European View: The Future of Political Parties (Vol.14, No.1, June 2015)

European View The Future of Political Parties Volume 14 • Number 1 • June 2015 EDITORIAL The future of political parties J. Daul 1 TRENDS IN PARTY POLITICS The rise of the populist radical right in Western Europe M. Rooduijn 3 In search of the ‘core electorate’: how should political parties react to an individualistic society?

N. Lange 13 How can European political parties maximise their success in the 2019 elections?

M. Peglis 21 Engaging the Roma community in the political party process in Slovakia M. Degro 31 Here to stay: anti-establishment parties in Europe F. Hartleb 39 Polarised and fractured US political parties and the challenges of governing J.C. Fortier 51 POLITICAL SYSTEMS UNDER RE-CONSTRUCTION Can political parties evolve if the political system does not?

T. Huhtanen 59 Why it is time to redesign our political system P. Mancini 69

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Online politics for citizens in the twenty-first century E. Majewski 77 Did we get it wrong? The true meaning of European federalism F.O. Reho 85 TOOLS FOR BETTER POLITICS Crowdsourcing as new instrument in policy-making: making the democratic process more engaging M. Lastovka 93 Values topple nationality in the European Parliament D.P. Frantescu 101 The case for election technology A. Mugica 111 Campaign-triggered mass collaboration in the EU’s online consultations: the ISDS-in-TTIP case M. Bauer 121 FROM MARTENS CENTRE RESEARCH The Renaissance of the West: how Europe and America can shape up in confronting Putin’s Russia R. Freudenstein · U. Speck 131 Dawn of the drones: Europe’s security response to the cyber age H. Hopia 133 It’s our job: reforming Europe’s labour markets E. Drea · S. Mures¸an 135 An unholy alliance: the European far right and Putin’s Russia A. Klapsis 137 TTIP IN FOCUS: 11 Myths Exposed E. Drea 139 Muzzling the bear: strategic defence for Russia’s undeclared information war on Europe S. Samadashvili 141

European View (2015) 14:1–2 DOI 10.1007/s12290-015-0356-4 EDITORIAL

The future of political parties Joseph Daul

Published online: 8 July 2015 Ó The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com

Traditionally, political parties have had a large and fixed membership that they could count on for support. Not only was membership seen as permanent, but it was also passed down from one generation to the next. This relationship was an essential part of political life in our democracies. However, globalisation and technology, amongst other factors, have forever altered this reality. These phenomena have opened up a new world where citizens can engage in politics outside of the framework of political parties.

Western society has changed from a church-centred community to an individualistic society. The ties between its members are weaker—and sometimes missing altogether. At the same time, people feel more connected than ever: via the Internet, reaching out to like-minded people has never been easier and more effortless. This combination of local disconnection and global connection has repercussions for politics as a whole and for political parties in particular.

The free flow of information is vital for a modern, functioning democracy as it helps people to engage with their representatives. We very much encourage this flow, especially as democracy not only gives freedom and rights to citizens, but also gives them the responsibility of proactively engaging with the society in which they live.

However, as we can see from Russian propaganda, information can be manipulated or distorted to create false perceptions. In this respect, political parties have an important role to play: not only must they guide citizens through the sea of available information, but they must also act responsibly when engaging with the media.

While people are benefiting from the enlargement of their world, globalisation also seems to have instilled fear in citizens, by bringing previously unknown threats into their living rooms. Moreover, the economic crisis has created discontent among voters, not only about the practices in the financial world but also about how politics and the political establishment have handled the crisis.

J. Daul (&) European People’s Party, Rue du Commerce 10, 1000 Brussels, Belgium e-mail: president@epp.eu

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This has created the opportunity and made way for protest movements and new types of parties to emerge. Unfortunately, these new parties are strongly populist, lean to either the extreme left or the extreme right, are single-issue based or anti-establishment, and are polarising our society. Moreover, they fail to provide a feasible vision for the future of our community. It is worrying that many voters believe that these political parties are serving our democracy. However, we can do more than sit back and hope that these parties will destruct themselves.

The rise of these parties offers an opportunity for people’s parties to show clear leadership and vision, and prove to our electorate that we do not shy away from taking difficult decisions and explaining them to the people. Established parties with well-elaborated policies are particularly capable of tackling the complexity of today’s challenges. However, such action may require people’s parties to modernise and effectively adapt to the new and empowered society that is emerging. Citizens are demanding results and proper representation. Furthermore, we need to make an effort to win back the hearts and minds of the citizens.

The articles in this issue of the European View provide ample food for thought regarding the modernisation of our people’s parties to meet the needs of our new society. Some authors question whether the representative model of democracy is still valid, and propose the introduction of direct democracy or open source democracy, where citizens use the Internet to tell their representatives how to vote. Others believe that political parties remain the best vehicle for translating citizens’ concerns into policy, but simultaneously argue that the parties need to do more to engage citizens, to explain themselves and to serve voters.

As the president of the European People’s Party, I too believe that the citizens are best served by the representative model and that political parties are the bestdeveloped vehicles for this purpose. We have to make sure that we not only keep pace with developments, but that we also use these changes to engage citizens on the largest scale possible. It is important for democracy that parties behave responsibly and always act in the best interests of the whole of society—and not merely in the interests of those who have voted for them or even in the interests of the current generation. We need to look beyond the present and create sustainable solutions to ensure a secure future for our children and grandchildren.

Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source are credited.

Joseph Daul is the President of the European People’s Party.

European View (2015) 14:3–11 DOI 10.1007/s12290-015-0347-5 ARTICLE

The rise of the populist radical right in Western Europe Matthijs Rooduijn

Published online: 3 June 2015 Ó The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com

Abstract Populist radical right (PRR) parties are on the rise in Western Europe.

Where do the electoral successes of these parties come from? First, it has been shown that the opening of borders has fuelled the divide between the ‘losers’ and ‘winners’ of globalisation. The ‘losers’ are individuals who feel threatened by international competition. They vote for PRR parties because they agree with their nativist, populist and Eurosceptic positions. Second, various social and political developments have facilitated the success of these parties. Some examples of these developments are increased electoral volatility, the ideological convergence of the mainstream parties, and increasing immigration and unemployment. Third, PRR parties themselves are, to a large extent, responsible for their own successes. Without their increasingly moderated messages and profiles, their often appealing external and internal leaders, and their well-institutionalised party organisations, their (long-term) successes would not have been possible. Most probably, the PRR party family will remain with us for a while.

Keywords Populism Radical right Euroscepticism Anti-immigration Political convergence Globalisation Introduction Although populist radical right (PRR) parties have been on the rise since approximately the mid-1990s, the elections to the European Parliament in May M. Rooduijn (&) University of Amsterdam, Postbus 15578, 1001 NB Amsterdam, The Netherlands e-mail: M.rooduijn@uva.nl

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2014 were the most telling mark of their success. Parties such as the National Front (Front National, FN) in France, the UK Independence Party in Britain and the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti) in Denmark all attracted about 25 % of the votes and became the biggest parties within their respective countries (Do¨ring and Manow 2015). They were not the only ones. The Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid) in the Netherlands, The Finns (Perussuomalaiset) in Finland, and the Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei O¨sterreichs, FPO¨) were also reasonably successful during the European elections. The day after the elections, various media outlets were talking about a ‘political earthquake’ (see, for instance, Parker et al. 2014).

What is going on in Western European democracies? Where has this upsurge of PRR parties come from? Before it is possible to answer these questions, it is of vital importance to carefully define what we are talking about when we employ the label ‘populist radical right’. Which parties belong to the PRR party family and why?

Defining the undefinable Various political scientists have aimed to define the PRR party family (see Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1997; Norris 2005). This has led to considerable conceptual fuzziness. Some talk about ‘neo-populist’ or ‘national populist’ parties, while others refer to these parties as ‘extreme right’, ‘anti-immigrant’ or ‘xenophobic’.

The Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde (2007) coined the term ‘populist radical right’. Scholars are increasingly employing this term and the corresponding definition. For this reason, I will also employ Mudde’s definition.

According to Mudde (2007), PRR parties are nativist, authoritarian and populist. Nativism can be defined as ‘an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘‘the nation’’) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state’ (Mudde 2007, 19). Non-native persons could be, for instance, immigrants or people of another race or religion (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008). The second attitudinal element that PRR parties share is authoritarianism. PRR parties want their society to be strictly ordered. They therefore place strong emphasis on the importance of law and order. Violations of the rules should be punished severely. The third main attitudinal element of PRR parties is populism. Populism could be seen as a set of ideas according to which the ‘good’ people are betrayed by an ‘evil’ elite (Hawkins 2010). Although it is often rather unclear who these parties consider to be ‘the people’, they are crystal clear about their negative attitude towards the elite (Canovan 2004). The elite is considered to be arrogant, selfish, incompetent and often also corrupt.

This critique could be directed towards a political elite (the established political order, the political ‘caste’), an economic elite (large companies, bankers in general) or a cultural elite (academics, writers, intellectuals).

Today’s PRR parties are also very critical of European unification. Their Eurosceptic attitude fits nicely with their nativist and populist outlook. Negativity

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towards immigrants from other European countries1 and the bureaucratic EU elites who, allegedly, do not listen to the ordinary people’s concerns, can be found among virtually all contemporary PRR parties’ programmes in Europe. It is important, however, to emphasise that PRR parties need not be Eurosceptic.

Political parties such as the Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang) in Belgium and the FN, for instance, have not always been negative about the EU. Although PRR parties have quite a lot of characteristics in common, they also differ from each other in important respects. When it comes, for instance, to attitudes towards homosexuality or foreign policy, different PRR parties can take diametrically opposing positions. Nonetheless, it has been shown that individual parties within the PRR party family do not differ more from each other than parties within the conservative or liberal party families. This does not mean, however, that they are able to successfully collaborate with each other on the international level, as most mainstream parties do. On the contrary, many attempts at international collaboration by PRR parties have failed.

Who votes for the PRR and why?

The reasons why people vote for PRR parties are in line with the ideological positions of these parties. First, PRR voters agree with these parties’ nativist outlook. It has been shown that PRR voters tend to be exclusive nationalist— that is, nativist (Dunn forthcoming). More specifically, it has been shown that attitudes towards immigration constitute the main motivation to vote for the PRR (Ivarsflaten 2008; Van der Brug et al. 2000).

Second, various studies have shown that those who vote for PRR parties also tend to be authoritarian, just like the parties themselves. They are in favour of a strictly ordered society and severe punishment in case of violation of the law (Lubbers 2001; Minkenberg 2000). However, a recent comparative study has shown that this need not always be the case: an authoritarian outlook is not a distinguishing characteristic of PRR voters in all Western European countries (Dunn forthcoming).

Third, many cross-national comparative studies demonstrate that those who vote for PRR parties are less satisfied with politics (Arzheimer 2009; Lubbers et al.

2002; Werts et al. 2012). Because PRR parties present themselves as political outsiders, and claim that established parties do not listen to ordinary citizens (Barr 2009), these parties form an attractive alternative for dissatisfied citizens. It is important to emphasise that they need not be real political outsiders; it is sufficient that they portray themselves as maverick outsiders. In fact, many PRR representatives are experienced politicians. Geert Wilders of the Dutch Freedom Party, for instance, is one of the most experienced politicians in parliament.

Fourth, various scholars have also shown that Euroscepticism is strongly related to voting for PRR parties (Arzheimer 2009; Ivarsflaten 2005; Lubbers and 1

This is particularly true of Western European populists, who dislike immigrants from Eastern European countries such as Poland and Romania.

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Scheepers 2007; Van der Brug et al. 2005; Werts et al. 2012). Many mainstream parties offer moderate messages when it comes to their positions on European integration. Citizens who are strongly Eurosceptic often have little other option than to choose from the parties on the fringes of the political spectrum. Thus because PRR parties present themselves especially clearly as the voice of Eurosceptic individuals, these parties are widely supported by Eurosceptic voters.

The general conclusion is that most individuals vote for PRR parties because they agree with them. They make a rational decision in favour of parties that are ideologically close to them on topics such as immigration, law and order, European integration, and the way in which the political system functions— they are, in other words, more than merely ‘protest voters’ (Van der Brug et al.

2000).

But why exactly do these citizens hold such attitudes? Various scholars have argued that citizens feel threatened by increasing international competition and growing supranational collaboration (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). These citizens are, in general, less educated employees in traditionally protected sectors of the labour market, who fear that they might lose their jobs and identity. They are the ‘losers of globalisation’ and their attitudes are diametrically opposed to those of the ‘winners of globalisation’, who have positive ideas about cultural diversity and European integration.

Facilitators of the success of PRR parties2 Political facilitators To understand the rise of PRR parties, it is not enough to just look at those who vote for these parties. Voter choices are also affected by external structures and processes. To start with, voters are affected by the behaviour and the ideas of the parties that compete with each other for their support. Various studies have shown that PRR parties are more successful when mainstream parties converge on centrist positions (Abedi 2002; Carter 2005; Kitschelt and McGann 1995).

Convergence basically means that centre–left parties become less left wing and centre–right parties become less right wing. When this occurs, they create an ideological space for PRR parties. Moreover, the greater the convergence of the mainstream parties, the more rewarding it becomes for PRR parties to express the populist message that the established parties can no longer be distinguished from each other. Often convergence is caused by the coming into being of a grand coalition containing both centre–left and centre–right parties (Arzheimer and Carter 2006). When the most important mainstream parties come together to form a government coalition they are forced to compromise. As a result they 2

In this section I do not discuss all the possible facilitators of PRR success. Some factors likely to exert an effect on the success of PRR parties still need further study before definitive conclusions can be drawn (e.g. the electoral system, the cordon sanitaire and media coverage). I focus only on those facilitators which various studies have persuasively shown exert an effect.

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inevitably move closer together.3 In the 1980s and 1990s, for instance, the Austrian Social Democrats and conservatives formed a grand coalition. An important outcome of their ideological convergence was the coming into being of an ideological space for the FPO¨. The more successful the FPO¨ became, the more the mainstream parties needed each other, the closer they moved together and the more fertile the breeding ground became for the FPO¨’s populist anti-establishment message (Heinisch 2008).

External facilitators Various other developments have facilitated the rise of PRR parties. First, several scholars have argued that the process of globalisation has set in motion a number of developments which have resulted in PRR successes. The theory is that increasing supranational collaboration (both at the EU level and the global level) has fuelled the above-mentioned distinction between the winners and the losers of globalisation and increased the attractiveness of PRR parties to the ‘losers’ (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008).

A second process that has affected the success of PRR parties is the process of individualisation, and, more specifically, increased electoral volatility. In the past, most voters remained loyal to one single political party, with which they identified strongly. Today voters in virtually all Western European countries increasingly switch between parties from one election to the next (Drummond 2006; Van der Meer et al. 2012). Without this increased volatility, the success of PRR parties would have been impossible. After all, it is the increased volatility that has made the electorate ‘available’ to vote for the new PRR parties (Van Kessel 2011). Where would the PRR electorate have come from if all voters had stayed loyal to ‘their’ parties? Of course, electoral volatility also creates a risk for PRR parties—as it does for mainstream parties. After all, if voters can more easily switch to voting for PRR parties, they can also more easily switch away from these parties.

Third, the success of PRR parties has also been ascribed to (alleged) cultural or economic crises. Various scholars have shown that the number of immigrants in a country affects the success of PRR parties. PRR parties become more successful when the number of immigrants increases (Lubbers et al. 2002; Werts et al.

2012). Moreover, in combination with increasing immigration, unemployment also appears to exert a strong (positive) effect on the success of PRR parties (Arzheimer 2009; Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2007; Golder 2003).

PRR parties themselves To a large extent the success of a PRR party is dependent on the PRR party itself.

The behaviour of other parties and other social structures and processes offer possibilities and restraints for PRR parties, but the success of these parties is 3

Note that this argument also holds for left wing populist parties like The Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza) in Greece or We Can! (Podemos) in Spain.

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largely dependent on the political messages of the parties themselves, the behaviour of the leaders and the strength of their organisations. In early studies it was argued that the success of the PRR is, to a large extent, due to a new ‘winning formula’: a strongly nationalist attitude combined with socio-economically right wing (neoliberal) positions (Kitschelt and McGann 1995). Later studies, however, have shown that many modern PRR parties do not owe their success so much to a socio-economically right wing message as to a centrist position on the classical left–right spectrum (De Lange 2007).4 Another reason for PRR parties’ success is that they have created a ‘detoxified’, more modern image (Mudde 2007), and thereby have differentiated themselves from fascists and (neo-)Nazis (Rydgren 2005).

To get their main message across, strong external leadership is very important to PRR parties. Prior to their electoral breakthrough, a strong and appealing leader can make a huge difference. It is therefore important for PRR party leaders to have strong rhetorical skills, to be media savvy and to know how to appeal to ordinary voters (De Lange and Art 2011). Successful PRR leaders such as JeanMarie Le Pen (FN), Jo¨rg Haider (FPO¨), Pim Fortuyn (of Pim Fortuyn List, Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF) and Umberto Bossi (of the Northern League, Lega Nord) have all been called charismatic leaders.

Yet external leadership is not the only form of leadership that is important. In the longer term, a party also needs a strong internal leader who takes care of the party’s organisation, communication with activists and political personnel, and recruitment and education (Eatwell 2004). Because most leaders do not possess both internal and external leadership qualities, many PRR parties divide these tasks up. A good example of this is the FN, in which, while Jean-Marie Le Pen was the external leader, Bruno Me´gret assumed the internal leadership (Mudde 2007, 272). Of course, these leadership qualities are also important for other party families. Yet, because mainstream party families such as liberals and conservatives have much more solid electoral bases, individual leadership qualities are of less decisive importance for them.

The organisation of a PRR party matters too. It is not so much the specific form of organisation that affects a party’s success,5 but the degree to which a party is institutionalised. A party is institutionalised when it is no longer a means to an end, but an end in itself. In an institutionalised party, members identify with the party, accept the decisions made by the leader and are loyal to the organisation. A big problem for many new parties (including many PRR parties) is that members and other followers support the leader of the party much more strongly than they support the party itself. This poses a threat to the party if the popularity of the leader dwindles or if the leader is replaced by someone else.

Indeed, research has indicated that for PRR parties it is of essential importance that the party is institutionalised before its electoral breakthrough. A problem for 4

It is important to emphasise that this only holds for the socio-economic left–right position. When it comes to socio-cultural issues (e.g. immigration, the EU), which are considered much more salient by the PRR, these parties maintain their radical positions.

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For instance, whether it is hierarchical or horizontal in structure, whether it has members or not and whether it has local branches or is purely a centralised party.

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suddenly successful but not institutionalised parties is that they have to find good politicians who are also loyal (De Lange and Art 2011). In contrast to the more established parties, many new PRR parties have not had the time to do this. For example, days after its leader Pim Fortuyn was murdered in 2002, the LPF won 26 out of the 150 seats in the Dutch lower house, and had to deliver 26 parliamentarians—basically from nowhere. Moreover, the party also had to recruit ministers because it had decided to participate in a government coalition.

The party was not ready for such responsibility and very soon its politicians were fighting each other. This marked the beginning of the end for the LPF.

Conclusion There are various reasons to expect that PRR parties will remain successful in the years to come. First of all, their main programme topics—immigration and European integration—will most likely remain highly salient. And as long as these topics remain on the political and media agenda, it is likely that support for PRR parties will remain high as well (see Walgrave and De Swert 2004).

Second, the older generation of PRR leaders with more extremist profiles (e.g.

Umberto Bossi and Jean-Marie Le Pen) has been replaced by a younger and more moderate generation (e.g. Marine Le Pen and Matteo Salvini). This new generation seems to be much more pragmatic and more prepared to cooperate on the international level. As a result, PRR parties can learn from each other’s success stories and mistakes. Third, public attitudes towards PRR parties are changing (De Lange et al. 2014). The FN in particular seems to have become increasingly mainstream and now attracts many voters who previously voted for one of the major parties. In sum, it can be expected that the PRR party family will remain with us for a while.

Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source are credited.

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Matthijs Rooduijn works as a postdoctoral researcher in the Department of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam. His research focuses on topics such as populism, left–right radicalism, voting behaviour, public opinion and democracy.

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European View (2015) 14:13–19 DOI 10.1007/s12290-015-0352-8 ARTICLE

In search of the ‘core electorate’: how should political parties react to an individualistic society?

Nico Lange

Published online: 16 June 2015 Ó The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com

Abstract Voters are becoming unstable in their voting behaviour, and party identification is in decline. These are only two of the developments that have their roots in a more individualistic society. Parties are confronted with these developments and have to find a way to maintain their attraction for the electorate. This article illustrates the challenges for parties and gives recommendations for action to maintain political stability.

Keywords Core voters Electorate Individualisation New parties Party identification People’s party Political stability Volatility Voting behaviour Introduction Society is changing. There is a strong trend towards individualisation. This is mirrored in various developments, and among the most significant of these are changes in voting behaviour and in the electorate itself. This paper illustrates the reasons for these changes and gives advice on possible solutions.

Core voters: A romantic dream?

It is election day. Father, mother, son and daughter are sitting at the breakfast table in their Sunday best. Having finished reading the Sunday papers, they leave together to attend church. Then they walk from the church to the polling N. Lange (&) Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Klingelho¨ferstraße 23, 10785 Berlin, Germany e-mail: nico.lange@kas.de

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station, meeting some neighbours on the way. They chat about newspaper reports and the Saturday night entertainment on television, which each family would have watched together. They generally vote for one of the people’s parties. Then the parents go off to spend Sunday afternoon in trade union meetings, engaging in parish work or in club activities. And the children play together.

This romantic image of an election Sunday is hardly applicable to Europe these days. Many of the voting pensioners, families, single parents, singles, patchwork families and immigrants would have cast their vote by post before election day. Instead of jointly watching the Saturday night family entertainment on TV, they will have viewed different digital cable channels or used a streaming service to watch TV. Many would have surfed the Internet on their tablets at the same time. If they had sought to keep up with the news at all, it would have been from online media and TV, which do not overlap to a great extent.

Neighbours hardly know one another, and there are few common points of reference to stimulate conversation. Voluntary work in churches, trade unions and clubs are also increasingly characterised by temporary commitment and project-based involvement.

The transformed electorate There is a clear understanding of the long-term social developments which have changed voters and therefore voter behaviour so fundamentally over recent decades. In the political party system, this social transformation manifests itself particularly in the loss of long-term party allegiance and its power to influence people’s conduct. As is the case for trade unions and churches, membership is declining, officials are ageing and few new people are joining. Since the democratic transformation, levels of party allegiance have been low in countries in Central and Eastern Europe. It would appear that the dynamic and frequently fragmented party systems of the new EU member states are increasingly setting the trend for development in the old member states.

Against this backdrop it is remarkable that traditional positions have continued to play such a large role in the analyses and discussions of election results and voter behaviour. No interpretational approaches are yet available to gain a true picture of the transformed electorate and of the associated impact on election results and the party landscape. Over a long period, societies throughout Europe have been undergoing noticeable changes which have undermined previously existing certainties with respect to voters, the underlying reasons for voter behaviour, and developments in party systems and in government compositions. Yet despite this, many commentators and analysts are still primarily trying to identify ‘core voters’, ‘camps’ and ‘milieux’.

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New parties come and go Analysts and political planners who still work with conceptions of ideologically motivated core voters disregard the fact that new parties are forming and disappearing again in Europe, that recently formed parties are achieving good election results within weeks, and that even in the rigid British multiparty system there has been a coalition government in place for some time and an increasing number of relevant parties. In many EU member states, people’s parties from the centre–right and centre–left now attract support from less than half the voting public. The European Parliament too acquired broader fringes and a narrower centre at the last European elections. Many political analysts run the risk of working on the basis of an outdated model of European societies, which no longer matches the realities in many respects. This is reflected in the efforts still made by political actors and analysts to pigeonhole on the basis of left–right criteria new phenomena such as the Italian Five Star Movement, the Slovenian Modern Centre Party, the German Pirate Party or the Alternative for Germany.

Within the parties too, the classic election Sunday described above, which may have existed in the 1970s, appears to continue to be a generally accepted ideal or at least a romantic notion. During many discussions between party members and party officials all across Europe, the parties are still frequently called upon to make greater efforts to return to the proven concepts of membership parties with a clear ideological orientation.

When reviewing election results, many party representatives mistakenly assume that voters ‘belong’ to them. Seen from that perspective, losses are then frequently interpreted as meaning that the voters ‘belonging’ to the party have merely ‘moved away’ and could be made to ‘return to the fold’ by the party repositioning itself with respect to certain issues. Citizens’ freedom in deciding where to cast their votes is left out of the equation.

In contrast with this viewpoint, the continuation of long-term trends towards the extensive individualisation of society that is apparent within the EU clearly suggests that other forces are at work. Permanent identification with a particular party is either on a continuous decline or non-existent. The picture is characterised by voter indecision, low turnouts and an ever greater willingness on the part of voters to experiment.

Where is the core electorate?

The electorate and the party system are experiencing ever greater changes.

During national elections, most European voters cast their votes for a different party from the one they voted for in the previous election. Many voters do not make up their mind about which party to vote for until shortly before polling day. There are large voter shifts, and conditions are favourable to the sudden emergence of new parties. These movements produce great uncertainties and risks in Europe, which are expected to play an even larger role during future elections.

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Assuming that current trends will continue, it appears likely that, in the future, achieving good election results will depend less on parties making efforts to appeal to who they mistakenly believe are their ‘core’ voters. Instead, it will be important to convince floating voters anew every time. This means that each campaign will be a competition to appeal to all voters.

In individualistic societies that are devoid of ideologies to a large extent, achievements in solving problems as part of government action will be the main means of convincing voters. Modern voters want parties to solve their individual problems, not to explain the world to them. Taking up positions based on ideology in the political debate runs the risk of fragmentation under these circumstances. Due to the demographic development if nothing else, parties will have to make efforts to attract new voters just to stand still in terms of electoral results. Great triumphs and disastrous failures frequently lie close together, given volatile electorates.

The numerous new parties created in Europe over recent years—you have only to look at the rapid rise and fall of the Pirate Party in Germany— demonstrate above all that declining identification with parties, voter indecision and the fading importance of ideological orientation mean that it is becoming ever easier in Europe to found a new party and achieve good results within a short time. Unfortunately, European elections often perform an incubator role, as party allegiance traditionally plays an even smaller role in that context and voter turnout is lower in what are considered second-order elections. In many countries, a volatile electorate encourages the arrival and departure of new political parties, many of which resist traditional classification on the left–right spectrum.

This scenario produces an important realisation for political planning. If the rise of new parties is first and foremost a consequence of volatile and increasingly non-aligned, highly heterogeneous electorates, then it is an illusion based on past performance if conventional parties think that they can ‘win back’ voters who have abandoned them for new parties by adopting certain positions on the left–right spectrum. Instead, long-term trends indicate that it is very likely that new parties will continue to appear and disappear rapidly because individualistic, non-ideological voters will be increasingly swinging between parties and be open to experiments in voting for different parties. Against the backdrop of a highly heterogeneous electorate, taking up uncompromising positions with respect to certain issues will be more likely to encourage fragmentation rather than stabilisation. Under these circumstances, people’s parties will have to take up integrative rather than confrontational political positions. Given the conditions of an individualistic society, the frequently quoted ‘hard line’ or entrenched ideological stances are only likely to produce fragmentation, fundamentalism and marginalisation.

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Personalities and problem-solving more important than party ideology However, despite the long-term trend towards the rapidly advancing individualisation of society, it appears to be possible for a party to appeal to and represent society in all its diversity. This has been illustrated not least by the election results of the CDU/CSU1 in Germany and the fact that its approval rating has held steady at over 40 % for years (Wolfram 2015a, b). But people’s parties will obviously have to undergo significant changes to achieve this goal. The recipe for success does not appear to be a return to old traditions but the beginning of something new instead. Winning 41.5 % of the vote in an election in 2013 (Wolfram 2015a) is simply a totally different challenge from achieving a similar result back in 1976 (Wolfram 2015b). The CDU/CSU did not win 41.5 % of the vote in the federal elections because it returned to old recipies but because under Angela Merkel the party did something new.

Long-term allegiances and ideological orientation are of less importance to parties in individualistic societies than the impact of personalities and the demonstration of concrete problem-solving capabilities. In the new and still changing circumstances, the latter also suggests that successful action while in government is the most promising way to strengthen the standing of people’s parties.

It appears that, above, all the effects of personalisation have the capability to stabilise parties faced with a volatile electorate. Integrative leaders, who can convince the party’s own membership as well as having charisma that impresses the heterogeneous segments of wider society, can help parties to gain greater appeal. The successful parties of the future will not leave the development of these leaders to chance. The early identification of talented individuals, efforts to foster their talents and their development, as well as the assignment of responsibilities to them, are becoming important factors in the survival of the political parties. This idea of purposeful personnel development frequently stands in contradiction to the existing selection and decision-making processes within the parties.

What applies to personnel also applies to political issues; in future, parties will have to increase their efforts to find processes that enable positioning and decision-making, taking into account not only the party’s homogenous membership but also the increasingly heterogeneous society. Modern parties will likely be characterised by efforts to reach out to non-members, from regular targeted surveys to co-decision rights. The reality of political parties will also increasingly involve open lists, preliminary elections, public candidate hearings and open forums on specific issues.

Problem-solving capabilities can only be demonstrated when the parties are capable of picking up on the problems that are relevant to their very diverse voters and devising approaches to solve those problems. If the people’s parties in particular want to avoid being left behind by social changes, they must be Par18 Christian Democratic Union of Germany/Christian Social Union of Bavaria (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands/Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern).

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capable of extending their reach into all segments of an individualistic society.

This is where they encounter a serious problem. While society is changing at an ever faster pace, the rate of change at the organisational level of the political parties has lagged behind. This applies similarly to churches, trade unions and other major organisations. To date, the parties in Europe have not changed sufficiently to reflect phenomena such as the rapid changes in working practices, the increasing digitisation of everyday activities and changed expectations with respect to social engagement. The injection of new blood into the membership and the ranks of party officials is not keeping pace with social change. At the same time, the forms of organisation and participation of political parties in Europe, which have not changed in decades in many cases, have not allowed the parties to tailor their offering to members with very different demands, different time budgets, different interests in issues, and different qualifications and competences. There is still generally one participation model for all.

Conclusion The successful parties of the future will have to offer their members different membership models. These could range from passive membership and classic participation in the local association to purely issue-based involvement and virtual association structures to temporary involvement in individual projects.

Purposeful mentoring for new party members, new member officers in the parties, and trial and premium memberships will soon be a matter of course.

Established European parties would be well advised to recognise the antiparty parties of the populists, the unpopularity of political parties and the protest behaviour of many voters as indications that the accelerating social change makes it necessary for them to contemplate the consequences for their internal forms of organisation and participation. This places the parties in a paradoxical situation. They claim to be involved in shaping social change, but the parties are themselves driven by social changes that they can neither steer nor undo.

The ability of political parties in Europe, and particularly the people’s parties, to achieve substantial success will depend to a very large extent on their capability to keep adapting to social developments. The parties’ flexibility in issues, organisation and participation is increasingly turning into a decisive success factor for political stability.

Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source are credited.

References Wolfram, N. (2015a). Parties and elections in Europe: Germany. http://www.parties-andelections.eu/germany.html. Accessed 11 May 2015.

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Wolfram, N. (2015b). Parties and elections in Europe: Germany. http://www.parties-andelections.eu/germany2.html. Accessed 12 May 2015.

Nico Lange is deputy director for political consulting at the Konrad-AdenauerStiftung in Berlin. He is currently leading a task force on the future of political parties in Germany. He is a member of the CDU reform commission and the CDU topical committee for domestic policy.

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European View (2015) 14:21–30 DOI 10.1007/s12290-015-0354-6 ARTICLE

How can European political parties maximise their success in the 2019 elections?

Michalis Peglis

Published online: 7 July 2015 The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com

Abstract During the 24 years that have passed since the Maastricht Treaty, there has been unprecedented progress in both the deepening and the widening of the EU. The European party federations, however, have not kept pace. This has created an asymmetry between the deepening of integration in the EU and its politically miniscule European political parties. There are several issues that need to be addressed. Doing so might improve the situation in the medium term.

Keywords European parties Europarties European elections European institutions Truly transnational European political parties and political foundations are key to articulating the voices of the citizens at European level. Can the Europarties really fulfil such a role?

J. M. D. Barroso (2012)

Introduction The title of this article has positive connotations. It infers that European parties are doing very well and, by taking a few fresh ideas into the 2019 European elections, will be able to do even better. This article will present the current situation of the European political parties and assess the main areas in which improvements can be made to further integration. It is not surprising that this is one of those topics on which researchers have widely divergent opinions.

M. Peglis (&) 18, Petras Str., 10444 Athens, Greece e-mail: mpeglis@gmail.com

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Do we really need parties in the EU? The EU has evolved into a fully-fledged political system with public opinion, institutions, regulation, and ordinary and extraordinary decision-making procedures. It deals with critical issues, not always visible to the majority of the citizens. These include areas such as agricultural policy, regional development funding instruments, monetary policy, economic policy coordination, the regulation of the internal market and the establishment of the rules governing trade with the rest of the world, among others. Although today’s EU is the product of a gradual evolution from the original treaties of the 1950s, much of its current structure is the result of the Maastricht Treaty. The last five years and the enduring financial and sovereign debt crises in the eurozone have further advanced European integration, through the introduction of new institutions and policies to address the design limitations of the monetary union (Sklias and Maris 2013).

The history of the European political parties and of the pro-European movement are mutually bound together (Pridham and Pridham 1981). After several years of sluggish progress on integration in the 1960s due to French reluctance, the 1970s saw significant steps being taken in the European project through the preparation for and introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament (EP). The commencement of the preparatory steps for these elections gave impetus to the creation of European federations.

Each European party has its own history. Christian Democracy was the leading post-war political movement. Inspired by federalist and pro-integration ideals, it gave birth to the European People’s Party (EPP) in 1976 (Kalyvas 1995). Social Democracy originated from the Socialist International and, despite early reluctance regarding integration, produced the Confederation of the Socialist Parties of the European Community in 1974 (Moschonas 2002). Finally, the international liberal movement created the European Liberal Democrats, also in 1976.

The 1990s brought renewed optimism regarding the European parties, which flourished after the inclusion of Article 138a in the Maastricht Treaty (Hix and Lord 1997), and again after the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and the Treaty of Nice (2000). The implementation of the ‘Party regulation’ in 2004 gave impetus to the creation of new Europarties, mainly by Eurosceptic forces, as it set down the criteria that had to be met for these organisations to be recognised and subsequently funded. Despite the fact that the Treaty of Lisbon, signed in 2007 and ratified in 2009, provided space for more integration, the ongoing crisis has pushed the institutional design of the EU in search of a new equilibrium.

Diachronically, the EU, through enlargement and deepening, has been completely overhauled. Today, the Union of 28 member states, compared to the Union of 9 in the mid-1970s, has institutions and bodies which are much larger and thus require more coordination. On this basis, the answer to the question is yes, political parties on the European level are needed, at least more so than in the past.

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The institutional asymmetry The discussion about the contribution and role of the existing European parties is ongoing; however, the majority of reviewers are not enthusiastic about their performance (Bartolini 2012; Priestly 2011; Van Hecke 2010; Peglis 2011a; Johansson 2009; Hanley 2008; Mair 2006; Hix 2007; Raunio 2006). This author’s view is that, taking into consideration their historical path of development and despite the huge steps taken towards integration in several policy domains by the EU, the European political parties have not followed a similar path of development. There is an asymmetry between the development of the EU and that of the European parties, which still operate under conditions that were more relevant to the earlier stages of European integration. Two indicators of this will be explored below: institutional impact and public reference to the Europarties.

The presence of the three oldest party groups in the core institutions, and the impact that they have on the decision-making processes of the EU, varies widely.

The European parties have a proven record of working well in the EP (Kreppel 2002), with their success lying in the formal character of their cooperation in organised groups. The European party groups have institutionalised their roles gradually since 1953 and the origins of the EP, in parallel with its growth in size and, most importantly, in competences. The same cannot be said of their roles in the other major institutions: the Commission, the Council and the European Council. The Council of the European Union and the European Council are key institutions in the EU’s decision-making process. European party activity is observed in these institutions, but it has not been formalised. Tallberg and Johansson (2008, 16) note, ‘[n]egotiations along party divides are relatively rare in the European Council, where issue-specific, interest-based coalitions instead constitute the most prevalent form of actor alignment.’ In contrast, of the EPP’s pre–European Council meetings, Jansen and Van Hecke (2011, 151) observe: ‘These meetings also sometimes afforded an insight into the strengths and weaknesses of their own countries’ negotiating positions, which was especially useful to members of the European Council. In any event, both government leaders and opposition leaders benefited from exchanges at the EPP Summit.’

The key characteristic here is the ‘informal character’ of the activities of the bigger European parties, which take place in ministerial meetings for several portfolios and in council of ministers and summit meetings prior to the European Council at the level of affiliated party leaders and heads of state. These meetings have a long history, dating back to the 1970s for the party summits and the 1980s for the ministerial meetings. However, little has changed in these bodies in recent decades as far as the content and contribution to the decisionmaking process is concerned. What they mainly provide is a space for additional consultations among the affiliated officers of the respective European party prior to the beginning of the normal session of the Council or the European Council.

However, in the ordinary decision-making processes of these institutions ideological affiliation is not the key factor. National agendas prevail and coalition building is based on converging interests among different member

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states. In general there is little empirical evidence regarding the contribution of these meetings to the decision-making process of the EU and virtually no research has been carried out into the matter. The minutes of these meetings are not public and this might be one reason why little is known about their role.

However, the three largest European parties, which account for the majority of the representatives in the Council and the European Council, self-define their presence in these institutions as a ‘network’, rather than a party. There is no reference to such meetings having any formal role in the decision-making process.

The presence and the activities of the European parties are less visible in the European Commission, where there is also a lack of empirical evidence as to the depth of the work being performed. Affiliated commissioners coordinate their role with their respective European party. This is done mainly in a ‘business-asusual’ format, through the attendance of the affiliated commissioners at the most important Europarty organs, such as ministerial meetings and pre-summit leaders meetings. Often termed the ‘European government’, the Commission, Council and European Council have been transformed since the 1970s. From 9 members in the late 1970s for the Council and the European Council and 13 commissioners, today each institution has 28 members, increasing the need for coordination. Despite their diverse presence in the Union’s core institutions, the European parties’ impact on the process of decision-making across them, albeit visible, could be improved substantially. In spite of the gradual development of the EU since the 1950s there has not been a parallel development in the programme content and processes of the European party groups. Member states are still the key players today, promoting their own interests in the interinstitutional processes of legislation and policy implementation. The ongoing financial crisis has strengthened intergovernmentalism.

The second issue is the absence of any public reference to the Europarties.

Even after the successful introduction of the Lisbon Treaty clause regarding the nomination of the president of the European Commission, from the results of the 2014 European elections it does not seem as if the European parties have improved their political footprint among the European electorate, aside from during the few weeks directly before the elections. This is despite the fact that the political agenda in all the member states has been dramatically Europeanised. The EU is on the news every day as a result of the wide variety of political issues that inspire reaction on the European level. This reaction though is mainly driven by the member states at the intergovernmental level, rather than by the European parties. As a result, last year’s European elections were not affected by this profound Europeanisation of political agendas. European voters still perceive the European elections as national elections of secondary importance (Reif and Schmitt 1980), mainly because, contrary to national elections, they do not produce a tangible political outcome. The day after the European elections nothing is expected of the European parties in terms of policy implementation or governance in Europe. The above comments regarding the status quo of the European parties should not be received as pessimism regarding their role. On the contrary, the size, structure and policy

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content of the EU today is such that only through an increased and more formalised role for the European political parties can we expect the work and the decisions taken to become more efficient and more democratic. The formalisation of the horizontal work of the European parties in the decision-making processes and institutions of the EU will contribute in the medium term to a better functioning Union. With this in mind, outlined below are four practical ideas to increase the output of the European parties and improve the functioning of the EU. Only the last proposal requires a treaty change.

Europarties need to strengthen their programmatic framework The first implementation, in 2014, of the nomination of a presidential candidate for the Commission by the European parties was relatively successful, despite the fact that it could already have been implemented in the 2009 European elections. The Lisbon Treaty was agreed and signed in December 2007, one and a half years before the 2009 European elections. Its ratification though was slow and stressful and was not concluded until December 2009. Technically, therefore, it was not in effect during the 2009 European elections. However, the clause governing the public appointment of a candidate for the Commission presidency could be exercised by European parties even in the pre-Lisbon but towards-Lisbon status quo. The European Council would have been uncomfortable if it had not ‘take[n] into account the elections to the European Parliament’ (Peglis 2011a). The EPP’s decision to back Barroso for a second term1 was made in the pre-Lisbon institutional and political context. Even so, neither the European socialists (Party of European Socialists/Socialists and Democrats) nor the liberals (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe) were able to reach a consensus over a candidate.

It is, therefore, necessary to take the next step of strengthening the content of the nomination—the policy programme—in readiness for the 2019 European elections. To achieve this, the European parties could internally contemplate a tighter procedure and timeline that aims to coordinate the policies of the national member parties, the European party, the party group in the EP and, ultimately, the candidate president of the Commission into one single programme for the next five years. As an example, in the run up to the 2014 European elections the EPP adopted the ‘Action Programme 2014–2019’, and held a final round of debate and a vote in the plenary session of the EPP Congress in Dublin in March 2014. The EPP Group participated to an extent in the several months of preparation of this document by the relevant EPP working group. Although the document was endorsed after the Congress2 by the EPP Group, in autumn 2014 the new EPP Group adopted the ‘A Reform Agenda for Europe’s Future - EPP Group Priorities 2014–2019’ document, published in November 2014. This document should have been a development of the Action 1

With official press releases following EPP Summits on 20 March (EPP 2009a) and 19 June 2009 (EPP 2009b).

2

It was not published, even on the EPP Group’s website.

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Programme adopted by the EPP Congress, but it is not. In the two months of campaigning, the EPP candidate for Commission president, Jean-Claude Junker, endorsed the EPP Action Programme and actually elaborated on certain chapters such as the energy union, the digital agenda and the investment plan, and added additional catchy proposals to build publicity. However, since his election as president of the Commission, the implementation of this programme has been enriched by the agendas of the other members of the European Commission. This is despite the fact that the role of the Commission president has been strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty: the president is now the agendasetter for the European Commission and not just first among equals. This change should facilitate the implementation of the agenda that has been presented to the public and provide the basis for increasing the party’s accountability. This is a good reason to encourage tighter implementation of the European party programme, updated over time, and increased commitment and active participation from all the relevant parties. Therefore, it is clear that this first implementation of the election of the Commission president based on the political content of the candidates’ programmes, similarly to how this is done at the national level, can be improved in the future.

Europarties should contemplate the introduction of the role of ‘chief whip’ to improve interinstitutional coordination European parties need to introduce mechanisms that follow the everyday decision-making process of the Union to make sure that their affiliated groups and members in the Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the European Council have as uniform a position as possible and can maximise their impact on the output of the EU. The balance of power between the members of the Commission and the national ministers, not to mention prime ministers, participating in the Council of Ministers, does not favour the European parties, which do not have any formal mandate to provide a ‘chief whip’ in the core institutions. The term ‘chief whip’ refers to a mechanism for each European party that would ensure that their representatives in the European Commission, the Council and the European Council keep to their party’s positions on different issues. The balance between ‘party discipline’ and representing national interests is a delicate one, but wherever European parties consolidate their positions on different issues, these positions should be implemented across the European institutions by their network of officers.

The effectiveness of the chief whip, even at the national level, is not based upon any formal authority among, for instance, members of parliament. In the same way, at the European level such a role would reinforce the depth of the work and coordination efforts that each European party and its national members have to put in to affect the decision-making process. It would reinforce the strength of the party and ultimately ensure that it was more coherent in terms of policymaking. The coordination of the European party representatives in the different institutions is a key factor in increasing efficiency due to the interinstitutional nature of the EU’s decision-making

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process. Being successful in the EP and getting a policy paper voted through means little if this success is not endorsed by the Council and the Commission.

Europarties should talk to the people Since their beginnings, Europarties have had a proven record in creating political documents. However, today they need to evolve this ‘talent’ by developing new policy ideas that will build up their public profiles. The documents of the Europarties usually score highly when bridging the gap between the different views of the member parties but score poorly with regard to putting forward new ideas on the European level, where their competences lie. New policy ideas usually come from member states or the core institutions. Through fresh policy proposals the parties could develop profiles that are of interest to the public.

Such policies might include, for example, a proposal for a European supplementary pension that would introduce voluntary contributions to efficiently build up a new pension system, or the introduction of the ‘European company’, which would enjoy some benefits vis-a`-vis nationally registered companies. In general, European parties should look into taking new ideas that affect ordinary people to the European level. In fact European parties do contemplate positions through resolutions and policy papers but knowledge of this rarely reaches the broader public. Policy initiatives today in the EU are credited to the Commission or Council members rather than to the European parties.

Changing how the commissioners are nominated After the 2019 European elections, the European Council will propose the next president of the Commission after taking into account the candidate proposed by the winning European party. The members of the Commission, however, will be appointed by the Council in accordance with the older procedure outlined in Article 17 Paragraph 7 of the Treaty of the European Union. This means that the European elections will have no effect on these appointments. This is explained by the fact that historically the European elections were not associated with the appointment of the European Commission, whose appointment was a competence of the national governments (Wonka 2008). The proposal is that the authority to appoint a member of the Commission be shifted from the government of the day to the national party that ranks first in the European elections (Peglis 2011a; b). This would strengthen the European dimension of the elections, as the citizens would take this into account more than the election of the president of the Commission, as it would determine who they send to Brussels to become their European commissioner.

The aim of this proposal is to strengthen the association of the European elections not just with the election of the members of the EP and the appointment of the president of the European Commission, but with the appointment of the designated commissioner from each country. National parties would put forward their proposed candidate for the College of the

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Commission as part of their campaign and would appeal to the electorate on this basis. The party that received the highest number of votes would be eligible to appoint its candidate for the Commission, rather than this being a competence of the government of the day. The pattern of implementation could be similar to the clause in the Lisbon Treaty for the appointment of the president of the European Commission. The legal provision could refer to the nomination of the commissioner designate from each country ‘taking into account the results of the European elections’. Such a legal provision, at a Treaty level, addresses the constitutional and legal barriers that would arise at the national level. The clause would be more political as there could be no legal or even a constitutional amendment at the national level, thus ensuring that only the government of the day would have the authority to nominate a candidate for Commissioner. Member countries would be invited to follow its provisions. If they did not they would risk their candidate commissioner not being approved.

The EP has a proven record on this front. Equally, if each national party were to name its candidate for commissioner, people would be less likely to vote based on national or reactionary criteria as, apart from electing the members of the EP, their vote would also decide who was appointed to the European Commission.

In contrast to the European institutions, European elections have evolved to become an incubator for populist political parties. The combination of a national ballot in the era of nationwide media and the absence of any actual consequences on the day after the election, has relaxed the voting criteria, which is the opposite of what is needed at the European level. Populist or singleissue parties that have little to say about the real issues in Europe have been strengthened as a result. Populist parties have flourished not only due to their anti-systemic nature and media tactics, but also because voting for them in the European elections poses no risk for the voter. From this perspective the change we propose would increase voters’ rationality when making their decision. The key paradigm today for the European elections is voting with national criteria in mind, thus rewarding or punishing the incumbent government. This indicates that the European question has not been strengthened diachronically, despite the obvious Europeanisation of the decision-making process. Furthermore, today, voting for party A or party B in the European elections basically equates to selecting candidates for the EP. If the selection of the national member of the European Commission was added to this it would strongly increase the attention paid by the voters to the real issue of the elections, that is, ‘who goes to Brussels’. Selecting a few people from each party who will become a marginal part of a several-hundred-member-strong institution has much less of an impact than selecting who will be the one and only national representative in the 28-member European Commission. By having both issues decided at the ballot box we can expect a significant increase in the rationality behind the voters’ decision-making processes. The authority and the legitimacy of the national government would not be challenged by this proposal and would continue to be reflected in the make-up of the Council and the European Council. The Commission is the supranational institution and it is only right that it be linked with the results of the European elections. This proposal would also further

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strengthen the independence of the commissioners from their national governments as their appointment would be linked with the outcome of the European elections.

Conclusion The way the EU works has changed a lot in the past four decades. Particularly with the launch of the co-decision procedure and its gradual extension to almost all areas of decision-making, the cooperation of all the core institutions is critical to the output of the Union. This is very different from the situation in the 1970s or 1980s, when the Commission and the Council were legislating independently of the EP, which was mainly a discussion forum. With the Lisbon Treaty, and especially with the ongoing financial crisis in Europe, the debate about the core European institutions remaining immune from and outside of continuous political confrontation is relatively outdated. The EU is a federal union of states with a high degree of unification in some domains but not in others. The discussion and the decisions that need to be taken to continue the process of unification should be carried out in an ideological and political way that complements the intergovernmental character of the EU which already exists in the Council and the European Council. This would offer opportunities and benefits for those political organisations that can coordinate and consolidate their representation in the core institutions across the EU. Although a complicated exercise, this is the direction in which the European parties should look to make a difference to policymaking in the EU. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source are credited.

References Barroso, J. M. D. (2012). State of the Union 2012 address. Speech given at the plenary session of the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 12 September. http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/ president/news/archives/2012/09/20120912_1_en.htm. Accessed 30 March 2015.

Bartolini, S. (2012). The strange case of Europarties. In E. Ku¨lahci (ed.), The domestic party politics of Europeanisation: Actors, patterns and systems (pp. 157–70). Colchester: ECPR Press.

EPP. (2009a). Press release. EPP leaders back Barroso for a second term as president of European Commission. 20 March. http://pr.euractiv.com/pr/epp-leaders-back-barroso-second-termpresident-european-commission-88785. Accessed 25 June 2015.

EPP. (2009b). Press Release. EPP leaders fully back Barroso for a second term. 19 June. http://pr.euractiv.com/pr/epp-leaders-fully-back-barroso-second-term-89004. Accessed 25 June 2015.

Hanley, D. (2008). Beyond the Nation State. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hix, S. (2007). Euroscepticism as anti-centralization. European Union Politics, 8(1), 131–49.

Hix, S., & Lord, C. (1997). Political parties and the European Union. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Jansen, T., & Van Hecke, S. (2011). At Europe’s service: The origins and evolution of the European People’s Party. Heidelberg: Springer/Centre for European Studies.

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30 Johansson, K. M. (2009). The emergence of political parties at European level: Integration unaccomplished. In S. Gustavsson, L. Oxelheim & L. Pehrson (eds.), How unified is the European Union? European integration between visions and popular legitimacy (pp. 157–78). Heidelberg: Springer.

Kalyvas, S. (1995). The rise of Christian Democracy in Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Kreppel, A. (2002). The EP and the supranational party system: A study in institutional development.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mair, P. (2006). Political parties and party systems. In P. Graziano & M. Vink (eds.), Europeanization: New research agendas (pp. 154–66). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Moschonas, G. (2002). In the name of Social Democracy, the great transformation. London/New York: Verso.

Peglis, M. (2011a). Europarties towards 2014. New Europe, 15 May. http://www.neurope.eu/blog/ europarties-towards-2014. Accessed 30 March 2015.

Peglis, M. (2011b). European parties in the post-Lisbon reality. European View, 10(2), 221–30.

Peglis, M. (2013). European elections 2014: what kind of dish will the parties serve the electorate? Will it have a national or European flavour? European View, 12(1), 121–34.

Pridham, G., & Pridham, P. (1981). Transnational party co-operation and European integration. London: Allen & Unwin.

Priestly, J. (2011). European political parties: The missing link. Brussels: Notre Europe.

Raunio, T. (2006). Political parties in the EU. In K. Jorgensen, M. Pollack, & B. Rosamond (eds.), Handbook of European Union politics (pp. 247–62). London: Sage.

Reif, K., & Schmitt, H. (1980). Nine second-order national elections: A conceptual framework for the analysis of European election results. European Journal of Political Research, 8(1), 3–45.

Sklias, P., & Maris, G. (2013). The political dimension of the Greek financial crisis: Perspectives on European politics and society. doi:10.1080/15705854.2012.732392.

Tallberg, J., & Johansson, K. M. (2008). ‘Party Politics in the European Council’. Journal of European Public Policy, 15(8), 1222–42.

Van Hecke, S. (2010). Do transnational party federations matter? (…Why should we care?). Journal of Contemporary European Research, 6(3), 395–411.

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Michalis Peglis, former European affairs adviser to the prime minister of Greece, is studying for a Ph.D. on European parties and is a Research Associate at the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies. He holds a Master’s degree in public administration and public policy from the London School of Economics.

European View (2015) 14:31–38 DOI 10.1007/s12290-015-0350-x ARTICLE

Engaging the Roma community in the political party process in Slovakia Marek Degro

Published online: 19 June 2015 Ó The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com

Abstract Establishing cooperation between the Slovak majority and the Roma minority within the political parties in Slovakia is a demanding and complicated process. Many political parties ignore this ethnic minority in their programmes or pay very little attention to it. This article aims to provide information about the development of the political ambitions of the Roma minority in Slovakia in the period leading up to 1989, the first steps taken by the post-revolution government for the advancement of the Roma nation and an analysis of the current involvement of the Roma minority in the decision-making processes.

Keywords

Roma Integration Participation Local politics Education

Introduction It is difficult to estimate how many Roma live in Slovakia; when the census is taken many Roma say that they are of Slovak or Hungarian nationality. In 2013, a special census by the UN Development Programme produced the Atlas of Roma communities in Slovakia 2013, which estimates that there are 400,000 Roma living in Slovakia, representing 7 %–8 % of the total population of 5.4 million (Musˇinka et al. 2014).

Furthermore, the Atlas indicated that Roma communities live in 1,070 municipalities and towns in Slovakia, approximately 37 % of the total number.

Some Roma live in impoverished groups in settlements, while others form part of the majority society. According to Marcincˇin (2013), in many municipalities today Roma represent the majority of the population, and in many districts M. Degro (&) Anton Tunega Foundation, Bajkalska´ 25, 821 01 Bratislava II, Slovakia e-mail: marek.degro@tunega.sk

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Roma births form the majority. Overall, the Roma population represents close to 15 % of the working-age population in Slovakia.

Yet despite the relatively high presence of Roma in Slovak society, their representation in the different levels of politics is very low. A Roma representative was elected to the national Parliament of the Slovak Republic for the first time in 2012. At the local level, fewer than 2 % of the elected deputies are Roma, the result of the most recent local authority elections in 2014. The level of participation of any minority—in this case the Roma—mostly depends on the circumstances (in terms of education, communication and societal tolerance and acceptance) determined by society and by politicians (Orgova´nova´ 2013). How should society respond to this situation, and what might be done by government?

The journey of Slovak Roma towards political and legal equality The first systematic attempts to organise the Roma go back a long time (Hancock and Jurova´ 2008). A pan-European Roma conference took place in Kisfalu, Hungary as early as 1879, but, even then, such activity was not welcomed by the government.

In the twentieth century most Roma associations in Slovakia were cultural and music societies and guilds. Their first significant political moves were made after the Communist takeover in February 1948, but the political goals of the Association of Slovak Gypsies (Zdruzˇenie Slovensky´ch ciga´nov) were not recognised by the newly installed political power (Jurova´ 1967).

The socialist regime of the Czechoslovak state did not officially recognise the existence of a Roma minority although other minorities were recognised in law.

This was because the Roma did not know where they fitted in—they were organised to some extent but had no institutions of their own. The exception to this—the Association of Gypsies—Romany (Zva¨z Ciga´nov–Ro´mov)—was established 20 years after change of the regime, in 1969 in Brno in the Czech Republic.

During its existence this association was quite successful in achieving support for Roma employment, but it was disbanded by the state and party organs in 1973.

At the time, the organisation had about 8,500 members (Orgova´nova´ 2013).

Scheffel (2013) described the consequences of following the socialist ideology thus: despite the slogans and plans of the socialist and post-socialist eras regarding the integration of Roma into society, the abyss between both groups did not decrease—rather the tension increased.

A number of experts see the period 1989–92, the final three years of Czechoslovakia’s existence, as one of the most positive for the Roma in the two decades leading up to the country’s division (Orgova´nova´ 2013). It was a period during which many non-governmental non-profit organisations, new institutions and political associations were established that focused on Roma issues, and in some cases included Roma among their representatives. The government of Slovakia was open to this because dealing with the problems of ethnic minorities was a condition for entry into the EU. Politically, the Roma were acknowledged as an ethnic minority in the early 1990s. The document Principles of Government Policy of the Slovak Republic for

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Roma of 1991 indicated that policies regarding Roma should be based on ‘the legislative system, starting with the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, to acknowledge the ethnic independence of the Roma on the same level as that of other ethnic minorities living in Slovakia—this means ‘ . . . to acknowledge Romany as a nationality and thus ensure the political and legal equality of these people’’’ (Slovakia 1991).

In 2003 the next fundamental government document was prepared—Basic positions of Government Policy on the Integration of Roma Communities (Slovakia 2003)—which established measures to ensure equality. By accepting these measures, the Slovak government acknowledged that a large group of people that live in Slovakia were not in the same position as other inhabitants, and that if they were to attain approximately the same approximate level, the government would have to take measures to help them (Orgova´nova´ 2013).

In early 2012, in response to an incentive from the Council of the European Union for Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs, the Slovak government prepared the Strategy of the Slovak Republic for Roma Integration to 2020 (Slovakia 2012), which received a European Commission award. It was conceived under the direction of Miroslav Polla´k, then representative of the Slovak Republic for Roma issues. The strategy presented four action plans—on education, employment, health and housing.

Currently, the Committee on National Minorities and Ethnic Groups and the Council of the Government of the Slovak Republic for Non-governmental Nonprofit Organisations Operating in Slovakia are responsible for matters relating to minorities. In 2001, the Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Government of the Slovak Republic for Roma Communities was established. In addition, dozens of non-governmental, non-profit organisations are active within the third sector— with the goal of supporting and developing the Roma minority in Slovakia.

Churches also play a substantial role in supporting integration.

Despite these developments over the past 20 years, many specialists agree that at the beginning of the 1990s, much more could have been done to promote the political representation and participation of the Roma community in Slovakia. (Barany 2002). However, the Roma topic was frequently overshadowed by other, more serious political issues, such as the split of Czechoslovakia and accession to the EU and NATO.

Political euphoria and a hard landing In the first free elections, which took place in 1990, Roma representatives were included on the candidate list of the party Public against Violence (Verejnostˇ proti na´siliu) and also, later, on that of the Civic Forum (Obcˇianske´ fo´rum) and were thus elected to the legislative organs of the Czechoslovak Federation. Thanks to the work of these representatives, the early 1990s saw the establishment of the globally unique Romathan Roma theatre, the Roma Academy of Music in Kosˇice and the Department of Roma Culture in the Faculty of Pedagogy at the University of Constantine the Philosopher in Nitra (Ko¨ke´ny 2013).

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However, the attempt to create an independent ethnic party called the Roma Civic Initiative (Ro´mska obcˇianska´ iniciatı´va) failed. In the June 1992 elections, as well as those in the autumn of 1994, the party received just 0.7 % of the vote. In Slovakia, no other Roma party gained more than 1 % of the vote (Sˇtatisticky´ U´rad Slovenskey Republicky 2014) and the euphoria created by participation in the election process quickly dissipated. This failure rested on the fact that the majority of Roma did not vote for Roma candidates and that the votes for Roma candidates that were cast were split among too many parties.

By the end of the 1990s, there were 27 Roma political parties in Slovakia. The Roma political scene was highly fragmented and the parties were unable to unite.

In 2004, after a shake-up of the rules transformed the party scene, the Roma Initiative in Slovakia (Ro´mska iniciatı´va Slovenska) was the only party that qualified for re-registration. Currently, there are three Roma political parties—the Party of the Roma Community (Strana Ro´mskej komunity) and the Party of Roma Union in Slovakia (Strana Ro´mskej u´nie na Slovensku) have both formed since 2004. Roma political participation on the national level has remained virtually non-existent. The existing Roma parties do not have any regional organisations and do not have a systematic approach to working with communities. The Roma living in settlements do not feel that these parties defend their interests and do not vote for them.

Roma and different levels of politics For many Roma, being elected into local or regional representative bodies is an achievable goal. In 2005, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs carried out a survey on the political participation and views of Roma communities. It found that these communities achieve their greatest successes in local politics. The survey was carried out by Toma´sˇ Hrusˇticˇ, a researcher with the Institute of Ethnology at the Slovak Academy of Science. Through the National Democratic Institute, he also led a training course for Roma political candidates in Slovakia. He speaks fluent English and Romany.

As shown in Table 1, there is a positive growth in the number of candidates and elected deputies in local elections in every election period. In terms of the representation of women, in 2014, approximately 20 female Roma deputies were Table 1 Number of Roma candidates and elected deputies and mayors during the local authority elections, 1998–2014 1998

2002

2006

2010

2014

Candidates

254

756

1,600

3,200

3,300

Elected deputies

56

158

220

330

390

Female elected deputies

*

*

11

20

20

Mayors

6

11

19

29

33

Number of municipalities

*

55

95

130

Sources: Data from Magdolenova´ (2015), Hrusticˇ (2013), Pecˇ´ınka (2009) and Sˇebesta (2002). * Data not available.

*

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Table 2 Share of elected Roma candidates in the local authority elections in 2014 Total number Elected mayors/lord mayors Elected local authority deputies

Number of Roma/%

2,909

33/1.1

20,753

390/1.9

Sources: Data from Sˇtatisticky´ U´rad Slovenskey Republicky (2014) and Magdolenova´ (2015).

elected. Out of the total number of elected Roma representatives on local authorities, this figure represents only 5 %. Hrusticˇ (2013) explained the low proportion of female representatives as a result of the traditional position of women within Roma communities, where they primarily play the role of mother and educator. Compared to the position of women within the majority society, Roma women have a weaker position in the political sphere. In 2010, the first female Roma mayor was elected in the municipality of Lomnicˇka.

The numbers included in the table were estimated by the National Democratic Institute and Slovak Roma newspaper Romano nevo Lil. No official statistics were available, so the mapping of the ethnic membership of political candidates is based on detailed data collected in the field through cooperation with Roma media and local Roma communities, as well as non-Roma non-governmental organisations. These estimates, therefore, likely represent the lower limit of the number of Roma candidates and many Roma candidates will have been left out as they considered themselves to be of Slovak or Hungarian nationality (Hrusticˇ 2013).

Table 2 shows that only 1.9 % of mayors and 1.1 % of deputies elected in 2014 were from Roma communities. According to the Atlas of Roma Communities 2013 (Musˇinka et al. 2014), Romany people represented 7 %–8 % of the population, so we can see that they are still very much underrepresented.

In the 2009 elections for the regional parliament only one Roma representative, from the Party of the Roma Community, was elected; and in 2013 again only one candidate won a seat, on behalf of the Bridge (Most–Hı´d) Party.

At the national level, the first elected Roma representative after the division of Czechoslovakia (in 1993) was Peter Polla´k, who was elected in 2012. He ran for parliament on the list of the Ordinary People (Obycˇajnı´ l’udia) and gained 6,000 preferential votes—more than double the number received by the most successful Romany political party. Polla´k currently works as the government representative for the Roma communities.

Strengths and weaknesses During municipal elections Roma settlements can become centres for vote buying or other efforts to influence election results. However, Hrusticˇ (2013) notes that this is a problem everywhere in countries with a concentrated level of poverty. This situation has changed slightly since 2010, when vote buying was made a criminal offence not only for the person buying votes but also for the person selling his or her vote.

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Concern is frequently cited that elected Roma mayors may misappropriate public resources, or have insufficient education or ability to fulfil the needs of the office to which they have been elected. This situation is even more noticeable in segregated Roma villages, where the Roma community represents the majority but the educational opportunities are few, leading to individuals not being suitably prepared to take on the position of mayor.

In extreme cases of long-term differences between the majority and the minority, the situation can escalate, even culminating in an exodus of the majority to other cities or villages, consequently further isolating the minority from the community, as is the case with the segregated Roma communities. The results of such isolation are terrifying zones of social and economic disaster, marked by disintegrating housing, unmaintained roads, abandoned schools, and inhabitants living on social benefits and criminal activities (Scheffel 2013).

On the other hand, several Roma councillors and mayors have been elected thanks to their high-quality programmes and well-prepared campaigns, which successfully mobilised Roma voters. And moreover—also positive news—several of these Roma politicians also received votes from non-Roma voters in their municipalities (Hrusticˇ 2013). This did not happen in the past.

This positive increase in the number of elected Roma candidates can also be partially attributed to the long-term activities of several organisations working with Roma leaders in Slovakia, as well as the generally increasing awareness of the importance of political participation among the Roma population. A further factor which should not be ignored is the increasing Roma population in certain municipalities and the greater experience of candidates who have run several times. In general, the rule remains that a Roma candidate must put in double the effort in order to achieve the same result as a non-Roma candidate (Hrusticˇ 2013).

Education as a way forward As Marcincˇin (2013) notes, an adequate education system is a basic precondition for a successful future for Roma representatives. Providing an effective primary education in a language which they understand and setting up special schools which will educate them for the jobs market should be the first steps.

Furthermore, it is necessary to offer the option of pre-school preparation as a part of the education system, as this is a vital development period in an individual’s life.

Many young people, including Roma, who have studied at the secondary and tertiary levels, have taken up positions in politics (Orgova´nova´ 2013). During the past 23 years the University of Constantine the Philosopher in Nitra, as well as other institutes of higher education have offered many students, including Romany ones, the option to study cultural, educational and social work in Roma communities, and many of them currently work in these fields (Ko¨ke´ny 2013).

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Conclusion The Roma minority is gradually achieving greater representation in the political life of Slovakia. Political parties cannot neglect this issue forever and sooner or later will have to deal with the question of systematic cooperation with the Roma minority—including within the party structures. Thus far, however, political parties based on ethnicity or nationality—such as the Magyar parties in Hungary—do not appear to have been needed to politically motivate the Roma community. In contrast, Roma candidates are increasingly proving their ability to win non-Roma votes, especially at the national and European levels. Thus the majority society must seek a way to increase the intensity of the dialogue with Roma parties interested in public engagement and offer them scope to realise their goals in municipal politics. A quality education enriched by acquired experience will make it possible to put forward qualified Roma politicians on the national as well as the European level. This will not happen overnight, but despite the less than optimistic estimates of several experts in this field, I am sure that the sooner the political parties intensify work in this direction, the more advantageous it will be for society. In this way, we can prevent many misunderstandings and encourage a common dialogue between the two nationalities with different cultures that live in the same country.

Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source are credited.

References Barany, Z. (2002). The East European Gypsies. Regime change, marginality, and ethnopolitics.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hancock, I., & Jurova´, A. (2008). Ro´movia na juzˇnom Slovensku na za´klade celouhorske´ho su´pisu z roku 1893 (proble´my pocˇetnosti, na´rodnostnej prı´slusˇnosti). [Romani in southern Slovakia based on the Hungarian census of 1893 (matter of numbers, nationality)]. In J. Sˇutajova´ & M. Dˇurkovska´ (eds.), Mad’arska´ mensˇina na Slovensku v procesoch transforma´cie po roku 1989 (Identita a politikaII) [Hungarian minority in Slovakia in transformation processes after 1989 (Identity and politics II)]. Presˇov: Universum Presˇov.

Hrusticˇ, T. (2013). Ro´mska politicka´ participa´cia v komuna´lnej politike na Slovensku [Roma political participation in communal politics in Slovakia]. In V. Bencˇ, T. Hrusticˇ, T. Kardos, & A. Musˇinka (eds.), Teoreticke´ a prakticke´ ota´zky politickej participa´cie Ro´mov na loka´lnej u´rovni [Theoretical and practical questions of political participation of Roma on the local level] (pp. 55–63). Presˇov: Slovenska´ spolocˇnostˇ pre zahranicˇnu´ politiku.

Jurova´, A. (1967). Ro´mska problematika 1945–1967 [Roma problems 1945–1967]. Prague: U´SD. Ko¨ke´ny, B. K. (2013). Niektore´ mozˇne´ doˆvody zabranˇuju´ce u´spesˇnej politickej participa´cii Ro´mov na moci na loka´lnej a vysˇsˇej u´rovni [Some possible reasons preventing the successful political participation of Roma in power at the local and higher level]. In V. Bencˇ, T. Hrusticˇ, T. Kardos, & A. Musˇinka (eds.), Teoreticke´ a prakticke´ ota´zky politickej participa´cie Ro´mov na loka´lnej u´rovni [Theoretical and practical questions of political participation of Roma on the local level] (pp.

137–41). Presˇov: Slovenska´ spolocˇnostˇ pre zahranicˇnu´ politiku.

Magdolenova´, K. (2015). Hrusticˇ: Zastu´penie ro´mskych starostov a poslancov je sta´le nı´zke [Hrusticˇ: Representation of Roma mayors and deputies continues to be insufficient]. Me.cem, 5 January.

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38 http://www.mecem.sk/14666/titul-hrustic-zastupenie-romskych-starostov-a-poslancov-je-stalenizke. Accessed 15 March 2015.

Marcincˇin, A. (2013). Chudobnı´ Ro´movia—indika´tor u´spesˇnosti robenia na´sˇho sˇta´tu [The poor Roma—an indicator of success in the making of our state]. In V. Bencˇ, T. Hrusticˇ, T. Kardos, & A. Musˇinka (eds.), Teoreticke´ a prakticke´ ota´zky politickej participa´cie Ro´mov na loka´lnej u´rovni [Theoretical and practical questions of political participation of Roma on the local level] (pp.

39–42). Presˇov: Slovenska´ spolocˇnostˇ pre zahranicˇnu´ politiku.

Musˇinka, A., Sˇkobla, D., Hurrle, J., Matlovicˇova´, K., & Kling, J. (2014). Atlas ro´mskych komunı´t na Slovensku 2013 [Atlas of Roma communities in Slovakia 2013]. Bratislava: UNDP. Orgova´nova´, K. (2013). Mozˇnosti a limity Ro´mov v politickom zˇivote [Options and limits for Roma in political life]. In V. Bencˇ, T. Hrusticˇ, T. Kardos, & A. Musˇinka (eds.), Teoreticke´ a prakticke´ ota´zky politickej participa´cie Ro´mov na loka´lnej u´rovni [Theoretical and practical questions of political participation of Roma on the local level] (pp. 33–7). Presˇov: Slovenska´ spolocˇnostˇ pre zahranicˇnu´ politiku.

Pecˇ´ınka, P. (2009). Romske strany a politici v Evrope [Roma parties and politicians in Europe]. Brno: Doplnek.

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Sˇebesta, M. (2002). Ro´mska politicka´ sce´na [Roma political scene]. In M. Vasˇecˇka (ed.), Cˇacˇicˇn pal o Roma. Su´hrnna´ spra´va o Ro´moch na Slovensku [Summary report on Roma in Slovakia]. Bratislava: Insˇtitu´t pre verejne´ ota´zky.

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Marek Degro is Director of the Anton Tunega Foundation, a political academy and think tank located in Bratislava. Until April 2015, he chaired the Christian Democratic Youth of Slovakia, the youth organisation of KDH (Christian Democratic Movement).

European View (2015) 14:39–49 DOI 10.1007/s12290-015-0348-4 ARTICLE

Here to stay: anti-establishment parties in Europe Florian Hartleb

Published online: 18 June 2015 The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com

Abstract Public attention has been drawn to the recent successes of the far right. This article claims that a new wave of anti-establishment parties has shaken European politics. A diverse array of outsiders from the left, right and no fixed ideological abode are attacking the mainstream centre–left and centre– right. Their anti-elitist approaches to politics have strategy, topics and style in common. Examples such as Syriza (The Coalition of the Radical Left), Podemos (We can!) and the Five Star Movement (MoVimento Cinque Stelle) show that this provocative new spectre of the twenty-first century is not just right wing.

Keywords Anti-establishment Party politics Alternative doctrine Far right Mobilisation Euroscepticism Populism Introduction: a misleading focus on the far right Political observers have given much attention to the far right and to right-wing populist challengers. Since the 1990s, in particular, these parties have either entered national parliaments for the first time or increased the number of seats they hold. In most European countries they are relevant political players. It is true that, at the moment, right-wing populist parties are part of the government in only four countries: in the non-EU countries Norway (the Progress Party, Fremskrittpartiet) and Switzerland (the Swiss People’s Party, Schweizerische Volkspartei); and since the most recent elections in 2015, in the EU countries Greece (Anexartiti Ellines, Independent Greeks) and Finland (Perussuomalaiset, F. Hartleb (&) Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, 1000 Brussels, Belgium e-mail: florian_hartleb@web.de

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The Finns Party). However, that these parties are generally found in the opposition should not lead one to underestimate the phenomenon. The recent European elections in 2014 have once again shown that such parties can attract a critical mass of disillusioned floating voters, particularly with their clear anti-immigration stance, but also with the message ‘Europe – no thanks!’

(Grabow and Hartleb 2014). The politics of exclusion, intolerance and xenophobia on the right-wing end of the political spectrum certainly deserves attention. Distrust in conventional parties seems to consistently correlate with far-right outsider party support and has become a permanent factor in European party politics. However, the sole focus on the ‘radical right-wing party family’ is, in some respects, misleading. This can be seen from the following four points.

First, the right-wing parties differ considerably, ranging in nature from democratic to clearly extremist. Moreover, they come from member states from Western to Central Eastern Europe. Consequently, after the European Parliament elections in 2014, they did not form a European group, but split up into different factions or decided to stand alone. The ‘merger’ of Marine Le Pen, leader of the French National Front (Front National, FN); Geert Wilders, leader of the Dutch Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV); and Heinz-Christian Strache, leader of the Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei O¨sterreichs, FPO¨), was more a successful public relations stunt than a real sign that they intended to join forces. These parties operate more on the idea of a common enemy (e.g. the West, the EU, Islam, globalisation, elites and the media) than on a shared ideology or coherent programme.

Second, this focus neglects the fact that the classical left–right dichotomy in politics loses much of its relevance in the framework of anti-establishment protest politics. The recent well-organised wave of street protests has involved parties from across the spectrum: from the radical leftist Occupy movement and the Spanish Outraged (Indignados) to the Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West (Patriotische Europa¨er gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes, Pegida) in Germany, especially in the city of Dresden. The latter movement combines mobilisation against ‘Islamisation’, a clear anti-elitist stance and scepticism regarding representative politics in general. In some instances, the street movements have led to the founding of a political party, most significantly in Spain with the Outraged movement. The leaders of the Spanish left-wing protest party Podemos (We can!) are individuals who had played a decisive role in the movement. In Germany, some leaders of the right-wing Alternative for Germany (Alternative fu¨r Deutschland, AfD) have declared their sympathy for the protesters on the street and stated that they share the same goals. This is not a new phenomenon: in the 1980s the alternative-left Green parties received support from various social movements. Due to their agendasetting role, topics such as peace, ecology and feminism have entered the mainstream.

Third, protest on the left is growing. This has been clearly demonstrated by Syriza, Podemos, the Five Star Movement (MoVimento Cinque Stelle, M5S) led by the Italian comedian Beppe Grillo, the (radical) socialist Left Parties in Germany

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(Die Linke) and France (Parti de Gauche), and the already forgotten project of the Pirate Parties in Sweden and Germany.

Fourth, the phenomenon of anti-establishment parties has grown. This is especially the case in the long-standing democracies of Western Europe, following the examples in (post-)transition Central Eastern Europe. As the most recent elections in Central Eastern Europe have shown, and especially those in Poland, Slovakia and Estonia, there is still plenty of room for outsider parties. In this regard, it seems that the party systems in Central Eastern Europe are a trendsetter for the Western European ones and not vice versa.

This article points out that the creation of anti-establishment parties is a real threat to conventional parties. Astonishingly, the research into the types of antiestablishment parties (which is still as basic as Schedler 1996) focuses more on the anti-systemic features of the extreme or radical right. However, European party politics has become highly dynamic, which means that its future has to be considered in a more general manner. Political parties need to transform their tools of organisation and participation in order to tackle declining memberships and to address the challenges of the digital age (Hartleb 2012). The rise of antiestablishment parties mirrors the changing European electorate, which is more volatile, more sceptical of the political elites and, in some respects, frustrated by ‘big politics’. The economic crisis has also accelerated the creation, growth and presence of anti-establishment parties in countries such as Italy, Spain and Greece.

The anti-establishment party I will now analyse a typical anti-establishment party, its mobilisation strategies and its impact on the European political landscape. The UK Independence Party (UKIP) boasts all the features of an anti-establishment party. On its website the party describes itself as a ‘patriotic party that promotes independence: from the EU, and from government interference. . . . No to political correctness—it stifles free speech. . . . Only UKIP will return self-government to the British people’ (UKIP 2015).

Unorthodox parties are often defined by what they are not—namely, orthodox or mainstream. A political party is classified as mainstream if its electoral appeal is based on a recognisable and moderate programmatic platform. Multicoloured outsiders from the left, right and no fixed ideological abode are attacking the mainstream centre–left and centre–right. They consider (mainstream) politics to be a redundant activity and argue that there is no distinction between the parties of the establishment. They use populist strategies to advocate the idea of the people against the politicians. Sometimes they use the logic that local politics is independent and not ideological. A good example of a party with this kind of electoral appeal is the Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (Obycˇajnı´ L’udia a neza´visle´ osobnosti) in Slovakia, founded in 2011, which has entered the national parliament. Another approach is to ridicule politics, either with provocations—against conservatism and in

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favour of an unconventional, liberal lifestyle, as is the policy of the left-wing Palikot’s Movement (Ruch Palikota) in Poland—or with comedy—as is the aim of the left-wing M5S. There are often scandals in anti-establishment parties because of their lack of experience. After the media reveal the truth behind the scandal, the parties accuse them of lying and being disrespectful. This sometimes even results in strengthening the position of the outsider party.

The Europe-wide success of new parties is, in many ways, astonishing considering their lack of resources, members and, to some extent, traditions. The latter factor has become less important because of anti-elitist tendencies in the media, the public’s attraction to new and unconventional parties, and the logic of the media systems themselves (e.g. the popularity of talk shows and short slogans, and the arrival of social media). Furthermore, these new parties sometimes have creative financing tools, or entrepreneurs as sponsors. The AfD is a good example of this: it has established an online gold shop where it sells gold (at a higher rate than the banks) to people looking ‘to buy gold products and simultaneously support the AfD’ (Dw.de 2014). The party argues on its website that ‘gold is fundamentally a product which is perceived by many citizens as a crisis-resistant and forward-thinking form of investment’ (AfD 2015).

The party also advertises Deutschemark coins, symbolising its criticism of the euro (see AfD 2015). The income from the sales (a profit of around €2 million in 2014) seems to be in line with the rules of party funding, despite open criticism (AfD 2015). Thus, anti-establishment parties in general often take the structure of a commercial company based on a business interest.

Anti-elitist topics A major anti-elitist theme for these parties is Euroscepticism, which comes in many forms. It brings the parties together, for example the left-wing Syriza and the right-wing FN. The specific Greek and Spanish criticisms against austerity, the Troika and the dominant role of Germany are predominantly rooted in the rise of radical left-wing anti-establishment parties—but also in the rise of the rightwing extremist Golden Dawn (Chrysi Avgi) in Greece. It is obvious that differences exist in the wide spectrum of anti-establishment parties, such as the differences between the anti-neoliberal (anti-austerity) southern European protest parties and the anti-immigration parties in the north. In a broader context, their politics are based on fear, resentment and stereotypes of all forms of modernisation, globalisation and harmonisation. Anti-establishment parties focus on the ‘neoliberal’ enemy stereotype to support their arguments in favour of the fatherland and the economic, political and cultural protectionism of the ‘nation’.

Citizens today express widespread scepticism about political parties as state institutions (with polemic use of the words ‘Partitocrazia’ or ‘Parteienstaat’), and the process of representative democracy based on political parties. Most citizens believe that parties do not care what they think, are not sufficiently responsive to public interests and cannot be trusted to represent them. From this position,

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it is only a small step to protest voting. This is the practice of voting for an antiestablishment party not because of the actual content of its electoral message but to ‘punish’ the conventional parties. This practice has been used as a general explanation from scholars for a variety of electoral outcomes in Western democracies.

Certainly, anti-party sentiment increases voter volatility, and hence directly contributes to the weakening of partisan attachments. However, this seems to be too simple an argument to explain the repeated success of the new challengers. Citizens who are disenchanted with political parties have three basic options at election time: abstaining, voting for an anti-establishment party or voting for an established party (including switching from centre–left to centre– right). Anti-establishment parties profit from the assumption that the ideological and even pragmatic differences between the mainstream parties have diminished in many important policy areas such as the economy, the environment and the family, and also in European and foreign affairs.

There is no single element in their electoral appeal and party structure that is shared by all anti-establishment parties. These parties mainly appeal to the losers of globalisation, but not only to them. People from the middle classes in wealthy countries such as Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Switzerland and Germany are also attracted to anti-establishment parties. These parties bring more conflict and polarisation to the political debate, for example in Italy or the Czech Republic, where the people have shown their disillusionment with the political elites, especially after the corruption scandals revealed in the media. Politicians accused of breaking the law do not enhance the reputation of the establishment. The public also expect higher moral standards from them, including in their private lives.

Not surprisingly, the new challengers have had success in those democratic systems which are based on consensus, often with a traditional dominant twoparty system. The anti-establishment parties have frequently achieved this success by breaking up the elite’s commitment to consensus and disrupting the classical method of reaching compromises in meetings, parliaments, summits and so on. As the polarisation between establishment parties decreases, the antiestablishment parties are able to gain more electoral support.

Anti-establishment parties refer to a nostalgic past (especially in the fields of European integration, where they speak of a Europe of nation-states), to a new path for democracy that includes strong participatory or autocratic elements, or to a combination of both—as is the case with Beppe Grillo’s M5S and radical rightwing populist parties such as the FN and the FPO¨. Some anti-establishment parties aim to create a system that involves more direct voter participation, while others want a more autocratic hierarchy. Direct democracy often serves as a placebo and can combine both aims: it attacks the model of representative democracy by showing distrust of the parliamentary decision-making process and the rationality behind it. In this respect, the anti-establishment parties challenge the relevance of political institutions. Direct democracy can be decisively influenced by the popular mood, business interests or stereotypes of foreigners.

The following criteria are common to all types of anti-establishment party, despite their differences:

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• •

• •

• • • • • • • • •

the doctrine that ‘there is an alternative’; the construction of a homogenous people (one people’s common interests in the sense of a volonte´ ge´ne´ral) and a front line against the political elites and the mainstream parties; the image of an underdog, perpetuating the myth that they are excluded from the establishment, including the media; the label of an opposition party (on current issues and in the format of representative democracy, but not necessarily against the democratic system itself); the claim to be an unconventional political party (e.g. an anti-party party, a movement, a leadership-based party, a party of real participation, etc.); the demand for forms of direct democracy (referenda, etc.); the promise to clean up ‘dirty politics’ (with slogans such as ‘we know the truth’) and fight against corruption and clientelism; the simplification or trivialisation of political issues; the claim to advocate on behalf of the ‘silent majority’; a cynical approach to politics (attacking either the morality or competence of the establishment); the image of a taboo-breaker with the aim of polarising the political discourse (on both issues and structural-based matters); an aggressive attitude towards political adversaries (conflict instead of consensus); and the formulation of a clear message (ideologically or pragmatically driven).

Modern politics in the framework of multi-level governance is often technocratically driven, as this is the administrative modus vivendi for problem-solving.

The new anti-establishment parties have adapted this style by combining the claims of simplification and creating an ‘expertocracy’. Some of the decisive figures in anti-establishment parties use the label of ‘expert’ in order to demonstrate how they differ from ordinary politicians. The leaders of such parties sell their lack of experience in politics as an added value. For example, Bernd Lucke, the leader of the AfD, is a professor of economics who lacks any real charismatic ability. Although he is not an expert on currency issues, his reputation as an economist helped him considerably when it came to establishing the credibility of the party platform, which originally began with criticism of the euro and Germany’s role as the decisive loan provider and actor in Europe. Pablo Iglesias Turrio´n, the leader of Podemos, has recently been awarded an honorary professorship in political science. Furthermore, Syriza appointed Yanis Varoufakis, a popular professor and media professional, as the Greek finance minister and the face of crisis management. Varoufakis plays the showman card, portraying himself as living a trendy lifestyle through a combination of provocative statements, portrayals of his private life and constant interviews in the national and foreign media. These new entrants into the political arena in Greece and Spain are benefiting from the poor economic and social conditions in their countries, which are encouraging a disaffected electorate to search for electoral alternatives to the more established parties.

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The doctrine that ‘there is an alternative’ ‘There is an alternative’—the basic mantra of anti-establishment competitors— refers to the established politicians, to the model of representative democracy, to the mainstream parties, to the media system, to the economic system, to the EU, to Westernisation and so on. The alternative option has been demonstrated in the close ties that some political parties have with President Putin’s autocratic Russia. Syriza, the Hungarian Jobbik, UKIP, the AfD and the FN have all built up privileged relationships with Putin in order to offer an alternative to the transatlantic ties in European politics. This relationship includes common conferences, financial support and friendly statements (Political Capital Institute 2014). On the other hand, Russia accuses European countries of having ‘Nazi’ parties in parliament (and this now extends to Estonia since the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (Eesti Koservatiivne Rahvaerakond) entered parliament after the March 2015 elections).

‘The alternative’ is manifested in very short bullet-point programme statements. These often leave out important facts and details, and prefer to make generalisations (especially after cases of corruption among the elites) or to manipulate statistics. In the longer term, a pure anti-establishment party (if it is not also anti-system) needs to ensure that it is not transformed during the process of office-seeking. The new parties are organised in very different ways: there are virtual or blog parties, such as the M5S or the Pirate Party; couch parties (where the members of the party can virtually sit on one couch or on one seat), such as Geert Wilders’s Party for Freedom; parties with a strong hierarchy, such as the FN or the FPO¨; and those with a decentralised structure, such as Syriza. The parties also claim to have new modes of communication, being either highly personalised or responsive (e.g. via virtual participation).

Anti-establishment parties stand apart from the mainstream parties. This separation is often visible in personal matters. Anti-establishment parties are weakened by their newly elected candidates’ lack of experience. These new antiestablishment parties have chosen their candidates in fast-moving procedures without having had the chance to get to know them over a longer period. Thus every anti-establishment party has to deal with crisis management, whether in the shorter or the longer term. Often the media investigates these parties’ internal structures, and their lack of professionalism is revealed through statements and interviews, or on social media. Sometimes the darker pasts of some of their activists are uncovered, especially concerning statements and comparisons made, the playing down of human rights or democratic freedoms, or the use of stereotypes when speaking about minorities or other nations. A recent example is that of the Dresden Pegida leader Sebastian Lutz Bachmann, who quickly resigned after his criminal past was revealed as a result of his public boasts. In Facebook posts he praised the Ku Klux Klan and denounced immigrants. The fast-growing character of anti-establishment projects also leads to internal rivalries about the course being taken, the issues covered and so on, as has been the case from the beginning for the AfD.

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Personal scandals cast doubt on the claim that the parties will clean up corrupted politics. The parties are not homogenous, but have an emotional internal life without discipline. Here are some examples. The Austrian Jo¨rg Haider, the epitome of a right-wing populist leader, once left his own party, the FPO¨, and founded a new one (since his death in 2008, many scandals and a whole system of patronage and clientelism in Carinthia, where he governed for a long time, have been revealed). The French Marine Le Pen has just forced her father, the founder and long-time leader of the FN, to step down. And in Germany, Lucke is no longer supported by all members of the AfD since there is no agreement on how to deal with the radical wing of the party. However, due to the protest character of these parties, such scandals may not automatically endanger or damage the whole project. For example, both the FN and the FPO¨ have shown in recent decades that such parties can even recover from splits (in both cases former party members formed new parties). However, others have disappeared from the political landscape, for example the Dutch Pim Fortuyn List (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF), the Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland (Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej) and the German Schill Party (Schill-Partei) at the beginning of the twenty-first century, and today, most probably, the Pirate Parties.

The unorthodox appeal of such parties brings some risks. Their leaders have two main options if they hope to escape a return to electoral marginality in subsequent elections. The first is to enter the realm of mainstream political competition by adopting a recognisable and moderate ideological platform. This would follow in the footsteps of the Green parties, which became part of the established system by removing fundamental positions from their platforms, both in terms of policies, such as peace, and in terms of democratic reforms, such as varying the numbers of members of parliament. The second alternative is to change the issues on which they base their discourse. This would follow the right-wing populist parties, which have shifted their platforms from neoliberalism to counter-globalisation and from anti-immigration to Euroscepticism and, perhaps, after the most recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Copenhagen in 2015, back again.

Effects The question thus arises of how the anti-establishment parties are changing politics. As argued above, they are not necessarily anti-systemic or antidemocratic. Certainly, they can influence policies in various ways: in recent years they have ensured a stricter approach to immigration issues and brought Euroscepticism into the mainstream. A good example of the latter is the British Conservative Party’s turn away from Europe due to the strength of UKIP. David Cameron has played the Eurosceptic card by questioning the UK’s membership of the EU and imposing stricter rules on immigrants who enter the country from outside of the EU.

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A more general effect that can be observed is that mainstream parties are trying to counter the anti-elitism with slogans such as ‘we are not ordinary politicians’. There have already been widespread attempts to include people from outside the political world—especially public figures, businessmen, and TV-show and sports stars—on party lists. The strength of anti-establishment parties could enforce the tendency to trivialise politics (in a ‘fast food’ format), for example by offering simple solutions to complex problems.

National politicians are also using ‘Brussels’ as a scapegoat and accusing the institutions of being anonymous and bureaucratic. Anti-establishment parties can alter the coalitional dynamics within party systems—for example, by acting as exit options for grand coalitions or simply by forcing the other parties to form a coalition against them; since the rise of right-wing populism in the 1990s, Austrian party politics has offered a good example for both of these situations. As a result, anti-establishment parties may also become ordinary mainstream parties (as in the successful case of the Green parties). A more difficult and complex effect is the connection with voter turnout. The arrival of outsider parties may increase general anti-political or anti-mobilisation feeling among the public, as was the case in Austria after the FPO¨ was first elected, or as is currently happening in Germany as a response to Pegida’s anti-Islamic street protests.

It is possible to create a new wave of mobilisation by campaigning on new or long-neglected taboo topics and activating non-voters who are frustrated with politics. There are serious concerns about the combination of the new protest culture in the West and some intellectual aspirations, such as ideas for revolutions, especially in the framework of counter-globalisation movements (Hartleb 2011). The success of anti-establishment parties has disturbed the traditional system in which mainstream parties have been the front runners for forming governments, making policy and supporting the integration of society in politics. Anti-establishment parties often attack basic societal values such as respect, mutual understanding, compromise, solidarity and tolerance. They strengthen the stereotypes of ordinary political parties, elites, hierarchies and the principle of representation itself.

Conclusion The success of anti-establishment parties has little to do with the classical distinctions in politics of left versus right, libertarian (such as UKIP) versus authoritarian (such as the classical right-wing and national populist parties like the FPO¨ or the FN), and democratic versus extremist. It has constructed its own dichotomy of the elites versus the people, creating a cleavage between the rulers and the ruled. Meanwhile, these parties are trying to mark themselves out as anti-establishment forces (with an open and artificial divide from the traditional hierarchical system). The call to ‘throw them all out’ has awakened

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general support from angered citizens. The success of these parties offers a (more) radical rejection of traditional party politics and represents a desire for change that comes from outside the system of modern, representative democracy.

The public scepticism regarding political parties can be regarded as a general symptom of the public’s growing doubts about representative democracy and its need to search for other democratic forms. What, then, are the options? The increased use of referenda, citizen hearings and other forms of direct action would at least allow voters to partially bypass partisan politics. But as has been shown by the Swiss referendum on immigration, to give but one example, this method of direct democracy can increase resentment, especially against minorities and Muslims. On 9 February 2014, 50.3 % of Swiss voters (with a majority of 0.6 %) voted for the Citizens’ Initiative Against Mass Integration.

Switzerland has the longest tradition of direct democracy on the national level in the world. The Conservative People’s Party of Estonia, which has just entered the national parliament after elections in March 2015, has unsurprisingly called for ‘direct democracy’ as a remedy: it is recommending the use of referenda in order to bypass or weaken parliamentary authority. Changes in policy administration are also likely to follow, as people demand a direct voice in politics because they do not trust the parties to act as their agents. All mainstream parties must advocate the legitimacy of the result in the political contest and push for a debate about old and new values in the changing European societies.

Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source are credited.

References Alternative fu¨r Deutschland. (2015). AfD ist Gold wert. www.afd-gold.de/. Accessed 14 March 2015.

Dw.de. (2014). Cash for gold—German euroskeptics’ fundraising in question. 21 November. http://www.dw.de/cash-for-gold-german-euroskeptics-fundraising-in-question/a-18079642.

Accessed 17 April 2015.

Grabow, K., & Hartleb, F. (2014). Europe—No, thanks? Study on the right-wing and national populist parties in Europe. Sankt-Augustin/Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and Centre for European Studies.

Hartleb, F. (2011). A new protest culture in Western Europe? European View, 10(1), 3–10.

Hartleb, F. (2012). All tomorrow’s parties: The changing face of European party politics. Brussels: Centre for European Studies.

Political Capital Institute. (2014). The Russian connection. The spread of pro-Russian policies on the European far right. Budapest. http://www.riskandforecast.com/useruploads/files/pc_flash_ report_russian_connection.pdf. Accessed 4 March 2014.

Schedler, A. (1996). Anti-political-establishment parties. Party Politics, 2, 291–312.

UKIP. (2015). Issues. What we stand for. www.ukip.org/issues. Accessed 17 March 2015.

European View

49 Florian Hartleb Ph.D., is a German political scientist, Estonian e-resident and Research Associate at the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies.

His latest publication is Europe – No, Thanks? Study on the Right-Wing and National Populist Parties in Europe (Sankt-Augustin/Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and Centre for European Studies, 2014).

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European View (2015) 14:51–58 DOI 10.1007/s12290-015-0353-7 ARTICLE

Polarised and fractured US political parties and the challenges of governing John C. Fortier

Published online: 16 June 2015 Ă“ The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com

Abstract The US has one of the longest traditions of a two-party political system of any nation. Although in recent years there has been a steep rise in the number of people who describe themselves as political independents, the two parties are still dominant, and the prospect of a third party is remote. However, the US party system faces several challenges which have made governing more difficult. The two parties have become much more ideologically polarised. They remain weaker than many European parties in their ability to select their candidates and maintain party discipline among their representatives. The two parties also face strengthened competition in fundraising and campaign spending from outside independent groups. All of these developments have made it more difficult for the parties to secure majorities and pass major legislation.

Keywords US political parties Polarisation Two-party system Independent expenditures

Introduction The US political party system has displayed remarkable stability, unmatched by any other country. The US has had a two-party system with the same two political parties for over 150 years. Since the 1860s, all presidents and nearly all senators and representatives have been members of one of these two parties.

J. C. Fortier (&) Bipartisan Policy Center, 1225 Eye Street NW, Suite 1000, Washington, DC 20005, US e-mail: jfortier@bipartisanpolicy.org

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In recent years, however, dissatisfaction with the parties has been high. A record number of Americans now describe themselves as independents. Certain groups have arisen—for example, the Tea Party—which some believed might evolve into a third political party. All of these developments have led some observers to believe that the time is right for a third party.

These observers are probably wrong. Although a multiplicity of parties is the rule in most European democracies, the hurdles for third parties have always been high in the US. At the moment the two parties are as dominant in winning elections as they have been in any period. However, this electoral dominance does not mean that the American party system has been static. The parties are in the midst of several dramatic changes: (1) the Republican and Democratic parties have become highly polarised, ideological parties with significant differences in worldview, (2) the two parties have weak discipline and fractures within their ranks, and (3) the two political parties now have significant competition from outside groups in terms of raising and spending funds on political campaigns. All of these developments have made the challenge of governing significantly more difficult.

This article will lay out why, despite evidence to the contrary, there is little prospect of the emergence of a third party and how the above-mentioned developments in the political parties present challenges to effective governance.

The hard road for a third party US politics has several features that have always made the successful formation of a third party difficult. In all federal and the vast majority of state elections, the country has single-member districts and does not have proportional representation. The extensive size of the country, combined with the winner-take-all aspects of congressional elections and the Electoral College, mean that a party must not only be strong enough to win in individual states and districts, but also have electoral strength in several regions of the US. Add to these systemic factors that many states have erected obstacles to ballot access and it is clear that the road to success for a third party will always be a difficult one.

Today the two major parties are as ensconced as they have ever been. Of the 535 members of Congress, only 2 senators do not run under the banner of either party, and once in office, those 2 choose to caucus with the Democratic Party. In the 49 states where party labels are attached to candidates, only 35 of the over 7,300 state legislators belong to a party other than the Democrats or Republicans (National Conference of State Legislatures 2015).

This strength of the two parties’ elective fortunes contrasts with the growing number of Americans who describe themselves as independents rather than supporters of one of the major parties. The number of independents grew in the 1960s and early 1970s and then plateaued for 30 years, but it has again risen significantly in the past 10 years. The latest aggregation of polling by Gallup for 2014 showed that 43 % of US citizens identified themselves as independents, 30 % as Democrats and 26 % as Republicans (Jones 2015). Similarly, in 2014 Pew

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showed that 39 % were independents, 32 % Democrats and 23 % Republicans (Pew Research Center 2015).

The rising number of independents gives hope to those advocating a third party. However, research has shown that most of these self-described independents lean towards one party or the other and that their voting patterns are regularly for that party. The percentage of ‘true independents’, who do not regularly support one party or the other, is small, by certain estimates 10 %–15 % of voters at most (Petrocik 2009, 562–72).

The hopes of those advocating a third party notwithstanding, the changes in the American party system do not point towards the emergence of a third party.

Yet, while the US will likely have the same two political parties for the foreseeable future, there are several dramatic trends that have changed the look of these parties and the party system: the emergence of ideologically polarised parties, the internal weakness and fractiousness of the parties, and the rise of campaign fundraising and spending by independent groups.

Polarisation of the political parties The US political party system has become increasingly polarised. Each of the two parties has become more internally homogenous and has moved further to the left or to the right of the political spectrum. These developments are making governance more difficult.

It is not just academics who lament the increasing distance between the two parties: the American people, too, sense that something has changed and that it is becoming harder to govern. A recent survey conducted by the Bipartisan Policy Center with USA Today showed that 76 % of respondents believed that US politics had become more divided than in the past. Seventy-four per cent thought that these divisions were a bad thing, making it harder to get things done, rather than a good thing by providing voters with a clear choice. These responses were consistent across Republicans, Democrats and independents.

Most respondents believed that the deepening divisions between the two parties were caused by both Republicans moving to the right and Democrats moving to the left (Bipartisan Policy Center 2013, 12: Questions 34, 35 and 36).

People are not wrong in their perception that the ideological gap between the parties has grown. For much of the twentieth century, the two political parties looked quite different from the way they do today. Each party contained within it a significant amount of ideological diversity, and the two parties’ ideological leanings overlapped in important ways.

This was most clearly seen in the Democratic Party, which for most of the midtwentieth century was the majority party. The Democratic Party had two ideological wings. Most Democrats and the representatives they elected were progressive, or on the left side of the political spectrum. But the Democratic Party also had a strong right wing, based primarily in the southern states. The Republican Party had its own wings: most Republicans were on the right of the political spectrum, but the party also had left-leaning voters and representatives.

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What this meant in practice was that it was not easy for one political party to govern by itself, even if it had a clear majority of elected representatives. To pass legislation, the majority Democratic Party in Congress would often have to find allies in the Republican Party. Conservative Democrats might defect from the party on issues of civil rights, defence or the expansion of the welfare state, but a coalition of left-leaning Democrats could ally with left-leaning Republicans to pass legislation. Conversely, the conservative faction of the Democratic Party could often find enough allies in the Republican Party to form a working majority to block these efforts or to pass legislation on other issues (Polsby 2005).

While this party system of the mid-twentieth century had the virtue of regular bipartisan coalitions, its critics were fierce in their opposition. Political scientists generally hated the system and the discipline took an official stance against it.

What kind of political system could elect a Democratic president and strong Democratic majorities in the House and the Senate, only to find that the president’s policy programme was blocked by a group of members from his own party (American Political Science Association, Committee on Political Parties 1950)? Powerful party chairs of committees would regularly oppose the speaker of the House and the president of their own party (Polsby 2005).

What political scientists railed against was the unaccountability of such a system. Should not the US have a more parliamentary system, in which parties with clearly defined ideologies campaign on distinct agendas are given an electoral mandate to govern by the voters and are then held accountable by the voters at the next election?

The story of the past 30 or 40 years is that many of the wishes of these political science critics have been fulfilled. The political parties have become much more ideologically unified. Southern congressional seats which were once held by members who were overwhelmingly white, conservative and Democratic are now held mostly by conservative Republicans and a smaller group of African American Democrats. In 1949, 98 % of House seats in southern states were held by Democrats. By 2013, only 28 % were in Democratic hands (Ornstein et al. 2014, Table 12).

Today, party polarisation in Congress has reached the point where the ideological separation of the parties is nearly perfect. For the past decade the most conservative Democrat in Congress has been to the left of the most leftleaning Republican. This can be compared to the situation in the early 1950s, where over 40 % of the members of Congress overlapped with the other party on an ideological scale (Voteview.com 2015).

The current situation resembles what the political scientists of the 1950s were calling for: responsible parties, one clearly on the left; the other clearly on the right. But as Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein (2012) have noted, today’s parties resemble parliamentary parties, but without a parliamentary system of institutions. The framers of the US Constitution designed a system of institutions whose power is fragmented. The executive is separate from the legislative. The president, senators and members of the House of Representatives are elected for terms of different lengths, and presidential year and mid-term elections have

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vastly different levels of voter turnout. Moreover, for many legislative actions in the Senate, a super-majority of 60 % is needed. As things stand today, it is very difficult for one party to assemble a governing majority. Capturing the House, Senate and presidency might take several elections. Conversely, when power is divided, the ideological polarisation that characterises the political parties makes it very difficult to forge the many compromises needed to negotiate legislation through the House and Senate and to get the signature of the president.

Commentators have always railed against the gridlock that can arise in the US system of the separation of powers (see, e.g., Burns 1963). However, a body of research shows that for much of the twentieth century divided governments were legislatively productive (Mayhew 1991). These governments were able to legislate because (1) cross-party coalitions were regularly formed to pass legislation, and (2) there were a number of areas—for example, farm and highway bills—that relied more on a coalition of regional interests than on ideological agreement.

Today the parties are polarised on many issues, and as a result, even seemingly apolitical matters such as roads and agriculture are seen through the lens of party ideology—and a divided government with two ideologically polarised parties is more often than not unproductive.

Weak and fractured parties Compared to parliamentary parties, US political parties are weak in selecting their own candidates and lack the strength required to keep the members of the legislative caucus together. In the US, the selection of candidates for office is mainly made through the primary election system, rather than by party leaders selecting candidates for office. Thus the selection of candidates who will appear on the party line on the ballot is made by the voters, not party leaders.

Therefore, for example, even someone who is considered a pariah by the Illinois Republican Party leadership could join the race, raise funds, develop a following and win the Republican nomination. In this sense, the candidate captures the party rather than the party controlling the candidate. Right from the start, candidates need not be from among the party faithful.

Party discipline is not strong once parties are in office. Congressional leadership does have some carrots and sticks to shape the behaviour of its rankand-file members. But ultimately, a representative who goes against party leadership, even on important issues, might still be able to return home and persuade the voters to re-elect him or her. In fact, there are times when standing up to the party leadership might make the representative more popular at home.

This lack of party discipline compounds the problems of governance. Both parties are increasingly finding it difficult to agree on policy. They are operating in a system of institutions where power is divided and are having a hard time corralling their own members and maintaining a working majority.

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The Tea Party phenomenon in the US illustrates this point. Most Republicans are in broad agreement with the policy preferences of the Tea Party. In recent years, however, there has been a substantial group of Republican members of Congress who identify strongly with the Tea Party and are disinclined to strike a deal with a president from the other party or to follow their congressional leaders in crafting a Republican position. Republican Party leaders have found it difficult to negotiate compromises with President Obama and the Democrats while at the same time negotiating with factions within their own party.

Financing of campaigns and parties US political campaigns are almost exclusively financed by private contributions.

Even as recently as 15 years ago, the overwhelming majority of those contributions flowed to political parties and their candidates. But in recent years, legislative, regulatory and especially court decisions have made it more difficult to limit or regulate how independent groups raise and spend money to influence political campaigns. (The most prominent of these court decisions is Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2008)).

The past 15 years have seen a dramatic rise in the campaign spending of independent groups, entities that are neither political parties nor candidate organisations. For example, independent expenditures in the 2014 House and Senate races totalled $531 million, up from less than $200 million in 2010 and less than $10 million in 1998 (Ornstein et al. 2014, Table 3-14). What this means is that campaigns are financed by a patchwork of groups, organisations and individuals, with political parties being one voice among many. The parties are still quite strong and have increased the amount of money they raise and spend, but they now have competitors. Some of these outside groups are allies of the parties. Others represent ideological factions within the parties, and they spend money to try to elect candidates who are more in line with the group’s ideological preferences. Still others are interest groups whose message sometimes appeals across party lines. The current state of campaign law prohibits political parties from coordinating with independent groups. For example, a political party may not coordinate with an ideologically friendly independent group to run political advertisements in favour of a particular candidate.

This proliferation of campaign groups makes life tougher for the two political parties. They cannot formally coordinate activities among groups that might be within their party orbit or that might perform important functions such as voter registration, the collection of political data and so on. At the same time, the parties are competing in elections with other entities that might outspend them in particular contests.

Some critics of these developments would like to regulate these outside groups, although court decisions have undone many of the existing regulations.

Other critics worry about the strength of the parties and their ability to compete with all of these groups. They advocate increasing the amount that can be

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donated to parties and removing certain restrictions on political parties. (For a summary of the debate, see Schmitt 2015.)

There is, however, no consensus on what should be done about the rise of independent groups. For the foreseeable future, parties will share the stage with them and thus face additional hurdles in electing candidates loyal to party beliefs.

Conclusion The US political party system is likely to continue to see the dominance of the two major political parties. However, these parties have undergone developments that have made governing more difficult.

The existence of ideological parties in a separated powers system of government that often produces a divided government makes achieving a majority on any legislative issue exceptionally difficult. Even agreements forged by the leaders of the opposing parties can be frustrated by fractures in the parties themselves and by the lack of party discipline. Finally, the parties face significant challenges during elections, as campaign spending is divided among many disparate and sometimes rivalrous groups.

Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source are credited.

References American Political Science Association, Committee on Political Parties. (1950). Toward a more responsible two-party system: A report. Menasha, WI: American Political Science Association.

Bipartisan Policy Center. (2013). BPC/USA Today national survey on political polarization. 6 March. http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/bpcusa-today-national-survey-political-polarization/. Accessed 22 April 2015.

Burns, J. M. G. (1963). The deadlock of democracy: Four-party politics in America. With revisions.

Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Jones, J. (2015). In U.S., new record 43% are political independents. Gallup, 7 January. http://www. gallup.com/poll/180440/new-record-political-independents.aspx. Accessed 22 April 2015.

Mann, T., & Ornstein, N. (2012). It’s even worse than it looks: How the American constitutional system collided with the new politics of extremism. New York: Basic Books.

Mayhew, D. R. (1991). Divided we govern: Party control, lawmaking, and investigations, 1946–1990. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

National Conference of State Legislatures. (2015). 2015 state and legislative partisan composition. http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/Elections/Legis_Control_2015_Apr1_1pm.pdf. Accessed 22 April 2015.

Ornstein, N., Mann, T., & Malbin, M. (2014). Vital statistics on Congress, 2014. Tables 1–14. Brookings. www.brookings.edu/vitalstats. Accessed 22 April 2015.

Petrocik, J. R. (2009). Measuring party support: Leaners are not independents. Electoral Studies, 28, 562–72.

Pew Research Center, US Politics and Policy. (2015). Trends in party identification, 1939–2014. 7 April. http://www.people-press.org/interactives/party-id-trend/. Accessed 22 April 2015.

Polsby, N. W. (2005). How Congress evolves: Social bases of institutional change. New York: Oxford University Press.

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58 Schmitt, M. (2015). Democratic romanticism and its critics: Everything you thought you knew about fixing American politics might be wrong. Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, Spring. http://www. democracyjournal.org/36/democratic-romanticism-and-its-critics.php?page=all. Accessed 4 May 2015.

Voteview.com. (2015). The polarization of the congressional parties. 21 March. http://voteview.com/ rank_orders_all_congresses.htm. Accessed 22 April 2015.

John C. Fortier, Ph.D. is the Director of the Democracy Project at the Bipartisan Policy Center.

European View (2015) 14:59–67 DOI 10.1007/s12290-015-0344-8 ARTICLE

Can political parties evolve if the political system does not?

Tomi Huhtanen

Published online: 3 June 2015 The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com

Abstract Political parties within democratic systems are facing enormous challenges. The democratic system and political parties have changed relatively little in the course of modern history. However, today’s societies and economies are experiencing major changes due to globalisation and the disruptive power of the Internet. Traditional party politics and party activities are no longer as appealing as in the past. Thus political parties need to change to regain their appeal with voters. However, such changes are only possible to a certain extent: despite the fact that political parties have new tools available to them to communicate and organise their supporters, the political system defines the environment and limits within which they operate. Political parties can only evolve to a limited extent in an unchanging political system. The renewal of the political and democratic process has to include both the evolution of the existing political structures and finding innovative new ways in which to enhance political communication and mobilisation.

Keywords Democracy Politics Political parties Citizen participation Political system Social movements Internet Introduction Many current societal trends seem to be working against party-based democracy. A major decline in the membership of political parties has long been observed (Van Biezen et al. 2012). Similarly, voter participation in elections, of all T. Huhtanen (&) Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, Rue du Commerce 20, 1000 Brussels, Belgium e-mail: th@martenscentre.eu

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types, has fallen. As a result, the need for the renewal of political parties has become prominent in public discourse. Almost ironically, while democracy and the values it presents are still considered of high importance, public perception of political parties and institutions is rather negative (Dalton 2008). Party politics is seen by many as a necessary evil. Yet, political parties are an essential part of a well-functioning democratic system, as democracy is a universal value and the democratic system undoubtedly one of the greatest achievements of Western civilisation (Sen 1999).

Political parties and their structures evolved when society was fundamentally different—mostly in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century— and the origins of our current modern parliamentary systems can be dated to almost 350 years ago. In today’s world, the environment in which political parties find themselves operating has fundamentally changed. Globalisation, through the digital communications revolution, has changed how society is structured, how individuals work and how they communicate. However, parliamentary democracy as a system remains largely unchanged, and the same is true of political parties.

To what extent can one expect political parties to renew themselves and to better respond to current societal challenges? Is such an adaptation even possible without the evolution of the political system which includes the democratic and state institutions? In order to answer these questions, one must understand the changes in the political environment, analyse the changing dynamics between different political actors, and understand the global trends affecting political parties on the national and local level.

A new environment for political parties: fragmentation, globalisation and changing societal dynamics The traditional left–right divide in party politics was based on clear divisions in society which largely no longer exist. Large segments of society are fragmented and this means that the major political platforms of the past are now being challenged or are no longer functioning. Fragmentation is the new norm in politics and parliaments (Traynor 2014). In recent years supporters within parties have coalesced politically while moving ever further away from the supporters of other parties. This phenomenon is very visible in the US (Mooney 2012), but it is also present in Europe. The result is that party politics has become increasingly polarised on both sides of the Atlantic. This polarisation makes compromise, and thereby effective governance, more difficult. Voter volatility (Dassonneville and Hooghe 2011), decreasing credibility and the corrosion of party loyalties have become normal in European party politics.

Globalisation and technological developments have connected different views, different opinions and different communities that were previously highly dispersed. Individuals who are geographically isolated from others who share their political views can now easily find like-minded people through the Internet.

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Local communities remain important, but global communities are rapidly gaining significance in the establishment of group political identities.

As social classes are breaking down in many countries, individuals are choosing to identify with various fragmented communities—some close to them geographically, others further away. As a result, individuals have less of a need to compromise their views or preferences in order to fit into the society in which they find themselves located. Within a geographic unit, such as a state, people’s views and preferences are differing more than ever before. In elections and for political parties the result is the fragmentation of the political party system.

Renewal and change in the party political landscape itself can be a positive and even necessary thing. Nevertheless, the mainstream catch-all parties with their longer histories have an important role to play in providing stability and continuity in the political system.

The Internet and social media—a revolution for political parties?

The Internet and social media have radically changed the way in which we communicate, including during political campaigns. US election campaigns, particularly the 2008 and 2012 Obama presidential campaigns, have pioneered a digital revolution in how political campaigns and parties communicate their messages effectively.

As a means of mass communication, the Internet appears to be the ideal tool for more effective, dynamic and efficient communication from political movements. But can the Internet replace traditional political party platforms? And can it really improve political decision-making? The key question seems to be how to effectively and democratically integrate large groups of people into nationallevel political decision-making. As an example of radical ideas for a new type of decision-making, advocates of ‘open source democracy’ claim that democratic systems need to open up their decision-making processes in the same way that ‘open source’ software is accessible for anybody to alter, change and develop.

There seem to be hopes and aspirations that a game changer will soon be developed. This ‘Facebook of politics’ would expand the possibilities for political communication and engagement. A new start-up, Brigade.com, which is due to be launched by the founders of Facebook and aims to restore ‘the voter to the center of our democracy’, is one example of a project which hopes to redefine politics in the Internet era (Brigade.com n.d.). Douglas Carswell, a British Member of Parliament, has suggested that political parties should resemble the commercial music streaming service Spotify (Martin 2014). Carswell believes that the Internet is a crucial tool in the process of reforming political parties to be more open, as it enables members to vote online to determine aspects of party policy, provides more space for single-issue movements and allows dissent from the party line.

So far, the most serious and perhaps the most successful attempts to use the Internet not only as a communication tool but as the structural basis for a political party have been made by the pirate parties, which were most successful

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in Germany. The pirate parties attempted to change party politics radically, aiming at full transparency through the use of the Internet for all party matters.

However, after initial successes, it was clear that the pirate parties were not able to meet these expectations or offer an alternative model for mainstream parties.

Political movements need to be able to respond to single issues. But at the same time, parties need a broad political agenda to be able to respond to the wideranging challenges faced by society. The pirate parties were unable to develop a wider political agenda and having ‘no position’ on a variety of issues undermined their credibility. One of the founders of the pirate movement, Peter Sunde, has stated that the movement is dead and has encouraged the members of the movement to join other parties (Sunde 2015).

The Internet and social media have changed the form, volume and frequency of political communication, but there is no evidence that the quality or content of the communication has changed to the same extent. Similarly, there is no evidence that, despite the massive increase in the availability of information, the quality of political decision-making has improved significantly. Social media has radically amplified the opportunities for citizens to connect around the planet at a very low cost. This increasingly applies not only to the Western world but also to people in developing countries. The Arab revolutions in 2011–12 in North Africa and the Middle East, which drew thousands of demonstrators into the street, are often mentioned as an example of the strength of modern social media as a tool of political mobilisation.

Sociologist Zeynep Tufekci (2014b), who has studied recent political movements and their relationship with online social changes, puts a damper on the enthusiasm surrounding the possibilities of the Internet. According to her research on the era of the Internet, social action is easy to organise but difficult to maintain. She argues that although political movements take less effort to organise online, this does not always mean that political goals are more easily achieved. Even though online activism is easy to grow, it often does not last.

Tufekci’s conclusion is that many of the current fast-growing social and political movements are like business start-ups that quickly become very large and do not know what to do when this happens. While organising a demonstration 50 years ago might have been much more complicated and challenging, it was those very challenges whose resolution created the organisational capacity building and motivational commitment necessary to sustain political parties. In other words, current political movements are relatively easy to organise spontaneously but they can die out just as easily (Tufekci 2014a).

In Tufekci’s view, political movements today need to move beyond mass participation and think about common policy proposals. For her, the answer is not just better online decision-making. Rather, in order to reinvent democracy one needs to innovate at every level, from the organisational to the political and social, and Tufekci believes that democracy needs to be developed in a wider context, which also takes into account the traditional societal elements, in order to be successful. Tufekci’s study makes an important point by underlining the fact that the renewal of the political system cannot simply involve abandoning

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the traditional political structures in favour of something totally new. The renewal of the political and democratic process has to include both the evolution of the existing political structures and innovative new ways to enhance political communication and mobilisation.

Politician versus citizen: should the roles be redefined?

Can political parties and the system be changed without redefining the role of the basic political actor—the politician? Many make the argument that we need professional politicians because gathering the information needed for political decision-making is a full-time job. The question is whether this is really true for all politicians. On a regional and community level the role of elected representative is often not full time; those elected execute their democratic mandate while having other jobs. Perhaps the political system should be enhanced by a class of part-time politicians, formally integrated into the political system using today’s technological solutions. The advantage of this would be that more citizens could be integrated into the political decision-making process.

According to Manin (1997), the political system has developed into an ‘audience’ democracy in which the relationship between politicians and voters is similar to that between theatre actors and their audience. Manin’s claim partly explains increasing voter volatility. If politics is seen only as a ‘show’, it is very easy to change the channel, and such a situation also allows the audience to abdicate responsibility for what happens on the stage.

Citizens often feel that they do not have anything political to say. But are citizens more interested in political participation if they are given easier access?

There is no proof that citizens will always participate more in politics simply as a result of increasing the opportunities for political participation. The main argument for political non-participation is a classic case of moral hazard: people feel that for them personally it is more advantageous to concentrate on advancing their personal interests rather than advancing the collective interests of society.

In order to ensure voter participation, voting in national elections is obligatory in many European countries. However, focusing on voting alone is not enough.

There is, though, a need to concentrate on citizens’ participation in the decisionmaking process. Citizens have obligations and responsibilities in society. If a wellfunctioning political system is seen as essential for a well-functioning state, then perhaps we need to increase the responsibilities of the citizens beyond voting. In the future citizens may be asked not only to vote, but, at least temporarily, to participate significantly more actively in political life.

Broken government, broken politics or both?

There is a growing gap between expectations and delivery in the political system, which has contributed to yet further dissatisfaction. In their book,

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Micklethwait and Wooldridge (2014) argue that the role of the state in the Western world is too large and has too many responsibilities, and that there is a need to rethink the very functioning and purpose of the modern state.

Especially since the onset of the global economic crisis in 2008, a line of thought has emerged that Western political systems have a major problem meeting the economic expectations of their citizens (Moyo 2012). This is contrasted with the rapid economic development of the new global powers, such as China and India. Not only are the economic choices and decisions of Western liberal democracies in question, but the very concept of Western democracy is under scrutiny.

As has been noted above, political parties are becoming more unstable due to both internal and external factors, but is this only true of the parties or is there a more fundamental change taking place that is impacting all political institutions and actors? In his book, The End of Power, Moise´s Naı´m (2014) argues that all powerful social actors, including the state, corporations and even religions, are being challenged more than ever before in this complex globalised world, while not yet having lost their power. The situation of mainstream political parties supports this argument as they are increasingly finding it difficult to defend their position.

Heimans and Timms (2014) formulate the dynamics related to political power as the concepts of ‘old power’ and ‘new power’ in the Internet era. For them, ‘new power’ is the deployment of mass participation and peer coordination to create change and shift outcomes. In their view, the challenge is how to use institutional power without becoming institutionalised. They see traditional actors as objects rather than subjects and, like Naı´m, see the current development as a challenge for existing institutions.

An increasing number of voices are asking what is wrong with democracy.

This is an extremely difficult question for politicians in the Western world to answer, especially as democracy is not simply seen as a way to organise political decision-making but rather as a value in and of itself. Performance evaluations of democratic institutions are often viewed as a criticism of the principles of democracy itself.

It is very important to separate democratic values from their implementation.

Democratic values are universal and not up for negotiation. But the mechanisms and institutions through which they are realised require constant scrutiny and examination. It is not a contradiction to be very convinced of the superiority of democratic ideals while criticising how they are implemented in the political system. For Western political elites to deny that there is room for improvement in the application of democracy would be a fatal mistake.

What do successful political parties do?

A major challenge for any organisation today, not only political parties, is building loyalty. People prefer low entry costs for engagement, allowing them to

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disengage quickly. Unfortunately for political parties, party membership is often considered a commitment with a social cost.

Today more than in the past, people prefer to align themselves with values not ideologies. Voters want to engage with individual projects with limited commitment, not comprehensive party programmes. Complex belief structures are often considered old-fashioned and not applicable to modern life.

Consequently, individual policy issues and the values they represent seem to increasingly define voting behaviour. People can see themselves signing up for issue-based campaigns rather than permanent party membership. Successful parties are accepting this new reality and dealing with it. More and more political parties are organising issue-based campaigns which use separate branding without denying the campaigns’ relationship with a political party. People are invited to campaign on the issues, rather than for the party itself.

A good example of this is the campaign team of the German Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands), called ‘teAM Deutschland’, which consisted of more than 21,000 volunteers (including both party members and non-members) divided into local municipalities for the 2013 German general election. On its online platform, called ‘teAMNETz‘, all members received information about the ongoing election campaign, including discussion papers and details of public events. Importantly, the platform offered the opportunity for members to contribute ideas and make statements on social and political topics. Thus, through this platform, non-members had the chance to contribute to defining the objectives of the Christian Democratic Union.

Another example of project-type campaigning was the concept of Cafe´ Niinisto¨ that emerged during Finland’s presidential election in 2012. The centre– right Kokoomus party launched meeting places around the country, called Cafe´ Niinisto¨ after the party’s candidate, which were managed by volunteers. These cafe´s aimed to make political discourse a normal aspect of everyday life for the duration of the campaign. All together 94 Cafe´s were established, more than initially planned. Cafe´ Niinisto¨ became a key mobilising factor in the successful campaign, enhancing engagement with it and increasing visibility.

The dynamics of the German and Finnish examples are the same: both projects were clearly party-related spins-offs with a limited duration. The projects had their own separate branding and clear operational concepts, independent of the daily running of the political party and its traditional structures, and aimed for a broader approach that went beyond usual party politics.

Thus, while party membership seems to be too much of a commitment for today’s citizens, successful political parties have launched issue-based campaigns which non-members can join. Membership is no longer a black-and-white choice between ‘yes’ and ‘no’, but rather a choice between many shades of grey.

The changed political environment has already underlined certain tactics and strategies which seem to be common to those political parties that are successfully adapting to modern political trends. Successful political parties need to reflect not only on their policy programme and their political agenda but also on their organisation, communication and activities in a similar way to businesses—actively questioning both the tasks and the function of the party.

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Conclusion Many political parties have successfully adapted to the new challenges and have developed new tactics which have helped their campaigns. However, the challenge political parties are facing is not for them alone but for the whole political system.

It had been hoped that the Internet and social media would boost citizens’ engagement in political parties. Yet, despite the arrival of new social media and communication tools, which have had a substantial impact on political campaigning, there does not seem to be a quick fix or short-cut for political parties. The Internet alone cannot resolve the challenges of political participation, engagement and decision-making. The Internet and social media have changed the environment political parties are operating in and have created opportunities, but have also brought new challenges that require resolution.

As political parties are an integral part of the democratic system and states’ political systems, the challenges facing political parties need to be seen in the wider context of the overall political system. Can political parties evolve if the political system does not? Yes, but only to a limited extent. At the end of the day, the existence of political parties is dependent on their capacity to mobilise people and win elections. Therefore, reflection needs to take place on both levels: at the grass-roots level to improve and evolve the political parties in their daily activities, but also on the systemic level—reflecting the political and democratic system as a whole. Democratic ideas and values have not lost their strength, but the tools used to deliver democracy clearly have.

Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source are credited.

References Brigade.com. (n.d.). What is Brigade? http://brigade.com/#about. Accessed 24 April 2015.

Dalton, R. J. (2008). Citizen politics: Public opinion and political parties in advanced industrial democracies. Irvine: University of California.

Dassonneville, R., & Hooghe, M. (2011). Mapping electoral volatility in Europe: An analysis of trends in electoral volatility in European democracies since 1945. Paper presented at the 1st European Conference on Comparative Electoral Research, University of National and World Economy, Sofia, 1–3 December. http://true-european-voter.net/sites/default/files/Mapping%20electoral%20volatility_Dassonneville_ Hooghe.pdf. Accessed 25 March 2015.

Heimans, J., & Timms, H. (2014). Understanding ‘new power’. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Review.

Manin, B. (1997). The principles of representative government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Martin, D. (2014). ‘Defunct’ Tories should expect more defections while it is out of date ‘like HMV’ and not modern ‘like Spotify’, says Ukip MP. Daily Mail, 12 October. http://www.dailymail.co. uk/news/article-2790311/more-leave-defunct-tories-says-ukip-s-mp-douglas-carswell-says-partydate-like-hmv-needed-modern-like-spotify.html. Accessed 31 March 2015.

Micklethwait, J., & Wooldridge, A. (2014). The fourth revolution: The global race to reinvent the state.

London: Penguin.

Mooney, C. (2012). The republican brain: The science of why they deny science—And reality. New York: Wiley.

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Moyo, D. (2012). How the west was lost: Fifty years of economic folly—And the stark choices ahead.

London: Penguin.

Naı´m, M. (2014). The end of power: From boardrooms to battlefields and churches to states, why being in charge isn’t what it used to be. New York: Basic Books.

Sen, A. (1999). Democracy as a universal value. Journal of Democracy, 10(3), 3–17. http://www.unicef.org/socialpolicy/files/Democracy_as_a_Universal_Value.pdf. Accessed 16 April 2015.

Sunde, P. (2015). The ‘Pirate Movement’ is dead. Torrentfreak.com, 4 April. http://torrentfreak. com/peter-sunde-the-pirate-movement-is-dead-150404/. Accessed 7 April 2015.

Traynor, I. (2014). The centre is falling apart across Europe. The Guardian, 16 November. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/16/europes-centre-cannot-hold. Accessed 31 March 2015.

Tufekci, Z. (2014a). Online social change: Easy to organize, hard to win. Ted.com. October. http://www.ted.com/talks/zeynep_tufekci_how_the_internet_has_made_social_change_easy_ to_organize_hard_to_win. Accessed 31 March 2015.

Tufekci, Z. (2014b). The medium and the movement: Digital tools, social movement politics, and the end of the free rider problem. Policy & Internet, 6(2), 202–8.

Van Biezen, I., Mair, P., & Poguntke, T. (2012). Going, going… gone? The decline of party membership in contemporary Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 51(1), 24–56.

Tomi Huhtanen is the Director of the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies. He is also the Editor-in-Chief of the European View.

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European View (2015) 14:69–75 DOI 10.1007/s12290-015-0343-9 ARTICLE

Why it is time to redesign our political system Pia Mancini

Published online: 3 June 2015 Ó The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com

Abstract Modern political systems are out of sync with the times we are living in. While the Internet allows us unprecedented access to information, low costs for collaborating and participating, and the ability to express our desires, demands and concerns, our input in policymaking is limited to voting once every two to five years. Innovative tools, both online and offline, are needed to upgrade our democracies. Society needs instruments and processes that allow it to choose how it is governed. Institutions have to be established that reflect today’s technological, cultural and social realities and values. These institutions must be able to generate trust and provide mechanisms for social debate and collaboration, as well as social feedback loops that can accelerate institutionalised change.

Keywords politics

Digital democracy Institutional innovation Open source Internet

Introduction A lot has been said about the impact of the digital world on science, technology and the entertainment industry. However, little attention has been paid to innovation—or lack thereof—in the political system. This article argues that the political system is out of sync with the times. It explores the causes of this and proposes some avenues for institutional innovation. The aim is not to propose a solution or a roadmap. Rather, it is to ask the questions that need to be asked P. Mancini (&) The DemocracyOS Foundation, 361 Lytton Ave. (Suite 200), Palo Alto, CA 94301, US e-mail: pia@democracyos.org

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and push the boundaries in terms of what could be done, all in the hope of moving the debate forward.

The Internet is bringing about a seachange in how citizens expect to be represented. Governments, however, are unable to keep up with the changes that it has provoked in our societies. The world changes by the second, and yet our governments are still only receiving citizen input every two, four or five years, depending on the system. Modern democracies are based on information technology that is five hundred years old, the printing press.

With this information technology, the best possible system that could be designed was one whereby a few make daily decisions for the many, and the many vote on who represents them once every few years. Long-term representation made sense at a time when citizens could not participate in the decision-making process. This was not physically possible, nor did the citizens have access to the information required to make informed decisions.

One could argue that, in the eighteenth century, someone like John Adams knew pretty much everything there was to know about running a country, but that is far from true today. The increased complexity of the issues we face, from climate change to the global financial markets, makes it impossible for our representatives to come up with innovative and long-term solutions on their own. We are in the middle of a global crisis of representation. Governments simply do not seem to be able to respond to the demands of our rapidly changing society.

Technological connectivity has multiplied access to and circulation of information at a very low cost. Conversations that used to be one-to-many have become many-to-many. The Internet has the potential to transform us all into producers as well as consumers of information, and we can now participate remotely in any global conversation.

This connectivity has lowered the barriers to accessing information and knowledge, and allows us to better express ourselves. However, our political systems expect us to be passive recipients of a monologue. Put simply, we are twenty-first century citizens trying our best to interact with institutions from the nineteenth century built on technology from the fifteenth century.

Conflict is thus bound to occur between, on the one hand, citizens—who are increasingly used to representing themselves in every other aspect of their lives through new information technology tools—and, on the other, a political system that has no capacity for dialogue. It is no wonder that political institutions like parliaments and traditional political parties are topping the charts for the least trusted institutions. This distrust will only deepen as the millennials start to come of age.

We seem to be moving towards a new model of state and society, but are clueless as to what it is or what it should look like. It is time for institutional innovation. We need to rethink how we organise our democratic life. Democracy is a work in progress. We need to set ourselves free of the structural and institutional dogmatism of the status quo. Innovation requires iteration and recursive processes that incorporate feedback.

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Today’s technology will allow us to design institutions that incorporate social feedback loops in order to correct themselves. Building a collective process for innovation and experimentation and thus broadening our ability to participate in public life could be a viable part of the changes made. This would ensure that entrenched defendants of the status quo are more easily disarticulated and would avoid crisis-led transformations which are currently the only avenue for making changes to rigid structures.

One idea for institutional innovation A new world view never completely changes or replaces the old one; therefore, innovative tools, both online and offline, are needed to accommodate and manage the conflict between them.

Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore (2001, 22) claim, ‘politics offers yesterday’s answers to today’s questions’. One way of innovating in the political system is to rethink and rewire it using a combination of online tools and a new kind of political party. Such a party plays by the existing rules but radically changes the way in which it makes decisions in parliament by taking advantage of new tools to make decisions in collaboration with the citizens.

DemocracyOS and the Net Party (Partido de la Red) from Argentina are two examples of such a combination. DemocracyOS is an open-source voting and debating platform, whereby citizens can learn about, debate and vote on how they would like their representatives to vote on political issues. The Net Party ran for election in 2013 in Buenos Aires, having made a public commitment to always vote in Congress in line with the decisions of those citizens that have engaged with DemocracyOS. This effort is the largest open-source attempt to bring nineteenth-century institutions into the twenty-first century.

The Net Party has yet to win a seat in Congress, but its impressive first performance in 2013 (where it gained 1.2 % of the votes) (GCBA 2013) won it a seat at the table. The Congress of the City of Buenos Aires introduced a pilot of DemocracyOS in 2014, and a bill that had been dormant for years—one to improve working conditions for nurses in public hospitals—was introduced through the citizens’ use of DemocracyOS. This idea is growing beyond Argentina and beyond political parties.

DemocracyOS has been successfully used by a local non-governmental organisation in Tunisia to debate the constitution; by activist groups in Ukraine, Spain, Australia, Canada, France, Chile, India, Puerto Rico and Peru; by a grassroots movement in San Francisco advocating for, among other things, affordable housing; and by a union for Uber drivers. Many other examples could be given.

Democracy cannot simply be a system that aggregates preferences one on top of the other. Healthy and robust public debate should again be one of democracy’s fundamental values. Citizen input as part of an ongoing decisionmaking process can produce innovations that an established political body would consider unthinkable. This is the nature of power. It is always conservative and risk averse: it wants to hold on to power.

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Therefore, a space to persuade and be persuaded, to debate, to imagine and innovate, and to reach consensus, as well as to provide structured ways of channelling dissent, must be designed. It may be that not everyone is ready to vote on and discuss every issue. Therefore, it is proposed that this idea should incorporate liquid democracy, a highly dynamic institutional arrangement. In this space, if someone does not feel comfortable voting on a certain issue, he or she could delegate his or her vote to another citizen for that particular topic. The goal is to produce a dynamic and emerging social leadership, in which representation is not based on territory but on trust and knowledge. In this way, a new system of horizontal and strategic representation can be pursued.

Citizen control in this kind of representation system could be infinitely fine and dynamic. For example, someone could choose to hand over voting power on health-care issues to a well-known medical practitioner at a public hospital, retain votes on economic matters, delegate environmental decisions to a trusted non-governmental environmental organisation and delegate all other issues to his or her local political representative.

But technology by itself is not enough. Social change does not simply come from knowing the facts but from being organised and doing something with that information. Social change stems not from our ability to protest but to articulate and offer alternatives that challenge the existing institutions. Innovative political parties could become the nuts and bolts of this transition because political parties are the natural connectors in our current political system.

DemocracyOS and the Net Party are an attempt to kick-start a conversation about how to build democracies that are able to experiment and how to recreate this at different levels of government using flexible systems that can adapt more quickly and easily to change. They are part of an effort to widen the realm of possibilities to help create a deeper understanding of the present and build a path towards the future.

Trust The underlying role of institutions is to build trust in society. We trusted political parties to interpret and aggregate our preferences and channel them up to their leadership to make decisions that benefit a substantial portion of society. We trusted our central banks to exchange paper with one another as a valuetransference protocol. Institutions like police forces and the justice system mediate trust amongst citizens.

This trust is broken. The younger the age group, the less trust there is in the existing institutions. Any institutional innovations need to aim to build trust in society. Distributed organisations and protocols for decision-making, such as DemocracyOS and the Net Party, face the challenge of generating trust in a distributed way, without depending on a centralised authority.

Incipient but exciting technologies such as the Blockchain could provide the infrastructure needed to build distributed trust. The Blockchain can be described as a public ledger that is hosted in a distributed way on every computer

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connected to its network. Transactions (e.g. user A sends a bitcoin to user B) or decisions (user A voted ‘yes’) are publicly certified in the ledger.

Online decisions require independent accountability in order to be trustworthy. The Blockchain is a very interesting protocol—and it is not the only one—in how it guarantees accountability: it is a decentralised ledger that can certify the reality of any kind of event that happens online. Therefore, any user, without needing to request the permission of an organisation, could validate and count every interaction or vote that is made by an online application. Thus, instead of a centralised institution mediating trust amongst citizens, everyone participating in the network accomplishes this.

As the Internet evolves as a medium for human organisations of all sorts, these kinds of protocols will be used to guarantee trust online. And, on these, a new generation of institutions and digital governance tools can be built.

Are we ready?

When I talk about DemocracyOS, I am repeatedly asked whether I think we can trust citizens to make important decisions. This question always makes me think of Aesop’s fable. A fox jumps up to try to reach a bunch of grapes. After a few unsuccessful attempts, the fox says out loud, ‘Well, it doesn’t really matter. Those grapes are sour anyway.’ And internalising this idea, it walks away. Even if one day the fox were to be become capable of reaching the grapes, it would not actually attempt to do so. In its mind the untasted grapes will be forever be sour.

In her book The Nature of the future: Dispatches from a socialstructed world, Marina Gorbis (2013) argues that, when facing the complex reality of our contemporary societies, we have been subject to rational ignorance. This is the perception that, since our opinion is just one in a million and our ability to effect change is close to zero, the benefits of participating and being truly informed do not outweigh the effort required. The result of this is that we decide to outsource our citizenship to a group of professional citizens, allowing them to make decisions for us for immensely long periods.

Since the early Greek democratic experiences, citizens have been told that they are not able to decide matters for themselves. We have outsourced our citizenship, our thinking, as a result of being forced to do so during the Middle Ages and having been convinced that it was the right thing to do since the eighteenth century. We have abdicated our most important responsibility: that of deciding our destiny.

As a consequence, two processes have unfolded. First, like the fox, we have internalised the notion that we are not capable of making those decisions for ourselves. We have happily given the task to someone else and have then had to suffer the consequences. Second, we have built institutions that frame and enhance this outsourcing process. As a consequence, our system is concerned with the game taking place amongst professional citizens rather than with providing the means, resources, institutions and norms for all citizens to fully participate in the game. Reducing our participation in the democratic process to

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voting and allowing this to take place only once every two, four or five years are probably the most blatant examples.

However, political institutions are not designed in the void: they respond to the social, technological and cultural realities of their time. We, both as individuals and as a society, are able to transcend the framework provided by existing institutions. That is why we can innovate. Therefore, we are responsible for upgrading political institutions to reflect our current values and to keep experimenting and innovating to adapt to new realities. We are not bound to the institutions we design; we have collective power over them.

What would have happened if, for example, the founding fathers of the US system of government, instead of concerning themselves with how to build a system based in the competing power of different forces in order to moderate passions in decision-making, had racked their brains to find a way to educate society to become responsible, engaged and participating citizens, able to make those decisions themselves? They designed a technology for government based on the ideal of ensuring that citizens could decide between the best possible set of counterbalanced options. What sort of system would we have today if, instead, they had designed a government based on the ideal of ensuring citizens could collaborate to design the best possible options?

Our political system needs to create spaces for interaction that favour empathy, debate and collaboration. Experiments in net or liquid democracy may rewire from the inside the way politics works—and speed up the way change happens within the system. The true potential of digital institutions, in other words, lies in reshaping what people can do. We can now open up the discussion and debate to an audience that does not have to be able to fit in a small room.

The question is not whether I believe citizens can be trusted, but rather, how do we design processes and experiences that produce that trust and responsibility through educating, informing, opening up and incorporating?

Conclusion We, the citizens, will never know that we can be trusted until we shed over two thousand years of history and start reaching out for those grapes. It will be a long and trying process, but it is one that we simply cannot afford to ignore. We are at a turning point in history where new technology is allowing us to rethink how we govern ourselves and what institutions we should build to reflect today’s technological, cultural and social realities and values. We are not bound to our political systems. They can be reinvented by rewiring them with the tools that technology affords us now. Innovation and experimentation are ongoing exercises in an open democracy.

In the introduction of The Federalist Papers, Hamilton (1788) writes: ‘It seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or

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whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.’ This time it is up to our generation. But it has always has been up to us.

Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source are credited.

References GCBA (Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires). (2013). Resultados generales elecciones CABA 2013. http://www.buenosaires.gob.ar/justiciayseguridad/elecciones/resultados-electorales/2013. Accessed 30 April 2015.

Gorbis, M. (2013). The nature of the future: Dispatches from a socialstructed world. New York: Free Press.

Hamilton, A. (1788). General introduction. In A. Hamilton, J. Madison, & J. Jay (eds.), The federalist: A collection of essays written in favour of the new constitution, as agreed upon by the federal convention (pp. 1–4). New York: J. and A. McLean.

McLuhan, M., & Fiore, Q. (2001). The medium is the massage: An inventory of effects. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Classics. First printed 1967.

Pia Mancini is co-founder and Executive Director of the DemocracyOS Foundation, peer and co-founder of the Net Party, formerly Chief Adviser to the Deputy Secretary of Political Affairs for the Government of the City of Buenos Aires.

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European View (2015) 14:77–83 DOI 10.1007/s12290-015-0351-9 ARTICLE

Online politics for citizens in the twenty-first century Eva Majewski

Published online: 11 June 2015 The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com

Abstract This article looks at models of political representation. It examines the ways in which social network sites and a faster exchange of information have influenced political engagement in general. Moreover, it looks at how political networks run by young people are reacting to the changing environments by trying to create unique experiences.

Keywords Online politics Political representation Youth engagement Anonymity Improvements SNS in politics Student organisations Experience Introduction Politicians need to answer more questions than ever before. And more than this, they need to provide answers more rapidly, and answers need to be more comprehensive. Due to the increase in the use of social network sites (SNS) and data being exchanged faster than ever, the challenge for politicians is to live up to the new and additional requirements involved in communicating with constituents. Online politics tries to offer tools to listen to constituents better and to reach out to them through new methods.

E. Majewski (&) European Democrat Students, Rue due Commerce 10, 1000 Brussels, Belgium e-mail: majewski@edsnet.eu

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Laying the groundwork Online tools are supposed to enhance democracy and make politics more efficient and effective. The online tools help citizens and politicians alike to exchange information in the process of reaching decisions. Nonetheless, Europe has seen not more but rather less political engagement in recent years—at least within political parties. Is public deliberation feasible through online politics, and if so, how can new tools be used to pave the way?

To answer these questions, it is necessary to take a step back and define the levels of representation. Traditionally, there have been ‘two sets of competing philosophies of representation’, as Ferber et al. (2007, 391) point out: ‘The trustee… model, where representatives act in accordance with their own judgement, versus the delegate, where representatives follow the wishes of their constituents.’ The authors go on to say that legislators do not conform completely to either type. However, it seems reasonable to believe that the delegate model is becoming predominant. The way politicians carry out their work is changing as a result of new ways of exchanging information: the increased use of SNS, websites, email, Internet forums and chat rooms. In all these ways citizens are placing new demands on their representatives, and in this situation, the delegate model of representation is more appropriate.

Political representation exists for a reason. Decisions in society are delegated to governmental bodies, which then conduct a process of deliberative decisionmaking with the aim of reaching the best solutions. Hence, the trustee approach makes sense even in the twenty-first century. The profession of politicians can and should be understood as a profession of decision-making. Politicians need to master and become specialists in their respective portfolios. As a result of the increasing complexity of politics and society, a successful politician faces increasing pressure to be a good ‘explainer’. Political actions need to be elucidated. Politicians have to answer critical questions and provide insight into their decision-making processes and objectives, their considerations and how they have reflected on the content provided by stakeholders. The demands involved in consulting all stakeholders and providing feedback to them have risen also as a result of the increased use of SNS. Moreover, politicians of all levels are urged to explain the objectives of toptier political decisions, such as those made at the European level during the recent economic and financial crises. Politicians had to justify the conclusions drawn by the heads of government. With new technologies available, decisions were taken almost instantly. Coordination took place in the physical meetings of the European Council and beyond. Views and information were exchanged beforehand not only over the phone, as in the old days, but also through the Internet.

Criticism of the decisions taken to stabilise the eurozone also focuses on how those decisions were taken. While the responsiveness of politicians is referred to by some as a blessing, critics stated that the normal process, involving extensive consultation with stakeholders, was not followed. This is a crucial point since, at a European level, decisions can be more far-reaching than had they simply

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reflected a national concern. Decisions are taken for a wider society, and the process is at times more complex than at a national level. However, in the case of mechanisms to save the euro, they have proven rather stable; political decisions taken in a short time matched the needs required to calm the international financial markets. From that example, it can be argued that, in times of crisis, the model tends to shift from the delegate to the trustee.

Another argument that needs to be raised with respect to the increased use of SNS is the real effects it has on politics. If a shift from the trustee to the delegate model of representation had been realised over the past years, this would have had to be supported by an increase in legislative bills arising from citizens’ initiatives. However, most legislative action is still carried out on the initiative of the legislator rather than that of constituents.

How to succeed in political communication One might argue that legislation and political initiative should apply for all instances that laws need to be applicable universally and not be case dependent. This is true for the content of (political) messages and decisions.

However, this article focuses on successful communication in policymaking. To do this, it is necessary to take a closer look at the different players in the political decision-making process and examine how they communicate.

A satisfactory model of intelligent and suitable discussion via the Internet that summarises, filters and classifies input has not yet been established. There is still no real sustained interactivity between legislators and citizens. Only in the runup to elections, or for specific issues, have there been attempts to foster interactivity with citizens on a larger scale. Nonetheless, the awareness of politicians has risen, and parliaments are increasingly trying to take stock of constituents’ opinions. To improve communication streams, Internet forums and diverse tools have been introduced to allow people to comment or vote. This should be done not only as part of political sites but also as part of SNS and on the sites of news organisations. However, the debate remains largely unmoderated, in part to avoid accusations of censorship.

It remains difficult both to channel the flow of information and ideas from various sources and to distinguish clearly in an exchange-based model who is sending information and who is receiving it. And there is yet another matter that remains worrisome: public discourse is not conducted in a fair way. The principles of privacy and the ‘right to be forgotten’ (known in the US as ‘Retain your name’) do not justify unmannerly behaviour. Posts and comments in political online forums often seem unconstructive. Ferber et al. (2007, 397) state: ‘Almost all of the participants wrote under some sort of ‘ screen name’’, with very few postings associated with what appeared to be a real name. Although this may be typical of electronic discussion, it also avoids serious ownership of one’s ideas.’ It has another downside: it puts politicians in a situation of having to respond to an anonymous mass of people. It is all the more difficult to address precise issues when the identity of one’s counterpart is unknown. Successful communication

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will always be a result of responses that are adapted to the knowledge of the recipient and his or her intention and need for information, which is more difficult when little is known about the recipient of the information.

Another overlooked item in the discussion is that a commitment to communicating politics online involves the expenditure of resources. Thorough work on social network sites and the whole stream of communication on them is not a task that can be accomplished half-heartedly. Political statements are under more severe observation than before and consequently require close attention. An individual, ‘tailor-made’ reply becomes almost impossible. It was only in 2015, that the German government launched its Facebook site (2015).

This reveals the dedication required to set up serious political communication online. The site provides insights into the work of the government, describes its institutions and introduces initiatives. It also offers an unconventional way to get in touch with the government’s communications team. Facebook sites existed much earlier for individual politicians, such as the chancellor and members of the cabinet and of political parties. And other online tools such as weekly podcasts and informative websites have been in existence for years. The launch of the government’s Facebook site was meticulously planned and is staffed with a team large enough to interact with citizens and the wider public.

Citizen–government interaction will always remain limited, however, and the reiteration of arguments will be inevitable if the government intends to reply to each citizen on SNS. Hence, moderation remains crucial, especially to ensure that key stakeholders and decision-makers receive a comprehensive overview of the concerns and issues raised by citizens. The moderation process is not easy because it will inevitably involve judgements about which comments should be deleted and why. There is a thin line between eliminating a comment that might contain insults, and censoring content and infringing on the right to speak one’s mind.

It remains for society as a whole and for politicians in particular to improve the way decisions are made. There is a gap between the everyday lives of citizens and politics, and efforts to strengthen online communication are only one way to fill this gap in connecting the two. Another way is to re-address grass-roots initiatives and to reach out to citizens in new ways that stretch beyond SNS. The German government’s Facebook site aims at what has been described as the need to explain politics. Other governments have also taken steps to move away from the image that politics is only dealt with behind closed doors. Some have reintroduced town hall meetings to create political gatherings that make it possible for citizens to get in touch with politicians on a personal level.

In fact, the need to shape encounters is just as important as the need to point out that a single voice can be important, even in the vast field of politics. This is emphasised by Bauerlein (2008) and in Jacoby’s findings (2008). Both authors contend that, despite increased budgets and government investment in ‘democratic’ information technology, young Americans are increasingly unaware of current issues and disengaged from civic involvement. The same holds for Europe. In some parts of Europe, political youth organisations are struggling to

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attract members. It would appear that the younger generation is not prepared to make the commitment entailed in joining a political group—as opposed to supporting a specific, time-limited cause. It seems untrendy to stick to one organisation when society is constantly changing and posing new challenges.

Institutions that try to provide more holistic approaches and solutions to societal challenges will eventually take a decision or adopt a position that is unpopular and does not reflect the mainstream consensus. Since these institutions are and will always be run by people, over time they will all make mistakes and reveal imperfections. Recent political consulting takes the approach that the success of political parties lies in having the flexibility to change their views and political discourse. This approach also admits that, at some point, validated positions will conflict with current challenges and the party will have to develop a new position. The larger the entity or institution, the longer the repositioning process. During that time, the entity or institution will be in the line of fire.

People do not like to take the fall for decisions and views that a previous generation has made and that time has proven wrong or outdated. Consequently, there is a reluctance to join parties because they will have made faulty decisions at one point or another. And this reluctance is only made greater by the fact that parties carry the weight of decisions that can affect the whole of society.

The use of SNS can be one way for citizens to express their concern about a particular issue. The European level is particularly emphasised since more and more decisions are being taken at a European or multinational level. The transnational decision-making bodies are larger than their nation-level counterparts and have more stakeholders. This makes it even more critical to point out the relevance of the individual in the decision-making process.

Student organisations creating unique experiences European Democrat Students (EDS), the official student organisation of the European People’s Party, operates on a European level. Its approach is not only to encourage the use of the social networking sites, Twitter and Instagram but also to reach beyond their conventional means of conducting political conferences and discussions on a multinational level. EDS tries to combine the requirements of both the trustee and the delegate model. It has been responding with more and more timely statements aimed at stressing particular issues that it believes are not covered sufficiently in the media. More importantly, however, it has created new formats of activities and events which focus on the individual and the exchange of best practices. The goal is to educate young people to become experts in particular areas so that they can help society develop. Peer leaders are chosen to participate in the events, where they can gain insights and develop a more comprehensive overview of particular concerns. The main conclusions are then summarised in statements that are communicated not only to the political leadership but also through SNS. By using this approach, the impact is substantially broadened: results find a much

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bigger audience and the involved peers spread it to further stakeholders and citizens that otherwise would not be affected by policy-making. The communication of the results and the outcomes also becomes easier. By sharing their experiences on SNS, the young peer leaders communicate politics towards friends and family.

EDS closes the gap between politics and society by engaging with both. In each event, a campaign works at drawing in citizens as a way to practice outreach. Additionally, internal reporting structures have been changed. The internal reports focus on outreach and attempts that have been undertaken to broaden the network and enhance the experience before other agenda items are dealt with.

Above all, personal experience is the decisive part in the changes introduced in recent years within the organisation. During the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine, young European politicians took part in a mission to Kyiv to look into the developments at the Maidan. They met with think tanks, governmental institutions and non-governmental organisations. However, it was the experience of the Maidan itself that had an impact on the work of the young politicians and their respective home organisations from all over Europe.

Similar experiences occurred during regional study trips. A good example is the trip through the Western Balkans, during which EDS focused on immigration and corruption in education. It helped the young politicians gain insights into the situation in the region. It enabled them to detect shortcomings there, but more importantly, it enabled them to discover similarities in the challenges faced by the entire European community.

These experiences are mirrored back into online politics but through a personalised lens. The experiences are shared extensively on SNS and through other communication tools. In today’s societies, it remains relevant to point out the importance of (political) action and the involvement of the individual. In that regard, EDS was able to make a substantial contribution and set examples of how politics can be communicated.

Conclusion The main question remains to be answered: how can interest triggered by the quick sharing of information lead to real action and interaction? Democratic participation remains key for political decision-making. Structures in decisionmaking become more complex in order to allow for more stakeholders to be involved and heard. However, the lack of knowledge persists of what government is and how it works. It remains difficult to explain these mechanisms and objectives in the 140 characters that are allowed on Twitter. And how is one to communicate complex ideas when only a few moments’ attention is given to single posts on SNS? Therefore, consideration has to be made to develop accepted means through which citizens can begin to interact to support democracy and strengthen our societies.

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Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source are credited.

References Bauerlein, M. (2008). The dumbest generation: How the digital age stupefies young Americans and jeopardizes our future (or, don’t trust anyone under 30). New York: Jeremy P. Tarcher/Penguin.

Facebook Bundesregierung. (2015). https://de-de.facebook.com/Bundesregierung. Accessed 6 May 2015.

Ferber, P., Foltz, F., & Pugliese, R. (2007). Cyberdemocracy and online politics. Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society, 27(5), 391–400.

Jacoby, S. (2008). The age of American unreason. New York: Pantheon Books.

Eva Majewski is Chairwoman of European Democrat Students (EDS), the official student organisation of European People’s Party. A graduate of Humboldt University, Berlin, she has also studied in Italy, the US and South Africa, and works as an adviser for the Transatlantic Partnership, the Digital Agenda, financial and budgetary questions.

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European View (2015) 14:85–92 DOI 10.1007/s12290-015-0342-x ARTICLE

Did we get it wrong? The true meaning of European federalism Federico Ottavio Reho

Published online: 9 June 2015 Ó The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com

Abstract This article reflects on the meaning of European federalism. Although many enthusiasts of European unity have referred to their vision as ‘federalist’, very little systematic analysis of what European federalism means and implies has been carried out. The result has been a tendency in the pro-European debate to identify the federalisation of Europe with the transfer of more and more powers to the EU level and the eventual creation of a continental state-like polity. This article argues that such a tendency is not in line with the proper and historical meaning of federation, a polity whose political and institutional logic is completely at odds with that of the modern nation state. The latter is characterised by an emphasis on institutional hierarchy, bureaucratic uniformity and economic controls, while the former encourages institutional competition, societal diversity and economic openness. This article concludes that embracing a clearly articulated federalist doctrine could help pro-European forces, most notably the pro-European right, to recover a sense of purpose and successfully meet many of the present challenges in European integration.

Keywords Federalism European integration Regionalism UK renegotiation Institutional competition Welfare state Introduction An article dealing with the meaning of European federalism may appear untimely and anachronistic to many contemporary readers. It comes at a F. O. Reho (&) Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, Rue du Commerce 20, 1000 Brussels, Belgium e-mail: fr@martenscentre.eu

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moment when the European ideal is under great strain, when only a handful of dreamers still have the temerity to call themselves ‘federalists’, and almost none of them would dare to do so in public. The EU has been mired for years in an economic crisis of unusual length and scope, the legitimacy of its institutions is being questioned and anti-EU forces are on the rise in many countries. Besides, the claim to be offering a reappraisal of such an important topic may appear presumptuous, coming as it does after more than 60 years of European integration and many profound appraisals of this historical process.1 However, very little systematic analysis has been carried out so far on the meaning of European federalism. This article, far from conclusive and allencompassing, is a contribution in the direction of such an analysis. It reflects on the meaning of European federalism and argues that the values and policies it implies could offer answers to many contemporary challenges and change the EU and its member states for the better. The first section deals with the ideals and institutional structure underpinning federalism. The second sketches the economic constitution of a federal polity. The third section briefly illustrates how this federalism can help meet certain contemporary challenges.

The meaning of federalism Whereas the US founding fathers gathered in Philadelphia to draft the original constitution of the United States, the European founding fathers never fully articulated their political vision of an integrated Europe in a constitutional document. Therefore, the origins of European integration contain no grand federalising moment comparable to the US Constitutional Convention. European integration developed as a process for which ‘ever closer union’ and federalism were simply regulative ideals and not elements of a precise constitutional blueprint.2 Today, a long way down the path of integration, this ambiguity seems less and less tenable, as it leaves all pro-Europeans open to the accusation that they are ultimately struggling to unify the continent within a state-like polity similar to those that unified the various European nations in previous centuries. Although many self-styled European federalists would recognise this accusation as faithfully reflecting their ultimate political aim, such an aim is emphatically not in line with the proper and historical meaning of federalism. While the modern state posits itself as a leviathan—the sovereign with ultimate and supreme power over everything—the most striking feature of a federal polity is the dissolution of sovereignty within ‘a regime that enables people to be first their own governors’ 1 2

For one of the most insightful, see Weiler (1999).

The various reasons that Europe did not have such a federalising moment lie beyond the scope of this short article. However, it is enough to remind the reader that while American unity was the product of a war of independence that had federated the 13 colonies against the motherland, the project of European unity developed in the aftermath of the most savage war ever fought on the old continent. The psychological and political scars of that war made it impossible for the founding fathers to envisage anything more than a circumscribed and gradual rapprochement between their peoples.

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and where ‘minimal emphasis is placed upon command and control’ by public powers (Ostrom 1991). As one of the foremost scholars of American federalism poignantly put it, in its deepest sense a federal system of governance means that the government does not govern, but ‘society governs itself for itself’ (Ostrom 1991).3 At an institutional level, this is accomplished by fragmenting powers among multiple units of government, each having autonomous existence in its respective sphere of competence, so that none of them is sovereign, with ultimate and supreme power over everything. It is reinforced by the principle that all public powers should be exercised as closely as possible to the individuals who bear their consequences, so as to ensure not only wide participation and accountability, but also a wide regulatory competition between the different centres of power.4 Most importantly, in a proper federal system the role of public powers is only residual, because the preferred instrument of collective action is not coercive government intervention, but voluntary (convenantal) agreements among free individuals and groups. In other words, federalism entails an insistence on individual freedom and responsibility and an open prejudice against coercive state intervention and in favour of voluntary cooperation for the solution of collective problems. Arguably, no federal state survived the centralist forces of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, the United States were a federation until the Civil War5—when, tellingly, ‘the US are’ became ‘the US is’—and the Holy Roman Empire at the very heart of Europe had many federal traits.

If construed as a federation, the EU is now in the position to resurrect a supranational order where the exclusionary powers of national political authorities are held in check and the self-governing potential of individuals and communities is again allowed to flourish. The fear that is playing into the hands of the EU’s enemies is, of course, that its institutions may want to develop their own exclusionary powers regardless of local sensitivities and traditions.

Indeed, the ideas of many so-called European federalists do sound worryingly centralist. Their focus seems much more on transferring powers from the national to the European level than on returning them to individuals, families and local communities within a continental federal polity.6 In a truly federal EU, 3

Here Ostrom is quoting from Tocqueville’s (2003) Democracy in America, the first systematic study of American democracy.

4

EU law recognises a weak version of this principle (the principle of subsidiarity), whereby action at the EU level is justified when its objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved at the state, regional or local level, but can rather be better achieved at Union level (See Art. 5 of the Treaty on European Union).

5

Many traits of federalism as described here were already identified by Alexis de Tocqueville. He visited the US in the early 1830s, well before the Civil War.

6

Interestingly, those who tend to confuse federalisation with state-making in Europe also tend to be in favour of wide-ranging government intervention in economic and social life, even if it comes at the cost of significant coercion. One should not forget that, for example, Altiero Spinelli was a Communist long before becoming a European ‘federalist’, and that his daughter Barbara Spinelli, another committed ‘federalist’, was elected a Member of the European Parliament in Italy with the radical left movement that supported Tsipras as President of the European Commission. Jean Monnet himself was a technocrat and the Commissioner-General of the French National Planning Board. Most recently, the French economist Piketty (2014) wrote in favour of a continental federation to harmonise social legislation and prevent tax competition.

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the common institutions would uphold the shared values of Europe’s civilisation, guarantee the integrity of the common market, administer both the monetary policy of the federation and an effective foreign and defence policy, and take over the few security and welfare obligations necessary to ensure the free movement of people and to grant equal rights to all citizens. All other functions would flow back to the member states, harmonisation would be kept to a minimum and decentralisation of power would be encouraged at all levels, as would the widest regulatory competition between different administrative units in the integrated continental space.

The economic constitution of a federal polity There can be little doubt that a federal polity as I have described it naturally encourages market openness, economic freedoms and competition between individuals and firms. This is largely confirmed by the experience of federations.

In the early part of their histories, they were long incapable of enacting wideranging regulations and economic controls at either the central or the state level.7 When they managed to do so, they either undermined their federalist fabric towards a more unitary and less polycentric economic order, or wounded the economic integrity of the federation with discriminatory controls and regulations at the level of the individual member states (Hayek 1948; Weingast 1995).

Since the Treaty of Rome, the clear commitment to the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons has created the conditions for the development of a distinctively federalist economic constitution for the European project. Such a constitution was then strengthened by conferring on the European Commission robust powers in the field of competition policy and by the enshrinement of the principle of mutual recognition in European law by the European Court of Justice.8 Indeed, it can be argued that the widest possible use of mutual recognition is the instrument best suited to a federation for opening markets. Mutual recognition allows multiple standards to exist and compete in the continental market, with the best among them being selected by consumers, instead of coming out of the arbitrary decisions of regulators. As a consequence, it seems in deeper accord with the polycentricity of a federalist economic order and its insistence on the freedoms of individuals and lower administrative units.

The tendency, evident since the early 1990s, towards large-scale re-regulation at 7

The ‘central’ level refers here to the government of the federation as a whole, while the ‘state’ level refers to the governments of the different units making up the federation. These are called ‘states’ in some federations (e.g. the US), but not in others (e.g. Switzerland).

8

The milestone case in this regard was the Cassis de Dijon decision of the European Court of Justice in 1979. The court stated that Germany’s refusal to admit a French liqueur into its market due to its insufficient alcohol content was to be viewed as a measure having an effect equivalent to that of placing quantitative restrictions on imports and, as a consequence, violated the Treaty of Rome. The Commission subsequently worded the meaning of the judgment as follows: ‘Any product lawfully produced and marketed in one Member State must, in principle, be admitted to the market of any other Member State.’

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the EU level to ensure ‘fair’ competition is a serious departure from a federalist method.

The most formidable challenges to economic federalism in Europe, however, arguably lie at the national level, where the size and scope of government inherited from the economic paradigm of the twentieth century welfare state seems singularly ill-suited to a federal setting. Most Central and Eastern European countries came out of their economic transitions with slim public budgets and free market policies. Many Western and Southern European countries, on the other hand, still have to cope with heavily regulated economies and high levels of public debt accumulated in the post–Second World War decades, when more and more personal and social responsibilities were taken away from individuals and handed over to state bureaucracies. In 1960 total government spending for the countries that would later make up the EU15 was, on average, 29 % of GDP. It grew steadily and in 1990 had already reached 50 % of GDP—half the size of the entire economy (Alesina and Giavazzi 2006). The recent economic crisis dramatically showed that such high levels of public debt are incompatible with the working of a decentralised monetary union. Especially, but not exclusively, among left-leaning politicians and economic pundits, it is fashionable to contend that pooling national debts and harmonising national welfare systems at the EU level would rescue ‘the European social model’, which they believe to be threatened by a ‘fragile’ and decentralised monetary union. In all fairness, however, more than rescuing the European social model, it would impose what they construe as the European social model—a model adopted, in subtly different varieties, by only a sub-group of EU member states—on the whole continent.9 Apart from being politically impracticable, such a move would be at odds with the very essence of a federalist order, which is variety and decentralisation, and implies the utmost respect for national and regional traditions under a continental framework of openness.

Let me stress at this point that, although there are good reasons to believe that such decentralised openness requires a drastic reduction in public debt and in the size of government, it need not force states accustomed to the farreaching provision of public services to discontinue it altogether.10 Let me also mention that nothing in a federal EU would prevent some minimal social security functions from being administered at the supranational level. Indeed, there could be a need for it in the area of social benefits paid by an EU member state to citizens of another, particularly a poorer, state. The issue has given rise to accusations of ‘welfare tourism’ and has inspired proposals that could unacceptably limit the free circulation of people (Reho 2014). In future, some of these benefits could be paid through the EU budget in order to prevent 9

Interestingly, and more in tune with my understanding of European federalism, one author went as far as to argue that Europe’s social model is its ‘competing institutional variety’ (Wohlgemuth 2008).

10

The exact impact of a federalist economic order on the provision of public services will have to be assessed in each specific institutional context. Systems of public service provision other than direct state provision may have to be explored (e.g. school vouchers for education, as opposed to the direct ownership of schools and the direct hiring of teachers by the state). For an early perspective on more competitive ways of providing public services see Friedman (1962).

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dangerous challenges to the four freedoms. In spite of these caveats, however, the central message is clear: if they wish to be part of a federal European order, member states (both governments and electorates) must be clear about what this means and implies, and stand ready to reorganise their economic and social systems accordingly. In the words of Hayek (1948)—the doyen of twentiethcentury liberalism and one of the earliest students of the economic conditions of supranational federations—the readiness to accept definite limits to the economic powers of the state ‘will be the acid test of whether we are intellectually mature for the achievement of suprastate organization’.

Federalism and contemporary policy challenges I will not claim that the federalism I defend provides some sort of panacea for the many policy challenges of our age. I am convinced, however, that this doctrine is in accord with the spirit of the age and could contribute—if it came to inspire our way of conceiving and pursuing European integration—to solving many of its challenges. I suspect that its first contribution would be towards a better articulation of the debate on the future of the EU and, more specifically, on what it actually means to be pro-European. Vague formulas such as ‘ever closer union’ and ‘more Europe’ would be given a more precise constitutional meaning—one that would make it easier to fend off the attacks of Eurosceptics against alleged attempts to create a European superstate with tentacular regulatory powers. Furthermore, this vision—which in itself does not have to be specifically associated with any political force—seems closer in spirit to the values of the pro-European right than to those of the pro-European left, which is more inclined to a state-like vision of harmonisation and relative centralisation of the EU. It can thus help the European centre–right to articulate a European federalism of its own. It can also contribute to reframing the European debate as a contest between competing visions of European unity, instead of a fight between a relatively undifferentiated pro-European mainstream, on the one hand, and the anti-European forces, on the other.

By fully embracing its federal destiny, the EU would also be in a better position to cope with the secessionist challenges that are threatening the integrity of many member states (e.g. Belgium, Italy, Spain and the UK). This is so for at least two reasons. First, secessionist tendencies are often exacerbated by the far-reaching regional transfers of modern European welfare states. Since the logic of openness in a decentralised federation tends to limit the scope of such centrally managed welfare structures, one of the economic rationales for secession is weakened.11 Second, while an increase of member countries as a 11

Different levels of economic development and regional transfers have undoubtedly played a major role in the rise of secessionist movements in Italy and Belgium, and some role in Spain.

Interestingly, awareness that free-market policies can be a welfare-enhancing alternative to secession is now inspiring the action of some separatist parties in government. The most notable example is the New Flemish Alliance in Belgium, the dominant force in a centre–right government whose programme is the most economically reformist that Belgium has seen in decades (Robinson 2014).

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result of secessions would probably put a strain on the present institutional structure of the EU, it could be more easily accommodated in a proper federal setting. This is because member states would have much less clout on the very few issues dealt with at the EU level, and almost complete autonomy on all the rest, with the only limit to such autonomy being the requirement of openness and competition.12 The creation of a proper federal structure is also the best way to ensure the widest possible ‘repatriation’ of powers from the EU to its states and regions.

Therefore, it has the potential to meet some demands of the more Eurosceptic countries (e.g. the UK) without rejecting the idea that Europe has a supranational and federal destiny. Indeed, the EU is in many regards more centralised than most federations in history, and a federal evolution could well reduce its competences in many fields. For example, no federation has ever controlled the budgets and economic policies of its constituent units as tightly as the EU does.13 Under a truly federal framework, these and other powers could probably be exercised at the state and local level without undermining the stability of the whole, as they unfortunately do in the present EU. Finally, as mentioned, economic federalism would drastically reduce the level of bureaucracy and make our economies much more flexible. Moreover, it would boost regulatory competition. This has the potential to free for productive endeavours the wealth of resources now employed in bureaucratic and other unproductive activities, thus giving Europe a more flexible and resilient economic constitution for the twenty-first century.

Conclusion This article has tried to shed light on the meaning of federalism in general and of European federalism in particular. It has argued that the common tendency to identify federalisation and state-making in Europe is highly misguided, as the political and institutional logic of modern nation states is completely at odds with that of federations. The former are characterised by sovereignty, institutional hierarchy and bureaucratic uniformity; the latter are characterised by the dissolution of sovereignty, institutional competition and societal diversity. While one is economically agnostic, and often displays a tendency towards significant regulation and government intervention, the other has a prejudice against coercive government intervention and in favour of economic openness. This 12

Incidentally, the same reasoning is applicable to future enlargements. The EU’s ‘enlargement fatigue’ is also the result of a confederal institutional structure where each new member state adds to the decision-making costs of the common institutions. Federalisation is therefore imperative to creating a positive perspective on further enlargements.

13

In the US, which has strayed a fair distance from a proper federalist structure in the direction of centralisation, it is still unthinkable (and unconstitutional) for the federal government in Washington to inspect the draft budgetary plans of states and pressure them into adopting ‘sound’ economic policy measures, as the European Commission does under the new governance of our Economic and Monetary Union. Some states are very fiscally responsible; others are virtually bankrupt. Tax harmonisation is equally inconceivable, and tax competition is the rule.

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article has further argued that embracing a clearly articulated federalist doctrine could help pro-European forces, and especially the pro-European right, to overcome the present crisis, recover a sense of purpose and prepare to more confidently meet the challenges of the coming years.

Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source are credited.

References Alesina, A., & Giavazzi, F. (2006). The future of Europe: Reform or decline. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. de Tocqueville, A. (2003). Democracy in America. London: Penguin.

Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and freedom. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Hayek, F. A. (1948). Individualism and economic order. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Ostrom, V. (1991). The meaning of American federalism: Constituting a self-governing society. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press.

Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the twenty-first century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Reho, F. O. (2014). ‘Theory checking’: Is unconditional free movement in the EU beneficial? Martens Centre Blog, 5 June. http://martenscentre.eu/blog/%E2%80%98theory-checking%E2%80% 99-unconditional-free-movement-eu-beneficial. Accessed 25 March 2015 Robinson, D. (2014). Flemish separatists hold sway in new Belgian government. Financial Times, 8 October.

Weiler, J. (1999). The constitution of Europe: ‘Do the new clothes have an emperor?’ and other essays in European integration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Weingast, B. R. (1995). The economic role of political institutions: Market-preserving federalism and economic development. Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation, 11(1), 1–31.

Wohlgemuth, M. (2008). The European social model of state–market relations: The ethics of competition from a ‘neo-liberal’ perspective. Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics. Walter Eucken Institut.

Federico Ottavio Reho is Junior Research Officer at the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies. He previously worked in the EU Institutions and Fora Division of the European Central Bank. He studied European political economy in four European countries, including at the London School of Economics and the Hertie School of Governance (Berlin).

European View (2015) 14:93–99 DOI 10.1007/s12290-015-0345-7 ARTICLE

Crowdsourcing as new instrument in policy-making: making the democratic process more engaging Maria Lastovka Published online: 11 June 2015 The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com

Abstract This paper discusses crowdsourcing as a new instrument for engaging the public in policymaking. Technological advancements in digital communication tools are making it increasingly easy and inexpensive to receive input from the ‘crowd’, the citizens. Hence utilising crowdsourcing in the democratic process can offer both traditional political institutions and political parties an opportunity to engage citizens and increase legitimacy.

Keywords Crowdsourcing Legislation Participation Policymaking Citizen empowerment Collective intelligence Introduction Our society is living in turbulent, yet exciting times: an unprecedented political crisis on the European level is shaking up the political status quo, leaving no stone unturned. Europeans have begun to realise that they live in a more complex, interdependent and connected era than ever before.

Citizens are now questioning the current political situation and are not satisfied with the means of participation. Where European politics is concerned, many citizens do not feel sufficiently informed and are unable to get actively involved. According to the latest Eurobarometer results, more than 50 % of European citizens feel ‘that their voice is not heard’ on the EU level (European Commission, Directorate-General for Communication 2014, 35).

M. Lastovka (&) Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, Rue du Commerce 20, 1000 Brussels, Belgium e-mail: maria@thumbsofeurope.com

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However, democratic processes, and policymaking tools especially, remain very traditional. Voting for representatives during elections is still the primary source of legitimacy in the law-making process—with only rare ‘adventurous’ participatory exceptions, for example in the Nordic countries.

The desire for more legitimacy in representative democracy, combined with the unprecedented technological possibilities available for realising greater citizen involvement, is exciting for citizens and political actors alike, as its achievement would offer a more encompassing assessment of society’s sentiments. Existing digital communication tools that are readily available and just waiting to be exploited are expected to improve the quality of democracy through an increase in citizen participation. Most promisingly, digital methods can improve the dialogue between civil society on the one hand, and elected officials and political parties on the other (Loader and Mercea 2012).

This article will address crowdsourcing in democratic processes and especially how the process of crowdsourcing legislation can be implemented by political parties to augment democratic processes. One example of how legislation can be crowdsourced will be presented in greater detail, and the implications for the citizens who participate in the process will be discussed. The article will look at possible challenges to crowdsourcing activities and then conclude with recommendations on how political parties can use this new technology effectively.

What is crowdsourcing?

Dr. Tanja Aitamurto is the Deputy Director of the Brown Institute for Media Innovation at Stanford University and an adviser to the Finnish government on Open Government projects, including those involving crowdsourced legislation.

She defines crowdsourcing as ‘an open call for anybody to participate in a task open online, … where ‘ the crowd’’ refers to an undefined group of people who participate’ (Aitamurto 2012, 8). Basically, crowdsourcing aims to gather collective intelligence—based on the assumption that knowledge is most accurately formed when ideas from a diverse population are combined.

As technologies have improved, crowdsourcing has become a popular method for gathering and exploiting collective intelligence. Crowdsourcing offers unprecedented possibilities for traditional representative democracy: citizens are able to participate in brainstorming, reflecting upon and even implementing decisions that used to be the exclusive territory of political and expert elites (Aitamurto 2012, 5).

There are many fields in which crowdsourcing is used as a method and a tool: crowdmapping, innovation processes, creative work and entertainment, journalism, and providing funding, to name just a few. This paper will focus on crowdsourcing in the democratic process and how political parties can best embrace crowdsourcing tools for policymaking.

First, it is necessary to take a quick look at political parties and their characteristics and key roles in a democratic society. A political party is an

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organised group of people that more or less shares the same goals and values, and has the aim of influencing public policy to its benefit. Among other tasks (such as nominating and supporting its candidates in electoral campaigns), a political party ideally acts as a negotiator or mediator between governmental institutions and civil society. It aims to educate its electorate about political processes, as well as to channel public opinion from citizens to government, consequently transforming these aggregated opinions into policy priorities and legislation (ACE Electoral Knowledge Network 2015).

Traditionally, political parties operate within their party boundaries, gathering opinions and formulating policy priorities. ‘Even if inner-party democracy and formation of opinion function perfectly, not all party members will be able or willing to participate actively in all the important decisions of a party’ (Hofmeister 2011, 34). However, with the many digital communication tools that exist today, political parties could be much more active in involving a larger share of their members or could even attract new members with the prospect of real participation in the policymaking process.

As crowdsourcing is one way to formulate and channel public opinion from the citizens to the government or from party members to the party leadership, an example of crowdsourcing is discussed below in more detail.

Crowdsourcing legislation in Finland: Openministry.org Finland introduced a national citizens’ initiative instrument into its constitution in 2012 which obliges the parliament to deal with any crowdsourced initiative that reaches 50,000 digital signatures. Open Ministry (Avoin ministerio¨) is aiming to be the first Finnish civil society organisation to crowdsource legislation through citizen input (Openministry.org 2015). The project enables citizens to present legislative proposals to the parliament once they have reached the threshold of 50,000 signatures (Crowd Expedition 2014).

Open Ministry is made possible through the EU-funded Decentralised Citizens Engagement Technologies project (D-CENT 2015), which is currently in the pilot stage and is developing next-generation tools for online democracy in Helsinki, Barcelona and Reykjavik (Pekkanen 2014). Openministry.org provides a platform for the discussion of proposals for citizens’ initiatives (Christensen et al. 2014).

Volunteer lawyers then transcribe the citizens’ ideas into actual legislative proposals which meet parliamentary standards.

So far, six initiatives have passed the threshold and have been handed over to the Finnish parliament. In November 2014, the largest initiative introduced through the Open Ministry platform became the first citizen initiative in Finnish history to be accepted by the parliament. Regarding the crowdsourced proposal, which gave gays and lesbians equal marriage rights with heterosexual couples, the Finnish Parliament voted 105 in favour and 92 against (Bria et al. 2014, 29).

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Implications for participating citizens Current research by Bria et al. (2014, 29) suggests that the success of the Finnish citizens’ initiative has had a positive effect on those citizens who engaged with the project, as they experienced first-hand that their digital participation made a difference. Another research team found that ‘taking part in crowdsourcing affects the attitudes of the participants’ (Christensen et al. 2014) and could help to restore political legitimacy. The research by Christensen et al. (2014, 13) also suggests that when the democratic decision-making process is conceived as fair, transparent and ultimately legitimate by citizens, they are also satisfied with an output or result that does not match their preferences. This indicates that crowdsourcing can make a difference in creating a ‘fairer and more trust-worthy decision-making process’ and could be an innovative way for political parties to foster more citizen engagement.

Challenges for crowdsourcing legislation When implementing crowdsourcing on a practical level there are also some challenges to take into account.

The digital divide, that is, between those who do not have access to the Internet or do not have the skills to use its infrastructure efficiently and those who do, is the most significant challenge to crowdsourcing. It is therefore of utmost importance to realise that the outcomes of crowdsourcing initiatives cannot be considered as equal with those of a national referendum. Currently there are still unconnected fringes of society that are not able to participate in such online initiatives and thus participants’ opinions do not necessarily represent the majority opinion (Aitamurto 2012, 36). It is vital to understand that ‘[t]he most efficient networks are those that link to the broadest range of information, knowledge, and experience’ (Howe 2006). Hence, the participation of a broad range of diverse population groups is desirable in crowdsourcing initiatives, and this should ideally also include the elderly, the less tech-savvy and the less affluent parts of society.

It is not recommended that experts be replaced with crowdsourcing alone.

However, the use of crowdsourcing for legislation has the positive effect that these open participatory methods enable citizens to have their voices heard beyond the traditional activist, expert and lobbying groups, and bring new perspectives to the table.

When it comes to the cost of crowdsourcing, it is an advantage that the actual tools for crowdsourcing legislation online are available on an open-source basis and free to use. However, ‘[d]esigning the process and community management requires the most human resources in crowdsourcing’ (Aitamurto 2012, 38).

Effective community management and the mobilisation of a wide range of citizen groups are essential. As crowdsourcing presents a new participatory culture, the threshold for becoming acquainted with a new technology and actually participating in an initiative can be high if left unmanaged. Community management is also important for monitoring participation in order to remove off-topic comments and inappropriate behaviour online.

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Recommendations for political parties In order for political parties or political institutions to effectively make use of crowdsourcing as a tool in policymaking, there are some key points that need to be taken into consideration. These are as follows.

Crowdsourcing initiatives should be launched in conjunction with offline events. In autumn 2012, for instance, Finland hosted the international Open Knowledge Festival to discuss open access topics and present related advances from all around the world (Aitamurto 2012, 40). Offline events also foster the initiator–participant relationship and give participants the opportunity to give feedback on the process.

Political parties could, for example, integrate a crowdsourcing initiative in the run-up to their party convention, through which delegates or members could vote on policy priorities. Adding a crowdsourcing initiative as a way to enhance the opinion-forming process within a party could also attract new party members. According to Hofmeister (2011, 37), offering the clear prospect of participation is, among other factors, one attractive asset that a political party can provide to prospective members.

Additionally, effective communication and community management are needed to reach a wide range of citizens. In order for a crowdsourcing initiative to mirror diversity, it is necessary to reach out to potential participants by actively contacting groups from all facets of society (Aitamurto 2012, 34). In addition to the initial invitation to participate in crowdsourcing, the actual process needs a lot of attention as well. Fruitful crowdsourcing needs a strong and clear-cut online presence, and the organisers have to ensure this is provided. An online community requires continuous attention as conversations have to be curated, questions answered and inappropriate statements deleted, and ideas need to be sorted and categorised. All of this requires human resources, which are absolutely necessary if a crowdsourcing initiative is to be sustainable (Aitamurto 2012, 35).

Furthermore, it is important to clearly communicate the time frame for the crowdsourcing initiative to ensure that citizens have the incentive to contribute.

Once the crowdsourcing initiative has closed and enough data has been gathered, the results of the process should be illustrated in a public report published online so that the citizens can see the effects of their input. Studies also recommend publishing the lessons learned and emphasising the role of crowdsourcing in the specific democratic process involved (Aitamurto 2012, 36). For political parties it could be beneficial if, during a party convention, a specific policy priority, which has been decided upon in the run-up to the convention using crowdsourcing, is presented alongside other policy priorities that have been voted on in the traditional way.

It is important to note that crowdsourcing and other participatory methods are tools to reach a goal, rather than ends in their own right. The goal is a more equal and democratic society, in which citizens have the ability and the aspiration to make their voices heard and in which they can influence policies directly, not just indirectly during elections.

Political window dressing actually reduces people’s motivation to participate in the future, ‘because the plausible promise of participation—impact, and being

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heard—isn’t realized’ (Aitamurto 2012, 39). Therefore, political parties as well as political actors should only consider incorporating crowdsourcing activities into their policymaking process if they are able and willing to seriously consider and implement crowdsourced ideas. Equally, if political parties incorporate a crowdsourcing initiative in their agenda-setting process which ultimately outputs policy priorities for the party’s programme, then it is vital that crowdsourcing is not treated as an inferior method of participation.

On a European level That crowdsourcing is a widely debated topic in Europe right now is underlined by the fact that the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technologies has initiated a crowdsourcing initiative, the Digital Futures foresight project. Its purpose is to reflect upon information and communication technology-related policies beyond 2020. This initiative aims to gather stakeholder opinions on the challenges and opportunities for decision-making in 2050. ‘Will a more politically active society work best through representative democracy, or will each individual’s opinion on all topics count? What new roles will emerge in politics as the use of big data and machines (e.g. high-performance devices and software) to support decisionmaking becomes the norm?’ (DG CONNECT 2014). These are important questions to raise now, as increased connectivity through the Internet will very likely generate a society that is better able to engage and might therefore be more politically interested as well.

Conclusion An increasing legitimacy problem on the political level, combined with unprecedented digital opportunities and the societal desire for participation, has created the opportunity for traditional institutions to embrace more transparency and openness in policymaking by using participatory methods such as crowdsourcing. Empirical research into crowdsourcing legislation suggests that citizens are eager to engage online in new and participatory ways of having their voices heard. Crowdsourcing is a new tool which citizens can use to actively shape traditional political processes. For these new channels of participation to succeed and evolve, adventurous and progressive policymakers and political parties are needed who are willing to take the path less travelled.

Crowdsourcing holds great potential for tapping into the wisdom of the ‘crowd’, the citizens, as well as increasing political legitimacy. It would be a lost opportunity if political parties did not embrace these new digital tools to enhance citizen engagement and ultimately increase trust in the democratic process.

Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source are credited.

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References ACE

Electoral Knowledge Network. (2015). Roles and definition of political parties. http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/pc/pca/pca01/pca01a. Accessed 30 March 2015.

Aitamurto, T. (2012). Crowdsourcing for democracy: A new era in policy-making. Helsinki: Parliament of Finland. http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Crowdsourcing_for_DemocracyF_www.pdf.

Accessed 24 March 2015.

Bria, F., Halpin, H., Pekkanen, J., Korhonen, J., Toret Medina, J., Arana Catania, M., & Mancini, P. (2014).

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610349. 30 November. http://dcentproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/D5.1-Pilot-Impleme ntation-of-Open-Social-Web-for-Participatory-Democracy.pdf. Accessed 27 March 2015.

Christensen, H. S., Karjalainen, M., & Nurminen, L. (2014). What does crowdsourcing legislation entail for the participants? The Finnish case of Avoin Ministerio¨. Paper presented at ‘The Internet, Policy and Politics Conferences 2014: Crowdsourcing for Politics and Policy’. Oxford. 25–6 September. http://ipp.oii.ox.ac.uk/sites/ipp/files/documents/IPP2014_Christensen.pdf. Accessed 27 March 2015 .

Crowd Expedition. (2014). Crowd expedition talks to Joonas Pekkanen from Open Ministry at the Crowdsourcing Week Europe 2014. YouTube.com. Published 14 October 2014. https://www.yo utube.com/watch?v=PMpUZfVt_pw&feature=youtube_gdata_player. Accessed 27 March 2015 .

D-CENT. (2015). D-CENT (website). http://dcentproject.eu/. Accessed 30 March 2015.

DG CONNECT. (2014). Digital single market: Digital4EU. https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en. Accessed 26 March 2015.

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Hofmeister, W. (2011). Political parties: Functions and organisation in democratic societies. Singapore: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_7671-1442-2-30.pdf?120920114650.

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Howe, J. (2006). The rise of crowdsourcing. Wired.com, June. http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/ 14.06/crowds.html. Accessed 26 March 2015.

Loader, B. D., & Mercea, D. (2012). Social media and democracy: Innovations in participatory politics.

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Openministry.org. (2015). Open Ministry – Crowdsourcing legislation. http://openministry.info/?og=1.

Accessed 27 March 2015.

Pekkanen, J. (2014). D-CENT piloting in Finland: Introducing online democracy into decision making.

D-CENT. 9 December. http://dcentproject.eu/2014/12/d-cent-piloting-in-helsinki-introducing-onl ine-democracy-into-decision-making/. Accessed 26 March 2015.

Maria Lastovka is the Co-founder of Thumbs of Europe, an online platform on which citizens can vote on EU policies. She completed her Bachelor’s degree in public management and governance at Zeppelin University, Germany, and her M.Sc. in EU politics at the London School of Economics.

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European View (2015) 14:101–110 DOI 10.1007/s12290-015-0349-3 ARTICLE

Values topple nationality in the European Parliament Doru Petrisor Frantescu

Published online: 18 June 2015 Ó The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com

Abstract This article shows that the internal unity of EU political groups, the legislative arm of the EU-level parties, is surprisingly high, despite the increasing cultural and geographical diversity among member states as a result of successive EU enlargements. Members of the European Parliament come from 28 countries with very different economic situations, cultural contexts and religious traditions. Some are members of governing parties, while others are in opposition. And yet this article shows that, generally speaking, the socialising effect of being part of a group with shared values contributes significantly to shaping a common vision of what the future of the EU should be and how our societies should function. However, this process is not yet visible enough to the public.

This lack of visibility could pose a significant challenge to creating a truly European public space and a genuinely democratic Union. Both are prerequisites to ensuring the EU’s key role in the world and the prosperity of its citizens.

Keywords European political groups Cohesion Values Integration EU public space

Introduction The political parties from across the European continent have formed transnational political families, based on their values. The ‘internationalisation’ of political parties started in the late nineteenth century, but it was brought to a completely new level once the European Parliament (EP) came into existence, as D. P. Frantescu (&) VoteWatch, Avenue de Tervueren 32–34, Box 1, 1040 Brussels, Belgium e-mail: doru@votewatcheurope.eu

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the parties then had the chance to compare their views and negotiate their positions on the same policy dilemmas at the same time.

From the beginning, the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have formed parliamentary groups not according to their nationality, but according to their ideology—just as in national parliaments parliamentary groups are formed by the members who share similar policy orientations in order to better coordinate, share resources and exert influence on policy.

This article analyses the voting behaviour of these pan-European parliamentary groups, whose cohesion and internal splits are used as indicators of the actual symmetries and divisions between national parties belonging to the same political orientation.

How cohesive are the European parliamentary groups in the new term?

The pan-European parties have long been considered mere consultative bodies, rather than decision-making ones. Power has always remained in the hands of the national party chiefs and the heads of state. Traditionally, the leading political figures within the EU institutions, whether commissioners or MEPs, have been seen as following instructions from their party bosses back home.

But the aftermath of the 2014 European elections may indicate a change of direction. Since the Lisbon Treaty, the EP has become bolder, not only when negotiating legislation, but also when appointing the EU’s chief executives. MEPs have been able not only to create a united front among themselves but also to rally support among their colleagues at national level using the structures of the European parties. Ultimately, they submit their candidate for the presidency of the European Commission.

Moreover, as shown by VoteWatch Europe, an organisation that tracks the votes and activities of MEPs, the internal cohesion of the EU political groups is surprisingly high despite the increasing cultural and geographical diversity that has resulted from successive EU enlargements (VoteWatch Europe 2015b).1 MEPs come from 28 countries with different economic situations, and different cultural and religious traditions. Some come from governing parties while others are in opposition. They speak 24 different languages. Individually, they would say that this makes it difficult and time-consuming for them to understand each other and reach common positions. And yet it seems that, generally speaking, the socialising effect of being part of a group with shared values contributes significantly to shaping a common vision of what the future of the EU should be and how our societies should function. Not least, the increasing security concerns both on the eastern frontier (concerning the conflict in Ukraine) and elsewhere (the emergence of Islamic State in particular) seem to have acted as catalysts for finding communalities within political families.

1

Measures of cohesion or unity assess the extent to which MEPs belonging to the same political group vote the same way in EP plenary roll-call votes.

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Since the 2014–2019 EP term got under way, most of the political groups have shown a high level of internal cohesion. This may be explained by the fact that half of the MEPs are new and have not yet been able to develop their own individual positions. The largest European political group, that of the European People’s Party (EPP), has proved better at mobilising its MEPs in this first part of the parliamentary term. As a result it continues to be the leading EP group, despite substantial losses in the May 2014 elections. This can partly be explained by the more fragmented political landscape. This has resulted in the EPP being under increased pressure from both the left and the right, a likely incentive for its backbenchers to support their leaders.

At the end of 2014, the level of internal cohesion of the EPP reached a record 95 %, the highest level since 2004, when VoteWatch began measuring this indicator. Similarly, the Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, once the fourth most cohesive group, has moved to second place, having improved its score from 88 % to 91 % (VoteWatch Europe 2015b).

The Conservatives and Reformists Group has, in theory, become stronger after the elections, as it is now the third largest in the parliament. In practice, however, its new structure, in which the British and Polish delegations are almost on a par, has apparently been making it more difficult than before to reach a common position. The group has lost 10 % in cohesion, going from 86 % to 76 %.

On the left, the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats is slightly less cohesive than before the elections. But the biggest negative change belongs to the Group of the Greens and the European Free Alliance; this group lost 6 %, reaching a record low of 88.5 % at the end of 2014. In reality however, these figures are an overestimate as the first six months of a term are a period of adaptation: half of the MEPs are new and many parties face changes in their internal composition as well as changes in the group’s leadership. Over time, the disparity in cohesion should narrow within these groups.

Last but not least, the Eurosceptics of the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group have been finding it much more difficult than any other group to agree among themselves. In fact, they vote as a group only about half of the time, while in other instances they effectively cancel out each other’s votes. This indicates that in this particular case the reasons for creating a group are much less about values than about logistics and strategy. Being part of a group helps individual members gain access to speaking time, reports, information and financial resources. It is worth mentioning here the failed attempt of the National Front (Front National) and its allies in 2014 to form yet another Eurosceptic, nationalist group. This did not succeed, largely because of the lack of coalition potential; that is, they were unable to find enough members from enough countries to side with their MEPs.

What are the historical trends?

The historical trends seem to confirm that political groups have generally become more organised over time, especially since the last European elections

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and the Lisbon Treaty. The role of the EP has also increased. Therefore, to obtain a more accurate assessment, we should look at similar types of decisions. An analysis of cohesive voting behaviour, limited to co-decision issues,2 shows a positive trend for most of the political groups (EPP, Socialists, Liberals, Greens, Group of the Conservatives and Reformists/Union of Europe of the Nations) throughout the interval starting with the fourth parliamentary term (which began in 1994) to 2013.

Interestingly, this trend has continued even in the wake of the big-bang enlargement of 2004 when 10 countries joined the EU. Many feared then that the increasing cultural and geographical variety would lead to chaos, both in the EU legislative process and within political groups. The data shows that this did not happen. It stands as solid proof of the importance of shared values and of the capacity of European groups to act as key catalysts for dialogue, consensus building and, ultimately, European integration. (This applies for the groups that support European integration, whose internal cohesion is substantially higher than that of the groups that oppose further integration, as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2). Moreover, within the groups, the behaviour of the national party delegations coming from the new member states does not appear to have changed after the first few years of ‘learning the ropes’, even though the confidence that their constituents—the citizens of the ‘new Europe’—have in the EU institutions has decreased during the economic crisis which succeeded the initial wave of enthusiasm.

What divides the members of a political group?

MEPs are agents with two principals: their constituents and their group leadership. An MEP represents the interests of his or her constituents and has to try to shape EU decisions in accordance with the needs and desires of the citizens he or she represents. To be effective, however, an MEP has to build trust among his or her political group colleagues and make trade-offs.

In particular situations, the interests of the constituents in a country or subnational constituency are (or are perceived to be) disproportionately affected by a decision. This gives the MEPs involved a greater incentive to vote differently from the majority of their group colleagues. In other situations, it is ethical topics that are responsible for group divisions. This differs from one group to another, depending on the hierarchy of priorities or values in each group. The impact of the decision, whether it is a simple recommendation or a binding law, also seems to play a role in how cohesive a group is.

For example, EPP Group members usually have a common line on votes that impact directly on the economy (e.g. votes involving the ‘Six Pack’) and the allocation of funds, the internal market (e.g. strengthening the internal market for services), international trade (e.g. negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership), budget matters and even agriculture (which accounts 2

The co-decision procedure was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty and is well established.

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Fig. 1 European political group cohesion rates in all policy areas, 1 July 2014–31 December 2014 100

95.42 88.59

90

90.1

91.04

82.5 80

76.61

70 60

51.11 50 GUE/NGL

Greens-EFA

S&D

ALDE

EPP

ECR

EFDD

Source: Data from VoteWatch Europe (2015b, 8) Note: GUE/NGL United European Le and Nordic Green Le , Greens-EFA Greens and European Free Alliance, S & D Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, ALDE Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, EPP European People’s Party, ECR European Conserva ves and Reformists, EFDD Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy.

Fig. 2 Cohesion in co-decision roll-call votes (1994–2013)

Cohesion in co-decision RCVs 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 EP4 EPP

S&D

EP5 ALDE

EP6 Greens/EFA

EP7 ECR

GUE

EFDD

Source: Data from VoteWatch Europe (2013a, 4) Note: EPP European People’s Party, S & D Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats and its predecessors, ALDE Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe and its predecessors, Greens/EFA Greens and European Free Alliance, UEN/ECR Union of Europe of the Na ons and European Conserva ves and Reformists, GUE United European Le , EFDD Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy.

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for around 40 % of the EU budget). On the other hand, EPP MEPs generally agree to have free voting on ethical issues. Here, cultural factors play a more important role. Moreover, voting is generally non-binding and more a matter of sending a political message. The issues involved include those linked to abortion; the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender community; and gender equality.3 On the left side of the political spectrum, we observe a somewhat different pattern. The Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats Group has been more cohesive on civil liberties and social issues and less cohesive on dossiers that deal with economic policies, trade and, during the last term, agriculture.

This trend could be explained by the fact that matters based on religion—such as traditional family values—play a lesser role for the MEPs of this group and the left in general (compared with the EPP). Moreover, members of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats are likely to be influenced more by local trade unions and show a comparatively higher level of protectionist behaviour.

The policy area of environment and public health has proved to be among the most divisive for both the centre–right and the centre–left. This is explained by the greater diversity of environmental regulations in various member states and the fact that the EU has strong prerogatives in this area. For example, many of the documents voted on are legally binding and have to be implemented across the EU.

What is the impact of vote tracking?

Since 2009, VoteWatch Europe has been tracking, in real time, all votes of the MEPs in the EP plenary. Individual MEPs and political groups seem to find our web platform helpful. They use it as a tool to track developments in voting behaviour in the EP. VoteWatch also measures the level of loyalty to the political group and the national party delegation to which MEPs belong.4 However, it does not make value judgements, loyalty in this case being simply a measurement of the extent to which an MEP votes in the same way as the majority of his or her colleagues. This calculation does not rely on the voting lists of the political groups. As mentioned above, it is understood that an MEP has to vote according to his or her conscience and in line with the interests of his or her constituents. But he or she also has to show solidarity with political colleagues, since they can prove useful in defending common interests when negotiating with, or voting against, other groups.

The leaderships of the groups show interest in the way their groups are perceived by the public, for example whether or not they are seen as united. This being the case, one would expect internal debate to be generated by the publication of both results related to the cohesion of the groups and, more 3

For a full table of cohesion scores for the period from 2004 to the present, see the VoteWatch Europe website (www.votewatch.eu).

4

For the ranking of the loyalty rates of the MEPs for the current EP term, see VoteWatch Europe (2015a).

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specifically, the rankings by degree of cohesion. Regardless of whether these statistical results come from outside sources or the internal monitoring of the groups, the groups in favour of EU integration are likely to aim to be more cohesive, in order to demonstrate to citizens that they are a strong force and for the practical purpose of winning votes in the EP. Consequently, one can expect their leadership to try to find ways to accommodate the interests of the MEPs who are likely to break away from the group line. This can be done with both ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’. For example, the leadership can pave the way for an MEP to gain more visibility and influence within the group and in the EP as a whole— through rapporteurships, key posts, speaking time, and support for amendments and other personal initiatives. But the leadership can also refrain from providing such opportunities.

On the other hand, the national bosses, home party leadership and constituents have their reasons for wanting to influence an MEP’s voting behaviour and to hold him or her to account. They have ways of achieving this end that go even beyond those available to the group leadership—provided they are constantly aware of the MEP’s activity. They can provide visibility and influence in the local arena, as well as support for re-election.

It seems reasonable to believe that MEPs would have a greater inclination to vote in line with the interests of that segment of their constituents, bosses and allies that follows and scrutinises their activity the most closely. Think of a situation where an MEP knows that the European group leadership is highly aware of his or her voting behaviour, while his or her national party or constituents in the member state are completely unaware of it. One would expect that, all other things being equal, the MEP would be more motivated to vote along the European group line than if the situations were reversed.

Despite this, our data shows that MEPs are more loyal to their national party delegation than to the European political group. If there is a difference between the position of their fellow countrymen coming from the same party and the majority of their European group, they tend to follow the national party line. But how has the cohesion of the groups increased at the same time? The likely answer is that the differences between various national party delegations within a group have become fewer. This could mean that there has been a decrease in the number of situations where an MEP has to choose between the position of the national party delegation and that of the European group as a whole.

What does the public think about European party cohesion?

Reactions from the public have been mixed. We have encountered quite a few people who are still surprised to find that MEPs form coalitions largely according to their political families and not on the basis of nationality. (This finding may come as a surprise to political experts.) There are some who expect that MEPs from their country will stand united, regardless of the political family, to defend the perceived national interest. The latest Parlemeter finds that only 48 % of the public know that MEPs sit in transnational groups, and only 40 % believe that

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the decisions in the EP are made according to political affinities. The results differ considerably between countries in the north and west (the older EU members) and those in the east and south (newer members)—with the newer EU members being more inclined to think that nationality prevails (European Parliament Directorate-General for Communication Public Opinion Monitoring Unit and TNS Opinion 2015, 32–5).

This perception may be at least partly generated by the rhetoric during the electoral campaigns, when some politicians resort to statements such as ‘Choose me to represent our country in Brussels.’ It is likely that this perception is intensified because many people fail to understand that what counts as being in the national interest can differ greatly from person to person. For example, one group may think that being part of a stronger EU is in the national interest, while another might believe it to be in the national interest to take an anti-European stance. Similarly, for one citizen it may be in the national interest to have a more social Europe, while for another it could be to have more open markets. This combination of choices means that EU debates are conducted on what is largely a two-dimensional basis: pro-EU or anti-EU, and left versus right. There seems to be a natural inclination that leads individual citizens to believe that all politicians should do what he or she thinks best. In reality, what one citizen thinks to be the optimum socio-economic arrangement is unlikely to be the same for another with a different profile. It is here that the need for political pluralism fits in.

This difference in the views of various political forces is more easily seen by the citizens at the national level, thanks to the continuous political debates, which are communicated better than those at the European level. The lack of exposure to the EP debates via the media prevents large sections of the public from understanding that EU politics are very similar to those at national level.

Consequently, in the absence of public debates about the EU, a part of the public is unaware that pan-European political groups exist. The Spitzenkandidaten process, through which the European political parties nominated their candidates to the European Commission presidency at the start of the electoral campaign in 2014, included debates between the leading candidates in several countries and in three languages. To some extent this has helped communicate the idea of political pluralism at EU level, particularly in the countries that put forward candidates. For example, centre–right oriented citizens in Germany probably realised that their views more closely matched those of a non-German, Jean-Claude Juncker, than those of a centre–left German, Martin Schulz. And of course, the opposite applies for centre–left oriented citizens in Luxembourg.

Citizens who tried out the unique tools developed by VoteWatch Europe in the run-up to the 2014 elections had a similar experience. Two websites, MyVote2014 and Electio2014, included a ‘vote match’ tool that allowed users to vote on 15 items on which MEPs had also voted and then to compare their own views against those of each MEP. These tools are the only ones of their kind at EU level, as the matching is not based on the party agenda but on actual MEP votes. As a result, the tools can indicate not only the party but also the individual MEP who comes closest to a user’s views. In many instances the best match for a participant was an MEP from another country. Even though the user cannot vote

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for that person, the result demonstrates to the public the power of values and ideology, which go beyond country borders. It also helps people understand why MEPs sit in political groups and why they usually vote in line with the majority in those groups. Moreover, this exercise would become even more useful were a pan-European constituency to be created (in addition to the national ones). Such a constituency was proposed in a report by former MEP Andrew Duff during the 2009–14 term but did not rally enough support at that time (European Parliament, Committee on Constitutional Affairs 2011).

Conclusions The tracking of voting behaviour in the EP could prove extremely useful for understanding trends in EU politics. The surprisingly high level of unity among MEPs belonging to the same European political family can be seen as a key indication of the growing integration of European political elites and of the increasing desire and incentive to find communalities across topics. The members of individual groups are finding that the issues that bring them together greatly outnumber those that divide them.

However, this trend is not yet obvious to the larger public, particularly in the countries that have joined the EU more recently. This continues to pose a serious impediment to correctly communicating the developments, debates and decision-making processes in EU politics. It is still difficult for the public to perceive that EU politics is about more than various national governments fighting each other for their own interests, that it is also about values and alternatives put forward by the transnational political families. In such circumstances, it is imperative that the European parties, EP groups and national parties find ways and resources to educate the electorate and to effectively communicate their political agendas, priorities and achievements—as well as to explain why these are better than those of the competing political actors. This is the only way in which a true European democratic space can be created. And this democratic space is required as a precondition to the strengthening of a political Union capable of engaging and uniting the citizens in 28 countries (or more).

Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source are credited.

References European Parliament, Committee on Constitutional Affairs. (2011). Report on a proposal for a modification of the act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage of 20 September 1976. Rapporteur: Andrew Duff. 28 April. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT?REPORT?A7-20110176?0?DOC?XML?V0//EN&language=en. Accessed 17 April 2015.

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110 European Parliament, Directorate-General for Communication, Public Opinion Monitoring Unit, & TNS Opinion. (2015). European Parliament Eurobarometer: 2014 Parlemeter – Analytical overview, 30 January. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/eurobarometre/2015/2014parlemeter/eb82_4_parlemeter_anal ytical_synthesis_en.pdf. Accessed 23 March 2015.

VoteWatch Europe. (2013a). 20 years of codecision: A more (party) political Parliament, a less consensual Council. Special policy brief, December. http://www.votewatch.eu/blog/wp-content/ uploads/2013/12/votewatch-europe-special-policy-brief-20-years-of-co-decision_final.pdf.

Accessed 17 April 2015.

VoteWatch Europe. (2013b). Cohesion of (trans-national) political groups in the European Parliament. http://term7.votewatch.eu/en/political-group-cohesion.html. Accessed 17 April 2015.

VoteWatch Europe. (2015a). Voting statistics of members of the European Parliament. http://www.votewatch.eu/en/term8-voting-statistics.html. Accessed 17 April 2015.

VoteWatch Europe. (2015b). Who holds the power in the European Parliament? And why? February. http://www.votewatch.eu/blog/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/VoteWatch_template_web.pdf.

Accessed 17 April 2015.

Doru Petrisor Frantescu is the Director and co-founder of VoteWatch Europe (founded in 2009). A political scientist and communication expert, he is the main author of numerous reports on voting behaviour in the European Parliament and the EU Council of Ministers.

European View (2015) 14:111–119 DOI 10.1007/s12290-015-0355-5 ARTICLE

The case for election technology Antonio Mugica

Published online: 27 June 2015 Ó The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com

Abstract Information technology permeates almost every aspect of our lives.

Finally, after years of resistance, election technology is slowly helping the world’s democracies increase transparency, facilitate turnout and reduce the cost of running elections whilst increasing integrity and security. The current article analyses some of the longstanding arguments against the use of technology in the election process, and the responses made by experts, including the demonstrated benefits of well-designed election technology. An entire section on security is provided, as are references to some implementations around the world and to the Election Automation Maturity Model. The article also touches briefly on the tools of Internet and mobile voting.

Keywords Citizen engagement Elections Turnout Online Voting Cybersecurity E-democracy Introduction Information technology permeates almost every aspect of our lives. The reason is simple. When a system is well designed, it makes everything better: speed, reliability, security, efficiency, convenience and capabilities are all increased, most often by many orders of magnitude.

No one would dream of running a bank without the computers and software that are the central nervous system of any institution. Every time you fly in a plane you put your life in the ‘hands’ of a computer for most of the trip, albeit A. Mugica (&) Smartmatic, 105 Piccadilly, London W1J 7NJ, UK e-mail: amugica@smartmatic.com

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with some human supervision. If you happen to be in hospital in critical condition, your life-support system is likely to be controlled by software run by a computer.

We twenty-first century humans trust computers with the most difficult, the most critical and the most important tasks of our personal lives. It therefore seems strange that technology is largely absent from important areas of government, which is not taking advantage of the significant benefits that we are now used to everywhere else. One area where developments in technology have been especially slow is in the process of enabling democracy. Enormous opportunities in this area remain unrealised: citizen engagement, real-time participation, communication between government and constituents, and elections.

This article discusses government elections from start to finish. It focuses on polling station voting. All around the world, from the most developed countries to the most challenged ones, running a successful, clean election is the first step towards true democracy. The process of assuring the eligibility and enfranchisement of voters, the voting itself, counting the votes, producing election returns, canvassing and tallying is still mostly done manually in a majority of countries. In each one of these stages, the 2,000-year-old system is unreliable at best and corrupt at worst. This leaves room for all kinds of problems. In many cases these problems are swept under the rug, but they pervert the ideal of democracy, that in elections it is only the will of the people that prevails.

Many people perceive the election process to be straightforward and take for granted that it works. For this reason, very little attention is given to election administration. But as one of the founders of Smartmatic, the largest voting technology company in the world, I can say that the election process is much more complex than most people realise. I am deeply concerned about the election process and consider the convergence of technology and politics a matter of great importance. I invite the reader to join me as I discuss this topic that is so fundamental to our democratic systems.

Election technology: the case for and against After 11 years conducting thousands of elections on every continent, and working side by side with countless election professionals and volunteers, Smartmatic election specialists have discovered common themes in the challenges faced by those with the difficult jobs of organising, running and managing elections.

Current opposition to the use of election technology is predominantly defended along two lines. The first is that an election is so straightforward that it does not need technology. How difficult can it be to count papers and declare a winner? The second is the inverse of the first (and thus an obvious contradiction): an election is such a complex and difficult process that no computer system is secure enough or robust enough to handle it.

Both arguments are flawed. Running a mid-sized election (say, in a country with 20 million voters) is not simple for a host of reasons. It is mission critical for

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the country, it is dispersed over a large territory, it can have thousands of candidates in hundreds of jurisdictions, it requires that millions of election instruments be under strict security while they move around the country’s territory, and it requires the disciplined performance of hundreds of thousands of poll workers and subcontractors on a very tight schedule. Precisely because elections are so complex and difficult to conduct, well-designed computer systems are essential to make them reliable and to guarantee that the process is tamper-proof and free of errors.

How can the benefits of running an automated election be summarised?

There are nine areas in which automation results in significant improvements over traditional manual voting and counting systems.

Security The security of a paper-based, manual vote with a manual count is extremely low. Single copies of each vote make them easy to tamper with or destroy. Also, from voting to counting to final tally, and at every step in between, human error and tampering, not only with the votes, is easy and very common. The most vulnerable type of election is that which uses no technology at any stage. Welldesigned, special-purpose systems reduce the possibility of results tampering and eliminate fraud. Security is increased by 10–1,000 times, depending on the level of automation.

Accuracy Computerised voting, counting, aggregating and tallying eliminate the introduction of errors (the result of the human factor) that to a greater or lesser extent always affect results in a manual election.

Speed Official results (as opposed to preliminary ones based on quick counts or exit polls) can be obtained a few minutes after the polls close. A good example comes from the Republic of the Philippines, where before automation it took 6 weeks to produce official results, compared to less than 12 hours after the automated elections of 2010 (Alave et al. 2010).

Privacy The sophistication of IT-based randomisation algorithms guarantees that votes are never stored in sequence. This, combined with the accessibility features (see point on accessibility), creates the most robust privacy settings available, making sure each citizen’s vote is truly private and not susceptible to being influenced in any way.

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Auditability One of the biggest issues with manual voting is that it leaves a very weak audit trail, with very little or no redundancy of data. A well-designed automated election, by contrast, produces multiple copies of every data point both in electronic and paper-based forms, creating a very rich audit trail that cannot be circumvented. This gives parties, election officials, candidates, accredited observers and even citizens the capability to verify that the results truly reflect the will of the voters. This is one of the strongest arguments in favour of good automated elections.

Accessibility and turnout The friendliness of the user interfaces—to which we are now accustomed via our phones and computers—can make voting more accessible. In automated elections, voters from all age groups consistently report that it is easier to vote electronically than with pen and paper. In addition, it has been widely demonstrated that it facilitates voting for those who are illiterate, because they can simply touch the face of their candidate or the colour of their party with a finger (Fig. 1). Voters with disabilities are lobbying governments for computerbased systems, because these systems allow them to vote and to do so unassisted, thanks to the use of audio voting and special controls that allow people with reduced motor skills to vote easily. So the technology would increase turnout of people with disabilities, strengthening inclusivity and the democratic process.

Fig. 1 Automatic voting for illiterates.

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Integrity Modifying, misplacing or spoiling a paper ballot or election return is a common occurrence in manual elections. With a well-designed automated election system, the possibility of this happening is reduced to zero. Multiple digital and paper copies of each element are created, which ensures that data is never lost, modified or destroyed.

Cost reduction Even after taking into consideration the initial investment in technology, the cost per voter per election falls significantly. Smartmatic, the largest voting technology company in the world, has customers that have reduced the cost per voter per election by between 15 % and 50 % by automating their elections.

Sustainability India used to cut down 280,000 trees and utilise huge amounts of energy and water to produce the paper ballots needed for each election. This cost to the environment was eliminated when elections were automated (Quraishi 2014).

After observing how elections are run in more than 70 countries and interacting with election commissions around the world, researchers at Electoralmaturity.org, which is sponsored by Smartmatic, have developed the

Fig. 2 Election Automation Maturity Model.

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Election Automation Maturity Model. This model enables anyone to assess the benefits derived from varying levels of automation within an election.

Any country will advance from left to right and from the bottom up, as shown in Fig. 2, following the curve. However, an election commission sometimes takes many steps at the same time. Theoretically it is possible to complete all eight steps together, although no country has ever done this. Stage zero would be a purely manual election using no technology. Stage 1 is the minimum level of automation, where there is only automated monitoring of a manual election.

The model proceeds all the way to Stage 8, where there is a combination of e-voting (using voting machines), I-voting (using the Internet), and the use of biometrics to authenticate voter eligibility and activate the voting session (Figs. 2, 3).

Shedding further light on good election system security The following analysis is based on research conducted by Smartmatic since 2001, which provides a model of what constitutes good security design for election systems to work in any part of the world. Real and perceived threats to election security are highly culture-dependent. The security assumptions made in Brazil are entirely different from those made in Switzerland, which are again different from those in the US or in the Philippines. It is for this reason that our starting position is always to assume the worst-case scenario. We require the most constraining security requirements to be used, in order to ensure an approach secure enough to be used universally.

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First and foremost, our design approach makes one key assumption: one cannot trust anyone. This is simply stated, but as far as we know, no other election system designer has taken this as the core key design variable on which to build a solution. But what is meant by not trusting anyone? It goes without saying that this includes hackers and criminals who could attempt to attack the system. But it also includes the political parties, the government, the election commission, everyone who works with the election commission, voters and, of course, the company building the system and its employees.

So how do you make an unhackable election system? As obvious as it sounds, let’s first remember that, in order to hack a system, you need time and money (to purchase, e.g. a computer). The more robust and advanced the security and cryptography are, the more time and money you will need to successfully attack the system. Thus, the time and money needed are directly proportional to the level of security. However, if you want to hack a cryptographic system more quickly (less time), you need more computational power (more money). Therefore, the two are inversely proportional to each other.

This is all great news for digital voting technologists, as we will soon see.

To create a completely unhackable system, Smartmatic combined the following ideas: security fragmentation, security layering, encryption, device identity assurance, multi-key combinations and opposing-party auditing.

Explaining all of them is beyond the scope of this article.

The important thing is that, when all of these methods are combined, it becomes possible to calculate with mathematical precision the probability of the system being hacked in the available time, because an election usually happens in a few hours or at the most over a few days. (For example, for one of our average customers, the probability was 1 9 10-19. That is a point followed by 19 zeros and then 1). The probability is lower than that of a meteor hitting the earth and wiping us all out in the next few years— approximately 1 9 10-7 (Chemical Industry Education Centre, Risk-Ed n.d.)— hence it seems reasonable to use the term ‘unhackable’, to the chagrin of the purists and to my pleasure.

Although this level of security is astronomically high, it is not enough simply to provide mathematically perfect security. Why not? Because although it is true, people need to know it is true, and the mathematical explanation is just too technical for the general population to understand. It is for that reason that we created the citizens’ audit: a simple, yet powerful method by which any concerned citizen can verify that the results of an election are indeed accurate and have not been tampered with.

The combination of perfect security with the awareness of that security created by the citizens audit is the reason why, after 2.5 billion votes cast and counted with our systems, and after multiple audits, including all citizens’ audits, we have never experienced a successful attempt to hack or tamper with our technology. Moreover, despite thousands of ‘sore-loser’ candidates in many countries and well-funded movements trying to attack the election system for their own gain, not once has any election result ever been changed in any one of

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the elections conducted with Smartmatic systems, through which more than 38,000 public officers have been elected during the past 10 years, from hundreds of thousands of candidates.

Conclusion The main message here is threefold: 1.

2.

3.

First, manual elections are extremely vulnerable, prone to errors and very expensive.

Second, the arguments that have long been made in favour of keeping elections manual are scientifically flawed. They can be placed alongside other thoroughly discredited theories such as those promoted by antivaccination groups. Unsupported by facts, they can be immensely damaging.

Third, progress is already being made. Currently more than 70 countries are between Stages 1 and 8 of the Election Automation Maturity Curve, up from less than 30 a mere 5 years ago. The trend is unstoppable, but we will benefit sooner if we fully embrace technology for elections now, focusing only on what is important: that the quality of the solutions is sound and complies with the highest standards.

In addition to all of the above, it is important to mention that Internet (and mobile) voting is rapidly being piloted as a substitute for postal voting and to provide the best absentee, overseas and military voting systems. This will become very common in the next few years. Internet voting pioneer Estonia (Estonian National Electoral Committee n.d.; Eesti Reformierakont 2015) has already gone further, having become the first country in the world to offer multichannel voting. Any citizen can decide to vote online or at the polling station.

Few doubt that the future is digital, not only for elections but also for government–citizen interaction, participation, engagement and campaigning.

Thus, the sooner we embrace voting technology, the more value we will extract from it. Pioneering countries are setting a new level of transparency, facilitating engagement and giving their citizens the advanced democratic tools that they demand and deserve.

Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source are credited.

References Alave, K. L., Yamsuan, C. C., & Quismundo, T. (2010). Fast count stuns nation. Faster than you can say ‘Garci’. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12, December. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/ nation/view/20100512-269508/Fast-count-stuns-nation. Accessed 27 March 2015.

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Chemical Industry Education Centre, Risk-Ed. (n.d). Asteroid impact. The probability of an asteroid impact. http://www.risk-ed.org/pages/risk/asteroid_prob.htm. Accessed 27 March 2015.

Eesti Reformierakont. (2015). Prime Minister of Estonia explains how fast, simple and safe is e-voting.

YouTube. 19 February. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yZ4s95lFkk4&feature=youtu.be.

Accessed 27 March 2015.

Electoral Maturity Model. (2015). Related work. http://electoralmaturity.org/blog/related-work/.

Accessed 27 March 2015.

Estonian National Electoral Committee. (n.d). Internet voting in Estonia. http://www.vvk.ee/votingmethods-in-estonia/. Accessed 27 March 2015.

Quraishi, S. Y. (2014). An undocumented wonder: The making of the great Indian election. New Delhi: Rupa Publications.

Smartmatic. (2014). Demo on accessibility. London, UK. Antonio Mugica is the founder and CEO of Smartmatic, the largest voting technology provider in the world, delivering secure and transparent elections across five continents. He also sits on the boards of SGO and the publicly listed company Anoto Ltd.

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European View (2015) 14:121–129 DOI 10.1007/s12290-015-0346-6 ARTICLE

Campaign-triggered mass collaboration in the EU’s online consultations: the ISDS-in-TTIP case Matthias Bauer

Published online: 9 June 2015 Ó The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com

Abstract For EU institutions, public consultations represent a key tool for transparent and accountable policymaking. By means of e-participation tools, both the European Parliament and the European Commission aim to encourage multiple stakeholders to provide input on legislative processes in ways that go beyond traditional consultations, which are sometimes aimed exclusively at a small group of stakeholders. Online questionnaires are frequently used to give individual citizens, civil society organisations and other interest groups the opportunity to express their opinions. Although it is widely accepted that e-participation can improve the democratic legitimacy of EU policymaking, online consultations entail a number of democratic challenges. With the Commission’s recent online public consultation on Investor–State Dispute Settlement in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, the flaws of online participation have once again become a focus of political debates. As a result of new societal trends that favour ‘low-effort, feel-good’ political participation via the Internet, e-participation will remain a challenge for the EU as well as for political parties. This challenge will not be appropriately addressed by having a high degree of transparency about the consultative procedures alone. What is required is more effective multi-level communication of the proceedings of the consultation and of its results.

Keywords E-participation Democratic legitimacy Democratic representation Online consultation Civil society Investor–State Dispute Settlement Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

M. Bauer (&) European Centre for International Political Economy, Rue Belliard 4-6, 1040 Brussels, Belgium e-mail: matthias.bauer@ecipe.org

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Introduction Engagement, involvement and empowerment—these are the political buzzwords often linked to modern forms of participation via the Internet. For many citizens the Internet has emerged as an indispensable medium that provides powerful digital tools for learning, networking and communication.

Since the Internet is open and transparent, it easily facilitates collaborative action in innumerable respects. As a result, Internet users generally benefit from shared information that is local, bottom-up and easily accessible worldwide. Because of these characteristics, many civil rights campaigners, political commentators and politicians have been calling for a stronger role for the Internet in formal politics and the formation of political opinion. According to their reasoning, e-participation—that is, a greater use of information and communication technologies (ICT) in governance and law-making—encourages more people to engage in political processes, helps to overcome prevailing democratic deficits and increases trust in politicians and governments.

Most EU member states already employ various e-participation tools, which help to facilitate public policymaking at local, regional and federal levels.

E-voting tools, e-petitions, online stakeholder surveys and online public consultations are frequently applied to involve citizens in political decisionmaking. At the EU level, the European Commission and the European Parliament have incorporated similar tools to encourage citizen ownership and inclusion.

For EU institutions, online public consultations represent a key tool for transparent and accountable policymaking. By means of online questionnaires, both the European Parliament and the Commission aim to encourage multiple stakeholders to provide input on legislative processes in ways that go beyond traditional consultations, which are sometimes aimed exclusively at stakeholders.

The EU explicitly aims to give ordinary citizens, civil society organisations and other organised interests the opportunity to express their opinions.

However, the Commission’s (2014a) online public consultation on Investor– State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) has very clearly shown that this deliberative approach towards policymaking is prone to several problems related to democratic representation, accountability and issue-specific technical expertise.

A few civil society organisations’ forceful grass-roots Internet campaigns against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and ISDS resulted in a distinctive regional asymmetry in the contributions made and a disproportionately high number of subjective opinions rather than fact-based reasoning. The vast majority of replies were made via collective submission. These replies do not display the characteristics needed for participation that is based on careful consideration of the issues involved. The consultation is characterised by the over-representation of a few campaign groups that forcefully promoted their views to their constituencies. This type of participation is not particularly deliberative since a small core group deliberates exclusively while the target constituency merely follows along.

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Legitimacy, dialogue and debate: e-participation in the EU In the late 1990s, the Commission and the European Council came up with several suggestions on how to apply advanced ICT in order to more actively engage citizens in legislative processes. In 2001 the Commission emphasised the need for EU institutions to reach out to citizens. It gradually moved towards both more transparent methods of communication and citizens’ systematic involvement in decision-making processes (European Commission 2001). Until the late 1990s the understanding of openness and accountability had in fact been restricted to public access to Community documents.

Initial concepts focusing on e-participation emerged with the European Commission’s White Paper Reforming the Commission (2000). In this paper the Commission recognises the need to consult in a timely fashion with all citizens at the early stages of the legislative process. The document paves the way for an ‘eCommission’ that would exploit the benefits of new digital communication channels. This publication was followed by the implementation of the Europa Portal and Europe Direct Service, as the EU gradually moved towards interactive policy consultations using the Internet. In 2006, e-participation emerged as a priority for the EU (Tambouris et al. 2013). Against the backdrop of the failed ratification of the European Constitution Treaty in 2005, the EU started to promote e-participation channels in order to become a ‘listening Commission’ (European Commission 2005).

The 2009 Lisbon Treaty explicitly envisages an EU with a stronger role for national parliaments and a stronger voice for citizens. Article 11 of the Lisbon Treaty requires EU institutions to ‘give citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action.’ Accordingly, EU institutions are required to conduct ‘open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society’ and ‘carry out broad consultations with parties concerned in order to ensure that the Union’s actions are coherent and transparent’.

The most important Internet access point for the Commission’s e-participation tools is Your Voice in Europe, which provides stakeholders with a single point of access for online consultations, discussions and forums. All directorategenerals are in charge of their specific online consultations, but they must adhere to a predefined set of common guidelines on how to facilitate a consultation process (European Commission 2014d). These standards give the EU’s consultation framework an institutional recognition and integrate it into a network of European governance tools (Smith and Dalakiouridou 2009).

According to these standards, the Commission is required to precisely outline the objectives of a specific consultation, the procedure of the consultation and the targeted audience.

Depending on the policy field, the Commission can invite either the general public, all stakeholder groups or specific target groups to participate in the consultation proceedings. For the ISDS online consultation, the Commission decided to ask all stakeholder groups including individual citizens and organised interest groups to participate. Prior to the consultation, however, a few civil

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society organisations firmly voiced concerns, particularly in the (social) online media, about TTIP and ISDS.

Anti-TTIP Internet campaigning in Europe In June 2013, EU member states unanimously asked the Commission to negotiate TTIP, a comprehensive trade and investment treaty with the US. Since the mid-1990s, several political initiatives have endeavoured to strengthen transatlantic relations (Schmucker and Braml 2007). Accordingly, TTIP was initially welcomed by a large majority of European national parliaments and the media alike. But soon after the official launch of the negotiations, a few civil society organisations started to raise multifaceted concerns over TTIP. Most concerns emerged from the TTIP negotiators’ decision to leave the European citizens uninformed about the negotiation agenda and interim outcomes.

Many observers were surprised that intense criticism of TTIP initially emerged in Germany. Germany’s economy is by far one of the most trade-intensive in the world and thus heavily dependent on open markets and on the fair and equitable treatment of exporters and foreign investors. However, in Germany (and Austria) a few environmentalist and anti-globalisation groups started to wage a resolute battle against TTIP through the Internet, primarily on social media. These groups frequently voiced far-fetched speculations about the scope and the adverse consequences of the agreement.

Campact, a professional campaign group that was initially funded (in 2004) by advocates of the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions and Citizen’s Action (Attac), started and coordinated a strong protest movement against TTIP in Germany. Campact had previously engaged in multi-year campaigns against genetically modified organisms (GMOs), fracking and national provisions concerning the retention of personal data. Thus, TTIP provided an excellent complement to the organisation’s campaign portfolio. In autumn 2013, Campact forged an alliance that was primarily supported by agricultural organisations, environmental activists and civil rights campaign groups (FAZ 2015; TTIP Unfairhandelbar 2015).

The protest against TTIP was primarily focused on the Internet. The campaign groups prepared TTIP-related information notes that were spread via paid Google advertisements, Facebook and Twitter. In addition, an online petition demanding a halt to the TTIP negotiations was forcefully promoted via Google advertisements and member organisations’ websites and mailing lists. In May 2014, 715,000 signatures had been handed over to Martin Schulz, the German Social Democrat’s top candidate for the 2014 elections to the European Parliament.

The protest groups engaged heavily in well-coordinated anti-TTIP campaigning via social media, which resulted in a distinct asymmetry in the debate. In the period July to December 2014, anti-TTIP groups’ announcements in Germany amounted to 83 % of total online media reporting on average, rising to 93 % at peak times. Peak-time media reporting took place around the TTIP negotiation

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rounds. Of all TTIP-related postings in the German online media, 85 % were originally authored and spread by anti-TTIP groups (Bauer 2015a).

Anti-TTIP campaigning had a strong impact on German citizens’ views of TTIP. A Google Trends analysis conducted for the period July 2013 to February 2015 suggests that German (as well as Austrian) citizens’ search interest in TTIP was 25 times higher than that of US citizens, and 14 times higher than that of French citizens (Bauer 2015b). And according to a November 2014 Eurobarometer survey, it was in Germany that support for TTIP was the lowest and aversion to TTIP the highest (Eurobarometer 2014).

Over time, the negative feeling towards TTIP spilled over to other European countries. In December 2013, several European civil society organisations followed an invitation from the Seattle to Brussels Network to form a Europewide coalition against TTIP (Attac 2015). This summit was followed by the German protest alliance’s decision to begin coordinating the European protest movement Stop TTIP. Again, anti-TTIP communication was conducted primarily through the Internet.

An analysis of European online media shows that anti-TTIP groups strongly dominated the online media debate in Europe: 60 % of the online media coverage from June to November 2014 can be attributed to anti-TTIP groups. As far as the issues primarily addressed in the media are concerned, ISDS took by far the largest share in total online media coverage (roughly 40 %), followed by GMOs (13 %), transparency (10 %) and culture (10 %). Because of German protest groups’ intense campaign activities, online media coverage of ISDS in Germany was roughly four times higher than in the US and France, and almost six times higher than in the UK (Bauer 2014). After the Commission refused to grant the Stop TTIP movement the status of a European Citizens’ Initiative (European Commission 2014c), the movement launched an EU-wide online petition to stop TTIP negotiations. By March 2015, the petition had received roughly 1.6 million signatures (Stop TTIP 2015).

The European Commission’s online public consultation on ISDS From its outset, TTIP was designed to contain investor–state dispute clauses aiming to protect foreign investors from discrimination and unjustified intervention by national public authorities and legislators. With TTIP, the Commission (2014b) explicitly aimed to enhance existing regulations on ISDS, for example to reduce the risk of frivolous cases, to balance investment protection with sovereign countries’ right to regulate and to improve global standards on investment protection (European Commission 2014b).

Although the objectives of the Commission had been made public, ISDS became the top concern addressed by anti-TTIP civil society groups. It was and still is frequently stated by campaign groups, as well as the media, that ISDS in TTIP constitutes an attack on democracy and the rule of law. It is noteworthy that these views have developed so much momentum, despite ISDS having

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been a standard ingredient of international economic diplomacy for 50 years and been included in more than 3,000 bilateral investment treaties worldwide.

Anti-TTIP and anti-ISDS protests caused EU member states and the Commission to create a transparency initiative concerning ISDS. On 21 January 2014, the European Commission announced it would conduct a consultation on ISDS. Then Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht stated, ‘I know some people in Europe have genuine concerns about this part of the EU–US deal. Now I want them to have their say.’ (European Commission 2014a) The Commission explicitly aimed to achieve a proper balance between protecting investors and safeguarding the member states’ right and ability to regulate in the public interest.

The consultation was launched on 27 March 2014 and closed on 13 July 2014.

On 3 July 2014 the consultation website was temporarily unavailable because a large number of replies were loaded simultaneously into the database.

Therefore, the Commission (2015a) decided to extend the consultation by one week. In total, 149,399 replies were received. To many observers the high number of replies came as a surprise. By comparison, a 2014 consultation on biodiversity and ecosystem services received 723 answers; a 2014 consultation on water reuse in the EU garnered 506; a 2014 consultation on the quality of drinking water, 5,908; and a 2014 consultation on geographical indication protection and non-agricultural products, 137 (European Commission 2015c).

During the ISDS consultation, 97 % of all replies were submitted by a small number of campaign groups. The responses were often identical or at least very similar to one another. Prior to the consultation, a few anti-TTIP civil society organisations had set up easy-to-use online tools to facilitate participation in the consultation proceedings. According to Friends of the Earth Europe (2015), 131,352 responses were submitted through the online platforms of Friends of the Earth Europe, the Austrian Federal Chamber of Labour, the Munich Environmental Institute, 38 Degrees and SumOfUs.org.

Among the national groups, there were, notably, replies from well-connected British, German, Austrian, Belgian and French consumer and environmental organisations. As a direct consequence, a disproportionate number of replies were received from the UK, followed by Austria, Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain. Together, these seven countries accounted for 97 % of all replies. The Commission received only 3,589 individual citizens’ submissions, which amounts to 2.4 % of all the replies received. The huge number of platform-triggered replies caused Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht to call it ‘an outright attack’ (Ja¨rvinen 2015).

Pathways for policymakers and political parties The Commission’s online consultation on ISDS reveals four core features that are critical for EU policymakers. First, the outcome of the consultation is characterised by a distinct regional asymmetry in the number of replies received from EU member states. Second, the replies show a distinct asymmetry between informed responses and subjective opinion. Third, a very small number of

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organised and well-coordinated interest groups provided easy-to-access platforms encouraging low-effort mass collaboration. Fourth, the post-consultation media response has frequently been non-reflective and largely negative.

The outcome of the ISDS consultation does not reflect a representative ‘European will’ on the scale of the EU, although its general purpose was to aggregate national opinions in a way consistent with an EU-wide representative democracy. Instead, the nominal consultation outcome is heavily biased towards segmented publics. A few national campaign networks, which are concerned with specific objectives and interests rather than representative of national opinion, dominated the public debate over ISDS. The logic of collective action suggests that small groups can easily act on shared objectives, while large groups do not engage collectively unless their members are motivated by individual gains (Olson 1971). Accordingly, the overrepresentation of a few activist networks must be put into perspective: their success is the consequence of the weak participation of non-affiliates. The weak representation of other stakeholders, however, is an implicit consequence of the special interests that are ‘represented by the transnational militant networks [that] occupy the terrain by a massive capacity of mobilization’ (Badouard 2010, 106).

Media reporting of the results of the ISDS consultation has often been unreflective and negligent. Although the Commission report (2015a) offers precise statistics and detailed information about individual contributions, the media paid little or no attention to democratic representativeness and the characteristics of the contributions made. Instead of addressing the highly obvious procedural problems, the media frequently referred to strong public opposition to ISDS. There might be a general tendency in the media towards patchy reporting, but in this case negative media reporting can be attributed to the Commission’s communication strategy. In its initial press release, Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom’s key message was that the ‘consultation clearly shows that there is a huge scepticism against the ISDS instrument’ (European Commission 2015b). Although the consultation results were immediately available to the public, the fundamental democratic flaws of the overall ISDS consultation process lacked public visibility.

Conclusion It is essential that policymakers and political parties officially recognise and clearly communicate that the democratic benefits of consultation tools are highly dependent on the public that uses them. In order to effectively communicate the benefits and flaws of future consultation procedures, improved communication between EU and national institutions is needed. To this end, the Commission should identify and proactively communicate the specific problems of a certain consultation procedure. It should then inform EU and national public servants according to established procedures prior to the official publication of the consultation results. The Commission should also liaise

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with member states’ parliaments, political parties and political foundations. This would help to broaden awareness of critical aspects among local opinion makers. Public authorities and political parties should also be encouraged to voice this information in modern online media. Such a process would require both new procedures and resources. But it would contribute to a more balanced and informed debate on complex policy issues, and it would help to shape public opinion in a more prudent and representative way.

Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source are credited.

References Attac. (2015). Aktionsbu¨ndnisse und weitere Links. http://www.attac.de/kampagnen/freihandelsfallettip/hintergrund/aktionsbuendnisse/. Accessed 24 March 2015.

Badouard, P. (2010). Pathways and obstacles to eparticipation at the European level: A comparative analysis of the European Citizens’ Consultation 2009 and the online consultations of the European Commission. JeDEM, 2(2), 99–110.

Bauer. (2014). TTIP storytellers and storytelling: Presentation of preliminary findings on online media coverage of TTIP. Presented at an event hosted by the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) in Brussels, 19 November 2014. http://www.ecipe.org/app/uploads/2014/12/ Presentation__Politics_of_TTIP_.pdf. Accessed 24 March 2015.

Bauer, M. (2015a). How anti-TTIP groups dominate online media in Germany. Atlantic-Community.org, 24 February. http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/how-anti-ttip-groups-dominate-onlinemedia-in-germany?redirect=http://www.atlantic-community.org/home?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_ Gwvqd2xBvtVQ&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=af-column3-2&p_p_col_pos=1&p_p_col_count=2. Accessed 22 March 2015.

Bauer, M. (2015b). TTIP: A¨ngste ‘Made in Germany’?, Analyse TTIP-relevanter Akteure und Themen in der o¨ffentlichen Diskussion und den Online-Medien. Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

Eurobarometer. (2014). Public opinion in the European Union. Standard Eurobarometer 82, Autumn. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb82/eb82_first_en.pdf. Accessed 22 March 2015.

European Commission. (2000). Reforming the Commission. White Paper, Part 2, Action Plan, COM (2000) 200 final, 1 March. http://aei.pitt.edu/1190/1/reform_commisson_pt_2_COM_2000_200. pdf. Accessed 13 April 2015.

European Commission. (2001). European Governance. White Paper, COM (2001) 428 final, 25 July.

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European Commission. (2014b). Consultation notice and consultation document of the online public consultation on investment protection and investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership agreement (TTIP). Launched 27 March. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/march/tradoc_152279.pdf. Accessed 13 April 2015.

European Commission. (2014c). Refused request for registration. http://ec.europa.eu/citizensinitiative/public/initiatives/non-registered/details/2041?lg=en. Accessed 8 May 2015.

European Commission. (2014d). Stakeholder consultation guidelines 2014, public consultation document. http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/docs/scgl_pc_questionnaire_en.pdf.

Accessed 13 April 2015.

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European Commission. (2015b). Report presented today: Consultation on investment protection in EU–US trade talks. Press release, 13 January.

European Commission. (2015c). Your voice in Europe. The European Commission’s Internet access point for online participation. www.ec.europa.eu/yourvoice.

FAZ. (2015). Freihandesabkommen TTIP: Da la¨uft etwas aus dem Ruder. 17 January. http://www. faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/ttip-und-freihandel/freihandelsabkommen-eu-usa-chronik-des-anti-ttipprotests-13442387.html. Accessed 22 March 2015.

Friends of the Earth Europe. (2015). Consultation or cover-up? The European Commission’s consultation on investment protection in the transatlantic trade deal. Media briefing, 12 January. https://www.foeeurope.org/sites/default/files/isds-public-consultation-briefing.pdf. Accessed 13 April 2015.

Ja¨rvinen, H. (2015). EU commissioner on ISDS consultation: ‘An outright attack’. EDRi, 30 July. https://edri.org/eu-commissioner-isds-consultation-outright-attack/. Accessed 24 March 2015.

Olson, M. (1971). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Schmucker, C., & Braml, J. (2007). Von der TAFTA zum freien Markt: Neue Handelsinitiativen zwischen EU und USA. Internationale Politik, 3 March, 100–3.

Smith, S., & Dalakiouridou, E. (2009). Contextualising public (e)participation in the governance of the European Union. European Journal of ePractice, 7, 1–11.

Stop TTIP. (2015). Online petition. https://stop-ttip.org/?noredirect=en_GB. Accessed 30 March 2015.

Tambouris, E., Macintosh, A., Dalakiouridou, E., Smith, S., Panopoulou, E., Tarabanis, K., & Millard, J. (2013). eParticipation in Europe: Current state and practical recommendations. In J. R. Gil-Garcia (ed.), E-government success around the world: Cases, empirical studies, and practical recommendations. Hershey, PA: IGI Global.

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Matthias Bauer is Senior Economist at ECIPE. His areas of research include international trade as well as European fiscal and capital market policy.

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European View Chairman

Advisory Board

Mikuláš Dzurinda

Antonio López-Istúriz Christian Kremer Luc Vandeputte Galina Fomenchenko Roland Freudenstein José Luis Fontalba

President of the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies

Editorial Board Carl Bildt former Prime Minister, Sweden

Elmar Brok Member of the European Parliament, Germany

John Bruton former Prime Minister, Ireland

Mário David

Editor-in-Chief Tomi Huhtanen Assistant Editors-in-Chief Ingrid Habets

Vice-President of the European People’s Party, Portugal

Assistant Editors

Ingo Friedrich

Marvin DuBois Communicative English Team Pavlina Pavlova Simon Forster Eoin O’Driscoll

Chairman of the Forum for European Studies, Germany

Vicente Martínez-Pujalte López Member of Parliament, Spain

Chris Patten former Member of the European Commission, United Kingdom

Jan Petersen former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway

Hans-Gert Pöttering Chairman of Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Germany

Alexander Stubb former Prime Minister, Finland

József Szájer Vice-Chairman of the EPP Group in the European Parliament, Hungary

Andrej Umek former Minister for Science and Technology, Slovenia

Yannis Valinakis former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Greece

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