
first published in its original language, Catalan, in the city of Valencia in 1487, followed by dozens of new editions in the same language over the next two hundred years. Moreover, following its spread to other territories as ‘good practices’ it was subsequently translated into Spanish, French, Italian (with several early Venetian editions), German, Dutch and English.
Mediterranean section of the Catalan Atlas by Abraham Cresques, Majorca, c. 1375.
The Consulate of the Seas was in force in Barcelona until 1829, when it was replaced by the Spanish Trade Code, a new set of rules inspired by the French legislation of Napoleonic origin.
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The Artist
Gabriel and the
regeneration of the form
Self-taught and in search of the highest form of artistic freedom, Gabriel (Badalona, 1954) works on the outline of forms, on the limits of personal identity, of an awareness of an uncertain destiny, existential anguish and metaphysical longing, in order to renew sculpture. Currently he teaches at the Massana School, in Barcelona.
Espai Volart Carrer AusiĂ s Marc, 22 08010 Barcelona Tel. 93 481 79 85 Fax. 93 481 79 84 espaivolart@fundaciovilacasas.com
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The Artist
If, as he himself says, the human mind is like a ‘hall of mirrors’, the creative impulse his work creates has to find its space, ‘provided by existence since the beginning of time’, a place that is a question that needs to consolidate itself as an object and material, as if it were an ‘unconscious library’ that builds us emotionally. For this reason, I see his work as an instrument of knowledge, an open process that distances itself from a system of closed thinking. The poetical, metaphorical and symbolic references make up the basis of a work in which art is seen as a perpetual question mark. It is an impulse which, according to Rafael Argullol, coincides with an ‘eternal vision of art’ and which, in spite of wearing different masks according to the time period, always questions the human condition and human behaviour. One characteristic of his work is the feeling of regeneration of the form, always open to new additions without breaking the natural evolution of a singular discourse which we find beneath its forms. It is from this point on, from this constant flow, that everything is modified via a formal multiplicity that incorporates distinct resources. ‘Plectopos’, the exhibition held in Espai VolArt of the Fundació Vila Casas, does not present us with a theme, but rather with an attitude of a particular reading, where he, aside from refounding the form, incorporates other resources and new materials. He once wrote that, ‘form is material’s dream’ and, ‘perhaps we make forms in order to contemplate this dream’.
In his attitude towards the creative process it is important that he does not consider art to be an idea that has become manifest, as a trace of ‘the idea printed in matter’ but rather as an intermediary between ‘human doubt and enigma’, this simultaneous ‘reveal and guard’ that Argullol seeks to analyse in the conversation he had with him for the exhibition catalogue. Something that I also recall, ‘the enigma of collaboration’, of meetings with the image or with the gesture before thought, that John Berger deals with in his writings when he speaks of the artist as an intermediary, but above all, of that species of ‘hospitality’ that receives the creative impulse when it takes shape before the constant interrogation of art, because if our attitudes truly coincide it is precisely in the belief that art has always existed and answers to the same impulse. From his beginnings, some thirty years ago, his proposal was already different in the context of the sculpture of the time, always situated ‘between visible forms of material and the possible forms of art’. Throughout his development, via different forms of expression, he has been consistent in his work and we always find links, analogies and correlations in time, where forms are (according to his reflections) ‘the primordial mud that reason shapes to extract language’. Far from conventional culture, with its exhibitions, installations and theoretical or poetical texts, he chose a singular creative path that, according to the needs of each period, has been channelled by more sensory or symbolic paths. Glòria Bosch
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A Poem Curated by Enric Bou Chair in Hispanic Studies, Brown University of Providence
Desolation Joan Alcover I am the remnants of a tree who yesterday was lush, Who shaded the harvesters as they napped; My branches, one by one, broken by the storm, And the lightning that struck the earth split my trunk in half. Stunted leaf buds top the open, hollow Vestige of the trunk that’s left; I saw my wood burn; like smoke trails from a fissure, I saw the best part of me into the sky disperse. But the bitterness of life sucks my roots dry, And feels the leaves sprout and the tree sap rise, And helps me pass the time as I await the consolation of a setting sun. Each scar marks the loss of a branch: Without me, nothing would speak of the half I am missing; I live only to pity that part of me which is dead.
(Translated by Jordi Torres)
Joan Alcover (Palma, 1854-1926) was a poet, essayist and politician. Together with Costa i Llobera he was one of the most distinguished Majorcan poets of the turn of the century. He published Poesías (1887), Nuevas poesías (1892), Poemas y armonías (1894) and Meteoros (1901) in Spanish, under the spell of Bécquer and Campoamor. His best poems were written in Catalan, Cap al tard (1909), where powerful metaphorical associations with the landscape allow him to express a deep grief after the death of his wife and two children. In Poemes bíblics (1918) he recreated topics from the Old Testament. His essays in La humanitazió de l’art (1904) were influential in establishing a ‘Noucentista’ aesthetic. His poem La Balanguera (with music by Amadeu Vives) was declared the official anthem of Majorca in 1996.
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